fix(admin): keep header-style tiles from overflowing their cards (stable) (#1423)

Apply the header-style overflow fix to stable: size the grids from their container width and wrap long translated labels within each card.

.env.example

@@ -56,8 +56,9 @@ DB_NAME=picpeak_prod
 # Admin Account (initial setup) — OPTIONAL
 # Leave these unset (default) to create your admin IN THE BROWSER on first run:
 # open /admin and PicPeak shows a setup screen. The one-time setup token is
-# printed to the backend logs (`docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`)
-# and saved to data/SETUP_TOKEN.
+# written to data/SETUP_TOKEN with mode 0600 — read it with
+# `docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN`. It is NOT logged
+# unless that write fails, so it never sits in `docker logs`.
 # Set ADMIN_PASSWORD to auto-create the admin on first boot instead (legacy;
 # credentials written to data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt).
 #ADMIN_USERNAME=admin

.github/workflows/docker-build.yml

@@ -203,6 +203,14 @@ jobs:
         format: 'sarif'
         output: 'trivy-backend-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }}.sarif'
         severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
+        # Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not actionable: the
+        # Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a CACHEBUST,
+        # so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting them
+        # buries the findings someone can actually do something about.
+        # Dropping them is also the precondition for ever setting
+        # exit-code: 1, which build-backend's comment flags as a
+        # deliberate follow-up.
+        ignore-unfixed: true
         timeout: '10m'
 
     - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
@@ -425,6 +433,14 @@ jobs:
         format: 'sarif'
         output: 'trivy-frontend-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }}.sarif'
         severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
+        # Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not actionable: the
+        # Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a CACHEBUST,
+        # so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting them
+        # buries the findings someone can actually do something about.
+        # Dropping them is also the precondition for ever setting
+        # exit-code: 1, which build-backend's comment flags as a
+        # deliberate follow-up.
+        ignore-unfixed: true
         timeout: '10m'
 
     - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab

.github/workflows/release-please.yml

@@ -25,33 +25,14 @@ jobs:
           token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
           config-file: release-please-config.json
           manifest-file: .release-please-manifest.json
+          target-branch: stable
 
-      # Auto-approve + auto-merge the open stable release PR. See the beta
-      # workflow for the full rationale. Skipped on the release-cutting run and
-      # whenever no PAT is configured.
-      - name: Auto-approve and enable auto-merge on the release PR
-        if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created != 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
-          # No checkout in this job — set the repo explicitly so gh works
-          # without a git remote (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
-          GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
-        run: |
-          if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
-            echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping auto-merge (manual review still required)."
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          pr=$(gh pr list --head release-please--branches--stable --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number // empty')
-          if [ -n "$pr" ]; then
-            # Approve as github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN, ≠ the PAT author) so it
-            # is a valid review; enable auto-merge as the PAT so the merge commit is
-            # attributed to a real identity and triggers the tag-cutting run (#719).
-            gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — release-please version bump + changelog (#719)." || true
-            GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto || true
-          else
-            echo "No open release PR to auto-merge."
-          fi
+      # NOTE: stable release PRs are intentionally NOT auto-merged here
+      # anymore. Fixes accumulate in the rolling release PR and are cut as
+      # ONE patch version per day by release-stable-daily.yml (18:00 UTC,
+      # or on demand via workflow_dispatch / a manual merge of the release
+      # PR). Beta keeps instant releases — see release-please-beta.yml —
+      # because same-day reporter verification depends on it.
 
       - name: Output Release Info
         if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}

.github/workflows/release-stable-daily.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+name: Cut Stable Release (daily batch)
+
+# Stable fixes accumulate in release-please's rolling release PR instead of
+# each cutting its own patch version (the old per-merge auto-merge produced
+# e.g. 3.45.8 AND 3.45.9 on the same day). This workflow merges the open
+# stable release PR once a day, so a day of N bugfixes ships as ONE version
+# with all N changelog entries — and one Docker build instead of N.
+#
+# - schedule only fires from the default branch (main); the stable copy of
+#   this file is inert and exists to keep the branches in sync.
+# - Need a release NOW? Run this via workflow_dispatch, or merge the
+#   release PR by hand — the schedule is a default, not a gate.
+# - Approval/merge mechanics mirror the old inline step (#719): approve as
+#   github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN, a valid distinct reviewer), enable
+#   auto-merge as the PAT so the merge attributes to a real identity and
+#   triggers the tag-cutting run. --auto waits for green checks.
+
+on:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '0 18 * * *'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: write
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  merge-stable-release-pr:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Approve and enable auto-merge on the open stable release PR
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
+          # No checkout — set the repo explicitly so gh works without a
+          # git remote (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
+          GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
+            echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping (manual review required)."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          # Strict selection (review P1): this job runs daily even without a
+          # stable push, and `gh pr list --head` matches the branch NAME only
+          # — a fork PR can spoof `release-please--branches--stable`. Pin the
+          # base to stable AND require a same-repo head (isCrossRepository
+          # == false); a fork PR is cross-repository, so it can never be
+          # picked and auto-merged with the privileged PAT.
+          pr=$(gh pr list \
+            --base stable \
+            --head release-please--branches--stable \
+            --state open \
+            --json number,isCrossRepository \
+            --jq '[.[] | select(.isCrossRepository == false)] | .[0].number // empty')
+          if [ -z "$pr" ]; then
+            echo "No open same-repo stable release PR — nothing to cut today."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          # Approve is tolerant — a pre-existing approval already satisfies
+          # branch protection and re-approving can return non-zero.
+          gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — daily stable release batch (release-please version bump + changelog)." || echo "::warning::approve returned non-zero (PR may already be approved)"
+          # But the auto-merge enable is the load-bearing step: this scheduled
+          # job is the ONLY automatic stable cut, so DON'T swallow its failure
+          # (review P2) — an expired/under-scoped PAT would otherwise stop
+          # releases while the workflow stays green.
+          GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto
+          # `gh pr merge --auto` merges IMMEDIATELY when the required checks
+          # are already green — the normal case at 18:00, since the fixes
+          # merged hours earlier and CI passed. So success is EITHER the PR is
+          # already merged OR an auto-merge request is now pending; only a PR
+          # that is still open with no auto-merge request is a real failure
+          # (expired/under-scoped PAT) worth failing the job on (review round 2).
+          # One snapshot of both fields (review round 3): querying state and
+          # autoMergeRequest separately races — auto-merge can complete
+          # between the two calls, so the first sees OPEN and the second sees
+          # the request already cleared on the now-merged PR → false failure.
+          read -r state automerge < <(gh pr view "$pr" --json state,autoMergeRequest \
+            --jq '[.state, (.autoMergeRequest != null)] | @tsv')
+          if [ "$state" = "MERGED" ]; then
+            echo "Stable release PR #$pr merged immediately (checks were already green)."
+          elif [ "$automerge" = "true" ]; then
+            echo "Auto-merge enabled on stable release PR #$pr — merges when checks are green."
+          else
+            echo "::error::stable release PR #$pr is still open with no auto-merge — check RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN scope/expiry."
+            exit 1
+          fi

.github/workflows/tests.yml

@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ name: Tests
 
 on:
   push:
-    branches: [main, beta]
+    branches: [main, beta, stable]
   pull_request:
-    branches: [main, beta]
+    branches: [main, beta, stable]
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 permissions:
@@ -30,6 +30,29 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
 
+    # The .picpeak restore suites gate their real-Postgres cases behind
+    # PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL and `describe.skip` themselves out when it is
+    # unset — so until now they never ran here. That hid the half that
+    # matters: sequence resync, operator/role preservation across a
+    # cross-instance restore, and (with #1041) whether a SQLite-shaped
+    # row actually lands in Postgres with the right STORED VALUES rather
+    # than merely not throwing. Everything else in the suite still runs
+    # on SQLite; this service only un-gates those cases.
+    services:
+      postgres:
+        image: postgres:15-alpine
+        env:
+          POSTGRES_USER: picpeak
+          POSTGRES_PASSWORD: testpass
+          POSTGRES_DB: picpeak_test
+        options: >-
+          --health-cmd "pg_isready -U picpeak -d picpeak_test"
+          --health-interval 2s
+          --health-timeout 2s
+          --health-retries 30
+        ports:
+          - 5432:5432
+
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -52,6 +75,9 @@ jobs:
           # The S3 path itself is covered separately by the integration
           # suite when MinIO is provisioned.
           SKIP_S3_TESTS: 'true'
+          # Un-gates the real-Postgres cases in the .picpeak restore suites
+          # (see the `services:` note above). Absent it they silently skip.
+          PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL: 'postgres://picpeak:testpass@127.0.0.1:5432/picpeak_test'
         run: |
           # Excluded suites — fail on upstream/beta too, tracked
           # separately as test-infra debt:

.gitignore

@@ -130,5 +130,27 @@ docker-compose.dev.yml
 # New layout development files
 new-layouts/
 
-# Generated CRM/accounting documents (runtime) — never commit
-backend/storage/business-docs/
+# Backend runtime storage (generated media, previews, thumbnails,
+# CRM/accounting documents) — never commit. Matches main: a dev instance
+# writes event photos into backend/storage/, and the narrower
+# business-docs-only rule let `git add -A` sweep them into a commit.
+backend/storage/
+
+# Python bytecode. The ML sidecar lives on main only, so this branch never
+# needed the rule — which is how a `git add -A` from a shared working tree
+# committed 16 .pyc files here in #1247.
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+
+# Issue / PR screenshots belong on a `screenshots/*` branch, never on main or
+# stable — that is what those branches exist for. Two landed at the repo root
+# on main in #1241 and shipped as part of the source tree; nothing stopped it.
+#
+# Anchored with a leading slash so docs/ keeps its own images.
+/issue-*.png
+/issue-*.jpg
+/screenshot-*.png
+/screenshot-*.jpg
+/*-screenshot.png
+/*-screenshot.jpg
+

.release-please-manifest-beta.json

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "3.82.5-beta.0"
+  ".": "3.83.0-beta.0"
 }

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1,3 +1 @@
-{
-  ".": "2.6.1"
-}
+{".":"3.46.12"}

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -163,13 +163,14 @@ PicPeak runs on two long-lived branches:
 | Branch | Role | What targets it |
 |---|---|---|
 | **`main`** | Active development. The next release is being assembled here. | Feature PRs. Most bugfix PRs. |
-| **`stable`** | Curated release channel. Production-recommended. | Urgent bugfix backports only — small, surgical PRs that land cleanly without dragging in unrelated changes. |
+| **`stable`** | Curated release channel. Production-recommended. | Security fixes and regular bugfix backports, kept small and free of unrelated features. |
 
 ### Which branch should my PR target?
 
 - **New feature** → target `main`.
 - **Bugfix that ONLY affects active dev** → target `main`.
-- **Bugfix that current stable users need** → open a small PR against `main`, AND a separate small PR against `stable` with the same change. Keep both surgical so each lands cleanly.
+- **Bugfix that current stable users need** → target `main`; regular bug fixes are generally backported automatically to `stable`. Maintainers handle conflicts or create a separate focused backport PR when needed.
+- **Security vulnerability** → report privately using [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). Security fixes are always released on both `stable` and `main`; coordinate any fix with the maintainers before opening a public PR.
 
 **Hard rule on PR scope**: bugfix PRs against `stable` must be small enough to backport without conflict. Omnibus PRs (e.g. five unrelated sub-features) are fine for `main`, but never for `stable` — they make the next `main → stable` merge painful and break the "stable is always shippable" invariant.
 
@@ -187,6 +188,6 @@ See [RELEASING.md](RELEASING.md) for the full operational doc (promotion criteri
 
 - Create an [issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) for bugs or features
 - Join [discussions](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions) for questions
-- Security issues: Open a [security issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub
+- Security vulnerabilities: Follow the [security policy](SECURITY.md) and use [private vulnerability reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
 
-Thank you for contributing! 🎉
+Thank you for contributing! 🎉

README.md

@@ -111,10 +111,15 @@ docker compose up -d
 On first start with no `ADMIN_PASSWORD` set, PicPeak has **no admin account yet** and greets you with an in-browser setup screen — no credentials in `.env`:
 
 1. Open **http://localhost:3000/admin** — you'll be redirected to `/setup`.
-2. Grab the **one-time setup token** from the backend logs (it's also saved to `data/SETUP_TOKEN`):
+2. Read the **one-time setup token** from the 0600 file the backend writes it to
+   (it is deliberately *not* printed to the logs — that would leave a live
+   bootstrap credential in `docker logs`):
    ```bash
-   docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"
+   docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN
    ```
+   It is bind-mounted, so `sudo cat data/SETUP_TOKEN` on the host works too. Only
+   if that file could not be written does the backend fall back to logging the
+   token (`docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`).
 3. Paste the token, set your admin **email + password**, and you're in. The token is single-use, and the setup screen closes permanently once an admin exists.
 
 > Prefer the old behaviour? Set `ADMIN_PASSWORD` in `.env` and PicPeak auto-creates the admin on first boot instead (credentials written to `data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt`).

RELEASING.md

@@ -62,13 +62,18 @@ The actual mechanics, in order:
 
 ## Hotfix path (backport to current stable)
 
-If a critical bug or security issue affects the current stable and `main` has moved too far for a full promotion to be appropriate, backport just the fix:
+Regular bug fixes are generally backported automatically from `main` to `stable`. Keep backports focused on the fix, without unrelated features, and resolve conflicts manually when needed.
+
+**Security fixes are always released on both `stable` and `main`.** Do not wait for a full promotion to deliver a security update. A fix first applied to `stable` must also be forward-ported to `main`; a fix first applied to `main` must also reach `stable`. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the support policy.
+
+When a backport needs manual handling:
 
 1. Create a `security/cve-backport-X.Y.Z` or `fix/critical-X.Y.Z` branch off `stable`.
 2. Cherry-pick or hand-write the minimal fix.
 3. Open a PR to `stable` with the smallest possible diff.
 4. After merge, release-please will propose a patch-level stable release (e.g. `v3.55.1`).
 5. **Forward-port the fix to `main`** if it isn't already there. Otherwise the next full promotion will reintroduce the bug.
+6. For security fixes, verify that the fix has been published through **both** release channels; merging the code is only part of delivery.
 
 PR #412 ("backport 18 dependency CVE patches from beta") is a worked example of this path (predates the rename; the mechanics are unchanged).
 

SECURITY.md

@@ -1,88 +1,81 @@
 # Security Policy
 
+## Scope
+
+This policy covers the PicPeak backend, frontend, all-in-one (AIO) image, optional
+ML component, and the Docker images published by the PicPeak project. Other
+PicPeak repositories define their own supported versions and release channels.
+
 ## Supported Versions
 
-We release patches for security vulnerabilities. Currently supported versions:
+Security support follows the current release channels:
 
-| Version | Supported          |
-| ------- | ------------------ |
-| 2.x.x   | :white_check_mark: |
-| < 2.0   | :x:                |
+| Version or channel | Security support |
+| --- | --- |
+| Latest stable release from `stable` | Supported; security fixes are published through this channel |
+| Latest beta release from `main` | Supported; security fixes are published through this channel |
+| Superseded stable or beta releases | Upgrade to the latest release in the same channel; older releases are not maintained separately |
+| 2.x and earlier | No longer supported |
+
+See the [latest stable release](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/releases/latest)
+and [all releases, including betas](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/releases).
+Version numbers differ between channels; each channel receives its own updates.
+
+### Security fixes and bug backports
+
+**Security fixes are always released on both `stable` and `main`.** A fix that
+lands on one branch must also reach the other branch and be published through
+both release channels. Security updates do not wait for the next full
+`main`-to-`stable` promotion.
+
+Regular bug fixes are also generally backported automatically to `stable`.
+Backports remain focused on the fix, without pulling in unrelated features.
+Maintainers resolve conflicts or handle a backport manually when necessary.
+
+The [release process](RELEASING.md) describes backports, forward-ports and
+publication. Operators must apply the published updates to their installations.
 
 ## Reporting a Vulnerability
 
-We take the security of PicPeak seriously. If you have discovered a security vulnerability, please follow these steps:
+**Do not report vulnerabilities in public issues, discussions or pull requests.**
 
-### 1. **Do NOT create a public GitHub issue**
+Report privately through:
 
-### 2. Report the vulnerability privately by:
-- **Preferred:** Use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
-- **Alternative:** Email us at **info@picpeak.app** with the details
-- Include:
-  - Description of the vulnerability
-  - Steps to reproduce
-  - Potential impact
-  - Suggested fix (if any)
+- [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new) (preferred).
+- Email **info@picpeak.app** if you cannot use GitHub's private reporting form.
 
-### 3. You can expect:
-- Acknowledgment within 48 hours
-- Regular updates on our progress
-- Credit in the fix announcement (unless you prefer to remain anonymous)
+Include the affected component, version or image tag, deployment method,
+reproduction steps, expected impact and any suggested fix. Share only the
+information needed to reproduce the problem; remove credentials and personal
+data from logs or examples.
 
-## Security Measures
+We aim to acknowledge reports within 48 hours. This is a response target, not a
+guaranteed service level or a promised resolution time. We will provide progress
+updates and coordinate disclosure with the reporter. Reporter credit is optional;
+tell us if you prefer to remain anonymous.
 
-PicPeak implements several security measures:
+## Deployment Security
 
-### Authentication & Authorization
-- JWT-based authentication with secure token storage
-- bcrypt password hashing with configurable rounds
-- Role-based access control for admin functions
-- Session timeout management
+Security depends on both the software and its configuration. Operators should:
 
-### Input Validation
-- All user inputs are validated and sanitized
-- SQL injection prevention through parameterized queries
-- XSS protection via Content Security Policy
-- File upload restrictions and validation
+- Use HTTPS and configure the reverse proxy and trusted proxy settings correctly.
+- Use strong credentials and keep deployment secrets private.
+- Apply updates for the chosen release channel and restrict unnecessary network access.
+- Keep backups and verify that they can be restored.
 
-### Rate Limiting
-- API rate limiting to prevent abuse
-- Brute force protection on authentication endpoints
-- Configurable limits per endpoint
-
-### Data Protection
-- HTTPS enforcement in production
-- Secure cookie settings
-- CORS configuration
-- Sensitive data encryption
-
-### Infrastructure
-- Regular dependency updates
-- Security headers (HSTS, X-Frame-Options, etc.)
-- Activity logging for audit trails
-- Automated backups
-
-## Best Practices for Deployment
-
-1. **Always use HTTPS** in production
-2. **Change default passwords** immediately
-3. **Keep dependencies updated** regularly
-4. **Configure firewall rules** appropriately
-5. **Monitor logs** for suspicious activity
-6. **Backup regularly** and test restoration
+See the deployment guides for [HTTPS](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/ssl-certificates),
+[reverse proxies](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/reverse-proxy),
+[security settings](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/admin-settings/security)
+and [backup and restore](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/backup-restore).
 
 ## Vulnerability Disclosure
 
-We believe in responsible disclosure. Once a vulnerability is fixed:
+We coordinate disclosure with the reporter while preparing fixes. Security fixes
+are published through both supported channels. Advisories and release notes
+identify affected versions, the fixed version in each channel, the impact and
+any required mitigation or upgrade steps. Reporter credit is included with
+permission.
 
-1. We'll publish a security advisory
-2. Credit researchers (with permission)
-3. Detail the impact and mitigation steps
-4. Release patches for all supported versions
-
-## Contact
-
-- Security issues: Email **info@picpeak.app** or use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
-- General support: [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues)
-
-Thank you for helping keep PicPeak and its users safe!
+For ordinary bugs and support requests, use
+[GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) or
+[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions).

SIMPLE_SETUP.md

@@ -170,10 +170,12 @@ If you installed with `picpeak-setup.sh` and gave an `--admin-password`, your ad
 If you started PicPeak **without** setting `ADMIN_PASSWORD` (e.g. a plain `docker compose up`), there's **no admin yet** and you create it in the browser:
 
 1. Open `http://your-server:3000/admin` — you'll land on a setup screen.
-2. Get the **one-time setup token** from the backend logs (also saved to `data/SETUP_TOKEN`):
+2. Read the **one-time setup token** from the 0600 file the backend writes it to
+   (it is not logged — that would leave a live credential in `docker logs`):
    ```bash
-   docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"
+   docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN
    ```
+   Only if that write fails does the backend log the token instead.
 3. Paste it, set your admin email + password. The token is single-use and the screen closes once an admin exists.
 
 ## 🌐 Access Methods

backend/Dockerfile

@@ -27,17 +27,35 @@ FROM node:22-alpine
 
 WORKDIR /app
 
-# Upgrade all packages to fix security vulnerabilities (OpenSSL, libexpat, BusyBox CVEs)
-RUN apk upgrade --no-cache
+# knexfile.js picks its config block by NODE_ENV, and the `development` block
+# defaults to sqlite3. Leaving NODE_ENV unset here meant every deployment that
+# doesn't go through our compose files — Kubernetes, Helm, plain `docker run` —
+# silently ran on SQLite and ignored DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD, while
+# wait-for-db.sh (shell, reads DB_HOST directly) reported "PostgreSQL is up" in
+# the same log. The compose files still override this, so nothing changes for
+# compose users. See #1038.
+ENV NODE_ENV=production
 
-# Upgrade the npm CLI in the final image so its bundled deps are patched
-# (sigstore 4.x, tar) — closes CVE-2026-48815 and the older @sigstore/core / tar
-# Trivy alerts. Safe here: only the CLI present in the image changes. Runtime
-# dependencies come from the builder stage (COPY --from=builder node_modules
-# below) and the entrypoint runs node, not npm — so npm 11's install behaviour
-# (the reason 10.x was pinned) never executes in this stage. npm 11 needs
-# Node >=22.9, satisfied by node:22-alpine.
-RUN npm install -g npm@11
+# Redeclare CACHEBUST — ARGs don't cross stage boundaries, so the builder
+# stage's declaration never reached this stage. Consuming it in the RUN below
+# busts that layer's cache every CI run (CACHEBUST=github.run_number), so the
+# image always picks up current Alpine security updates instead of reusing a
+# stale cached upgrade layer.
+ARG CACHEBUST=1
+
+# Upgrade all packages to fix security vulnerabilities (OpenSSL, libexpat, BusyBox CVEs)
+RUN echo "cachebust=${CACHEBUST}" && apk upgrade --no-cache
+
+# Remove the npm CLI from the final image. Nothing runs npm here: the
+# entrypoint is node, runtime deps are COPY'd from the builder stage, and
+# wait-for-db.sh invokes the migration runners via node directly. npm's
+# bundled node_modules kept tripping Trivy (sigstore, tar 7.5.19,
+# brace-expansion 5.0.7 — even npm 12.0.1 still ships the vulnerable
+# copies), so shipping no npm ends that alert class instead of chasing
+# per-release patches. Note: `docker exec … npm run <script>` no longer
+# works in the container — use `node migrations/run-migrations-safe.js`
+# and friends instead.
+RUN rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm /usr/local/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npx
 
 # Install dumb-init for proper signal handling, postgresql-client for database
 # checks, ffmpeg for video upload support, and su-exec for the root → nodejs

backend/__tests__/integration/adminArchives.restoreCategories.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,498 @@
+/**
+ * Restoring an archive must put the photos back into their categories.
+ *
+ * The archive writer already persists `category_name` per photo in
+ * `photos_manifest.json` — that is why the manifest exists, and the comment
+ * above it says so: "(and category linkage) can't be derived from the
+ * extracted files alone". The restore route then read only
+ * `original_filename` from it and kept deriving the category from the ZIP's
+ * first path segment.
+ *
+ * Archives store photos exactly as they sit on disk, so an event whose photos
+ * live in the gallery root produces a FLAT zip. `path.dirname()` is '.' for
+ * every entry, no category is resolved, and every restored photo lands with
+ * `category_id = null` — silently, with a 200 response.
+ *
+ * These pin the manifest as the source of truth, with the directory as the
+ * fallback that keeps foldered and legacy archives working.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+describe('archive restore restores categories (flat archives included)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let app; let storagePath;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restore-cat-'));
+    storagePath = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'test.db');
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = storagePath;
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(storagePath, 'archives'), { recursive: true });
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
+      requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+    // bootCrmDb points STORAGE_PATH at its own tmp dir; follow it rather than
+    // fighting it, so the archives the tests write are where the route looks.
+    storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(storagePath, 'archives'), { recursive: true });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/admin/archives', require('../../src/routes/adminArchives'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('photo_categories').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+  });
+
+  /** A one-pixel JPEG is enough; the route only stats the extracted file. */
+  const PIXEL = Buffer.from(
+    '/9j/4AAQSkZJRgABAQEAYABgAAD/2wBDAAgGBgcGBQgHBwcJCQgKDBQNDAsLDBkSEw8UHRofHh0a'
+    + 'HBwgJC4nICIsIxwcKDcpLDAxNDQ0Hyc5PTgyPC4zNDL/wAALCAABAAEBAREA/8QAFAABAAAAAAAA'
+    + 'AAAAAAAAAAAACf/EABQQAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAD/2gAIAQEAAD8AKp//2Q==',
+    'base64',
+  );
+
+  async function writeArchive(name, entries) {
+    // Required lazily: the suite calls jest.resetModules() in beforeAll, and
+    // archiver's readable-stream copy does not survive being split across the
+    // two module registries.
+    const archiver = require('archiver');
+    const archivePath = path.join(storagePath, 'archives', name);
+    await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      const output = fs.createWriteStream(archivePath);
+      const zip = archiver('zip', { zlib: { level: 0 } });
+      output.on('close', resolve);
+      zip.on('error', reject);
+      zip.pipe(output);
+      for (const [entryName, buffer] of Object.entries(entries)) {
+        zip.append(buffer, { name: entryName });
+      }
+      zip.finalize();
+    });
+    return path.join('archives', name);
+  }
+
+  async function seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, slug) {
+    const [row] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: slug,
+      event_date: '2026-06-27',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `${slug}-share`,
+      expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      is_archived: 1,  // sqlite stores booleans as 0/1, see utils/dbCompat
+      archive_path: archiveRelPath,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
+  }
+
+  const categoryOf = async (filename) => {
+    const photo = await db('photos').where('filename', filename).first();
+    if (!photo || !photo.category_id) return null;
+    const category = await db('photo_categories').where('id', photo.category_id).first();
+    return category ? category.name : null;
+  };
+
+  it('takes the category from the manifest when the archive is flat', async () => {
+    // Exactly the shape a gallery-root event archives to: no directories.
+    const manifest = JSON.stringify([
+      { filename: 'a.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_0001.jpg', category_name: 'Polterabend' },
+      { filename: 'b.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_0002.jpg', category_name: 'Ceremony' },
+    ]);
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('flat.zip', {
+      'a.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'b.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(manifest, 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'flat-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // The whole bug: both of these used to be null.
+    expect(await categoryOf('a.jpg')).toBe('Polterabend');
+    expect(await categoryOf('b.jpg')).toBe('Ceremony');
+  });
+
+  it('stores a real timestamp on restored photos, not "[object Object]"', async () => {
+    // The jest+sqlite landmine: a Date handed to knex inside jest stores as
+    // the literal string "[object Object]". Production writes ms-numbers and
+    // is unaffected, so this only ever corrupts what tests read back — which
+    // is how it survives unnoticed.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('timestamp.zip', {
+      'individual/STAMPED.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'STAMPED.jpg', original_filename: 'STAMPED.jpg', category_name: 'Ceremony' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'timestamp-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId, filename: 'STAMPED.jpg' }).first();
+    expect(String(photo.uploaded_at)).not.toBe('[object Object]');
+    expect(Number.isNaN(new Date(photo.uploaded_at).getTime())).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('reuses an existing category row instead of creating a duplicate', async () => {
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('reuse.zip', {
+      'c.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'c.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_0003.jpg', category_name: 'Party' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'reuse-event');
+    await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, name: 'Party', slug: 'party', created_at: new Date(),
+    });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('c.jpg')).toBe('Party');
+    const rows = await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name: 'Party' });
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it('still falls back to the directory for legacy archives with no manifest', async () => {
+    // No manifest at all — the shape every archive had before the manifest
+    // landed. The directory is the only signal left, and it must keep working.
+    //
+    // `individual/` is what a REAL archive contains: entry names are the
+    // storage key minus `events/active/{slug}`, and that layout is
+    // `individual/` / `collages/`. Categories have never been directories, so
+    // the fallback invents a category with that name — not useful, but better
+    // than losing every category, and this pins what actually happens rather
+    // than a category-shaped folder no archive produces.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('foldered.zip', {
+      'individual/d.jpg': PIXEL,
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'foldered-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('d.jpg')).toBe('individual');
+  });
+
+  it('reuses a GLOBAL category instead of cloning it into the event', async () => {
+    // Seeded categories (Ceremony, Reception, ...) have event_id NULL. An
+    // event-only lookup misses them, so the restore used to create a second
+    // "Ceremony" — and because is_global defaults to TRUE, that duplicate then
+    // appeared in every other event's category list.
+    const [g] = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      event_id: null, name: 'Ceremony', slug: 'ceremony', is_global: true, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const globalId = typeof g === 'object' ? g.id : g;
+
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('global.zip', {
+      'individual/gl.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'gl.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_1.jpg', category_name: 'Ceremony' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'global-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where('filename', 'gl.jpg').first();
+    expect(photo.category_id).toBe(globalId);
+    // No clone, global or otherwise.
+    const all = await db('photo_categories').where('name', 'Ceremony');
+    expect(all).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it('does not create a GLOBAL category when it has to invent one', async () => {
+    // is_global defaults to true on this column, so an unqualified insert would
+    // leak a restore's category name into every gallery on the instance.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('newcat.zip', {
+      'individual/nc.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'nc.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_2.jpg', category_name: 'Polterabend' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'newcat-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const created = await db('photo_categories').where('name', 'Polterabend').first();
+    expect(created.event_id).toBe(eventId);
+    expect(created.is_global === false || created.is_global === 0).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('matches the manifest when the ZIP was written with original filenames', async () => {
+    // With general_use_original_filenames_for_downloads on at archive time,
+    // archiveService names entries after the ORIGINAL filename while the
+    // manifest stays keyed by photos.filename. Looking up the extracted
+    // basename missed every entry, so categories were lost on exactly those
+    // archives.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('original-names.zip', {
+      'individual/DSC_4242.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'stored_9f8e7d.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_4242.jpg', category_name: 'Drohne' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'original-names-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('DSC_4242.jpg')).toBe('Drohne');
+  });
+
+  it('prefers the event-scoped category when a global shares its name', async () => {
+    // The category API permits both. A single OR-lookup with .first() returned
+    // whichever the engine chose, so a photo could be reassigned to the global
+    // row and lose event-local settings such as allow_downloads.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('collide.zip', {
+      'individual/co.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'co.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_3.jpg', category_name: 'Reception' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'collide-event');
+
+    await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      event_id: null, name: 'Reception', slug: 'reception-global', is_global: true, created_at: new Date(),
+    });
+    const [own] = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, name: 'Reception', slug: 'reception-own', is_global: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const ownId = typeof own === 'object' ? own.id : own;
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where('filename', 'co.jpg').first();
+    expect(photo.category_id).toBe(ownId);
+  });
+
+  it('matches a sanitized original filename, as the ZIP would have written it', async () => {
+    // archiveService runs original names through sanitizeForZipEntry() before
+    // writing the entry, so the emitted name differs from the manifest column.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('sanitized.zip', {
+      'individual/od_dr_DSC_5.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'stored_abc.jpg', original_filename: 'od/dr/DSC_5.jpg', category_name: 'Strand' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'sanitized-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('od_dr_DSC_5.jpg')).toBe('Strand');
+  });
+
+  it('ignores a legacy event-owned row when falling back to globals', async () => {
+    // The bug fixed here left rows behind on upgraded instances: event-owned
+    // AND is_global true, because the column defaults true. Matching on the
+    // flag alone would let one event's leftover be adopted by another event's
+    // restore, tying photos to a category that vanishes with someone else's
+    // gallery.
+    const otherEventId = await seedArchivedEvent('archives/none.zip', 'legacy-owner-event');
+    await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      event_id: otherEventId, name: 'Sunset', slug: 'sunset-legacy',
+      is_global: true, created_at: new Date(),
+    });
+
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('legacy-global.zip', {
+      'individual/lg.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'lg.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_6.jpg', category_name: 'Sunset' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'legacy-global-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where('filename', 'lg.jpg').first();
+    const cat = await db('photo_categories').where('id', photo.category_id).first();
+    // Its own row, not the other event's leftover.
+    expect(cat.event_id).toBe(eventId);
+  });
+
+  it('drops an ambiguous original-name alias rather than guessing', async () => {
+    // Two photos in different ZIP folders can share an original basename;
+    // archiveService treats the paths as distinct and suffixes neither. Both
+    // would collapse onto one alias, and whichever won would hand the other
+    // photo someone else's category.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('ambiguous.zip', {
+      'individual/SHARED.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'a_stored.jpg', original_filename: 'SHARED.jpg', category_name: 'Alpha' },
+        { filename: 'b_stored.jpg', original_filename: 'SHARED.jpg', category_name: 'Beta' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'ambiguous-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // Falls back to the directory rather than picking Alpha or Beta at random.
+    expect(await categoryOf('SHARED.jpg')).toBe('individual');
+    for (const name of ['Alpha', 'Beta']) {
+      expect(await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name }).first()).toBeFalsy();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('honours a manifest that says UNCATEGORIZED, instead of inventing one from the directory', async () => {
+    // The case the manifest-first change was for. A real archive puts every
+    // photo under `individual/`, so a photo the manifest records as having no
+    // category used to come back filed under a category called "individual" —
+    // the manifest being authoritative for "category X" but not for "none".
+    const manifest = JSON.stringify([
+      { filename: 'u.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_7000.jpg', category_name: null },
+    ]);
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('uncategorized.zip', {
+      'individual/u.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(manifest, 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'uncategorized-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('u.jpg')).toBeNull();
+    // And no junk category row was created as a side effect.
+    const rows = await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId });
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('drops a canonical filename that two photos claim, rather than guessing', async () => {
+    // photos.filename is not unique within an event: s3AutoImporter takes
+    // path.basename(entry.key) and dedupes by path, so two imported files in
+    // different subfolders both land as IMG_1234.jpg. Both ZIP entries reduce
+    // to the same basename at restore, so keeping the last row seen would give
+    // one photo the other's category.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('dup-canonical.zip', {
+      'individual/IMG_1234.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'IMG_1234.jpg', original_filename: 'a.jpg', category_name: 'Alpha' },
+        { filename: 'IMG_1234.jpg', original_filename: 'b.jpg', category_name: 'Beta' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'dup-canonical-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('IMG_1234.jpg')).toBe('individual');
+    for (const name of ['Alpha', 'Beta']) {
+      expect(await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name }).first()).toBeFalsy();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("drops a name that one row owns canonically and another claims as an alias", async () => {
+    // Undecidable: with original-filename archiving ON the ZIP entry under
+    // this name is the ALIAS owner's file, with it OFF it is the canonical
+    // owner's, and the manifest does not record which mode was used. The
+    // point of the two-pass split is that this now resolves the same way
+    // every run — the archive query has no ORDER BY, so it used to be a coin
+    // flip between dropping the name and overwriting it.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('alias-vs-canonical.zip', {
+      'individual/CANON.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'CANON.jpg', original_filename: 'unrelated.jpg', category_name: 'Canonical' },
+        { filename: 'other_stored.jpg', original_filename: 'CANON.jpg', category_name: 'Aliased' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'alias-vs-canonical-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // Falls back to the directory rather than guessing either row.
+    expect(await categoryOf('CANON.jpg')).toBe('individual');
+    for (const name of ['Canonical', 'Aliased']) {
+      expect(await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name }).first()).toBeFalsy();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('picks the lowest id and warns when two categories share a name', async () => {
+    // Allowed: two event-scoped categories with the same display name and
+    // different slugs. .first() used to pick either, so a re-run could move
+    // photos between them and inherit the wrong allow_downloads.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('dupe-category.zip', {
+      'individual/DUPE.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'DUPE.jpg', original_filename: 'DUPE.jpg', category_name: 'Ceremony' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'dupe-category-event');
+
+    const [first] = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      name: 'Ceremony', slug: 'ceremony-a', is_global: 0, event_id: eventId,
+    }).returning('id');
+    await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      name: 'Ceremony', slug: 'ceremony-b', is_global: 0, event_id: eventId,
+    });
+    const firstId = typeof first === 'object' ? first.id : first;
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // Stable, not arbitrary: the same run twice lands on the same row.
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId, filename: 'DUPE.jpg' }).first();
+    expect(photo.category_id).toBe(firstId);
+    // And no third "Ceremony" was invented.
+    expect((await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name: 'Ceremony' })).length)
+      .toBe(2);
+  });
+
+  it('does not invent a category for a photo row that already exists', async () => {
+    // archiveEvent retains photo rows, so a restore can skip every insert.
+    // Resolving categories before that check created one from the stale
+    // manifest name that nothing then used — renaming a category while its
+    // event was archived left the old name behind as an empty duplicate.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('existing-rows.zip', {
+      'individual/KEPT.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'KEPT.jpg', original_filename: 'KEPT.jpg', category_name: 'OldName' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'existing-rows-event');
+    await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'KEPT.jpg', path: 'whatever/KEPT.jpg', type: 'jpg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name: 'OldName' }).first())
+      .toBeFalsy();
+  });
+
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/adminBackupCoverage.test.js

