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Paul Nothaft 7598e20f55 chore(stable): release 3.46.2 (#1121)
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2026-08-21 20:30:47 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 32db1c8052 fix(ui): stop iOS Safari zooming in on 14px form fields (#1114)
Closes #1105.

iOS Safari zooms the whole page in when a focused form control computes to
under 16px, and it does not zoom back out. Unlocking a gallery is a
client-side transition rather than a document navigation, so the zoom the
password field triggers carries straight into the gallery: the layout pans
horizontally and the header actions sit off-screen until the visitor
pinch-zooms out by hand. A real page load would have reset it.

`.input` and `.input-themed` are `text-sm`, so the field is 14px on every
phone, and GalleryPage inverts the breakpoint on top of that
(`text-sm sm:text-base` — 14px below 640px, where iOS zooms, and 16px above
it, where it never does).

Keyed to the POINTER, not a width. The zoom depends on the computed font size
and a touch device, never on how wide the viewport is — and a phone in
landscape is 667-956 CSS px, above any width you could call "phone". Measured
on the admin login page, which has no `sm:` override:

  main   portrait 390x844    14px    zooms
  main   landscape 844x390   14px    zooms
  main   iPad 820x1180       14px    zooms
  fixed  all three           16px
  fixed  desktop (mouse)     14px    unchanged, no zoom off touch

One media query rather than flipping each call site. `.input` alone backs 334
`<Input>` usages, but there are also ~440 raw inputs, selects and textareas
carrying their own `text-sm`, and Tailwind utilities sit in a later layer than
@layer components — so a fix at the component definition misses most controls
and any new `text-sm` silently reintroduces the bug.

The `:not()` on each selector is load-bearing, not decoration: it buys the
specificity to beat a utility class. Measured in a browser —

  input.text-sm     16px   (0,2,1 beats .text-sm)
  select.text-sm    14px   (0,0,1 loses)
  textarea.text-sm  14px   (0,0,1 loses)

24 selects and textareas in the tree carry `text-sm`, so the bare form would
have left them zooming. Checkbox and radio stay excluded so font-size never
sizes their box.

max(16px, 1em, 1rem) is a FLOOR, not a size. A flat 16px would make controls
that are already bigger smaller: Typography -> Large sets --font-size-base to
18px on body, so anything inheriting it would be clamped down and the setting
quietly ignored. Each term covers a case the others miss:

  normal (body 16)       16px      Large theme (body 18)    18px
  Small theme (body 14)  16px      browser default 20px     20px

The viewport meta is deliberately left alone: `maximum-scale=1` would suppress
the zoom by disabling pinch-to-zoom for everyone.
2026-08-21 19:25:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9833237d37 chore(stable): release 3.46.1 (#1082)
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2026-08-19 20:29:01 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 83290a0f1a chore(security): ignore unfixed CVEs in Trivy, override deepmerge-ts (#1085)
Stable twin of #1083, scoped to what exists on this branch.

docker-build.yml — set ignore-unfixed on both Trivy steps. Stable has
the backend and frontend legs only (no aio, no ml), so two steps here
against four on main. Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not
actionable: the Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a
CACHEBUST, so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting
them buries anything someone can actually act on.

backend — deepmerge-ts <8.0.0 has a stack-exhaustion advisory
(CVE-2026-40345, high) reached via mailparser -> html-to-text, which
pins ^7.1.5 so npm cannot get there alone. Stable carries the same
mailparser ^3.9.9 and the same 3-high exposure as main. Not reachable
in our code: html-to-text only feeds deepmerge-ts its options object,
never parsed email content. npm audit on this branch goes 3 high -> 0.

The ml/Dockerfile half of #1083 has no counterpart here — the face
sidecar does not exist on stable, so there is nothing to drift.

Verified on stable itself rather than assuming main's results carry:
npm audit 3 high -> 0, html-to-text exercised end-to-end through
simpleParser, and jest at 1577 passed. The 5 failing suites (20 tests)
fail identically on clean origin/stable with these changes stashed.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-19 13:56:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6df42ab22c fix(preview): generate lightbox previews for external/reference photos (#1078) (#1080)
* fix(preview): generate lightbox previews for external/reference photos (#1078)

Stable twin of the main-line fix. ensurePreviewImage() resolved its source
only via resolvePhotoStorageKey(), which returns null for external/reference
photos by design — those live on a media mount outside the managed storage
tree. The null went straight into withLocalCopy(), which throws, so the
preview route fell back to redirecting at the full-size original. Galleries
whose photos are all external got no benefit from the preview tier (#492):
guests paid 5-12 MB on every lightbox open.

Add the external branch ensureThumbnail() already has: resolve via
resolvePhotoFilePath() and feed the mount path to generatePreviewImage()
directly, with an ext<id>_ output basename.

generatePreviewImage() on this branch hardcoded path.basename(imagePath) and
ignored options.outputBasename, so it needs the same one-line honouring that
generateThumbnail() already does — without it two events referencing the same
NAS basename collide on one preview key.

Also return null rather than throwing for a row with no source_origin in a
reference-mode event, whose mode falls back to the event's.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc

* fix(preview): select the columns the external branch needs on bulk regenerate

POST /api/admin/thumbnails/regenerate-previews selected only id, event_id,
path, media_type, mime_type and preview_path, so photo.source_origin was
undefined by the time ensurePreviewImage branched on it. Every external row in
a reference gallery took the managed path, resolvePhotoStorageKey returned null
for it, and the endpoint reported success while generating nothing.

Add source_origin, external_relpath and filename to the select, plus a
source-inspection test pinning the caller contract and a service-level test
showing a column-starved row is indistinguishable from a managed one.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-19 10:17:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 45ffe64b7c fix(storage): write business documents under STORAGE_PATH, not the cwd (#1072)
Stable twin of #1070.

persistDocPdf, the invoice sending and reminder writers, both contract
signature writers and persistSignatureImage built their targets from
`path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'business-docs', ...)` and never
consulted STORAGE_PATH. Both compose files pin STORAGE_PATH=/app/storage
and the image's WORKDIR is /app, so on a stock deployment the two name
the same directory and nothing looked wrong. Point STORAGE_PATH anywhere
else and quotes, invoices, Mahnungen, contracts and signature images
land outside the configured storage root: missed by the backup walker,
invisible to storage accounting, and gone when the container is
replaced.

assertContractPdfPath moves with them. On this branch the writers and
the guard are wrong together, so contract downloads currently work —
migrating the writers alone would have introduced PATH_OUTSIDE_STORAGE
on every newly generated contract. The guard now resolves through
getStoragePath() like the writers, and keeps the legacy cwd root so
contracts written before this still resolve; their absolute paths are
in the database.

Also on the shared resolver: the custom PDF font lookup (a font under
STORAGE_PATH/fonts was never found, and the document silently fell back
to the built-in face) and the two backup diagnostics, which otherwise
inspect a different root than the backup walker when STORAGE_PATH is
unset.

No migration needed — the persisted path is stored absolute.

Verified on this branch, not inferred from main: the new test is 6/6,
and contract/quote/invoice/pdf/safePath suites are 213/213 both before
and after the change.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-18 22:14:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 84eab88801 test(e2e): read the admin JWT from the cookie, not the login body (#1073)
Stable twin of #1071.

Three specs acquire an admin token with `const body = await res.json();
return body.token`. On this branch too the admin login sets the JWT as
the httpOnly `admin_token` cookie and responds with `res.json({ user })`
— verified in auth.js on stable, not assumed from main — so the token is
undefined and each spec fails at its first assertion, before exercising
anything it was written to cover.

Cookie and Authorization: Bearer are interchangeable server-side, so the
helpers read the value back out of the context cookie jar and keep
threading it as a Bearer. Every downstream call is unchanged.

Verification is weaker than the main twin's, deliberately: the three
spec files are byte-identical to the ones measured there (0 passed /
6 failed before, 3 passed / 3 failed after, against a live stack), and
they compile and enumerate on this branch. Standing up a full stable
compose stack to re-measure test-only changes was not worth it — say the
word if you want that done before merge.

The remaining failures are UI staleness, not auth, and are not addressed
here. No CI workflow runs tests/e2e on this branch either, which is why
this rotted unnoticed.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-18 22:14:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 10d5cf54a5 chore(stable): release 3.46.0 (#1060)
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2026-08-16 20:22:19 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 376311cb90 fix(pdf): RFC 6266-encode Content-Disposition on quote/invoice PDFs (#1024) (#1062)
Stable backport of #1055 (main: 3a11e6eb). Change content is byte-identical
to the main twin; cherry-picked clean, no resolutions needed.

The six quote/invoice PDF endpoints interpolated buildPdfFilename()'s result
straight into `inline; filename="${filename}"`. That result deliberately
preserves non-ASCII (it doubles as the PDF's internal Title metadata), and
HTTP header values are latin1, so a customer label reaching the header
directly failed in one of two ways:

  - U+0080-U+00FF (ä ö ü ß — every German umlaut): no throw. The raw byte
    goes out and the client reads back a mangled name. Silent corruption.
  - above U+00FF (Polish ł, Czech ř, Turkish ş, €, Cyrillic, CJK, emoji):
    Node's setHeader rejects it with ERR_INVALID_CHAR. The throw lands
    after the PDF buffer is already rendered, so the request 500s.

This corrects the issue's diagnosis: it reported umlauts as the 500 case,
but umlauts are inside latin1 and mangle rather than throw.

Route all six through buildContentDisposition(), which emits an ASCII
fallback plus the RFC 5987 filename*=UTF-8'' form. Also stops sanitiseSegment
splitting surrogate pairs at its 80-unit cap — a dangling high surrogate makes
encodeURIComponent throw URIError inside the helper, reaching the same 500 a
different way (found by external review on the main twin).

Verified on this branch: 14/14 in the new suite, 151/151 across the nine
surrounding pdf/filename/quote/invoice suites, lint clean.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-16 19:52:39 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 88fa3c5297 fix(storage): add S3 client timeouts so a dropped connection can't wedge uploads (#1049) (#1054)
Stable backport of #1049 (main: 3600231d). Change content is byte-identical
to the main twin.

S3StorageAdapter built its S3Client with no requestHandler timeouts, and the
SDK's defaults wait indefinitely. When a connection is dropped silently (no
FIN/RST — NAT/LB idle reaps, transient faults), the in-flight request hangs
forever and every subsequent storage operation queues behind it process-wide;
only a restart recovers. _retryOperation never ran because the promise it
wraps never settled.

Configure connectionTimeout (120s) and socketTimeout (60s) on the request
handler, overridable via STORAGE_S3_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT /
STORAGE_S3_SOCKET_TIMEOUT, and add TimeoutError to the retryable list so the
existing backoff engages.

socketTimeout rather than requestTimeout: the latter is a total-duration cap
that would kill legitimate large uploads and only warns without
throwOnRequestTimeout. Both values are deliberately generous — connectionTimeout
covers time queuing for a socket from the agent pool (maxSockets 50), so a
short value expires while merely waiting in line and breaks reads.

Reported against v3.45.16 on Cloudflare R2: wedged roughly every 40 minutes
with serial uploads, every 15-20 with 4 parallel uploaders.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-16 19:23:59 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 980378a17b feat(backup): open sqlite → pg .picpeak restore as the supported upgrade direction (#1041) (#1059)
Stable backport of #1043 (main: 8809564a).

sqlite → pg restore is allowed for anyone holding backup.restore, from the
upload UI and the CLI alike, gated by the manifest-direction rule in
validateManifest. pg → sqlite stays refused, with an error naming the
supported direction. allowEngineSwitch is removed rather than kept alongside:
one gate, no way to drive the refused direction.

Two resolutions were needed against stable rather than a clean cherry-pick,
both from known main/stable divergences:

  - replaceAllTables has no roleSnapshot parameter on this branch, so the call
    keeps stable's 4-arg signature while taking the derived { crossEngine }.
  - resyncSequences was guarded by `if (allowEngineSwitch)`, which this change
    removes — leaving an undefined reference. It now runs unconditionally,
    matching main. That also closes a stable-only gap: a same-engine pg → pg
    restore previously left identity sequences stale, so the next natural
    insert collided on the primary key.

Also exports resyncSequences (the function already existed here, main already
exports it) so the cross-engine suite can drive the post-restore fixup.

Verified on this branch: all four picpeak suites green on SQLite, and 20/20
against a real Postgres 15 with the PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL-gated cases executing.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-16 19:20:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0a999795cc ci(tests): run the gated real-Postgres .picpeak cases in the backend job (#1058)
Stable backport of #1056 (main: 18b1e0f6). Change content is byte-identical
to the main twin.

The .picpeak restore suites gate their Postgres cases behind
PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL and describe.skip themselves out when it is unset. The
variable is set in no workflow, so those cases have never run in CI.

On this branch the effect lands together with the #1041 backport, which brings
picpeakCrossEngine.test.js and its three real-Postgres stored-value cases —
stable has no picpeakRestorePg.test.js, so before that PR this wires up a
service nothing reads yet. Merging it first keeps the two twins mirroring
their main counterparts one-for-one instead of folding both into one PR.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-16 19:17:17 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ed4e32c4df chore(stable): release 3.45.16 (#1047)
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2026-08-13 20:58:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9003b34c8a fix(docker): default NODE_ENV=production so non-compose deploys don't fall back to SQLite (#1038) (#1040)
* fix(docker): default NODE_ENV=production so non-compose deploys don't fall back to SQLite (#1038)

knexfile.js selects its config block by NODE_ENV and the `development` block
defaults to sqlite3. The image never set NODE_ENV, so every deployment that
doesn't go through our compose files — Kubernetes, Helm, plain `docker run` —
silently ran on SQLite and ignored DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD.

It stayed invisible because wait-for-db.sh is shell: it reads DB_HOST directly,
connects to Postgres, creates the database and logs "PostgreSQL is up" in the
same container where the Node process then writes to a SQLite file. Migrations
go through src/database/db.js → the same knexfile, so they also ran against
SQLite, leaving the provisioned Postgres database empty.

Setting the default alone would be unsafe: an affected install would flip to
Postgres on its next image pull and come up against an EMPTY database, which
reads as total data loss. So this adds a guard that runs before migrations
touch anything:

  - logs the resolved engine + target at boot
  - refuses to start when pointed at a virgin Postgres while a populated
    SQLite file exists, naming the file and the .picpeak export path for
    moving the data, with PICPEAK_ALLOW_EMPTY_PG=true as the escape hatch
  - warns but boots when Postgres settings are present yet SQLite is in use

Compose files already set NODE_ENV explicitly, so compose users are unaffected.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): stay on SQLite instead of blocking, and add a migration path (#1038)

Reworks the guard after walking through what an existing install actually
experiences on its next image pull.

Blocking was the wrong trade. An operator who had unknowingly been running on
SQLite (because the image left NODE_ENV unset) would have pulled the fix and
got a CrashLoopBackOff: data safe, galleries offline, for something they did
not do. Now the boot RESOLVES the engine before migrations run and stays on
whichever one holds the data:

  - Postgres configured but holding no galleries, while a populated SQLite file
    exists → keep serving from SQLite, print what happened and how to migrate.
  - once Postgres holds the data, the next restart switches over on its own.
  - an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT is always honoured.

Keyed on Postgres holding DATA, not on it having tables: a stray
`run-migrations` against the empty database creates every table, which would
otherwise blind the check.

Adds scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js, which reuses the .picpeak
export/import services rather than hand-rolling a cross-engine copy. Two
additions were needed for the SQLite → Postgres direction, both opt-in and
CLI-only so the upload/restore UI is untouched:

  - `allowEngineSwitch` relaxes the importer's same-engine guard
  - cross-engine row coercion: SQLite has no real date or boolean types, so its
    rows carry epoch numbers where Postgres wants a timestamp and 0/1 where it
    wants a boolean, both of which Postgres rejects outright. Driven by the
    TARGET schema, never guessed from the value.

DELTA FROM THE BETA PR: this branch's import service has no resyncSequences()
— that landed on main only. Without it a cross-engine load leaves Postgres
identity sequences at 1 and the next insert collides on the primary key, so
the function is backported here and called ONLY on the cross-engine path.
Same-engine restores through the UI keep their current behaviour exactly.

Verified end to end on this branch against a real PostgreSQL 15: a seeded
SQLite install migrated across with booleans, timestamps and foreign keys
intact, and the next INSERT got id 2 rather than colliding.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close four review findings on the SQLite fallback + migration (#1038)

External review (codex) found four issues, all confirmed against the code and
fixed here. Two of them could have cost data.

1. The engine resolver was reachable only through wait-for-db.sh. A Kubernetes
   manifest that sets `command`/`args`, or a plain `docker run … node
   server.js`, bypasses the entrypoint — exactly the deployment styles this fix
   targets. With NODE_ENV now baked into the image, such an install would have
   resolved to Postgres and come up against an empty database while its SQLite
   data sat there unseen. server.js now resolves the engine itself, before
   anything requires knexfile, via the same script the entrypoint uses.
   Verified by running `node server.js` directly against an install with
   stranded SQLite data: it logs the banner and serves SQLite.

2. Cross-engine loads double-encoded JSON. SQLite has no json type, so its json
   columns are TEXT holding JSON; the export dumps that as a string and
   serialiseJsonColumns stringified it again, storing `true` as the scalar
   string "true". app_settings.setting_value is json on every install, so this
   reshaped every migrated setting. The text is decoded before serialisation
   now — verified against a real Postgres: json_typeof(setting_value) is
   `boolean`, matching a native install exactly.

3. The migration could silently miss concurrent writes. If the backend keeps
   serving, rows written after the export never reach Postgres and vanish from
   view once the engine switches. The script now fingerprints the SQLite tables
   whose loss would be noticed, checks for drift BEFORE loading Postgres (so a
   detected race leaves the target untouched) and again after, and refuses with
   the exact rows that moved. It also says plainly to stop the backend first.

4. The child phases shared stdout with winston. Outside production, and
   whenever LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true, createPicpeak's own log line was concatenated
   with the archive path and the migration failed on a bogus filename. Payloads
   travel through a result file now; verified with LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 2 — six more data-safety findings (#1038)

1. The engine choice is now PINNED once the data is in Postgres. Previously the
   boot decided from "does Postgres hold galleries", so an operator who later
   deleted every gallery would be sent back to the stale pre-migration SQLite
   file while their settings, admins and CRM data stayed in Postgres. The
   migration writes a marker next to the database file (and retires the file
   itself by renaming it); the marker wins over any probe.

2. The migration refused to overwrite Postgres only when it held GALLERIES. A
   target with admins, customers, invoices or projects but no galleries was
   wiped without --force. Both the source and target checks now look for user
   data across the tables that are empty on a fresh install.

3. Same bug in the other direction: an install with no galleries but real
   admins/settings/customers was refused a migration it was entitled to.

4. Drift detection covered four tables and only count/max(id), so an in-place
   UPDATE (event edit, password change) or a write to any other table passed
   unnoticed. It now fingerprints every table the export carries, including
   max(updated_at). It still is not a substitute for stopping the backend, and
   the script says so rather than implying a guarantee.

5. probeSqliteData() treated an unreadable or corrupt file as "no data", which
   would have switched the install to an empty Postgres — the very failure this
   module exists to prevent. It fails closed now and stays on SQLite so the real
   error surfaces.

6. The "you are leaving SQLite data behind" warning was unreachable: setting
   DATABASE_CLIENT skipped the probes, so the branch that produces it never had
   the inputs. Postgres and SQLite are both probed whenever Postgres is the
   engine in play.

Also: the final verification compares row counts for EVERY table rather than
just galleries, and flags only a shortfall — the import legitimately adds an
app_settings row (setSessionsValidAfter) that made the strict equality fail on
a first real run.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15 end to end, including: the marker keeps
an install on Postgres after every gallery is deleted; removing the marker and
restoring the file rolls back to SQLite as documented.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 3 — occupancy, bootstrap admin, secrets in /tmp (#1038)

1. Both engine probes judged occupancy by GALLERIES alone. An install whose
   galleries were all deleted, but which still has admins, customers or
   accounting records, was treated as empty: on the SQLite side that meant
   booting the empty Postgres and appearing to lose everything; on the Postgres
   side it meant diverting a live install to a stale SQLite file. Both now look
   across the tables that are empty on a fresh install, matching the migration
   script.

2. The migration ran migrate-schema BEFORE checking the target, and migration
   001 seeds a bootstrap admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set (common on legacy
   installs). The occupancy check then saw that admin and refused, pushing the
   operator towards --force against a genuinely empty database. The target is
   read first now.

3. probeSqliteData()'s warning went through the app logger, which writes to
   STDOUT when LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true — and the resolver's stdout is the protocol
   channel wait-for-db.sh captures, so DATABASE_CLIENT could have been set to a
   JSON log line. Diagnostics take an injected sink (stderr in the resolver),
   and the shell now validates the value it captured instead of trusting it.

4. The .picpeak archive holds password hashes, SMTP credentials and API keys in
   plaintext, and was only removed on the fully-successful path — any drift or
   import failure left it in /tmp. Every exit path removes it now.

5. A database-only migration still hauled every business-doc and upload through
   /tmp and back into the same volume. createPicpeak takes includeFiles:false
   for this path; rows move, files stay where they already are.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a gallery-less install with only an admin
account now stays on SQLite and migrates successfully with ADMIN_PASSWORD set;
the resolver emits exactly one token on stdout with LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true and a
corrupt database; a drift failure leaves Postgres untouched and no archive
behind.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): pin the boot to SQLite while a migration is unfinished (#1038)

Review round 4. A migration that dies after touching Postgres leaves rows
behind — schema creation alone seeds a bootstrap admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is
set, and a drift or row-count failure can leave a partial load. Since the
occupancy probes were widened in round 3, those rows read as "Postgres is
occupied", so the next restart would switch engines and hide the SQLite data
that is still the database of record.

The script now writes a pin file next to the database BEFORE its first Postgres
write and clears it only on success (after the success marker exists, so no
restart in between can pick the wrong engine). While the pin is present the
resolver stays on SQLite and explains why.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15 by reproducing the exact scenario: a
migration failed mid-run with ADMIN_PASSWORD set, leaving one bootstrap admin
in Postgres. With the pin the next boot resolves to sqlite3; with the pin
removed it resolves to pg — the failure this closes. The subsequent successful
re-run clears the pin and the boot moves to Postgres.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 5 — occupancy, path drift, retry, host default (#1038)

1. A seeded bootstrap admin counted as "Postgres is occupied". core/001_init.js
   inserts one whenever ADMIN_PASSWORD is set, so a Postgres that was
   initialised once and never used would have beaten a SQLite file full of real
   galleries — the exact failure the guard exists to prevent, reintroduced by
   widening the probe in round 3. The two sides are deliberately asymmetric now:
   the SQLite probe counts any user data (err towards keeping data visible),
   the Postgres probe ignores rows that schema creation seeds (err towards
   requiring proof of real use).

2. The guard resolved DATABASE_PATH with its own logic while knexfile trimmed
   whitespace and collapsed the legacy duplicated-backend form. A path either
   engine normalised differently meant probing a file nobody uses, concluding
   there was no SQLite data, and booting an empty Postgres. The resolution now
   lives in one module both require.

3. Re-running after a partial migration — the documented recovery — was refused
   unless the operator passed the destructive-sounding --force, because the
   half-written rows read as target data. An unfinished run of this same script
   is now recognised as a safe retry.

4. wait-for-db.sh verified readiness against its own default host (`postgres`)
   while knexfile's production block defaults to `db`. With NODE_ENV now baked
   in, a bare `docker run` without DB_HOST would have passed the readiness check
   against one host and then dialled another. The entrypoint exports the exact
   connection it verified. Compose sets DB_HOST explicitly and is unaffected.

Verified: a Postgres holding only a seeded admin now loses to real SQLite data;
a DATABASE_PATH with surrounding whitespace resolves to the identical file in
both knexfile and the guard.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 6 — explicit-client bypasses, retry scope, cleanup (#1038)

1. An explicit DATABASE_CLIENT bypassed the unfinished-migration pin, because
   decideBootEngine honoured it first. docker-compose sets DATABASE_CLIENT=pg,
   so a failed migration would have restarted on a half-written Postgres on
   exactly the deployments that pin it. Worse in the other direction: with
   DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3, a SUCCESSFUL migration renames the source file, so
   the next start created a NEW, empty SQLite database and served that. The pin
   now outranks explicit pg (clearing the marker is the override), explicit
   sqlite3 is left alone since it already points at the data, and the migration
   refuses up front when the deployment pins anything other than pg.

2. The retry allowance was bound to the SQLite file, not to the target. An
   operator who repointed DB_HOST/DB_NAME between attempts could have replaced
   an unrelated populated database without --force. The pin records the target
   and the allowance only applies when it matches.

3. The printed rollback did not roll back: with data on both sides and no
   marker, the resolver still selects Postgres. It now spells out all three
   steps, including DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3.

4. A failure inside createPicpeak left a partial archive — plaintext hashes and
   credentials — in the caller-supplied temp dir, which that service
   deliberately does not clean. The export phase removes it on error.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 7 — pin bypass on direct start, real admins (#1038)

1. server.js only ran the engine resolver when DATABASE_CLIENT was unset, so a
   deployment that both bypasses the entrypoint (Kubernetes `command:`) AND
   pins DATABASE_CLIENT=pg never consulted the migration pin — the round-6 fix
   was unreachable on exactly that path, and a failed migration would have
   served a half-populated Postgres. The resolver now also runs whenever a pin
   file exists.

2. Round 5 excluded admin_users from Postgres occupancy to stop a seeded
   bootstrap admin counting as real data. That over-corrected: an install that
   has completed first-run setup but has no galleries yet has exactly one
   user-created row — an admin — so Postgres looked empty and, with a stale
   SQLite file present, the boot would switch away and the admin's credentials
   and configuration would disappear.

   core/001_init.js seeds must_change_password=true; setupService writes false
   once a human completes setup. The FLAG, not the table, distinguishes them,
   and a legacy NULL counts as a real admin.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a Postgres holding only the seeded row
loses to real SQLite data, the same Postgres wins once setup is completed, and
a server started directly with DATABASE_CLIENT=pg and a pin present comes up on
SQLite with the warning.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 8 — reset admins, CLI config, JSON nulls (#1038)

1. must_change_password is mutable: resetAdminPassword() re-raises it on REAL
   accounts (userManagementService.js:474). Round 7's discriminator therefore
   read a gallery-less Postgres whose only admin had been reset as an untouched
   bootstrap seed — and with a stale SQLite file present, the boot would have
   switched away and hidden those live credentials. The rule is layered now:
   more than one admin, any admin that has logged in, or must_change_password
   false all count as use. Only core/001_init.js's exact leftovers — one admin,
   never logged in, still flagged — read as a seed.

2. The CLI read process.env directly but never loaded the configuration the
   child phases get through knexfile, so running it directly (or via
   `docker exec`, which does not inherit wait-for-db.sh's exports) failed the
   pre-flight checks even with valid settings in backend/.env or
   /run/secrets/db_password. Both sources are loaded up front now.

3. The migration's target check counted a seeded bootstrap admin as user data
   while probePgData classified the identical row as empty, so migrating into a
   previously-initialised-but-unused Postgres demanded --force. Same rule on
   both sides.

4. Cross-engine JSON handling is simpler and no longer lossy. SQLite keeps json
   columns as TEXT holding valid JSON and Postgres accepts JSON text directly,
   so the correct action is to pass them through untouched. Round 1 parsed then
   re-serialised them to undo a double-stringify; that round-tripped the JSON
   literal `null` into SQL NULL, changing data and breaking NOT NULL json
   columns. Not serialising at all fixes both.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a migrated install now carries
json_typeof = null for a JSON null, object for a nested object, and boolean for
a boolean — matching a native install exactly.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 9 — probe error classes, marker ordering (#1038)

1. probePgData() answered every failure with "Postgres has data". That is right
   for an unreachable server — the app cannot run on it either way, and
   diverting a healthy pg install to a stale SQLite file over a transient blip
   would be worse — but wrong for a server that answers and then fails the
   query, which is what a half-built or damaged schema looks like. That is not
   evidence of data, and reporting it as such booted the empty Postgres and hid
   a populated SQLite file: the exact failure this guard exists to prevent.

   Reachability is now established with SELECT 1 first, so the two cases get
   opposite answers: unreachable → leave the configured engine alone;
   reachable-but-uninspectable → unproven, and the SQLite side wins if it
   actually holds data.

2. The success marker was written after the SQLite file was renamed away. A
   failure in between — a full disk — left the source retired with no marker:
   the next attempt reported "No SQLite database", the in-progress pin stayed,
   and the operator never saw the rollback path. The marker is written first
   and updated with the retired filename once the rename succeeds, so a failure
   at any point leaves everything recoverable.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a reachable database whose admin_users
table lacks the probed column now resolves to sqlite3 rather than hiding the
data, while an unreachable host still resolves to pg.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): don't fail the migration on empty SQLite-only tables (#1038)

Review round 10. The final verification flagged every source table missing from
Postgres, regardless of whether it held rows — and SQLite-only tables do exist:
initializeDatabase() creates an `events_new` scratch table and, when its legacy
column copy throws, the catch swallows the error and leaves the empty table
behind (db.js:236). The importer correctly skips tables Postgres does not have,
so verification then reported a mismatch AFTER the data had already landed,
exited 1, and left the install pinned to SQLite with no way to finish.

An absent target table only matters if the source actually had rows. Empty ones
are now listed and skipped.

Reproduced both ways against a real PostgreSQL 15 with an events_new table
present: without the fix the run ends in "ROW COUNTS DO NOT MATCH" and leaves
the in-progress pin; with it, the table is reported as skipped, the migration
completes and the pin is released.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): a completed migration overrides an implicit SQLite config (#1038)

Review round 11. The migration allowed the one configuration it should have
worried about most: DATABASE_CLIENT unset AND NODE_ENV not "production", which
resolves to the development block — i.e. sqlite3. That is precisely the state
the affected installs are in, since it is why they ended up on SQLite at all,
so an operator can easily run the migration before fixing it. The script then
renames the source database away, and the next start resolved to the implicit
sqlite3, created a NEW empty database and served it — after reporting success.

The success marker now overrides an IMPLICITLY resolved sqlite3 when Postgres
settings are present, because the marker is durable proof of where the data
actually went. An explicit DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3 still wins: that is the
documented rollback.

The script says something rather than refusing — refusing would block exactly
the population this exists for.

Reproduced with NODE_ENV and DATABASE_CLIENT both empty, against a real
PostgreSQL 15: the migration completes, the source is renamed away, and the
next boot resolves to pg with the data intact. Before this it resolved to
sqlite3 and would have served an empty database.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* refactor(db): drop the dead reachability flag in probePgData (#1038)

github-code-quality flagged `if (reachable)` as always true, and it is right:
the unreachable branch returns, so everything below it runs only when the probe
connected. The variable and the conditional were leftovers from a first draft
that used a single catch for both failure classes.

No behaviour change — the two error paths still return opposite answers.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): refuse to choose when both databases hold data (#1038)

Review round 12.

1. An install that ran on PostgreSQL, lost NODE_ENV/DATABASE_CLIENT, and kept
   working on SQLite has REAL data on both sides: old rows in Postgres, newer
   ones in SQLite. The stranded-data rule only protected SQLite when Postgres
   was empty, so pulling this fix would have booted Postgres and hidden every
   gallery created since the switch — the exact failure this PR exists to
   prevent, in a variant I had not considered.

   A completed migration leaves a marker saying which side is current. Without
   one, two populated databases are a conflict: the boot stops and prints both
   targets, the two DATABASE_CLIENT values that resolve it, and the migration
   command that merges them. This is the only deliberate refusal in the change —
   guessing here would hide data AND split subsequent writes across two
   databases.

2. probePgData was handed knexConfig.connection even when knexfile had resolved
   to SQLite (a completed migration whose environment still says sqlite3), so
   node-postgres dialled its own localhost defaults instead of DB_HOST/DB_NAME —
   false "unreachable" diagnostics and a needless delay on every boot. The probe
   target is now built from the environment when the config is not pg.

The conflict is honoured by all three entry points: the resolver exits 3 with an
empty stdout, wait-for-db.sh stops the container, and server.js refuses to start.

Two existing tests asserted that Postgres wins when both sides hold data. They
encoded the pre-conflict assumption and described a state that cannot occur
after a real migration (which always leaves a marker); both now pass the marker.

Found while testing: the resolver's logger shim had no .error, so the conflict
path threw, was swallowed by the fallback, and silently chose Postgres — the
precise outcome this refuses to make. The shim is complete now.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): symmetric bootstrap rule, one resolved Postgres target (#1038)

Review round 13. Both findings are consequences of earlier rounds.

1. The conflict rule added in round 12 counted an untouched SQLite bootstrap
   admin as data. core/001_init.js seeds one whenever ADMIN_PASSWORD is set —
   including into the accidental SQLite database — so a healthy Postgres install
   that had ever started once without NODE_ENV would have had a seeded-only
   SQLite file beside it, been declared a both-populated conflict, and REFUSED
   TO BOOT. The bootstrap discrimination is applied on both sides now; a
   setup-completed or logged-in admin still counts as real use on either.

2. The CLI's child phases inherited whichever knexfile block NODE_ENV selected.
   The development block defaults Postgres to localhost/postgres/photo_sharing,
   production to db/picpeak/picpeak — and this script is explicitly meant to run
   with NODE_ENV unset. With DB_USER/DB_NAME left to defaults it would therefore
   have migrated into `photo_sharing`, after which following the script's own
   advice to set NODE_ENV=production pointed the app at an empty `picpeak`.

   The target is resolved once, with production defaults, and passed explicitly
   to every phase — so the block knexfile happens to pick can no longer decide
   which database the data lands in. The pin and success marker record that same
   resolved identity.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a live Postgres beside a seeded-only
SQLite file now boots pg rather than refusing, flipping that admin to
setup-completed restores the conflict, and a migration records
localhost:7102/picpeak_r13b as its target rather than a defaulted guess.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): one Postgres identity everywhere; protect the credentials file (#1038)

Review round 14. Three of the six findings were the same defect as round 13's,
surfacing through paths that fix did not cover: the connection used to PROBE or
MIGRATE could differ from the one the application then OPENS, because
knexfile's development block points Postgres at localhost/postgres/photo_sharing
while production uses db/picpeak/picpeak.

1. server.js exported only DATABASE_CLIENT=pg after the resolver decided, so
   knexfile filled in host/user/database from whichever block NODE_ENV selected.
   With SQLite already retired by a migration, that meant opening an empty
   database. The whole connection is pinned now.

2. Two defaults existed for DB_HOST: wait-for-db.sh resolves and exports
   `postgres`, knexfile's production block says `db`. Since the entrypoint
   exports its value, `postgres` is what a running container actually uses — so
   a `docker exec` migration, which inherits neither, has to agree with that,
   not with the default that is only reached when the entrypoint did not run.

3. The migration's Postgres phases inherited an unset NODE_ENV and therefore the
   development block, which ignores DB_SSL entirely — a managed Postgres
   requiring TLS could never be migrated into. The phases run with production
   semantics now.

4. core/001_init.js writes data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt, and that data directory
   belongs to the SOURCE install. Bootstrapping the Postgres schema replaced the
   operator's real credentials file with ones for a temporary admin the import
   immediately discards. The file is preserved across the phase, including when
   it fails.

5. The boot line described knexConfig, so an install redirected to Postgres by a
   migration marker still logged "Database engine: sqlite (...)", contradicting
   the warning printed one line earlier.

6. On a both-populated conflict resolveBootEngine returns client:null, and both
   migration runners told the operator their data was in "null" and to set
   DATABASE_CLIENT=null. They now present the two real choices.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a migrated install started directly with
NODE_ENV unset now logs `postgres (localhost:7102/picpeak_r14)` and opens it,
where before it would have gone to the development block's photo_sharing.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* refactor(db): resolve the PostgreSQL target in exactly one place (#1038)

Rounds 13 and 14 both traced back to the same thing, each time through a caller
the previous fix had not covered: three different defaults existed for the same
connection.

  knexfile development : localhost / postgres / photo_sharing
  knexfile production  : db        / picpeak  / picpeak
  wait-for-db.sh       : postgres  / picpeak  / picpeak   (and it EXPORTS them)

So a process that probed or migrated against one could hand over to a process
that opened another. Patching each caller was not converging — the guard, then
the CLI's child phases, then server.js — so this deletes the divergence instead.

`src/utils/pgConnection.js` now owns the resolution and knexfile's development
and production blocks both derive from it, as does the engine guard. Same shape
as the earlier sqlitePath.js extraction, for the same reason.

The database NAME is what made this dangerous: a wrong host or user fails
loudly at connect time, while a wrong name connects fine and presents an empty
installation.

BEHAVIOUR CHANGE: with DATABASE_CLIENT=pg and no DB_* variables, a
non-production environment now resolves to postgres/picpeak/picpeak instead of
localhost/postgres/photo_sharing. Deployments are unaffected — compose sets
these explicitly and wait-for-db.sh exports them — but a local machine running
Postgres bare now needs DB_HOST=localhost DB_USER=postgres DB_NAME=photo_sharing
(or DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3, which is what backend/.env already uses). The
failure mode of getting this wrong is a refused connection, not a silently empty
database.

Side effect worth having: DB_SSL is now honoured whatever NODE_ENV says, so the
managed-Postgres case is fixed at the root rather than by forcing production
semantics onto the migration's child phases.

The test block keeps its own photo_sharing_test default — isolation is the point
there.

Verified: every block plus the guard resolve identically from the same
environment; explicit DB_* still wins; production's pool tuning is preserved;
and a full SQLite → PostgreSQL migration with NODE_ENV unset lands in the right
database with JSON shapes intact.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): two more components that guessed the database instead of asking (#1038)

Both found while sweeping for copies of the connection defaults. Checked in
detail first — one of my suspicions about them was wrong.

scripts/set-admin-password.js hand-rolled its own knex config while all four
sibling scripts (reset-admin-password, create-admin, show-admin-credentials,
reset-admin-mfa) use the application's connection. Two consequences:

  - it read DB_CLIENT, a variable nothing else in this codebase sets, so it
    defaulted to Postgres and could not work on a SQLite install at all;
  - it defaulted to database `picpeak_dev`, a name no other component uses.

It now uses `require('../src/database/db')` like its siblings, so it follows
whatever engine the install actually runs on. Timestamps are written as ISO
strings because it reaches SQLite now, where raw Date objects are the documented
landmine.

NOT changed: the script's "all existing sessions have been invalidated" notice
is accurate — auth.js compares token iat against password_changed_at — and it
deliberately leaves must_change_password alone, which is right for an operator
choosing a password rather than being issued one.

routes/adminSystem.js re-derived three things the live connection already knows,
and each could disagree with it:

  - the engine, from DATABASE_CLIENT || 'sqlite3' — so a Postgres install
    without an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT took the SQLite branch;
  - the Postgres database, from DB_NAME || 'picpeak';
  - the SQLite file, from a hardcoded ../../data/photo_sharing.db that ignored
    DATABASE_PATH entirely.

All three now come from db.client.config, with pg_database_size(current_database()).

Verified: set-admin-password works on SQLite (new hash verifies, old rejected)
and still on PostgreSQL; and on a SQLite install with a custom DATABASE_PATH the
size logic reports the real database (1,748,992 bytes) where the old code
reported a different file entirely (1,851,392) — or 0 where that path does not
exist.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): bind the migration marker to its target; fix a phantom table (#1038)

Review round 15.

1. The marker records `host:port/database`, but only its EXISTENCE was checked.
   Repoint DB_NAME or DB_HOST at a different, empty PostgreSQL after migrating
   and the marker would vouch for that one too — booting it, presenting an empty
   installation, and suppressing the SQLite fallback while the real data sits in
   the recorded target and the renamed rollback copy. The marker is compared
   against the current connection now, and a mismatch stops the boot with both
   targets named and the two ways out.

2. `incoming_invoices` is not a table — supplier documents live in
   `inbound_documents` (core migration 124). Both occupancy lists skip tables
   that do not exist, so those records were silently not protecting anything:
   an install whose only remaining data was inbound documents could be switched
   away from, or overwritten without --force. Verified every other name in the
   lists against the live schema at the same time.

Verified: a marker naming picpeak_original with picpeak_mk configured refuses
with exit 3 and prints both; making them agree boots pg.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-13 18:51:20 +02:00
Paul Nothaft de459c701f fix(feedback): persist guest feedback settings, unshadow the guest route (#1030) (#1032)
Enabling Guest Feedback on an event could silently do nothing.

1. `updateEventFeedbackSettings` spread the request body straight into the
   knex UPDATE. The admin event form posts its whole client-side state,
   including three keys that were never columns on event_feedback_settings
   (`enable_rate_limiting`, `rate_limit_window_minutes`,
   `rate_limit_max_requests`), so the write threw and the route answered 500.
   Writable columns are now whitelisted; identity columns and timestamps stay
   server-managed.

2. EventDetailsPage swallowed that 500 in a bare `catch {}` ("Error already
   handled by mutation" — it is a different request), so the admin was left
   looking at "Event updated successfully" while the toggle never persisted.
   The error is surfaced now and the settings query is invalidated on success.

3. gallery.js declared a duplicate `GET /:slug/feedback-settings`. server.js
   mounts galleryRoutes before galleryFeedback, so it shadowed the real
   handler and dropped the per-guest caps (#655) from the guest payload — the
   gallery could never render the favorite/like limits or their counters.

Timestamps are written as ISO strings so they round-trip on both engines.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-13 18:51:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8b6cd3c74f fix(gallery): coerce SQLite 0/1 booleans in the guest surface (#1028) (#1037)
SQLite stores booleans as 0/1, Postgres as true/false. The guest gallery
compared strictly against `true`/`false`, so every flag read backwards on
SQLite installs:

    allow_downloads:    0 !== false → true   (header Download button shown
                                              with downloads disabled)
    allow_user_uploads: 1 === true  → false  (upload button hidden with
                                              uploads enabled)

Worse, all five download guards used `allow_downloads === false`, which never
fires against a stored 0 — so on SQLite "Allow photo downloads = off" was
inert end to end: single photo, download-all, download-selected, download-jobs
and the job-status poll all kept serving, as did the secure-images download
route. Per-category blocking (#640) was ignored for the same reason, the
protection toggles (right-click, devtools, canvas, watermark) reported false
while enabled, overlay_protection was stuck on, and show_feedback_to_guests
leaked feedback with the setting off.

The /info endpoint was already correct — it checks 0/'0' explicitly. The two
payloads had simply drifted. Everything now goes through parseBooleanInput
(utils/parsers.js), which normalises both engines and takes a per-column
default so legacy NULL rows keep their documented behaviour.

Tests run on the SQLite harness, so they assert the real engine values. Every
one of them fails on the unfixed code — the payload assertions return the
inverted value, and the guard assertions never get their 403 (the request
proceeds to serve instead).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-13 18:51:12 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fb3d0b08b2 fix(events): make event_date/expires_at nullable on SQLite (#1029) (#1036)
Clearing a gallery's expiration failed on every SQLite install with

    SQLITE_CONSTRAINT: NOT NULL constraint failed: events.expires_at

surfacing in the admin UI as "Failed to update event".

Migration 061 added the event_require_event_date / event_require_expiration
settings and dropped the NOT NULL on both columns — but only for Postgres. It
skipped SQLite on the premise that "SQLite doesn't enforce NOT NULL as
strictly", which is untrue, so "never expires" was never reachable there. The
#426 work that allows clearing the expiration on edit therefore never worked
on SQLite either.

Migration 174 finishes 061 for SQLite. Knex implements .alter() on SQLite by
recreating the table; migration 073 already does that on `events`, so the path
is well-trodden. Postgres is skipped — it was handled in 061 and .alter() there
would needlessly rewrite a column that is already correct.

The test asserts against the real engine (the Jest harness runs SQLite) and
reproduces the reporter's exact error without the migration.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-13 18:51:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 945e63ae86 chore: ignore all of backend/storage on stable (#1033)
main already ignores `backend/storage/` wholesale; stable only ignored
`backend/storage/business-docs/`. A dev instance writes event photos,
thumbnails and previews into backend/storage/, so `git add -A` on this
branch sweeps 17 runtime artifacts into the commit.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-13 18:51:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 93d4ae68f4 chore(stable): release 3.45.15 (#1017)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
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2026-08-10 20:52:00 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2bdb1204fe fix(slideshow): stop "no crop" fit letterboxing a pre-cropped frame (stable) (#1015) (#1019)
Backport of #1018 to the curated channel; the reporter on #1015 is running v3.45.14.

The slideshow resolved its image as preview_url || hero_url || url. preview_url is only emitted when lightbox_preview_enabled is on (default false), so a default install fell through to hero_url — the 1920x1080 fit:'cover' centre crop built for gallery header banners. object-fit: contain then letterboxed an already-cropped 16:9 frame.

Emits slideshow_url (same aspect-preserved preview tier) unconditionally for image photos; the show prefers it and never falls back to hero_url. preview_url stays gated so the lightbox opt-in is unchanged.
2026-08-10 13:32:24 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cee0a380a6 fix(deps): bump nanoid and js-yaml out of two HIGH advisories (stable) (#1014)
Backport of #1013 to the curated channel. Both are production dependencies of the backend image (npm ci --omit=dev):

- nanoid 3.3.16 -> 3.3.18 (CVE-2026-67213, infinite loop in customAlphabet)
- js-yaml 4.3.0 -> 4.3.1 (GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj, quadratic CPU in !!omap resolution)

Stable reported no open alerts only because its last Trivy scan ran on 2026-08-04 with v3.45.14, before either advisory was published — the vulnerable versions were present in the lockfile regardless.

Lockfile-only; the existing ^ ranges already permitted both fixes.
2026-08-10 11:00:03 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c01d8d8d2e chore(stable): release 3.45.14 (#990)
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2026-08-04 21:26:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft bf9bd76278 fix(security): vet the destination project when linking a deal (stable) (#992)
Backport of #991. stable carried the identical code path and the same missing
guards.

A scoped admin could point a quote or contract at a project they do not own —
the quote/contract create+update paths pass a body-supplied projectId with no
ownership check, and linkDealToProject's lineage guard is skipped when the deal
has no event yet. On an ownerless project this escalated to a read once the
quote converted to an event.

Vetted at the service choke point, ahead of both the null-deal early return and
the customer check. 404 PROJECT_NOT_FOUND throughout. super_admin unaffected.
2026-08-04 16:36:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0fe5792a7d fix(deps): bump ip-address, brace-expansion and postcss for open CVEs (stable) (#988)
Backport of #987. stable carried the same vulnerable versions.

  brace-expansion  5.0.8  -> 5.0.9   CVE-2026-69152 (high)
  ip-address       10.2.0 -> 10.4.0  CVE-2026-69192 (high), CVE-2026-54272,
                                     CVE-2026-69198 (medium) — SSRF and
                                     trust-boundary bypasses
  postcss          8.5.18 -> 8.5.23  CVE-2026-69153 (medium)

Lockfile holds exactly one entry per package, all at or above the fixed
version; the image installs via npm ci --omit=dev.
2026-08-04 14:36:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3f7364be8e chore(stable): release 3.45.13 (#972)
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Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
2026-08-03 21:26:03 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2d0e6ab2dc fix(projects): stop the cockpit offering email controls the API rejects (stable) (#977)
Closes #969 on stable. Backport of #976.

The cockpit's email feed rendered preview/resend/cancel/retry/send-now for every mail regardless of role or permission, producing 404s (CRM document mail has no event_id; project ownership does not imply event ownership) and 403s (preview needs events.view, the write actions need email.send).

getProjectOverview now stamps each email with an authoritative canAct, mirroring filterOwnedEventIds; created_by is selected only for that check and stripped before the response. A missing canAct reads as false.
2026-08-03 14:49:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cc49f6997a fix(auth): fail closed when the adminAuth roles join errors (stable) (#975)
Closes #968 on stable. Backport of #974.

The roles-join fallback in adminAuth fabricated role_name='super_admin' on ANY database error, so a transient fault silently granted super_admin for its duration. Gate it on isMissingRolesSchema(), moved to utils/dbErrors.js and shared with apiTokenAuth, with the predicate tightened to trust SQLSTATE 42P01/42703 on Postgres and exact driver phrasing on SQLite.
2026-08-03 14:48:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fecc18cbc8 fix(security): enforce project ownership on project + project-email routes (stable) (#966)
* fix(security): enforce project ownership (GHSA-wrg5, GHSA-93x4)

Project routes authorized on generic events.view / events.edit with NO
ownership check, so an editor-like admin could enumerate, read, update and
aggregate projects belonging to other admins' events. The project email
endpoints keyed on an email_queue id alone — any admin with events.view /
email.send could preview, resend, cancel or retry ANY queued mail by walking
ids.

The earlier 'needs a migration, deferred' assessment was wrong in one
direction and right in another: ownership IS derivable transitively via
events.project_id -> events.created_by, but only for projects that already
have a linked event. A brand-new EMPTY project has no derivable owner, which
is exactly where the create -> attach flow starts. So migration 167 adds
projects.created_by (backfilled from the single linked event owner, skipping
ambiguous multi-owner projects) and createProject finally persists the adminId
it was already being passed.

- ownedProjectIds(): union of the stored owner and the transitive path, so
  pre-167 rows and new empty projects both resolve. Reads created_by
  defensively so an instance that hasn't run 167 falls back to the transitive
  rule instead of throwing.
- requireProjectOwnership on detail/update/attach-event/attach-quote/
  attach-contract/overview; list filtered by an id allowlist (empty array
  means 'owns nothing' and must return no rows, hence null-vs-[] care).
- POST /:id/events also validates the INCOMING eventId — owning the project
  is not enough, or an editor could pull a foreign event in and read its
  rolled-up documents via /:id/overview.
- Queued-email routes scoped via email_queue.event_id. CRM document mail has
  event_id NULL and no ownable parent here, so a scoped caller is denied
  rather than guessed into access. 404 (not 403) so it isn't an id oracle.

Note: adminEmail.js:315/332 let any email.view/edit admin archive or delete
any email_queue row — the same class, pre-existing and outside these two
advisories. Left untouched and reported rather than silently widened.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — make the stored project owner authoritative (GHSA-wrg5)

The first predicate union'd 'any linked event I can see' with the stored
owner, which opened two holes:

- A project owned by admin B containing ONE legacy ownerless event became
  readable by every admin — and /:id/overview aggregates B's other events,
  invoices and emails, so a single legacy event exposed the whole project.
- Migration 167 deliberately leaves multi-owner (ambiguous) projects NULL
  rather than guessing an owner. A NULL owner was then treated as
  'everyone's', so exactly those mixed projects became globally accessible.

Now: the stored created_by wins outright, and a project without a usable
stored owner only derives access when EVERY linked event is accessible (and at
least one exists). A created_by pointing at a hard-deleted admin degrades to
'no usable owner' so the project falls back to its events instead of being
locked away — no ON DELETE SET NULL migration needed. A project with neither a
usable owner nor linked events stays super_admin-only: failing closed beats
failing open, and a super_admin can reassign it.

Also returns a knex SUBQUERY rather than a materialised id list, so a large
project count can't hit the driver's bind-parameter limit.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — enforce deal-lineage ownership on project attach (GHSA-wrg5)

requireProjectOwnership vets only the DESTINATION project, while attaching a
quote or contract cascades through linkDealToProject — which re-points every
event the deal produced into that project. An editor could therefore create an
empty project of their own, attach another admin's quote, and pull that admin's
events (plus the invoices, emails and gallery that roll up with them) into a
project they own and can read via /:id/overview. The single-customer guard did
not stand in the way: an unassigned project ADOPTS the deal's customer rather
than rejecting it.

linkDealToProject now refuses to move lineage events the actor cannot own, and
assignDocument cascades BEFORE stamping the document so a refused attach leaves
nothing half-applied (the old order committed the foreign document into the
caller's project and only then declined the cascade). The quote/contract
create+update paths, which reach the same cascade with an arbitrary project_id,
thread their adminId through as well; isSuperAdmin() resolves the role for them
and fails closed when it cannot.

Events are the only ownership signal a deal carries — quotes and contracts have
no created_by in this schema — so a lineage that produced no event still cannot
be attributed. That is a property of the CRM model, noted in the code.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 688e318850db1b5f4ea2a4ae3c0fcf0fc137620d)

* docs(security): drop the stale ownership JSDoc left by the rebase (GHSA-wrg5)

Rebasing onto stable (which had gained scopeEventsQuery from #963) replayed the
round-1 doc block above round-2's replacement, leaving a comment that describes
the ORIGINAL union rule — "a project is the caller's when … it has at least one
linked event they own" — directly above the code that deliberately no longer
does that. That union is the hole round 2 closed; a comment asserting it is
worse than none.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:24:41 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7f27e6771f fix(security): escape brand tokens, block tracker redirects, trim logo diagnostic (stable) (#967)
* fix(security): escape brand tokens, block tracker redirects, trim logo diagnostic (GHSA-j347, mw76, 29vm)

GHSA-j347 — buildCachedPayload sanitizes the operator's HTML and THEN runs
applyBrandTokens over the result with a plain String.replace, so any markup in
a token value reached the public origin unfiltered. The default templates
interpolate tokens into text AND into quoted attributes
(<img src="{{brand_logo_url}}" alt="{{company_name}} logo">,
href="mailto:{{support_email}}"), so a value could close the attribute and
inject. Token values are now HTML-escaped on substitution, mirroring
galleryOgService's escapeHtml. sanitizeBrandUrl's case-sensitive literal
'javascript:' check (which 'JavaScript:' walked straight past) is replaced by
an http/https scheme allowlist; relative logo paths are unaffected.

Writer is settings.edit (super_admin only) and the CSP blocks inline script,
so this is defence-in-depth — but sanitize-then-substitute is a real ordering
bug regardless.

GHSA-mw76 — the SSRF decline STANDS: self-hosted operators legitimately point
analytics at private addresses, so connection-time IP blocking would break real
deployments. Fixed only the narrow leak: undici strips
Authorization/Cookie/Proxy-Authorization/Host across a cross-origin redirect,
but umamiAdapter sends a CUSTOM x-umami-api-key header, which would be replayed
verbatim to the redirect target. Both adapters now use redirect: 'error'.

GHSA-29vm — the logo diagnostic echoed absolute storage roots, process.cwd()
and absolute candidate paths. It now reports candidates relative to
<STORAGE>/<CWD_STORAGE>, which answers the same 'which candidate existed'
question. It also still advertised the raw-absolute candidate that GHSA-c7x5
removed from resolveLogoFile, so it was misreporting what the resolver tries —
aligned with the real candidate list.

publicSiteService.test.js expectation updated: an '&' in a company name is now
emitted as '&amp;'. Renders identically; the raw payload string differs.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — stop the remaining logo-path disclosure, mirror the resolver (GHSA-29vm)

- sources[].value was still echoed verbatim. branding_logo_path is stored
  ABSOLUTE by multer, so relativising only resolvedTo and the candidate paths
  left the filesystem layout going out anyway. It is now relativised too.
- Round 1 dropped the raw-absolute candidate on the grounds that GHSA-c7x5
  removed it from resolveLogoFile — but the c7x5 follow-up RE-ADDED it (kept,
  subject to the containment filter, so a legitimate multer path still
  resolves). The diagnostic therefore reported every candidate as missing for
  a contained absolute logo while resolvedTo named the file. It now mirrors the
  resolver, containment filter included.

One deliberate cosmetic divergence, commented in place: for an absolute value
the resolver also tries path.join(root, value-minus-leading-slash), which can
never exist and would re-embed the absolute path this endpoint must stop
echoing. Omitted; every candidate that can actually match is still shown.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — mirror the resolver for root-relative logo paths (GHSA-29vm)

The logo diagnostic skipped the `<STORAGE>/<value>` candidates whenever
path.isAbsolute(value) was true. That test cannot distinguish a multer disk
path from a root-relative URL such as `/custom/logo.png`, and for the URL form
resolveLogoFile.generateCandidates() does try `<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png` and
can resolve it — so the endpoint reported "no source candidate exists" about a
logo that renders fine, and collapsed the configured value to its basename.