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
   requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
 }));
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('GET /api/admin/system-health/backup-coverage', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/adminBackupIntegrity.test.js

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
   requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
 }));
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('GET /api/admin/system-health/backup-integrity', () => {
   let cleanup;

backend/__tests__/integration/adminThumbnails.regenerate.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+/**
+ * POST /admin/thumbnails/regenerate for external/reference photos (#1129).
+ *
+ * STABLE TWIN. Diverges from the main version in one place: stable has no
+ * responsive ?w= tiers (#1095/#1109), so there is no deleteThumbnailTiers call
+ * to assert and the "drops the tiers first" test is absent here. Everything
+ * else — the external rebuild, the thumbnail_path:null contract, video
+ * skipping, per-event scoping and the superseded-key deletion — is identical.
+ *
+ * The route used to resolve every source as `storage/events/active/<path>` and
+ * `fs.access` it. External and reference rows do not live there — their
+ * originals sit under `events.external_path` — so every one of them failed the
+ * check and was counted as an error.
+ *
+ * That alone would be inert. What made it destructive is that the tier
+ * deletion runs FIRST (deliberately, so S3 and external rows are not skipped):
+ * on a reference install the button dropped every ?w= tier and rebuilt
+ * nothing, while the UI reported success — the response is sent before the
+ * background loop starts.
+ *
+ * The background work is fired with setImmediate, so every assertion here has
+ * to wait for it to drain rather than trusting the response.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+describe('admin thumbnail regeneration (#1129)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let app; let imageProcessor; let storage;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-'));
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'test.db');
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    // One instance, not a fresh object per call — the route and the
+    // assertions have to be looking at the same mock.
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/storage', () => {
+      const instance = { delete: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+      return { getStorage: () => instance };
+    });
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
+      ensureThumbnail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('thumbnails/thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'),
+      ensurePreviewImage: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('previews/p.jpg'),
+      deletePreviewTiers: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+    }));
+
+    // bootCrmDb, not run-migrations: the latter calls process.exit(0) on
+    // success, which ends the jest worker mid-suite.
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+    storage = require('../../src/services/storage').getStorage();
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/admin/thumbnails', require('../../src/routes/adminThumbnails'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    jest.clearAllMocks();
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+  });
+
+  async function seedEvent() {
+    const [row] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'nas-wedding', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'nas',
+      event_date: '2026-01-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', share_link: 'nas-share', expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'weddings/2026-08',
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
+  }
+
+  async function seedPhoto(eventId, overrides = {}) {
+    const [row] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'shot.jpg', path: 'nas-wedding/shot.jpg',
+      type: 'individual', ...overrides,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
+  }
+
+  /** The work runs in setImmediate; give it room to finish. */
+  const drain = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 150));
+
+  it('rebuilds the canonical thumbnail for an external photo instead of erroring', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await seedPhoto(eventId, {
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'shot.jpg',
+      thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/stale.jpg',
+    });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    await drain();
+
+    // The whole bug: this used to be zero calls and one logged
+    // "Original file not found" per photo.
+    expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it('nulls thumbnail_path so the valid-thumbnail short-circuit cannot skip the rebuild', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await seedPhoto(eventId, {
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'shot.jpg',
+      thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/still-on-disk.jpg',
+    });
+
+    await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+    await drain();
+
+    // Without this the endpoint is a no-op whenever the OLD thumbnail is still
+    // readable — which is the normal case after a settings change, and exactly
+    // when the admin pressed the button.
+    const [photoArg] = imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mock.calls[0];
+    expect(photoArg.thumbnail_path).toBeNull();
+    expect(photoArg.source_origin).toBe('external');
+    // Carried through so ensureThumbnail can resolve off the mount rather than
+    // under events/active.
+    expect(photoArg.external_relpath).toBe('shot.jpg');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves videos alone rather than handing a container file to Sharp', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await seedPhoto(eventId, { source_origin: 'managed', media_type: 'video', filename: 'clip.mp4' });
+    await seedPhoto(eventId, { source_origin: 'managed', filename: 'still.jpg' });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+    await drain();
+
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
+    expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mock.calls[0][0].filename).toBe('still.jpg');
+  });
+
+  /**
+   * On S3, ensureThumbnail downloads the source to a randomly-named temp file,
+   * and for non-RAW input withProcessableImage passes no outputBasename — so
+   * generateThumbnail derives the key from that random name and it differs on
+   * every run. Nulling thumbnail_path hides the old key from everything that
+   * would otherwise clean it up, so each regeneration would strand a full
+   * thumbnail in the bucket, once per photo per run.
+   */
+  describe('superseded canonical renditions', () => {
+    it('removes the old thumbnail when the key moved', async () => {
+      const eventId = await seedEvent();
+      await seedPhoto(eventId, {
+        source_origin: 'managed',
+        thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_OLDRANDOM_shot.jpg',
+      });
+      imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_NEWRANDOM_shot.jpg');
+
+      await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+      await drain();
+
+      expect(storage.delete).toHaveBeenCalledWith('thumbnails/thumb_OLDRANDOM_shot.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT delete when the key is unchanged — that is the new file', async () => {
+      const eventId = await seedEvent();
+      await seedPhoto(eventId, {
+        source_origin: 'managed',
+        thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_stable.jpg',
+      });
+      // Local storage resolves to a stable path, so the key is identical.
+      imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_stable.jpg');
+
+      await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+      await drain();
+
+      expect(storage.delete).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ['a Windows-style legacy path', 'thumbnails\\thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'],
+      ['a leading ./', './thumbnails/thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'],
+      ['a doubled separator', 'thumbnails//thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'],
+    ])('does not delete the file it just wrote when the old path is %s', async (_name, stored) => {
+      const eventId = await seedEvent();
+      await seedPhoto(eventId, { source_origin: 'managed', thumbnail_path: stored });
+      // Both storage backends fold these to the same key, so this is the SAME
+      // object — deleting it would remove the freshly generated thumbnail and
+      // leave the row pointing at nothing.
+      imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_ext1_shot.jpg');
+
+      await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+      await drain();
+
+      expect(storage.delete).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('counts the photo as regenerated even if the old object cannot be removed', async () => {
+      const eventId = await seedEvent();
+      await seedPhoto(eventId, {
+        source_origin: 'managed',
+        thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_OLD.jpg',
+      });
+      imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_NEW.jpg');
+      storage.delete.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('bucket said no'));
+
+      await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+      await drain();
+
+      // Losing the old object is untidy; the regeneration itself succeeded.
+      expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('scopes to one event when asked', async () => {
+    const a = await seedEvent();
+    await seedPhoto(a, { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'a.jpg' });
+    const [b] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'other', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'other', event_date: '2026-01-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: 'other-share', expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    await seedPhoto(typeof b === 'object' ? b.id : b, { source_origin: 'managed' });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({ eventId: a });
+    await drain();
+
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
+    expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/backupService.configurableWalker.test.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ const path = require('path');
 
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('backupService — configurable walker (backup_paths)', () => {
   let db;
@@ -177,4 +177,203 @@ describe('backupService — configurable walker (backup_paths)', () => {
     const filesOn = await backupService.getFilesToBackup(true);
     expect(filesOn.map((f) => f.relativePath)).toContain('events/archived/E3/legacy.jpg');
   });
+
+  // Issue #871 — the "What to Backup" checkboxes were stored but never read.
+  describe('UI opt-out toggles (issue #871)', () => {
+    it('unchecking Thumbnails excludes thumbnails/', async () => {
+      seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_thumbnails: false,
+      });
+      const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+      expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+      expect(rels).not.toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('unchecking Photos excludes events/active', async () => {
+      seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_photos: false,
+      });
+      const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+      expect(rels).toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      expect(rels).not.toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('defaults to including everything when the keys were never saved', async () => {
+      seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({});
+      const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+      expect(rels).toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it("accepts the UI's plural backup_include_archives for the archived gate", async () => {
+      seedFile('events/archived/E4/archived.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_archives: true,
+      });
+      expect(files.map((f) => f.relativePath)).toContain('events/archived/E4/archived.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('the UI plural key beats the migration-seeded singular key', async () => {
+      // Migration seeds backup_include_archived=true on every install; the
+      // form only ever writes the plural key, so unchecking Archives must
+      // win over the stale seeded value.
+      seedFile('events/archived/E5/archived.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_archived: true,   // seeded default
+        backup_include_archives: false,  // what the admin actually chose
+      });
+      expect(files.map((f) => f.relativePath)).not.toContain('events/archived/E5/archived.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('rsync gets the de-selected paths and noise filters as --exclude args', async () => {
+      const excluded = await backupService.resolveExcludedBackupPaths({
+        backup_include_thumbnails: false,
+        backup_include_archives: false,
+      });
+      expect(excluded.map((r) => r.path)).toEqual(
+        expect.arrayContaining(['thumbnails', 'events/archived'])
+      );
+
+      const args = backupService.buildRsyncArgs(
+        { backup_rsync_host: 'backup.example.com', backup_rsync_path: '/srv/backups' },
+        excluded.map((r) => `/${r.path}/`)
+      );
+      const excludes = args
+        .map((a, i) => (a === '--exclude' ? args[i + 1] : null))
+        .filter(Boolean);
+      expect(excludes).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
+        '.nfs*',
+        '/thumbnails/',
+        '/events/archived/',
+      ]));
+    });
+
+    it('rows toggled off via include_in_default also become rsync excludes', async () => {
+      // The enabled-only loader hides these rows from the walker, but rsync
+      // syncs the whole storage root, so they must still appear as excludes.
+      await db('backup_paths').where('path', 'previews').update({
+        include_in_default: false,
+      });
+
+      const excluded = await backupService.resolveExcludedBackupPaths({});
+      expect(excluded.map((r) => r.path)).toContain('previews');
+    });
+  });
+
+  // Issue #871 — .nfs* silly-rename artifacts were uploaded to S3.
+  it('never backs up filesystem noise (.nfs*, .DS_Store)', async () => {
+    seedFile('thumbnails/E1/.nfs000000000000006600000008');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/.DS_Store');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+    const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({});
+    const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    expect(rels.some((r) => r.includes('.nfs'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(rels.some((r) => r.includes('.DS_Store'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('the walker honors backup_exclude_patterns (previously rsync-only)', async () => {
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/scratch.tmp');
+
+    const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+      backup_exclude_patterns: ['*.tmp'],
+    });
+    const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    expect(rels).not.toContain('events/active/E1/scratch.tmp');
+  });
+
+  it('glob patterns are literal outside the star (.nfs* must not eat anfs-…)', async () => {
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/anfs-photo.jpg');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/notes-tmp');
+
+    const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+      backup_exclude_patterns: ['*.tmp'],
+    });
+    const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+    // '.nfs*' used to compile to /^.nfs.*$/ whose dot matched any char;
+    // '*.tmp' used to compile to /^.*.tmp$/ which also matched 'notes-tmp'.
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/anfs-photo.jpg');
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/notes-tmp');
+  });
+
+  // Issue #871 — weekly schedules silently ran daily, and the dashboard's
+  // "next backup" was a hardcoded "tomorrow 02:00".
+  describe('schedule resolution + next run (issue #871)', () => {
+    it('a named label beats the stray default cron the UI used to send', () => {
+      expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({
+        backup_schedule: 'weekly',
+        backup_schedule_cron: '0 3 * * *', // old UI default, sent unconditionally
+      })).toBe('0 3 * * 0');
+    });
+
+    it('custom schedules use the cron field', () => {
+      expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({
+        backup_schedule: 'custom',
+        backup_schedule_cron: '15 5 * * 2',
+      })).toBe('15 5 * * 2');
+    });
+
+    it('falls back to the default daily cron', () => {
+      expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({})).toBe('0 2 * * *');
+    });
+
+    it('getNextScheduledRun is null when backups are disabled', () => {
+      expect(backupService.getNextScheduledRun(null)).toBeNull();
+      expect(backupService.getNextScheduledRun({ backup_enabled: false })).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('getNextScheduledRun returns the real next weekly fire time', () => {
+      const iso = backupService.getNextScheduledRun({
+        backup_enabled: true,
+        backup_schedule: 'weekly',
+        backup_schedule_cron: '0 3 * * *',
+      });
+      const next = new Date(iso);
+      expect(Number.isNaN(next.getTime())).toBe(false);
+      expect(next.getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
+      expect(next.getDay()).toBe(0);   // Sunday
+      expect(next.getHours()).toBe(3); // 03:00
+    });
+  });
+
+  // Issue #871 — "Backup Size: 167.6 TB": file_size_bytes is a bigInteger
+  // column, node-postgres returns int8 as a string, and the S3 path did
+  // `backedUpSize += size` — string concatenation.
+  it('getDatabaseBackupInfo coerces file_size_bytes to a number', async () => {
+    await db('database_backup_runs').del();
+    await db('database_backup_runs').insert({
+      backup_type: 'full',
+      status: 'completed',
+      file_path: '/backups/db/dump.sql.gz',
+      // Simulate the PG int8-as-string driver behaviour (sqlite stores
+      // whatever it is handed, so the string round-trips).
+      file_size_bytes: '421988',
+      started_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      completed_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+
+    const info = await backupService.getDatabaseBackupInfo();
+    expect(typeof info.size).toBe('number');
+    expect(info.size).toBe(421988);
+  });
 });

backend/__tests__/integration/backupService.inlineDbDump.test.js

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/databaseBackup', () => ({
   DatabaseBackupService: class {},
 }));
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('backupService — inline DB dump + fail-loud guard', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/backupService.perPathStats.test.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ const path = require('path');
 
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('backupService — per-Stage-B-path statistics', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/backupService.smoke.test.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ const path = require('path');
 
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('backupService — config + file collection + manifest (smoke)', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/bookingCutover.test.js

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 const crypto = require('crypto');
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('booking cutover — draft invoices on hold', () => {
   let db; let cleanup; let adminId; let customerId; let quoteService;

backend/__tests__/integration/businessProfileLogoUpload.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/**
+ * POST /api/admin/business-profile/logo and PUT /api/admin/business-profile
+ * — GHSA-6wrv-9pr4-hhmw regression coverage.
+ *
+ * The upload route used to take the stored file extension straight from
+ * the client-supplied filename and only checked `file.mimetype` against an
+ * allowlist — a file could declare an image MIME type while carrying a
+ * `.html`/`.js` extension and arbitrary content, land in the same-origin
+ * `/uploads/logos` static mount, and execute as script. The mass-assignable
+ * `logoPath` field on PUT compounded it: an attacker could point the
+ * "logo" at any other uploaded file.
+ *
+ * These tests pin:
+ *   (a) a MIME/extension mismatch is rejected at upload,
+ *   (b) the extension actually written to disk always matches the
+ *       validated MIME type, never the client-supplied filename,
+ *   (c) legitimate PNG/JPEG/SVG uploads still succeed,
+ *   (d) `logoPath` on PUT cannot be set to an arbitrary string pointing at
+ *       another file, only to a path the upload route itself produced.
+ *
+ * Defense-in-depth (not a re-opening of the above): fileFilter only pairs
+ * the claimed MIME type against the extension — it can't see the bytes,
+ * since it runs before multer finishes writing the stream to disk. A file
+ * whose declared MIME/extension pair is valid but whose actual content
+ * doesn't match (e.g. a PNG-declared upload that isn't really a PNG) is
+ * now caught by validateFileContent() (magic-number check) after multer
+ * writes it, closing the gap where declared-vs-actual content diverges.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-bplogo-test-'));
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite');
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'bplogo-route-test-secret';
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
+} = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+// Real magic-number-prefixed payloads, for content-sniffing to accept.
+const REAL_PNG_BYTES = Buffer.concat([
+  Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A]),
+  Buffer.from('not a real png body, but the header is real'),
+]);
+const REAL_JPEG_BYTES = Buffer.concat([
+  Buffer.from([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]),
+  Buffer.from('not a real jpeg body, but the header is real'),
+]);
+
+describe('business profile — logo upload content/extension validation', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let token;
+
+  const uploadLogo = (buffer, filename, mimetype) => request(app)
+    .post('/api/admin/business-profile/logo')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+    .attach('logo', buffer, { filename, contentType: mimetype });
+
+  const put = (payload) => request(app)
+    .put('/api/admin/business-profile')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+    .send(payload);
+
+  const get = () => request(app)
+    .get('/api/admin/business-profile')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+  const profileOf = (res) => (res.body.data || res.body).profile;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    const { adminId } = await seedMinimal(db);
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+    app = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/business-profile', require('../../src/routes/adminBusinessProfile'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  // fileFilter rejections surface via Express's generic error handler
+  // (the pre-existing behaviour of every sibling logo/favicon upload
+  // route in this codebase — none of them special-case multer's
+  // fileFilter `Error` into a 400 either), so the status code itself
+  // can be 400 or 500 depending on environment. What actually matters
+  // for GHSA-6wrv-9pr4-hhmw is that the request never succeeds and
+  // nothing with the dangerous extension is ever written to disk.
+  const logosDirFiles = () => {
+    const logosDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads', 'logos');
+    return fs.existsSync(logosDir) ? fs.readdirSync(logosDir) : [];
+  };
+
+  it('rejects an HTML/script payload disguised as an image via mismatched extension', async () => {
+    const evil = Buffer.from('<script>alert(document.domain)</script>');
+    const res = await uploadLogo(evil, 'evil.html', 'image/svg+xml');
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(200);
+    expect(logosDirFiles().some((f) => f.endsWith('.html'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a .js file disguised with an image MIME type', async () => {
+    const evil = Buffer.from('alert(1)');
+    const res = await uploadLogo(evil, 'evil.js', 'image/png');
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(200);
+    expect(logosDirFiles().some((f) => f.endsWith('.js'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a disallowed MIME type outright', async () => {
+    const res = await uploadLogo(Buffer.from('whatever'), 'file.pdf', 'application/pdf');
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(200);
+    expect(logosDirFiles().some((f) => f.endsWith('.pdf'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legitimate PNG upload and stores it with a .png extension', async () => {
+    const res = await uploadLogo(REAL_PNG_BYTES, 'logo.png', 'image/png');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const logoPath = (res.body.data || res.body).logoPath;
+    expect(logoPath).toMatch(/^\/uploads\/logos\/pdf-logo-\d+\.png$/);
+
+    const onDisk = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, logoPath.replace(/^\//, ''));
+    expect(fs.existsSync(onDisk)).toBe(true);
+
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe(logoPath);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legitimate JPEG upload and stores it with a .jpg extension', async () => {
+    const res = await uploadLogo(REAL_JPEG_BYTES, 'logo.jpg', 'image/jpeg');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const logoPath = (res.body.data || res.body).logoPath;
+    expect(logoPath).toMatch(/^\/uploads\/logos\/pdf-logo-\d+\.jpg$/);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a PNG-declared upload whose bytes are not actually a PNG, and leaves nothing on disk', async () => {
+    const before = logosDirFiles();
+    const res = await uploadLogo(Buffer.from('totally not a png'), 'logo.png', 'image/png');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/content does not match/i);
+
+    // No new file left behind: the rejected upload's own file was cleaned
+    // up, and every other file on disk (if any) is unchanged.
+    expect(logosDirFiles()).toEqual(before);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legitimate SVG upload and always stores it with a .svg extension, even under a spoofed filename', async () => {
+    const svg = Buffer.from('<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><rect width="1" height="1"/></svg>');
+    // Client-declared filename ext is .svg here to pass validateFileType
+    // (mismatched ext is covered by the rejection tests above); the point
+    // of this test is that the ON-DISK extension comes from the MIME type
+    // lookup table, not path.extname(originalname).
+    const res = await uploadLogo(svg, 'vector-logo.svg', 'image/svg+xml');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const logoPath = (res.body.data || res.body).logoPath;
+    expect(logoPath).toMatch(/^\/uploads\/logos\/pdf-logo-\d+\.svg$/);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects logoPath on PUT set to an arbitrary string pointing at another file', async () => {
+    const before = profileOf(await get()).logoPath;
+
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: '/uploads/logos/cms-somepage-1234.png' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe(before);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects logoPath on PUT with a path-traversal payload', async () => {
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: '/uploads/logos/../../../../etc/passwd' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts logoPath on PUT when it matches the pattern this route itself writes', async () => {
+    const upload = await uploadLogo(REAL_PNG_BYTES, 'logo2.png', 'image/png');
+    const uploadedPath = (upload.body.data || upload.body).logoPath;
+
+    // Round-trip: PUT-ing back the exact value the upload endpoint
+    // returned (what the frontend's generic profile save does) must
+    // keep working.
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: uploadedPath });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe(uploadedPath);
+  });
+
+  it('still allows clearing logoPath with an empty string', async () => {
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: '' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe('');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/captureDateBackfill.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+/**
+ * Backfilling captured_at on a library imported before #1172.
+ *
+ * The point of the endpoint, rather than a migration: it resolves originals
+ * through resolvePhotoFilePath, which is the only path that reaches an
+ * external row. The thumbnail regenerator resolves under
+ * storage/events/active/<photo.path>, which never exists for those (#1129) —
+ * so it cannot be the model.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+describe('capture date backfill (#1172)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot;
+
+  const writeJpegWithExif = async (abs, iso) => {
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
+    const d = new Date(iso);
+    const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, '0');
+    const exifDate = `${d.getUTCFullYear()}:${pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1)}:${pad(d.getUTCDate())} `
+      + `${pad(d.getUTCHours())}:${pad(d.getUTCMinutes())}:${pad(d.getUTCSeconds())}`;
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 60, height: 40, channels: 3, background: { r: 9, g: 9, b: 9 } } })
+      .withExif({ IFD2: { DateTimeOriginal: exifDate } }).jpeg().toFile(abs);
+  };
+
+  const settle = async () => { for (let i = 0; i < 60; i++) { await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50)); const s = await status(); if (!s.body.isRunning) return s; } throw new Error('backfill did not settle'); };
+  const status = () => request(app).get('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates/status');
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capfill-'));
+    mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'capfill-secret';
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotoDimensions'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db) await db.destroy?.();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function seed({ relpath, exifIso, writeFile = true, archived = false }) {
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+    const [e] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'capfill', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'capfill', event_date: '2026-01-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `capfill-${Math.random()}`, expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'trip', is_archived: archived,
+    }).returning('id');
+    const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
+    if (writeFile) await writeJpegWithExif(path.join(mediaRoot, 'trip', relpath), exifIso);
+    const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: path.basename(relpath), path: `capfill/${path.basename(relpath)}`,
+      // Root-relative, as this branch stores it (#1163) — the file lives at
+      // <mediaRoot>/trip/<relpath>.
+      type: 'individual', source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: `trip/${relpath}`,
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(), captured_at: null,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return { eventId, photoId: typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p };
+  }
+
+  it('fills captured_at for an external photo the thumbnail regenerator cannot reach', async () => {
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'a.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z' });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
+    const done = await settle();
+
+    expect(done.body.lastResult.success).toBe(1);
+    expect((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('counts a photo with no EXIF separately from a failure', async () => {
+    // "The mount is broken" and "these files carry no date" need different
+    // answers from an operator, so they are not the same number.
+    await db('photos').del(); await db('events').del();
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'plain.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z', writeFile: false });
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 40, height: 30, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 1, b: 1 } } })
+      .jpeg().toFile(path.join(mediaRoot, 'trip', 'plain.jpg'));
+
+    await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    const done = await settle();
+
+    expect(done.body.lastResult).toMatchObject({ success: 0, noExif: 1, failed: 0 });
+    expect((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('counts an unreachable original as a failure, not as missing EXIF', async () => {
+    await seed({ relpath: 'gone.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z', writeFile: false });
+
+    await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    const done = await settle();
+
+    expect(done.body.lastResult).toMatchObject({ success: 0, noExif: 0, failed: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('reports nothing to do once every photo has a date', async () => {
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'b.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-02T09:00:00Z' });
+    await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).update({ captured_at: new Date().toISOString() });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
+    expect((await status()).body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('skips a watcher-imported video, which carries media_type "image"', async () => {
+    // fileWatcher.processNewPhoto sets type='video' and a video/* mime but
+    // never media_type (fileWatcher.js:128-130), so the row keeps the 'image'
+    // default from migration 048. Filtering on media_type alone queued it every
+    // run: extractCaptureDate returns null for a video, captured_at stays null,
+    // and the backlog never cleared.
+    const { eventId } = await seed({ relpath: 'clip.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z', writeFile: false });
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'clip.mp4', path: 'capfill/clip.mp4',
+      type: 'video', media_type: 'image', mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'trip/clip.mp4',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(), captured_at: null,
+    });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
+
+    const s = await status();
+    // And it is not counted as a permanent backlog either.
+    expect(s.body.total).toBe(0);
+    expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('never reports more dated photos than it has photos', async () => {
+    // Both counts come from one aggregate; as two queries an import committing
+    // between them produced withCaptureDate > total and a negative backlog.
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'counted.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-05T08:00:00Z' });
+    await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).update({ captured_at: new Date().toISOString() });
+
+    const s = await status();
+    expect(s.body.total).toBe(1);
+    expect(s.body.withCaptureDate).toBe(1);
+    expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
+    expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+  });
+
+  it('skips archived events instead of failing them on every run', async () => {
+    // Archiving deletes the originals and keeps the rows, so an archived photo
+    // can never get a date. Counting it would fail it every pass and leave the
+    // status endpoint permanently reporting a backlog.
+    await seed({ relpath: 'archived.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-04T09:00:00Z', archived: true });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
+    const s = await status();
+    expect(s.body.total).toBe(0);
+    expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
+    expect(s.body.isRunning).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('does not overwrite a date written while it was running', async () => {
+    // whereNull on the update: an import or a replacement finishing mid-run has
+    // already written a better value than this pass would.
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'c.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-03T09:00:00Z' });
+    const claimed = '2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z';
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
+    await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).update({ captured_at: claimed });
+    const done = await settle();
+
+    expect(new Date((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toISOString()).toBe(claimed);
+    expect(done.body.lastResult.success).toBe(0);
+    // Read but not written, so it is accounted for rather than dropped.
+    expect(done.body.lastResult.skipped).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('does not date a row whose file was replaced while it was reading (#1201)', async () => {
+    // replacePhoto swaps a NEW file under an existing row and rewrites
+    // path/filename (reachable from replace_by_name). The replacement carries
+    // no date of its own, so captured_at is still NULL and the whereNull guard
+    // alone would let the previous file's EXIF date land on it. The write is
+    // fenced on the identity that was read, so the row is skipped instead —
+    // and not counted as updated either.
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'orig.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-03T09:00:00Z' });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
+    // Simulate the replacement landing before the loop writes.
+    await db('photos').where({ id: photoId })
+      .update({ path: 'capfill/replaced.jpg', filename: 'replaced.jpg' });
+    const done = await settle();
+
+    expect((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toBeNull();
+    expect(done.body.lastResult.success).toBe(0);
+    // Not an error and not "no EXIF" — the date was found, another writer just
+    // got there first. It stays in the backlog for the next run.
+    expect(done.body.lastResult).toMatchObject({ noExif: 0, failed: 0, skipped: 1 });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/discountLineItems.test.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 // Service-level CRM calls cold-require heavy modules (pdfService,
 // nodemailer, etc.) on first use; the global 5 s per-test budget is
 // too tight for that. Bump it for this file only.
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('discount line items (negative unit_price_minor)', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/eventTypeRename.test.js