The stripped joins are now built unconditionally, exactly as the resolver does.
Disclosure stays closed: every candidate still passes the containment filter and
redact() rewrites survivors to `<STORAGE>/…`, never an absolute host path.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 093480a753ff3d4b6ed48dd9f1108f975c8e0d47)

* fix(security): gate the logo stripped-joins on containment, not isAbsolute (GHSA-29vm)

The previous commit dropped the isAbsolute() gate entirely and regressed
logoDiagnostic's own disclosure assertion: for a genuine multer disk path,
path.join(root, value-minus-leading-slash) yields
`<STORAGE>/tmp/…/storage/custom/logo.png`, and redact() only rewrites the
LEADING root — so the inner absolute path went straight back into the payload.

The right discriminator is not "is this absolute" (which cannot separate a disk
path from a root-relative URL) but "does the value already resolve inside a
storage root". If it does, it is a real disk path, the raw candidate already
covers it, and the stripped join is the double-prefixed junk that can never
exist. If it does not — the `/custom/logo.png` URL form — the stripped join is
exactly what resolveLogoFile resolves, and is shown.

Covered by a new case asserting both halves: the candidate appears for the URL
form, and the payload still contains neither the storage root nor cwd.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit c6b95d3cd1cb28e5c2828d29d4d63fadad981dcf)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:55 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 4e99897313 fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697) (stable) (#963)
* fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697)

Migration 081 documents the intent — 'the token's effective permissions are
the intersection of the user's role permissions and the token's own scope
flags' — but it was never implemented.

- apiTokenAuth selected only id/username/email/role_id, so req.admin.roleName
  was undefined. Every ownership helper keys on roleName, so the v1 surface
  could not tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer. Now joins roles and
  emits the same req.admin shape adminAuth does, including the
  roles-table-missing upgrade fallback.
- No v1 route applied any ownership predicate: GET /events listed every event
  on the instance, and GET /events/:id/share-link returned ANY event's
  share_token — the gallery access credential, same class as GHSA-rh8r.
  List is now scoped via a new scopeEventsQuery helper; the three :id routes
  (detail, photo upload, share-link) use the existing requireEventOwnership.

Not a breaking change: tokens are minted by super_admins, who bypass
ownership. It closes the case where a token's owner is later demoted —
userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlived the
demotion with full read of every gallery's share token.

events.category.test.js stubbed apiTokenAuth without roleName; giving the
stub super_admin keeps requireEventOwnership from issuing a DB query and
desyncing that suite's sequenced dbMock.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — intersect v1 token scopes with role permissions (GHSA-9697)

Ownership scoping alone left half the documented control missing. Migration
081 defines a token's effective permissions as the INTERSECTION of the owner's
role permissions and the token's scope flags; requireApiScope only ever checked
the scope half. A token minted while its owner was super_admin therefore kept
write access after the owner was demoted to viewer — userManagementService
never touches api_tokens, so the token outlives the demotion, and ownership
scoping does not help because the demoted owner still owns their events.

Adds requirePermission to all six v1 routes (events.create on create,
events.view on the reads, photos.upload on upload). It keys on req.admin.id,
which apiTokenAuth already populates.

The two existing v1 suites mock the database, so a real permission lookup
500s — they now mock the permissions middleware as pass-through, matching how
they already mock apiTokenAuth. Those suites cover route logic; the
intersection is pinned by the new v1TokenPermissions suite.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — fail closed on the roles-join fallback (GHSA-9697)

The round-2 fix loaded the token owner's role so the v1 ownership checks could
tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer, and mirrored adminAuth's
roles-table-missing fallback. That fallback assigns role_name = 'super_admin',
and the catch around it was unconditional — so ANY failure of the joined query
(connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout) elevated the token owner to
super_admin as long as the simpler fallback query then succeeded. A restricted
owner could ride that into listing, reading and share-tokening every event on
the instance, which is the exact hole GHSA-9697 closes.

The fallback is now reached only for an error that genuinely names a missing
roles table/column (PG 42P01/42703 or the SQLite/MySQL wording); anything else
propagates to the 500 handler.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 53d1e5d1b3148a7f4067308b08fcdf8ddab0a39f)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:52 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ccab9024d4 fix(security): bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (stable) (#965)
* fix(security): bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (GHSA-2qf9, pgmp, r794)

GHSA-2qf9 — emailIntakeService downloaded, parsed and persisted every message
with no size, attachment-count or attachment-byte limit, reachable
unauthenticated by anyone who can email the operator's mailbox:
- fetch the envelope with `size` (same cheap pass) and refuse an oversized
  message BEFORE downloading its source;
- cap attachment count and cumulative attachment bytes;
- limits env-overridable, defaults generous for real supplier invoices.

The teeth were in the dedup key. received_emails.message_id is varchar(512)
UNIQUE, and the failure path wrote `err-<uid>-<Date.now()>`, which can never
match the envelope-derived messageId the dedup pass compares against — so an
oversized (or overlong-Message-ID) mail was re-downloaded every poll forever,
and an OOM-kill/restart just resumed the loop. Size-skips are now recorded
under the REAL message id, and overlong ids collapse to a stable sha256 key
that always fits the column.

GHSA-pgmp / r794 — new sanitizeForLog() util (key-name deny-set, recursive,
cycle-safe) applied to the three request-body log sites in adminEvents/crud.js,
plus sanitizeValidationErrors() because express-validator's errors.array()
embeds the SUBMITTED value per field — a rejected plaintext password was still
logged. Scope is wider than filed: the update path also logged
client_password_hash and a LIVE client_share_token bearer credential.

Also: the one-time setup token was logged at warn AND printed to stdout on
every first boot, putting a live first-admin credential in combined.log,
security.log and `docker logs`. It is now written to the 0600 token file and
only surfaced when that write fails — the last-resort path it existed for. (stable)

* fix(security): codex round 3 — repair the first-run token recovery flow (GHSA-r794)

Two regressions from keeping the setup token out of the logs.

1. server.js decided whether to print the token by calling existsSync() on the
   candidate path. That answers a different question than "did the write
   succeed": a stale, read-only or directory-shaped SETUP_TOKEN reports as
   present, so the banner suppressed the live token and pointed the operator at
   content that is not it — leaving the current token only in combined.log
   under default production logging. setupService now records the path the
   write actually produced and exposes it via writtenSetupTokenFile().

2. The setup screen, its EN/DE strings, README, SIMPLE_SETUP and .env.example
   all still told first-time users to run
   `docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`. On the normal path
   that command now returns a path banner and no credential, so the documented
   browser-first onboarding could not be completed. They now point at
   `docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN`, with the log
   fallback described as what it is — the failure path.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 9a54b6f0231c3285df4c4865eb846e63e1ed0dda)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 11f9f584de fix(security): scope dashboard stats/analytics/activity to the caller's events (stable) (#964)
* fix(security): scope dashboard endpoints to the caller's events (GHSA-c2jj, gqx7, jhcf)

/dashboard/stats, /analytics and /activity are gated only by analytics.view,
which the editor role holds — but the events LIST restricts editors to their
own rows (adminEvents/crud.js: roleName === 'editor' -> created_by =
admin.id). So an editor saw instance-wide totals, and via /analytics
topGalleries other admins' gallery NAMES and SLUGS (the public gallery URL
component), for events invisible to them everywhere else.

- stats: all 10 aggregates scoped (events by id, photos/access_logs by
  event_id).
- analytics: all 8 series/aggregates scoped, including topGalleries. The
  external tracker device breakdown reports instance-wide data with no event
  filter, so a scoped caller falls through to the access_logs heuristic
  instead, which IS scoped.
- activity: feed scoped. activity_logs.event_id is nullable and the join is a
  leftJoin, so system-level rows (logins, settings changes) are deliberately
  excluded for a scoped caller — those are precisely the cross-admin actions
  the advisory is about.

Scoping keys on 'editor' to mirror the events list exactly, so the admin
role's dashboard is unchanged. filterOwnedEventIds uses the broader
'!== super_admin' rule; the two conventions disagree in this codebase and
matching the list is the no-regression choice.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — fix activity misattribution, scope via subquery (GHSA-jhcf, c2jj, gqx7)

- expenseService passed adminId as logActivity's THIRD positional parameter,
  which is eventId — so admin ids were being written into
  activity_logs.event_id. The /activity scoping filter trusts that column, and
  admin/event id sequences overlap, so a foreign admin's expense metadata could
  surface under an editor's event. All 11 calls now pass null for eventId and
  the admin as the actor, which is what they meant.
- Dashboard scoping now uses a SUBQUERY instead of pluck()+whereIn. An editor
  owning more events than the driver's bind-parameter limit (~999 SQLite,
  65535 Postgres) would have turned all three endpoints into 500s once each id
  became a placeholder; below the limit it still re-sent the full list for each
  of the ~10 aggregates per request.

Note: two billInboundNow() calls also end in ', adminId)' but have an unrelated
signature — verified untouched.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — correct legacy accounting activity rows (GHSA-jhcf)

expenseService called logActivity(type, metadata, adminId), but logActivity's
third positional parameter is eventId. Every expense / incoming-invoice entry
therefore stored the ACTING ADMIN'S ID in activity_logs.event_id.

Round 2 scoped the activity feed with
`WHERE activity_logs.event_id IN (SELECT id FROM events WHERE created_by = me)`,
which does nothing about the rows already on disk. Admin ids and event ids are
small integers from the same range, so on any upgraded instance an editor who
owns the event whose id happens to equal another admin's id is served that
admin's accounting activity, verbatim metadata included — GHSA-jhcf, still
live. Migration 168 re-attributes those rows (event_id holds exactly the actor
id that was lost) and then clears event_id so the scope predicate can no longer
match them. All ten activity types are emitted by expenseService and nothing
else, so no row with a genuine event_id is touched.

Also: the round-2 rewrite passed `{ type: 'admin', id: adminId }`
unconditionally, which stored actor_type='admin' with a null id for the
automated mailbox intake (emailIntakeService calls recordInboundDocument with
no adminId). adminActor() restores 'system' attribution for those.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 459e9e42434defd0dc7b87246e4d894dd47dcc56)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:46 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3b88036fda fix(security): backup/restore hardening — public-dir DB dump, restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest keying (stable) (#962)
* fix(security): stop caller-chosen database backup destination (GHSA-jw8m)

POST /api/admin/database-backup/backup forwarded req.body straight into
databaseBackupService.backup(), which merges options over config:
  const { destinationPath = '/backup/database', ... } = { ...config, ...options }

destinationPath is not a persistable setting — the /config allowlist only
accepts database_backup_* keys — so the request body was its only source.
The built-in `admin` role holds backup.create but neither settings.edit nor
backup.restore, so it could aim a full DB dump (admin bcrypt hashes, gallery
password hashes, encrypted SMTP creds) at the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
(server.js mounts it with no auth middleware) and then fetch it
unauthenticated. Filed low; it is a privilege escalation to unauthenticated
disclosure.

Forward only the real knobs, and only when present so absent keys can't
override config defaults via spread.

* fix(security): backup/restore hardening — restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest checksum keying (GHSA-fw4c, h652, hgp8)

- adminRestore /validate + /start: constrain caller-supplied source and
  manifestPath to the operator-configured backup roots — the SAME set the
  restore wizard discovers from — so disaster recovery from a rescued mount
  still works, with RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS as an escape hatch (GHSA-fw4c).
- restoreService.decompressFile: bound the EXPANDED size and abort the
  pipeline when exceeded; default 50 GB, RESTORE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES
  overrides (GHSA-h652).
- backupManifest: BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY upgrades new manifests to a keyed
  HMAC (GHSA-hgp8). Deliberately opt-in and verify-if-present — the key
  cannot live in the database because the database is inside the backup, so
  a mandatory HMAC would lock operators out of the exact disaster-recovery
  case this exists for.

Also fixes a pre-existing bug found while testing hgp8: the checksum passed
Object.keys().sort() as JSON.stringify's second argument, which is an array
REPLACER (a property allowlist applied at every depth), not a key sorter. All
nested keys — path, size, per-file checksum — were dropped before hashing, so
the file list sat outside the integrity check entirely and a manifest path
could be rewritten to ../../etc/passwd without disturbing the digest. Now
hashes a recursively-canonicalized copy, with the legacy serialization
accepted on validation so existing backups stay restorable.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — unbreak the restore wizard, share checksum verification, guard downgrades

- adminRestore: `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE ('local'|'s3'|'upload'),
  not a path — restoreService branches on those literals. The containment
  check treated it as a path, so path.resolve('local') fell outside the
  backup roots and BOTH /validate and /start returned 400, blocking every
  normal restore. Type tokens are now excluded from the path check.
- backupManifest: extracted verifyManifestChecksum() as the single source of
  truth for the legacy/keyed fallbacks. restoreService.performPreRestoreValidation
  recomputed the digest itself with the default canonical+keyed settings,
  which rejected EVERY backup written before this batch. It now delegates.
- backupManifest: guard the algorithm downgrade — with a key configured, an
  attacker able to rewrite the backup store could strip checksum_algorithm,
  edit the manifest and recompute a plain SHA-256 that verified. Opt-in via
  BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED so pre-key backups keep restoring by default.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — close two manifest-verification fail-opens (GHSA-hgp8)

verifyManifestChecksum returned valid for a manifest with no
verification.total_checksum at all, and restoreService only called it when
that field was present. Deleting the field was therefore a complete bypass of
the keying work: no digest check, no downgrade guard, no
BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED. Every manifest this codebase writes stamps the
field, so an absent one now fails validation, and the call site invokes the
verifier unconditionally.

Second fail-open: the strict-mode rejection of an unkeyed manifest was gated on
`&& key`, so with BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED=true and no BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY
configured a plain SHA-256 manifest sailed through. Strict mode is a statement
about the operator's manifests, not about the host — it is exactly the fresh
disaster-recovery box that lacks the secret. The rejection no longer depends on
a key being present.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 292a5b784acd7f47099aa234c1c2ea00050fca97)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0c73bf2cdc chore(stable): release 3.45.12 (#955)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-backend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-frontend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
2026-08-02 20:25:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2c7b5dfd02 fix(security): redact gallery share tokens from analytics tracking (GHSA-7m6c) (stable) (#953)
* fix(security): redact gallery share tokens from analytics page-view tracking (GHSA-7m6c)

* fix(security): codex round-1 — actually disable raw auto-tracking (GHSA-7m6c)

The previous patch was inert: App.tsx passed autoTrack:true (so Umami's
data-auto-track=false was never set) and the sanitized trackPageView had no
caller (useAnalytics sits outside <Router>), so the raw token URL still hit
the collector.

- Umami: drop autoTrack:true → data-auto-track=false; page views now come
  from a sanitized manual tracker.
- Rybbit: its initial-load auto pageview can't be intercepted client-side, so
  use native data-mask-patterns=['/gallery/**'] to strip the token on every
  auto-tracked view; skip manual tracking for it to avoid double counting.
- Mount <AnalyticsRouteTracker/> INSIDE <Router> so manual tracking runs.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:39:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5d5db4e766 fix(security): authz/ownership gaps (token binding, auth revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging) (stable) (#951)
* fix(security): close authz/ownership gaps (secure-download binding, photo-auth+logout revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging)

* fix(security): codex round-1 — complete admin-token invalidation + preserve foreign assignments

- photoAuth: mirror adminAuth's active-admin lookup + iat<password_changed_at
  check in the admin branch, so a deactivated admin or a pre-password-change
  token can no longer fetch every photo (GHSA-x55x was only revoke+cutoff).
- adminAuth logout: revoke req.token (the token adminAuth authenticated with,
  cookie OR header) instead of header-only, and clear the auth cookie — a
  cookie-based logout previously left the JWT live (GHSA-cjqh).
- adminCustomers PUT /:id/events: preserve the customer's existing
  assignments to events the caller does NOT own, so a restricted admin can't
  revoke another admin's customer-event links via full-list replacement.

* fix(security): codex round-2 — don't 403 legit restricted-admin assignment edits

The Manage-galleries dialog submits the full initial assignment list, so a
restricted admin editing a customer that already has a foreign assignment hit
the denied.length 403 before the preservation logic ran. Reject only
NEWLY-supplied foreign/nonexistent ids; retain foreign ids the customer is
already assigned to (they can't be added or removed by a non-owner).

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:39:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e5dccf1664 fix(security): neutralize spreadsheet formulas in all CSV/export cell-writers (CSV injection cluster) (#949)
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:38:55 +02:00
Paul Nothaft bfafecedc7 fix(security): unauth share_token leak (HIGH) + restore path-traversal, logo file-read (stable) (#947)
* fix(security): stop unauth share_token leak + block restore path-traversal, logo-path file read, branding path keys

* test: update resolveLogoFile for the c7x5 containment (reject outside-storage absolute paths, keep inside)

* fix(security): codex round-1 — escape LIKE wildcards in share-link resolve, keep in-storage absolute logos, guard restore verification

- shareLinkService: escape %/_ in the link_partial LIKE fallback so an
  anonymous /resolve/____… wildcard can't match an arbitrary share_link and
  leak its bearer token (reopened GHSA-rh8r). Explicit ESCAPE for SQLite.
- resolveLogoFile: re-add the raw absolute candidate but keep it subject to
  the storage-root containment filter (GHSA-c7x5) so legit in-storage
  absolute logos resolve while /etc/passwd stays rejected.
- restoreService: apply the same pathEscapes guard in post-restore
  verification so a skipped traversal entry isn't fs.access'd/hashed.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:38:47 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2c5a094c5c chore(stable): release 3.45.11 (#936)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-backend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-frontend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
2026-08-01 17:38:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2462ba6897 fix(security): close authorization/ownership gaps (token scope, mass-assignment, category hero, project docs) (stable) (#944)
* fix(security): close authorization/ownership gaps (token scope, mass-assignment, category hero, project docs)

* fix(security): block archive columns in event mass-assignment per review

* fix(security): comprehensive event mass-assignment denylist + deal-cascade cross-domain permission gate (codex r2)

* fix(security): case-insensitive complete event denylist + project_id + empty-update no-op (codex r3)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 90275f88e9 fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) (stable) (#942)
* fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster)

* fix(security): harden SSRF fix per review (rsync backup path, S3 config-save, webhook transient-DNS retry)

* fix(security): S3 endpoint validation on any endpoint update + no-connect on unresolved webhook host (codex r2)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:51 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 34a7b1c013 fix(security): block guest access to hidden/client-only photos across bulk + secure routes (stable) (#940)
* fix(security): block guest access to hidden/client-only photos across bulk + secure routes

* fix(security): harden hidden-photo fix per review (stale ZIP cache, legacy token mint, SQLite bool, client rebuild)

* fix(security): invalidate ZIP cache on photo visibility/category change (codex r2)

* fix(security): recheck photo visibility at signed/secure serve time (TOCTOU) + invalidate ZIP on client visibility change (codex r3)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:46 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7419c68337 fix(security): bump sanitize-html to 2.17.5 (CVE-2026-53606) (stable) (#938)
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fc99e2b233 fix(uploads): prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes (#931) (stable) (#934)
* fix(uploads): prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes (#931)

* test: pin the suffixed photo filename format in the NFD pipeline suite (#931)

* chore(deps): promote p-limit to a direct dependency for the watermark limiter (#931)

* test: make the suffix-uniqueness check deterministic-in-practice (#931)

* fix(uploads): widen the anti-collision suffix to 48 bits (#931)

* fix(uploads): hide staging files from list() + share one watermark limiter process-wide (#931)

* fix(uploads): reclaim orphaned staging files + revalidate watermark settings in queued jobs (#931)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 12:29:23 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7974b9c6d7 chore(stable): release 3.45.10 (#923)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-backend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-frontend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
2026-07-30 21:20:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 60cbda5b22 fix(security): close GHSA-g94x (cross-gallery photo read) + GHSA-pv6w (admin DB export) (stable) (#925)
* fix(security): close two access-control advisories (GHSA-g94x, GHSA-pv6w) (stable)

GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f (HIGH) — the secure-image VIEW route
(/secure-images/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token) validated only the token
signature and took the gallery/photo from the URL, so a token minted on
any PUBLIC gallery read every other gallery's photos with no password
(its download sibling has verifyGalleryAccess; the view route can't —
it serves via <img src> with no header). Bind the token to its scope
instead: the URL photoId must equal the token's minted photoId (photos
belong to exactly one gallery, and minting is gallery-scoped), and the
gallery embedded in the token's sessionId must equal the URL gallery.

GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v (MEDIUM) — GET /admin/backup/picpeak/export dumps
every table unredacted (bcrypt hashes, 2FA, SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/webhook/S3
secrets) and was gated only by backup.create, which the built-in admin
role holds. Gate it behind super_admin, matching the restore side
(backup.restore, already admin-denied) and the masked config APIs.

Regression tests pin both: cross-gallery token reads 403 (photo and
gallery checks), backup export 403 for admin / passes for super_admin.

Stable port of #924. secureImages on stable has no reveal-mode block, so
only the token-binding checks are added; the backup export gate is
identical.

* fix(security): review follow-ups on the export gate (GHSA-pv6w)

- test: place the mocked export in its own mkdtemp dir. The route
  recursively deletes path.dirname(filePath) after download, so a stub
  in bare os.tmpdir() made the super_admin test wipe the whole temp
  root — other jest workers' DB files included (latent CI flake).
- ui: hide PicpeakExportCard from non-super_admins. The role keeps
  settings.view + backup.create, so after the gate its Download button
  always 403'd with a generic toast; gate the card on role super_admin
  to match the endpoint.

* fix(security): keep the token-mismatch audit values within varchar(20) (GHSA-g94x review)

image_access_logs.access_type is varchar(20) (migration 038), but
'token_gallery_mismatch' is 22 chars — on Postgres the audit write
threw value-too-long and logImageAccess swallowed it, so the security
event went unrecorded (the 403 still fired; log is best-effort). Shorten
to 'photo_mismatch' / 'gallery_mismatch' (14/16).

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 14:24:34 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a27d19b4d1 fix(admin): expose view/download counters in the admin photos list (#895 follow-up) (stable) (#915)
* fix(admin): expose view/download counters in the admin photos list (#895 follow-up) (stable)

st-ivan's re-test after #904: statistics panel and event summary now
agree, but the per-image Engagement column still shows 0. Root cause:
the admin photos LIST endpoint maps rows to an explicit response object
that includes like/comment/rating/favorite counts but never included
view_count or download_count — the grid reads photo.view_count ?? 0,
so the column showed 0 regardless of what the DB counted. This mapper,
not stale data, is also why per-image downloads always displayed 0 in
the original report.

Suite extended with a list-endpoint assertion (beacon + download, then
the admin list reflects 1/1 and untouched photos 0/0). The skip test now
neutralizes the route's background pre-zip build, whose async ENOENT
against the intentionally missing file could land mid-suite.

Includes the one-line chunkedUploadService unref from #911 so the test
suite can mount adminPhotos regardless of merge order (identical change,
merges cleanly either way).

* test: widen the fire-and-forget settle window (#895 follow-up)

The 100ms settle was marginal on loaded CI runners — the counter
increments are deliberately fire-and-forget, and the 909 PRs flaked on
exactly these assertions. 400ms keeps the suite fast while giving slow
runners room.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 12:15:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d68d84e5c8 fix(admin): serve videos with their real MIME type in the admin photo view (#908) (stable) (#911)
* fix(admin): serve videos with their real MIME type in the admin photo view (#908) (stable)

The admin view route built Content-Type from the filename extension —
image/<ext> — which is invalid for videos (image/mp4). The admin player
fetches this URL into a blob that inherits the type, and browsers
refuse to play a <video> blob labeled image/*: blank/grey preview,
while download (which already uses photo.mime_type) worked fine.

Stored mime_type now wins; videos without one fall back to video/mp4,
images to the extension, and extensionless files to image/jpeg instead
of the equally invalid bare 'image/'.

Also unrefs chunkedUploadService's module-level hourly cleanup interval:
it kept Jest from exiting for any suite requiring adminPhotos (it's why
adminPhotos.reference sits on the CI ignore list). Production behavior
unchanged — the HTTP listener keeps the process alive.

New adminPhotoContentType suite pins all four MIME cases.

* fix(admin): harden admin photo Content-Type resolution (#908 review round)

External review findings, all verified:

- The header is now ALWAYS image/* or video/*. photos.mime_type is
  never echoed verbatim unless it is a video/ type — the chunked-upload
  path stores the client-sent MIME unvalidated, so a stored text/html
  served inline under the app origin was a same-origin XSS hazard.
- MIME-less videos map from the extension via the shared
  EXTENSION_TO_MIME (.mov → video/quicktime, .webm → video/webm)
  instead of a blanket video/mp4 that would mislabel them.
- Images ignore the stored MIME entirely: migration 039 backfilled
  image/jpeg onto every legacy row (PNGs included), so trusting it
  would regress previously-correct extension-derived types. Extension
  wins, normalized (jpg → image/jpeg).

Suite extended to 8 MIME cases including the XSS guard and the
039-backfill immunity.

* fix(admin): validate stored video MIME as a full header-safe token (#908 review round 2)

A prefix check let malformed client-stored values through:
'video/mp4\r\nX: y' makes res.setHeader throw ERR_INVALID_CHAR — a
permanent 500 for that photo — and a bare 'video/' is an invalid type.
Strict /^video\/[\w.+-]+$/ now gates the stored value; anything else
falls back to the extension map. Two new tests pin both shapes.

* fix(admin): map-only image Content-Type — no raw extension interpolation (#908 review round 3)

image/${ext} could synthesize image/svg+xml (scriptable when served
inline) or header-invalid values from client-controlled chunked-upload
filenames. The shared EXTENSION_TO_MIME map is now the allowlist on the
image side too; unmapped extensions serve as image/jpeg — browsers
sniff image bytes in img/blob contexts, so a mislabel is harmless where
an injected type is not.

* fix(admin): own-property lookup in the extension MIME map (#908 review round)

A client-controlled filename ending in .constructor / .__proto__ /
.toString made EXTENSION_TO_MIME[ext] return an inherited Object.prototype
member (truthy), and the downstream extMime.startsWith threw —
a permanent 500 on the admin view for that photo instead of the JPEG /
mp4 fallback. hasOwnProperty-gated now; test pins both a .constructor
image and a .__proto__ video.

* fix(admin): honor safe stored image MIME for auto-imported formats (#908 review round 2)

My previous round made the image side map-only to dodge the migration
039 image/jpeg backfill and image/svg+xml — but that regressed the S3
auto-importer (STORAGE_AUTO_IMPORT), which stores correct types for
avif/bmp/tiff/heic whose extensions aren't in EXTENSION_TO_MIME. Those
now served as image/jpeg (JPEG-labelled non-JPEG bytes).

Precedence is now mapped-extension (still corrects the 039 backfill on
PNGs) -> stored MIME IF in a safe raster allowlist (avif/bmp/tiff/heic
+ the mapped ones) -> image/jpeg. Allowlist, not a regex: image/svg+xml
stays excluded (scriptable inline). Tests pin avif preserved and svg
degraded to jpeg.

* fix(admin): allow any header-safe raster MIME, deny svg/xml (#908 review round 3)

The round-2 hand-listed Set kept missing formats the S3 auto-importer
stores (apng/ico/jxl beyond avif/bmp/tiff). Replace it with a regex:
honor image/<token> EXCEPT the scriptable svg / *+xml family. Covers
every current and future raster type in one rule while still blocking
inline-scriptable svg and header injection. Tests pin apng + x-icon
preserved, svg still degraded to jpeg.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 12:14:58 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6891769124 fix(admin): stop marking events expired up to 24h early (#909) (stable) (#917)
* fix(admin): stop marking events expired up to 24h early (#909) (stable)

differenceInDays truncates to whole days, so an event expiring in a few
hours returned 0 and three admin surfaces treated it as gone:

- EventsListPage: status chip said 'Expired' (days <= 0) while the
  public gallery — which compares real timestamps — correctly showed
  'expires in X hours'. This is the reporter's exact symptom.
- EventDetailsPage: same isExpired math on the detail view.
- AdminDashboard: the expiring-soon card showed '0 days left' on the
  final day.

Expired is now gated on the actual timestamp (expires_at <= now), and
the countdown chips use ceiling days so the last day reads '1 day
left' instead of flipping to Expired/0.

* fix(admin): drop already-expired events from the dashboard card (#909 review round)

The expiring-soon card ran Math.max(1, ceil(delta)), so an event that
expired while the dashboard sat open (its query isn't polled) showed
'1 day left' indefinitely from the stale cached row. Expired rows are
now filtered out before render; the delta is therefore always positive
and the clamp is gone.