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
 // bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll.
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('event type slug rename cascade', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/externalImportCaptureDate.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/**
+ * External imports must record captured_at (#1172).
+ *
+ * Managed uploads get it from photoProcessor, which external media never goes
+ * through — so every externally imported photo carried captured_at NULL, and
+ * the gallery's "Date Taken" sort fell back to uploaded_at through its
+ * COALESCE. On a library imported in two batches that ordered a 12-day trip by
+ * which folder was imported first: the reporter's first two days landed at
+ * positions 4204-5296 of 5555.
+ *
+ * Driven through the real route against real files carrying real EXIF, because
+ * the whole question is whether the import reads the file it already has open.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+describe('external import capture dates (#1172)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot;
+
+  /**
+   * A real JPEG carrying DateTimeOriginal.
+   *
+   * IFD2, not IFD0 — DateTimeOriginal lives in the Exif IFD, and exifr does not
+   * see it anywhere else (IFD0 takes plain DateTime, which surfaces as
+   * ModifyDate instead).
+   */
+  const writeJpegWithExif = async (rel, iso) => {
+    const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    const d = new Date(iso);
+    const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, '0');
+    const exifDate = `${d.getUTCFullYear()}:${pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1)}:${pad(d.getUTCDate())} `
+      + `${pad(d.getUTCHours())}:${pad(d.getUTCMinutes())}:${pad(d.getUTCSeconds())}`;
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 60, height: 40, channels: 3, background: { r: 10, g: 20, b: 30 } } })
+      .withExif({ IFD2: { DateTimeOriginal: exifDate } })
+      .jpeg()
+      .toFile(full);
+    return full;
+  };
+
+  const writeJpegNoExif = async (rel) => {
+    const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 60, height: 40, channels: 3, background: { r: 200, g: 10, b: 10 } } })
+      .jpeg().toFile(full);
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capdate-'));
+    mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'capdate-secret';
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
+      requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => {
+      const actual = jest.requireActual('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+      return { ...actual, generateThumbnail: jest.fn(async () => 'thumbnails/mock.jpg'), ensureThumbnail: jest.fn() };
+    });
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('../../src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db) await db.destroy?.();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function seedEvent() {
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+    await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+    const [e] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: `capdate-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+      event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'capdate', event_date: '2026-01-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `capdate-${Math.random()}`, expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference',
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
+  }
+
+  const runImport = (eventId, external_path) => request(app)
+    .post(`/api/admin/external-media/events/${eventId}/import-external`)
+    .send({ external_path, recursive: true });
+
+  it('records the EXIF capture date on import', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await writeJpegWithExif('trip/a.jpg', '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'trip');
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
+    expect(photo.captured_at).toBeTruthy();
+    // NOT asserted as an absolute instant. EXIF carries a naive wall-clock
+    // time and exifr resolves it against the HOST timezone, so the stored UTC
+    // value differs between a CEST developer machine and a UTC runner. What
+    // this fix is about is that the field is populated and orders correctly;
+    // that captured_at is not a true instant is a separate, pre-existing
+    // problem shared with managed uploads (#1172's own footnote).
+    expect(new Date(photo.captured_at).getUTCFullYear()).toBe(2026);
+    expect(new Date(photo.captured_at).getUTCMonth()).toBe(5); // June
+  });
+
+  it('imports a photo with no EXIF date rather than failing it', async () => {
+    // Plenty of sources carry none; that must stay an import, not an error.
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await writeJpegNoExif('trip/plain.jpg');
+
+    const res = await runImport(eventId, 'trip');
+
+    expect(res.body.imported).toBe(1);
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
+    expect(photo.captured_at).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('orders a two-batch import by capture time, not by batch', async () => {
+    // The reported shape: the FIRST days of the trip imported second. Sorting
+    // on COALESCE(captured_at, uploaded_at) put them after the last days,
+    // because uploaded_at is the import timestamp.
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await writeJpegWithExif('late/day12.jpg', '2026-06-12T10:00:00Z');
+    await runImport(eventId, 'late');
+    await writeJpegWithExif('early/day01.jpg', '2026-06-01T10:00:00Z');
+    await runImport(eventId, 'early');
+
+    const rows = await db('photos')
+      .where({ event_id: eventId })
+      .orderByRaw('COALESCE(captured_at, uploaded_at) asc')
+      .select('filename');
+
+    expect(rows.map((r) => r.filename)).toEqual(['day01.jpg', 'day12.jpg']);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/externalImportConcurrency.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/**
+ * Two overlapping external imports insert every file twice (#1162).
+ *
+ * The route checked for an existing external_relpath and then inserted, with
+ * an fs.stat and a `sharp().metadata()` read sitting in between. A reporter
+ * double-clicked a slow import of a 6012-file tree and got 8004 rows.
+ *
+ * Both halves of the fix are driven here through the real route:
+ *
+ *   - the in-flight guard, which turns the second click into a 409 instead of
+ *     a second full walk of the tree;
+ *   - convergence when the guard cannot help (another replica, another
+ *     process), which is the unique index from migration 186 firing and the
+ *     loop counting a skip rather than dying or duplicating.
+ *
+ * The second is exercised by inserting a competing row from inside the mocked
+ * `sharp().metadata()` call — literally inside the window the bug lived in.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+describe('concurrent external imports (#1162)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot;
+  // When set, the mocked sharp metadata read inserts this row first — the
+  // other run winning the race between our SELECT and our INSERT.
+  let stealDuringMetadata = null;
+  let thumbnailDelayMs = 0;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-extdup-'));
+    mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(mediaRoot, 'nas', 'individual'), { recursive: true });
+    for (const name of ['a.jpg', 'b.jpg', 'c.jpg']) {
+      await fs.promises.writeFile(path.join(mediaRoot, 'nas', 'individual', name), 'not-a-real-jpeg');
+    }
+
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'extdup-secret';
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
+      requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+
+    // The window. In production this is a real decode of a NAS-hosted file —
+    // hundreds of milliseconds during which the row we just proved absent can
+    // appear. Standing in for the other run here makes that deterministic.
+    jest.doMock('sharp', () => () => ({
+      metadata: async () => {
+        if (stealDuringMetadata) {
+          const { db: liveDb } = require('../../src/database/db');
+          await liveDb('photos').insert(stealDuringMetadata);
+          stealDuringMetadata = null;
+        }
+        return { width: 100, height: 200 };
+      },
+    }));
+
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
+      generateThumbnail: jest.fn(async () => {
+        if (thumbnailDelayMs) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, thumbnailDelayMs));
+        return 'thumbnails/mock.jpg';
+      }),
+      ensureThumbnail: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('../../src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db) await db.destroy?.();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function seedEvent() {
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+    stealDuringMetadata = null;
+    thumbnailDelayMs = 0;
+    const [e] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: `extdup-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'extdup',
+      event_date: '2026-01-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `extdup-${Math.random()}`,
+      expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference',
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
+  }
+
+  const runImport = (eventId) => request(app)
+    .post(`/api/admin/external-media/events/${eventId}/import-external`)
+    .send({ external_path: 'nas', recursive: true });
+
+  async function relpathCounts(eventId) {
+    const rows = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).select('external_relpath');
+    const counts = new Map();
+    for (const r of rows) counts.set(r.external_relpath, (counts.get(r.external_relpath) || 0) + 1);
+    return counts;
+  }
+
+  it('rejects a second import while the first is still running', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    // Enough to keep the first request inside its loop while the second
+    // arrives — the "slow import looks hung, so I clicked again" case.
+    thumbnailDelayMs = 20;
+
+    const [first, second] = await Promise.all([runImport(eventId), runImport(eventId)]);
+
+    const statuses = [first.status, second.status].sort();
+    expect(statuses).toEqual([200, 409]);
+    const rejected = first.status === 409 ? first : second;
+    expect(rejected.body.error).toMatch(/already running/i);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves exactly one row per file after both runs', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    thumbnailDelayMs = 20;
+
+    await Promise.all([runImport(eventId), runImport(eventId)]);
+
+    const counts = await relpathCounts(eventId);
+    expect(counts.size).toBe(3);
+    expect([...counts.values()]).toEqual([1, 1, 1]);
+  });
+
+  it('releases the event once the import finishes, so a re-import still works', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+
+    expect((await runImport(eventId)).status).toBe(200);
+    // Not 409 — the guard is per run, not a permanent lock on the event.
+    const second = await runImport(eventId);
+    expect(second.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(second.body.imported).toBe(0);
+    expect(second.body.skipped).toBe(3);
+  });
+
+  it('converges when another writer wins the race mid-file', async () => {
+    // The guard is in-process, so it cannot see a second replica. This is what
+    // the unique index is for: the insert bounces, and the file is counted as
+    // skipped rather than duplicated or lost to a 500.
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    stealDuringMetadata = {
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'a.jpg',
+      path: 'x/a.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: path.join('nas', 'individual', 'a.jpg'),
+    };
+
+    const res = await runImport(eventId);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const counts = await relpathCounts(eventId);
+    expect(counts.get(path.join('nas', 'individual', 'a.jpg'))).toBe(1);
+    // Two imported by us, one lost to the other writer and reported honestly.
+    expect(res.body.imported).toBe(2);
+    expect(res.body.skipped).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('does not let one contended file abort the rest of the import', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    stealDuringMetadata = {
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'a.jpg',
+      path: 'x/a.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: path.join('nas', 'individual', 'a.jpg'),
+    };
+
+    await runImport(eventId);
+
+    // All three files present — the contended one via the other writer's row.
+    expect((await relpathCounts(eventId)).size).toBe(3);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/externalImportSecondFolder.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/**
+ * Importing a second folder must not move the photos already in the event (#1163).
+ *
+ * events.external_path is overwritten by every import, and external_relpath
+ * used to be stored relative to it — so a second import silently rebased every
+ * existing row onto the new folder. The reporter had 7547 of 8004 originals
+ * pointing at files that do not exist, and nothing said so: thumbnails are
+ * written to local storage during the import while the base path is still
+ * correct, so the grid carries on rendering.
+ *
+ * Driven through the real route and the real resolver, against a real
+ * directory tree — the failure is entirely about whether a file is where the
+ * app looks for it.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+describe('a second external import (#1163)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot; let resolvePhotoFilePath;
+
+  const touch = async (rel) => {
+    const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.writeFile(full, 'not-a-real-jpeg');
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-ext2nd-'));
+    mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'ext2nd-secret';
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
+      requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('sharp', () => () => ({ metadata: async () => ({ width: 100, height: 200 }) }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
+      generateThumbnail: jest.fn(async () => 'thumbnails/mock.jpg'),
+      ensureThumbnail: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+    ({ resolvePhotoFilePath } = require('../../src/services/photoResolver'));
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('../../src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db) await db.destroy?.();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function seedEvent() {
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+    await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+    const [e] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: `ext2nd-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'ext2nd',
+      event_date: '2026-01-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `ext2nd-${Math.random()}`,
+      expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference',
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
+  }
+
+  const runImport = (eventId, external_path) => request(app)
+    .post(`/api/admin/external-media/events/${eventId}/import-external`)
+    .send({ external_path, recursive: true });
+
+  /** Where the app would go looking for this photo's original, right now. */
+  async function resolved(eventId, filename) {
+    const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId, filename }).first();
+    return resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo);
+  }
+
+  it('stores paths relative to the media root, not to the imported folder', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/old.jpg');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
+    expect(photo.external_relpath).toBe(path.join('Trip', 'Leknes', 'old.jpg'));
+  });
+
+  it('leaves the first folder’s originals reachable after a second import', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/old.jpg');
+    await touch('Trip/Sub/new.jpg');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
+    const before = await resolved(eventId, 'old.jpg');
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip/Sub');
+    const after = await resolved(eventId, 'old.jpg');
+
+    // The regression: `after` used to be <root>/Trip/Sub/Leknes/old.jpg.
+    expect(after).toBe(before);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(after)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('every original in the event is still on disk afterwards', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/a.jpg');
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/b.jpg');
+    await touch('Trip/Sub/c.jpg');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip/Sub');
+
+    const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+    const photos = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId });
+    expect(photos).toHaveLength(3);
+    for (const photo of photos) {
+      expect(fs.existsSync(resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo))).toBe(true);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('does not re-insert a file the first import already took', async () => {
+    // The dedupe check compares stored paths, so it has to be comparing the
+    // same shape the insert writes.
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await touch('Trip/Sub/c.jpg');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
+    const second = await runImport(eventId, 'Trip/Sub');
+
+    expect(second.body.imported).toBe(0);
+    expect(second.body.skipped).toBe(1);
+    expect(await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('resolves a subfolder that repeats its parent’s name', async () => {
+    // The old resolver stripped the relpath's first segment when it matched the
+    // base path's last one, which broke exactly this layout.
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await touch('Trip/Trip/x.jpg');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
+
+    const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
+    expect(resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo)).toBe(path.join(mediaRoot, 'Trip', 'Trip', 'x.jpg'));
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/externalRelpathFoldPg.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/**
+ * PostgreSQL integration test for the external-path fold (#1163).
+ *
+ * Gated the same way as picpeakRestorePg: runs only when PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL
+ * points at a throwaway Postgres DB, e.g.
+ *   PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:picpeak_secure_pass_2024@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_fold_test" \
+ *     npx jest __tests__/integration/externalRelpathFoldPg.test.js
+ *
+ * This exists because of a defect SQLite could not have caught. The two-pass
+ * rewrite parks each row on a temporary value, and that value was first written
+ * with a leading NUL. SQLite stores NUL in TEXT without complaint; Postgres
+ * rejects it outright ("invalid byte sequence for encoding UTF8"), so migration
+ * 187 would have rolled back on exactly the installs needing the repair — and
+ * only on the engine most of them run.
+ *
+ * The staging value is therefore an engine-level contract, not an
+ * implementation detail, and it is pinned here on the engine that constrains it.
+ */
+
+const knex = require('knex');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
+const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
+
+maybe('external relpath fold on Postgres', () => {
+  let pgDb; let mediaRoot; let fold;
+
+  const touch = async (rel, bytes) => {
+    const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.writeFile(full, Buffer.alloc(bytes));
+    return bytes;
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    mediaRoot = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-foldpg-'));
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+    jest.resetModules();
+    ({ foldExternalRelpaths: fold } = require('../../src/services/externalRelpathFold'));
+
+    pgDb = knex({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL });
+  }, 60000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (pgDb) await pgDb.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    delete process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT;
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS photos, events, app_settings CASCADE');
+    await pgDb.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.text('external_path');
+    });
+    await pgDb.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.text('external_relpath');
+      t.bigInteger('size_bytes');
+      t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
+    });
+    await pgDb.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.string('setting_key');
+      t.text('setting_value');
+      t.string('setting_type');
+      t.string('updated_at');
+    });
+    await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+  });
+
+  const relpaths = async () =>
+    (await pgDb('photos').orderBy('id').select('external_relpath')).map((r) => r.external_relpath);
+
+  it('completes the two-pass repair that a NUL staging value would abort', async () => {
+    // The exact shape that forces staging: `photo.jpg` repairs up to
+    // `Trip/photo.jpg`, while the row already holding `Trip/photo.jpg` folds
+    // deeper. Every final value is distinct, but a final value equals another
+    // row's current one, so the rewrite has to park first.
+    const a = await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 11);
+    const b = await touch('Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg', 22);
+    await pgDb('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await pgDb('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: a, source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/photo.jpg', size_bytes: b, source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await fold(pgDb);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/photo.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves no staging value behind', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg', 8);
+    await pgDb('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await pgDb('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', size_bytes: 8, source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await fold(pgDb);
+
+    const rows = await relpaths();
+    expect(rows).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
+    expect(rows.some((r) => r.includes('staging'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('folds and marks in one transaction', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg', 8);
+    await pgDb('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await pgDb('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', size_bytes: 8, source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await fold(pgDb);
+    // Second run is a no-op: the marker committed with the rewrites.
+    await fold(pgDb);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/galleryFilterFeedbackVisibility.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/**
+ * Guest filters must respect show_feedback_to_guests (#1044 follow-up).
+ *
+ * Every filter token on /photos is an OR of two halves: what THIS viewer
+ * marked, and what ANYONE marked. The response fields built from the second
+ * half — like_count, comment_count — are all gated on
+ * show_feedback_to_guests. The FILTER was not.
+ *
+ * So with the setting off, the numbers were hidden but `?filter=liked` still
+ * returned exactly the photos other people had liked: the same information as
+ * a set instead of a count, one token at a time. These tests pin the gate on
+ * every token, and pin that the viewer's own half is never gated — filtering
+ * by what you yourself marked is yours to do regardless.
+ */
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'filter-visibility-secret';
+
+const SLUG = 'filter-visibility-event';
+const ME = 'guest-me-identifier';
+const SOMEONE_ELSE = 'guest-other-identifier';
+
+describe('guest filters and show_feedback_to_guests (#1044)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let mine;
+  let theirs;
+  let myGuestRowId;
+
+  const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  const setVisibility = (visible) => db('event_feedback_settings')
+    .where({ event_id: eventId })
+    .update({ show_feedback_to_guests: visible });
+
+  // A real verified guest, which is how the viewer's own feedback is actually
+  // identified — NOT the `guest_id` query parameter the frontend invents.
+  const guestToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { type: 'guest', guestId: myGuestRowId, eventId },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  const filter = async (token, { as = 'me', claimGuestId } = {}) => {
+    const req = request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
+      .query({ filter: token, ...(claimGuestId ? { guest_id: claimGuestId } : {}) })
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+    if (as === 'me') req.set('x-guest-token', guestToken());
+    const res = await req;
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const photos = Array.isArray(res.body) ? res.body : res.body.photos;
+    return (photos || []).map((p) => p.id).sort((a, b) => a - b);
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Filter Visibility',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'filter-visibility-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const addPhoto = async (name) => {
+      const p = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename: name,
+        path: `events/filter/${name}`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      return p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
+    };
+    mine = await addPhoto('mine.jpg');
+    theirs = await addPhoto('theirs.jpg');
+
+    await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      feedback_enabled: true,
+      allow_likes: true,
+      allow_comments: true,
+      allow_ratings: true,
+      allow_favorites: true,
+      moderate_comments: false,
+      show_feedback_to_guests: true,
+    });
+
+    const guestRow = await db('gallery_guests').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      name: 'Me',
+      identifier: ME,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      last_seen_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      is_deleted: false,
+    }).returning('id');
+    myGuestRowId = guestRow[0]?.id ?? guestRow[0];
+
+    const feedback = (photoId, who, type, extra = {}) => db('photo_feedback').insert({
+      photo_id: photoId,
+      event_id: eventId,
+      guest_identifier: who,
+      // Submission links to the per-person guest row when one is present, and
+      // that is the column the viewer's own half resolves through.
+      guest_id: who === ME ? myGuestRowId : null,
+      feedback_type: type,
+      is_approved: true,
+      is_hidden: false,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      ...extra,
+    });
+
+    // Everything on `theirs` belongs to somebody else; `mine` is this viewer's.
+    await feedback(mine, ME, 'like');
+    await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'like');
+    await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'favorite');
+    await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'comment', { comment_text: 'lovely' });
+    await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'rating', { rating: 5 });
+
+    // The denormalized counters the aggregate half of the filter reads.
+    await db('photos').where('id', theirs).update({
+      like_count: 1, favorite_count: 1, comment_count: 1, average_rating: 5,
+    });
+    await db('photos').where('id', mine).update({ like_count: 1 });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  describe('with feedback visible to guests', () => {
+    beforeAll(() => setVisibility(true));
+
+    it('shows other people\'s marks through every token, as before', async () => {
+      expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([mine, theirs].sort((a, b) => a - b));
+      expect(await filter('favorited')).toEqual([theirs]);
+      expect(await filter('rated')).toEqual([theirs]);
+      expect(await filter('commented')).toEqual([theirs]);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('with feedback hidden from guests', () => {
+    beforeAll(() => setVisibility(false));
+
+    it('stops every token from selecting on other people\'s marks', async () => {
+      // `theirs` is the photo only other guests marked. It must not come back
+      // through any token — a filter that selects on hidden feedback reports
+      // that feedback just as surely as a count would.
+      expect(await filter('favorited')).toEqual([]);
+      expect(await filter('rated')).toEqual([]);
+      expect(await filter('commented')).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it('still filters by what the viewer marked themselves', async () => {
+      // The viewer's own half is never gated: this is their own action, and
+      // hiding it would break "show me the ones I liked" for no privacy gain.
+      expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([mine]);
+    });
+
+    it('drops the viewer\'s own feedback once an admin hides it', async () => {
+      // Moderation has to reach the filter too. getPhotoFeedback excludes
+      // hidden rows for the guest's OWN feedback, so a photo matching here
+      // would come back with nothing visible on it to explain why.
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: mine, guest_id: myGuestRowId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: true });
+
+      expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([]);
+
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: mine, guest_id: myGuestRowId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: false });
+      expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([mine]);
+    });
+
+    it('ignores a guest_id supplied by the caller', async () => {
+      // The own-half is resolved from the request identity. If it honoured the
+      // query string instead, anyone holding another guest's identifier could
+      // read that guest's hidden memberships one token at a time — straight
+      // back through the gate this file exists to pin.
+      expect(await filter('favorited', { claimGuestId: SOMEONE_ELSE })).toEqual([]);
+      // And an anonymous caller claiming to be me gets nothing of mine.
+      expect(await filter('liked', { as: 'anon', claimGuestId: ME })).toEqual([]);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/galleryShortUrlRoute.test.js

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const request = require('supertest');
 
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(60000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db; let cleanup; let service; let app;
 

backend/__tests__/integration/galleryShortUrls.test.js

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  */
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(60000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db; let cleanup; let service; let adminId;
 

backend/__tests__/integration/hiddenOwnFeedback.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+/**
+ * Hidden feedback, seen from the guest who left it (#1150).
+ *
+ * Everything in the system treats a hidden row as absent: getPhotoFeedback
+ * drops it even for the guest's own feedback, the /photos filters drop it, and
+ * updatePhotoFeedbackStats does not count it. One place disagreed — the
+ * per-viewer `is_liked` heart — so a like the photographer had hidden still
+ * showed as liked on a photo whose like_count was zero. (The `my_color_label`
+ * badge has the same shape on main; colour labels are not on this branch.)
+ *
+ * Making those two agree exposes the second half: the duplicate check that
+ * powers like/favorite toggling did NOT skip hidden rows, so the now-empty
+ * heart, when clicked, found the hidden row and toggled it OFF. The click
+ * appeared to do nothing and it took two more to get back to a filled heart.
+ *
+ * Hiding a non-comment is deliberate, not an accident of the raw route: #839
+ * and #1044 both ship it, with tests asserting that a hidden reaction or
+ * colour label stops counting. So the fix is to make hidden mean absent
+ * consistently — not to stop admins hiding these.
+ */
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'hidden-feedback-secret';
+
+const SLUG = 'hidden-own-feedback';
+const ME = 'guest-me-identifier';
+
+describe('a guest\'s own hidden feedback (#1150)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let feedbackService;
+  let eventId; let photoId; let myGuestRowId;
+
+  const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+  const guestToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { type: 'guest', guestId: myGuestRowId, eventId },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  const getPhoto = async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
+      .set('x-guest-token', guestToken());
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const photos = Array.isArray(res.body) ? res.body : res.body.photos;
+    return (photos || []).find((p) => p.id === photoId);
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    feedbackService = require('../../src/services/feedbackService');
+
+    const [ev] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Hidden Own Feedback',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'hidden-own-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = typeof ev === 'object' ? ev.id : ev;
+
+    const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'shot.jpg', path: 'events/hidden/shot.jpg',
+      type: 'individual', uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    photoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
+
+    const [g] = await db('gallery_guests').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, name: 'Me', identifier: ME,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(), last_seen_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      is_deleted: false,
+    }).returning('id');
+    myGuestRowId = typeof g === 'object' ? g.id : g;
+
+    await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, feedback_enabled: true, allow_likes: true,
+      moderate_comments: false,
+      show_feedback_to_guests: true,
+    });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/galleryFeedback'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  const like = () => db('photo_feedback').insert({
+    photo_id: photoId, event_id: eventId, guest_identifier: ME,
+    guest_id: myGuestRowId, feedback_type: 'like',
+    is_approved: true, is_hidden: false, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('photo_feedback').where({ photo_id: photoId }).del();
+    await db('photos').where('id', photoId).update({ like_count: 0 });
+  });
+
+  describe('the read surfaces agree with each other', () => {
+    it('un-fills the heart once the like is hidden', async () => {
+      await like();
+      await feedbackService.updatePhotoFeedbackStats(photoId);
+      expect((await getPhoto()).is_liked).toBe(true);
+
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: true });
+      await feedbackService.updatePhotoFeedbackStats(photoId);
+
+      const photo = await getPhoto();
+      // like_count already ignored hidden rows, so the heart was the only
+      // thing still claiming this photo was liked.
+      expect(photo.like_count).toBe(0);
+      expect(photo.is_liked).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+  });
+
+  describe('and every other surface agrees', () => {
+    it('keeps a hidden like out of /my-feedback', async () => {
+      await like();
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: true });
+
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/my-feedback`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
+        .set('x-guest-token', guestToken());
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+      // In guest identity mode the Liked/Favorited/Rated chips and their
+      // filters are built from THIS array, not from is_liked — so a hidden
+      // like left an empty heart while the chip still counted it.
+      expect(res.body.filter((f) => f.feedback_type === 'like')).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('does not count a hidden row against the guest cap', async () => {
+      await db('event_feedback_settings')
+        .where({ event_id: eventId }).update({ max_likes_per_guest: 1 });
+      await like();
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: true });
+
+      // The hidden row is room, not an occupant: the guest sees an empty
+      // heart, and meeting that click with limit_reached leaves the control
+      // dead until they un-like something they can still see.
+      const result = await feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
+        feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: ME, guest_id: myGuestRowId,
+      });
+      expect(result.limit_reached).toBeUndefined();
+
+      await db('event_feedback_settings')
+        .where({ event_id: eventId }).update({ max_likes_per_guest: null });
+    });
+
+    it('leaves other anonymous rows alone when there is no identity to scope by', async () => {
+      // With neither guest_id nor guest_identifier the collapse scope degrades
+      // to `guest_identifier IS NULL` — every identifier-less row on the
+      // photo, i.e. other people's.
+      const anon = (extra) => ({
+        photo_id: photoId, event_id: eventId, feedback_type: 'like',
+        is_approved: true, created_at: new Date().toISOString(), ...extra,
+      });
+      const [h] = await db('photo_feedback').insert(anon({ is_hidden: true })).returning('id');
+      const hiddenId = typeof h === 'object' ? h.id : h;
+      await db('photo_feedback').insert(anon({ is_hidden: false }));
+      await db('photo_feedback').insert(anon({ is_hidden: false }));
+
+      await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(hiddenId, 'approve', 1);
+
+      expect(await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like', is_hidden: false }))
+        .toHaveLength(3);
+    });
+
+    it('collapses the replacement when an admin unhides the original', async () => {
+      await like();
+      const original = await db('photo_feedback').where({ photo_id: photoId }).first();
+      await db('photo_feedback').where('id', original.id).update({ is_hidden: true });
+
+      await feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
+        feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: ME, guest_id: myGuestRowId,
+      });
+      expect(await db('photo_feedback').where({ photo_id: photoId })).toHaveLength(2);
+
+      await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(original.id, 'approve', 1);
+
+      // Two visible rows for one guest would double-count in the tallies and
+      // need two toggles to clear, since each deletes a single row.
+      const visible = await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like', is_hidden: false });
+      expect(visible).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(visible[0].id).toBe(original.id);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('and clicking still works afterwards', () => {
+    it('re-liking creates a fresh row instead of toggling the hidden one off', async () => {
+      await like();
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: true });
+
+      // What the guest sees is an empty heart, so this is an ADD.
+      const result = await feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
+        feedback_type: 'like',
+        guest_identifier: ME,
+        guest_id: myGuestRowId,
+      });
+
+      // Before this, the duplicate check found the hidden row and deleted it —
+      // `removed: true` — so the click did nothing visible and the moderation
+      // was silently undone.
+      expect(result.removed).toBeUndefined();
+
+      const visible = await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like', is_hidden: false });
+      expect(visible).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect((await getPhoto()).is_liked).toBe(true);
+    });
+  });
+
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/incomingInvoiceRebill.test.js

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
 // Service-level CRM calls cold-require heavy modules (pdfService, nodemailer)
 // on first use; bump the budget for this file.
-jest.setTimeout(60000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('incoming-invoice categorise / re-bill chain', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/installFromBackupBoot.test.js

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/restoreService', () => ({
   },
 }));
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('installFromBackupBoot', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/invoiceDunning.test.js

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 // bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll; under full-suite
 // parallel load on a small CI runner that can exceed the 5s default. Match the
 // other migration-heavy CRM suites (discountLineItems, incomingInvoiceRebill).
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db;
 let cleanup;

backend/__tests__/integration/maintenanceJobState.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/**
+ * Shared run state for the maintenance sweeps (#1181).
+ *
+ * The behaviour that matters here cannot be observed from one process holding
+ * a module-level flag, which is exactly why the flag moved into the database.
+ * A second replica is simulated the only way that is honest in a single-process
+ * test: by asserting on the shared row itself, and by driving claim() twice —
+ * a second caller getting null is precisely what a second replica gets.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+describe('maintenance job state (#1181)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let app; let jobs;
+
+  const dimStatus = () => request(app).get('/api/admin/photos/repair-dimensions/status');
+  const capStatus = () => request(app).get('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates/status');
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mjs-'));
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mjs-secret';
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+    jobs = require('../../src/services/maintenanceJobState');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotoDimensions'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db) await db.destroy?.();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').update({
+      is_running: false, started_at: null, heartbeat_at: null, finished_at: null, last_result: null, owner: null, claim_token: null,
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('the lease table is kept out of .picpeak archives', () => {
+    // It is live state, not data. An archive taken mid-sweep would otherwise
+    // carry is_running = true and a claim token owned by a process on the
+    // SOURCE install; restored inside the staleness window, the target reports
+    // the job as running and refuses new POSTs with no runner to release it.
+    // The importer filters on this same set, so archives written before the
+    // exclusion are skipped on restore too.
+    const { EXCLUDED_TABLES } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService');
+    expect(EXCLUDED_TABLES.has('maintenance_jobs')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('the migration seeds a row for each job', async () => {
+    const names = await db('maintenance_jobs').pluck('job_name');
+    expect(names.sort()).toEqual(['photo_capture_date_backfill', 'photo_dimension_repair']);
+  });
+
+  test('a second claim is refused while the first is alive', async () => {
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    // What a second replica's POST does. Nothing about the first claim lives in
+    // this process, so this is the same question the other replica asks.
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test('the two jobs claim independently', async () => {
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+  });
+
+  test('each claim gets a distinct token', async () => {
+    const first = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, first);
+    const second = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    // Same process, same pid — so an owner string would have collided here and
+    // the fencing below would be worthless.
+    expect(second).not.toBe(first);
+  });
+
+  test('a claim whose heartbeat has gone quiet can be taken over', async () => {
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toBeNull();
+
+    // The replica holding it was killed: no release, no further heartbeats.
+    const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
+
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+  });
+
+  test('a superseded runner cannot renew its lease', async () => {
+    const oldToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
+    const newToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    expect(newToken).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+
+    // The old runner is still alive and mid-loop. Its renewal must tell it so,
+    // which is what makes the route loop stop instead of running alongside the
+    // new owner.
+    expect(await jobs.heartbeat(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, oldToken)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await jobs.heartbeat(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, newToken)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('a superseded runner cannot release the new owner\'s claim', async () => {
+    const oldToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
+    const newToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+
+    // The old runner finishes late and tries to write its result. Unfenced,
+    // this cleared is_running under the new owner and let a THIRD sweep start.
+    expect(await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, oldToken, { success: 999, noExif: 0, failed: 0 })).toBe(false);
+
+    const state = await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    expect(state.isRunning).toBe(true);
+    expect(state.lastResult).toBeNull();
+    // And the row is still the new owner's to release.
+    expect(await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, newToken, { success: 1, noExif: 0, failed: 0 })).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('a stale run reads as not running, so the button comes back', async () => {
+    await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).isRunning).toBe(true);
+
+    const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
+
+    // is_running is still true in the row — nothing released it — but a status
+    // poll must not leave the operator staring at a job that cannot finish.
+    expect((await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).first()).is_running).toBeTruthy();
+    expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).isRunning).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('a heartbeat keeps a long run claimed', async () => {
+    const token = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
+
+    expect(await jobs.heartbeat(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, token)).toBe(true);
+
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toBeNull();
+    expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).isRunning).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('release stores the result and read gives it back parsed', async () => {
+    const token = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, token, { success: 3, noExif: 2, failed: 1 });
+
+    const state = await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    expect(state.isRunning).toBe(false);
+    expect(state.lastResult).toEqual({ success: 3, noExif: 2, failed: 1 });
+  });
+
+  test('releasing without a result keeps the previous run visible', async () => {
+    const first = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, first, { success: 7, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
+
+    // The "nothing to do" path: claimed, found no candidates, released. It must
+    // not blank the numbers the last real run reported.
+    const second = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, second);
+
+    expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL)).lastResult).toEqual({ success: 7, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
+  });
+
+  test('a malformed result does not take the status endpoint down', async () => {
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ last_result: 'not json' });
+    const state = await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    expect(state.lastResult).toBeNull();
+    expect(state.isRunning).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('both status endpoints report the shared row, not process memory', async () => {
+    await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    const capToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, capToken, { success: 1, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
+
+    // Written straight to the row, exactly as another replica would have.
+    const dim = await dimStatus();
+    expect(dim.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(dim.body.isRunning).toBe(true);
+
+    const cap = await capStatus();
+    expect(cap.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(cap.body.isRunning).toBe(false);
+    expect(cap.body.lastResult).toEqual({ success: 1, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
+  });
+
+  test('a POST is refused while another replica holds the claim', async () => {
+    // The claim was taken by "another replica" — this process knows nothing
+    // about it beyond the row.
+    await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(409);
+
+    const dimRes = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-dimensions');
+    // The other job is untouched by that claim, so it is free to start.
+    expect(dimRes.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  test('the no-op path releases the claim it took', async () => {
+    // No photos at all, so both endpoints take their "nothing to do" exit.
+    await db('photos').del();
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
+
+    const row = await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL }).first();
+    expect(row.is_running).toBeFalsy();
+    // ...and a second POST is therefore accepted rather than 409ing forever.
+    expect((await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates')).status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/maintenanceJobStatePg.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/**
+ * PostgreSQL checks for the shared maintenance-job state (#1181).
+ * Gated: runs only when PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL points at a throwaway database, e.g.
+ *   PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:picpeak_secure_pass_2024@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_mjs_test" \
+ *     npx jest __tests__/integration/maintenanceJobStatePg.test.js
+ *
+ * What SQLite cannot answer: the claim leans on comparing a `timestamp` column
+ * against an ISO-8601 string, and on an UPDATE ... WHERE guard being atomic
+ * under real concurrent connections. SQLite compares those strings
+ * lexicographically and serialises writes anyway, so it would pass either way —
+ * exactly the shape of divergence that has bitten this repo before.
+ */
+
+const knex = require('knex');
+
+const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
+const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
+
+maybe('maintenance job state on Postgres', () => {
+  let pgDb;
+  let jobs;
+  const JOB = 'photo_dimension_repair';
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    pgDb = knex({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL, pool: { min: 0, max: 10 } });
+    await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS maintenance_jobs');
+    await require('../../migrations/core/179_maintenance_job_state').up(pgDb);
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: pgDb }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+    jobs = require('../../src/services/maintenanceJobState');
+  }, 60000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
+    if (pgDb) await pgDb.destroy();
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').update({
+      is_running: false, started_at: null, heartbeat_at: null, finished_at: null, last_result: null, owner: null, claim_token: null,
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('the ISO-string cutoff really compares as a timestamp, not as text', async () => {
+    expect(await jobs.claim(JOB)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    expect(await jobs.claim(JOB)).toBeNull();
+
+    await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB })
+      .update({ heartbeat_at: new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString() });
+
+    // If Postgres had rejected or mis-cast the ISO string this would either
+    // throw or never match.
+    expect(await jobs.claim(JOB)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+
+    const row = await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB }).first();
+    expect(row.heartbeat_at).toBeInstanceOf(Date);
+  });
+
+  test('concurrent claims on real connections produce exactly one winner', async () => {
+    // The whole point of the conditional UPDATE. Ten connections race; nine
+    // must lose. SQLite cannot demonstrate this — it serialises writers.
+    const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 10 }, () => jobs.claim(JOB)));
+    expect(results.filter(Boolean)).toHaveLength(1);
+    // ...and the winner holds a token nobody else can forge.
+    expect(results.find(Boolean)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+  });
+
+  test('a released job can be re-claimed exactly once again', async () => {
+    const token = await jobs.claim(JOB);
+    await jobs.release(JOB, token, { success: 2, failed: 0 });
+
+    const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 5 }, () => jobs.claim(JOB)));
+    expect(results.filter(Boolean)).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).lastResult).toEqual({ success: 2, failed: 0 });
+  });
+
+  test('a superseded runner is fenced out on real Postgres', async () => {
+    const oldToken = await jobs.claim(JOB);
+    await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB })
+      .update({ heartbeat_at: new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString() });
+    const newToken = await jobs.claim(JOB);
+
+    expect(await jobs.heartbeat(JOB, oldToken)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await jobs.release(JOB, oldToken, { success: 999, failed: 0 })).toBe(false);
+    // The new owner still holds it, with its result unwritten.
+    expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).isRunning).toBe(true);
+    expect(await jobs.release(JOB, newToken, { success: 4, failed: 0 })).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('read() reports a live claim as running and a stale one as not', async () => {
+    await jobs.claim(JOB);
+    expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).isRunning).toBe(true);
+
+    await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB })
+      .update({ heartbeat_at: new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 1000).toISOString() });
+    expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).isRunning).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/picpeakCrossEngine.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * Cross-engine .picpeak restore policy (#1041): a SQLite archive restored onto
+ * a PostgreSQL instance — the official small-install → full-stack upgrade
+ * path — now allowed by validateManifest's direction rule instead of the
+ * former CLI-only allowEngineSwitch flag. The coercion engine itself
+ * (typedColumnsFor / epochToIso / coerceForTargetEngine) landed with #1039;
+ * these tests pin the direction policy and the coercion's cross-engine
+ * value-correctness.
+ *
+ * Ungated: validateManifest direction rules and the pure coercion units.
+ * The reverse direction (pg backup onto a sqlite instance) staying blocked is
+ * pinned by picpeakRoundtrip.test.js, which runs on the real sqlite harness.
+ *
+ * Gated on PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL (same contract as picpeakRestorePg.test.js):
+ * sqlite-shaped NDJSON rows land in real Postgres with correct stored VALUES,
+ * not just row counts, e.g.
+ *   PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:pw@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_xengine_test" \
+ *     npx jest __tests__/integration/picpeakCrossEngine.test.js
+ */
+const knexLib = require('knex');
+
+describe('validateManifest cross-engine direction (pg target)', () => {
+  let validateManifest;
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg' }));
+    // validateManifest wraps its knex_migrations lookup in try/catch — a
+    // throwing stub simply skips the forward-only check, which is not under
+    // test here.
+    jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: () => { throw new Error('stub'); } }));
+    ({ validateManifest } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
+  });
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
+    jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
+    jest.resetModules();
+  });
+
+  it('allows a sqlite backup onto a pg instance (upgrade direction)', async () => {
+    const blockers = await validateManifest({
+      kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'sqlite' }, tables: {},
+    });
+    expect(blockers.filter((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('still allows same-engine pg → pg', async () => {
+    const blockers = await validateManifest({
+      kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'pg' }, tables: {},
+    });
+    expect(blockers.filter((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('epochToIso (landed with #1039)', () => {
+  let epochToIso;
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    ({ epochToIso } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
+  });
+
+  it('converts epoch milliseconds', () => {
+    expect(epochToIso(1723400000000)).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
+  });
+
+  it('converts epoch SECONDS to the same instant, not January 1970', () => {
+    expect(epochToIso(1723400000)).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
+  });
+
+  it('converts numeric strings', () => {
+    expect(epochToIso('1723400000000')).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
+  });
+
+  it('passes non-numeric values through untouched', () => {
+    expect(epochToIso('2026-08-12 10:00:00')).toBe('2026-08-12 10:00:00');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('coerceForTargetEngine on sqlite-shaped rows', () => {
+  let coerceForTargetEngine;
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    ({ coerceForTargetEngine } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
+  });
+
+  const types = { timestamps: ['created_at', 'expires_at'], booleans: ['is_active'] };
+
+  it('coerces 0/1 booleans and epoch timestamps, leaves date strings alone', () => {
+    const [row] = coerceForTargetEngine(
+      [{ id: 1, is_active: 1, created_at: 1723400000000, expires_at: '2026-09-01 12:00:00' }],
+      types
+    );
+    expect(row.is_active).toBe(true);
+    expect(row.created_at).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
+    expect(row.expires_at).toBe('2026-09-01 12:00:00'); // pg parses this natively
+  });
+
+  it('coerces falsy variants and passes null/empty through', () => {
+    const [row] = coerceForTargetEngine(
+      [{ is_active: 0, created_at: null, expires_at: '' }],
+      types
+    );
+    expect(row.is_active).toBe(false);
+    expect(row.created_at).toBeNull();
+    expect(row.expires_at).toBe('');
+  });
+});
+
+// ── Real-Postgres integration (gated) ────────────────────────────────────────
+const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
+const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
+
+maybe('sqlite-shaped rows land correctly in real Postgres', () => {
+  let pgDb;
+  let svc;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    pgDb = knexLib({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL });
+    await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS xengine_events, xengine_settings CASCADE');
+    await pgDb.schema.createTable('xengine_events', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.string('slug');
+      t.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
+      t.boolean('allow_downloads').defaultTo(true);
+      t.timestamp('created_at');
+      t.timestamp('expires_at');
+    });
+    await pgDb.schema.createTable('xengine_settings', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.string('setting_key').notNullable().unique();
+      t.jsonb('setting_value');
+    });
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg' }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: pgDb }));
+    svc = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService');
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
+    jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
+    if (pgDb) {
+      await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS xengine_events, xengine_settings CASCADE');
+      await pgDb.destroy();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('typedColumnsFor classifies boolean and timestamp columns via columnInfo()', async () => {
+    const types = await svc.typedColumnsFor(pgDb, 'xengine_events');
+    expect(types.booleans.sort()).toEqual(['allow_downloads', 'is_active']);
+    expect(types.timestamps.sort()).toEqual(['created_at', 'expires_at']);
+  });
+
+  it('inserts a sqlite archive row (0/1 booleans, epoch dates, json text) with correct stored values', async () => {
+    // Exactly what a sqlite-created .picpeak carries: integers for booleans,
+    // epoch numbers for #485-shape timestamps (ms here, seconds covered by the
+    // epochToIso unit), a "YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS" string for clean ones, and
+    // json columns as TEXT (the crossEngine path skips serialiseJsonColumns —
+    // the text is already what pg wants).
+    const epoch = 1723400000000;
+    const eventRows = [
+      { id: 1, slug: 'wedding', is_active: 1, allow_downloads: 0, created_at: epoch, expires_at: '2026-09-01 12:00:00' },
+    ];
+    const settingRows = [{ id: 1, setting_key: 'brand', setting_value: '{"name":"PicPeak","dark":true}' }];
+
+    await pgDb.transaction(async (trx) => {
+      const evTypes = await svc.typedColumnsFor(trx, 'xengine_events');
+      await trx.batchInsert('xengine_events', svc.coerceForTargetEngine(eventRows, evTypes), 100);
+      const stTypes = await svc.typedColumnsFor(trx, 'xengine_settings');
+      await trx.batchInsert('xengine_settings', svc.coerceForTargetEngine(settingRows, stTypes), 100);
+    });
+
+    const ev = await pgDb('xengine_events').where({ id: 1 }).first();
+    expect(ev.is_active).toBe(true);          // 1 → true, not backwards (#1028 class)
+    expect(ev.allow_downloads).toBe(false);   // 0 → false
+    expect(new Date(ev.created_at).getTime()).toBe(epoch);
+    expect(new Date(ev.expires_at).toISOString().slice(0, 10)).toBe('2026-09-01');
+
+    const st = await pgDb('xengine_settings').where({ id: 1 }).first();
+    // jsonb parsed back by the driver — value intact, no double encoding.
+    expect(st.setting_value).toEqual({ name: 'PicPeak', dark: true });
+  });
+
+  it('id sequence works after explicit-id insert + resync (next natural insert)', async () => {
+    await svc.resyncSequences(['xengine_events']);
+    const [next] = await pgDb('xengine_events')
+      .insert({ slug: 'fresh', is_active: true })
+      .returning('id');
+    expect(Number(next.id || next)).toBe(2);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/picpeakExport.test.js

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
   ({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
   process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpDir; // isolate file collection to the temp dir
   ({ createPicpeak } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService'));
-}, 60000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => {
   await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/integration/picpeakRoundtrip.test.js

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
   ({ importFromPicpeak, validateManifest } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
   const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
   superAdminRoleId = role.id;
-}, 60000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => {
   await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/integration/publishPasswordPolicy.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/**
+ * Publishing must not be a way around the configured gallery password policy.
+ *
+ * `POST /:id/publish` (#627) re-hashes `password_hash` from a plaintext the
+ * admin re-types in the publish dialog, and validated it with nothing but
+ * express-validator's `isLength({ min: 6 })`. So the configured complexity —
+ * moderate by default, meaning 8 characters plus upper, lower and a digit —
+ * governed event creation and password reset, while this door accepted
+ * `aaaaaa` and made it the live gallery password.
+ *
+ * Not an escalation: it needs admin auth plus events.edit, and such an admin
+ * could already set a weak password elsewhere. It is a policy gap — the admin
+ * UI advertises a complexity level this write path did not enforce.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-pubpolicy-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'publish-policy-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-pubpolicy-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
+} = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('publish enforces the gallery password policy', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let token;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    const { adminId } = await seedMinimal(db);
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+    app = buildRouteApp('/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  async function seedDraft(slug) {
+    const [row] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: `Event ${slug}`,
+      event_date: '2026-09-01',
+      host_email: 'client@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'original-hash',
+      require_password: 1,
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
+      share_token: `${slug}-token`,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
+  }
+
+  it('refuses a password that misses the configured complexity', async () => {
+    const id = await seedDraft('weak-publish');
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post(`/admin/events/${id}/publish`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ password: 'aaaaaa' });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/security requirements/i);
+
+    // Rejected BEFORE the write, not after — the gallery must be untouched,
+    // and still a draft.
+    const after = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(after.password_hash).toBe('original-hash');
+    expect(after.is_draft === 1 || after.is_draft === true).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts a password that meets it', async () => {
+    const id = await seedDraft('strong-publish');
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post(`/admin/events/${id}/publish`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ password: 'Sup3r-Secret' });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+    const after = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(after.password_hash).not.toBe('original-hash');
+    expect(await bcrypt.compare('Sup3r-Secret', after.password_hash)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a publish without a password alone', async () => {
+    // The legacy sentinel path: no password in the body means no rehash, so
+    // the policy has nothing to check and must not block the publish.
+    const id = await seedDraft('no-password-publish');
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post(`/admin/events/${id}/publish`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({});
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const after = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(after.password_hash).toBe('original-hash');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/regenerateThumbnailsScript.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+/**
+ * scripts/regenerate-thumbnails.js against external photos (#1148).
+ *
+ * The same defect #1129 fixed in the admin route, still standing in the CLI
+ * fallback: the script resolved every source as
+ * `storage/events/active/<photo.path>` and fs.access'd it. External and
+ * reference rows do not live there — their originals sit under
+ * `events.external_path` — so every one failed the check and was counted as an
+ * error. On an install where all photos are external the script did nothing at
+ * all, while reporting one error per photo.
+ *
+ * Driven against a REAL file on a REAL external mount with the real
+ * imageProcessor, not a mock: the whole point is that the source resolves off
+ * the mount, and a mocked ensureThumbnail would assert nothing about that.
+ *
+ * Responsive tiers (#1095/#1109) do not exist on this branch, so the tier
+ * backfill in the main twin has nothing to port. Everything else does.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+const { execFile } = require('child_process');
+
+describe('regenerate-thumbnails script (#1148)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let regenerateThumbnails;
+  let eventId; let externalPhotoId; let videoPhotoId; let watcherVideoId; let repairPhotoId;
+  let vanishingPhotoId;
+  let externalRoot;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-script-'));
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'test.db');
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    // External sources are sandboxed under EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT. Rows carry a
+    // path relative to that root (#1163), so the 'wedding/' prefix on each
+    // external_relpath below is the event folder, not decoration.
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    externalRoot = path.join(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, 'wedding');
+
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(externalRoot, { recursive: true });
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+
+    // A real image on the external mount — never under events/active.
+    await sharp({
+      create: { width: 1200, height: 800, channels: 3, background: { r: 10, g: 90, b: 160 } },
+    }).jpeg().toFile(path.join(externalRoot, 'shot.jpg'));
+
+    const [ev] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'regen-script-event',
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Regen Script',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: '/gallery/regen-script-event/share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference',
+      external_path: 'wedding',
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = typeof ev === 'object' ? ev.id : ev;
+
+    const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'shot.jpg',
+      // `path` is what the old script joined onto events/active. Left
+      // populated on purpose: the fix must ignore it for an external row.
+      path: 'regen-script-event/shot.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'wedding/shot.jpg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    externalPhotoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
+
+    const [v] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'clip.mp4',
+      path: 'regen-script-event/clip.mp4',
+      type: 'individual',
+      media_type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'wedding/clip.mp4',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    videoPhotoId = typeof v === 'object' ? v.id : v;
+
+    // How fileWatcher.processNewPhoto actually writes a video: `type` and
+    // `mime_type` set, media_type left to its 'image' default. A media_type-only
+    // filter lets this through and hands the container to Sharp.
+    //
+    // The file has to EXIST, otherwise the row fails resolution and looks
+    // skipped for the wrong reason — the bug is Sharp being handed a video, not
+    // a missing source. Real MP4 header bytes, no image in sight.
+    await fs.promises.writeFile(
+      path.join(externalRoot, 'watched.mp4'),
+      Buffer.from('00000018667479706d70343200000000', 'hex')
+    );
+    const [wv] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'watched.mp4',
+      path: 'regen-script-event/watched.mp4',
+      type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'wedding/watched.mp4',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    watcherVideoId = typeof wv === 'object' ? wv.id : wv;
+    expect((await db('photos').where('id', watcherVideoId).first()).media_type).not.toBe('video');
+
+    // A photo whose thumbnail_path points at something that is no longer there.
+    await sharp({
+      create: { width: 900, height: 600, channels: 3, background: { r: 200, g: 40, b: 40 } },
+    }).jpeg().toFile(path.join(externalRoot, 'repair.jpg'));
+    const [rp] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'repair.jpg',
+      path: 'regen-script-event/repair.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_ext_missing_repair.jpg',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'wedding/repair.jpg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    repairPhotoId = typeof rp === 'object' ? rp.id : rp;
+
+    // A photo whose source is not on the mount at all — an unavailable mount,
+    // which is the failure an operator most needs to hear about.
+    const [vp] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'missing.jpg',
+      path: 'regen-script-event/missing.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'missing.jpg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    vanishingPhotoId = typeof vp === 'object' ? vp.id : vp;
+
+    ({ regenerateThumbnails } = require('../../scripts/regenerate-thumbnails'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  it('builds a thumbnail for an external photo instead of erroring on events/active', async () => {
+    // The location the old script computed and fs.access'd. Nothing is there,
+    // which is the whole defect — it is not where an external original lives.
+    // (The old script cannot be driven from a test directly: it had no export
+    // and ran on require, calling process.exit. Making it importable is part
+    // of this fix.)
+    const legacyPath = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', 'regen-script-event/shot.jpg');
+    expect(fs.existsSync(legacyPath)).toBe(false);
+
+    const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
+
+    // The old script reported an error for this photo and wrote nothing.
+    // The unresolvable row fails; the external photo and the repair row build.
+    expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.successCount).toBe(2);
+
+    const row = await db('photos').where('id', externalPhotoId).first();
+    expect(row.thumbnail_path).toBeTruthy();
+    const onDisk = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, row.thumbnail_path);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(onDisk)).toBe(true);
+
+    // Named per-photo so two events referencing one NAS basename cannot
+    // clobber each other — the property ensureThumbnail owns and the reason
+    // the script must not build this name itself.
+    expect(path.basename(row.thumbnail_path)).toContain(`ext${externalPhotoId}_`);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves videos alone', async () => {
+    // A video thumbnail is a poster frame from videoProcessor; handing the
+    // container to Sharp produced one error per video row.
+    const row = await db('photos').where('id', videoPhotoId).first();
+    expect(row.thumbnail_path).toBeFalsy();
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a watcher-imported video alone, which carries no media_type', async () => {
+    // fileWatcher writes type + mime_type and lets media_type default to
+    // 'image', so filtering on media_type alone still fed these to Sharp. The
+    // signal is errorCount: the images are already done by now, so the only
+    // NEW thing that could fail this run is a video reaching Sharp. One error
+    // is the deliberately unresolvable row; two would be the video.
+    const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
+
+    expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
+    const row = await db('photos').where('id', watcherVideoId).first();
+    expect(row.thumbnail_path).toBeFalsy();
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent — a second run skips instead of rebuilding', async () => {
+    const before = await db('photos').where('id', externalPhotoId).first();
+    const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
+
+    expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.successCount).toBe(0);
+    expect(result.skipCount).toBe(2);
+
+    const after = await db('photos').where('id', externalPhotoId).first();
+    expect(after.thumbnail_path).toBe(before.thumbnail_path);
+  });
+
+  it('counts a repaired thumbnail as generated, not skipped', async () => {
+    // Both images are valid at this point. Destroy ONE thumbnail object while
+    // leaving thumbnail_path pointing at it — the corrupt/missing case.
+    const row = await db('photos').where('id', repairPhotoId).first();
+    const onDisk = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, row.thumbnail_path);
+    await fs.promises.rm(onDisk);
+
+    const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
+
+    // On local and external storage the rebuilt key is identical, so inferring
+    // "skipped" from an unchanged path reports this repair as already valid —
+    // the one number an operator running this is actually reading.
+    expect(result.successCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.skipCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(onDisk)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  /** Run the CLI the way cron does, and hand back its exit status. */
+  const runCli = (args = []) => new Promise((resolve) => {
+    execFile(
+      process.execPath,
+      [path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'regenerate-thumbnails.js'), ...args],
+      { env: { ...process.env }, cwd: path.join(__dirname, '..', '..') },
+      (error, stdout, stderr) => resolve({ code: error?.code ?? 0, stdout, stderr })
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('exits nonzero when a photo could not be built', async () => {
+    // Exit status is the only thing a cron job reads, and `missing.jpg` has no
+    // source on the mount.
+    const failed = await runCli([String(eventId)]);
+    expect(failed.code).toBe(1);
+    expect(failed.stderr).toContain('completed with failures');
+  }, 120000);
+
+  it('exits zero when every photo resolves', async () => {
+    // Drop the unresolvable row: a clean run must not cry wolf at automation.
+    await db('photos').where('id', vanishingPhotoId).del();
+    const ok = await runCli([String(eventId)]);
+    expect(ok.code).toBe(0);
+    expect(ok.stdout).toContain('Script completed successfully');
+  }, 120000);
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/resetAdminMfaCli.test.js

@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
 
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(60000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db;
 let cleanup;
 
 beforeAll(async () => {
   ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
-}, 60000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => {
   if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/integration/restoreService.pgBranch.test.js

@@ -183,22 +183,24 @@ describe('restoreService — PG branch scope contract (PR #596 review)', () => {
     expect(window).toMatch(/was_successful:\s*true/);
   });
 
-  it('npm run migrate:safe is invoked after the replay in restore()', () => {
+  it('the safe migration runner is invoked after the replay in restore()', () => {
     // Contract from PR #596 round 4: backups taken on older picpeak
     // versions must restore COMPLETELY on a newer image — even if new
     // migrations have been added since the backup was taken. The
-    // restore() flow shells out to `npm run migrate:safe` AFTER the
+    // restore() flow shells out to the safe migration runner AFTER the
     // operator-meta replay so the schema catches up to the running
     // code WITHIN the restore boundary (not on the next container
-    // restart).
+    // restart). Invoked as `node migrations/run-migrations-safe.js` —
+    // the runtime image ships no npm, so the former `npm run
+    // migrate:safe` would ENOENT into the non-fatal catch.
     //
     // Contract:
-    //   1. A `migrate:safe` shell-out exists somewhere in restoreService
+    //   1. A run-migrations-safe shell-out exists somewhere in restoreService
     //   2. It sits AFTER the replay drain — verification → replay →
     //      migrations is the documented order
     //   3. It does NOT sit inside performDatabaseRestore (must run
     //      against the reinit'd pool from the parent restore())
-    const migrateLine = findFirst(/['"]migrate:safe['"]/);
+    const migrateLine = findFirst(/run-migrations-safe\.js/);
     expect(migrateLine).toBeGreaterThan(0);
 
     const replayLine = findLast(/this\.preservedMetaSnapshot\.length\s*>\s*0/);

backend/__tests__/integration/setupService.test.js

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
   setupService = require('../../src/services/setupService');
   ({ getAppSetting, upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings'));
   app = buildRouteApp('/api/setup', require('../../src/routes/setup'));
-}, 60000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => {
   await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/integration/slideshowPhotoSource.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/**
+ * Slideshow photo source (#1015).
+ *
+ * The bug: with `lightbox_preview_enabled` off (the default), /photos emitted
+ * `preview_url: null`, so the slideshow's `preview_url || hero_url || url`
+ * chain fell through to `hero_url` — a 1920x1080 `fit: 'cover'` centre crop
+ * meant for gallery header banners. With the "Black Bars (No crop)" fit the
+ * show then letterboxed an already-cropped frame: portrait photos lost their
+ * top and bottom and the setting looked broken.
+ *
+ * The contract pinned here: `slideshow_url` points at the aspect-preserved
+ * preview tier and is emitted for image photos REGARDLESS of the lightbox
+ * toggle, so the slideshow never has a reason to reach for `hero_url`.
+ * `preview_url` itself must stay gated — the lightbox opt-in is unchanged.
+ */
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'slideshow-src-test-secret';
+
+const SLUG = 'slideshow-source-event';
+
+describe('Slideshow photo source (#1015)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let imagePhotoId;
+  let videoPhotoId;
+
+  const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  const setLightboxPreview = async (on) => {
+    await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'lightbox_preview_enabled' }).del();
+    await db('app_settings').insert({
+      setting_key: 'lightbox_preview_enabled',
+      setting_value: JSON.stringify(on),
+      setting_type: 'general',
+      updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+  };
+
+  const fetchPhotos = async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
+      .expect(200);
+    return res.body.photos;
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Slideshow Source Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'slideshow-source-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const img = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'portrait.jpg',
+      path: 'events/slideshow-source/portrait.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      mime_type: 'image/jpeg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    imagePhotoId = img[0]?.id ?? img[0];
+
+    const vid = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'clip.mp4',
+      path: 'events/slideshow-source/clip.mp4',
+      type: 'individual',
+      media_type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    videoPhotoId = vid[0]?.id ?? vid[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  it('emits slideshow_url for image photos even when lightbox previews are OFF', async () => {
+    await setLightboxPreview(false);
+    const photos = await fetchPhotos();
+    const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
+
+    expect(image.slideshow_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/preview/${imagePhotoId}`);
+    // The regression: this is what used to be null, pushing the show to hero.
+    expect(image.preview_url).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('leaves preview_url gated so the lightbox opt-in is unchanged', async () => {
+    await setLightboxPreview(true);
+    const photos = await fetchPhotos();
+    const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
+
+    expect(image.preview_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/preview/${imagePhotoId}`);
+    expect(image.slideshow_url).toBe(image.preview_url);
+  });
+
+  it('never points the slideshow at the cover-cropped hero tier', async () => {
+    await setLightboxPreview(false);
+    const photos = await fetchPhotos();
+    const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
+
+    // hero_url still ships (the gallery header uses it) — it just must not be
+    // what the slideshow resolves to.
+    expect(image.hero_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/hero/${imagePhotoId}`);
+    expect(image.slideshow_url).not.toBe(image.hero_url);
+  });
+
+  it('emits slideshow_url: null for videos, which have no preview tier', async () => {
+    await setLightboxPreview(false);
+    const photos = await fetchPhotos();
+    const video = photos.find((p) => p.id === videoPhotoId);
+
+    expect(video.slideshow_url).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/uncategorizedFilter.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/**
+ * The admin photo list's category filter, and the value it answers to (#1211).
+ *
+ * The frontend used to send `category_id=0` for "Uncategorized". This route
+ * skips `'0'` outright — the guard reads `category_id !== '0'` — so no
+ * condition was applied and the whole event came back. Four lines below that
+ * guard sits the branch that does the work, keyed on the literal
+ * `uncategorized`, which nothing was sending.
+ *
+ * Reported in #1209 by someone trying to isolate a few thousand uncategorised
+ * imports. The frontend half is fixed in PhotoFilters; this pins the backend
+ * half of the same contract, because the failure mode was the two ends
+ * disagreeing about a string and neither one being wrong on its own.
+ */
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('admin photo list — uncategorized filter (#1211)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let eventId; let categoryId;
+  let uncategorisedIds; let categorisedId;
+
+  const list = async (query = '') => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/photos${query}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const photos = Array.isArray(res.body) ? res.body : res.body.photos;
+    return (photos || []).map((p) => p.id).sort((a, b) => a - b);
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
+      requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const [ev] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'uncat-filter', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Uncat Filter',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/gallery/uncat-filter/share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = typeof ev === 'object' ? ev.id : ev;
+
+    const [cat] = await db('photo_categories')
+      .insert({ name: 'Ceremony', slug: 'ceremony', event_id: eventId })
+      .returning('id');
+    categoryId = typeof cat === 'object' ? cat.id : cat;
+
+    const insertPhoto = async (filename, category) => {
+      const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId, filename, path: `events/uncat/${filename}`,
+        type: 'individual', category_id: category,
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      return typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
+    };
+
+    // Two with no category — the shape a plugin upload leaves behind — and one
+    // filed properly, so a filter that does nothing is visibly different from
+    // a filter that works.
+    uncategorisedIds = [await insertPhoto('a.jpg', null), await insertPhoto('b.jpg', null)];
+    categorisedId = await insertPhoto('c.jpg', categoryId);
+    uncategorisedIds.sort((a, b) => a - b);
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotos'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('returns only the photos with no category', async () => {
+    expect(await list('?category_id=uncategorized')).toEqual(uncategorisedIds);
+  });
+
+  it('returns everything when no category filter is given', async () => {
+    expect(await list()).toEqual([...uncategorisedIds, categorisedId].sort((a, b) => a - b));
+  });
+
+  it('still filters by a real category id', async () => {
+    expect(await list(`?category_id=${categoryId}`)).toEqual([categorisedId]);
+  });
+
+  it('treats 0 as no filter at all', async () => {
+    // Pinning the behaviour that made the bug silent rather than loud: '0' is
+    // not "uncategorized" and never was, it simply falls through the guard. A
+    // future change that made 0 mean uncategorized here would be fine too —
+    // but it must be a decision, not an accident, and this test forces it.
+    expect(await list('?category_id=0')).toEqual([...uncategorisedIds, categorisedId].sort((a, b) => a - b));
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/workflowEngine.test.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 // bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll; under full-suite
 // parallel load on a small CI runner that can exceed the 5s default. Match the
 // other migration-heavy CRM suites (discountLineItems, incomingInvoiceRebill).
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db;
 let cleanup;
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
     expect(again.already).toBe(true);
   });
 
-  test('seeds the invoice-dunning built-in as the delegation graph (v6, disabled for first beta)', async () => {
+  test('seeds the invoice-dunning built-in as the delegation graph (disabled for first beta)', async () => {
     const { seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot, DUNNING_KEY } = require('../../src/services/_workflowSeedBoot');
     const noopLogger = { info() {}, warn() {} };
     await seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot(db, noopLogger);
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
     expect(wf).toBeTruthy();
     expect(!!wf.is_builtin).toBe(true);
     expect(!!wf.enabled).toBe(false); // first beta: ships disabled; legacy ladder runs until enabled
-    expect(JSON.parse(wf.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(6);
+    expect(JSON.parse(wf.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(7);
 
     const nodes = await db('workflow_nodes').where({ workflow_id: wf.id, version: wf.version });
     expect(nodes.filter((n) => n.type === 'trigger')).toHaveLength(1);
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
     await seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot(db, noopLogger);
     const reseeded = await db('workflows').where({ id: wf.id }).first();
     expect(reseeded.version).toBe(wf.version + 1); // bumped
-    expect(JSON.parse(reseeded.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(6);
+    expect(JSON.parse(reseeded.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(7);
     expect(!!reseeded.enabled).toBe(false); // seed default re-applied (not admin-owned → flips enabled→disabled)
     const newNodes = await db('workflow_nodes').where({ workflow_id: wf.id, version: reseeded.version });
     expect(newNodes.some((n) => n.type === 'gate')).toBe(false); // legacy graph replaced

backend/__tests__/integration/workflowRoutes.test.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ const {
 // bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll; under full-suite
 // parallel load on a small CI runner that can exceed the 5s default. Match the
 // other migration-heavy CRM suites (discountLineItems, incomingInvoiceRebill).
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db;
 let cleanup;

backend/__tests__/middleware/adminAuthRoleFallback.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/**
+ * The roles-join fallback in adminAuth fabricates `role_name = 'super_admin'`
+ * to keep existing sessions working across the RBAC upgrade window. The catch
+ * around it used to be unconditional, so ANY transient database failure —
+ * connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout, pool exhaustion — took the
+ * same branch and handed the caller super_admin for the duration of the fault.
+ *
+ * `roleName` is the sole discriminator for every ownership check (ownership.js,
+ * adminProjects, adminUsers, adminApiTokens, projectService, ...), so that
+ * inverted the whole authorization model rather than failing the request.
+ * Issue #968. Same treatment apiTokenAuth already got for the v1 surface.
+ */
+
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() }));
+
+// The joined query throws whatever the test stages; the role-less fallback
+// query (no .leftJoin) always succeeds, which is what made the original bug
+// reachable — it is the cheaper single-table read.
+// `mock`-prefixed so jest's module-factory hoisting allows the reference.
+let mockJoinError = null;
+const mockAdminRow = { id: 7, username: 'scoped', email: 's@example.com', password_changed_at: null };
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: () => ({
+    _joined: false,
+    leftJoin() { this._joined = true; return this; },
+    where() { return this; },
+    select() { return this; },
+    first() {
+      if (this._joined && mockJoinError) return Promise.reject(mockJoinError);
+      return Promise.resolve({ ...mockAdminRow });
+    },
+  }),
+}));
+
+const { adminAuth } = require('../../src/middleware/auth');
+
+const SECRET = 'test-secret-for-admin-auth-fallback';
+
+function makeReq() {
+  const token = jwt.sign(
+    { id: mockAdminRow.id, type: 'admin' },
+    SECRET,
+    { algorithm: 'HS256', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+  );
+  return { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, ip: '127.0.0.1', connection: {} };
+}
+
+function makeRes() {
+  return {
+    statusCode: null,
+    body: null,
+    status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
+    json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
+  };
+}
+
+describe('adminAuth roles-join fallback (#968)', () => {
+  const OLD_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
+  beforeAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = SECRET; });
+  afterAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = OLD_SECRET; });
+  beforeEach(() => { mockJoinError = null; });
+
+  it('grants the upgrade-window fallback only for a genuinely missing roles table', async () => {
+    mockJoinError = new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: roles');
+    const req = makeReq();
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin.roleName).toBe('super_admin');
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['connection reset', new Error('Connection terminated unexpectedly')],
+    ['deadlock', new Error('deadlock detected')],
+    ['pool exhaustion', new Error('Knex: Timeout acquiring a connection')],
+    ['statement timeout', new Error('canceling statement due to statement timeout')],
+  ])('does NOT fabricate super_admin on a transient failure (%s)', async (_label, err) => {
+    mockJoinError = err;
+    const req = makeReq();
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    // Fails closed: request rejected, req.admin never populated. The specific
+    // status is 401 (adminAuth's blanket outer catch) — what matters is that
+    // the caller is not elevated and does not reach the route.
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT fabricate super_admin when an unrelated table is missing', async () => {
+    mockJoinError = new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: admin_sessions');
+    const req = makeReq();
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/middleware/apiTokenRoleFallback.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/**
+ * The roles-join fallback in apiTokenAuth grants `super_admin` (upgrade-path
+ * parity with adminAuth). It must therefore fire ONLY when the roles schema is
+ * genuinely absent — a catch-all turns any transient database failure into a
+ * privilege escalation that reopens GHSA-9697 for a demoted token owner.
+ */
+
+const { isMissingRolesSchema } = require('../../src/middleware/apiTokenAuth');
+
+describe('apiTokenAuth roles-schema fallback predicate (GHSA-9697)', () => {
+  it('accepts a genuinely missing roles table on both engines', () => {
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: roles'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+      Object.assign(new Error('relation "roles" does not exist'), { code: '42P01' }),
+    )).toBe(true);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+      Object.assign(new Error('column roles.name does not exist'), { code: '42703' }),
+    )).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects transient failures that must not elevate the caller', () => {
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('Connection terminated unexpectedly'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('deadlock detected'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('Knex: Timeout acquiring a connection'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('canceling statement due to statement timeout'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(undefined)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a missing-table error for an unrelated table', () => {
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: api_tokens'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  // knex prefixes the failing SQL to err.message, and that SQL always names
+  // `roles` on this join — so the message substring proves nothing about the
+  // error, and only an exact driver phrase (or a SQLSTATE) may be trusted.
+  // These are real knex message shapes, captured from the actual query.
+  describe('with knex\'s SQL prefix on the message (#968)', () => {
+    const withSql = (driverMessage) => new Error(
+      'select `roles`.`name` as `role_name` from `admin_users` '
+      + 'left join `roles` on `roles`.`id` = `admin_users`.`role_id` '
+      + `where \`admin_users\`.\`id\` = 1 limit 1 - ${driverMessage}`,
+    );
+
+    it('accepts both legitimate upgrade-window states', () => {
+      // pre-054: the roles table does not exist yet
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+        Object.assign(withSql('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: roles'), { code: 'SQLITE_ERROR' }),
+      )).toBe(true);
+      // post-054, pre-057: roles exists, admin_users.role_id not added yet
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+        Object.assign(withSql('SQLITE_ERROR: no such column: admin_users.role_id'), { code: 'SQLITE_ERROR' }),
+      )).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects an unrelated "does not exist" fault despite the SQL naming roles', () => {
+      // pgbouncer transaction pooling loses a named prepared statement
+      // (SQLSTATE 26000). Transient — the fallback query would succeed on a
+      // fresh connection, so accepting this would fabricate super_admin.
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+        Object.assign(withSql('prepared statement "S_1" does not exist'), { code: '26000' }),
+      )).toBe(false);
+      // The DB role/user, not the roles table.
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+        Object.assign(withSql('role "picpeak" does not exist'), { code: '28000' }),
+      )).toBe(false);
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+        Object.assign(withSql('database "picpeak" does not exist'), { code: '3D000' }),
+      )).toBe(false);
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(withSql('Connection terminated unexpectedly'))).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/middleware/authMustChangePassword.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx enforcement half: `must_change_password` was written
+ * by the admin password-reset flow (userManagementService.resetAdminPassword)
+ * and returned in a few response payloads, but no route-blocking logic ever
+ * checked it — a reset admin could keep using the old/weak password on every
+ * protected route indefinitely. adminAuth() is now the server-side backstop:
+ * a flagged admin gets 403 MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD on everything except the
+ * routes they need to clear the flag (change-password) or leave (logout).
+ *
+ * Mirrors the mocking shape of adminAuthRoleFallback.test.js — a stub `db`
+ * chain, no real SQLite needed, so this stays a fast unit test.
+ */
+
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() }));
+
+let mockMustChangePassword = false;
+const mockAdminRow = { id: 7, username: 'scoped', email: 's@example.com', password_changed_at: null, role_id: 1, role_name: 'editor' };
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: () => ({
+    leftJoin() { return this; },
+    where() { return this; },
+    select() { return this; },
+    first: () => Promise.resolve({ ...mockAdminRow, must_change_password: mockMustChangePassword }),
+  }),
+}));
+
+const { adminAuth } = require('../../src/middleware/auth');
+
+const SECRET = 'test-secret-for-must-change-password';
+
+function makeReq(originalUrl) {
+  const token = jwt.sign(
+    { id: mockAdminRow.id, type: 'admin' },
+    SECRET,
+    { algorithm: 'HS256', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+  );
+  return { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, ip: '127.0.0.1', connection: {}, originalUrl };
+}
+
+function makeRes() {
+  return {
+    statusCode: null,
+    body: null,
+    status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
+    json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
+  };
+}
+
+describe('adminAuth must_change_password enforcement (GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx)', () => {
+  const OLD_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
+  beforeAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = SECRET; });
+  afterAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = OLD_SECRET; });
+  beforeEach(() => { mockMustChangePassword = false; });
+
+  it('blocks an arbitrary protected route with 403 MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD when the flag is set', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/dashboard/stats');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body).toEqual(expect.objectContaining({ code: 'MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD' }));
+    expect(req.admin).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('does not block when the flag is not set', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = false;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/dashboard/stats');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin.mustChangePassword).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['/api/admin/auth/change-password'],
+    ['/api/admin/auth/logout'],
+  ])('still allows %s through when the flag is set', async (originalUrl) => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq(originalUrl);
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin.mustChangePassword).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('allows the exempt change-password path even with a query string', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/auth/change-password?foo=bar');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('does not exempt a route that merely starts with the change-password path', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/auth/change-password-history');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/middleware/photoAuth.thumbnailScope.test.js

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Regression test for the cross-event thumbnail enumeration leak.
- *
- * Thumbnails are served flat from /thumbnails/thumb_<name> with
- * deterministic, enumerable filenames. photoAuth previously granted any
- * holder of a gallery token for ANY active event access to ANY thumbnail
- * (it set eventSlug=null and returned next() as long as the token's event
- * existed), so a visitor to one gallery could pull another (password-
- * protected) gallery's entire thumbnail set. The fix scopes thumbnail
- * access to the token's event by matching the requested file against
- * photos.thumbnail_path for that event_id.
- */
-
-process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'test-secret-thumbnail-scope-000000000000';
-
-const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
-
-// Two events, each owning one thumbnail. The photos mock resolves a row
-// only when BOTH event_id and thumbnail_path match — i.e. it models the
-// real ownership query.
-const EVENTS = [
-  { id: 10, slug: 'event-a', is_active: 1 },
-  { id: 20, slug: 'event-b', is_active: 1 },
-];
-const PHOTOS = [
-  { id: 1, event_id: 10, thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_event-a_ceremony_0001.jpg' },
-  { id: 2, event_id: 20, thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg' },
-];
-
-jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
-  db: (table) => ({
-    _cond: null,
-    where(cond) { this._cond = cond; return this; },
-    first() {
-      if (table === 'events') {
-        return Promise.resolve(EVENTS.find((e) => e.id === this._cond.id) || null);
-      }
-      if (table === 'photos') {
-        return Promise.resolve(
-          PHOTOS.find((p) => p.event_id === this._cond.event_id
-            && p.thumbnail_path === this._cond.thumbnail_path) || null
-        );
-      }
-      return Promise.resolve(null);
-    },
-  }),
-}));
-
-jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
-  info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
-}));
-
-const photoAuth = require('../../src/middleware/photoAuth');
-
-function galleryToken(eventId) {
-  return jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
-}
-
-function makeReqRes(token, thumbPath) {
-  const req = { path: thumbPath, headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, cookies: {} };
-  const res = {
-    statusCode: null,
-    body: null,
-    status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
-    json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
-  };
-  return { req, res };
-}
-
-describe('photoAuth — thumbnail ownership scoping', () => {
-  it('denies a gallery token for event A fetching event B\'s thumbnail', async () => {
-    const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(10), '/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg');
-    const next = jest.fn();
-
-    await photoAuth(req, res, next);
-
-    // Access denied: middleware must not pass the request through.
-    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(res.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
-    expect(req.event).toBeUndefined();
-  });
-
-  it('allows a gallery token to fetch its own event\'s thumbnail', async () => {
-    const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(20), '/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg');
-    const next = jest.fn();
-
-    await photoAuth(req, res, next);
-
-    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(req.event).toMatchObject({ id: 20 });
-  });
-
-  it('denies a traversal / foreign filename that matches no owned thumbnail', async () => {
-    const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(10), '/thumb_../../etc/passwd');
-    const next = jest.fn();
-
-    await photoAuth(req, res, next);
-
-    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(res.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
-    expect(req.event).toBeUndefined();
-  });
-});