* fix(admin): refresh expiry status live at the boundary (#909 review round 2)

Two review findings on the admin expiry surfaces:

- The dashboard 'expiring soon' card, list badges, and detail banner are
  all computed inline from Date.now() at render, so a page left open
  across an event's expiry kept showing 'active'/'1 day left' until an
  unrelated render — which for editor/viewer roles (no health poll)
  never happens.
- My round-1 client-side filter on the dashboard desynced the visible
  list from the cached total/stat ('no events expiring' beside 'view
  all N').

Both are fixed by new useExpiryRefresh: it fires once at the soonest
future expiry (setTimeout, overflow-guarded). The dashboard refetches
its expiring + stats queries — the backend already excludes expired
events, so rows/total/stats come back consistent (filter removed). The
list and detail pages bump a tick so the inline badges recompute. Hooks
are placed above the loading early-returns (rules-of-hooks is disabled
in eslint, so this was a latent crash otherwise).

* fix(admin): expiry-refresh precision + filtered refetch (#909 review round 3)

Three refinements to round-2's live-expiry work:

- useExpiryRefresh now re-arms past setTimeout's ~24.8-day overflow
  limit (capped wake-up that re-evaluates) instead of dropping the timer,
  so a page mounted for weeks still updates.
- The dashboard requests the expiring list ordered by expires_at asc, so
  the five shown rows ARE the soonest to expire — the timer schedules
  against the true next boundary even when >5 events are expiring
  (getEvents gains optional sortBy/sortOrder; backend already whitelists
  expires_at).
- EventsListPage refetches instead of only re-rendering at the boundary:
  under the 'expiring' filter the backend drops expired rows, so a plain
  tick would leave a stale 'Expired' row + total. refetch keeps rows and
  totals correct under every filter.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 12:14:54 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b32ba1ed6b ci: batch stable releases into one daily version (stable) (#920)
* ci: batch stable releases into one daily version (stable)

The stable release PR was auto-merged the instant it went green, so a
day with N bugfixes produced N patch releases (3.45.8 AND 3.45.9 on
2026-07-29 alone) — N upgrade notifications for stable users and N
full Docker build cycles.

Fixes now accumulate in release-please's rolling release PR and are
cut as ONE version per day by release-stable-daily.yml (18:00 UTC).
Approval/merge mechanics are unchanged from the inline step (#719):
approve as github-actions[bot], auto-merge as the PAT so the merge
triggers the tag-cutting run.

- Urgent fix? workflow_dispatch the daily job or merge the release PR
  by hand — the schedule is a default, not a gate.
- Beta is untouched: instant beta releases are load-bearing for
  same-day reporter verification.
- schedule only fires from the default branch; the stable copy of the
  new workflow is inert and exists to keep branches in sync.

* ci: harden the daily stable-release cut (review round) (stable)

Mirror of the #919 hardening — fork-PR head-name spoof (require
--base stable + same-repo head) and no longer swallowing the
auto-merge-enable failure on the sole automatic stable cut.

* ci: accept an immediately-merged release PR as success (review round 2) (stable)

Mirror of #919: MERGED state = success (the normal 18:00 case where
checks were already green and --auto merges immediately), pending
auto-merge = success, still-open-no-auto-merge = real failure.

* ci: read release-PR state + auto-merge in one snapshot (review round 3) (stable)

Mirror of #919 — collapse the two racing gh pr view calls into one.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 12:14:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f99357460f chore(stable): release 3.45.9 (#907)
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2026-07-29 16:02:51 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 90b589a88e fix(analytics): make per-photo view/download counters actually count (#895) (stable) (#905)
* fix(analytics): make per-photo view/download counters actually count (#895) (stable)

Three stacked defects behind 'per-image stats stay 0':

- photos.view_count had NO writer anywhere — the admin IMAGES table and
  photo viewer display it, so it was permanently 0. It now increments
  when the full-size photo or its preview tier is served, excluding the
  slideshow kiosk (migration 138 design) and follow-up video Range
  requests (seeks are not views). Fire-and-forget so analytics can
  never fail the byte-serving path.
- Zip downloads (download-all, presigned download-all,
  download-selected) never incremented per-photo download_count — only
  single-photo downloads did, so zip-heavy galleries showed 0 forever.
  The zip routes now bump exactly the photos that went into the archive
  (the prebuilt-zip path mirrors the archive builders' category filter).
- Every admin surface used a different definition of 'downloads', which
  is the reporter's 46 vs 45 vs 0: event details counted only
  action='download' (no zips at all), the dashboard counted
  download+download_all but silently EXCLUDED download_selected and
  download_all_presigned. All queries now share one action set:
  download, download_all, download_all_presigned, download_selected.

New photoEngagementCounters suite pins all of it (7 tests).

* fix(analytics): count views via an explicit lightbox beacon (#895 review round)

External review flagged that request-level view counting is wrong in
both directions: the lightbox preloads prev/next neighbours (3 fetches
per open) while a preloaded neighbour promoted by a swipe is never
re-fetched (#505 keeps the DOM node), and enhanced/maximum galleries
never hit /photo at all (bytes come from /api/secure-images).

- Views now count via POST /:slug/photo/:photoId/view, fired by the
  lightbox exactly when a photo becomes the visible slide; the
  serving-route increments are removed. Covers protected galleries and
  the preview tier uniformly; slideshow kiosk stays excluded.
- bumpEventDownloadCounts mirrors downloadZipService._build (ALL event
  photos) — the category filter mismatched the prebuilt zip's actual
  contents. (That the builder ignores per-category allow_downloads is a
  separate pre-existing issue.)
- Zip loops count only successfully appended entries, with a pre-append
  storage stat: a lazy stream's async error bypassed the per-photo
  catch and hung the whole response — pre-existing bug, now fixed.

Suite extended to 9 tests (beacon semantics, serve-does-not-count,
skipped-entry exclusion).

* fix(analytics): fire the view beacon from the premium lightbox too (#895 review round 2)

gallery-premium events use yet-another-react-lightbox inside
GalleryPremiumLayout instead of PhotoLightbox, so the layout never
counted views. yarl's on.view fires on open and on every slide change —
identical semantics to the PhotoLightbox beacon.

Also documents the accepted prebuilt-zip approximation: _build can skip
entries whose watermark step fails and still publish the archive;
counting those exactly would need a persisted zip manifest.

* perf(analytics): skip the per-entry zip preflight on S3 (#895 review round 3)

The pre-append source check exists for LocalFs's lazy createReadStream
(async error would kill the whole zip response). S3's get() awaits
GetObject and rejects inside the loop's try/catch on a missing key, so
a HEAD per entry was a redundant serial round trip — 500 extra HEADs
on a 500-photo zip.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 17:59:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1ad8ad5b68 chore(stable): release 3.45.8 (#903)
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2026-07-29 10:52:37 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 962f1d9586 fix(tests): raise jest timeouts to the 120s convention (stable) (#902)
Stable backport combining #860 (never reached stable) and #900:

- jest.config.js gains testTimeout: 120000 — stable still ran on Jest's
  5s default for anything unpinned, while its migration chain (134 core
  migrations via backports) is nearly as long as beta's.
- All 19 suite-level jest.setTimeout(30000/60000) pins raised to 120s;
  local pins override the config default (#860's rationale).
- All 15 hook-ARGUMENT timeout pins on migration-booting beforeAll
  hooks raised to 120s (#900's rationale — the 3.97.0-beta.0 release PR
  failed on exactly this class on the beta side).

Untouched: the three suites whose pinned hooks don't run migrations
(webhookDelivery, imageProcessor.storage, storageBackend) and
publicQuotes' 30s pin on the rate-limit lockout test.

No test logic changed.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 12:48:50 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a7885846ac chore(stable): release 3.45.7 (#881)
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2026-07-27 07:58:07 +00:00
Paul Nothaft d868aac703 fix(security): close 5 Trivy alerts — postcss/tar bumps + drop npm from the runtime image (stable) (#879)
* fix(security): close the 5 open Trivy alerts — dep bumps + drop npm from the runtime image

Backend deps:
- postcss 8.5.10 -> 8.5.18 (CVE-2026-45623, GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849; the pin
  exists to force sanitize-html's transitive copy onto a fixed version)
- tar pin/override >=7.5.16 -> >=7.5.21, resolves 7.5.22
  (GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m)

Runtime image:
- Remove the npm CLI from the final stage instead of upgrading it: npm's
  bundled node_modules ship tar 7.5.19 and brace-expansion 5.0.7 (no npm
  release bundles the fixed versions — checked 11.18.0 and 12.0.1), and
  npm never runs in production. wait-for-db.sh now invokes the migration
  runners via node directly. This ends the recurring npm-bundled-CVE
  alert class; the previous 'npm install -g npm@11' line was itself a
  patch for the last batch. (stable)

* fix(restore): run post-restore migrations via node — the image ships no npm

restoreService still shelled out to 'npm run migrate:safe' after a
restore; with npm removed from the runtime image that would ENOENT into
the non-fatal catch, silently leaving a restored older backup on a
schema behind the running code until the next container restart. Invoke
migrations/run-migrations-safe.js through node directly, matching
wait-for-db.sh. The PR #596 source-contract test now pins the new
invocation. (stable)
2026-07-27 09:54:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 577b7fa6ae chore(stable): release 3.45.6 (#877)
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2026-07-27 07:10:18 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a27c705e39 fix(backup): make backup settings actually apply (#871) (stable) (#875)
* fix(backup): make backup settings actually apply (#871) (stable)

- Wire the What-to-Backup toggles into the walker: honor
  backup_include_thumbnails / backup_include_photos (opt-out,
  default ON) and accept the UI's backup_include_archives spelling
  for the archived gate (the engine expected _archived, so the
  Archives checkbox silently never worked).
- Fix the 167.6 TB dashboard size: file_size_bytes is a bigint that
  node-postgres returns as a string, and the S3 path concatenated it
  onto the byte counter; coerce to Number at the source.
- Compute the real next scheduled run (cron-parser) and return it as
  nextBackup; the UI read a field the API never sent and rendered a
  hardcoded 'Not scheduled'. A named schedule label now beats the
  stray default cron the UI always sent, which silently turned
  weekly schedules into daily 03:00 runs.
- Never back up filesystem noise (.nfs* silly-renames, .DS_Store,
  Thumbs.db) and honor backup_exclude_patterns in the walker
  (previously rsync-only).
- Remove the compression/encryption toggles from the configuration
  UI: no backend implementation exists, and collecting an encryption
  passphrase while uploading plaintext is a false promise.

* fix(backup): close the review gaps in the settings wiring (stable)

- The UI's backup_include_archives now beats the migration-seeded
  backup_include_archived: every install has the singular key seeded
  true, so the alias-only-when-absent lookup made unchecking Archives
  a no-op.
- rsync destinations now receive the de-selected What-to-Backup paths
  and the noise filters as anchored --exclude args; previously rsync
  synced the whole storage root and the walker's selection only shaped
  the manifest, which then misreported what was actually transferred.
- Escape regex metacharacters in the walker's glob matcher: '.nfs*'
  compiled to /^.nfs.*$/ whose leading dot matched any character, so
  files like anfs-photo.jpg were silently dropped from backups.
- The Backup Coverage report now uses the same gate as the walker
  (new 'skipped-by-setting' status) instead of re-implementing it
  without the opt-out toggles and the archives alias.

* fix(backup): make the coverage diagnostics agree with the walker

- The coverage table shows the alias-aware flag value the gate actually
  used, instead of the seeded backup_include_archived shadowed by the
  UI's plural key (true next to a 'Gated off' badge).
- skipped-by-setting paths are now counted in the coverage summary
  (backend, TS contract, summary card, EN/DE locales) so the totals
  reconcile again when Photos or Thumbnails is unchecked.
- The form's thumbnail default now matches the backend's never-saved
  fallback (include): the checkbox no longer shows 'off' while
  thumbnails are being backed up, and saving an unrelated setting no
  longer flips the backup scope. (stable)

* fix(backup): keep custom crons, exclude disabled rows from rsync, normalize flag display

- Saving a named schedule no longer wipes the stored custom cron: the
  backend already prefers the label, so the cron field stays inert for
  named schedules and is preserved for switching back to Custom. A
  custom schedule now validates the 5-field expression before saving
  (the backend silently fell back to daily 02:00 on a blank value).
- resolveExcludedBackupPaths now also returns rows disabled via
  include_in_default, so rsync excludes them; the enabled-only loader
  hid them and rsync transferred their contents anyway.
- The coverage table normalizes flag values like the walker does —
  Boolean('false') displayed true beside a gated-off badge. (stable)
2026-07-27 09:06:50 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b0e9145bba chore(stable): release 3.45.5 (#873)
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2026-07-26 18:41:48 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 39696d42fe fix(security): bump backend deps to close all 14 open Trivy code-scanning alerts (stable) (#870)
* fix(security): bump backend deps to close all open Trivy code-scanning alerts (stable)

- axios 1.16.0 -> 1.18.1 (GHSA-gcfj-64vw-6mp9 high + 10 medium advisories)
- sharp 0.34.3 -> 0.35.3 (GHSA-f88m-g3jw-g9cj, inherited libvips CVEs)
- mailparser 3.9.9 -> 3.9.14 (pulls linkify-it 5.0.2, CVE-2026-59887)
- brace-expansion override >=5.0.6 -> >=5.0.7 (CVE-2026-13149)
- body-parser 1.20.4 -> 1.20.6 via lockfile refresh (CVE-2026-12590)

* fix(images): migrate removed sharp failOnError option and enforce Node >=20.9 (stable)

sharp 0.35 drops the deprecated failOnError constructor option, so
recoverably corrupt images would start failing upload validation and
thumbnail generation; use the failOn: 'none' equivalent instead.

sharp 0.35 also requires Node >=20.9: declare it in engines and make
picpeak-setup.sh compare the full version instead of only the major,
so native installs on Node 20.3-20.8 upgrade instead of breaking.

* fix(setup): align the Node floor with the whole dependency tree and gate native updates (stable)

html-to-text@10 needs Node >=20.19 and the glob/minimatch family excludes
Node 21, so declare engines as ^20.19.0 || >=22 and enforce the same range
in picpeak-setup.sh. Also run install_nodejs at the start of
update_native_installation so existing native installs on an old Node get
upgraded before the service is stopped, instead of restarting broken.

* fix(setup): make the update-path Node gate actually work (stable)

--update dispatches before detect_os, so install_nodejs saw an empty
PACKAGE_MANAGER, matched no install branch, and reported success on the
old runtime. Detect the OS on demand and re-verify the installed version
afterwards, failing loudly (before the service is stopped) when the
runtime still misses the engines range, e.g. a Node 21 that package
managers refuse to downgrade.
2026-07-26 20:38:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 50f5ca1d5b fix(security): read the password-complexity key the settings UI writes (stable) (#844)
* fix(security): read the password-complexity key the settings UI writes

The settings UI saves the admin's complexity choice as
security_password_complexity (useSettingsState.ts prefixes security_ to
password_complexity), but getPasswordComplexitySettings() queried
security_password_complexity_level — written by nothing — so the setting
was silently ignored and password validation always used the 'moderate'
default. Spotted in the filpgame fork (their main, 2026-07-14).

* fix(security): accept the Postgres json-column shape of the complexity value (codex review of #843)

On SQLite the TEXT column returns the JSON-stringified value
('"very_strong"'), but on Postgres (production default) setting_value
is a json column and arrives already decoded ('very_strong') — the bare
JSON.parse threw and the outer catch silently fell back to 'moderate'
again. Parse with fallback, mirroring getAppSetting's documented
pattern; test now covers both driver shapes + the empty-value default.
2026-07-19 20:04:35 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 11b6490e4c chore(stable): release 3.45.4 (#831)
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2026-07-17 19:43:45 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 1cff576439 Merge pull request #829 from PicPeak/fix/hero-logo-visible-null-validation-stable
fix(events): accept hero_logo_visible: null on create/update (#822) (stable)
2026-07-17 21:39:26 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8978acdb49 fix(events): accept hero_logo_visible: null on create/update (#822)
hero_logo_visible is nullable — null means "inherit the global
branding_logo_display_hero toggle" (#756, migration 152). But the create and
update validators used `.optional()` without `{ nullable: true }`, which only
skips `undefined`; an explicit `null` still ran `.isBoolean()` and failed with
HTTP 400 "Invalid value". Saving an event with `hero_logo_visible: null` (the
inherit state the frontend sends) was rejected on v3.45.2.

- Both routes: `body('hero_logo_visible').optional({ nullable: true }).isBoolean()`,
  matching the already-correct `hero_logo_size` rule next to it.
- Create handler: guard on `!= null` instead of `!== undefined` so an explicit
  null stores NULL (inherit) rather than being coerced to 0/false by
  formatBoolean on SQLite. The update handler already did `=== null ? null`.

Left hero_logo_position on plain `.optional()` on purpose: its column is NOT
NULL (no inherit migration) and its handler always resolves to a concrete value
via `|| brandingDefaults`, so null is genuinely invalid there — allowing it
would trade the 400 for a 500.

Adds smoke tests: PUT accepts hero_logo_visible: null and stores NULL; a
non-boolean value is still rejected.
2026-07-17 21:14:12 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0d8123ed4a chore(stable): release 3.45.3 (#827)
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2026-07-17 19:08:55 +00:00
Paul Nothaft db1d28a75b Merge pull request #825 from PicPeak/fix/update-instructions-production-compose-stable
fix(update): target docker-compose.production.yml in dashboard update steps + gate mailhog (stable)
2026-07-17 21:03:21 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 64bcd0ab9f fix(update): target docker-compose.production.yml in dashboard update steps
Production installs use docker-compose.production.yml (the README's documented
path, pinned GHCR images, no dev services), but the dashboard's update
instructions emitted bare `docker compose pull` / `up -d`. Bare `docker compose`
operates on docker-compose.yml — a different, build-based stack — so a
production user who followed the steps:
  - never pulled/recreated their real containers (stayed on the old version,
    e.g. stuck on 3.44.0 after "updating" to 3.45.2), and
  - started the dev-only mailhog service that docker-compose.yml defines
    (reported restart-looping).

The backend runs inside a container and can't stat the host's compose files, but
docker-compose.production.yml passes PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL into the backend env
and docker-compose.yml does not. detectEnvironment() now derives
isProductionCompose from it, and the Docker update steps prepend
`-f docker-compose.production.yml` when set. The non-production branch keeps the
bare commands but the warning now tells users to add `-f docker-compose.production.yml`
if they installed with it.

Also gates the mailhog service in docker-compose.yml behind a `dev` compose
profile so a plain `docker compose up -d` never starts it (opt in with
`docker compose --profile dev up -d`). Nothing depends on it (SMTP_HOST comes
from .env), so gating is safe. Verified: `docker compose config` lists mailhog
only with `--profile dev`; production compose is unchanged.

Adds unit tests for the production-vs-default command generation.
2026-07-17 20:56:18 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1d48f59fe1 chore(stable): release 3.45.2 (#819)
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2026-07-17 07:34:35 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e37d1fac58 Merge pull request #818 from PicPeak/fix/legacy-events-router-bola-stable
fix(security): remove unguarded legacy /api/events router on stable (GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq)
2026-07-17 09:29:24 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9ee3ff45d0 fix(security): remove unguarded legacy /api/events router (GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq)
The legacy gallery router mounted at /api/events exposed create/list/update/
delete/extend guarded by adminAuth ALONE — no requirePermission, no
requireEventOwnership. adminAuth only checks the token is a valid type:'admin'
session, which every back-office role holds, down to read-only `viewer`. So any
non-super-admin account could:
  - GET /api/events → every gallery's bcrypt password_hash, share_token, and
    client name/email (the list handler selects * and mapEventForApi keeps
    those columns),
  - PUT /api/events/:id → reset any gallery's password (full takeover),
  - DELETE /api/events/:id → delete any gallery,
all bypassing the per-photographer ownership isolation the canonical
/api/admin/events router enforces. Affects any instance with more than the
single super_admin.

Fix: remove the legacy router entirely (mount + require + src/routes/events.js).
It was a superseded duplicate of /api/admin/events and unused by the frontend
EXCEPT for one live route — POST /:id/extend (the "Extend expiration" UI action,
which hit /api/events/:id/extend via the api client's /api base). That route is
migrated to the canonical mount as POST /api/admin/events/:id/extend with the
same guards as every other gallery mutation (adminAuth + requirePermission
('events.edit') + requireEventOwnership), and the frontend is repointed to it.
Behaviour of the extend itself is unchanged (expires_at + reactivate).

Verified end-to-end on a booted instance: /api/events (all methods) now 404;
/api/admin/events/:id/extend returns 401 unauth, 200 for the owner, 403 for a
non-owning editor; the full login→create→extend flow works. Adds a regression
test pinning the router removal and the extend ownership check.
2026-07-17 09:18:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5453152f1c chore(stable): release 3.45.1 (#815)
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2026-07-16 11:44:00 +00:00
Paul Nothaft b416baec5c Merge pull request #812 from PicPeak/fix/security-advisories-backend-stable
fix(security): close 4 open security advisories on stable (backup takeover, share-login bypass, ZIP slip, chunked-upload traversal)
2026-07-16 13:37:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 38ddd70c12 Merge pull request #809 from PicPeak/fix/docker-image-os-cves-stable
chore(security): close 21 frontend image CVEs on stable — nginx 1.30 base + apk cache-bust
2026-07-16 13:37:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b00a16159e fix(security): harden .picpeak restore operator-preservation (GHSA-qxfx follow-up)
The req.admin.id fix activated reinjectCurrentAdmin(); hardening its preservation
logic (found across Codex review rounds of #811):

- MFA hijack: reinject wrote back only password_hash/is_active/
  must_change_password, leaving a crafted backup's two_factor_* on the
  operator's row — it could strip or replace their second factor. The email-
  matched row is now updated with the operator's full AUTH set (login identity,
  password, and all two_factor_* columns). Relationship/audit FKs (role_id,
  created_by) are deliberately NOT forced from the snapshot: on a cross-instance
  restore those pre-restore ids may be absent from the backup and would dangle
  the FK (SQLite rolls back at commit); the restored row keeps its own valid
  values.

- Cross-instance restore rollback / FK safety: reinject matched only by email,
  so a backup shipping a different admin with the default `admin` username hit
  UNIQUE(username) and rolled the whole restore back; email and username could
  even collide on two different rows. Reconciliation is now non-destructive:
  the email-matching row is updated in place (id preserved → restored FKs like
  events.created_by stay valid); any different row holding the operator's
  username is RENAMED, not deleted (deletion would fire ON DELETE actions /
  dangle references); only when no row has the operator's email is a fresh row
  inserted, with created_by nulled and an explicit max(id)+1 id (batchInsert
  left the Postgres identity sequence unadvanced, so a sequence-based insert
  could collide).

- Stale session after restore: admin_users ids shift on restore, but the
  operator's live JWT is bound only to decoded.id (IP logged not enforced; the
  backup controls password_changed_at). The route now revokes the token (result
  checked and logged) and clears the admin cookie; the client redirects to a
  fresh login via a sessionInvalidated flag. Cookie clear is the unconditional
  guarantee.

Adds SQLite-backed reinject regression tests (in-place login/MFA restore with id
and FK columns preserved, username-only rename, email+username on different rows,
clean insert with created_by nulled) and the frontend redirect on
sessionInvalidated.

Deferred (design decisions / pre-existing, need a Postgres test env — see PR
discussion): global "invalidate all pre-restore sessions" cutoff; preserving the
operator's ROLE semantics across an RBAC-table replace; and resyncing Postgres
identity sequences after any restore (batchInsert leaves them behind max(id) —
pre-existing, affects every restored table).
2026-07-16 12:31:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft dcfcb67f9b fix(security): sanitize chunked-upload filename (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j)
The chunked video upload stored req.body.filename unmodified and later built
the merged path as path.join(tempDir, uploadMeta.filename). path.join does not
neutralise '../', so a filename like '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the
temp dir on merge and overwrote arbitrary files. Requires admin with
photos.upload.

Fix: path.basename() the client filename in initializeUpload() and reject
names that collapse to nothing. Adds a regression test.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cde0b465a9 fix(security): reject ZIP-slip entries in archive/backup restore (GHSA-jfhw-fj23-fx6x)
node-stream-zip's extract(null, root) writes each entry to path.join(root,
entry.name) without neutralising '../', so a crafted archive entry named
'../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the target dir and overwrote arbitrary
files (logos, .env, route files → RCE on source deploys). Requires admin with
archives.restore.

Adds assertZipEntriesWithin() to utils/safePath.js — a lexical containment
check run on the entry list BEFORE extract() — and guards both extract sinks:
adminArchives.js (the reported route) and picpeakImportService.js (the sibling
.picpeak import, same sink). Adds unit tests for traversal, absolute-path, and
sibling-prefix entries.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 28f69e4bf3 fix(security): share-login must not bypass gallery password (GHSA-9hmx-68vc-qpqw)
POST /auth/gallery/share-login validated only the 128-bit share token and then
minted a full type:'gallery' access token regardless of require_password —
computing requiresPassword at the end only to echo it, never enforce it. Anyone
holding a gallery's share link could read and download every photo in a
password-protected gallery via a direct API call, no password needed.

Fix: compute requiresPassword before minting; for a password-protected gallery
return { requires_password: true } with NO token and NO cookie. The client then
goes through /gallery/verify, which does bcrypt.compare the password. The public
(no-password) auto-login path is unchanged. The frontend already falls through
to the password prompt when share-login returns no token/event.

Adds route regression test covering the bypass, the public path, and bad tokens.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1cf82d81a7 fix(security): preserve current admin on .picpeak restore (GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f)
adminAuth populates req.admin, not req.user, so currentAdminId was always
undefined in the /api/admin/picpeak/import handler. reinjectCurrentAdmin()
then had no account to preserve and the admin_users table was fully replaced
by the uploaded backup — a crafted .picpeak let any admin with backup.restore
take over every admin account (critical). One-line fix: pass req.admin.id.

Closes GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f and its duplicate GHSA-pjp6-jcrj-3cr5.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ae98e7ad74 chore(security): close 21 frontend image CVEs — nginx 1.30 base + apk cache-bust
The frontend image kept shipping vulnerable OS packages (nginx 1.28.3-r1,
curl/libcurl 8.19.0, c-ares 1.34.6) despite the apk upgrade line, for two
independent reasons:

1. The runtime stage's apk upgrade layer was cached indefinitely — the
   CACHEBUST build-arg CI passes (github.run_number) was only declared in
   the builder stage, and ARGs don't cross stage boundaries. Both
   Dockerfiles now redeclare CACHEBUST in the runtime stage and consume it
   in the apk RUN, so every build re-runs the upgrade and picks up current
   Alpine security updates.

2. nginx itself can never upgrade via apk on the nginx.org-based image:
   the bundled nginx-module-* packages pin the exact nginx version, so
   Alpine's patched 1.28.3-r4 is unreachable (verified empirically —
   apk add --upgrade nginx is a silent no-op). nginx fixes must come via
   the base tag, so bump to nginx:1.30-alpine (current stable, 1.30.4 on
   Alpine 3.24, same nginx.org conf.d layout — drop-in).

Verified: local image build scans clean with Trivy (0 OS findings, was 21);
container serves /health, SPA fallback, and BRAND_TITLE envsubst as non-root
nginx user.

Closes code-scanning alerts 371-374, 376-392 (nginx HTTP/2 & module CVEs,
curl CVE-2026-5773/-6276 + 6 medium, c-ares CVE-2026-33630).
2026-07-16 10:30:42 +02:00
Paul Nothaft caa9fe5d56 chore(stable): release 3.45.0 (#777)
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2026-07-09 11:22:46 +00:00
Paul Nothaft c6e61f64ba Merge pull request #775 from PicPeak/ci/release-please-target-stable-on-stable
ci(release): cut the real v3.45.0 stable (target-branch: stable)
2026-07-09 13:13:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3ec0451cbb ci(release): pin target-branch: stable so release-please cuts the real v3.45.0
Triggers the correct stable release from the stable branch (manifest
3.44.0 -> 3.45.0). Same fix as #774 (which fixes it on main for future
promotes); merging this to stable is what re-runs release-please
correctly for the promote that mis-fired as v2.7.0.
2026-07-09 11:40:44 +02:00
Paul Nothaft edac463ec3 Merge pull request #771 from PicPeak/release/3.83.0-merge-from-beta
chore(release): promote beta → stable (v3.83.0 line)
2026-07-08 20:42:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2d3537f61c ci: run the Tests workflow on stable-targeted PRs (unblock this promote)
Same one-liner as #772 — adds stable to tests.yml push/pull_request
filters so the required backend/frontend checks report on this PR
instead of hanging on 'Expected — Waiting for status to be reported'.
2026-07-08 20:29:41 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6025b3194d chore(release): align README/DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE with main (promote content) 2026-07-08 20:01:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8713ab7f60 chore(release): keep stable manifest (3.44.0) + CHANGELOG for release-please-stable 2026-07-08 20:00:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8994901e4a chore(release): promote beta → stable (v3.83.0 line)
Merge main (v3.83.0-beta.0) into stable to cut the next stable release.
Conflicts resolved toward main (the promoted code); stable release-control
files (manifest, CHANGELOG) restored separately.
2026-07-08 19:59:55 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c29ad747f2 chore(main): release 3.83.0-beta.0 (#770)
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2026-07-08 10:42:24 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a71b9b5ed7 Merge pull request #769 from Luca-Timo/feat/messages-email-client
feat(messages): unified Messages email client (flag-gated, default off)
2026-07-08 12:38:58 +02:00
Luca 1e08a4fb15 fix(messages): PR #769 nits — server-side search, bare-email recipient, DE i18n
- Search now hits the backend (debounced) so results aren't truncated to the
  first loaded page: /received gains a `q` filter (sender/subject); the frontend
  passes the debounced term to every list query. The instant client-side filter
  stays for responsiveness.
- Reply/compose recipient extracts the bare address from a "Name <addr>" From
  header (extractEmail) — also used for the customer-lookup key.
- Added the full de + en `messages.*` and `email.customerMailbox.*` translation
  namespaces (were English inline-fallbacks only). Swiss-German spelling.
2026-07-07 18:39:04 +02:00
Luca bb235e72e5 fix(messages): PR #769 review — escape reply sender (XSS), gate backend routes, exact customer match
- BLOCKER: stored XSS via inbound sender display name. The reply stub built raw
  HTML with the unsanitized From name and set it as innerHTML on the composer's
  contentEditable (admin origin) → onerror JS ran on Reply. Now HTML-escape
  from_address in the stub AND DOMPurify-sanitize the composer body before
  innerHTML (defense in depth).
- Gate the NEW Messages routes with requireFeatureFlag('messaging') per-route
  (queue/:id, received/:id, item/*, identities, accounts, accounts/test, send)
  — NOT the shared /email mount, so the pre-existing email-config endpoints stay
  ungated.
- DocumentActionModal auto-picks a customer only on an EXACT email match
  (customer search is prefix/fuzzy), else leaves the picker to the admin.
2026-07-07 18:28:26 +02:00
Luca 99d5996561 feat(messages): search bar + Archive/Delete with Archived & Deleted folders
- Search box in the header filters the current folder's list (sender/subject),
  client-side; works across the merged Archived/Deleted views too.
- Archive and Delete are now implemented as soft moves: migration 157 adds
  mailbox_state ('active'|'archived'|'deleted') to email_queue + received_emails.
  Archive → 'archived', Delete → 'deleted' (trash). Restore → 'active'. Deleting
  FROM the Deleted folder is permanent (hard row delete).
- New cross-account system folders Archived + Deleted (merge sent + received of
  that state, sorted by date). Normal folders now exclude archived/deleted.
- Backend: /queue + /received gain a `state` filter (default active + legacy
  NULL); new POST /item/:kind/:id/state (archive/delete/restore) and DELETE
  /item/:kind/:id (purge, email.edit).
- Toolbar Archive/Delete wired; Restore + "Delete permanently" shown in the
  system folders.

Frontend build + migration boot (157) verified.
2026-07-07 16:16:51 +02:00
Luca c8cb4c88ca harden(messages): SSRF guard on mailbox host, strict sandbox + sanitizer, per-account TLS
Pre-upstream review hardening:
- /accounts + /accounts/test now reject private/internal IMAP/SMTP hosts via
  isPrivateIP(), matching /config + /incoming-config (SSRF).
- QueueDetail body iframe uses sandbox="" (script-less, no same-origin) like the
  inbound pane, instead of allow-same-origin.
- /send sanitizer drops the <style> tag + data: scheme to match the stricter
  inbound sanitizeBody allowlist.
- Per-account SMTP transport sets tls.rejectUnauthorized explicitly.
2026-07-07 16:04:11 +02:00
Luca 2c5c1d561b fix(messages): show the resolved customer's name in the doc-action modal
CustomerPicker uses its 'label' prop as the selected-customer chip text, so
passing the static 'Customer' string hid the actual name. Pass the resolved
customer's name as label and add a separate field heading.
2026-07-07 15:45:59 +02:00
Luca 0dbf863f60 feat(messages): create/select quote, contract, invoice, gallery from a message
The toolbar doc buttons now open a real document-action flow instead of just
loading an email template:

- DocumentActionModal resolves the customer from the message's sender address
  (customers/search); if no match, the CustomerPicker lets you search or create
  a passive customer inline.
- Create new -> jumps to the real editor prefilled with the customer
  (quotes/contracts/bills ?customerAccountId=), so numbering, line items and PDF
  all come from the existing CRM. Gallery opens the event editor.
- Select existing -> lists that customer's quotes/contracts/invoices and drops
  the chosen document number into a reply composer.
- Toolbar buttons are gated by the global feature flags (quotes/contracts/bills).

Adds the missing customerAccountId prefill to ContractEditorPage (quotes + bills
already had it). Frontend-only; reuses existing endpoints. Build verified.
2026-07-07 13:16:18 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 72cbb95b44 chore(main): release 3.82.6-beta.0 (#768)
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2026-07-07 10:35:31 +00:00
Luca c622a35033 Merge pull request #358 from Luca-Timo/feat/messages-email-client
fix(messages): show only the mailbox local part in the sidebar (full …
2026-07-07 12:33:18 +02:00
Luca 88fe9f9844 fix(messages): show only the mailbox local part in the sidebar (full address on hover) 2026-07-07 12:32:08 +02:00
Luca 9596342d6a Merge pull request #764 from Luca-Timo/fix/dunning-backfill-on-enable
fix(workflows): backfill existing invoices + anchor dunning grace to due date when enabled (#750)
2026-07-07 12:31:15 +02:00
Luca 7cc1c59661 Merge pull request #357 from Luca-Timo/feat/messages-email-client
fix(messages): dynamic addresses, branding accent, compose/sync, per-identity SMTP
2026-07-07 12:08:59 +02:00
Luca f9c2b4ed75 fix(messages): dynamic addresses, branding accent, compose/sync, per-identity SMTP
Addresses dev-test feedback:
- Sidebar + reading-pane addresses (rechnungen@ / hello@ / no-reply@) are now
  read from the mail config via GET /admin/email/identities, not hardcoded.
- Highlight/selection now uses the branding accent (bg-accent-soft /
  text-on-accent-soft / accent-dark) instead of hardcoded blue, so it follows
  the admin's CI colour like the sidebar.
- Header gains "New message" (compose) and "Sync" (poll mailboxes now) buttons.
- Composer modal enlarged (920px, taller editable body).
- Customer mailbox (hello@) now has BOTH incoming (IMAP) and outgoing (SMTP)
  settings — migration 156 adds smtp_* + from_* to mail_accounts;
  emailProcessor.sendRawEmail takes an accountKey and sends via that mailbox's
  SMTP identity (falls back to the global from). Manual/reply sends from the
  Messages UI use the 'customers' identity, so replies come from hello@.

Frontend build + migration boot (156) verified.
2026-07-07 11:58:41 +02:00
Luca 976d52280e Merge pull request #356 from Luca-Timo/feat/messages-email-client
Feat/messages email client
2026-07-07 11:11:21 +02:00
Luca 0ed3bbefa1 chore(messages): describe the feature as 'unified' rather than by a third-party product name 2026-07-07 11:10:00 +02:00
Luca b96ad36f5d fix(messages): make the Messaging feature flag toggleable
The Messaging FeatureCard was a hardcoded-disabled 'roadmap' placeholder
(no-op toggle), so the messaging flag could never be turned on — the Messages
sidebar item + page stayed hidden. Wire the toggle to setFlag, mark it 'new',
and describe the actual admin Messages client.
2026-07-07 11:06:16 +02:00
Luca d0bdcb1a6a Merge pull request #355 from Luca-Timo/feat/messages-email-client
feat(messages): Outlook-style Messages email client (3 phases, flag-gated)
2026-07-07 10:48:46 +02:00
Luca 768e84711f feat(messages): Phase 3 — editable-template composer, reply + create actions
The CRM action buttons and Reply now open a send-composer, not a silent
templated send.

- New send-composer (MessageComposer): loads the rendered template (via
  previewTemplate) or a reply stub into a fully-editable body — the admin can
  rewrite it or drop a note anywhere before sending. On send it goes out as-is
  (server-sanitized), no template re-render.
- Backend: emailProcessor.sendRawEmail() sends admin-edited HTML via the
  configured SMTP identity; POST /admin/email/send sanitizes + sends + records
  the message in email_queue as a 'manual' send.
- Migration 155: email_queue.origin ('system' default | 'manual'). The Sent
  stream now splits by origin — Automated ▸ Sent = system, Customers ▸ Sent =
  the human/edited messages (which finally populates that folder). /queue gains
  an origin filter + returns origin.
- Toolbar wired: Reply enabled on inbound customer mail (prefilled + quoted);
  Create Quote/Contract/Invoice open the composer with that template loaded;
  Gallery opens a blank compose. Accounting/Forward/Archive/Delete stay disabled
  (later phases). After send, jumps to Customers ▸ Sent.

Deferred to a later phase: two-way IMAP write-back; per-identity SMTP (manual
sends currently use the global from address). Frontend build + migration boot
verified.
2026-07-07 10:42:54 +02:00
Luca da3a77dac4 fix(workflows): scope dunning backfill to its own flow via targetWorkflowId
Address review on #764: backfillDunningRuns emitted invoice.sent without a
target, so enabling dunning would also enroll every historical open invoice
into any custom invoice.sent flow. Pass the enabled flow's id through to
emitWorkflowEvent so the backfill only touches dunning. Also note the
computeWakeAt both-fields (untilVar + delay) behaviour change in its comment.
2026-07-07 10:33:01 +02:00
Luca ee46cf2125 feat(messages): Phase 2 — customer (hello@) mailbox + inbound body capture
Second inbound mailbox and real message bodies for the Messages viewer.

Backend:
- Migration 154: mail_accounts table (additional inbound mailboxes beyond the
  primary accounting IMAP) + received_emails.{account_key,to_address,body_html,
  body_text}. Additive/guarded.
- emailIntakeService now polls the accounting mailbox AND every enabled
  mail_accounts row. Extracted pollAccountOnce(cfg, {accountKey, routeToExpenses});
  accounting keeps its exact attachment->expenses behavior, customer mail is
  logged with its body and NOT routed to accounting. Inbound HTML is sanitized
  server-side (sanitize-html) on ingest.
- adminEmail: /received gains an account filter + returns account_key/to_address
  (bodies excluded from the list); new GET /received/:id returns the body;
  GET/POST /accounts + /accounts/test manage the extra mailboxes.

Frontend:
- Customers inbox now pulls the hello@ mailbox; reading pane renders the
  sanitized body in a strict (script-less, no same-origin) sandboxed iframe.
  Accounting inbox shows bodies too. Toolbar context keys off the mailbox.
- CustomerMailboxCard in Settings -> Email (behind the messaging flag) to
  configure + test the hello@ IMAP box.

No behavior change to the existing accounting inbound flow. Frontend build +
migration boot verified.
2026-07-07 10:11:58 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c0ac5c36a4 chore(main): release 3.82.5-beta.0 (#767)
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2026-07-07 07:08:02 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 760a201b60 Merge pull request #766 from PicPeak/fix/date-input-invalid-crash
fix(admin): stop the event-date field crashing the page on backspace
2026-07-07 09:04:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 945026d446 fix(admin): stop the event-date field crashing the page on backspace
Repro: create an event, click into the date field, backspace a day digit.
The whole page white-screened and needed a reload.

Root cause: LocalizedDateInput's `toIso` only checked the day/month were
1-2 digits, not that they formed a real date — so a mid-backspace value
like "0/07/2026" was coerced to the string "2026-07-00" and committed to
`event_date`. CreateEventPage then rendered
`format(addDays(new Date('2026-07-00'), days))`, and date-fns `format`
throws RangeError on an Invalid Date — thrown during render, so React
tore the tree down to the error boundary.

Two complementary fixes:
- `toIso` round-trips the parsed y/m/d through `Date` and rejects
  impossible dates (day 00, month 13, 31 Feb…), so the field never
  commits a value that isn't a real calendar date.
- `useLocalizedDate.format`/`formatDistanceToNow` guard with `isValid`
  and return '' instead of throwing — defence in depth for the ~57 call
  sites that could otherwise white-screen on a bad date.

Verified live: backspacing to a partial/invalid date no longer crashes
(the form stays rendered), a valid date still commits + the expiry
preview renders. Adds a LocalizedDateInput regression test; tsc + build
green.
2026-07-07 08:56:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2522d7e1ce chore(main): release 3.82.4-beta.0 (#765)
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2026-07-07 05:13:53 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 0c2d319fc1 Merge pull request #763 from Luca-Timo/fix/email-language-and-payment-confirm
fix(email,ui): billing emails follow customer language + readable payment-check confirmation
2026-07-07 07:10:09 +02:00
Luca 26eeb76197 feat(messages): Phase 1 read-only Messages viewer (email client shell)
New admin "Messages" page — a three-pane mail viewer over the mail picpeak
already stores, feature-flagged behind `messaging` (default off):

- Sidebar account tree: All mail / Customers (hello@) / Accounting (rechnungen@)
  / Automated (no-reply@), matching the agreed IA.
- Automated + All Sent = email_queue (listQueue); Accounting + All Inbox =
  received_emails (listReceived). Customers folders show an explanatory empty
  state pending the hello@ mailbox (Phase 2).
- Reading pane renders the sent body from rendered_html (migration 119) in a
  sandboxed iframe; new GET /admin/email/queue/:id returns body + cc +
  attachment filenames (disk paths never exposed).
- Received supplier invoices: envelope + rasterized PDF viewer reusing the
  accounting inbound blob endpoint, plus "Open in Accounting inbox".
- Context toolbar (Reply/Forward/Create Quote-Contract-Gallery-Invoice /
  Book-as-expense-Re-bill) present but disabled — wired in later phases.

Reuses email.service, accounting inbound blob endpoint, RequireFeature +
PermissionGate (email.view), Tailwind dark: theming. No schema change.
2026-07-07 03:15:41 +02:00
Luca c0008be39b fix(email): sibling billing emails follow customer language too
Addresses the PR #763 review: the invoice_sent / storno_issued / payment-check
/ paid-admin-notification emails share the identical event-first language bug
and never set __language, so a German customer on an English-gallery event got
an English email body with German-formatted amounts.

Each call site already computes the locale it formats amounts in, so this is a
one-liner per call — the body language now matches the amount formatting:
- invoice_sent, storno_issued (sending.js) -> __language: ctx.locale
- payment-check, invoice_paid_admin_notification (payments.js) -> __language: locale

Leak-safe (no template references {{__language}}) and falls back to the
existing event-first resolution when unset, per the mechanism added in #763.
2026-07-06 22:10:18 +02:00
Luca 2c7b351458 fix(workflows): backfill existing invoices + anchor grace to due date when dunning is enabled (#750)
Enabling the invoice-dunning built-in suppressed the legacy reminder ladder
but only created runs for invoices sent AFTER enabling — already-sent unpaid
invoices got dunned by neither. Now:

- Turning dunning ON enrolls every open sent/overdue unpaid invoice via
  emitWorkflowEvent('invoice.sent') (engine.backfillDunningRuns(), wired into
  the workflow enable toggle). Idempotent via the per-(flow,entity) dedup.
- The grace wait is anchored to the invoice's due date: computeWakeAt now
  treats { untilVar, delayDays } as "var + offset" (was var-only OR now+offset),
  and the built-in's waitGrace becomes { untilVar: 'dueDate', delayDays:
  firstDays } (seed v6 -> v7). An already-overdue invoice duns on its real
  timeline instead of restarting a fresh grace clock.

Note: the due-date-anchored graph applies to freshly seeded built-ins; an
already-admin-enabled dunning workflow still enrolls via backfill but keeps its
current grace timing until re-seeded.
2026-07-06 21:57:23 +02:00
Luca ea86871b81 Merge pull request #354 from Luca-Timo/fix/email-language-and-payment-confirm
fix(email,ui): billing emails follow customer language + readable pay…
2026-07-06 19:33:47 +02:00
Luca fcc3e9195d fix(email,ui): billing emails follow customer language + readable payment-check confirmation
- Billing/dunning emails no longer render in the gallery event's language.
  emailProcessor now honors an explicit `__language` in the email data
  (else falls back to the event-first recipient resolution), and the invoice
  reminder passes the customer/invoice locale (customer.preferred_language
  || invoice.language || 'de'). Fixes German customers getting English
  dunning notices. (#760)
- Payment-check confirmation card ("Action recorded") is now theme-adaptive
  (green tint + readable text on both light and dark surfaces) instead of a
  hardcoded light-green mix + dark-green title that vanished in dark mode. (#759)
- The per-customer "Preferred language" field already exists
  (CustomerDetailPage) plus the business-profile default; updated the helper
  text to note billing emails now honor it too. (#761)
2026-07-06 19:27:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a52317d8a5 chore(main): release 3.82.3-beta.0 (#758)
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2026-07-06 09:53:29 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a88da99c8d Merge pull request #757 from PicPeak/fix/hero-logo-global-inherit-756
fix(branding): make 'Show logo in hero' a true global toggle with per-event override (#756)
2026-07-06 11:50:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 60b03b1728 fix(branding): unify hero logo SIZE the same way as visibility (#756)
Follow-on to the visibility fix in this PR — hero_logo_size had the same
split-brain: GalleryLayout read the global branding_logo_size live while
the hero-header path used the per-event snapshot, so a hero logo could
render at different sizes on different layouts and the global size didn't
reach hero-header galleries.

Now mirrored on the visibility model: NULL per-event hero_logo_size =
inherit branding_logo_size; explicit = override.

- Migration 153: hero_logo_size nullable + backfill NULL so existing
  galleries inherit the global size (restores GalleryLayout's prior
  live-global behaviour and fixes the hero-header staleness).
- Creation stores NULL unless explicit; gallery.js resolves
  per-event ?? global and sends the effective size.
- GalleryLayout now consumes that resolved size for the hero logo (new
  heroLogoSize prop) instead of the global — both render paths match.
- Admin size control gains a 'Use branding default' (inherit) option.

Verified: migration on SQLite + PG; live resolution (inherit follows
global both ways, override wins); creation stores NULL on PG; tsc clean,
106 adminEvents+gallery tests pass, build green.
2026-07-06 11:44:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 96fe478bf8 fix(branding): make 'Show logo in hero' a true global toggle with per-event override (#756)
Before: the global branding_logo_display_hero toggle was only a
creation-time default — snapshotted into each event's hero_logo_visible
column at creation and never consulted again. Disabling it did nothing
to existing galleries (the reporter's bug), and the two gallery render
paths disagreed (GalleryLayout read the global, HeroHeader read the
per-event snapshot).

Now: NULL per-event hero_logo_visible = 'inherit the global toggle';
an explicit true/false is a per-gallery override.

- Migration 152: make events.hero_logo_visible nullable and NULL out the
  defaulted  rows so existing galleries follow the global going
  forward. Deliberate per-gallery hides () are preserved.
- Creation stores NULL unless the admin explicitly sets it; the update
  path preserves NULL.
- gallery.js resolves per-event ?? global (branding_logo_display_hero,
  default true) and sends the EFFECTIVE value on both gallery responses.
- Both frontend render paths now consume that resolved value
  (GalleryLayout gets it via a new heroLogoVisible prop).
- Admin per-event control is now tri-state: Use branding default /
  Always show / Always hide (en + de).

Verified: SQLite migration + live resolution (inherit follows global
both ways; override wins both ways); PG migration SQL dry-run; the admin
tri-state renders 'Use branding default' for an inherited event; tsc
clean, 106 adminEvents+gallery tests pass, build green.
2026-07-06 11:20:36 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 43213b50ce chore(main): release 3.82.2-beta.0 (#755)
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2026-07-05 21:43:21 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a87ad77d8d Merge pull request #754 from PicPeak/fix/og-shorturl-slideshow-viber-699
fix(og): route branded short URLs + slideshow to OG handler, add Viber (#699)
2026-07-05 23:39:59 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a0a28a4777 fix(og): broaden social-crawler coverage (Bluesky Cardyb, WeChat-scraper, fediverse, etc.)
From alexvaltchev's field UA list on #699. Adds CRAWLER-EXCLUSIVE tokens
to both the nginx UA regex and SOCIAL_CRAWLER_PATTERNS (kept in sync):
Cardyb (Bluesky's actual link-card fetcher), facebookcatalog, Signal,
Misskey, Pleroma, Synapse, Nextcloud, Rocket.Chat, kakaotalk-scrap,
Google-PageRenderer, OdklBot, ZoomBot.

Deliberately NOT added: UAs shared with real human in-app browsers
(WeChat MicroMessenger, LINE 'Line/', Zalo) and broad strings
('InAppBrowser', 'preview', 'unfurl', 'XING' → matches 'boxing'). Our OG
response is meta-only with no redirect, so matching those would serve a
human the bare stub. New negative test locks that exclusion in.

Verified: nginx -t passes; live harness confirms the new tokens rewrite
to /og while the in-app-browser UAs still get the SPA. Backend suite 15/15.
2026-07-05 23:37:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0dffe0ce92 fix(og): route branded short URLs + slideshow links to OG, add Viber (#699)
Follow-up to #699/#700/#702 — the OG SSR handler existed but three link
shapes never reached it behind the frontend nginx:

- Branded short URLs (/s/<slug>, #702) had NO nginx location, so they fell
  through to the SPA — which has no /s/ route. Dead for humans (no 302
  redirect) and crawlers (no OG). Add an ^~ /s/ proxy to the backend, whose
  /s/:shortSlug route already handles both.
- Slideshow links (/gallery/<slug>/show/<token>) have TWO extra path
  segments; the crawler-detect location regex allowed only one, so they
  never rewrote to /og and got generic site-wide OG. Widen to {0,2} extra
  segments (quoted regex — the braces would otherwise be parsed as nginx
  config delimiters). client-access still matches (its token is in ?query,
  one path segment).
- Viber's preview fetcher wasn't in either UA list, so Viber shares showed
  no preview. Add it to nginx + SOCIAL_CRAWLER_PATTERNS (kept in sync).

Verified end-to-end: nginx -t passes; a live nginx+mock-backend harness
confirms /s/ proxies to the backend, slideshow + Viber + share-token +
client-access crawler UAs all rewrite to /og/gallery/<slug>, and browsers
still get the SPA. Backend isSocialCrawler test extended for Viber.
2026-07-05 21:19:53 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f15e104702 chore(main): release 3.82.1-beta.0 (#753)
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2026-07-05 17:27:41 +00:00
Luca 9a763337b6 Merge pull request #752 from Luca-Timo/fix/dunning-payment-check-template-key
fix(invoices): correct payment-check email template key so dunning email sends
2026-07-05 19:24:37 +02:00
Luca 3682de195b fix(invoices): correct payment-check email template key so dunning email sends
queuePaymentCheckEmail queued the admin payment-check email with template
key 'invoice_payment_check_admin', but no such template exists — the only
one is 'invoice_payment_check' (crmEmailTemplates.js:217, seeded by
migration 116), which IS the admin "Paid / Partial / Not paid" email. The
processor does an exact template_key lookup and throws "template not
found", so every dunning admin payment-check email failed, retried to the
cap, and got stuck pending.

One-word fix: queue 'invoice_payment_check'. Unbreaks the built-in
invoice-dunning flow's email step. (Rebased onto the post-decompose
invoiceService refactor — the line now lives in invoice/payments.js.)
2026-07-04 23:51:22 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c3ed7f1693 chore(main): release 3.82.0-beta.0 (#742)
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2026-07-03 11:10:31 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a5f49e3235 Merge pull request #741 from PicPeak/feat/setup-final-step-and-button-fix
feat(setup): final community step (#732) + fix create-admin button overflow (#730)
2026-07-03 13:07:21 +02:00
Paul Nothaft dadaaeea77 feat(setup): final community/thank-you step (#732); fix create-admin button overflow (#730)
#730 — the account step's Create-admin button shared a flex row with Back;
its label + loading spinner exceeded the card width, so the button
overflowed the card outline while submitting (and was fragile for longer
i18n labels). Stack both buttons full-width — the primary always has room
for the spinner now, matching every other wizard step.

#732 — add a final 'community' step, shown once on first-run after
config / no-config, before entering the app. Mission line + four link
cards (report a bug, request a feature, star/share, Buy Me a Coffee),
all target=_blank rel=noopener, and a Finish → Dashboard button. Fully
i18n (en + de). Restore keeps its reload flow (a restored instance is no
longer first-run, so it never reaches this step). Adds .github/FUNDING.yml
so GitHub renders a Sponsor button too.

Verified live: drove the real first-run wizard end to end — stacked
account buttons render inside the card, community step shows the mission
+ all four links, Finish lands on the dashboard.
2026-07-03 12:29:58 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c76877c0c4 chore(main): release 3.81.0-beta.0 (#740)
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2026-07-03 10:08:29 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e985c6bacd Merge pull request #733 from PicPeak/refactor/codebase-cleanup
refactor: codebase-wide cleanup — dead code, dedup, standardization, god-file decomposition
2026-07-03 12:05:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f564b38c5a Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into refactor/codebase-cleanup
# Conflicts:
#	backend/src/routes/adminEvents.js
#	backend/src/routes/protectedImages.js
#	frontend/src/pages/admin/EventDetailsPage.tsx
2026-07-03 11:54:01 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cf073615ef Merge pull request #739 from PicPeak/feat/admin-mfa
feat: admin two-factor authentication (TOTP) with recovery codes + CLI reset
2026-07-03 11:49:07 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b732974779 Merge pull request #737 from PicPeak/fix/auth-access-control
fix(security): cross-event thumbnail leak, bulk-op ownership bypass + auth hardening
2026-07-03 11:47:25 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b187f588b4 Merge pull request #734 from PicPeak/fix/event-create-nan-and-bool-render
fix: event creation 500s on PostgreSQL (NaN slideshow seed) + stray "0" boolean renders
2026-07-03 11:46:58 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 96e3c68b9d feat(admin-ui): TOTP MFA enrollment + two-step login; remove stub 2FA toggle
Frontend for #738.
- mfa.service.ts + MfaSettingsCard (Settings → General → Admin Account):
  per-user setup (QR + manual secret + verify), recovery codes shown once
  (copy/download/confirm), status, regenerate, disable. Renders for
  super_admin (closes #735).
- Two-step login in AdminLoginPage: on {mfaRequired,mfaToken} swap to a
  code step (TOTP or recovery), call /auth/admin/login/mfa; handle
  MFA_INVALID / MFA_SESSION_EXPIRED / 423 lockout.
- Removed the non-functional global enable_2fa checkbox from SecurityTab
  (and its persistence) — replaced with a note pointing to per-user setup.
- en + de i18n.

Verified live in-browser: enroll (QR→code→recovery codes), logout, and
the two-step challenge into the dashboard as super_admin.
2026-07-03 11:44:07 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cdbfb514bd test(auth): MFA unit + route + CLI coverage (39 tests)
mfaService unit (encrypt/decrypt, TOTP, single-use recovery, isEnrolled),
adminMfa HTTP (enroll/challenge/verify/recovery/disable; super_admin
enrollment guards #735), and reset-admin-mfa.js CLI.
2026-07-03 11:37:51 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 72e2ef6721 feat(auth): admin TOTP MFA — enrollment, login challenge, recovery, CLI reset
Backend for #738. Real TOTP 2FA for admin accounts, all roles incl.
super_admin (closes #735).