backend/__tests__/middleware/securityHardeningBatch2.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/**
+ * Second security sweep on the same branch as the password-strength DoS fix
+ * (stable port: the maintenance and admin-preview cases do not apply here).
+ * Each block pins one gap the audit found:
+ *
+ *  - the general rate limiter skipped anyone holding ANY verified JWT,
+ *    including a gallery token minted for free on password-less galleries
+ *  - the multipart branch of the CSRF Content-Type gate accepted cross-site
+ *    form posts
+ */
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'hardening-batch2-secret';
+
+const fake = { maintenance: 'true', revoked: false, beforeCutoff: false, admin: { id: 1, password_changed_at: null } };
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const db = jest.fn((table) => {
+    const q = {
+      where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+      select: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+      first: jest.fn(async () => {
+        if (table === 'app_settings') {
+          return { setting_key: 'general_maintenance_mode', setting_value: fake.maintenance };
+        }
+        if (table === 'admin_users') return fake.admin;
+        return null;
+      }),
+    };
+    return q;
+  });
+  return { db, withRetry: (fn) => fn() };
+});
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() }));
+process.env.FRONTEND_URL = 'https://photos.example.com';
+
+const { isAuthenticated } = require('../../src/services/rateLimitService');
+const { multipartOriginAllowed } = require('../../src/utils/requestOrigin');
+
+const iat = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 10;
+const adminToken = (extra = {}) => jwt.sign({ type: 'admin', id: 1, iat, ...extra }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId: 1, iat }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+
+describe('general rate limiter skip', () => {
+  const req = (token) => ({ path: '/api/gallery/x/photos', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, cookies: {} });
+  it('is granted to an admin session', () => {
+    expect(isAuthenticated(req(adminToken()))).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('is NOT granted to a gallery token', () => {
+    expect(isAuthenticated(req(galleryToken()))).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('multipart origin gate', () => {
+  const req = (headers) => ({ headers: { host: 'photos.example.com', ...headers } });
+  it('accepts same-origin, same-site and non-browser requests', () => {
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-site' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'none' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({}))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'https://photos.example.com' }))).toBe(true);
+    // Same-origin install without FRONTEND_URL: Origin matches the Host.
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed({ headers: { host: 'gallery.local', origin: 'http://gallery.local' } })).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('rejects cross-site form posts', () => {
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' }))).toBe(false);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'https://evil.example' }))).toBe(false);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'null' }))).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/167_projects_created_by.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 167 (projects.created_by) — idempotent on re-run, reversible,
+ * and backfills the owner from a project's single linked event (GHSA-wrg5).
+ */
+const path=require('path'), fs=require('fs'), os=require('os');
+process.env.NODE_ENV='test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH=path.join(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(),'picpeak-mig167-')),'db.sqlite');
+process.env.JWT_SECRET='mig';
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const mig = require('../../migrations/core/167_add_projects_created_by');
+describe('migration 167', () => {
+  let db, cleanup;
+  beforeAll(async()=>{ ({db,cleanup}=await bootCrmDb()); await seedMinimal(db); },120000);
+  afterAll(async()=>{ if(cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+  it('is idempotent on re-run and reversible', async () => {
+    await mig.up(db);            // already applied by boot; must no-op
+    await mig.up(db);            // and again
+    expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('projects','created_by')).toBe(true);
+    await mig.down(db);
+    expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('projects','created_by')).toBe(false);
+    await mig.up(db);            // re-apply cleanly
+    expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('projects','created_by')).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('backfills created_by from a single linked event owner', async () => {
+    const p = await db('projects').insert({name:'bf',status:'active',created_at:new Date(),updated_at:new Date()}).returning('id');
+    const pid = p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
+    await db('events').insert({slug:'bf-ev',event_type:'wedding',event_name:'bf',event_date:'2026-08-01',
+      host_email:'h@e.com',admin_email:'a@e.com',password_hash:'x',share_token:'t1',share_link:'/g/bf-ev/t1',
+      created_by: 4242, project_id: pid, expires_at:new Date(Date.now()+864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active:1,is_archived:0,is_draft:0,created_at:new Date().toISOString()});
+    await mig.up(db);
+    const row = await db('projects').where({id:pid}).first();
+    expect(row.created_by).toBe(4242);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/168_fix_expense_activity_event_id.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-jhcf round 3: scoping the activity feed does nothing about the rows
+ * already on disk. expenseService used to pass adminId into logActivity's
+ * `eventId` slot, so upgraded instances carry accounting rows whose event_id
+ * is an ADMIN id — and the scope predicate happily matches those against a
+ * same-numbered event the caller owns.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig168-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mig168-test-secret';
+
+const { bootCrmDb } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/168_fix_expense_activity_event_id');
+
+describe('migration 168 — legacy accounting activity rows (GHSA-jhcf)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('re-attributes the admin id and clears event_id, leaving real rows alone', async () => {
+    await db('activity_logs').insert([
+      // Legacy shape: event_id is really admin #7, no actor recorded.
+      {
+        activity_type: 'expense_created',
+        actor_type: 'system',
+        actor_id: null,
+        event_id: 7,
+        metadata: JSON.stringify({ expenseId: 1 }),
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      },
+      {
+        activity_type: 'incoming_invoice_captured',
+        actor_type: 'system',
+        actor_id: null,
+        event_id: 9,
+        metadata: JSON.stringify({ inboundDocumentId: 2 }),
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      },
+      // A genuine event-scoped row from another subsystem must survive intact.
+      {
+        activity_type: 'photo_uploaded',
+        actor_type: 'admin',
+        actor_id: 3,
+        event_id: 7,
+        metadata: JSON.stringify({}),
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(db);
+
+    const expense = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'expense_created' }).first();
+    expect(expense.event_id == null).toBe(true);
+    expect(Number(expense.actor_id)).toBe(7);
+    expect(expense.actor_type).toBe('admin');
+
+    const captured = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'incoming_invoice_captured' }).first();
+    expect(captured.event_id == null).toBe(true);
+    expect(Number(captured.actor_id)).toBe(9);
+
+    const photo = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'photo_uploaded' }).first();
+    expect(Number(photo.event_id)).toBe(7);
+    expect(Number(photo.actor_id)).toBe(3);
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent on re-run', async () => {
+    await expect(migration.up(db)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    const expense = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'expense_created' }).first();
+    expect(Number(expense.actor_id)).toBe(7);
+    expect(expense.event_id == null).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/175_fix_css_template_photo_height.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/**
+ * Repairing the bundled templates' fixed image height (#1131).
+ *
+ * The risk in a migration that rewrites user-visible CSS is doing too much,
+ * so most of what is pinned here is what it must NOT touch: the other pixel
+ * heights inside the very same templates (a 1px divider, an 8px scrollbar),
+ * and any rule a user wrote themselves.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/175_fix_css_template_photo_height');
+
+const ELEGANT_DARK = `
+.photo-card {
+  border-radius: 12px;
+}
+
+.photo-card img {
+  width: 100%;
+  height: 200px;
+  object-fit: cover;
+  transition: transform 0.3s ease;
+}
+`;
+
+const LIQUID_GLASS_DARK = `
+.gallery-page::after {
+  content: '';
+  height: 1px;
+  background: linear-gradient(90deg, transparent, #fff, transparent);
+}
+
+.photo-card img {
+  width: 100%;
+  height: 240px;
+  object-fit: cover;
+  filter: brightness(0.9);
+}
+
+.gallery-page ::-webkit-scrollbar {
+  width: 8px;
+  height: 8px;
+}
+
+@media (max-width: 640px) {
+  .photo-card img {
+    height: 180px;
+  }
+}
+`;
+
+describe('migration 175 — CSS template image height (#1131)', () => {
+  let knex; let tmpDir;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig175-'));
+    knex = require('knex')({
+      client: 'sqlite3',
+      connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
+      useNullAsDefault: true,
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('css_templates', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('name');
+      t.text('css_content');
+    });
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (knex) await knex.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => { await knex('css_templates').del(); });
+
+  const contentOf = async (name) =>
+    (await knex('css_templates').where({ name }).first()).css_content;
+
+  it('relaxes the default template so the layouts h-full can win', async () => {
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Elegant Dark', css_content: ELEGANT_DARK });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('Elegant Dark');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('height: 200px');
+    // Everything else about the rule survives.
+    expect(css).toContain('object-fit: cover');
+    expect(css).toContain('transition: transform 0.3s ease');
+  });
+
+  it('fixes both the base rule and the mobile override of the dark glass template', async () => {
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Liquid Glass Dark', css_content: LIQUID_GLASS_DARK });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('Liquid Glass Dark');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('height: 240px');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('height: 180px');
+    expect(css.match(/height: 100%/g)).toHaveLength(2);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves the divider and the scrollbar alone', async () => {
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Liquid Glass Dark', css_content: LIQUID_GLASS_DARK });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    // The whole reason this matches full rule bodies rather than every
+    // `height: <n>px`: these are in the same stylesheet and are correct.
+    const css = await contentOf('Liquid Glass Dark');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 1px');
+    expect(css).toContain('width: 8px');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 8px');
+  });
+
+  /**
+   * The case that forced the scope wider. `sanitizeCSS` strips control
+   * characters, so any template ever saved through the editor — including a
+   * save that only changed its name — has had every newline REMOVED. An
+   * exact-text migration finds nothing on those installs, is recorded as
+   * applied, and leaves them broken permanently.
+   */
+  it('fixes a template that has been through the editor, newlines and all', async () => {
+    const { sanitizeCSS } = require('../../src/utils/cssSanitizer');
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(ELEGANT_DARK);
+    // Precondition: the sanitizer really did flatten it.
+    expect(sanitized).not.toContain('\n');
+    expect(sanitized).toContain('height: 200px');
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Saved Once', css_content: sanitized });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('Saved Once');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('200px');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
+  });
+
+  it('relaxes a user-authored fixed height too, but only on .photo-card img', async () => {
+    // Deliberately broader than the seeded text — see the migration header. A
+    // pixel height on the image cannot be right under any of the seven
+    // layouts, whoever wrote it; a height anywhere else is none of our
+    // business.
+    const mine = '.photo-card img {\n  height: 220px;\n}\n.hero { height: 400px; }';
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'My Own', css_content: mine });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('My Own');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('220px');
+    expect(css).toContain('.hero { height: 400px; }');
+  });
+
+  it('does not rewrite other properties that merely end in -height', async () => {
+    // `line-height: 200px` contains `height: 200px` as a substring, so an
+    // unanchored pattern silently rewrites it — in a migration that cannot be
+    // undone.
+    const mine = [
+      '.photo-card img {',
+      '  line-height: 200px;',
+      '  max-height: 300px;',
+      '  min-height: 14px;',
+      '  --tile-height: 220px;',
+      '  height: 200px;',
+      '}',
+    ].join('\n');
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Adjacent Props', css_content: mine });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('Adjacent Props');
+    expect(css).toContain('line-height: 200px');
+    expect(css).toContain('max-height: 300px');
+    expect(css).toContain('min-height: 14px');
+    expect(css).toContain('--tile-height: 220px');
+    // Only the real one moved.
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
+    expect(css).not.toMatch(/(?<![\w-])height:\s*200px/);
+  });
+
+  it('handles a grouped selector list', async () => {
+    // Requiring `{` straight after `img` skipped these entirely — and the
+    // migration is still recorded as applied, so the template kept the bug.
+    const mine = '.photo-card img, .thumbnail img {\n  height: 200px;\n}';
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Grouped', css_content: mine });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('Grouped');
+    expect(css).toContain('.photo-card img, .thumbnail img {');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('200px');
+  });
+
+  it('skips a nested rule rather than rewriting the wrong declaration', async () => {
+    // Valid nested CSS that passes the validator. A brace-greedy body would
+    // capture the inner block and rewrite the CAPTION's height, which cannot
+    // be undone. Leaving it untouched is the lesser evil.
+    const mine = '.photo-card img {\n  & + .caption { height: 200px; }\n}';
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Nested', css_content: mine });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await contentOf('Nested')).toBe(mine);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves non-pixel heights on the image alone', async () => {
+    const mine = '.photo-card img { height: 50vh; }\n.photo-card img { height: auto; }';
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Relative', css_content: mine });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await contentOf('Relative')).toBe(mine);
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent and safe on a row with no CSS', async () => {
+    await knex('css_templates').insert([
+      { name: 'Elegant Dark', css_content: ELEGANT_DARK },
+      { name: 'Empty', css_content: null },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    const once = await contentOf('Elegant Dark');
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await contentOf('Elegant Dark')).toBe(once);
+    expect(await contentOf('Empty')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('no-ops when the table does not exist yet', async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTable('css_templates');
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    await knex.schema.createTable('css_templates', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('name');
+      t.text('css_content');
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/176_external_relpath_unique.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
+/**
+ * One row per external file per event (#1162).
+ *
+ * The migration has two halves and they fail differently: the cleanup can take
+ * out the wrong row of a pair (losing a thumbnail, orphaning an event's hero),
+ * and the index can fail to be created at all — leaving an install that looks
+ * migrated and is still racing. Both are pinned here.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/176_external_relpath_unique');
+
+describe('migration 176 — unique (event_id, external_relpath) (#1162)', () => {
+  let knex; let tmpDir;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig186-'));
+    knex = require('knex')({
+      client: 'sqlite3',
+      connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
+      useNullAsDefault: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (knex) await knex.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    for (const table of [
+      'photos', 'events', 'photo_categories', 'photo_feedback',
+      'photo_admin_marks', 'photo_faces', 'image_access_logs', 'transfer_files',
+    ]) {
+      await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists(table);
+    }
+    await knex.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('hero_photo_id');
+      t.string('download_zip_path');
+      t.string('download_zip_generated_at');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photo_categories', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('hero_photo_id');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.string('external_relpath');
+      t.string('thumbnail_path');
+      t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
+      t.integer('feedback_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('like_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.decimal('average_rating', 3, 2).defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('favorite_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('reaction_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('color_label_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.string('face_status');
+      t.integer('view_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('download_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('face_count');
+      t.string('face_started_at');
+      t.text('face_error');
+    });
+    // Declared exactly as the real schema declares them — CASCADE and all.
+    // The point of these tables here is that SQLite does NOT enforce any of
+    // it (PicPeak never sets `PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON`), so a bare delete of
+    // the photo row leaves every one of them dangling.
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photo_feedback', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('photo_id').references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.string('feedback_type');
+      t.text('comment_text');
+      t.string('guest_identifier');
+      // Per-person guest identity (migration 078). Nullable: galleries without
+      // guest identity leave it NULL and fall back to guest_identifier.
+      t.integer('guest_id');
+      t.integer('rating');
+      t.boolean('is_hidden').defaultTo(false);
+      t.boolean('is_approved').defaultTo(true);
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photo_admin_marks', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('photo_id').notNullable().references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.integer('admin_id');
+      t.integer('rating');
+      // Independently writable alongside rating, per photoAdminMarksService.
+      t.string('color_label', 16);
+      t.unique(['photo_id', 'admin_id'], 'photo_admin_marks_photo_admin_uniq');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photo_faces', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('photo_id').references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      // purgePhotoFaces rebuilds the people that lose members, so the cluster
+      // link and the vectors recomputeCentroid reads have to be here for this
+      // to exercise the real path rather than a stub.
+      t.integer('person_id');
+      t.binary('embedding');
+      t.float('det_score');
+    });
+
+    await knex.schema.createTable('image_access_logs', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('photo_id');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('transfer_files', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('transfer_id');
+      t.integer('photo_id');
+      t.unique(['transfer_id', 'photo_id'], 'transfer_files_unique');
+    });
+  });
+
+  /** Two duplicate rows for the same file: id 1 survives, id 2 is doomed. */
+  const seedPair = async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+  };
+
+  const rows = () => knex('photos').orderBy('id', 'asc').select('*');
+
+  it('collapses a duplicated pair to one row and leaves distinct paths alone', async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't1', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't2', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/y.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't3', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const after = await rows();
+    expect(after.map((r) => r.external_relpath)).toEqual(['a/x.jpg', 'a/y.jpg']);
+    // Lowest id survives when both sides are equally complete.
+    expect(after[0].id).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('does not collapse the same path across different events', async () => {
+    // The constraint is per event. Two events referencing the same NAS folder
+    // is a supported setup, and treating those as duplicates would delete one
+    // event's entire library.
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 2, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
+  });
+
+  it('never touches managed rows, however many carry NULL', async () => {
+    // Every managed photo has external_relpath NULL. Grouping on it without
+    // the NOT NULL filter would make them all one enormous "duplicate" group
+    // and delete the entire library bar one row.
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 3 });
+  });
+
+  it('keeps the row that has a thumbnail, not merely the lowest id', async () => {
+    // An import killed mid-flight leaves rows without a thumbnail. Dropping
+    // the completed one would blank a tile in the grid for no reason.
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: null, source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 'thumb.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const after = await rows();
+    expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(after[0].thumbnail_path).toBe('thumb.jpg');
+  });
+
+  it('repoints a hero that pointed at the row being removed', async () => {
+    // events.hero_photo_id is ON DELETE SET NULL, so without this the cleanup
+    // silently strips the event's hero image — a visible regression caused
+    // entirely by the fix.
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, hero_photo_id: 2 });
+    await knex('photo_categories').insert({ id: 1, hero_photo_id: 2 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('events').where({ id: 1 }).first()).hero_photo_id).toBe(1);
+    expect((await knex('photo_categories').where({ id: 1 }).first()).hero_photo_id).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a hero that pointed at the survivor untouched', async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, hero_photo_id: 1 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('events').where({ id: 1 }).first()).hero_photo_id).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('makes a second insert of the same path impossible afterwards', async () => {
+    // The whole point. Without this the route is still racing, and the
+    // migration is recorded as applied.
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    await expect(
+      knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' })
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/unique/i);
+  });
+
+  it('still admits managed rows once the index exists', async () => {
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+    ]);
+
+    expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
+  });
+
+  it('leaves nothing dangling behind the deleted row', async () => {
+    // SQLite never enforces the ON DELETE CASCADE these tables declare, so a
+    // bare delete strands biometric embeddings, feedback and marks pointing at
+    // a photo id that no longer exists — on every SQLite install.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_faces').insert({ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1 });
+    await knex('image_access_logs').insert({ photo_id: 2 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_faces').where('photo_id', 2).first()).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(await knex('image_access_logs').where('photo_id', 2).first()).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('does not carry the duplicate\'s faces over to the survivor', async () => {
+    // Both rows were scanned independently, so the survivor already holds its
+    // own embeddings. Moving these would fabricate a second copy of every face
+    // and split the person clusters built from them.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_faces').insert([{ photo_id: 1, event_id: 1 }, { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1 }]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_faces').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('moves a guest comment to the survivor rather than deleting it', async () => {
+    // The duplicates were separate tiles in the grid, so a guest could have
+    // commented on either. Silently dropping that inside a fix for silent data
+    // loss would be its own bug.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert({
+      photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'comment',
+      comment_text: 'lovely shot', guest_identifier: 'guest-a',
+    });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_feedback');
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].photo_id).toBe(1);
+    expect(rows[0].comment_text).toBe('lovely shot');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps both comments when the same guest commented on both tiles', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'comment', comment_text: 'one', guest_identifier: 'g' },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'comment', comment_text: 'two', guest_identifier: 'g' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_feedback').orderBy('id');
+    expect(rows.map((r) => r.comment_text)).toEqual(['one', 'two']);
+    expect(rows.every((r) => r.photo_id === 1)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('does not double-count a like the same guest left on both tiles', async () => {
+    // Unlike comments, a like is a per-guest toggle: moving it would show two
+    // likes from one person.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g' },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_feedback').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('moves a like from a guest the survivor has never seen', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert({
+      photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'other',
+    });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_feedback');
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].photo_id).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('moves an admin mark, and drops it when that admin already marked the survivor', async () => {
+    // photo_admin_marks is UNIQUE(photo_id, admin_id), so a blind move would
+    // throw and abort the migration.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_admin_marks').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: 5 },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: 2 },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, admin_id: 9, rating: 4 },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_admin_marks').orderBy('admin_id');
+    expect(rows.map((r) => [r.admin_id, r.rating])).toEqual([[7, 5], [9, 4]]);
+    expect(rows.every((r) => r.photo_id === 1)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('respects the transfer_files uniqueness when moving membership', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('transfer_files').insert([
+      { transfer_id: 3, photo_id: 1 },
+      { transfer_id: 3, photo_id: 2 },
+      { transfer_id: 4, photo_id: 2 },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('transfer_files').orderBy('transfer_id');
+    expect(rows.map((r) => r.transfer_id)).toEqual([3, 4]);
+    expect(rows.every((r) => r.photo_id === 1)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('recomputes the survivor\'s feedback totals after reparenting rows', async () => {
+    // photos carries denormalized counters (migration 033). A survivor that
+    // now OWNS the feedback but still renders zero is the visible half of
+    // getting this wrong.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g1' },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'rating', rating: 4, guest_identifier: 'g1' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const survivor = await knex('photos').where('id', 1).first();
+    expect(survivor.like_count).toBe(1);
+    expect(Number(survivor.average_rating)).toBe(4);
+    expect(survivor.feedback_count).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps two people who share a device apart', async () => {
+    // guest_identifier is per-device; guest_id is per-person (migration 078),
+    // and feedbackService scopes by guest_id when it is present. Keying on the
+    // identifier alone would read these as one person and delete a rating.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'rating', rating: 5, guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 10 },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'rating', rating: 2, guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 11 },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_feedback').orderBy('guest_id');
+    expect(rows.map((r) => [r.guest_id, r.rating])).toEqual([[10, 5], [11, 2]]);
+  });
+
+  it('still dedupes one person voting on both tiles', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 10 },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 10 },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_feedback').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('still clears face rows on a branch that has no face feature', async () => {
+    // DIVERGES FROM MAIN, deliberately. Face recognition (#1090) is main-only:
+    // there is no faceProcessor on this branch, so purgePhotoFaces cannot be
+    // called and there are no event_people counts or centroids to reconcile.
+    // What still matters is the half that is not optional — the rows must not
+    // dangle, because SQLite never enforces the CASCADE that would remove
+    // them. The service reaches for purgePhotoFaces, finds nothing, and falls
+    // back to a plain delete; this pins that fallback.
+    //
+    // If faces are ever backported, main's version of this test comes with
+    // them.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_faces').insert({ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, person_id: 5 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_faces').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 0 });
+  });
+
+  it('keeps a hidden moderation record from swallowing the visible replacement', async () => {
+    // feedbackService lets both coexist and counts only the visible one.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g', is_hidden: true },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g', is_hidden: false },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_feedback').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
+  });
+
+  it('merges the independent halves of one admin\'s mark', async () => {
+    // rating and color_label are written independently, so the same admin can
+    // have rated one tile and coloured the other.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_admin_marks').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: 5, color_label: null },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: null, color_label: 'red' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_admin_marks');
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect([rows[0].rating, rows[0].color_label]).toEqual([5, 'red']);
+  });
+
+  it('requeues the survivor when the duplicate held the only scan', async () => {
+    // Otherwise the sole embeddings go with the purge and nothing re-queues:
+    // the photo just silently stops having a face.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_faces').insert({ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('photos').where('id', 1).first()).face_status).toBe('pending');
+  });
+
+  it('carries the duplicate\'s views and downloads over', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photos').where('id', 1).update({ view_count: 2, download_count: 1 });
+    await knex('photos').where('id', 2).update({ view_count: 5, download_count: 3 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const survivor = await knex('photos').where('id', 1).first();
+    expect([survivor.view_count, survivor.download_count]).toEqual([7, 4]);
+  });
+
+  it('fails loudly rather than recording itself applied without the index', async () => {
+    // Swallowing a failed CREATE INDEX would leave the install permanently
+    // racy — the in-flight guard only covers one process — with nothing to
+    // trigger a retry. Driven through the helper the migration calls, against
+    // a table that still holds duplicates — i.e. what it would face if the
+    // dedupe above had not achieved uniqueness.
+    await seedPair();
+    const { createExternalRelpathIndex } = require('../../src/services/externalPhotoDedupe');
+
+    await expect(createExternalRelpathIndex(knex)).rejects.toThrow(/unique/i);
+  });
+
+  it('invalidates the pre-built download zip for the affected event', async () => {
+    // The cached archive still contains the rows just removed, and every
+    // ordinary photo-deletion path invalidates it for exactly that reason.
+    // getZipInfo treats a cleared record as a miss and rebuilds on request.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('events').insert({
+      id: 1, download_zip_path: 'events/active/x/.download-cache/all.zip',
+      download_zip_generated_at: '2026-01-01',
+    });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const ev = await knex('events').where('id', 1).first();
+    expect(ev.download_zip_path).toBeNull();
+    expect(ev.download_zip_generated_at).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('leaves an untouched event\'s zip alone', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('events').insert([
+      { id: 1, download_zip_path: 'a.zip', download_zip_generated_at: '2026-01-01' },
+      { id: 2, download_zip_path: 'b.zip', download_zip_generated_at: '2026-01-01' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('events').where('id', 2).first()).download_zip_path).toBe('b.zip');
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent', async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    const once = await rows();
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await rows()).toEqual(once);
+  });
+
+  it('rolls back to an unconstrained table', async () => {
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    await migration.down(knex);
+
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+    expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
+  });
+
+  it('no-ops before 041 has added the column', async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => { t.increments('id').primary(); });
+
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/177_external_relpath_from_root.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
+/**
+ * Folding the event's base path into every external row (#1163).
+ *
+ * Two things can go wrong and both are silent, which is why they are pinned
+ * here rather than left to review: folding a path that was ALREADY folded
+ * (every original moves), and "repairing" a healthy install because the media
+ * root happened to be unmounted when the migration ran (every original moves).
+ *
+ * The repair itself is driven against a real temp directory tree, because the
+ * whole mechanism is "is this file actually there" and a mocked fs would only
+ * be testing the mock.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+describe('migration 177 — external_relpath from the media root (#1163)', () => {
+  let knex; let tmpDir; let mediaRoot; let migration;
+
+  /** Writes `bytes` bytes and returns the size, so fixtures can record it the
+   *  way an import would have. */
+  const touch = async (rel, bytes = 8) => {
+    const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.writeFile(full, Buffer.alloc(bytes));
+    return bytes;
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig187-'));
+    mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+
+    // The service caches the root on first call, so it must not have been
+    // resolved before EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT was set above.
+    jest.resetModules();
+    migration = require('../../migrations/core/177_external_relpath_from_root');
+
+    knex = require('knex')({
+      client: 'sqlite3',
+      connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
+      useNullAsDefault: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (knex) await knex.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    delete process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT;
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('events');
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('app_settings');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('external_path');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.string('external_relpath');
+      t.integer('size_bytes');
+      t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('setting_key');
+      t.text('setting_value');
+      t.string('setting_type');
+      t.string('updated_at');
+    });
+    await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+  });
+
+  const relpaths = async () =>
+    (await knex('photos').orderBy('id', 'asc').select('external_relpath'))
+      .map((r) => r.external_relpath);
+
+  it('folds the base path into every row of a healthy event', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/a.jpg');
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/b.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/b.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Leknes/a.jpg', 'Trip/Leknes/b.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('repairs rows an earlier import had rebased', async () => {
+    // The reported shape: a parent imported first, a child imported second, so
+    // events.external_path is the child and the parent's rows resolve into a
+    // path that does not exist.
+    const oldSize = await touch('Trip/Leknes/old.jpg', 11);   // from the first import
+    const newSize = await touch('Trip/Sub/new.jpg', 22);      // from the second
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/old.jpg', size_bytes: oldSize, source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'new.jpg', size_bytes: newSize, source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    // The old row is placed where the file actually is; the new one keeps
+    // resolving exactly where it resolved before.
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Leknes/old.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/new.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses an ancestor whose file is a different size', async () => {
+    // The dangerous case: the row's own file was simply deleted, and an
+    // UNRELATED file one directory up happens to share its name. Adopting it
+    // would make downloads serve the wrong original — worse than a dead link.
+    await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 999);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({
+      event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: 42, source_origin: 'external',
+    });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/photo.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses an ancestor when the row records no size to check against', async () => {
+    // Nothing to verify provenance with, so the row stays where it resolves
+    // today rather than adopting a same-named stranger.
+    await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 100);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({
+      event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: null, source_origin: 'external',
+    });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/photo.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves nothing folded when a rewrite fails partway', async () => {
+    // Without a transaction, a crash between the first event's UPDATE and the
+    // marker leaves mixed formats behind — and the next run folds the already
+    // folded rows a second time, putting every original one directory deeper.
+    await touch('A/one.jpg');
+    await touch('B/two.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert([
+      { id: 1, external_path: 'A' },
+      { id: 2, external_path: 'B' },
+    ]);
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'one.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 2, external_relpath: 'two.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+    // app_settings is written last, in the same transaction as the rewrites.
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('app_settings_backup');
+    await knex.raw('CREATE TRIGGER fail_marker BEFORE INSERT ON app_settings '
+      + "BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'boom'); END");
+
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).rejects.toThrow(/boom/);
+
+    await knex.raw('DROP TRIGGER fail_marker');
+    // Every row still base-relative, and no marker — so a retry is correct.
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['one.jpg', 'two.jpg']);
+    expect(await knex('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'external_relpath_root_relative').first())
+      .toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('removes the losing row when two paths converge, instead of stranding it', async () => {
+    // Trip/Sub/c.jpg imported once via `Trip` (as `Sub/c.jpg`) and once via
+    // `Trip/Sub` (as `c.jpg`). Both fold to the same path. Skipping the loser
+    // would leave it base-relative under a root-only resolver — pointing at
+    // <root>/c.jpg — with the marker claiming the conversion is complete.
+    const size = await touch('Trip/Sub/c.jpg', 33);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Sub/c.jpg', size_bytes: size, source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'c.jpg', size_bytes: size, source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photos').select('external_relpath');
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].external_relpath).toBe('Trip/Sub/c.jpg');
+  });
+
+  it('survives a final path that equals another row\'s current path', async () => {
+    // `photo.jpg` repairs to `Trip/photo.jpg` while the row already holding
+    // `Trip/photo.jpg` folds to `Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg`. Every FINAL value is
+    // distinct, but a one-pass rewrite collides halfway through — and on
+    // Postgres that 23505 is misread by the migration runner as "already
+    // applied", leaving everything unconverted.
+    const a = await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 11);
+    const b = await touch('Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg', 22);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: a, source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/photo.jpg', size_bytes: b, source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/photo.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('does not re-prefix a row inserted while the probe was running', async () => {
+    // Phase 1 runs outside the transaction and can take minutes on a cold
+    // mount. An import finishing in that window writes an already
+    // root-relative row, which a `where event_id` bulk update would prefix a
+    // second time with the stale base.
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    const { foldExternalRelpaths } = require('../../src/services/externalRelpathFold');
+    const realStat = fs.promises.stat;
+    let injected = false;
+    jest.spyOn(fs.promises, 'access').mockImplementation(async (...args) => {
+      if (!injected) {
+        injected = true;
+        await knex('photos').insert({
+          event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/late.jpg', source_origin: 'external',
+        });
+      }
+      return realStat(args[0]).then(() => undefined);
+    });
+
+    await foldExternalRelpaths(knex);
+    fs.promises.access.mockRestore();
+
+    expect((await relpaths()).sort()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg', 'Trip/late.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a row it cannot place resolving where it resolves today', async () => {
+    // Never guess below current behaviour: a file that is genuinely gone must
+    // not have its path rewritten to some other file that happens to exist.
+    await touch('Trip/Sub/present.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'present.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'vanished.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/present.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/vanished.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('folds without repairing when the media root is unmounted', async () => {
+    // An unmounted share leaves the mountpoint as an empty directory, so every
+    // file looks missing. Repairing off that signal would move every original
+    // on a perfectly healthy install.
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+    // mediaRoot is empty — see beforeEach.
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/Leknes/a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves managed rows alone', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual([null, 'Trip/a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves an event with no base path alone — its rows are already root-relative', async () => {
+    await touch('a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: null });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('folds each event with its own base', async () => {
+    await touch('A/one.jpg');
+    await touch('B/two.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert([
+      { id: 1, external_path: 'A' },
+      { id: 2, external_path: 'B' },
+    ]);
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'one.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 2, external_relpath: 'two.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['A/one.jpg', 'B/two.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('tolerates a base path with stray slashes', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: '/Trip/' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('does not fold twice when run again', async () => {
+    // The failure this guards is total: every original on the install moves one
+    // directory deeper, and there is no undo.
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('does not fold twice when the base repeats in the relpath', async () => {
+    // The inference this migration deliberately does NOT use: `Trip/x.jpg`
+    // under base `Trip` already "starts with the base", but has not been
+    // folded — it is a subfolder that shares its parent's name.
+    await touch('Trip/Trip/x.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Trip/x.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('rollback does not clear the marker, so a re-run cannot double-fold', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    await migration.down(knex);
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('no-ops before 041 has added the column', async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => { t.increments('id').primary(); });
+
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/178_reset_legacy_preview_paths.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * Legacy preview keys must not survive the encoder change.
+ *
+ * The old generator kept the SOURCE basename verbatim while always writing
+ * JPEG, so a `.webp` upload produced `preview_shot.webp` holding a JPEG. The
+ * route now derives Content-Type from the key, and sets `nosniff` — so that
+ * legacy object would be announced as image/webp and render as a broken image.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/178_reset_legacy_preview_paths');
+
+describe('migration 178 — legacy preview keys (#1166 follow-up)', () => {
+  let knex; let tmpDir;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig188-'));
+    knex = require('knex')({
+      client: 'sqlite3',
+      connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
+      useNullAsDefault: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (knex) await knex.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('preview_path');
+      t.string('thumbnail_path');
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('clears the mislabelled .webp keys that would render broken', async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert({ preview_path: 'previews/preview_shot.webp' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('photos').first()).preview_path).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('clears .jpg keys too, because a byte-correct one can still be flattened', async () => {
+    // A legacy .jpg key is valid JPEG, but it may be a flattened rendition of a
+    // transparent or animated source, and nothing in the key says so. One lazy
+    // regeneration is cheaper than reasoning about which of them lied.
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { preview_path: 'previews/preview_a.jpg' },
+      { preview_path: 'previews/preview_b.png' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photos').whereNotNull('preview_path').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 0 });
+  });
+
+  it('leaves thumbnails alone — they are a different cache', async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert({ preview_path: 'previews/p.jpg', thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/t.jpg' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('photos').first()).thumbnail_path).toBe('thumbnails/t.jpg');
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent and safe with nothing to clear', async () => {
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('no-ops before 104 has added the column', async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => { t.increments('id').primary(); });
+
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminContractsSignedPdfPathTraversal.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/**
+ * Same bug class as GHSA-9q5j-vqfw-32hr (fixed in adminEvents/logo.js) —
+ * the signed-PDF upload's multer `filename` callback built the stored
+ * path directly from `req.params.id` with no integer validation:
+ *
+ *   filename: (req, file, cb) => {
+ *     cb(null, `contract-${req.params.id}-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
+ *   }
+ *
+ * `POST /:id/upload-signed-pdf` declares `param('id').isInt({ min: 1 })`,
+ * but express-validator's check only runs inside the route handler via
+ * validateRequest(req) — AFTER multer has already parsed the multipart
+ * body and invoked the filename callback. A traversal payload in the raw
+ * `:id` URL segment reaches multer completely unvalidated.
+ *
+ * Fixed by rejecting any non-positive-integer id before it is used to
+ * build the filename, independent of the declared-but-too-late
+ * express-validator check.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+// ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES in fileSecurityUtils.js only defines image/video
+// entries, so the route's real fileFilter (validateFileType(..., ['application/pdf']))
+// rejects every PDF upload with "Only PDF files are allowed" — a
+// separate, pre-existing bug unrelated to the path-traversal fix under
+// test here (also present in publicContracts.js, which is why neither
+// suite exercises a successful upload). Stub validateFileType so this
+// suite can drive the full route, including the filename-callback fix,
+// end-to-end.
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/fileSecurityUtils', () => {
+  const actual = jest.requireActual('../../src/utils/fileSecurityUtils');
+  return {
+    ...actual,
+    validateFileType: (filename, mimetype, allowedTypes) => allowedTypes.includes(mimetype),
+  };
+});
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-contracts-signed-pdf-')), 'db.sqlite'
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-contracts-signed-pdf-test-secret';
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
+} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('POST /api/admin/contracts/:id/upload-signed-pdf — path traversal guard', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let customerId; let token;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+
+    // Feature flag defaults OFF on a fresh install — the contracts
+    // router 403s every route until it's on.
+    await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'contracts' }).update({ value: true });
+
+    app = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/contracts', require('../../src/routes/adminContracts'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
+
+  const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+  const signedDir = () => path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads/contracts/signed');
+
+  async function insertContract(over = {}) {
+    const base = {
+      contract_number: `K-TEST-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2, 8)}`,
+      customer_account_id: customerId,
+      title: 'Test Contract',
+      issue_date: new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10),
+      status: 'sent',
+      language: 'de',
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      ...over,
+    };
+    const inserted = await db('contracts').insert(base).returning('id');
+    return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+  }
+
+  it('rejects a traversal payload in the id param instead of writing outside uploads/contracts/signed', async () => {
+    // '../../../../tmp/pwned' URL-encoded so the raw request path still
+    // has a single segment (matches Express's `:id`), but Express
+    // decodes the param back into literal '../' sequences before the
+    // route sees it.
+    const traversalId = encodeURIComponent('../../../../tmp/pwned');
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/contracts/${traversalId}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+    ).attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/invalid contract id/i);
+
+    // No file should have been written anywhere — the filename callback
+    // must error out before multer opens a write stream.
+    const escapedFile = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'pwned');
+    expect(fs.existsSync(escapedFile)).toBe(false);
+    if (fs.existsSync(signedDir())) {
+      expect(fs.readdirSync(signedDir())).toHaveLength(0);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts a normal numeric contract id', async () => {
+    const id = await insertContract();
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/contracts/${id}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+    ).attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const files = fs.readdirSync(signedDir());
+    expect(files.some((f) => f.startsWith(`contract-${id}-`))).toBe(true);
+
+    const row = await db('contracts').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(row.status).toBe('fully_signed');
+    expect(row.signed_pdf_path).toMatch(new RegExp(`contract-${id}-`));
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminCrmAuth.test.js

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ describe('admin CRM routes — auth + permission gate', () => {
     // Invalid: signed with a different secret. adminAuth must reject.
     const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
     invalidToken = jwt.sign({ id: adminId, type: 'admin' }, 'WRONG-SECRET', { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
-  }, 60000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
     if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/routes/adminEvents.smoke.test.js

@@ -180,6 +180,27 @@ describe('admin events CRUD endpoints (smoke)', () => {
       });
       expect(res.status).toBe(404);
     });
+
+    // #822 — hero_logo_visible/position are nullable (null = "inherit the global
+    // branding toggle"), but the validator used .optional() without
+    // { nullable: true }, so an explicit null was rejected with 400.
+    it('accepts hero_logo_visible: null and stores NULL (inherit)', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { hero_logo_visible: 1 });
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
+        hero_logo_visible: null,
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.hero_logo_visible).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('still rejects a non-boolean hero_logo_visible', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
+        hero_logo_visible: 'maybe',
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    });
   });
 
   describe('DELETE /:id', () => {

backend/__tests__/routes/adminEventsCascadeStorage.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test: deleting an event must remove its stored objects.
+ *
+ * deleteEventCascade() cleaned up the local filesystem only (#608). On an
+ * S3/R2 storage backend that cleanup is a no-op, so every deleted gallery
+ * left its originals and derived tiers in the bucket — unreferenced,
+ * invisible in the UI, and billed forever. Measured on a v3.45.16 install
+ * against Cloudflare R2: deleting a 403-photo event changed the bucket
+ * object count by exactly zero.
+ *
+ * The keys must be collected BEFORE the transaction deletes the photo
+ * rows, because afterwards nothing knows which objects were this event's.
+ */
+
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+
+// The cascade runs a real `fs.rm(..., { recursive: true })` over
+// {STORAGE_PATH}/events/{active,archived}/{slug}. Point that at a throwaway
+// directory before requiring the module under test — the default resolves
+// into the working tree.
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-cascade-storage-test');
+
+const mockStorage = { delete: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+
+const mockEvent = {
+  id: 42,
+  slug: 'other-demo-2026-01-01',
+  event_name: 'Demo',
+  source_mode: 'managed',
+  // Written through the backend by archiveService, so it is a bucket object
+  // and the fs.unlink in the cascade never touched it on S3.
+  archive_path: 'archives/other-demo-2026-01-01.zip',
+  // The pre-built "Download All" zip. Lives under the event prefix, so the
+  // recursive fs.rm covers it on local disk and nothing covers it on S3.
+  download_zip_path: 'events/active/other-demo-2026-01-01/.download-cache/all.zip',
+};
+
+const mockPhotos = [
+  {
+    id: 1,
+    path: 'other-demo-2026-01-01/photo_one.jpg',
+    thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+    hero_path: null,
+    preview_path: 'previews/prev_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+    watermark_path: 'watermarked/wm_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+    source_origin: 'managed',
+  },
+  {
+    id: 2,
+    path: 'other-demo-2026-01-01/photo_two.jpg',
+    thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_bbb_photo_two.jpg',
+    hero_path: null,
+    preview_path: null,
+    watermark_path: null,
+    source_origin: 'managed',
+  },
+  {
+    // External photos live outside the managed backend and must be left alone.
+    id: 3,
+    path: 'ignored.jpg',
+    thumbnail_path: null,
+    hero_path: null,
+    preview_path: null,
+    watermark_path: null,
+    source_origin: 'external',
+  },
+];
+
+let mockPhotoRowsDeleted = false;
+let mockJobRowsDeleted = false;
+
+// Photos in OTHER events that share a canonical derivative key with this one.
+let mockSharedDerivatives = [];
+
+// The shared-derivative probe: db('photos').whereNot(...).where(cb).select(...)
+const sharedProbe = {
+  where: () => sharedProbe,
+  whereIn: () => sharedProbe,
+  orWhereIn: () => sharedProbe,
+  select: async () => mockSharedDerivatives,
+};
+
+function mockMakeDb() {
+  const table = (name) => {
+    const chain = {
+      where: () => chain,
+      first: async () => (name === 'events' ? mockEvent : undefined),
+      whereNotNull: () => chain,
+      whereNot: () => sharedProbe,
+      orWhereIn: () => chain,
+      whereIn: () => chain,
+      select: async () => {
+        if (name === 'photos') {
+          // The whole point: if this runs after the transaction, the rows
+          // are gone and we would collect nothing.
+          return mockPhotoRowsDeleted ? [] : mockPhotos;
+        }
+        return [];
+      },
+      del: async () => {
+        if (name === 'photos') mockPhotoRowsDeleted = true;
+        if (name === 'download_jobs') mockJobRowsDeleted = true;
+        return 1;
+      },
+    };
+    return chain;
+  };
+  // #1132 guards the merge-dismissals delete behind a hasTable check.
+  table.schema = { hasTable: async () => false };
+  table.transaction = async (cb) => cb(table);
+  return table;
+}
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: mockMakeDb(),
+  logActivity: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/storage', () => ({
+  getStorage: () => mockStorage,
+}));
+
+const { deleteEventCascade } = require('../../src/routes/adminEvents/helpers');
+
+describe('deleteEventCascade — storage cleanup', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    mockStorage.delete.mockClear();
+    mockPhotoRowsDeleted = false;
+    mockJobRowsDeleted = false;
+    mockSharedDerivatives = [];
+  });
+
+  it('deletes originals and every derived tier from the storage backend', async () => {
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const deleted = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls.map(([key]) => key);
+
+    expect(deleted).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
+      'events/active/other-demo-2026-01-01/photo_one.jpg',
+      'events/active/other-demo-2026-01-01/photo_two.jpg',
+      'thumbnails/thumb_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+      'thumbnails/thumb_bbb_photo_two.jpg',
+      'previews/prev_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+    ]));
+  });
+
+  it('deletes pre-generated watermarks and the archive zip', async () => {
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const deleted = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls.map(([key]) => key);
+
+    // Both are storage-backend objects that only fs.unlink ever touched, so
+    // both survived an event delete on S3.
+    expect(deleted).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
+      'watermarked/wm_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+      'archives/other-demo-2026-01-01.zip',
+    ]));
+  });
+
+  it('deletes the Download All cache, which only fs.rm ever covered', async () => {
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const deleted = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls.map(([key]) => key);
+
+    // Sits under events/active/{slug}/.download-cache/ — swept by the
+    // recursive fs.rm on local disk, invisible to it on S3 where the prefix
+    // is not a directory. Gallery-sized. (download_jobs is main-only, so the
+    // per-job archives main also sweeps have no counterpart here.)
+    expect(deleted).toContain(
+      'events/active/other-demo-2026-01-01/.download-cache/all.zip'
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a derivative alone when another event still points at it', async () => {
+    // Canonical thumbnail/hero/preview keys are not event-scoped — the
+    // basename is the photo's filename, and filenames are not unique across
+    // events. Deleting one a surviving gallery still references would blank
+    // its tile.
+    mockSharedDerivatives = [{
+      thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+      hero_path: null,
+      preview_path: null,
+      watermark_path: null,
+    }];
+
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const deleted = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls.map(([key]) => key);
+    expect(deleted).not.toContain('thumbnails/thumb_aaa_photo_one.jpg');
+    // The originals are slug-scoped and must still go.
+    expect(deleted).toContain('events/active/other-demo-2026-01-01/photo_one.jpg');
+    // So must a derivative nobody else claims.
+    expect(deleted).toContain('thumbnails/thumb_bbb_photo_two.jpg');
+  });
+
+  it('never asks the backend to delete the same key twice', async () => {
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const managed = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls
+      .map(([key]) => key)
+      .filter((key) => !key.startsWith('thumbnails/thumb_w') && !key.startsWith('previews/preview_w'));
+
+    expect(managed).toEqual([...new Set(managed)]);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves external/reference photos in place', async () => {
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const deleted = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls.map(([key]) => key);
+    expect(deleted).not.toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(['ignored.jpg']));
+    expect(deleted).not.toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(['events/active/ignored.jpg']));
+  });
+
+  it('still completes the delete when the storage backend throws', async () => {
+    mockStorage.delete.mockRejectedValue(new Error('bucket unreachable'));
+
+    await expect(deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' }))
+      .resolves.toEqual({ id: 42, name: 'Demo' });
+
+    mockStorage.delete.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminEventsLogoPathTraversal.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-9q5j-vqfw-32hr — the event-logo upload's multer `filename` callback
+ * built the stored path directly from `req.params.id` with no integer
+ * validation:
+ *
+ *   filename: (req, file, cb) => {
+ *     cb(null, `event-${req.params.id}-logo-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
+ *   }
+ *
+ * A traversal payload in the `:id` route param (URL-encoded so it still
+ * matches a single Express path segment, then decoded back into literal
+ * `../` sequences by Express before handlers see it) could escape the
+ * intended uploads/logos/events/ directory. Most directly reachable via a
+ * super_admin session: requireEventOwnership short-circuits with next() and
+ * zero DB lookup for that role (src/middleware/ownership.js), so nothing
+ * upstream of multer validates the id first.
+ *
+ * Fixed by rejecting any non-positive-integer id before it is used to build
+ * the filename, regardless of role or ownership-check ordering.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-events-logo-')), 'db.sqlite'
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-events-logo-test-secret';
+
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+async function insertEvent(db, adminId, over = {}) {
+  const base = {
+    slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    event_type: 'wedding',
+    event_name: 'Test Wedding',
+    event_date: '2026-05-29',
+    host_email: 'host@example.com',
+    admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+    is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+    created_by: adminId,
+    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    ...over,
+  };
+  const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
+  return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+}
+
+describe('POST /api/admin/events/:id/logo — path traversal guard', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let token;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    // super_admin: requireEventOwnership short-circuits with no DB lookup
+    // for this role, so it reaches multer with nothing upstream having
+    // validated the id — the exact path GHSA-9q5j-vqfw-32hr exploited.
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+    app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+      res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
+    });
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
+
+  const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+  const logoDir = () => path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads/logos/events');
+
+  it('rejects a traversal payload in the id param instead of writing outside uploads/logos/events', async () => {
+    // '../../../../tmp/pwned' URL-encoded so the raw request path still has
+    // a single segment (matches Express's `:id`), but Express decodes the
+    // param back into literal '../' sequences before the route sees it.
+    const traversalId = encodeURIComponent('../../../../tmp/pwned');
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/events/${traversalId}/logo`)
+    ).attach('logo', Buffer.from('fake image data'), 'logo.png');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/invalid event id/i);
+
+    // No file should have been written anywhere — the filename callback
+    // must error out before multer opens a write stream.
+    const escapedFile = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'pwned');
+    expect(fs.existsSync(escapedFile)).toBe(false);
+    if (fs.existsSync(logoDir())) {
+      expect(fs.readdirSync(logoDir())).toHaveLength(0);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts a normal numeric event id', async () => {
+    const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Logo Event' });
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/logo`)
+    ).attach('logo', Buffer.from('fake image data'), 'logo.png');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.hero_logo_url).toMatch(new RegExp(`^/uploads/logos/events/event-${id}-logo-`));
+
+    const files = fs.readdirSync(logoDir());
+    expect(files.some((f) => f.startsWith(`event-${id}-logo-`))).toBe(true);
+
+    const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(row.hero_logo_url).toBe(res.body.hero_logo_url);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminMfa.test.js

@@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ const { authenticator } = require('otplib');
 const {
   bootCrmDb, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
 } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const mfaService = require('../../src/services/mfaService');
 
-jest.setTimeout(60000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db;
 let cleanup;
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
   ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
   adminApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/auth', require('../../src/routes/adminAuth'));
   authApp = buildRouteApp('/api/auth', require('../../src/routes/auth'));
-}, 60000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => {
   if (cleanup) await cleanup();
@@ -235,6 +236,138 @@ describe('MFA disable — /api/admin/auth/mfa/disable', () => {
     expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeNull();
     expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBeNull();
   });
+
+  // Concurrency regression: a plain UPDATE with no conditional guard let two
+  // requests carrying the same captured code both read the same
+  // two_factor_last_used_step and both persist, defeating replay protection.
+  // The guarded UPDATE (mfaService.persistTotpStep) makes only the first
+  // writer's affected-row count > 0; the loser must be rejected.
+  it('two concurrent disable requests with the SAME captured code: only one succeeds', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+    ]);
+
+    expect([r1.status, r2.status].sort()).toEqual([200, 400]);
+
+    const status = await request(adminApp)
+      .get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+    expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('MFA regenerate recovery codes — /api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes', () => {
+  it('a valid TOTP regenerates the recovery codes and persists the step', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+
+    const res = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
+  });
+
+  it('a wrong code is rejected (400)', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const valid = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const wrong = valid === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
+
+    const res = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ code: wrong });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  // Concurrency regression (see the disable test above for the mechanism):
+  // this is the endpoint called out as the worst lost-update case, since it
+  // both rotates the recovery codes and (previously) persisted the step in
+  // one unconditional UPDATE.
+  it('two concurrent regenerations with the SAME captured code: only one succeeds', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+    ]);
+
+    expect([r1.status, r2.status].sort()).toEqual([200, 400]);
+    const winner = r1.status === 200 ? r1 : r2;
+    expect(winner.body.recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
+
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    expect(row.two_factor_last_used_step).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('mfaService.persistTotpStep — atomic replay-tracking persist', () => {
+  // Deterministic simulation of the race: two "concurrent" requests that
+  // read the SAME two_factor_last_used_step and computed the SAME totpStep
+  // from the same captured code. Calling persistTotpStep twice in a row with
+  // that identical totpStep reproduces exactly the DB-level outcome of a
+  // true race, without relying on event-loop timing.
+  it('the second writer with the same totpStep affects 0 rows and is rejected', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const totpStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, row.two_factor_secret, null);
+    expect(totpStep).toEqual(expect.any(Number));
+
+    const first = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, { updated_at: new Date() });
+    expect(first).toBe(true);
+
+    // The row's two_factor_last_used_step has now already advanced to
+    // totpStep by the time this "losing" write runs — the guard condition
+    // (whereNull OR < totpStep) is false, so 0 rows are affected.
+    const second = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, { updated_at: new Date() });
+    expect(second).toBe(false);
+
+    const after = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    expect(Number(after.two_factor_last_used_step)).toBe(totpStep);
+  });
+
+  it('succeeds when the new step advances past the current one', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const totpStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, row.two_factor_secret, null);
+
+    const ok = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, {});
+    expect(ok).toBe(true);
+
+    const nextStepAuthenticator = authenticator.clone({ epoch: Date.now() + 30000 });
+    const nextCode = nextStepAuthenticator.generate(secret);
+    const nextStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(nextCode, row.two_factor_secret, totpStep);
+    expect(nextStep).toBeGreaterThan(totpStep);
+
+    const advanced = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, nextStep, {});
+    expect(advanced).toBe(true);
+  });
 });
 
 describe('Admin login challenge — /api/auth/admin/login[/mfa]', () => {
@@ -284,6 +417,86 @@ describe('Admin login challenge — /api/auth/admin/login[/mfa]', () => {
     expect(res.body.user.id).toBe(admin.id);
   });
 
+  // GHSA-qcwx-r25m-j869: verifyTotp() was stateless, so otplib's window:1
+  // tolerance let the same 6-digit code complete two independent logins
+  // within its ~90s validity window. mfaService now tracks each admin's
+  // last-consumed TOTP step and rejects a code that doesn't advance past it.
+  it('#GHSA-qcwx-r25m-j869 — a TOTP code cannot be replayed into a second login', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    // First use of the code completes a login.
+    const c1 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const first = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c1.body.mfaToken, code });
+    expect(first.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(first.body.user).toBeDefined();
+
+    // Replaying the SAME code for an independent second login must fail,
+    // even though otplib's window:1 tolerance still considers it valid.
+    const c2 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const replay = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c2.body.mfaToken, code });
+    expect(replay.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(replay.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
+    expect(replay.body.user).toBeUndefined();
+
+    // A freshly generated code for the NEXT TOTP step is not a replay and
+    // succeeds. Generated via a cloned authenticator with a future epoch
+    // rather than mocking Date.now(), so mfaService's own step computation
+    // (real Date.now()) still lands the match one step ahead.
+    const nextStepAuthenticator = authenticator.clone({ epoch: Date.now() + 30000 });
+    const nextCode = nextStepAuthenticator.generate(secret);
+    const c3 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const third = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c3.body.mfaToken, code: nextCode });
+    expect(third.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(third.body.user).toBeDefined();
+    expect(third.body.user.id).toBe(admin.id);
+  });
+
+  // Concurrency regression: verifyTotpEncryptedStep()'s "does this advance"
+  // check was read against a snapshot taken earlier in the request, then a
+  // PLAIN update persisted the step — two concurrent requests carrying the
+  // SAME captured code could both pass the check and both complete a login
+  // before either write landed. The persist is now a conditional UPDATE
+  // (mfaService.persistTotpStep), so only the first writer's affected-row
+  // count is > 0 and the other is correctly treated as a replay.
+  it('two concurrent login/mfa requests with the SAME captured code: only one completes', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const c1 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const c2 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+
+    const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([
+      request(authApp).post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa').send({ mfaToken: c1.body.mfaToken, code }),
+      request(authApp).post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa').send({ mfaToken: c2.body.mfaToken, code }),
+    ]);
+
+    expect([r1.status, r2.status].sort()).toEqual([200, 401]);
+    const winner = r1.status === 200 ? r1 : r2;
+    const loser = r1.status === 200 ? r2 : r1;
+    expect(winner.body.user).toBeDefined();
+    expect(loser.body.user).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(loser.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
+  });
+
   it('login/mfa with a wrong code is 401 MFA_INVALID', async () => {
     const admin = await seedAdmin();
     const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);

backend/__tests__/routes/adminPhotoContentType.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/**
+ * Admin photo view route Content-Type (#908).
+ *
+ * The route built `image/<ext>` from the filename, producing invalid
+ * types like image/mp4 for videos. AdminAuthenticatedVideo fetches this
+ * URL into a blob whose type inherits the header, and browsers refuse to
+ * play a <video> blob labeled image/* — blank/grey admin video preview.
+ *
+ * Pins (incl. external-review hardening):
+ *  - the header is ALWAYS image/* or video/*: a stored non-media MIME
+ *    (chunked uploads store the client-sent type unvalidated) is never
+ *    echoed — text/html inline under the app origin would be XSS
+ *  - stored video/ MIME wins; MIME-less videos map from the extension
+ *    (.mov → video/quicktime), unknown video extensions get video/mp4
+ *  - images IGNORE the stored MIME (migration 039 backfilled image/jpeg
+ *    onto every legacy row, PNGs included) and use the extension,
+ *    normalized (jpg → image/jpeg); extensionless files get image/jpeg
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-admin-ct-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-ct-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-admin-ct-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'admin-ct-test-event';
+
+describe('admin photo view Content-Type (#908)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let adminToken;
+
+  const addPhoto = async (filename, extra = {}) => {
+    const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
+    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, filename), Buffer.from(`bytes-${filename}`));
+    const r = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename,
+      path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      ...extra,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  const getPhotoRes = (photoId) => request(app)
+    .get(`/api/admin/photos/${eventId}/photo/${photoId}`)
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Admin CT Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'admin-ct-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
+    const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'admin-ct-admin',
+      email: 'admin-ct-admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('AdminCt123', 4),
+      role_id: superRole.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id: rootId, username: 'admin-ct-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotos'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('serves a video with its stored mime_type, not image/<ext>', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('clip.mp4', { media_type: 'video', mime_type: 'video/mp4' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+  });
+
+  it('maps MIME-less videos from their extension (.mov → video/quicktime)', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('clip-nomime.mov', { media_type: 'video' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/quicktime');
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to video/mp4 for a video with an unknown extension', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('clip-unknown.xyz', { media_type: 'video' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects malformed video/ MIME values that would break setHeader', async () => {
+    // Header-invalid chars in the stored value must not 500 the route —
+    // fall back to the extension map instead.
+    const id = await addPhoto('crlf.mp4', {
+      media_type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4\r\nX-Evil: 1',
+    });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+    expect(res.headers['x-evil']).toBeUndefined();
+
+    const bare = await addPhoto('bare.webm', { media_type: 'video', mime_type: 'video/' });
+    const res2 = await getPhotoRes(bare);
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/webm');
+  });
+
+  it('preserves an auto-imported avif via the safe stored-MIME allowlist', async () => {
+    // .avif isn't in EXTENSION_TO_MIME; s3AutoImporter stores image/avif.
+    // Map-only would mislabel it image/jpeg — the allowlist keeps it.
+    const id = await addPhoto('imported.avif', { mime_type: 'image/avif' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/avif');
+  });
+
+  it('preserves other importer raster types too (apng, x-icon)', async () => {
+    const apng = await addPhoto('anim.apng', { mime_type: 'image/apng' });
+    expect((await getPhotoRes(apng)).headers['content-type']).toBe('image/apng');
+    const ico = await addPhoto('fav.ico', { mime_type: 'image/x-icon' });
+    expect((await getPhotoRes(ico)).headers['content-type']).toBe('image/x-icon');
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT honor a stored scriptable image type (image/svg+xml)', async () => {
+    // svg is inline-scriptable and must never be echoed — allowlist excludes it.
+    const id = await addPhoto('vector.svg', { mime_type: 'image/svg+xml' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+
+  it('never echoes a stored non-media MIME type (inline XSS guard)', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('evil.png', { mime_type: 'text/html' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('ignores the migration-039 image/jpeg backfill on legacy PNG rows', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('legacy.png', { mime_type: 'image/jpeg' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('normalizes jpg to the canonical image/jpeg', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('shot.jpg');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps the extension fallback for images without a stored mime_type', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('shot.png');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('handles Object.prototype key extensions without a 500 (.constructor)', async () => {
+    // The extension-to-MIME lookup must be own-property only — a raw
+    // index access returns an inherited function for these keys and the
+    // downstream startsWith throws. Serve image/jpeg instead of 500.
+    const id = await addPhoto('payload.constructor');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+
+    const id2 = await addPhoto('payload.__proto__', { media_type: 'video' });
+    const res2 = await getPhotoRes(id2);
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+  });
+
+  it('does not synthesize types from unmapped image extensions', async () => {
+    // Raw interpolation would produce image/svg+xml (scriptable inline)
+    // or arbitrary strings from client-controlled filenames — the shared
+    // map is the allowlist, everything else is served as image/jpeg.
+    const svg = await addPhoto('vector.svg+xml');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(svg);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+
+    const weird = await addPhoto('weird.xyz');
+    const res2 = await getPhotoRes(weird);
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+
+  it('extensionless files get image/jpeg, never a bare image/', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('noext');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminShortUrlOwnership.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-9h7q-2jpf-vj85 — DELETE /api/admin/short-urls/:id only checked
+ * `events.edit` permission, with no ownership scoping. GET and POST for an
+ * event's short URLs both chain requireEventOwnership; DELETE takes the
+ * short URL row's own :id (not :eventId), so any admin holding events.edit
+ * could delete another admin's branded gallery short URL. The route now
+ * resolves the short URL's event first and applies the same ownership
+ * predicate requireEventOwnership uses. super_admin keeps global access.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-suown-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'suown-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-suown-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('short URL delete ownership scoping', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let service;
+  let superTok; let ownerTok; let foreignTok;
+  let ownerId;
+  let foreignShortUrlId;
+
+  const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
+
+  async function seedEvent(createdBy, slugSuffix) {
+    const farFuture = new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 86400000).toISOString();
+    const [id] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: `suown-${slugSuffix}`,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Test Event',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@e.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@e.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `suown-${slugSuffix}`,
+      share_token: `suown-share-${slugSuffix}`,
+      expires_at: farFuture,
+      is_active: true,
+      is_archived: false,
+      created_by: createdBy,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+    return db('events').where({ id }).first();
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    service = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
+
+    const superIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'suown-super', email: 'suown-super@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const superId = superIns[0]?.id ?? superIns[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+    superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
+
+    const ownerIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'suown-owner', email: 'suown-owner@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    ownerId = ownerIns[0]?.id ?? ownerIns[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, ownerId, 'editor');
+    ownerTok = mintAdminToken(ownerId);
+
+    const foreignIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'suown-foreign', email: 'suown-foreign@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const foreignId = foreignIns[0]?.id ?? foreignIns[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'editor');
+    foreignTok = mintAdminToken(foreignId);
+
+    // Event owned by `owner`, NOT `foreign`.
+    await seedEvent(ownerId, 'owned');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin', require('../../src/routes/adminShortUrls'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    // Fresh short URL per DELETE test so earlier deletes don't interfere.
+    const event = await db('events').where({ created_by: ownerId }).first();
+    const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id,
+      customSlug: `suown-target-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`,
+      createdBy: ownerId,
+    });
+    foreignShortUrlId = row.id;
+  });
+
+  it('an admin who does not own the event cannot delete its short URL (403, row survives)', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete(`/api/admin/short-urls/${foreignShortUrlId}`),
+      foreignTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    const row = await db('gallery_short_urls').where({ id: foreignShortUrlId }).first();
+    expect(row).toBeDefined();
+    expect(row.deleted_at).toBeFalsy();
+  });
+
+  it('the owning admin can delete its own short URL', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete(`/api/admin/short-urls/${foreignShortUrlId}`),
+      ownerTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(204);
+    const row = await db('gallery_short_urls').where({ id: foreignShortUrlId }).first();
+    expect(row.deleted_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin can delete any short URL', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete(`/api/admin/short-urls/${foreignShortUrlId}`),
+      superTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(204);
+    const row = await db('gallery_short_urls').where({ id: foreignShortUrlId }).first();
+    expect(row.deleted_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('deleting a nonexistent short URL id returns 404', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete('/api/admin/short-urls/9999999'),
+      superTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it('deleting a nonexistent short URL id as a non-owner also returns 404 (existence check runs first)', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete('/api/admin/short-urls/9999999'),
+      foreignTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminThumbnails.previewColumns.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/**
+ * Source-inspection contract test for #1078.
+ *
+ * POST /api/admin/thumbnails/regenerate-previews hands its selected rows to
+ * ensurePreviewImage, which branches on `source_origin` (and then reads
+ * `external_relpath` / `filename`) to reach an external/reference photo on its
+ * media mount. When the select list omitted those columns, every external row
+ * looked managed, resolvePhotoStorageKey returned null, and the endpoint
+ * reported success while silently generating nothing for reference galleries.
+ */
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+describe('regenerate-previews selects the columns ensurePreviewImage branches on (#1078)', () => {
+  const src = fs.readFileSync(
+    path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'routes', 'adminThumbnails.js'),
+    'utf8',
+  );
+
+  // The select feeding the regenerate-previews handler, from the route
+  // declaration to the end of that statement.
+  const selectStatement = (() => {
+    const routeIdx = src.indexOf('/regenerate-previews');
+    expect(routeIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
+    const selectIdx = src.indexOf('.select(', routeIdx);
+    expect(selectIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
+    return src.slice(selectIdx, src.indexOf(';', selectIdx));
+  })();
+
+  it.each(['source_origin', 'external_relpath', 'filename'])(
+    'selects %s',
+    (column) => {
+      expect(selectStatement).toContain(`'${column}'`);
+    }
+  );
+
+  it('still selects the columns the managed path needs', () => {
+    for (const column of ['id', 'event_id', 'path', 'media_type', 'mime_type', 'preview_path']) {
+      expect(selectStatement).toContain(`'${column}'`);
+    }
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/authSession.symmetry.test.js

@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ function signAdminToken({ id = 1, username = 'admin', iat, exp }) {
   );
 }
 
-function signGalleryToken({ eventId = 100, eventSlug = 'wedding' } = {}) {
+function signGalleryToken({ eventId = 100, eventSlug = 'wedding', ...extra } = {}) {
   return jwt.sign(
-    { eventId, eventSlug, type: 'gallery' },
+    { eventId, eventSlug, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
     process.env.JWT_SECRET,
     { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
   );
@@ -288,6 +288,56 @@ describe('GET /auth/session — symmetry with protected middleware', () => {
     expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
   });
 
+  /**
+   * What KIND of gallery session this is (#1149).
+   *
+   * The frontend used to keep this in sessionStorage, which is per-TAB while
+   * the cookie is per-browser: a gallery reopened in a second tab lost
+   * 'client' even though the backend still served it as one, and the UI hid
+   * the only control that clears the privileged cookie. Reported from the
+   * token so a restored session knows what it actually is.
+   */
+  describe('gallery session kind', () => {
+    beforeEach(() => {
+      fakeDb.events.push({
+        id: 100,
+        slug: 'wedding',
+        is_active: true,
+        is_archived: false,
+        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400_000),
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('reports a PIN-client session as client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(makeApp())
+        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ accessLevel: 'client' })}`);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('client');
+      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('reports a customer-portal session, which looks like a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(makeApp())
+        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ via: 'customer', customerId: 7 })}`);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
+      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('reports a plain guest as neither', async () => {
+      // The flags have to discriminate, or they would just hand every visitor
+      // a Logout button back.
+      const res = await request(makeApp())
+        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken()}`);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
+      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
   it('returns valid:false when the token is revoked', async () => {
     fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
       id: 1,