- mfaService: otplib TOTP; AES-256-GCM encryption of the secret at rest
  (key derived from MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY or JWT_SECRET); bcrypt-hashed,
  single-use recovery codes; otpauth URI + QR.
- Migration 151: adds two_factor_recovery_codes + two_factor_enrolled_at
  (secret/enabled columns already existed from legacy 016).
- Enrollment endpoints (behind adminAuth, per-user): GET /mfa/status,
  POST /mfa/{setup,enable,disable,recovery-codes}. Disable/regenerate
  require a current code so a hijacked session can't strip 2FA.
- Login challenge: /admin/login returns {mfaRequired, mfaToken} (no
  session) when 2FA is on; /admin/login/mfa exchanges a TOTP or recovery
  code for the session. Lockout counter is NOT reset until the second
  factor passes, so MFA brute-force is rate-limited too.
- CLI break-glass: scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --email <e> | --all --yes,
  audit-logged, matches reset-admin-password.js convention.
- Docs + optional MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY env.

Verified end-to-end on a live backend: enroll (super_admin), challenge,
TOTP + single-use recovery login, disable, and CLI reset.
2026-07-03 11:33:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 081f3edcdf fix(security): close cross-event thumbnail leak, bulk-op ownership bypass, + hardening
Auth/access-control audit fixes (all pre-existing on main; none are
regressions). Verified end-to-end where noted.

HIGH
- Thumbnail enumeration: photoAuth granted any gallery token access to any
  flat /thumbnails/thumb_* file, so a visitor to one gallery could
  enumerate another (password-protected) gallery's entire thumbnail set.
  Scope thumbnail access to the token's event via photos.thumbnail_path.
  Live-verified: cross-event fetch now 404s, own-event still 200s.
- Bulk ownership bypass: bulk-archive/bulk-delete acted on body-supplied
  event ids with no owner filter (single-event routes enforce
  requireEventOwnership), letting admin/editor archive or cascade-delete
  any event. Add filterOwnedEventIds; also guard rename + import-external;
  tighten photo-retry to scope admin (not just editor). Fix misleading
  bulk-delete comment.

MED
- verifyGalleryAccess never checked decoded.type — assert 'gallery'
  instead of relying on other token types incidentally lacking eventId.
- secure-images generate-token/secure-download missing denySlideshowToken
  (#646 bypass): a leaked slideshow token could download originals.
- Frontend: AuthenticatedImage + api.ts attached the gallery bearer token
  to absolute/external URLs — only attach to relative same-app paths.

LOW hardening
- Pin algorithms:['HS256'] on all auth-boundary jwt.verify calls.
- crypto.timingSafeEqual for share-token + HMAC compares (utils/timingSafe).
- Remove dead photoAuth import in galleryFeedback.

Tests: new regression suites for thumbnail scoping + filterOwnedEventIds;
fixed verifyGalleryAccess.customerRevoke fixture (real customer tokens
carry type:'gallery'). Full backend suite at the pre-existing baseline
(5 suites/27 tests fail on main too), zero new failures.
2026-07-03 10:27:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5b26dbd935 chore(main): release 3.80.0-beta.0 (#736)
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2026-07-03 08:05:34 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e513e8345b Merge pull request #731 from Luca-Timo/feat/setup-wizard-and-backup-roundtrip
feat: first-run setup wizard (feature selection + config) and portable .picpeak backup roundtrip
2026-07-03 10:03:22 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 766351b588 fix: mirror #734 onto decomposed files (PG NaN slideshow seed, SQLite bool renders)
Same two pre-existing-on-main bugs, at their post-decomposition
locations: clampIntOrUndefined in adminEvents/crud.js slideshow seed;
!! coercion in EventDetailsHeader, EventInformationCard,
ClientAccessCard. Keeps this branch correct in either merge order with
#734 — when merging main afterwards, resolve the adminEvents.js
modify/delete conflict by keeping the deletion.
2026-07-03 09:01:01 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 760c3d7b67 fix(admin): stray literal "0" rendered from SQLite integer booleans
On SQLite deployments boolean event columns come back as 0/1, and
{event.is_draft && ...} renders the 0 as a literal text node. Visible on
the event details page in three spots: above the tab bar (is_draft),
in the download-protection badge row (disable_right_click /
enable_devtools_protection / watermark_downloads), and in the Client
Access card (client_access_enabled). Coerce with !! at the render sites.
2026-07-03 08:57:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8c86518aad fix(events): NaN from slideshow seed breaks event creation on PostgreSQL
The create route seeds show_interval_ms/show_transition_ms from
app_settings through an inline guard that pre-checked Number.isFinite(+v)
but then used parseInt(v). The two disagree for null/''/true — +null is 0
(finite) while parseInt(null) is NaN — so when the slideshow settings rows
are absent (getAppSetting returns its null default), NaN flowed through
Math.min/Math.max into the INSERT. PostgreSQL rejects NaN for integer
columns; SQLite silently stores NULL, which is why every SQLite-based
test passed while POST /api/admin/events 500'd on the PG dev stack and
broke the e2e smoke suite.

Fix: parse first, then check — clampIntOrUndefined in utils/numericHelpers
(unit-tested against every failure-mode input). Verified end-to-end: the
previously-failing minimal create now succeeds against the PG dev stack.
2026-07-03 08:57:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2ea26a4962 fix: conform moved code to eslint indent/quotes, 4-arg mutation callbacks
- eslint --fix on branch-changed backend files (indent shift from the
  module-wrapper nesting in decomposed files); backend lint now 904
  errors vs 1,315 on main
- useMutationWithToast forwards all four TanStack v5 callback args
  (tsc -b strict build flagged the 3-arg passthrough)
2026-07-03 08:17:14 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b5eafc52bd refactor(frontend): decompose EventDetailsPage and ThemeCustomizerEnhanced
Move-code split, entry paths/exports unchanged:
- EventDetailsPage.tsx (2,697 -> 679) + pages/admin/event-details/* (16 files)
- ThemeCustomizerEnhanced.tsx (1,541 -> 349) + admin/theme-customizer/* (11)
Known ephemeral-UI delta: widget-local state (copied-link flags, unsaved
PIN input, modal selection) now resets when a tab unmounts.
2026-07-03 08:10:25 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fdf62dafef refactor(backend): decompose invoiceService, contractService, adminEvents
Move-code split, public entry points unchanged:
- services/invoiceService.js (3,623 -> 99) + services/invoice/* (10 modules)
- services/contractService.js (2,363 -> 83) + services/contract/* (6 modules)
- routes/adminEvents.js -> routes/adminEvents/* (crud, slideshow, resets,
  archive/bulk, logo); route registration order verified identical
Lazy cross-service requires preserved to keep the module graph acyclic.
2026-07-03 08:10:25 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 51f827774a refactor(frontend): extract shared PhotoCard from gallery layouts
One card implementation (hover overlay, download/expand/select, likes,
identity flow, lazy render) replaces per-layout copies in Masonry,
Justified, Grid, Mosaic, Timeline (-1270/+395 in layouts). Carousel,
Premium, Story stay bespoke — different DOM/design by intent.
2026-07-03 07:49:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0f230f53fb refactor(frontend): useMutationWithToast + useModal hooks, migrate admin surfaces
- 92 mutations across 40 files moved to useMutationWithToast
  (success/error toast + invalidateKeys); complex flows left as-is
- 24 boolean modal flags moved to useModal
- Mutations without an original onError intentionally not migrated
  to avoid introducing new error toasts
2026-07-03 07:49:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6eb46d8c31 refactor(backend): standardize error responses, logging, pagination
- errorResponse(res, error, status, publicMessage) in routeHelpers,
  wired into 125 catch blocks across 10 route files; wire format
  ({ error: <string> }) unchanged byte-for-byte
- Replace remaining console.* with logger across src (178 sites);
  3 intentional console sites kept (install boot, unbound .catch ref)
- Adopt getPagination in 6 routes where semantics match exactly
2026-07-03 07:49:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d44ead41c5 test: add smoke tests for invoiceService, adminEvents routes, backupService
26 tests as a safety net ahead of decomposition — invoice create/list/
status transitions, adminEvents CRUD via Supertest+SQLite, backup config
parsing and manifest validation.
2026-07-03 07:49:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9d7b6f0e11 test: extend documentSequences mock for shared nextDocumentNumber 2026-07-03 07:27:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft eb71fcf209 refactor: remove dead files, dedupe formatBytes and document numbering helpers
- Delete unused adminEvents-enhanced.js, backupService.original.js,
  databaseBackup.example.js, s3Storage.example.js, ThemeCustomizer.tsx
- Extract shared formatBytes to utils/formatBytes.js (was copied 4x)
- Centralize formatNumberInTemplate + next-document-number logic in
  utils/documentSequences.js (was copied in invoice/quote/contract services)
2026-07-03 07:25:07 +02:00
Luca fa7665c5b1 fix(backup): address .picpeak review — table filter, superuser guard, tests
From the-luap's review:

- Import no longer trusts manifest.tables blindly. It now intersects the
  manifest's table list with the real data tables of THIS database
  (listDataTables(), which already excludes knex_migrations/_lock) and
  drops anything else. A crafted/corrupted .picpeak listing knex_migrations
  or a non-existent table can no longer wipe it; skipped tables are logged.
- The Postgres session_replication_role='replica' SET (needs superuser) is
  now wrapped: on a managed-PG non-superuser it fails BEFORE any rows are
  deleted (transaction rolls back) and surfaces a clear, actionable 400
  instead of a cryptic permission error.
- Export: on an archiver error, the temp out dir (a partial plaintext-secret
  archive) is now removed instead of orphaned.

Tests (+4, now 26): engine-mismatch rejection, forward-only newer-refused,
non-picpeak rejection, and files/ restored + filesRestored asserted.
2026-07-03 01:39:13 +02:00
Luca 07b450a954 feat(setup): per-feature config step after feature selection
When the chosen features need config the wizard can collect, 'Finish' on
the usage step now advances to a lean config step instead of jumping to
the dashboard:
- Invoicing (if Invoices): company/legal name, address, VAT-ID or tax
  number, IBAN, currency → saved to business-profile + a default bank
  account. Carries the bank/VAT legal disclaimer.
- Email (if reminders/incoming-mail/whatsapp/invoices): SMTP host/port/
  user/pass/from → saved to email_configs.
Each section persists only if started, and 'Skip for now' is always
available — soft settings keep their seeded defaults. en + de strings.
2026-07-02 22:10:54 +02:00
Luca a95ee473ae feat(setup): add restore-from-backup branch to the first-run wizard
The usage step now offers 'Migrating from another PicPeak?' → a restore
step that uploads a .picpeak (reusing PicpeakRestoreCard) to clone another
instance onto this fresh one, preserving the account just created. en + de
strings added.
2026-07-02 21:57:50 +02:00
Luca 86324e7da7 feat(backup): fold .picpeak restore into the Restore wizard's Upload source
Removes the redundant standalone .picpeak card. The wizard's 'Upload
Backup' source now splits into two kinds: '.picpeak backup' (the working
portable restore — renders the upload + destructive-confirm flow inline)
and 'Manifest + files' (legacy, still 'Manifest Upload functionality
coming soon'). en + de strings added.
2026-07-02 21:38:48 +02:00
Luca d4b143f313 fix(setup): keep the first-run wizard light regardless of dark mode
The setup page background used var(--color-background), which flips to
#0a0a0a under the .dark class while the wizard card stays hardcoded light
— giving a dark page + light card mismatch in dark mode. Pin the first-run
screen to its intended light branded look (fixed #fafafa bg / #171717 text)
so all three steps render consistently.
2026-07-02 21:29:47 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b04ef216f5 chore(main): release 3.79.1-beta.0 (#729)
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2026-07-02 19:03:05 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 4aa6583bae Merge pull request #728 from Luca-Timo/fix/settings-duplicate-mail-import
fix(settings): remove duplicate Mail import that crashes the dev server
2026-07-02 20:59:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c8610276c2 Merge pull request #727 from PicPeak/chore/security-nginx-npm-bumps
chore(security): bump frontend nginx to r4 (close 4 HTTP/2 & module CVEs)
2026-07-02 20:53:45 +02:00
Luca cc79b3d9ec refactor(backup): move .picpeak download to the Dashboard tab
Downloading a portable backup is a "make a backup" action, so it belongs
next to "Run Backup Now" on the Dashboard, not under Restore. Split the
combined card into PicpeakExportCard (Dashboard) and PicpeakRestoreCard
(Restore). The manifest stays bundled inside the .picpeak, so there is no
separate manifest-only download for the portable format.
2026-07-02 20:37:35 +02:00
Luca f57462f798 fix(backup): make .picpeak roundtrip work on Postgres
Two Postgres-only bugs found by a live docker-pg roundtrip (SQLite tests
passed because neither reproduces on SQLite):

- Export: knex `.stream()` pulls in the optional `pg-query-stream` module
  (not bundled) and throws on pg. Switched to a plain per-table `select`
  — works on both engines, no new dependency. Rows are DB metadata
  (blobs live under files/), so holding a table in memory is fine.
- Import: the pg driver returns json/jsonb columns as parsed JS values,
  so re-inserting a scalar like the string "PicPeak" sent it unquoted and
  pg rejected it ("invalid input syntax for type json"). Now introspects
  each table's json/jsonb columns and re-serialises those values before
  insert (pg only; SQLite stores json as TEXT and round-trips as-is).

Verified end-to-end on docker Postgres: export 85 tables, full-override
import, current account preserved, post-backup data removed.
2026-07-02 20:13:18 +02:00
Luca 66d61c87ca feat(backup): .picpeak download + upload-restore UI in Backup Manager
Adds a self-contained "Portable backup (.picpeak)" card to the Restore
tab, completing the GUI-only roundtrip:
- Download: optional "include original photos" toggle + a prominent
  plaintext-secrets warning, streams the file via a blob download.
- Restore: file picker → destructive confirmation modal ("replaces ALL
  data except your current account, cannot be undone") → multipart upload
  to /admin/backup/picpeak/import → success summary. If the backup uses
  external media, shows a banner to reconfigure the mount, with a docs link.
Kept separate from the legacy RestoreWizard (different format/flow). en+de
strings added; dark-mode variants throughout.
2026-07-02 19:45:16 +02:00
Luca 2b66f6d889 feat(backup): upload + restore endpoint for .picpeak
POST /admin/backup/picpeak/import — multipart upload of a .picpeak,
streamed to a temp file (after auth, so unauthenticated requests can't
push a large file to disk), then restored via picpeakImportService with
currentAdminId = the logged-in operator (preserved across the override).
Gated on backup.restore. Returns usesExternalMedia so the UI can prompt to
reconfigure the external-media mount. Temp upload is always unlinked.

Completes the backend half of the GUI-only roundtrip (export download +
import upload). Multipart is already allowed by the CSRF content-type guard.
2026-07-02 19:37:17 +02:00
Luca 2920d82186 feat(backup): .picpeak import/restore (full override, keeps current account)
Receiving half of the roundtrip. picpeakImportService.importFromPicpeak():
- Validates the manifest: rejects non-picpeak files, a newer format, an
  engine mismatch (pg↔pg / sqlite↔sqlite only), and a backup from a NEWER
  schema than this instance (forward-only). knex_migrations absence is
  tolerated (test harnesses).
- Snapshots the current logged-in admin, then wipes + reloads every table
  from the backup NDJSON in one transaction with FK enforcement suspended
  (pg: session_replication_role=replica reset before commit; sqlite:
  defer_foreign_keys). knex_migrations is never touched, so the target's
  schema/migration state is preserved.
- Re-injects the current account so the operator is never locked out; a
  backup admin colliding on email is overwritten with the current creds.
- Restores files/ into storage and detects external-media references so the
  caller can prompt to reconfigure the mount.

Roundtrip integration test proves: backup data restored, current account
survives a full override (different email → added), and the email-collision
case keeps the operator's password.
2026-07-02 19:35:48 +02:00
Luca 422dfe1cc8 feat(setup): add "How will you use PicPeak?" feature-selection step
After the admin account is created (and we're logged in), the wizard now
shows an opt-in feature step instead of jumping straight to the dashboard.
Grouped ticks (Client management / Accounting / Automation) map to the
existing feature flags; galleries/analytics/userManagement stay always-on
and are noted, not listed.

- Selection is saved via the existing authenticated PUT /admin/feature-flags,
  whose server-side applyDependencyRules resolves dependencies (e.g. Invoices
  pulls in Accounting) — the wizard only sends raw ticks.
- Labels/descriptions reuse settings.features.<key>.title/description so
  translations stay in sync (en + de verified for all 14 features).
- Saving is best-effort: on failure the admin still enters the app and can
  set features later in Settings.
- New en/de strings for the usage step.

Option A (lean wizard): this is the feature-selection foundation; per-feature
hard-required config steps + the restore-from-backup branch come next.
2026-07-02 19:31:10 +02:00
Luca 38b3aef63d feat(backup): .picpeak portable export (engine-neutral logical snapshot)
First half of the GUI-only backup roundtrip. Adds a self-describing
".picpeak" archive that can be downloaded from one instance and (later)
re-uploaded to another via the web UI only.

- picpeakExportService.createPicpeak(): dumps every table as NDJSON
  (tables introspected at runtime — no hardcoded list, won't rot), plus
  a manifest (format version, app version, DB engine, latest migration,
  per-table row counts + checksums, includePhotos, contains_secrets),
  plus files/ (business-docs + uploads always; original gallery photos
  only when includePhotos). NDJSON is engine-neutral so the target
  rebuilds schema via migrations then loads rows — enabling pg↔pg /
  sqlite↔sqlite and forward-only auto-migrate.
- GET /admin/backup/picpeak/export?includePhotos= streams the file and
  sets X-Picpeak-Contains-Secrets (the file holds plaintext SMTP pass,
  admin hashes, API keys — the UI must warn).
- Purely additive: no existing backup/restore path is touched.

Integration test proves the archive shape, knex-table exclusion, and
row-count/NDJSON consistency (85 tables on the seed schema).
2026-07-02 19:13:58 +02:00
Luca 5b535f8658 fix(settings): remove duplicate Mail import that broke the dev server
SettingsPage.tsx imported `Mail` from lucide-react twice — in the main
icon block (line 20) and again in a later import (line 58). The
@vitejs/plugin-react babel transform rejects the duplicate with
"Identifier 'Mail' has already been declared", so `npm run dev` crashed
when the module loaded. The production `vite build` (esbuild) silently
dedupes it, which is why CI/Docker builds passed and it went unnoticed.

The two imports overlap only on `Mail`; drop it from line 58, keeping
that line's six unique icons (Briefcase, Receipt, ScrollText, Landmark,
Smartphone, MonitorPlay). Verified: single Mail import remains, prod
build passes, and the vite dev transform of SettingsPage now returns 200
with no "already been declared" error.
2026-07-02 17:37:51 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 64e4925fbb chore(security): bump backend npm 10 -> 11 to patch bundled sigstore/tar
Closes Trivy alerts #375 (sigstore CVE-2026-48815), #321 (@sigstore/core),
#314 (tar) — npm@10 bundles the vulnerable sigstore 3.1.0; npm 11 ships the
patched 4.x. Safe because this npm is CLI-only in the final image: runtime
deps come from the builder stage's node_modules and the entrypoint runs node,
not npm, so the install-behaviour issues that motivated the 10.x pin never run
here. npm 11 requires Node >=22.9 — satisfied by node:22-alpine.
2026-07-02 17:16:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 12a9d963f5 chore(security): bump frontend nginx to r4 — close 4 HTTP/2 & module CVEs
Trivy flagged nginx 1.28.3-r1 in the frontend image (alerts #371-374):
- CVE-2026-42055 (HIGH) HTTP/2 heap overflow
- CVE-2026-49975 (HIGH) HTTP/2 DoS
- CVE-2026-9256  (HIGH) rewrite_module code exec / DoS
- CVE-2026-48142 (MED)  charset_module memory disclosure

All fixed in nginx 1.28.3-r4. The Dockerfile already ran 'apk upgrade
--no-cache', but the pushed image predated the fixed package and the layer
was cached on r1. Add an explicit nginx upgrade to force the layer to rebuild
against the current Alpine repos (which now carry r4).
2026-07-02 17:14:29 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 24c287d051 chore(main): release 3.79.0-beta.0 (#726)
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2026-07-02 15:12:45 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 681619f0a1 Merge pull request #718 from PicPeak/feat/setup-wizard-unattended
feat: setup wizard + argument-driven unattended install
2026-07-02 17:08:21 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d35c413651 feat(setup): step-by-step wizard + argument-driven unattended install
Restructure picpeak-setup.sh around two clear modes:

- Interactive wizard (run_wizard): asks method → install dir → channel →
  domain → HTTPS handling → admin email → SMTP, then shows a review and
  confirms before installing. Each value already passed as a flag is
  respected and its question skipped.
- Unattended (--unattended + flags): validate_unattended fills defaults and
  fails fast on impossible combos (e.g. --enable-ssl without --domain).
  New flags: --admin-password, --install-dir, --channel.

Align the Docker path with the rest of the project:
- Use the committed docker-compose.production.yml (prebuilt GHCR images) via
  COMPOSE_FILE in .env instead of hand-generating a divergent compose file.
- Drop the broken setup_ssl_docker call (was referenced but never defined).
- Update path pulls images instead of building.

Admin bootstrap follows the browser-first model (#714): by default no
password is written; the one-time /setup token is surfaced (from
data/SETUP_TOKEN or the logs) with browser instructions. --admin-password
keeps the legacy seeded-admin + ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt flow for headless runs.

Depends on #714 (setup-token backend + secrets-init in production compose)
for the browser-first + zero-secret behavior at runtime.
2026-07-02 16:44:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6850bd3bef chore(main): release 3.78.0-beta.0 (#725)
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2026-07-02 14:35:07 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 97b9853709 Merge pull request #724 from PicPeak/fix/release-automerge-pat
fix: enable release-PR auto-merge with the PAT so releases actually publish
2026-07-02 16:32:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft bafc96f468 Merge pull request #714 from Luca-Timo/feat/first-run-setup-wizard
feat: zero-config first run — in-browser admin bootstrap + auto-generated secrets
2026-07-02 16:19:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e08a33d9ea fix(ci): enable release-PR auto-merge with the PAT, not GITHUB_TOKEN
Auto-merge enabled via GITHUB_TOKEN attributes the eventual merge commit to
github-actions[bot], so recursion prevention suppresses the resulting push to
main — the follow-up release-please run that cuts the tag/release never fires.
Net: the version PR merges but no release/tag/images are ever produced (#719).

Enable auto-merge with RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN instead (a real identity) so the
merge triggers the tag-cutting run. Approval stays on GITHUB_TOKEN because it
must be a different identity than the PR author (the PAT) to count as a review.

Observed on #723: merged 3.77.3-beta.0 but no run followed and no tag was cut.
2026-07-02 15:41:25 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2b2dc6e35c chore(main): release 3.77.3-beta.0 (#723)
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2026-07-02 13:29:08 +00:00
Paul Nothaft d00d52a221 Merge pull request #722 from PicPeak/fix/release-please-gh-repo
fix: set GH_REPO in release-please auto-merge step
2026-07-02 15:23:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e54100ac46 Merge pull request #721 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.77.2-beta.0
2026-07-02 15:23:08 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0cab43ed89 fix(ci): set GH_REPO in release-please auto-merge step
The auto-merge step runs in a job with no actions/checkout, so gh could not
infer the repository from a git remote and failed with 'not a git repository'
(#719 follow-up). Set GH_REPO=${{ github.repository }} so gh pr list/review/
merge work without a checkout — same fix as the whatsnew workflow (2a5f0a8).

Confirmed working otherwise: with RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN set, release PR #721 is
now PAT-authored and its required checks run automatically (no manual approval).
2026-07-02 15:20:07 +02:00
Luca b0912c7427 feat(setup): validate setup token at step 1 before advancing
Previously "Continue" on the token step only checked the field was
non-empty; a wrong token wasn't caught until the final submit, after the
user had filled in email + password. Add a non-burning verify:

- backend: POST /setup/verify-token constant-time compares the token
  without consuming it (createInitialAdmin still claims it atomically on
  submit), gated on no-admin-exists and rate-limited like /setup/admin.
- frontend: step-1 "Continue" calls verifyToken and only advances on a
  valid token; a wrong token shows the invalidToken error on the field,
  429 -> too-many-attempts, 409 -> redirect to login.

Adds integration tests for accept-without-burn / reject / closed-once-set.
2026-07-02 15:18:22 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 95dac43fdf chore(main): release 3.77.2-beta.0 2026-07-02 15:17:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fb64ec0910 Merge pull request #720 from PicPeak/fix/release-please-automation
fix: auto-publish release-please PRs without manual approval
2026-07-02 15:16:54 +02:00
Luca 3e69c5df3f fix(setup): match first-run logo size to the login page default
The header logo used a hardcoded 64px frame; the login page renders a
medium (200x150) frame via resolveLoginLogoClasses. Reuse that helper
with the default size so /setup and /admin/login read identically.
2026-07-02 15:03:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a3e7232b8e fix(ci): auto-publish release-please PRs without manual approval (#719)
The release PR (authored by github-actions[bot] via GITHUB_TOKEN) sat open
forever: its workflows were held behind 'awaiting approval' and the required
review could not be satisfied by the bot. Both release-please workflows now:

- Use a dedicated ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }} (fine-grained PAT) with a
  GITHUB_TOKEN fallback. A PAT-authored PR runs CI automatically (no 'awaiting
  approval') and can be merged without a human.
- Auto-approve (as github-actions[bot], a different identity than the PR
  author) and enable auto-merge on the open release PR, so it publishes once
  checks pass. Skipped when no PAT is configured — falls back to today's manual
  flow, nothing breaks.

A PAT also un-suppresses the tag-push and release-published triggers on
docker-build (GITHUB_TOKEN suppressed them), so add a concurrency group there
to collapse the duplicate same-version builds into one.

Requires (repo/org settings, one-time):
- Create fine-grained PAT RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN (contents:write, pull-requests:write).
- Enable 'Allow auto-merge' on the repo (currently off).
- 'Allow GitHub Actions to approve pull requests' — already enabled.
2026-07-02 15:01:52 +02:00
Luca d9b0eb7232 feat(setup): brand first-run screen and split into two-step wizard
Address post-merge UI feedback on the first-run setup screen — the first
screen any new admin sees:

- Use the bundled PicPeak logo (same asset the login page falls back to)
  on the cream brand plate instead of the generic lucide Sparkles icon.
- Split the flow into two steps: step 1 takes only the one-time setup
  token, with the `docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`
  recovery command shown prominently (with a copy button) directly under
  the field, plus a docs link for when the logs have rotated away; step 2
  collects email + password. A rejected token bounces back to step 1.

en/de strings added; other locales fall back to en.
2026-07-02 14:56:14 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 934cc92bb8 Merge pull request #717 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.77.1-beta.0
2026-07-02 14:51:09 +02:00
Luca 286975dc52 fix(setup): address PR #714 review — password UX, script token, race, nits
Blockers:
- SetupPage now mirrors the server password rule (>=8 with upper/lower/digit) so
  a green client isn't bounced by the server; server errors carry a `field`
  (routes/setup.js) that the client maps to a translated key instead of
  rendering raw English. New i18n: setup.invalidToken, setup.passwordRequirements.
- picpeak-setup.sh: the ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt block no longer dead-ends on the
  wizard path — when no legacy admin was seeded it prints the one-time setup
  token (from data/SETUP_TOKEN / docker compose logs) and points at /setup.

Concern:
- createInitialAdmin creates the admin + burns the token in ONE transaction,
  atomically claiming the token (null-if-present, expect 1 row) so a
  double-submit can't create two super_admins. Cross-DB (whereNotNull, trx-only
  writes). Added a concurrency test.

Nits:
- SetupPage redirects to /login when /setup/status errors (no form flash on a
  configured instance).
- Dropped the unused DATABASE_URL from docker-compose.yml.
- Documented why secrets are chmod 644 (three different reader users).
2026-07-02 13:21:55 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 6f5a02b817 chore(main): release 3.77.1-beta.0 2026-07-02 11:01:34 +00:00
Paul Nothaft f5b4aa7a5b Merge pull request #716 from PicPeak/docs/require-ui-screenshots
docs: require screenshots for UI changes in PRs
2026-07-02 13:01:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8ca74776f4 docs: require screenshots for UI changes in PRs
Any PR that changes a user-facing surface must include a screenshot of the
result in the description (before/after where it helps). Reviewers ask for
one before reviewing UI-touching PRs; backend/non-visual changes are exempt.
2026-07-02 11:57:32 +02:00
Luca 415bffa04c feat: zero-config first run — in-browser admin bootstrap + auto-generated secrets
Fresh installs need nothing in .env. See PR description for the full feature.
2026-07-01 14:49:18 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b8b33ae6d6 Merge pull request #713 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.77.0-beta.0
2026-07-01 10:00:29 +02:00
github-actions[bot] e1dae31e16 chore(main): release 3.77.0-beta.0 2026-07-01 07:55:55 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e873f7c98c Merge pull request #712 from PicPeak/chore/conventional-pr-title-guard
feat: admin photos list/grid toggle + upload failure report (#707, #708)
2026-07-01 09:55:37 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6f95796b7c feat: admin photos list/grid toggle + upload failure report (#707, #708)
Records two features that merged with gitmoji commit subjects and were
therefore skipped by Release Please, so the next beta credits them:
- #707 grid/list layout toggle on the admin Photos tab
- #708 per-file upload failure report in the upload modal

No code change — the features are already on main; this commit only gives
Release Please a Conventional Commit to cut the release from.
2026-07-01 09:38:34 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 4881d2040a ci: validate PR titles against Conventional Commits
Release Please only recognizes Conventional Commit prefixes (feat:, fix:,
...). PRs merged with other conventions (gitmoji, free-form) are silently
skipped, shipping changes with no version bump or changelog entry (see
#707/#708). Fail such PRs early via amannn/action-semantic-pull-request.
2026-07-01 09:38:34 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b8665e1d86 Merge pull request #708 from andredlng/feat/upload-failure-details
Surface which files failed during photo upload
2026-07-01 09:29:19 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f4a1db8b6a Merge pull request #707 from andredlng/feat/photos-list-view
Add grid/list layout toggle to admin Photos tab
2026-07-01 09:00:31 +02:00
André Deuerling 1be871cb9a 🐛 Address review: fix spinner hang + show processing failures
Blocker: the "every file rejected" reset never fired because the backend
returns `upload_id` unconditionally (with count 0), so `anyQueued` was
always true and the completion effect (gated on total > 0) never ran —
modal spun forever. Gate `anyQueued` on `count > 0` so a zero-photo
response takes the terminal reset path.

Concern 1: processing-stage failures were invisible — the modal
auto-closed on clean transfer before the worker reported them. Defer the
settle/close decision to the completion effect (combining transfer +
processing failures), and persist failed photos into `processingFailures`
state before `uploadIds` is cleared, so the rows don't vanish the instant
they appear.

Also: report card gets role="status"/aria-live (nit), and tests now cover
the whole-chunk transfer failure, the clean-settle path, and the
onUploadSettled contract from the real component.
2026-07-01 08:03:01 +02:00
André Deuerling 2a81d992f1 🎨 Address review: persist-on-click + radiogroup toggle
- Persist the layout choice in the toggle click handlers instead of a
  useEffect, so simply opening the Photos tab no longer re-writes the
  value it just read from localStorage (review concern 1).
- Give the Grid/List toggle radiogroup/radio + aria-checked semantics
  so a screen reader announces them as one mutually-exclusive set
  (review concern 2).
- Add a test that mount performs no localStorage write.
2026-07-01 07:55:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 22b20e8314 Merge pull request #711 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.76.2-beta.0
2026-06-30 22:57:16 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 79924e10d9 chore(main): release 3.76.2-beta.0 2026-06-30 20:52:33 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 3feed0fae6 Merge pull request #710 from PicPeak/fix/whatsnew-workflow-no-checkout
fix(ci): whatsnew highlights — set GH_REPO so gh runs without a checkout
2026-06-30 22:52:08 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2a5f0a8601 fix(ci): whatsnew highlights — set GH_REPO so gh runs without a checkout
Release Please Beta on v3.76.1-beta.0 hard-failed at the very first
`gh release view "$TAG"` call:

  failed to run git: fatal: not a git repository
  (or any of the parent directories): .git

The reusable `whatsnew-highlights.yml` (PR #703) doesn't run
actions/checkout — so when `gh` tried to infer the target repo from
the runner's empty workspace it errored out. The first time it ran
against an actual release (#709 → 3.76.1-beta.0), the whole job died
before the deterministic-fallback path could save it.

Two changes, both single-line:

1. `env.GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}` at job scope. `gh` honours
   this and won't fall back to parsing `.git/config`, so no checkout
   is needed (the workflow only calls the GitHub API, never reads
   repo files).

2. `continue-on-error: true` on the "Extract Features" step. The
   file's comments say "never let highlights break a release", but
   the original wiring only soft-failed the AI + inject steps. A
   transient API hiccup at extract still hard-failed the whole job —
   defeating the design intent. Match the comment.

Why not just add actions/checkout? It would work, but pulls the whole
repo over the wire on every release just for `gh` to read its own
config. GH_REPO is the lighter idiom.

Net impact today: v3.76.1-beta.0 shipped without the `<!-- whatsnew -->`
block; the app's parseWhatsNew() already falls back to the raw Features
list so the admin "What's New" banner still works. The next beta release
will pick up the polished version.
2026-06-30 22:47:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 152952877f Merge pull request #709 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.76.1-beta.0
2026-06-30 22:42:09 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 753e680b1c chore(main): release 3.76.1-beta.0 2026-06-30 20:33:22 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 0b74b51f40 Merge pull request #703 from Luca-Timo/ci/whatsnew-highlights-workflow
ci(whatsnew): generate release highlights via GitHub Models
2026-06-30 22:33:00 +02:00
André Deuerling cc26296c58 🐛 Keep upload modal open when some files fail
The failure report lives inside the upload modal, but the modal
auto-closed the instant the transfer finished (handleUploadComplete →
onClose), unmounting the report before the user could read it — so the
"which files failed" list never actually appeared.

Split the modal's completion callback in two:
- onUploadComplete: refresh the grid only (no close), as bytes land and
  again when processing finishes
- onUploadSettled({ hasFailures }): fired once the transfer settles; the
  modal auto-closes only on a clean upload and stays open (report
  visible) when any file failed

Also reset the transfer UI when nothing was queued (every file failed),
which previously left the modal spinning forever. Add a PhotoUploadModal
test covering close-on-clean vs stay-open-on-failure.
2026-06-30 21:22:49 +02:00
André Deuerling 1b0100cfad Surface which files failed during photo upload
A partial upload only told the admin "some files failed" with no way to
find out which ones — even though the data existed. The backend already
returns per-file rejections (response.errors: [{filename, error}]) and the
progress hook already exposes failedPhotos, but both were dropped.

Add a dismissible failure report to the upload modal listing every file
that didn't make it into the gallery, grouped by stage with its reason:
- rejected: per-file validation rejections from the upload response
  (previously discarded entirely)
- transfer: whole-chunk request failures (now captured with the error,
  not just the filename)
- processing: background-worker failures from useUploadProgress.failedPhotos

Replace the count-only "some files failed" toast with one that points at
the list. Add en/de keys under upload.failures.* and a component test
covering the rejected + processing rows and dismissal.
2026-06-30 21:08:02 +02:00
André Deuerling 46ce59d82e Add grid/list layout toggle to admin Photos tab
The event detail Photos tab (AdminPhotoGrid) only offered a thumbnail
grid. Add a Grid/List toggle in the action bar so admins can scan
photos in a compact, metadata-oriented list.

- New utils/photoViewPrefs.ts persists the choice per admin via
  localStorage (mirrors utils/calendarPrefs.ts), defaulting to grid
- List view is a compact <table> following the established admin
  list pattern (EventsListPage), with responsive column hiding:
  Photo (thumbnail + filename + original + Video/Hidden badges),
  Category (lg+), Uploaded date (md+, via useLocalizedDate),
  Engagement views/downloads/likes (xl+), Feedback rating/comments
  (sm+), Size, and hover Actions (download, delete)
- Rows reuse the existing selection, download, delete and category
  handlers; row click opens the photo viewer
- Toggle buttons use LayoutGrid / List icons with aria-pressed state
- Add en.json + de.json keys under admin.photos (viewMode, gridView,
  listView, columns.*)
- Tests for the persistence util and the toggle's render + persistence
2026-06-30 19:17:26 +02:00
Luca 5582644dc4 fix(whatsnew): decode HTML entities and trim em-dash detail in fallback bullets
The Features-fallback showed raw changelog text, so a commit subject like
'branded URL shortener — /s/<slug> with OG injection' surfaced two problems
in the admin banner:
- release-please escapes <slug> to &lt;slug&gt;; React renders the literal
  entity, so the banner read '/s/&lt;slug&gt;'. Decode the entities
  (&lt; &gt; &amp; &quot; &#39;), &amp; last to avoid double-decoding.
- the technical tail leaked into a user-facing highlight. Drop a trailing
  '— detail' clause (em dash only, so 'mark-paid' is untouched) so the bullet
  reads as the headline 'branded URL shortener'.

Only affects the deterministic fallback; curated <!-- whatsnew --> blocks are
unchanged.
2026-06-30 18:39:21 +02:00
Luca d25178d2e5 ci(whatsnew): let the Models step fail soft so the fallback runs without Models
If GitHub Models is disabled for the org the ai-inference step errors;
without continue-on-error the job would go red and skip the inject+fallback.
Mark it continue-on-error so an unavailable Models cleanly degrades to the
deterministic bullets — the feature now works with Models off, not just on.
2026-06-30 17:28:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 627c655a4d Merge pull request #704 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.76.0-beta.0
2026-06-30 17:12:31 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 6439cf2e42 chore(main): release 3.76.0-beta.0 2026-06-30 15:02:34 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a0f7033ffc Merge pull request #702 from PicPeak/feat/branded-short-urls-699
feat(gallery): branded URL shortener — /s/<slug> with OG injection (#699)
2026-06-30 17:01:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3ac88370d6 Merge pull request #701 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.75.1-beta.0
2026-06-30 17:00:10 +02:00
Luca 5aeb6905ac ci(whatsnew): generate release highlights via GitHub Models
Activate the What's New highlights step that condenses each release's
Features into <=8 short bullets and injects a <!-- whatsnew --> block the
app reads (utils/whatsNew.parseWhatsNew), with a deterministic fallback.

Runs as a needs: job inside the release-please workflows rather than on a
standalone release: published trigger, because release-please creates the
release with GITHUB_TOKEN and GitHub never starts new workflow runs from
token-generated events -- a standalone trigger would never fire. Shared as
a reusable workflow_call so the stable and beta channels stay in sync.

Best-effort: continue-on-error + fallback mean it can never break a release.
Requires GitHub Models enabled for the org; until then the fallback is used.
2026-06-30 16:43:54 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 56c2386c90 feat(gallery): branded URL shortener — /s/<slug> with OG injection (#699)
Issue 3 from #699 (@alexvaltchev's report): expose a custom-named short
URL per event that bots scrape for OG previews and browsers redirect to
the underlying gallery. WhatsApp / iMessage / Facebook cache the OG
metadata by the URL they crawl, so the SHORT URL becomes the cache key
— admins can rotate or split-test underlying gallery URLs without
re-pushing a fresh link to clients.

Additive feature; no existing route, table, or column is modified.

## Backend

- `gallery_short_urls` table (migration 150): id, short_slug UNIQUE,
  event_id FK CASCADE, target_path TEXT, created_by/at, hit_count,
  last_hit_at, deleted_at/by. hasTable-guarded so the migration is
  idempotent on re-run.

- `src/services/galleryShortUrlService.js` — validator + CRUD +
  resolver. Slug rules: `/^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,62}[a-z0-9])?$/`,
  reserved blocklist (admin, api, auth, gallery, og, s, login, ...).
  target_path snapshots at create-time from the event + global
  short-URL toggle, so a later flip of the toggle does NOT silently
  change where existing short URLs resolve.

- `src/routes/adminShortUrls.js` — `GET/POST
  /api/admin/events/:eventId/short-urls`, `DELETE
  /api/admin/short-urls/:id`. Structured errors: 400 INVALID_SLUG,
  409 SLUG_TAKEN (with `suggested`), 404 EVENT_NOT_FOUND. Gated by
  events.view / events.edit + requireEventOwnership.

- `server.js` /s/:shortSlug public route. Bot UA → server-render the
  same OG metadata the existing /og/gallery/<slug> handler produces,
  then override og:url to point at /s/<shortSlug> itself (cache-key
  invariant — social platforms key by the URL they scrape).
  Browser UA → 302 to target_path. Soft-deleted slug → 410 Gone
  (intentional-delete signal, distinct from 404 unknown slug).
  Hit accounting is fire-and-forget.

## Frontend

- `services/shortUrls.service.ts` — list/create/remove.
- `components/admin/ShortUrlsCard.tsx` — per-event card on the
  EventDetailsPage. Form for custom or auto-generated slug, list with
  copy-to-clipboard + soft-delete. SLUG_TAKEN error surfaces the
  service's `suggested` slug with a "use suggested" button.
- i18n: events.shortUrls.* added to EN + DE.

## Tests

78 new tests, all passing:

- `__tests__/utils/galleryShortUrlValidation.test.js` (48) — pure-
  function tests for validateSlug: accepts/rejects, reserved-slug
  blocklist, path-traversal + URL-injection vectors.
- `__tests__/integration/galleryShortUrls.test.js` (19) — service
  layer against a real SQLite DB. Covers custom + auto-generated
  slugs, collision + SLUG_TAKEN + suggested, target_path
  snapshotting (backward-compat invariant), soft-delete + slug
  rotation, hit counting.
- `__tests__/integration/galleryShortUrlRoute.test.js` (11) —
  HTTP-level: 302 redirect for browser UA, 200 + OG HTML for bot UA,
  og:url canonical points at /s/<slug>, 410 for soft-deleted +
  orphaned events, 404 unknown + malformed.

Regression sweep: 47 existing migration-chain integration tests still
pass; migration 150 is additive only.

## Backward compatibility

- Existing `/gallery/<slug>`, `/gallery/<32-hex-share-token>`,
  `/gallery/<slug>/show/<token>`, `/og/gallery/<slug>`,
  `/og/gallery/<slug>/cover` routes are untouched.
- The `/s/` namespace is new; no existing route lives there.
- Migration 150 only ADDs the new table — no ALTERs on existing
  schema, no destructive changes.
- target_path is snapshotted at create-time so flipping the global
  "Use short gallery URLs" setting after a short URL exists does NOT
  change where that short URL resolves.
2026-06-30 16:30:13 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 541b3d32ef chore(main): release 3.75.1-beta.0 2026-06-30 14:09:58 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 25bf7bb523 Merge pull request #700 from PicPeak/fix/og-injection-share-token-and-slideshow-699
fix(og): rich social previews for share-token + slideshow URLs (#699)
2026-06-30 16:09:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1b8747dc82 fix(og): rich social previews for share-token + slideshow URLs (#699)
Two SSR-OG injection bugs reported by @alexvaltchev. Both made his link
previews fall back to the brand logo + site-wide tagline instead of the
event-specific name/photo, even though the bot UA was hitting our
already-existing OG handler. He compensated with a Cloudflare Worker as
SSR middleware — which then created bug 3 below (og:image at the
auth-gated /api/.../hero/ path, not the public /og/.../cover one), so
Instagram never rendered the image either.

## Bug A — slideshow URLs miss the OG handler entirely

`/gallery/<slug>/show/<token>` has 3 segments after `/gallery/`. The OG
route was wired only at `/gallery/:slug/:token?` (1-2 segments), so
slideshow links fell through to the SPA-catchall `/gallery/*` and never
invoked the OG handler at all. Added a second route handler for the
3-segment slideshow shape, sharing the same intercept middleware so a
recognised social crawler still gets the rich preview.

## Bug B — share-token-only URLs resolve to nothing

`/gallery/<32-char-share-token>` (the form produced when migration 525's
short-URLs option strips the event slug) routes to the OG handler with
`slug=<token>`. resolveSlug then queries `events.slug = <token>`, which
never matches because the token is in a separate `share_token` column.
Result: falls through to the "no event found" branch and serves the
generic site-wide OG.

Fix: when the slug shape matches a 32-char hex AND the slug lookup
missed AND no redirect rule applies, try `events.share_token = slug` as
a final fallback. Real slugs are kebab/dot/underscore mixes, never pure
32-hex, so the extra DB roundtrip is gated to only fire for the
token-shaped URL.

## Tests

3 new tests in galleryOgService.shareImage.test.js using non-entropy
32-hex fixtures (deliberately zero-padded to avoid tripping
GitGuardian's Generic High Entropy Secret detector while still
matching the route's /^[a-f0-9]{32}$/i shape check):
- share-token slug resolves via the share_token column (alex's case)
- malformed/expired 32-hex token returns the site-wide fallback (no leak)
- non-hex slugs skip the share_token query entirely (hot-path cost guarded)

All 14 tests in the file pass.

## Out of scope here (separate follow-up)

- Issue 2 (Instagram og:image) — alex-side CF Worker bug pointing
  og:image at /api/gallery/<slug>/hero/<id>, which requires gallery
  auth. PicPeak already has the right unauthenticated path
  (/og/gallery/<slug>/cover) gated by events.og_image_share_enabled
  per-event opt-in (#474). Documented in the issue reply.
- Issue 3 (URL shortener with custom names) — real feature request,
  meaningfully different from the existing #525 short-URLs option that
  just strips the slug. Designing separately.
2026-06-30 16:03:49 +02:00
Luca de789faec5 Merge pull request #698 from Luca-Timo/docs/comparison-pixieset 2026-06-30 12:35:29 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 52dfe2723d Merge pull request #697 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.74.1-beta.0
2026-06-30 11:44:10 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 5925bed761 chore(main): release 3.75.0-beta.0 2026-06-30 09:44:00 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a1a73bf75f Merge pull request #694 from Luca-Timo/feat/whatsnew-notifications
feat(updates): "What's New" highlights after update + pre-update teaser
2026-06-30 11:43:39 +02:00
Luca 3528f6b8b7 Merge pull request #696 from Luca-Timo/docs/contributor-luap
docs(readme): credit @the-luap as creator/lead maintainer

Docs only no change in Codebase
2026-06-30 11:23:02 +02:00
Luca b0439638bd docs(readme): clarify comparison footnotes — $0 cost caveat + Pixieset video cap
- you still bring your own server (own hardware or VPS) and optional domain.
- Pixieset "unlimited" storage is photos only — video is capped per plan (~0–10 h depending on tier).
- Renumber the PicPeak storage footnote (* → **) so the three markers don't collide.
2026-06-30 11:20:37 +02:00
Luca 721f440fa6 docs(readme): add Pixieset to comparison + customer-accounts/CRM/accounting rows 2026-06-30 11:07:58 +02:00
Luca 748238e8ca docs(readme): credit @the-luap as creator/lead maintainer 2026-06-30 11:06:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0191b283d7 Merge pull request #692 from PicPeak/chore/security-bumps-aug-2026-batch
chore(security): close all 27 code-scanning alerts via dep + base-image bumps
2026-06-30 10:58:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e48b81fb8d Merge pull request #693 from PicPeak/chore/workflow-required-checks-always-fire
ci: required-check workflows fire on every PR (drop paths filter + post-rename branch list)
2026-06-30 10:53:25 +02:00
Luca 500cf8522e feat(updates): "What's New" highlights after update + pre-update teaser
Surfaces release highlights to admins, sourced from the GitHub release notes
(no AI at runtime). Bullets are written once per release in CI via GitHub Models
(see docs/ci/whatsnew-highlights.yml) into a <!-- whatsnew --> block; the app
reads that block and falls back to the changelog's "### Features" for releases
without it — so it works against today's releases immediately.

- backend utils/whatsNew.parseWhatsNew(body): curated block else Features
  section, strips scope/PR-links, de-dups, caps at 8 (tested).
- GET  /admin/system/updates/whatsnew: highlights for every version moved
  through since the per-instance marker (whatsnew_last_seen_version); fresh
  installs self-anchor silently. Best-effort, never errors.
- POST /admin/system/updates/whatsnew/seen: advance the marker (per-instance).
- /admin/system/updates also returns latestHighlights for the teaser.
- Frontend: WhatsNewBanner (green bar -> modal with "Full changelog" link) on
  the dashboard via adminService; UpdateNotification shows a "New features
  include:" teaser. i18n de/en. No migration (uses app_settings).
2026-06-30 02:31:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a40ab6a9b1 ci: required-check workflows now fire on every PR (no paths filter)
Branch protection on `main` + `stable` lists `upgrade-from-bootstrap`
and `fresh-install` as REQUIRED checks. The producing workflows had
`paths:` filters in their `pull_request` triggers, so they correctly
skipped on PRs that didn't touch migrations / package.json. But a
skipped workflow doesn't satisfy a required check — it leaves the
status "missing", which blocks merge on every unrelated PR.

Concretely surfaced on PR #692 (security bumps): all 12 visible checks
were green, but the merge button was blocked because the two
path-filtered workflows skipped and their required-check names never
reported.

This PR drops the `paths:` filter from both workflows so they always
fire on PRs against `main` + `stable`. Costs:
- `schema-drift` (`upgrade-from-bootstrap`): ~75 s per PR (Postgres
  service boot + migrate:safe run + schema assertion).
- `install-smoke` (`fresh-install`): ~2 min per PR (full Docker
  Compose boot + login).

Both are buying unconditional safety nets on the install + migration
paths, which is what the required-check gate is supposed to model.

Also fixes the trigger branch list while in the file: `[main, beta]`
→ `[main, stable]`, completing the post-#669 rename for these two
workflows that were missed in PR #686.

## What this does NOT fix

`GitGuardian Security Checks` is the third required check that's
currently missing on PRs — but that's a separate problem. The
GitGuardian GitHub App was installed at the user-account level
(`the-luap`) before the org transfer and didn't move with the repo.
Re-installing it on the org via the GitHub Marketplace is a UI step
the maintainer needs to do; can't be done via API.
2026-06-30 00:07:44 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7546f104a3 chore(security): close 27 code-scanning alerts via dep + base-image bumps
Single PR closing every open code-scanning alert at
https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/code-scanning. Both repos go
from 27 open alerts → 0 across direct deps, transitive deps, and build-
time bundled deps.

## Backend (`backend/package.json` + overrides)

Direct dep bumps:
- axios          1.15.2   → 1.16.0       (closes 9 alerts: 7 high + 1 med + 1 low)
- nodemailer     8.0.10   → ^9.0.1       (closes 1 high — SSRF + file-read via raw option)
- multer         2.1.1    → 2.2.0        (closes 2 alerts: 1 high + 1 med)
- form-data      4.0.5    → 4.0.6        (closes 1 high)
- tar            ≥7.5.13  → ≥7.5.16      (closes 1 med)
- postcss        8.5.6    → 8.5.10       (closes 1 med)
- i18next-http-backend  3.0.2  → 3.0.5   (closes 1 med — backend lagged frontend)
- js-yaml        4.1.1    → ^4.2.0       (closes 1 med)
- joi            17.13.3  → ^17.13.4     (closes 1 med)

Overrides updated to match deps (npm rejected the install otherwise) +
nodemailer ^9.0.1 added as override so imapflow + mailparser transitive
bundling of older nodemailer is also fixed. Babel devDep auto-bumped via
`npm audit fix` (low-severity arbitrary file read).

Backend npm audit: 0 vulnerabilities.

## Frontend (`frontend/package.json`)

Direct dep bumps:
- axios                 1.15.2  → 1.16.0
- postcss               8.5.6   → 8.5.10
- i18next-http-backend  3.0.5   → 3.0.5  (already current — kept for parity)

`npm audit fix` swept up 12 transitive issues at the same time:
- vitest (1 critical — file read on UI server)
- vite (2 high — fs.deny bypass, NTLM hash via launch-editor)
- ws (2 high — uninitialized memory + DoS)
- dompurify (8 mod — multiple IN_PLACE / hook-pollution XSS vectors)
- react-router-dom + react-router (1 mod transitive)
- esbuild (1 mod — dev server file read)
- @babel/core (1 low)

Frontend npm audit: 0 vulnerabilities.

## Frontend Dockerfile

- Build stage: `node:20-alpine` → `node:22-alpine`

Closes the npm-bundled CVE class (picomatch, ip-address, brace-expansion,
@sigstore/core, tar) that came from Node 20's older bundled npm. Matches
the backend Dockerfile base. The nginx serving stage stays at
`nginx:1.28-alpine` — that tag is rolling, so the next build picks up
the fixed 1.28.3-r4 layer that closes the 4 nginx CVEs.

## Verification

- Backend: `npm audit` → 0 vulnerabilities 
- Frontend: `npm audit` → 0 vulnerabilities 
- Backend Jest (workflow engine, rounding, WhatsApp): 47/47 pass 
- Frontend Vitest: 84/84 pass 
- `frontend npm run build`: succeeds 
- nodemailer 9 sanity check: our usage is `createTransport({host,port,secure,auth})`
  + `sendMail({from,to,subject,html,text})` — we don't touch the `raw`
  option that 9.x tightened, so the major bump is API-compatible.
2026-06-29 23:26:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a24821de55 Merge pull request #691 from PicPeak/chore/bypass-size-gate
ci: bypass size gate — cap self-merge PR size for bypass users
2026-06-29 23:15:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 806b1ac921 ci: bypass size gate — cap self-merge PR size for review-bypass users
@Luca-Timo is on main's review-bypass list so he can self-merge small
bugfixes without waiting for a maintainer review. The bypass list alone
is binary (he can merge anything), so this adds a complementary required
status check that fails when a bypass user's PR exceeds a configured
line-count threshold — blocking merge for genuine features while leaving
small bugfixes flowing.

How it works:
- Trigger: pull_request_target (so the workflow runs in the base repo's
  context with permissions to write a check status — script never
  executes PR code, so fork-PR-attack-safe).
- For PRs authored by a bypass user (default: @Luca-Timo):
    - linesChanged = additions + deletions
    - If ≤ LINE_LIMIT (300): check = success → bypass works → self-merge OK
    - If > LINE_LIMIT: check = failure → required-check gate blocks merge
      regardless of bypass; needs a maintainer review.
- For everyone else: check = success ("not applicable"). They go through
  the normal review path and are unaffected.

Both constants (LINE_LIMIT, BYPASS_USERS) are at the top of the workflow
for easy tuning.

After this lands on main, a separate API step adds 'bypass-size-gate' to
the main branch's required_status_checks list so the gate is actually
enforced. Until that's in place the check runs but doesn't block.
2026-06-29 23:13:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft beae46e408 Merge pull request #689 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.74.0-beta.0
2026-06-29 22:44:39 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 5ba45753c1 chore(main): release 3.74.0-beta.0 2026-06-29 20:39:22 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 14bd3e1a6c Merge pull request #688 from PicPeak/chore/readme-migration-banner
docs: prominent migration banner at the top of README
2026-06-29 22:29:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5839bba72a docs: prominent migration banner at the top of README (#669)
GitHub-flavored `> [!IMPORTANT]` callout right below the title, before
the badges/hero block, so it's the first thing a visitor or repo browser
sees in the rendered README. Mirrors the in-app banner (#687) so an
operator gets the same message whether they're browsing the repo or
logged into the admin dashboard.

Body covers:
- Image-path change with the literal new path
- Branch rename (beta → main, main → stable) with auto-redirect note
- Link to docs/migration-to-org.md for the exact compose-file edit

Remove (or downgrade to a regular note) after the migration window
settles, same lifecycle as the in-app banner constant.
2026-06-29 22:24:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 02133478bd Merge pull request #687 from PicPeak/chore/in-app-migration-banner
feat(admin): in-app migration banner for the org rename
2026-06-29 22:22:52 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 297c2d3df0 Merge pull request #686 from PicPeak/chore/post-rename-workflow-triggers
chore: workflows + RELEASING.md for the post-rename branch model
2026-06-29 22:21:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 166ef47611 Merge pull request #685 from PicPeak/chore/post-org-move-docs-and-contributing
docs: branch model + migration-to-org guide + PR template
2026-06-29 22:21:24 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2a4bf3b868 feat(admin): in-app migration banner for the org rename (#669)
One-time banner shown at the top of the admin layout to surface the org
rename + GHCR registry change for operators who haven't read the release
notes. Sits right below the existing maintenance banner — same pattern.

## What it looks like

Blue, dismissible banner with a short body:

> PicPeak's image registry has moved
> Update your docker-compose.yml to pull from
> ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/{backend,frontend} — the old path is no longer
> being updated. [See migration notes]

The link goes to `docs/migration-to-org.md` on the new org repo.

## Design choices

- **No backend feature flag.** A hard-coded `MIGRATION_BANNER_ENABLED`
  constant in the component file (1 line) gates global display. After
  ~1 quarter, flip it to false (or drop the mount in `AdminLayout.tsx`)
  in a small follow-up PR. A backend `app_settings` row + Settings UI
  toggle would be overkill for a one-time migration event.

- **Per-admin dismissal via localStorage.** Key is `picpeak:migration-banner:v1`
  (versioned so a future "we've moved AGAIN" banner can show without
  inheriting earlier dismissal). Wrapped in try/catch so private-mode
  browsers + storage-quota-exceeded errors don't crash the layout.

- **EN + DE strings** under a new top-level `migrationBanner` namespace.
  Other locales (fr, nl, pt, ru) fall through to EN — `migrationBanner.*`
  keys aren't translated there yet, deliberate (per #669 the ops
  banner is operator-facing and admins reading EN/DE is the majority).

- **Reuses `common.dismiss`** for the close-button aria-label.

## Test plan

- [ ] Frontend `npm run build:check` passes (TS + build)
- [ ] Open admin dashboard in EN → banner shows at top, below header,
      above main content
- [ ] Switch to DE → banner shows German strings
- [ ] Click dismiss → banner hides, doesn't re-appear on hard refresh
- [ ] Clear localStorage `picpeak:migration-banner:v1` → banner returns
- [ ] Flip `MIGRATION_BANNER_ENABLED` to false → banner doesn't render
      for anyone, regardless of dismissal state

Refs #669.
2026-06-29 22:19:22 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3ca6378bd7 chore: workflows + RELEASING.md for the post-rename branch model
After the org move + branch rename (#669):
  beta  → main   (active development)
  main  → stable (curated release channel)

This PR rewires the workflows that referenced the old branch names so
release-please and the Docker build target the right channels.

## Workflow changes

### `.github/workflows/docker-build.yml`

- **Push triggers**: `[main, beta]` → `[main, stable]` (both `push.branches`
  and `pull_request.branches`). `beta` no longer exists; `stable` is the
  curated channel that should also produce builds.
- **`is_prerelease` detection**: pre-release context was decided by
  `refs/heads/beta`; now decided by `refs/heads/main` (active dev →
  prerelease, `-beta.N` version suffix unchanged).
- **`:latest` + `:stable` tagging**: were gated on `{{is_default_branch}}`
  (which used to be `main` = stable channel). Default branch is now `main`
  = active dev, so the implicit gate would have aliased `:latest` to dev.
  Both tags now explicitly gate on `refs/heads/stable` OR a non-prerelease
  release tag.
- **`:beta` tag**: REMOVED. Active-dev pulls are `:main` (auto-generated
  by `type=ref,event=branch`). The pre-rename `:beta` tag remains frozen
  at its last build under Option B / #669 — operators are expected to
  update to `:main` or pin to a versioned tag.

### `.github/workflows/release-please.yml`

- `branches: [main]` → `branches: [stable]`. This is the **stable**
  release-please workflow (uses `release-please-config.json`); after the
  rename, the stable channel lives on the `stable` branch.

### `.github/workflows/release-please-beta.yml`

- `branches: [beta]` → `branches: [main]`.
- `target-branch: beta` → `target-branch: main`.
- This is the **pre-release** release-please workflow (uses
  `release-please-config-beta.json`, `prerelease: true`); after the rename,
  pre-releases are cut from the new `main` (active dev). The version-suffix
  scheme stays `-beta.N` so existing operator pins keep working.

## RELEASING.md

Rewrote the TL;DR, "How a stable release is cut", and hotfix path to
reference the new branch names. Added a one-line "branch model background"
note pointing at #669 so future maintainers know why `main` means active
dev (the opposite of what some projects use). Filename conventions:
`release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-main` (was `…-from-beta`); promotion PR title
`promote main → stable as vX.Y.Z` (was `promote beta → main`).

## Why combined with PR A's content as a single PR

Originally planned as two PRs (B = workflow triggers, C = release-please
reconfigure). Splitting wasn't worth it: the configs are branch-agnostic
(`release-please-config.json` and `release-please-config-beta.json` don't
mention branch names internally), and not bundling them meant a window
where the stable release-please workflow would fire on pushes to the new
`main` (active dev) — exactly the wrong place. Single PR closes that gap.

## Versioning scheme — kept

No version-scheme decision needed. The `-beta.N` suffix on pre-release
versions is preserved (existing operator pins like `v3.71.3-beta.0` keep
working). If a `v4.0.0-pre.N`-style reset is desired later, that's a
separate PR with explicit operator-comms attached.
2026-06-29 22:15:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d606fcd5a4 docs: branch model + migration-to-org guide + PR-template target hint
Operator + contributor docs for the post-org-move world. None of these
files reference the legacy branch names (`beta` / old `main` meaning) —
they describe the new shape (`main` = active dev, `stable` = curated
release channel), so they're correct from the moment the rename happens.

Three additions/edits:

1. `docs/migration-to-org.md` (new) — operator-facing one-pager that the
   in-app migration banner + the OLD GHCR package URLs (now 404) can
   point at. Walks through the single `docker-compose.yml` edit needed.

2. `CONTRIBUTING.md` — new "Branch model" section explaining which
   branch to target (`main` for features + most fixes; `stable` only
   for small, surgical bugfix backports). Updates the "fork from beta"
   step to "fork from main". Updates the release-process paragraph to
   describe the two-channel model instead of the old beta→main promote.

3. `.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md` — adds a target-branch hint at
   the top of the template (HTML comment so it shows during PR
   composition but doesn't render in the merged PR body).
2026-06-29 22:05:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 448da95020 Merge pull request #684 from PicPeak/chore/migrate-image-registry-to-picpeak-org
chore: migrate Docker registry + GitHub URLs to PicPeak org
2026-06-29 20:25:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0205c7dcce chore: migrate Docker registry + GitHub URLs to PicPeak org
Repo transferred from the-luap/picpeak → PicPeak/picpeak. Docker images
publish to ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/{backend,frontend} (lowercase, per the
GHCR canonical form computed by docker-build.yml's `${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}`).

Sweep covers:
- docker-compose.production.yml + Dockerfiles → new image registry path
- README, CONTRIBUTING, SECURITY, SIMPLE_SETUP, scripts/picpeak-setup.sh
  → new GitHub URLs
- Update-check / release-notes services (updateCheckService,
  environmentService, updateNotificationService, adminSystem,
  UpdateNotification, githubReleaseUrl) → GitHub API + tag URLs use the
  canonical PicPeak/picpeak path
- Issue templates + README-DOCKER + workflow README → updated package URLs
- One commit-context comment in migrations/090 + customerAccountsService

CHANGELOG.md is intentionally untouched (historical release entries are
immutable; GitHub auto-redirects the old URLs indefinitely).
CLAUDE.md keeps the bare `(the-luap)` reference — that's the maintainer's
personal handle, not a repo URL.

22 files, 48/48 line swaps (every change is a 1:1 URL replacement).
2026-06-29 20:20:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5ebe126970 Merge pull request #683 from the-luap/release-please--branches--beta
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chore(beta): release 3.73.0-beta.0
2026-06-29 20:00:07 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 578a73f352 chore(beta): release 3.73.0-beta.0 2026-06-29 17:57:55 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 86475582e8 Merge pull request #682 from Luca-Timo/fix/invoice-draft-and-nits
CRM: held invoices read as "Draft", + mark-paid / dashboard / reminder fixes
2026-06-29 19:57:27 +02:00
Luca e4367e028a fix(invoices): badge held (unsent, no send date) invoices as "Draft"
The earlier change only relabeled is_monthly_draft rows. But a per-event
invoice created from hours is status 'scheduled' with scheduled_send_at = NULL
and is_monthly_draft = false — it never auto-ships (the scheduler only picks
rows with scheduled_send_at <= now), yet it still read "Scheduled" on the
customer panel + lists.

Add a shared isDraftInvoice() helper (scheduled && no send date, or a
monthly/manual accumulator) and use it for the badge in the Bills list, the
invoice detail header, and the customer profile's invoice panel. A scheduled
invoice WITH a future send date keeps "Scheduled".
2026-06-29 19:39:40 +02:00
Luca d1c9e02bcf feat(dashboard): revenue "year" tile toggles 365 days ↔ calendar YTD
Per request, keep the dashboard to four tiles rather than adding a fifth: the
"Revenue · last 365 days" tile is now clickable and toggles in place between
the trailing-365-day window and calendar year-to-date (since Jan 1).

- adminDashboard: new calendar-year cutoff + revenue.calendarYearMinor (same
  cash-basis paid_at window logic as the existing trio).
- StatCard gains an optional onClick (renders as a button); the year tile uses
  it, with a "Tap to switch window" hint for discoverability.
- bills.service CrmOverviewStats.revenue gains calendarYearMinor.
2026-06-29 19:39:40 +02:00
Luca e96ef4c5a3 fix(invoices): add bank transfer to the mark-paid method list
The mark-paid dialog offered Cash / Card / PayPal / TWINT but not bank
transfer — the default method for the QR-bill / IBAN invoices picpeak issues
(createInvoice even falls back to 'bank_transfer'). Added it as the first
option. Backend already accepts paymentMethod as a free string, so no API
change; i18n bills.payment.methods.bankTransfer (de "Überweisung").
2026-06-29 19:39:40 +02:00
Luca ca0944293f fix(invoices): show "Draft" on the invoice detail page for accumulator drafts
Follow-up to the Bills-list change: the invoice detail header still printed
"Scheduled" for a running monthly/manual draft (is_monthly_draft). It already
had a separate monthly-draft badge, but the status pill itself now reads
"Draft" too, matching the list and the Billed-chip link target.
2026-06-29 19:39:40 +02:00
Luca e457656b9d feat(invoices): surface monthly/manual accumulator drafts in the Bills list
Manual/monthly-cadence customers accumulate logged hours into one running
draft invoice (is_monthly_draft, migration 128). That draft gets a real
invoice number and stamps the hours ("Billed: R-2026-0026"), but listInvoices
hid is_monthly_draft rows from the main list — so the invoice looked lost even
though it existed on the customer's monthly-queue card. It also carried status
'scheduled' despite never auto-sending on manual cadence, reading misleadingly
as "Scheduled".

- Bills list now opts into drafts via a new `includeDrafts` query param
  (GET /admin/invoices → listInvoices includeMonthlyDrafts). Pickers/sub-lists
  that reuse billsService.list leave it off, so they're unaffected.
- Draft rows render a distinct "Draft" badge instead of "Scheduled"
  (transformInvoice already exposes isMonthlyDraft).
- The hours "Billed: R-…" chip now links straight to its invoice.
- i18n: bills.status.draft (de "Entwurf", en "Draft").
2026-06-29 19:39:40 +02:00
Luca b9d91385b4 fix(reminders): wrap is_active/is_archived wheres in formatBoolean
eventReminderService used bare boolean literals in its knex .where() calls
(events.is_active/is_archived/event_reminder_disabled and the assigned-
customer c.is_active), instead of the codebase's formatBoolean() convention
(utils/dbCompat). On SQLite, booleans are stored as 0/1, so a bare `true`
relies on knex's coercion rather than the explicit helper every other service
uses — the maintainer flagged this twice (#674, #679). Wrap all four.
2026-06-29 19:39:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 06f4c109bc Merge pull request #680 from Luca-Timo/fix/invoice-pdf-multipage
Fix/invoice pdf multipage
2026-06-28 22:17:07 +02:00
Luca c2bc2b098e fix(invoices): show sub-cent Rundung in the editor totals preview
The live totals panel in the quote/invoice editor (LineItemsTable) summed the
per-line rounded totals and showed that as Total — so with crm_invoice_round_total
on, a 4 × (2.5h @ 32.25) invoice previewed CHF 322.52 while the saved invoice +
PDF correctly show 322.50 with a Rundung row. The preview now mirrors the backend.

- LineItemsTable gains a `roundTotal` prop. When set, it computes the clean net
  (full-precision sum rounded once — same rule as backend
  utils/invoiceRounding.cleanNetMinor, including the migration-119 priced
  sub-item override), shows a "Rundung" row for the drift, and folds it into the
  VAT base + Total. Off ⇒ unchanged (no row).
- Bill + Quote editors pass roundTotal from appSettings.crm_invoice_round_total.
- i18n: crm.lineItems.rounding (de "Rundung", en "Rounding").

The saved-invoice detail view already shows the stored clean total, so no change
there.
2026-06-28 17:28:21 +02:00
Luca 4670292139 feat(invoices): optional sub-cent rounding reconciliation ("Rundung" row)
Per-line totals are each rounded to the cent before the net is summed, so
a long time-based invoice can drift a few Rappen from qty × rate — e.g.
68 h × 32.25 = 2193.00, but the 21 rounded line totals sum to 2193.02. This
is the standard "sum of rounded lines" convention (Stripe/QuickBooks/Xero
do the same) and it foots, but some issuers want the total to match the
customer's arithmetic.

New per-issuer setting `crm_invoice_round_total` (default OFF, no migration —
read via getAppSetting with a false default). When on, the create paths store
the full-precision net rounded ONCE (cleanNetMinor), and the drift is shown to
the reader as an explicit "Rundung" row:

    Betrag Netto    2'193.02   (= Σ visible line totals, still foots)
    Rundung            -0.02
    Gesamtbetrag    2'193.00

- New util src/utils/invoiceRounding.js (cleanNetMinor) mirrors the
  migration-119 hierarchy (priced sub-items override their parent) but sums
  at full precision; rate-agnostic, so mixed hourly rates reconcile to one
  clean net. Single document-level VAT rate ⇒ one Rundung row.
- computeTotals (quotes) + createInvoice + payload-preview gain the toggle.
- Render contexts derive the row as storedNet − Σ(line totals); legacy/off
  documents have equal values ⇒ adjustment 0 ⇒ byte-identical output.
  Suppressed on Storno/Mahnung (negated net + sign-flipped lines).
- Storno/tax-report stay correct: both use the stored net scalar, which is
  the clean value (createStorno negates net_amount_minor; it never re-sums).
- pdf-i18n: totals_rounding in all 6 locales (de/en/fr confident; nl/pt/ru
  machine-translated — flag for native review).
- Frontend: toggle on Settings → CRM (Invoices), default off.

Tests: backend/__tests__/utils/invoiceRounding.test.js (real 68h invoice,
mixed rates, discounts, sub-item hierarchy, no-op case).
2026-06-28 15:53:44 +02:00
Luca 2205b0bd68 fix(pdf): correct multi-page invoice/quote layout + drop IBAN dup under Swiss QR
Before drawing the line-items table, the renderer inflated page 1's bottom
margin to reserve room for the bottom-pinned totals block, but the `finally`
restored it on whichever page the table *ended* on — leaving page 1
permanently short on any multi-page document. On long invoices and quotes
this caused:

  - the table to break far too early (only ~6 items on page 1, large blank
    gap beneath)
  - the page-number stamp to land below page 1's phantom bottom margin,
    auto-paginating a stray blank trailing page and desyncing the
    "Seite X von Y" labels (page 1 unnumbered, the blank page labelled
    "Seite 1 von N")

Let the table paginate with the document's normal margins so each page fills
to the bottom; the existing desiredTotalsY check already advances to a fresh
page when the last item row would collide with the pinned totals block.

Also suppress the IBAN block under the totals when a Swiss QR-bill slip is
appended: the slip already prints the account/IBAN in human-readable form,
so it was pure duplication. The EPC QR path keeps the block (its QR lives on
a trailing page, so on-page bank details still help).
2026-06-28 14:49:50 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b86669f1e1 Merge pull request #569 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.44.0
2026-05-27 21:51:33 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 80296282e8 chore(main): release 3.44.0 2026-05-27 19:50:15 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 5551c89bda Merge pull request #568 from the-luap/release/3.55.0-merge-from-beta
chore(release): promote beta → main as v3.55.0
2026-05-27 21:48:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft dbde67c0fa Merge branch 'main' into release/3.55.0-merge-from-beta
Resolves 6 file conflicts arising from main carrying 7 weeks of
stable-channel work (security backports, release-please cuts, README
rewrite #281) that hadn't been forward-merged into beta.

Resolution per file:

- backend/package.json + package-lock.json — kept beta's version.
  Beta is the superset; it intentionally drops `handlebars` (PR #367
  removed the runtime require; the dep was the source of 2 criticals
  + 8 highs). Security-pinned versions (axios 1.15.2, nodemailer ^8,
  i18next-http-backend ^3.0.2, multer ^2.0.2, tar >=7.5.13) already
  match across both branches — no security regression.
- frontend/package.json + package-lock.json — kept beta's version.
  Superset of main (adds marked, @types/node, i18next-cli, memfs,
  i18n CLI scripts). Same security versions on both sides.
- README.md — kept main's version. PR #281 was an explicit cleanup
  ("shorter, cleaner, less AI-sounding"); beta had grown the file by
  326 lines ad-hoc during the freeze. Preserving the rewrite.
- CHANGELOG.md — kept main's version. Release-please regenerates from
  conventional commits on its next stable cut, so beta's accumulated
  entries will roll into the new v3.55.0 release block automatically.

Auto-merged files carrying main's session-invalidation fix (#245)
flowed cleanly into beta's versions — sessionTimeout.js, adminAuth.js,
and the test files all merged without conflict, meaning beta had
already absorbed equivalent changes by independent paths.

CI on the underlying merge state was green on PR #568 prior to this
resolution; will re-run automatically on push.
2026-05-27 21:45:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 067e460a4d Merge pull request #413 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.43.1
2026-05-07 20:09:30 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 3678193ae2 chore(main): release 3.43.1 2026-05-07 12:36:13 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 74eacbc78f Merge pull request #412 from the-luap/security/cve-backport-3.42.2
fix(security): backport 18 dependency CVE patches from beta (3.42.2 stable)
2026-05-07 14:35:47 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 37bf894412 fix(security): patch 18 dependency CVEs (axios + transitives + nodemailer + i18next-http-backend)
Closes the open Trivy code-scanning alerts for app-side dependencies.
The npm-bundled CVEs in /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm (picomatch,
brace-expansion, ip-address inside the Node image itself) are deferred
to a separate Node-base-image PR — they're build-environment-side and
need their own compatibility testing.

| Package | From | To | CVEs cleared |
|---|---|---|---|
| axios (backend + frontend) | 1.14.0 | 1.15.2 | CVE-2026-42264 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42043 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42035 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42033 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42044, CVE-2026-42042, CVE-2026-42041, CVE-2026-42040, CVE-2026-42039, CVE-2026-42038, CVE-2026-42037, CVE-2026-42036, CVE-2026-42034, CVE-2026-40175, CVE-2025-62718 |
| nodemailer (backend) | ^7.0.13 | ^8.0.5 | GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g, GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 |
| i18next-http-backend (frontend) | ^3.0.2 | ^3.0.5 | CVE-2026-41691 |
| uuid (backend) | ^11.1.0 | ^11.1.1 | CVE-2026-41907 |
| postcss (frontend, devDep) | ^8.4.21 | ^8.5.10 | CVE-2026-41305 |

For transitives whose direct parents haven't released a version that
picks up the patched range, pinned via npm overrides:

| Package | Min | CVE |
|---|---|---|
| follow-redirects (backend + frontend) | >=1.16.0 | GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 |
| fast-xml-parser (backend) | >=5.7.0 | CVE-2026-41650 |
| @tootallnate/once (backend) | >=3.0.1 | CVE-2026-3449 |
| ip-address (backend) | >=10.1.1 | CVE-2026-42338 |

PR #268 originally pinned axios to 1.14.0 to avoid a supply-chain
attack on a specific compromised version range. The 1.15.x series
are post-incident upstream releases — clean. Confirmed with the
maintainer before bumping.

* `npx tsc --noEmit` (frontend) — clean
* `npx vite build` (frontend) — clean (~4s, existing bundle-size
  warning, not new)
* Backend module-load smoke test — all critical modules load
  (`auth`, `adminAuth` middleware, `emailProcessor`, `recaptcha`,
  `storage`) with the new axios + nodemailer
* Lockfile re-verification — every targeted CVE now resolves to
  the patched version range

* npm-bundled CVEs inside `/usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm/` —
  picomatch CVE-2026-33671 (HIGH), CVE-2026-33672, brace-expansion
  CVE-2026-33750, ip-address (npm-internal) CVE-2026-42338. These
  live in the Node base image and require a Node base image bump
  with its own compatibility testing — separate PR.

Targeting `beta` so the bumps go through the normal release-please
flow before promotion to `main`.
2026-05-07 14:28:53 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 506b5c3dc4 Merge pull request #408 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-backend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-frontend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
chore(main): release 3.43.0
2026-05-07 13:00:20 +02:00
github-actions[bot] ab6db37326 chore(main): release 3.43.0 2026-05-07 10:59:36 +00:00
Paul Nothaft eb2ce290a7 Merge pull request #407 from the-luap/release/3.42.1-merge-from-beta
chore(release): promote beta → main as v3.42.1
2026-05-07 12:56:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8a4c1a7c0a chore(release): promote beta → main as v3.42.1
Stable release promoting the entire `beta` channel to `main`. Brings
~300 commits of features, fixes, and infrastructure improvements that
have been baked on the beta channel since v2.6.5.

## Major themes since v2.6.5

* Multi-administrator support with RBAC (super admin / admin / editor)
* Async upload pipeline (background worker pool for sharp/ffmpeg/EXIF/
  watermark/webhooks; bytes-on-wire returns 202)
* Self-hosted webfonts (filesystem-driven scanner; replaces Google Fonts
  CDN; GDPR-compliant)
* 8-token CI palette + force color mode (full theming across admin and
  public site, with WCAG-safe contrast helpers)
* Native multi-arch Docker images (Apple Silicon + ARM64 Linux native)
* Native S3 storage backend (S3 + S3-compatible providers)
* Comprehensive video support (MP4/WebM/MOV upload, stream, play)
* Outbound webhooks for event/photo lifecycle (HMAC-signed)
* Gallery layout overhaul (decoupled header style, banner option,
  theme-aware skeletons, lazy-loaded folder tree picker)
* Multilingual email templates (EN/DE/NL/PT/RU translations table)
* Bulk operations (delete with password gate, archive)
* Photo dimensions backfill (true masonry layout)
* Customer client access (review area before guest share)
* Image security (devtools detection, watermarking, right-click,
  secure thumbnails)

## Notable bug fixes from beta

* `/auth/session` symmetry — three rounds of fixes (#350, #355, #363,
  #398) for the admin-login redirect-loop family
* Email template renderer: handle {{#if}} conditionals, fix CSS leak in
  plain-text fallback, gate publish-from-draft password placeholder,
  gate external_url in public response
* Caller/template variable drift across gallery_created,
  expiration_warning, archive_complete, gallery_expired
* Full-URL gallery_link in all email types (was path-only in 3 sites)
* ffmpeg/ffprobe via apk for Alpine compatibility (was glibc-bundled)
* Admin events search and counters not bounded to first 100 (#346)

## Conflict resolution notes

* `README.md` — kept main's leaner v2.6.5 rewrite (#281); added a
  Contributors section adapted from PR #393.
* `DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE.md` — beta version (more recent, includes External
  Media docs already backported to main).
* `CHANGELOG.md` — new 3.42.1 entry leads, beta's 3.x history follows,
  main's 2.x entries appended below a divider so the historical chain
  is preserved.
* `package.json` (backend + frontend) — beta's structure with version
  bumped from `3.42.1-beta.0` → `3.42.1`.
* `package-lock.json` (backend + frontend) — regenerated via
  `npm install --package-lock-only`.
* `.release-please-manifest.json` — bumped from `2.6.5` → `3.42.1` so
  the next release-please run on main starts from the correct base.

## Pre-flight checks

* Frontend `tsc --noEmit` — clean
* Frontend `vite build` — clean (~3.5s, 2.6 MB main chunk; existing
  warning about chunking, not new)
* Backend `npm test` — pre-existing failures in 6 integration suites
  (DB-fixture-dependent, not regressions)
* Frontend `vitest` — pre-existing failures in
  ThemeCustomizerEnhanced.test.tsx (missing QueryClientProvider after
  PR #390 added useQuery; not a regression of this merge)

The pre-existing test failures are tracked as separate follow-ups and
do not block this release promotion.
2026-05-07 12:47:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 4d3836fb2e Merge pull request #282 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
chore(main): release 2.6.5
2026-04-08 13:18:17 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 75499992eb chore(main): release 2.6.5 2026-04-08 11:15:26 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 62643f241b Merge pull request #281 from the-luap/docs/readme-rewrite-main
docs: rewrite README — shorter, cleaner
2026-04-08 13:15:07 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 64f606152f docs: rewrite README — shorter, cleaner, less AI-sounding
Rewrote from 350 lines to ~130 lines. Removed emoji-heavy headings,
marketing fluff, redundant sections, and the AI disclosure. Collapsed
screenshots into details tags. Kept all essential info: demo, features,
quick start, comparison, tech stack, docs links.
2026-04-08 13:14:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e2a698e892 Merge pull request #277 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
chore(main): release 2.6.4
2026-04-08 09:39:15 +02:00
github-actions[bot] d1d71dba25 chore(main): release 2.6.4 2026-04-08 07:14:32 +00:00
Paul Nothaft bb81fa5f4b Merge pull request #276 from the-luap/fix/main-lockfile-sync
fix: sync backend package-lock.json for security deps
2026-04-08 09:14:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 03e19893b3 fix: sync backend package-lock.json with security dep updates
The lock file was not committed with PR #275, causing npm ci to fail
in Docker builds. Regenerate to match the updated package.json overrides.
2026-04-08 09:14:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 279314e4b7 Merge pull request #275 from the-luap/security/fix-dep-vulnerabilities-main
security: fix 20 dependency vulnerabilities (backport)
2026-04-08 09:05:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 730912a3f4 security: fix 20 dependency vulnerabilities (backport to main)
Same fixes as beta PR #274. Updates handlebars, nodemailer, tar,
fast-xml-parser, brace-expansion, path-to-regexp, and lodash to
address 20 GitHub code scanning alerts.
2026-04-08 09:05:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ff9fb64e75 Merge pull request #273 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
chore(main): release 2.6.3
2026-04-07 20:40:47 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 9cbbe74051 chore(main): release 2.6.3 2026-04-07 18:40:34 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 2e1c71c1ab Merge pull request #272 from the-luap/docs/external-media-library-270
docs: add External Media Library section to deployment guide (#270)
2026-04-07 20:40:11 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f6ca713a6e docs: add External Media Library section to deployment guide (#270)
Add the missing "External Media Library" chapter to DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE.md
that was referenced in the TOC but never written. Covers configuration,
Docker volume mounting, folder structure, usage workflow, limitations,
and troubleshooting.

Closes #270
2026-04-07 19:52:02 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 197cd8e1e0 Merge pull request #268 from the-luap/security/pin-axios-main
security: pin axios to 1.14.0 — supply chain attack prevention
2026-04-05 18:41:54 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 681b440381 security: pin axios to 1.14.0 to prevent supply chain attack
Axios versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 were compromised on March 31, 2026
with a RAT dropper attributed to North Korean threat actor. Pin to
exact 1.14.0 (latest safe release) to prevent resolution to compromised
versions. See https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/10604
2026-04-05 18:41:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3daeac9e53 Merge pull request #246 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
chore(main): release 2.6.2
2026-03-16 22:37:56 +01:00
github-actions[bot] 7febba2d9c chore(main): release 2.6.2 2026-03-16 21:37:35 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 0a3a53763c Merge pull request #245 from the-luap/fix/security-session-invalidation-main
fix(security): token invalidation on password change, session timeout enforcement
2026-03-16 22:37:16 +01:00
Paul Nothaft 85a60a2dc7 fix(security): invalidate tokens on password change, enforce session timeout, fix role update
- Set password_changed_at when changing password via adminAuth route so
  existing JWT tokens are rejected by the auth middleware check
- Enforce session timeout on first request with unseen tokens by checking
  token iat against configured timeout (prevents bypass after server restart)
- Convert camelCase roleId/isActive