backend/__tests__/routes/authShareLoginPassword.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test for GHSA-9hmx-68vc-qpqw — share-link login must not bypass
+ * the gallery password.
+ *
+ * POST /auth/gallery/share-login validates only the share token. For a
+ * password-protected gallery it previously minted a full `type:'gallery'`
+ * access token on the share token alone, letting anyone holding the share URL
+ * read the gallery without the password. The fix: when the gallery requires a
+ * password, return `{ requires_password: true }` with NO token and NO cookie.
+ */
+
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'share-login-test-secret';
+
+const events = [];
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  function dbFn(table) {
+    if (table === 'events') {
+      let filter = () => true;
+      return {
+        where(criteria) {
+          filter = (row) => Object.entries(criteria).every(([k, v]) => {
+            if (k === 'is_active') return Boolean(row.is_active) === Boolean(v);
+            if (k === 'is_archived') return Boolean(row.is_archived) === Boolean(v);
+            return row[k] === v;
+          });
+          return this;
+        },
+        async first() { return events.find(filter); },
+      };
+    }
+    return { where() { return this; }, async first() { return undefined; } };
+  }
+  dbFn.raw = async () => {};
+  return { db: dbFn, logActivity: async () => {} };
+});
+
+// Share token is stored plainly on the fake event row.
+jest.mock('../../src/services/shareLinkService', () => ({
+  getEventShareToken: (event) => event.share_token,
+  resolveShareIdentifier: async () => ({ event: null }),
+}));
+
+const mockSetGalleryAuthCookies = jest.fn();
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenUtils', () => ({
+  setGalleryAuthCookies: (...args) => mockSetGalleryAuthCookies(...args),
+  clearGalleryAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
+  getGalleryTokenFromRequest: jest.fn(),
+  setAdminAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/authSecurity', () => ({
+  trackFailedAttempt: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+  trackSuccessfulLogin: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+  checkAccountLockout: jest.fn(async () => ({ isLocked: false })),
+  resetLockout: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+}));
+
+// Collaborators the router imports at load but the share-login path doesn't hit.
+jest.mock('../../src/services/recaptcha', () => ({ verifyRecaptcha: async () => true }));
+jest.mock('../../src/services/mfaService', () => ({}));
+jest.mock('../../src/middleware/sessionTimeout', () => ({ endSession: jest.fn(), sessionTimeoutMiddleware: (req, res, next) => next() }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ revokeToken: jest.fn(async () => {}), isTokenRevoked: async () => false }));
+
+const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
+
+function makeApp() {
+  const app = express();
+  app.use(express.json());
+  app.use('/auth', authRouter);
+  return app;
+}
+
+const SHARE_TOKEN = 'a'.repeat(64);
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  events.length = 0;
+  mockSetGalleryAuthCookies.mockClear();
+});
+
+describe('POST /auth/gallery/share-login password enforcement', () => {
+  it('does NOT mint a token for a password-protected gallery', async () => {
+    events.push({
+      id: 1, slug: 'private-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
+      require_password: 1, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Private',
+    });
+    const res = await request(makeApp())
+      .post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
+      .send({ slug: 'private-gallery', token: SHARE_TOKEN });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.requires_password).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('mints a token for a public (no-password) gallery', async () => {
+    events.push({
+      id: 2, slug: 'public-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
+      require_password: false, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Public',
+    });
+    const res = await request(makeApp())
+      .post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
+      .send({ slug: 'public-gallery', token: SHARE_TOKEN });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(typeof res.body.token).toBe('string');
+    expect(res.body.event).toBeDefined();
+    expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a wrong share token regardless of password setting', async () => {
+    events.push({
+      id: 3, slug: 'public-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
+      require_password: false, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Public',
+    });
+    const res = await request(makeApp())
+      .post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
+      .send({ slug: 'public-gallery', token: 'b'.repeat(64) });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/authzPermissionGaps.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/**
+ * Authorization / ownership gaps (GHSA permission cluster):
+ *  - jm7j: API-token list must scope to the caller (non-super sees only own)
+ *  - gprq: API-token revoke must be owner-or-super_admin
+ *  - 3rqx: event update must not mass-assign identity/secret columns
+ *  - j2f4: category hero must belong to that category
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-authz-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'authz-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-authz-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken,
+} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('authorization / ownership gaps', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let superId; let superTok; let adminId; let adminTok;
+
+  const grantPermissionToRole = async (roleName, permName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const perm = await db('permissions').where({ name: permName }).first();
+    const exists = await db('role_permissions')
+      .where({ role_id: role.id, permission_id: perm.id }).first();
+    if (!exists) {
+      await db('role_permissions').insert({ role_id: role.id, permission_id: perm.id });
+    }
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+    superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
+
+    const pass = await bcrypt.hash('x', 4);
+    const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'plain-admin', email: 'plain@example.com',
+      password_hash: pass, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    adminId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'admin');
+    // Grant settings.edit to the admin role BEFORE any request populates the
+    // 60s permission cache, so the revoke test exercises the ownership check
+    // (404) rather than the missing-permission gate (403). This models a
+    // custom role that carries settings.edit — the scenario GHSA-gprq needs.
+    await grantPermissionToRole('admin', 'settings.edit');
+    adminTok = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin/api-tokens', require('../../src/routes/adminApiTokens'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/categories', require('../../src/routes/adminCategories'));
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+    app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+      res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
+    });
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
+
+  describe('API tokens (jm7j / gprq)', () => {
+    let superTokenId;
+
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/api-tokens'), superTok)
+        .send({ name: 'super-token', scopes: ['read'] });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(201);
+      superTokenId = res.body.id;
+    });
+
+    it('non-super admin does not see another admin\'s tokens in the list', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/api-tokens'), adminTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.find((t) => t.id === superTokenId)).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('super_admin sees all tokens', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/api-tokens'), superTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.find((t) => t.id === superTokenId)).toBeDefined();
+    });
+
+    it('a non-owner (with settings.edit) cannot revoke another admin\'s token', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/api-tokens/${superTokenId}`), adminTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+      const row = await db('api_tokens').where({ id: superTokenId }).first();
+      expect(row.revoked_at).toBeFalsy();
+    });
+
+    it('the owner can revoke their own token', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/api-tokens/${superTokenId}`), superTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('event update mass-assignment (3rqx)', () => {
+    it('ignores identity/secret columns in the request body', async () => {
+      const seedShareToken = 'orig-share-token';
+      const ins = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: 'authz-mass-assign', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Before',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'orig-hash', share_link: '/gallery/authz/share', share_token: seedShareToken, expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const eventId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`), superTok).send({
+        event_name: 'After',
+        created_by: 99999,
+        slug: 'hijacked-slug',
+        share_token: 'hijacked-token',
+        password_hash: 'hijacked-hash',
+        is_archived: 1,
+        archive_path: '/hijacked/archive/path',
+        hero_logo_path: '/etc/passwd',
+        is_draft: 1,
+        project_id: 99999,
+        // Case-variant keys — SQLite matches columns case-insensitively.
+        Password_Hash: 'case-hijack-hash',
+        Created_By: 88888,
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('After');        // legit field applied
+      expect(row.created_by).toBe(superId);         // ownership untouched (+ case-variant)
+      expect(row.slug).toBe('authz-mass-assign');   // routing identity untouched
+      expect(row.share_token).toBe(seedShareToken); // secret untouched
+      expect(row.password_hash).toBe('orig-hash');  // secret untouched (+ case-variant)
+      expect(row.is_archived).toBeFalsy();          // archive lifecycle untouched
+      expect(row.archive_path).toBeFalsy();         // forged archive path rejected
+      expect(row.hero_logo_path).toBeFalsy();       // fs.unlink primitive blocked
+      expect(row.is_draft).toBeFalsy();             // publish workflow not bypassed
+      expect(row.project_id).toBeFalsy();           // server-managed relationship untouched
+    });
+
+    it('returns 200 (no-op) when the body contains only protected fields', async () => {
+      const ins = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: 'authz-empty-update', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Keep',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/gallery/authz-empty/share', share_token: 'authz-empty-share',
+        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const id = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+      // Body reduces to {} after the denylist — must not 500 (Knex rejects
+      // .update({})).
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`), superTok)
+        .send({ created_by: 1, slug: 'x', is_archived: 1 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('Keep');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('category hero cross-category (j2f4)', () => {
+    it('rejects a hero photo that is not in the category', async () => {
+      const evIns = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: 'authz-cat', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Cat Event',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/gallery/authz-cat/share', share_token: 'authz-cat-share', expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const evId = evIns[0]?.id ?? evIns[0];
+
+      const mkCat = async (name) => {
+        const c = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+          event_id: evId, name, slug: name.toLowerCase(), created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        }).returning('id');
+        return c[0]?.id ?? c[0];
+      };
+      const cat1 = await mkCat('Cat1');
+      const cat2 = await mkCat('Cat2');
+
+      const pIns = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: evId, filename: 'p.jpg', path: 'authz-cat/p.jpg', type: 'individual',
+        category_id: cat1, uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const photoInCat1 = pIns[0]?.id ?? pIns[0];
+
+      // Pointing cat2's hero at a photo that lives in cat1 must be refused.
+      const bad = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/categories/${cat2}/hero`), superTok)
+        .send({ hero_photo_id: photoInCat1 });
+      expect(bad.status).toBe(404);
+
+      // The photo's own category accepts it.
+      const ok = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/categories/${cat1}/hero`), superTok)
+        .send({ hero_photo_id: photoInCat1 });
+      expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/backupExportSuperadmin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/**
+ * Full-instance export is super_admin only (GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v).
+ *
+ * GET /api/admin/backup/picpeak/export dumps every table unredacted (bcrypt
+ * hashes, 2FA, SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/webhook/S3 secrets). It was gated only by
+ * requirePermission('backup.create'), which the built-in `admin` role holds —
+ * so any non-super_admin admin could download the whole database. Pins that
+ * `admin` now gets 403 and `super_admin` passes the gate.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-bkexport-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'bkexport-test-secret';
+
+// The export otherwise walks the whole DB and writes a zip — stub it so the
+// super_admin happy path is fast and deterministic; the gate is what's tested.
+// The route deletes path.dirname(filePath) recursively after download, so the
+// stub MUST live in its own dir — a bare os.tmpdir() file would make the route
+// wipe the whole temp root (and other jest workers' DB files).
+const mockExportDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-export-stub-'));
+const mockExportPath = path.join(mockExportDir, 'export.picpeak');
+fs.writeFileSync(mockExportPath, 'stub');
+jest.mock('../../src/services/picpeakExportService', () => ({
+  createPicpeak: jest.fn(async () => ({ filePath: mockExportPath })),
+}));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('backup export super_admin gate (GHSA-pv6w)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let adminToken; let superToken;
+
+  const mkUser = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username,
+      email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    return jwt.sign(
+      { id, username, type: 'admin', role: roleName, loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    adminToken = await mkUser('limited-admin', 'admin');
+    superToken = await mkUser('root-admin', 'super_admin');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/backup', require('../../src/routes/adminBackup'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+    fs.rmSync(mockExportDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('denies the built-in admin role (was: full DB dump)', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/backup/picpeak/export')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('allows super_admin', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/backup/picpeak/export')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
+    expect(res.status).toBeLessThan(500);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/dashboardScope.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/**
+ * Dashboard endpoints must not leak other admins' data to event-scoped
+ * editors — GHSA-c2jj (/stats), GHSA-gqx7 (/analytics), GHSA-jhcf (/activity).
+ *
+ * All three are gated only by `analytics.view`, which the `editor` role holds.
+ * But the events LIST restricts editors to their own rows
+ * (adminEvents/crud.js: roleName === 'editor' → created_by = admin.id), so an
+ * editor saw instance-wide totals — and, via /analytics topGalleries, other
+ * admins' gallery names and SLUGS (the public gallery URL component) — for
+ * events invisible to them everywhere else.
+ *
+ * Scoping deliberately keys on `editor` to mirror the events list exactly, so
+ * the `admin` role's dashboard is unchanged.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dashscope-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dashscope-test-secret';
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('dashboard scoping (GHSA-c2jj / gqx7 / jhcf)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let editorToken; let superToken;
+  let ownEventId; let foreignEventId;
+
+  const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username,
+      email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    const token = jwt.sign(
+      { id, username, type: 'admin', role: roleName, loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+    return { id, token };
+  };
+
+  const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy) => {
+    const r = await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: `${slug}-name`,
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_token: `tok-${slug}`,
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/tok-${slug}`,
+      created_by: createdBy,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const editor = await mkAdmin('scoped-editor', 'editor');
+    const sup = await mkAdmin('root-admin', 'super_admin');
+    editorToken = editor.token;
+    superToken = sup.token;
+
+    ownEventId = await mkEvent('own-gallery', editor.id);
+    foreignEventId = await mkEvent('foreign-gallery', sup.id);
+
+    // One photo + one view per event so the aggregates are non-zero.
+    for (const [eventId, name] of [[ownEventId, 'own'], [foreignEventId, 'foreign']]) {
+      await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename: `${name}.jpg`,
+        path: `events/active/${name}.jpg`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        size_bytes: 1000,
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      });
+      await db('access_logs').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        action: 'view',
+        ip_address: `10.0.0.${eventId}`,
+        user_agent: 'Mozilla/5.0',
+        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+      });
+      await db('activity_logs').insert({
+        activity_type: 'photo_viewed',
+        actor_type: 'admin',
+        actor_name: `${name}-actor`,
+        event_id: eventId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      });
+    }
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/dashboard', require('../../src/routes/adminDashboard'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('/stats counts only the editor\'s own events and photos', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(Number(res.body.totalEvents)).toBe(1);
+    expect(Number(res.body.totalPhotos)).toBe(1);
+    // The catalogued original bytes — this is what carries the per-event
+    // scoping, and what `storageUsed` reported before #1164.
+    expect(Number(res.body.catalogedBytes)).toBe(1000);
+  });
+
+  it('/stats reports disk usage unscoped, because disk is not per-event', async () => {
+    // storageUsed is a measurement of the storage root (#1164), so it is the
+    // same number for every admin by design. Pinned so a future reviewer
+    // reading "everything on this endpoint is scoped" does not turn it into a
+    // sum of this editor's photos again — which is the bug that was fixed.
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.storageUsed).not.toBe(1000);
+    expect(res.body).toHaveProperty('storageBreakdown');
+  });
+
+  it('/stats reports the catalogued figure on an S3 backend, not a near-zero disk walk', async () => {
+    // STORAGE_PATH holds only incidental local files when objects live in a
+    // bucket, so walking it would report near-zero and drag the soft-limit
+    // recommendation with it.
+    const prev = process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND;
+    process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND = 's3';
+    try {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.storageUsed).toBeNull();
+      expect(res.body.storageMeasurement).toBe('catalog');
+      expect(Number(res.body.catalogedBytes)).toBe(1000);
+    } finally {
+      if (prev === undefined) delete process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND;
+      else process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND = prev;
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('/analytics does not expose a foreign gallery name or slug', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/analytics?days=7')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const body = JSON.stringify(res.body);
+    expect(body).not.toContain('foreign-gallery');
+    expect(body).not.toContain('foreign-gallery-name');
+    expect(res.body.topGalleries.map((g) => g.slug)).toEqual(['own-gallery']);
+  });
+
+  it('/activity does not surface a foreign event\'s entries', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/activity')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const actors = res.body.map((a) => a.actorName);
+    expect(actors).toContain('own-actor');
+    expect(actors).not.toContain('foreign-actor');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves super_admin unscoped across all three', async () => {
+    const stats = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(Number(stats.body.totalEvents)).toBe(2);
+
+    const analytics = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/analytics?days=7')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(analytics.body.topGalleries.map((g) => g.slug).sort())
+      .toEqual(['foreign-gallery', 'own-gallery']);
+
+    const activity = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/activity')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(activity.body.map((a) => a.actorName)).toContain('foreign-actor');
+  });
+});
+
+/**
+ * Codex round 2: the /activity filter trusts `activity_logs.event_id`, but
+ * expenseService was passing `adminId` into logActivity's third positional
+ * parameter — which is `eventId`. Admin and event id sequences overlap, so a
+ * foreign admin's expense metadata could surface under an editor's event.
+ * Those writers now pass the actor instead, leaving event_id NULL.
+ */
+describe('activity writers do not put admin ids in event_id (GHSA-jhcf)', () => {
+  it('expenseService passes the actor, not adminId, as the event id', () => {
+    const fs2 = require('fs');
+    const src = fs2.readFileSync(
+      require('path').join(__dirname, '../../src/services/expenseService.js'), 'utf8',
+    );
+    // No logActivity call may end with a bare `, adminId)` — that slot is eventId.
+    const offenders = src.split('\n').filter(
+      (l) => l.includes('logActivity(') && /,\s*adminId\s*\)/.test(l),
+    );
+    expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
+    // And the actor form must actually be in use.
+    expect(src).toContain("{ type: 'admin', id: adminId }");
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/databaseBackupConfigDestination.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * PUT /api/admin/database-backup/config must reject a
+ * database_backup_destination_path that resolves inside a publicly served
+ * directory (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm class, #1365).
+ *
+ * Before #1365, database_backup_destination_path was silently ignored by
+ * databaseBackupService.backup() (a destructuring bug always fell back to
+ * the hardcoded /backup/database), so this setting being freely writable by
+ * any backup.create holder — the built-in `admin` role has it without
+ * settings.edit or backup.restore — was harmless. Making the setting
+ * actually take effect reopens the exact exfiltration path GHSA-jw8m fixed
+ * for the per-request override, through the persisted setting instead.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-config-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dbbackup-config-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('database backup destination-path config guard (GHSA-jw8m class, #1365)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminToken;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'limited-admin',
+      email: 'limited-admin-config@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id, username: 'limited-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/database-backup', require('../../src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('rejects a destination inside the public uploads/logos mount', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads', 'logos') });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+
+    // The seeded default must survive untouched — the rejected value never lands.
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_destination_path' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe('/backup/database');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a destination inside the public fonts mount', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'fonts') });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a destination outside any public mount', async () => {
+    const safePath = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'db-backups');
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: safePath });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_destination_path' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(safePath);
+  });
+
+  // A retention of 0 or less pushes cleanupOldBackups' cutoff to today or
+  // the future, deleting every completed backup on the next scheduled run
+  // — a backup.create holder achieving what backup.delete gates on /cleanup.
+  it.each([-1, 0])('rejects database_backup_retention_days=%s', async (bad) => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_retention_days: bad });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a positive database_backup_retention_days', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_retention_days: 90 });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_retention_days' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(90);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/databaseBackupDestination.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/**
+ * Manual database backup must not honour a caller-supplied destination
+ * (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm).
+ *
+ * POST /api/admin/database-backup/backup forwarded req.body straight into
+ * databaseBackupService.backup(), which merges options over its config:
+ *   const { destinationPath = '/backup/database', ... } = { ...config, ...options }
+ * `destinationPath` is not a persistable setting (the /config allowlist only
+ * accepts `database_backup_*` keys), so the request body was its ONLY source.
+ *
+ * The `admin` role holds backup.create but neither settings.edit nor
+ * backup.restore — so it could aim a full DB dump (bcrypt hashes, gallery
+ * password hashes, encrypted SMTP creds) at the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
+ * (server.js mounts it with no auth middleware) and fetch it unauthenticated.
+ *
+ * Pins that destinationPath from the body is ignored, while the legitimate
+ * knobs still pass through.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dbbackup-test-secret';
+
+// Capture what the route hands the service; never run a real backup.
+const mockBackup = jest.fn(async () => ({ success: true }));
+jest.mock('../../src/services/databaseBackup', () => ({
+  databaseBackupService: {
+    get isRunning() { return false; },
+    backup: (...args) => mockBackup(...args),
+  },
+}));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('manual database backup destination (GHSA-jw8m)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminToken;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'limited-admin',
+      email: 'limited-admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id, username: 'limited-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/database-backup', require('../../src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(() => mockBackup.mockClear());
+
+  it('ignores a caller-supplied destinationPath', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ destinationPath: '/app/storage/uploads' });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    // Give the fire-and-forget call a tick to land.
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+    expect(mockBackup).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    const opts = mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0];
+    expect(opts).not.toHaveProperty('destinationPath');
+    expect(JSON.stringify(opts)).not.toContain('uploads');
+  });
+
+  it('still forwards the legitimate backup knobs', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ compress: false, validateIntegrity: false, destinationPath: '/tmp/evil' });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+    const opts = mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0];
+    expect(opts.compress).toBe(false);
+    expect(opts.validateIntegrity).toBe(false);
+    expect(opts).not.toHaveProperty('destinationPath');
+  });
+
+  it('omits absent knobs entirely so service/config defaults still apply', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({});
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+    // An explicit `{compress: undefined}` would override config on spread —
+    // absent keys must simply not be present.
+    expect(mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0]).toEqual({});
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/feedbackOwnership.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-2qc2 / GHSA-32h4 / GHSA-3335 — feedback moderation, deletion, and the
+ * pending-moderation list are by-feedback-id (or global) and lacked ownership
+ * scoping, so a restricted editor could act on / enumerate feedback for events
+ * it does not own. super_admin keeps global access.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-fbown-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'fbown-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-fbown-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('feedback ownership scoping', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let superTok; let editorTok; let editorId;
+  let foreignFeedbackId;
+
+  const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    const { adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db);
+    await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+    superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
+
+    const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'editor', email: 'editor@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('x', 4), must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    editorId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, editorId, 'editor');
+    editorTok = mintAdminToken(editorId);
+
+    // Event owned by super_admin (NOT the editor).
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'fbown-foreign', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Foreign',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/g/fbown/s', share_token: 'fbown-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+    const ph = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'p.jpg', path: 'fbown-foreign/p.jpg', type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const photoId = ph[0]?.id ?? ph[0];
+    const fb = await db('photo_feedback').insert({
+      photo_id: photoId, event_id: eventId, feedback_type: 'comment',
+      comment_text: 'hi', is_approved: 0, is_hidden: 0, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    foreignFeedbackId = fb[0]?.id ?? fb[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin/feedback', require('../../src/routes/adminFeedback'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('editor cannot moderate feedback on an event it does not own (404)', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}/approve`), editorTok);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    const row = await db('photo_feedback').where({ id: foreignFeedbackId }).first();
+    expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.is_approved); // untouched
+  });
+
+  it('editor cannot delete foreign feedback, row survives', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}`), editorTok);
+    // Denied either at the events.delete permission layer (editor lacks it →
+    // 403) or the ownership layer (404) — both must leave the row intact.
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
+    expect(await db('photo_feedback').where({ id: foreignFeedbackId }).first()).toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it('editor sees no foreign feedback in pending-moderation', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/feedback/feedback/pending-moderation'), editorTok);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.find((f) => f.id === foreignFeedbackId)).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin CAN moderate and see it', async () => {
+    const pending = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/feedback/feedback/pending-moderation'), superTok);
+    expect(pending.body.find((f) => f.id === foreignFeedbackId)).toBeDefined();
+    const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}/approve`), superTok);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryDownloadStorage.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+/**
+ * Single-photo gallery downloads must go through the storage backend (#1048).
+ *
+ * `GET /api/gallery/:slug/download/:photoId` resolved a LOCAL filesystem path
+ * unconditionally and handed it to res.sendFile. On an S3/R2 deployment
+ * managed photos never exist on local disk, so every per-photo download 404'd
+ * with ENOENT — while download-all and secure-images worked fine, because they
+ * already went through getStorage(). The gallery looks healthy until a guest
+ * clicks the download button on a single photo.
+ *
+ * The local branch is pinned just as hard: sendFile emits Content-Length,
+ * Accept-Ranges, ETag and Last-Modified and answers Range with a 206. Routing
+ * local installs through a bare stream.pipe(res) to share one code path would
+ * silently drop all of that, and a resumed download would append a second full
+ * body onto the partial file.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dl-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'download-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dl-storage-'));
+
+const { Readable } = require('stream');
+
+const SLUG = 'download-gallery';
+const FILENAME = 'original.jpg';
+// Deliberately not written to disk anywhere: if the route reads the
+// filesystem instead of the backend, it cannot produce these bytes.
+const mockObjectBody = Buffer.from('S3-ONLY-ORIGINAL-BYTES-not-on-local-disk');
+const mockBackendKind = { value: 's3' };
+
+const mockStorage = {
+  kind: () => mockBackendKind.value,
+  stat: jest.fn(async () => ({ size: mockObjectBody.length, mtime: new Date('2026-08-20T10:00:00Z') })),
+  get: jest.fn(async () => Readable.from([mockObjectBody])),
+  getRange: jest.fn(async (key, start, end) => Readable.from([mockObjectBody.subarray(start, end + 1)])),
+  delete: jest.fn(async () => undefined),
+  exists: jest.fn(async () => true),
+};
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/storage', () => ({
+  getStorage: () => mockStorage,
+  initStorage: async () => mockStorage,
+}));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('single-photo download through the storage backend (#1048)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId; let photoId;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Downloads',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
+      share_token: 'download-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      require_password: 0,
+      allow_downloads: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    const row = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: FILENAME,
+      path: `${SLUG}/${FILENAME}`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      source_origin: 'managed',
+      mime_type: 'image/jpeg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    photoId = row[0]?.id ?? row[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    mockBackendKind.value = 's3';
+    mockStorage.get.mockClear();
+    mockStorage.getRange.mockClear();
+  });
+
+  it('streams the stored object instead of 404ing on a local path', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .buffer(true)
+      .parse((response, cb) => {
+        const chunks = [];
+        response.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
+        response.on('end', () => cb(null, Buffer.concat(chunks)));
+      });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    // The bytes only exist in the backend — proof it did not read the disk.
+    expect(res.body.equals(mockObjectBody)).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockStorage.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith(`events/active/${SLUG}/${FILENAME}`);
+    // Never written locally, so a filesystem read could not have served this.
+    expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG, FILENAME))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('sends Content-Length so the browser can show download progress', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+
+    expect(res.headers['content-length']).toBe(String(mockObjectBody.length));
+    expect(res.headers['accept-ranges']).toBe('bytes');
+    expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toContain(FILENAME);
+  });
+
+  it('answers a Range request with 206 and only the requested bytes', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9')
+      .buffer(true)
+      .parse((response, cb) => {
+        const chunks = [];
+        response.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
+        response.on('end', () => cb(null, Buffer.concat(chunks)));
+      });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(206);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBe(`bytes 0-9/${mockObjectBody.length}`);
+    expect(res.headers['content-length']).toBe('10');
+    expect(res.body.equals(mockObjectBody.subarray(0, 10))).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockStorage.getRange).toHaveBeenCalledWith(`events/active/${SLUG}/${FILENAME}`, 0, 9);
+  });
+
+  it('ignores a malformed Range rather than emitting a nonsense 206', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=abc-def');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('404s cleanly when the object is missing from the backend', async () => {
+    mockStorage.stat.mockResolvedValueOnce(null);
+
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    // The error must not inherit the image headers staged for a successful
+    // download, or the browser saves a .jpg containing JSON.
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/json/);
+    expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('keeps res.sendFile on a local backend rather than a bare pipe', async () => {
+    mockBackendKind.value = 'local';
+    const abs = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG, FILENAME);
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(abs, 'local-disk-bytes');
+
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(mockStorage.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    // sendFile's signature: conditional-request headers a raw pipe never sets.
+    expect(res.headers.etag).toBeDefined();
+    expect(res.headers['last-modified']).toBeDefined();
+
+    fs.rmSync(abs, { force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('does not serve a partial body when the If-Range validator is stale', async () => {
+    // The object was replaced since the client's last attempt. Answering 206
+    // from the new bytes would let it splice two versions into one file.
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9')
+      .set('If-Range', new Date('2020-01-01T00:00:00Z').toUTCString());
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.headers['content-length']).toBe(String(mockObjectBody.length));
+  });
+
+  it('still serves 206 when the If-Range validator matches', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9')
+      .set('If-Range', new Date('2026-08-20T10:00:00Z').toUTCString());
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(206);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBe(`bytes 0-9/${mockObjectBody.length}`);
+  });
+
+  it('errors cleanly when the object vanishes between stat and get', async () => {
+    // HeadObject succeeding does not mean GetObject will — a concurrent
+    // delete lands here. The staged image headers must not escape with it.
+    const gone = new Error('NoSuchKey');
+    gone.name = 'NoSuchKey';
+    mockStorage.get.mockRejectedValueOnce(gone);
+
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/json/);
+    expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('does not send 206 headers before the range fetch can fail', async () => {
+    // writeHead(206) before the await would make this ERR_HTTP_HEADERS_SENT.
+    mockStorage.getRange.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('connection reset'));
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(500);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/json/);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('answers HEAD from stat instead of draining the object out of S3', async () => {
+    const before = (await db('photos').where('id', photoId).first()).download_count || 0;
+    const logsBefore = (await db('access_logs').where({ photo_id: photoId, action: 'download' })).length;
+
+    const res = await request(app).head(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-length']).toBe(String(mockObjectBody.length));
+    expect(res.headers['accept-ranges']).toBe('bytes');
+    // The whole point: no egress for a metadata probe.
+    expect(mockStorage.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(mockStorage.getRange).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    // And no side effects: a probe is not a download.
+    const after = (await db('photos').where('id', photoId).first()).download_count || 0;
+    expect(after).toBe(before);
+    const logsAfter = (await db('access_logs').where({ photo_id: photoId, action: 'download' })).length;
+    expect(logsAfter).toBe(logsBefore);
+  });
+
+  it('returns a clean error when the range stream dies before its first chunk', async () => {
+    // Resolves, then errors — writeHead would already have committed the 206,
+    // leaving a connection reset as the only possible outcome.
+    const { Readable: R } = require('stream');
+    mockStorage.getRange.mockImplementationOnce(async () => {
+      const dead = new R({ read() { this.destroy(new Error('socket hang up')); } });
+      return dead;
+    });
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(500);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/json/);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryDraftPreviewResolve.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+/**
+ * Previewing an unpublished gallery through its SHORT share URL (#1386).
+ *
+ * /info has honoured admin_preview since #868, but two sibling routes never
+ * did, and both sit on the short-URL path:
+ *
+ *   GET /resolve/:identifier      — filtered drafts out via ACTIVE_EVENT_FILTER
+ *   GET /:slug/verify-token/:token — same, inline
+ *
+ * With "use short gallery URLs" OFF the admin's View Gallery link carries the
+ * slug, GalleryPage never calls /resolve, and the preview worked. With it ON
+ * the link is the token form, GalleryPage resolves it first, and the draft
+ * 404'd as "Gallery Not Found" — which is exactly what was reported.
+ *
+ * The relaxation is admin-preview-only, so the other half of these tests is
+ * the part that must NOT move: anonymous callers still get 404 for a draft,
+ * and GHSA-rh8r's rule (never hand a share_token back on a bare slug lookup)
+ * has to survive the new path too.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-draft-preview-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'draft-preview-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-draft-preview-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+// Share-token fixtures, deliberately low-entropy and obviously fake. They
+// have to satisfy SHARE_TOKEN_REGEX (32 hex chars), and random-looking hex of
+// that shape is exactly what secret scanners flag — GitGuardian raised two
+// "Generic High Entropy Secret" findings on the first version of this file.
+const DRAFT_SLUG = 'draft-preview-event';
+const DRAFT_TOKEN = 'deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef';
+const LIVE_SLUG = 'published-event';
+const LIVE_TOKEN = 'feedfacefeedfacefeedfacefeedface';
+
+describe('draft preview through the short share URL (#1386)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let foreignId;
+
+  // Two transports. admin_preview=1 is an intent flag authenticated by the
+  // admin cookie — what the frontend sends. ?preview=<jwt> is the legacy
+  // hand-built-link form, kept working.
+  const preview = (id = adminId) => `preview=${mintAdminToken(id)}`;
+  const asAdmin = (req, id = adminId) => req.set('Cookie', `admin_token=${mintAdminToken(id)}`);
+
+  async function insertEvent({ slug, token, isDraft }) {
+    await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: slug,
+      event_date: '2026-09-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/${token}`,
+      share_token: token,
+      require_password: 0,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: isDraft ? 1 : 0,
+      created_by: adminId,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+    const [row] = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'foreign', email: 'foreign@example.test', password_hash: 'unused', is_active: 1,
+    }).returning('id');
+    foreignId = row?.id ?? row;
+    await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'viewer');
+
+    await insertEvent({ slug: DRAFT_SLUG, token: DRAFT_TOKEN, isDraft: true });
+    await insertEvent({ slug: LIVE_SLUG, token: LIVE_TOKEN, isDraft: false });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe('the reported case — admin previewing a draft', () => {
+    it('resolves the draft by share token (was 404 "Gallery Not Found")', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?${preview()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(DRAFT_SLUG);
+      expect(res.body.matchType).toBe('token');
+    });
+
+    it('resolves the draft by full share link', async () => {
+      const identifier = encodeURIComponent(`/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/${DRAFT_TOKEN}`);
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${identifier}?${preview()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(DRAFT_SLUG);
+    });
+
+    it('clears verify-token for the draft, the next step of the same flow', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/verify-token/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?${preview()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+    });
+  });
+
+  // The transport the SHIPPED frontend uses. The first cut of this fix only
+  // tested ?preview=, which the browser never sends on an API call — so the
+  // suite passed while the feature stayed broken end to end. Caught in review.
+  describe('admin_preview=1 authenticated by the admin cookie', () => {
+    it('resolves the draft', async () => {
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(DRAFT_SLUG);
+    });
+
+    it('clears verify-token', async () => {
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/verify-token/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('serves /info for the draft', async () => {
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/info?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+
+    it('serves draft MEDIA, which is what the flag on the URL is for', async () => {
+      // AuthenticatedImage/Video use native fetch and never see the axios
+      // interceptor, so the flag has to travel on the media URL itself. Without
+      // it the preview loaded metadata and showed no images at all.
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/photos?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+
+    it('404s with the flag but no admin cookie — the flag authorizes nothing', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s with the flag and a cookie that is not an admin JWT', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`)
+        .set('Cookie', 'admin_token=not-a-jwt');
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('what must not move', () => {
+    it('404s an anonymous resolve of the draft token', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s when ?preview= carries a token that is not a valid admin JWT', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?preview=not-a-jwt`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s when ?preview= is absent entirely', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?preview=`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s a non-owning admin on verify-token too (#1411)', async () => {
+      // This route selected its own columns and omitted created_by, so the
+      // ownership check saw an ownerless event and waved the caller through
+      // while /resolve and /info refused them.
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/verify-token/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+        foreignId,
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s an admin who does not own the event (#1411)', async () => {
+      // Was 200: a valid signature was the whole check, so any admin previewed
+      // any draft, including another photographer's. Now ownership applies —
+      // the same rule requireEventOwnership enforces everywhere else.
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+        foreignId,
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+
+      const info = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/info?admin_preview=1`),
+        foreignId,
+      );
+      expect(info.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s an admin whose role grants no gallery permissions (#1411)', async () => {
+      // The owner, but stripped of events.view/photos.view.
+      const original = (await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).first()).role_id;
+      await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ role_id: null });
+      try {
+        const res = await asAdmin(
+          request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+        );
+        expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+      } finally {
+        await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ role_id: original });
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('404s an admin whose account has been deactivated (#1411)', async () => {
+      await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
+      try {
+        const res = await asAdmin(
+          request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+        );
+        expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+      } finally {
+        await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ is_active: 1 });
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('404s an anonymous verify-token for the draft', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/verify-token/${DRAFT_TOKEN}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('still withholds the share_token on a bare slug lookup (GHSA-rh8r)', async () => {
+      // The draft path must not become a way around the token-withholding rule.
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_SLUG}?${preview()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.matchType).toBe('slug');
+      expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(res.body.share_link).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(res.body.share_url).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(DRAFT_TOKEN);
+    });
+
+    it('leaves the published gallery resolving anonymously, as before', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${LIVE_TOKEN}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(LIVE_SLUG);
+      expect(res.body.token).toBe(LIVE_TOKEN);
+    });
+
+    it('still 404s an identifier that matches nothing', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/no-such-gallery?${preview()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryProtectedVideoUrls.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/**
+ * Videos under enhanced/maximum image protection (#1370).
+ *
+ * Both halves of the video path used to be routed through /api/secure-images
+ * once an event left `standard` protection, and neither half could carry a
+ * video:
+ *
+ *   1. galleryQueryService emitted `/api/secure-images/{slug}/secure/{id}/{{token}}`
+ *      as the video's `url`. The lightbox drops that straight into a <video>
+ *      element, nothing substitutes `{{token}}` (the helper that could is
+ *      unreferenced), and the route answers 403 "Invalid or expired token".
+ *   2. Even with a valid token it would still fail: the secure-images route
+ *      pipes every byte through secureImageService.processProtectedImage,
+ *      which calls sharp() and throws on an mp4 → 404.
+ *
+ * The guest saw a poster frozen at 0:00 with no error of any kind.
+ *
+ * Videos now keep the JWT route at every protection level. That is not a new
+ * exposure — thumbnails of those same videos have always been served from it —
+ * so these tests also pin the inverse: still images must keep bouncing to the
+ * secure endpoint. Every assertion here fails on the unfixed code except the
+ * two guarding images.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-video-urls-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'video-urls-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-video-urls-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'protected-video-gallery';
+const VIDEO_BYTES = Buffer.from('not really an mp4, but the route only streams bytes');
+
+describe('videos stay playable under enhanced/maximum protection (#1370)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId; let videoId; let imageId;
+
+  async function setProtection(level) {
+    await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ protection_level: level });
+  }
+
+  async function photoPayload(id) {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const photo = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === id);
+    expect(photo).toBeDefined();
+    return photo;
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Protected Video',
+      event_date: '2026-09-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
+      share_token: 'protected-video-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      // Password-free so verifyGalleryAccess takes the public path, same as
+      // the sibling gallery suites.
+      require_password: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    const mediaDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG, 'individual');
+    fs.mkdirSync(mediaDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(mediaDir, 'clip.mp4'), VIDEO_BYTES);
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(mediaDir, 'still.jpg'), Buffer.from('jpeg-ish'));
+
+    const vid = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'clip.mp4',
+      path: `${SLUG}/individual/clip.mp4`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      media_type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      duration: 43,
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    videoId = vid[0]?.id ?? vid[0];
+
+    const img = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'still.jpg',
+      path: `${SLUG}/individual/still.jpg`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    imageId = img[0]?.id ?? img[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe.each(['enhanced', 'maximum'])('protection_level = %s', (level) => {
+    beforeAll(async () => { await setProtection(level); });
+
+    test('the video url is the JWT route, not a {{token}} template', async () => {
+      const photo = await photoPayload(videoId);
+      expect(photo.url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`);
+      expect(photo.url).not.toContain('{{token}}');
+      expect(photo.requires_token).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test('the video streams instead of bouncing to the secure endpoint', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+      expect(res.headers['accept-ranges']).toBe('bytes');
+      expect(Buffer.from(res.body)).toEqual(VIDEO_BYTES);
+    });
+
+    test('range requests still work, so seeking is possible', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`)
+        .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9');
+      expect(res.status).toBe(206);
+      expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBe(`bytes 0-9/${VIDEO_BYTES.length}`);
+    });
+
+    test('still images keep bouncing to the secure endpoint', async () => {
+      const photo = await photoPayload(imageId);
+      expect(photo.url).toBe(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/secure/${imageId}/{{token}}`);
+      expect(photo.requires_token).toBe(true);
+
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${imageId}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(302);
+      expect(res.body.error).toBe('Secure access required');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('protection_level = standard', () => {
+    beforeAll(async () => { await setProtection('standard'); });
+
+    test('both media types take the JWT route, as before', async () => {
+      expect((await photoPayload(videoId)).url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`);
+      expect((await photoPayload(imageId)).url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${imageId}`);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryResolveShareToken.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-rh8r-7x3h-36rv — the unauthenticated GET /api/gallery/resolve/:identifier
+ * must NOT return a gallery's secret share_token (nor the share links that
+ * embed it) for a bare *slug* lookup. Slugs appear in gallery URLs and are
+ * guessable; handing back the secret turns a known slug into share-link
+ * access to a no-password gallery. The token is only returned when the caller
+ * resolved via the token / full share link (i.e. already holds it).
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-resolve-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'resolve-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-resolve-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'resolve-test-event';
+const SHARE_TOKEN = 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6';
+
+describe('GET /api/gallery/resolve/:identifier (GHSA-rh8r)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Resolve Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/${SHARE_TOKEN}`,
+      share_token: SHARE_TOKEN,
+      require_password: 0, // no-password → the token IS the access credential
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('does NOT leak the share_token (or share links) for a bare slug lookup', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${SLUG}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.slug).toBe(SLUG);
+    expect(res.body.matchType).toBe('slug');
+    // The secret must be absent — and must not sneak out via the share links.
+    expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.body.share_link).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.body.share_url).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(SHARE_TOKEN);
+  });
+
+  it('DOES return the token when the caller already resolved via the token', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${SHARE_TOKEN}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.token).toBe(SHARE_TOKEN);
+    expect(res.body.matchType).toMatch(/token/);
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT leak the token via SQL LIKE wildcards in the link_partial fallback', async () => {
+    // Before the escaping fix, an anonymous request of 32 underscores matched
+    // any share_link ending in a 32-char token (`_` = single-char wildcard),
+    // resolved as matchType 'link_partial', and handed back the bearer token.
+    // The share_token here has no underscores, so an escaped LIKE must miss.
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${'_'.repeat(SHARE_TOKEN.length)}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(SHARE_TOKEN);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/gallerySqliteBooleanFlags.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/**
+ * SQLite boolean coercion in the guest gallery surface (#1028).
+ *
+ * SQLite stores booleans as 0/1; Postgres stores true/false. The /photos
+ * payload and every download guard compared strictly against `true`/`false`,
+ * so on SQLite:
+ *
+ *   allow_downloads:    0 !== false → true   (button shown while disabled)
+ *   allow_user_uploads: 1 === true  → false  (button hidden while enabled)
+ *   if (allow_downloads === false)  → never fires, so ALL download endpoints
+ *                                     kept serving with downloads switched off
+ *
+ * (The download-jobs route asserted on main is #858, which is beta-only —
+ * this branch covers the three download endpoints that exist here.)
+ *
+ * The harness runs on SQLite, so these assertions exercise the real engine
+ * values rather than a mock. Every test here fails on the unfixed code.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sqlite-flags-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'sqlite-flags-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sqlite-flags-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'sqlite-flags-gallery';
+
+describe('gallery flags survive SQLite 0/1 storage (#1028)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId; let photoId;
+
+  async function setEventFlags(patch) {
+    await db('events').where('id', eventId).update(patch);
+  }
+
+  async function getPayload() {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    return res.body.event;
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'SQLite Flags',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
+      share_token: 'sqlite-flags-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      // Password-free so verifyGalleryAccess takes the public path and loads
+      // the row with SELECT * — i.e. the raw 0/1 values, same as production.
+      require_password: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    const ph = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'p.jpg',
+      path: `${SLUG}/p.jpg`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    photoId = ph[0]?.id ?? ph[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  test('the engine under test really is SQLite storing 0/1', async () => {
+    expect(['sqlite3', 'better-sqlite3']).toContain(db.client.config.client);
+    await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 0 });
+    const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first('allow_downloads');
+    expect(row.allow_downloads).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  describe('with downloads disabled (allow_downloads = 0)', () => {
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 0, allow_user_uploads: 1 });
+    });
+
+    test('payload reports allow_downloads false (was true — header button shown)', async () => {
+      expect((await getPayload()).allow_downloads).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test('payload reports allow_user_uploads true (was false — upload button hidden)', async () => {
+      expect((await getPayload()).allow_user_uploads).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test('single-photo download is refused', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+
+    test('download-all is refused', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+
+    test('download-selected is refused', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [photoId] });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('with downloads enabled (allow_downloads = 1)', () => {
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 1, allow_user_uploads: 0 });
+    });
+
+    test('payload reports allow_downloads true / allow_user_uploads false', async () => {
+      const event = await getPayload();
+      expect(event.allow_downloads).toBe(true);
+      expect(event.allow_user_uploads).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test('download-all is no longer refused', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`);
+      expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('protection flags', () => {
+    test('0/1 protection toggles are reported the way they are stored', async () => {
+      await setEventFlags({
+        disable_right_click: 1,
+        enable_devtools_protection: 1,
+        use_canvas_rendering: 1,
+        watermark_downloads: 1,
+        overlay_protection: 0,
+      });
+      const event = await getPayload();
+      expect(event.disable_right_click).toBe(true);
+      expect(event.enable_devtools_protection).toBe(true);
+      expect(event.use_canvas_rendering).toBe(true);
+      expect(event.watermark_downloads).toBe(true);
+      expect(event.overlay_protection).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('per-category download blocking (#640) on SQLite', () => {
+    test('a category with allow_downloads = 0 is reported as blocked', async () => {
+      const cat = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+        name: 'Blocked', slug: 'blocked', event_id: eventId, is_global: 0, allow_downloads: 0,
+      }).returning('id');
+      const categoryId = cat[0]?.id ?? cat[0];
+      await db('photos').where('id', photoId).update({ category_id: categoryId });
+
+      await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 1 });
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+      const category = res.body.categories.find((c) => c.id === categoryId);
+      expect(category.allow_downloads).toBe(false);
+      const photo = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoId);
+      expect(photo.category_allow_downloads).toBe(false);
+
+      // …and the per-category guard on the single-photo route fires.
+      const dl = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+      expect(dl.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/gallerySqliteCaptureSort.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/**
+ * "Date Taken" ordering across SQLite's storage classes (#1172).
+ *
+ * photos.captured_at does not hold one type on SQLite. Three writers put three
+ * different things in it:
+ *
+ *   integer  managed uploads — photoProcessor.js:441 hands knex a Date, which
+ *            the sqlite3 binding stores as epoch milliseconds
+ *   text     external imports and the capture-date backfill, which write
+ *            ISO-8601 ('2026-06-03T01:15:00.000Z')
+ *   null     no capture date, so the sort falls through to uploaded_at —
+ *            itself text, in knex's 'YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS' shape
+ *
+ * A plain COALESCE over that mixture is not an ordering. SQLite sorts INTEGER
+ * before TEXT unconditionally, so every managed photo carrying EXIF came back
+ * ahead of every photo that did not, whatever the dates said. And among the
+ * text values 'T' (0x54) outranks the space (0x20), so a same-day ISO 01:15
+ * sorted behind a fallback 23:00.
+ *
+ * Both failures predate #1172 — the first needs only two managed photos — but
+ * the sort is what that issue is about, so they are fixed and pinned here.
+ * Every test below fails on the unfixed ORDER BY.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capsort-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'capsort-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capsort-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'capsort-gallery';
+
+describe('capture-date ordering on SQLite (#1172)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId;
+
+  // Managed uploads store an epoch-millisecond INTEGER, because
+  // photoProcessor.js:441 hands knex a Date and the sqlite3 binding converts
+  // it. That conversion cannot be reproduced from inside jest — there the
+  // binding's type dispatch misses sandbox-created Dates and writes the string
+  // "[object Object]" instead (CLAUDE.md). Verified outside jest: a Date lands
+  // as {"c":1830211200000,"ty":"integer"}. So these tests write the integer
+  // production would have written, rather than a Date that jest mangles.
+  const managed = (iso) => new Date(iso).getTime();
+
+  const addPhoto = async (filename, capturedAt, uploadedAt) => {
+    const row = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename,
+      path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      captured_at: capturedAt,
+      uploaded_at: uploadedAt,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return row[0]?.id ?? row[0];
+  };
+
+  const orderedFilenames = async (order = 'asc') => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos?sort=capture_date&order=${order}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    return res.body.photos.map((p) => p.filename);
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Capture Sort',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
+      share_token: 'capsort-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      require_password: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => { await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).del(); });
+
+  test('the fixture really does put three storage classes in one column', async () => {
+    expect(['sqlite3', 'better-sqlite3']).toContain(db.client.config.client);
+    await addPhoto('m.jpg', managed('2026-06-03T01:15:00Z'), '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('e.jpg', '2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('n.jpg', null, '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
+
+    const rows = await db.raw('select filename, typeof(captured_at) as t from photos order by filename');
+    const byName = Object.fromEntries((rows.rows || rows).map((r) => [r.filename, r.t]));
+    // Exactly the mixture that made COALESCE meaningless.
+    expect(byName).toEqual({ 'm.jpg': 'integer', 'e.jpg': 'text', 'n.jpg': 'null' });
+  });
+
+  test('a managed EXIF date does not outrank an earlier one stored as text', async () => {
+    // The pre-existing failure, reachable with managed photos alone: integer
+    // beat text regardless of the dates, so this came back exactly reversed.
+    await addPhoto('managed-2027.jpg', managed('2027-12-31T00:00:00Z'), '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('external-2020.jpg', '2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
+
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['external-2020.jpg', 'managed-2027.jpg']);
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('desc')).toEqual(['managed-2027.jpg', 'external-2020.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  test('a photo with no capture date sorts by its upload time, not ahead of everything', async () => {
+    await addPhoto('has-exif-2027.jpg', managed('2027-12-31T00:00:00Z'), '2027-12-31 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('no-exif-2020.jpg', null, '2020-01-01 00:00:00');
+
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['no-exif-2020.jpg', 'has-exif-2027.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  test('an ISO capture time and a fallback upload time compare by clock, not by separator', async () => {
+    // Same day: 'T' vs ' ' decided this before, so 01:15 sorted after 23:00.
+    await addPhoto('iso-0115.jpg', '2026-06-03T01:15:00.000Z', '2026-06-03 05:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('fallback-2300.jpg', null, '2026-06-03 23:00:00');
+
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['iso-0115.jpg', 'fallback-2300.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  test('an epoch-integer uploaded_at is compared as a date, not as its digits', async () => {
+    // uploaded_at is not always text either: a legacy archive restore leaves
+    // epoch milliseconds in it (a .picpeak restore from an install that stored them that way).
+    // Reading that with substr() would have compared the string '1830297600000'
+    // against '2020-01-01 00:00:00', putting the 2028 row first.
+    await addPhoto('epoch-upload-2028.jpg', null, new Date('2028-01-01T00:00:00Z').getTime());
+    await addPhoto('captured-2020.jpg', managed('2020-01-01T00:00:00Z'), '2020-01-01 00:00:00');
+
+    const [row] = await db.raw('select typeof(uploaded_at) as t from photos where filename = \'epoch-upload-2028.jpg\'');
+    expect((row.t || row).toString()).toBe('integer');
+
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['captured-2020.jpg', 'epoch-upload-2028.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  test('all three storage classes order together correctly', async () => {
+    await addPhoto('c-managed-2026-08.jpg', managed('2026-08-15T12:00:00Z'), '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('a-external-2026-06.jpg', '2026-06-03T01:15:00.000Z', '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('d-fallback-2026-09.jpg', null, '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('b-managed-2026-07.jpg', managed('2026-07-04T09:30:00Z'), '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
+
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual([
+      'a-external-2026-06.jpg',
+      'b-managed-2026-07.jpg',
+      'c-managed-2026-08.jpg',
+      'd-fallback-2026-09.jpg',
+    ]);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/hiddenPhotoAccessControl.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/**
+ * Hidden/client-only photo access control across the bulk + secure photo
+ * routes (GHSA cluster: fpwq / ghf8 / 3jvw / 9cc4 / 2hqg / jc22).
+ *
+ * A photo with visibility='hidden' is client-only. The main photo-list and
+ * single-photo download/view routes enforced this, but the bulk-download,
+ * protected-image, and secure-image routes shipped without the check —
+ * letting an ordinary guest reach hidden photos. These tests pin that
+ * guests are refused and PIN-clients (accessLevel='client') still succeed.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-hidden-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'hidden-photo-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-hidden-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'hidden-photo-test-event';
+
+describe('hidden-photo access control (GHSA cluster)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let visibleId;
+  let hiddenId;
+
+  const guestToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+  const clientToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery', accessLevel: 'client' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Hidden Photo Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'hidden-photo-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, allow_downloads: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const photoDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
+    fs.mkdirSync(photoDir, { recursive: true });
+
+    // A real 1x1 PNG so the protected /view route's Sharp processing path
+    // succeeds (fake bytes 500 on metadata()). Content, not extension,
+    // drives Sharp's format detection.
+    const PNG_1x1 = Buffer.from(
+      'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk+M8AAAMCAQGV2rY9AAAAAElFTkSuQmCC',
+      'base64'
+    );
+    const mkPhoto = async (filename, visibility) => {
+      fs.writeFileSync(path.join(photoDir, filename), PNG_1x1);
+      const p = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename,
+        path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        visibility,
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      return p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
+    };
+    visibleId = await mkPhoto('visible.jpg', 'visible');
+    hiddenId = await mkPhoto('hidden.jpg', 'hidden');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+    app.use('/api/images', require('../../src/routes/protectedImages'));
+    app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe('download-selected (GHSA-ghf8, medium)', () => {
+    it('omits a hidden photo for a guest even when its id is requested', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [visibleId, hiddenId] });
+      // The visible photo still zips; the hidden one is filtered out. If
+      // only the hidden id were requested, the filter empties the set → 404.
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const solo = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [hiddenId] });
+      expect(solo.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('includes the hidden photo for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [hiddenId] });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('download-all (GHSA-fpwq, medium)', () => {
+    it('streams for a guest without erroring (hidden photos filtered)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('protected-image view (GHSA-9cc4)', () => {
+    it('403s a hidden photo for a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('serves a visible photo for a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+    it('serves a hidden photo for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('signed-URL mint (GHSA-3jvw)', () => {
+    it('403s minting a signed URL for a hidden photo as a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('mints for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.url).toContain('/signed/');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('legacy secure-token mint (protectedImages generate-secure-token)', () => {
+    it('403s a hidden photo for a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-secure-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('mints for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-secure-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.token).toBeDefined();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('secure-token mint (GHSA-2hqg)', () => {
+    it('403s minting a secure token for a hidden photo as a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/generate-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
+        .send({ photoId: hiddenId });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('mints for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/generate-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`)
+        .send({ photoId: hiddenId });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.token).toBeDefined();
+    });
+  });
+
+  // A capability minted while a photo is visible must stop serving once the
+  // photo is hidden — unless minted by a client (clientBypass in the token).
+  describe('signed-URL TOCTOU (hidden AFTER minting)', () => {
+    afterEach(async () => {
+      await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'visible' });
+    });
+
+    it("a guest's pre-minted signed URL stops serving once the photo is hidden", async () => {
+      const mint = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(mint.status).toBe(200);
+      const url = mint.body.url;
+      // Still visible → serves.
+      expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(200);
+      // Hide it → the guest token (no clientBypass) must now be refused.
+      await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'hidden' });
+      expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(403);
+    });
+
+    it("a client's pre-minted signed URL keeps serving after the photo is hidden", async () => {
+      const mint = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(mint.status).toBe(200);
+      const url = mint.body.url;
+      await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'hidden' });
+      expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/legacyEventsRouterRemoved.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test for GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq — broken access control in the legacy
+ * /api/events router.
+ *
+ * The legacy router exposed create/list/update/delete/extend guarded by
+ * adminAuth ALONE (no requirePermission, no requireEventOwnership), so any
+ * back-office account — down to a read-only viewer — could read every gallery's
+ * password_hash/share_token and take over any gallery. The fix removes that
+ * router entirely and migrates its one UI-used route (POST /:id/extend) to the
+ * canonical /api/admin/events mount, where it inherits the permission +
+ * ownership guards.
+ *
+ * This test pins two invariants:
+ *   1. The legacy source file is gone (nothing can re-mount it).
+ *   2. The migrated extend route enforces ownership — a non-owning editor gets
+ *      403, the owner succeeds.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-legacy-acl-')), 'db.sqlite'
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'legacy-acl-test-secret';
+
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+async function insertEvent(db, ownerId, over = {}) {
+  const base = {
+    slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    event_type: 'wedding',
+    event_name: 'Owner Gallery',
+    event_date: '2026-05-29',
+    host_email: 'host@example.com',
+    admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+    is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+    created_by: ownerId,
+    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    ...over,
+  };
+  const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
+  return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+}
+
+describe('GHSA-4j34: legacy /api/events router removed + extend guarded', () => {
+  it('the legacy events router source file no longer exists', () => {
+    expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../src/routes/events.js'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  describe('POST /api/admin/events/:id/extend ownership enforcement', () => {
+    let db; let cleanup; let app;
+    let ownerId; let ownerToken;
+    let editorId; let editorToken;
+
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+      ({ adminId: ownerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+      await assignAdminRole(db, ownerId, 'super_admin');
+      ownerToken = mintAdminToken(ownerId);
+
+      // A second, non-owning account with the low-trust editor role.
+      [editorId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
+        username: 'editor1', email: 'editor1@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'x', is_active: 1,
+      }).returning('id');
+      editorId = editorId?.id ?? editorId;
+      await assignAdminRole(db, editorId, 'editor');
+      editorToken = mintAdminToken(editorId);
+
+      app = express();
+      app.use(express.json());
+      app.use(cookieParser());
+      app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+      app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+        res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
+      });
+    }, 120000);
+
+    afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
+
+    it('lets the owner extend their own gallery', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId, { expires_at: '2026-06-01T00:00:00.000Z' });
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${ownerToken}`)
+        .send({ days: 10 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(new Date(res.body.expires_at).toISOString()).toBe('2026-06-11T00:00:00.000Z');
+    });
+
+    it('403s a non-owning editor trying to extend someone else\'s gallery', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId); // owned by the super_admin
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`)
+        .send({ days: 30 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403); // requireEventOwnership blocks it
+    });
+
+    it('validates the days field', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId);
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${ownerToken}`)
+        .send({ days: 9999 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/logoDiagnostic.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/**
+ * Logo diagnostic must not leak the filesystem layout, and must mirror what
+ * resolveLogoFile actually tries (GHSA-29vm, codex round 2).
+ *
+ * Round 1 relativised `resolvedTo` and the candidate paths but still echoed
+ * `sources[].value` verbatim — and branding_logo_path is stored ABSOLUTE by
+ * multer, so the layout went out anyway. It also dropped the raw-absolute
+ * candidate, which the resolver retains (subject to containment), making the
+ * diagnostic report every candidate as missing for a legitimately contained
+ * absolute logo while `resolvedTo` named the file.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-logodiag-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'logodiag-test-secret';
+
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('logo diagnostic disclosure (GHSA-29vm)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let token;
+  // bootCrmDb() sets STORAGE_PATH itself, so resolve these AFTER it runs.
+  let STORAGE; let logoDir; let logoPath;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    // A legitimately contained absolute logo in a NON-standard storage subdir.
+    STORAGE = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
+    logoDir = path.join(STORAGE, 'custom');
+    logoPath = path.join(logoDir, 'logo.png');
+    fs.mkdirSync(logoDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(logoPath, 'png');
+
+    const setting = { setting_key: 'branding_logo_path', setting_value: JSON.stringify(logoPath), setting_type: 'branding' };
+    const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' }).first();
+    if (existing) await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' }).update(setting);
+    else await db('app_settings').insert(setting);
+
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'diag-admin', email: 'diag@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    token = jwt.sign(
+      { id, username: 'diag-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/business-profile', require('../../src/routes/adminBusinessProfile'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('does not leak absolute paths, cwd or storage root anywhere in the payload', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/business-profile/logo-diagnostic')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const body = JSON.stringify(res.body);
+    expect(body).not.toContain(STORAGE);
+    expect(body).not.toContain(process.cwd());
+    expect(res.body.storageRoot).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.body.cwd).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('still finds a contained absolute logo outside the standard subdirs', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/business-profile/logo-diagnostic')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+    const source = res.body.sources.find((s) => s.label === 'app_settings.branding_logo_path');
+    expect(source).toBeTruthy();
+    // The resolver keeps the contained absolute candidate, so the diagnostic
+    // must show it existing rather than reporting everything missing.
+    expect(source.candidates.some((c) => c.exists)).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.body.resolvedTo).toMatch(/^<STORAGE>\//);
+  });
+
+  it('shows the <STORAGE>/<value> candidate for a ROOT-RELATIVE logo URL (round 3)', async () => {
+    // `/custom/logo.png` is a URL, not a disk path, but path.isAbsolute() says
+    // true for both. Gating the stripped joins on isAbsolute() therefore hid
+    // `<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png` — a candidate resolveLogoFile does try and
+    // can resolve — so the diagnostic claimed nothing existed for a logo that
+    // renders fine, and collapsed the configured value to its basename.
+    await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' })
+      .update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify('/custom/logo.png') });
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/business-profile/logo-diagnostic')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const source = res.body.sources.find((s) => s.label === 'app_settings.branding_logo_path');
+    expect(source.candidates.some((c) => c.path === '<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png' && c.exists)).toBe(true);
+
+    // …and the disclosure guarantee still holds for this shape.
+    const body = JSON.stringify(res.body);
+    expect(body).not.toContain(STORAGE);
+    expect(body).not.toContain(process.cwd());
+
+    await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' })
+      .update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(logoPath) });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/passwordStrengthDos.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/**
+ * POST /api/auth/password-strength is unauthenticated and feeds its body into
+ * zxcvbn, whose matching is superlinear and runs synchronously on the event
+ * loop. Behind express.json({ limit: '50mb' }) that made a single request a
+ * whole-process denial of service: measured on this codebase, 1,000 characters
+ * blocked for ~5 seconds and 5,000 did not return in two minutes.
+ *
+ * The control is the length cap inside validatePassword(), so it holds for
+ * every caller. These tests pin the cap itself rather than the route, and use
+ * a wall-clock ceiling that only an unbounded zxcvbn call can breach.
+ */
+const { validatePassword, MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH } = require('../../src/utils/passwordValidation');
+
+describe('password validation length cap (zxcvbn DoS)', () => {
+  it('rejects an over-length password without doing superlinear work', () => {
+    const huge = 'aA1!'.repeat(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH); // 4x the cap
+    const started = Date.now();
+    const result = validatePassword(huge);
+    const elapsed = Date.now() - started;
+
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(result.errors.join(' ')).toMatch(/at most 128 characters/);
+    // Unbounded, this input would not return for minutes.
+    expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(250);
+  });
+
+  it('is bounded at the cap itself, the worst input it will still analyse', () => {
+    const atCap = 'aA1!'.repeat(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH / 4);
+    expect(atCap).toHaveLength(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+
+    // 128 was chosen so the worst input the validator will still analyse costs
+    // about as much as an ordinary request (~41ms measured); 512 cost 1.4s.
+    const started = Date.now();
+    validatePassword(atCap);
+    expect(Date.now() - started).toBeLessThan(1000);
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts an ordinary strong password', () => {
+    const result = validatePassword('Tr0ub4dour&3-horse-battery');
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('does not spin when a caller asks for a length the cap forbids', async () => {
+    // Codex review. generateSecurePassword retried by recursing on any invalid
+    // candidate, so the new cap made every candidate invalid for length > 128
+    // and turned the call into unbounded recursion. It now refuses up front,
+    // and the retry loop is bounded.
+    const { generateSecurePassword } = require('../../src/utils/passwordValidation');
+
+    expect(generateSecurePassword({ length: 16 })).toHaveLength(16);
+    expect(generateSecurePassword({ length: MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH }))
+      .toHaveLength(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+    expect(() => generateSecurePassword({ length: MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH + 1 }))
+      .toThrow(/at most 128/);
+  });
+
+  it('does not echo the rejected password back in the error body', async () => {
+    // Codex review round 2. express-validator's errors.array() carries the
+    // submitted `value`, so the 400 for an oversized password returned the
+    // password itself -- reflecting a credential, and re-allocating up to the
+    // 50mb body limit on an unauthenticated endpoint, which partly undid the
+    // DoS fix this branch exists for.
+    const src = require('fs').readFileSync(
+      require('path').join(__dirname, '../../src/routes/auth.js'), 'utf8');
+
+    // No route may hand errors.array() straight to the response.
+    expect(src).not.toMatch(/errors:\s*errors\.array\(\)/);
+    // ...and the shared helper that replaces it must drop `value`.
+    const helper = require('fs').readFileSync(
+      require('path').join(__dirname, '../../src/utils/routeHelpers.js'), 'utf8');
+    expect(helper).toMatch(/safeValidationErrors\s*=\s*\(errors\)\s*=>\s*errors\.array\(\)\.map\(\(\{ value, \.\.\.rest \}\)/);
+  });
+
+  it('applies the cap through the context wrapper too', async () => {
+    const { validatePasswordInContext } = require('../../src/utils/passwordValidation');
+    const huge = 'aA1!'.repeat(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+    const result = await validatePasswordInContext(huge, 'admin', {});
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/photoEngagementCounters.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+/**
+ * Per-photo engagement counters (#895).
+ *
+ * Pins the contract that the admin EVENT > IMAGES table depends on:
+ *  - photos.view_count increments when the full-size photo is served
+ *    (it existed in the schema + admin UI but had NO writer at all)
+ *  - the slideshow kiosk never increments views (migration 138 design)
+ *  - single-photo downloads increment download_count (regression pin)
+ *  - zip downloads (download-all, download-selected) increment
+ *    download_count for the contained photos — previously they didn't,
+ *    so zip-heavy galleries showed 0 per-photo downloads forever
+ *  - the admin event-detail total_downloads counts singles AND zips
+ *    (it counted action='download' only, disagreeing with the dashboard)
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-engagement-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'engagement-test-secret';
+// Real files on disk so /photo and the zip routes actually stream bytes.
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-engagement-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'engagement-test-event';
+
+describe('photo engagement counters (#895)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let photoIds;
+  let adminToken;
+
+  const galleryToken = (extra = {}) => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  const getPhoto = async (id) => db('photos').where('id', id).first();
+  // The counter writes are fire-and-forget on purpose — give the event
+  // loop a beat before asserting.
+  const settle = () => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 400));
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Engagement Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'engagement-test-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      allow_downloads: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const photoDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
+    fs.mkdirSync(photoDir, { recursive: true });
+
+    photoIds = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+      const filename = `photo-${i}.jpg`;
+      fs.writeFileSync(path.join(photoDir, filename), Buffer.from(`fake-jpeg-bytes-${i}`));
+      const p = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename,
+        path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      photoIds.push(p[0]?.id ?? p[0]);
+    }
+
+    const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
+    const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'engagement-admin',
+      email: 'engagement-admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('EngagementAdmin123', 4),
+      role_id: superRole.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id: rootId, username: 'engagement-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotos'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('photos').where('event_id', eventId).update({ view_count: 0, download_count: 0 });
+    await db('access_logs').where('event_id', eventId).del();
+  });
+
+  describe('view_count via the view beacon (#895 — previously never written)', () => {
+    const beacon = (photoId, token = galleryToken()) => request(app)
+      .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoId}/view`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+    it('increments exactly the beaconed photo', async () => {
+      expect((await beacon(photoIds[0])).status).toBe(204);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(1);
+
+      expect((await beacon(photoIds[0])).status).toBe(204);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(2);
+      // Other photos untouched
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[1])).view_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('serving the image bytes does NOT count (preloads must not inflate)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      await settle();
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects the slideshow kiosk (migration 138 design)', async () => {
+      const res = await beacon(photoIds[0], galleryToken({ accessLevel: 'slideshow' }));
+      expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it("404s a photo that isn't in the event", async () => {
+      const res = await beacon(999999);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('download_count', () => {
+    it('single-photo download increments (regression pin)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoIds[0]}`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      await settle();
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).download_count).toBe(1);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[1])).download_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('download-selected increments exactly the selected photos (#895)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [photoIds[0], photoIds[1]] });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      await settle();
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).download_count).toBe(1);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[1])).download_count).toBe(1);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[2])).download_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('download-all increments every downloadable photo (#895)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      await settle();
+      for (const id of photoIds) {
+        expect((await getPhoto(id)).download_count).toBe(1);
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('skipped archive entries do not count (missing source file)', async () => {
+      // Own event so the on-the-fly archiver path is guaranteed — the
+      // main event may have a cached zip from the previous test's
+      // background generation, and racing its build/invalidate hangs.
+      // The route also fires a background pre-zip build after streaming;
+      // against this event's intentionally missing file it crashes with
+      // an async ENOENT that jest attributes to whatever test is running
+      // by then — neutralize it, it's not under test here.
+      const downloadZipService = require('../../src/services/downloadZipService');
+      const generateZipSpy = jest.spyOn(downloadZipService, 'generateZip')
+        .mockResolvedValue({ success: false, error: 'disabled in test' });
+      const slug2 = `${SLUG}-skip`;
+      const ev = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: slug2,
+        event_type: 'wedding',
+        event_name: 'Engagement Skip Test',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01',
+        host_email: 'host@example.com',
+        admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'x',
+        share_link: `/gallery/${slug2}/share`,
+        share_token: 'engagement-skip-share',
+        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1,
+        is_archived: 0,
+        is_draft: 0,
+        allow_downloads: 1,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const eventId2 = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+      const dir2 = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', slug2);
+      fs.mkdirSync(dir2, { recursive: true });
+      const ids2 = [];
+      for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        // Only photo 0 gets a real file — photo 1's source is missing.
+        if (i === 0) fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir2, `photo-${i}.jpg`), Buffer.from('skip-test-bytes'));
+        const p = await db('photos').insert({
+          event_id: eventId2,
+          filename: `photo-${i}.jpg`,
+          path: `${slug2}/photo-${i}.jpg`,
+          type: 'individual',
+          uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        }).returning('id');
+        ids2.push(p[0]?.id ?? p[0]);
+      }
+      const token2 = jwt.sign(
+        { eventId: eventId2, eventSlug: slug2, type: 'gallery' },
+        process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+        { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+      );
+
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${slug2}/download-all`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token2}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      await settle();
+      expect((await db('photos').where('id', ids2[0]).first()).download_count).toBe(1);
+      // photo-1's source was missing → skipped from the zip → not counted
+      expect((await db('photos').where('id', ids2[1]).first()).download_count).toBe(0);
+      generateZipSpy.mockRestore();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('admin photos list exposes the counters (#895 follow-up)', () => {
+    it('returns view_count and download_count so the Engagement column can render them', async () => {
+      // The list mapper builds an explicit object — before this fix it
+      // omitted both fields, so the admin table showed 0 forever even
+      // though the DB counted correctly.
+      await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoIds[0]}`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      await settle();
+
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/admin/photos/${eventId}/photos`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoIds[0]);
+      expect(row.view_count).toBe(1);
+      expect(row.download_count).toBe(1);
+      const untouched = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoIds[1]);
+      expect(untouched.view_count).toBe(0);
+      expect(untouched.download_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('admin event-detail total_downloads (#895 — one definition everywhere)', () => {
+    it('counts singles and every zip variant, one row each', async () => {
+      const row = (action) => ({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        ip_address: '127.0.0.1',
+        user_agent: 'jest',
+        action,
+      });
+      await db('access_logs').insert([
+        row('download'),
+        row('download_all'),
+        row('download_all_presigned'),
+        row('download_selected'),
+        row('view'), // not a download
+      ]);
+
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.total_downloads).toBe(4);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/projectOwnership.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+/**
+ * Project ownership — GHSA-wrg5 (project routes) and GHSA-93x4 (project email
+ * endpoints).
+ *
+ * Project routes authorized on generic events.view / events.edit with NO
+ * ownership check, so an editor could enumerate, read, update and aggregate
+ * projects belonging to other admins' events. The email endpoints keyed on an
+ * email_queue id alone, so any id could be previewed/resent/cancelled.
+ *
+ * `projects` had no owner column. It was added in migration 167 (backfilled
+ * from linked events) rather than relying only on the transitive
+ * events.project_id -> events.created_by path, because a brand-new EMPTY
+ * project has no linked event to infer an owner from — which is exactly where
+ * the create -> attach flow begins.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-projown-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'projown-test-secret';
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('project ownership (GHSA-wrg5 / GHSA-93x4)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let editorToken; let superToken; let editorId; let superId;
+  let ownProjectId; let foreignProjectId; let foreignEventId; let foreignEmailId;
+
+  const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username,
+      email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    return {
+      id,
+      token: jwt.sign(
+        { id, username, type: 'admin', role: roleName, loginTime: Date.now() },
+        process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+      ),
+    };
+  };
+
+  const mkProject = async (name, createdBy) => {
+    const r = await db('projects').insert({
+      name, status: 'active', created_by: createdBy,
+      created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'projects', value: 1 })
+      .onConflict('key').merge({ value: 1 });
+
+    const editor = await mkAdmin('proj-editor', 'editor');
+    const sup = await mkAdmin('proj-super', 'super_admin');
+    editorToken = editor.token; editorId = editor.id;
+    superToken = sup.token; superId = sup.id;
+
+    ownProjectId = await mkProject('own-project', editorId);
+    foreignProjectId = await mkProject('foreign-project', superId);
+
+    // A foreign event linked to the foreign project, plus a queued email on it.
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'foreign-ev',
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Foreign Event',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_token: 'ftok', share_link: '/gallery/foreign-ev/ftok',
+      created_by: superId,
+      project_id: foreignProjectId,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    foreignEventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    const em = await db('email_queue').insert({
+      event_id: foreignEventId,
+      recipient_email: 'client@example.com',
+      email_type: 'gallery_created',
+      status: 'sent',
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    foreignEmailId = em[0]?.id ?? em[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/projects', require('../../src/routes/adminProjects'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('lists only the editor\'s own projects', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/projects')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const names = (res.body.projects || res.body.data?.projects || []).map((p) => p.name);
+    expect(names).toContain('own-project');
+    expect(names).not.toContain('foreign-project');
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to read a foreign project', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to update or aggregate a foreign project', async () => {
+    const update = await request(app)
+      .put(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`)
+      .send({ name: 'hijacked' });
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(update.status);
+
+    const overview = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}/overview`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(overview.status);
+
+    // And the name must not have changed.
+    const row = await db('projects').where({ id: foreignProjectId }).first();
+    expect(row.name).toBe('foreign-project');
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to attach a FOREIGN event to an owned project', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post(`/api/admin/projects/${ownProjectId}/events`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`)
+      .send({ eventId: foreignEventId });
+
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
+    const ev = await db('events').where({ id: foreignEventId }).first();
+    expect(ev.project_id).toBe(foreignProjectId); // still attached to its own
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to preview or act on a foreign queued email (GHSA-93x4)', async () => {
+    const preview = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/admin/projects/email/${foreignEmailId}/preview`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(preview.status);
+
+    const cancel = await request(app)
+      .post(`/api/admin/projects/email/${foreignEmailId}/cancel`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(cancel.status);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves super_admin unrestricted', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/projectOwnershipEdgeCases.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/**
+ * Project ownership edge cases (GHSA-wrg5, codex round 2).
+ *
+ * The first predicate union'd "any linked event I can see" with the stored
+ * owner, which opened two holes:
+ *   - a project owned by B containing ONE legacy ownerless event became
+ *     readable by everyone (and /overview aggregates B's other events,
+ *     invoices and emails);
+ *   - migration 167 deliberately leaves multi-owner projects NULL, and a NULL
+ *     owner was treated as "everyone's".
+ * The stored owner is now authoritative, and a NULL owner only derives access
+ * when EVERY linked event is accessible.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-projedge-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'projedge-test-secret';
+
+const bcrypt3 = require('bcrypt');
+const { bootCrmDb: boot3, seedMinimal: seed3 } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('project ownership edge cases (GHSA-wrg5, round 2)', () => {
+  let db3; let cleanup3; let ownership; let editorA; let editorB;
+
+  const mkAdmin3 = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db3('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db3('admin_users').insert({
+      username, email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt3.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+  const mkProject3 = async (name, createdBy) => {
+    const r = await db3('projects').insert({
+      name, status: 'active', created_by: createdBy,
+      created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+  const mkEvent3 = async (slug, createdBy, projectId) => {
+    const r = await db3('events').insert({
+      slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      share_token: `t-${slug}`, share_link: `/g/${slug}/t-${slug}`,
+      created_by: createdBy, project_id: projectId,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db: db3, cleanup: cleanup3 } = await boot3());
+    await seed3(db3);
+    ownership = require('../../src/middleware/ownership');
+    editorA = await mkAdmin3('edge-a', 'editor');
+    editorB = await mkAdmin3('edge-b', 'editor');
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup3) await cleanup3(); });
+
+  it('one ownerless event in B\'s project does not expose it to A', async () => {
+    const pid = await mkProject3('b-project', editorB);
+    await mkEvent3('b-owned-ev', editorB, pid);
+    await mkEvent3('legacy-ev', null, pid); // ownerless legacy event
+
+    const idsA = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
+    expect(idsA).not.toContain(Number(pid));
+
+    const idsB = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorB, roleName: 'editor' });
+    expect(idsB).toContain(Number(pid));
+  });
+
+  it('a mixed-owner project left NULL by migration 167 is not global', async () => {
+    const pid = await mkProject3('ambiguous', null);
+    await mkEvent3('mix-a-ev', editorA, pid);
+    await mkEvent3('mix-b-ev', editorB, pid);
+
+    for (const who of [editorA, editorB]) {
+      const ids = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: who, roleName: 'editor' });
+      expect(ids).not.toContain(Number(pid));
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('a NULL-owner project whose events are all mine IS mine', async () => {
+    const pid = await mkProject3('legacy-mine', null);
+    await mkEvent3('mine-ev', editorA, pid);
+
+    const ids = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
+    expect(ids).toContain(Number(pid));
+  });
+
+  it('a project whose creator was deleted falls back to its events', async () => {
+    const ghost = await mkAdmin3('ghost-admin', 'editor');
+    const pid = await mkProject3('orphaned', ghost);
+    await mkEvent3('orphan-ev', editorA, pid);
+    await db3('admin_users').where({ id: ghost }).del();
+
+    const ids = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
+    expect(ids).toContain(Number(pid));
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin stays unrestricted', async () => {
+    expect(await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: 1, roleName: 'super_admin' })).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/publicContracts.test.js

@@ -25,14 +25,18 @@ process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
 fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
 process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'crm-route-test-secret';
 
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
 const request = require('supertest');
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, createPublicToken, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
 const tokenGuards = require('../../src/utils/publicTokenGuards');
+const { errorHandler } = require('../../src/middleware/errorHandler');
 
 describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
   let db;
   let cleanup;
   let app;
+  let appWithErrorHandler;
   let customerId;
   let contractId;
 
@@ -51,7 +55,18 @@ describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
     contractId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
 
     app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/contracts', require('../../src/routes/publicContracts'));
-  }, 60000);
+
+    // A second app instance wired to the REAL production error handler
+    // (buildRouteApp's is a simplified stand-in that only reads
+    // err.statusCode/err.status, which a bare MulterError doesn't set).
+    // Used below to verify the actual 4xx contract end-to-end, not just
+    // that multer aborted the request.
+    appWithErrorHandler = express();
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(express.json());
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(cookieParser());
+    appWithErrorHandler.use('/api/public/contracts', require('../../src/routes/publicContracts'));
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(errorHandler);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
     if (cleanup) await cleanup();
@@ -131,6 +146,40 @@ describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
         .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
       expect(res.status).toBe(404);
     });
+
+    // CVE-2026-82333 regression (#1374 follow-up): multer 2.3.0 added an
+    // opt-in `fieldArrayIndexLimit` that must be set to actually close the
+    // field-parser DoS — the version bump alone does nothing. This route is
+    // unauthenticated (token-in-URL only), so it's the sharpest place to
+    // prove a crafted request with an oversized array-index field name
+    // (`evil[999999999]`) is rejected rather than accepted or left to hang.
+    it('rejects a multipart request with an oversized array-index field name', async () => {
+      const token = await createPublicToken(db, 'contract_action_tokens', {
+        contract_id: contractId,
+      });
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/public/contracts/${token}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+        .field('evil[999999999]', 'x')
+        .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+      // multer aborts the request before the handler runs; buildRouteApp's
+      // generic error handler falls back to 500 for a bare MulterError
+      // (see appWithErrorHandler test below for the real 4xx contract), so
+      // here we only assert the upload was NOT accepted/processed.
+      expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+      expect(res.body.error).not.toBe(undefined);
+    });
+
+    it('maps the oversized array-index rejection to a 400 through the real error handler', async () => {
+      const token = await createPublicToken(db, 'contract_action_tokens', {
+        contract_id: contractId,
+      });
+      const res = await request(appWithErrorHandler)
+        .post(`/api/public/contracts/${token}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+        .field('evil[999999999]', 'x')
+        .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.code).toBe('VALIDATION_ERROR');
+    });
   });
 
   describe('GET /:token/pdf', () => {

backend/__tests__/routes/publicPaymentCheck.test.js

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ describe('publicPaymentCheck routes', () => {
     ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
     await seedMinimal(db);
     app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/payment-check', require('../../src/routes/publicPaymentCheck'));
-  }, 60000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
     if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/routes/publicQuotes.test.js

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ describe('publicQuotes routes', () => {
     quoteId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
 
     app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/quotes', require('../../src/routes/publicQuotes'));
-  }, 60000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
     if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/routes/restorePathAllowlist.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+/**
+ * Restore path containment must not break the normal restore wizard
+ * (GHSA-fw4c, codex round 2).
+ *
+ * `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE, not a path: RestoreWizard posts
+ * 'local' | 's3' | 'upload', and restoreService.restore() branches on those
+ * literals before deriving a directory. The first version of the containment
+ * check treated `source` as a path, so path.resolve('local') landed outside
+ * the configured backup roots and BOTH /validate and /start returned 400 —
+ * blocking every normal restore.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restorepath-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restorepath-test-secret';
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+// `bootCrmDb()` hands back the process-wide `db` singleton (module cache —
+// see its own comment), so it must only be called ONCE per test file: a
+// second call re-runs migrations against the same connection, and the first
+// call's `cleanup()` (db.destroy()) would tear down the connection both
+// describe blocks below share. Boot once at file scope; each describe below
+// only touches app_settings / env vars, never the connection lifecycle.
+let db; let cleanup; let checkRestorePathsAllowed;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  await seedMinimal(db);
+  ({ checkRestorePathsAllowed } = require('../../src/routes/adminRestore')._internal);
+}, 120000);
+
+afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+async function setBackupSetting(key, value) {
+  const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).first();
+  if (existing) {
+    await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(value) });
+  } else {
+    await db('app_settings').insert({
+      setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'backup',
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+describe('restore path allowlist (GHSA-fw4c)', () => {
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    // Configure a backup root so the allowlist is actually active.
+    await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
+  });
+
+  it('allows the wizard\'s source TYPE tokens', async () => {
+    for (const source of ['local', 's3', 'upload']) {
+      const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+        source, manifestPath: '/backup/manifests/backup-manifest-1.json',
+      });
+      expect(err).toBeNull();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('allows an s3:// source URL', async () => {
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+      source: 's3://bucket/key/backup.tar.gz',
+      manifestPath: '/backup/manifests/backup-manifest-1.json',
+    });
+    expect(err).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('still rejects a manifestPath outside the configured roots', async () => {
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+      source: 'local', manifestPath: '/etc/passwd',
+    });
+    expect(err).toMatch(/inside a configured backup location/i);
+  });
+
+  it('still rejects a traversal manifestPath', async () => {
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+      source: 'local', manifestPath: '/backup/../etc/shadow',
+    });
+    expect(err).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a real path source inside the roots', async () => {
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+      source: '/backup/run-1', manifestPath: '/backup/run-1/manifest.json',
+    });
+    expect(err).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+/**
+ * GHSA-xfvx-j447-732c: `checkRestorePathsAllowed` constrained the top-level
+ * `source`/`manifestPath` request fields (GHSA-fw4c above), but never looked
+ * INSIDE the manifest itself. `manifest.database.backup_file` — handed
+ * straight to restoreService's candidate resolution and eventually
+ * interpolated into `sqlite3 .restore '<path>'` — was unchecked, so an
+ * absolute path there could point the restore at an arbitrary file even
+ * though `source`/`manifestPath` both passed containment.
+ */
+describe('restore path allowlist — manifest database.backup_file containment (GHSA-xfvx)', () => {
+  let tmpRoot;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
+
+    tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-xfvx-manifest-'));
+    // Additional allowed root via the documented escape hatch — keeps this
+    // describe block's fixtures out of the shared '/backup' root above.
+    process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = tmpRoot;
+  });
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  const writeManifest = (name, databaseSection) => {
+    const manifestPath = path.join(tmpRoot, name);
+    fs.writeFileSync(manifestPath, JSON.stringify({
+      manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
+      backup: { type: 'full' },
+      system: { platform: 'linux' },
+      application: { version: '1.0.0' },
+      files: { count: 0, manifest: [] },
+      database: databaseSection,
+      verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: null },
+    }));
+    return manifestPath;
+  };
+
+  it('rejects a manifest whose database.backup_file is an absolute path outside every configured root', async () => {
+    const manifestPath = writeManifest('evil-1.json', { backup_file: '/etc/passwd' });
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
+    expect(err).toMatch(/database\.backup_file must be inside a configured backup location/i);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a manifest whose database.backup_file is an absolute path inside a configured root', async () => {
+    const dbFile = path.join(tmpRoot, 'database', 'picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql.gz');
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(dbFile), { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(dbFile, 'not a real sqlite dump, just a fixture');
+    const manifestPath = writeManifest('legit-1.json', { backup_file: dbFile });
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
+    expect(err).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('does not choke on a manifest whose database.backup_file is a legitimate relative path', async () => {
+    // Relative candidates are resolved against restoreService's own
+    // `backupPath` (which this route-level pre-check doesn't have — it only
+    // sees `source`/`manifestPath`), so this layer intentionally defers
+    // relative-path containment to restoreService.performDatabaseRestore
+    // and must not false-positive here.
+    const manifestPath = writeManifest('legit-2.json', { backup_file: 'database/picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql.gz' });
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
+    expect(err).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects everything when no backup location is configured at all (fail closed, not fail open)', async () => {
+    // Simulate an install that never had backup_destination_path /
+    // backup_manifest_path seeded/configured, and isn't using the
+    // RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS escape hatch either.
+    const savedRoots = process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    await db('app_settings').whereIn('setting_key', ['backup_destination_path', 'backup_manifest_path']).del();
+
+    try {
+      const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+        source: '/backup/run-1', manifestPath: '/backup/run-1/manifest.json',
+      });
+      expect(err).toMatch(/no backup location is configured/i);
+    } finally {
+      process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = savedRoots;
+      await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
+    }
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/secureImageTokenBinding.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/**
+ * Secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f).
+ *
+ * The view route GET /api/secure-images/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token serves
+ * via <img src> with the token in the URL, so it can't carry a gallery-token
+ * header like the download sibling. Before the fix it validated only the
+ * token signature and took the gallery/photo from the URL — so a token minted
+ * on any PUBLIC gallery read every other gallery's photos with no password.
+ *
+ * Pins that the route now enforces the scope inside the token:
+ *  - the URL photoId must equal the token's minted photoId
+ *  - the gallery embedded in the token's sessionId must equal the URL gallery
+ * A token minted on gallery A cannot read gallery B under either check; a
+ * token used on its own gallery+photo passes the binding.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-secimg-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'secimg-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-secimg-storage-'));
+
+// Stub the anti-bot/rate-limit middleware so the fingerprint is deterministic
+// — the token below is minted with the same fingerprint, so verifySecureToken
+// passes and the binding logic under test is what decides the outcome.
+jest.mock('../../src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware', () => ({
+  secureImageAccess: (req, _res, next) => {
+    req.clientInfo = { fingerprint: 'test-fp', ip: '127.0.0.1', userAgent: 'jest' };
+    next();
+  },
+  getSecurityStatus: (_req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }),
+}));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const secureImageService = require('../../src/services/secureImageService');
+
+describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let galleryA; let galleryB;
+  let photoA; let photoB;
+
+  const mkEvent = async (slug, requirePassword) => {
+    const r = await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: slug,
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      require_password: requirePassword ? 1 : 0,
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
+      share_token: `${slug}-share`,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  const mkPhoto = async (eventId, slug, filename) => {
+    const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', slug);
+    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, filename), Buffer.from('img'));
+    const r = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename,
+      path: `${slug}/${filename}`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  // Mint a token exactly as the mint route does — bound to (photoId, gallery
+  // sessionId, fingerprint) — bypassing the anti-bot HTTP path.
+  const mint = (photoId, eventId) => secureImageService.generateSecureToken(
+    photoId,
+    `gallery_public_${eventId}_${Date.now()}`,
+    { clientFingerprint: 'test-fp', maxUses: 100, expiresIn: 3600 },
+  );
+
+  const view = (slug, photoId, token) => request(app)
+    .get(`/api/secure-images/${slug}/secure/${photoId}/${token}`);
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    galleryA = await mkEvent('secimg-public-a', false);   // public — token source
+    galleryB = await mkEvent('secimg-private-b', true);   // password-protected — victim
+    photoA = await mkPhoto(galleryA, 'secimg-public-a', 'a.jpg');
+    photoB = await mkPhoto(galleryB, 'secimg-private-b', 'b.jpg');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('rejects a gallery-A token used against gallery B (cross-photo)', async () => {
+    const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
+    const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoB, token);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this photo/i);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a gallery-A token replayed on gallery B with A\'s photoId', async () => {
+    const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
+    // URL photoId matches the token, so the photo check passes — the gallery
+    // check (sessionId gallery A != URL gallery B) must catch it.
+    const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoA, token);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this gallery/i);
+  });
+
+  it('lets a token read its own gallery + photo (binding passes)', async () => {
+    const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
+    const res = await view('secimg-public-a', photoA, token);
+    // Binding passes; serving may 200/404/500 depending on the pipeline, but
+    // it must NOT be rejected as a token mismatch.
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/slideshowAdmin.test.js

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ describe('admin Live Slideshow endpoints', () => {
     app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
       res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
     });
-  }, 30000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });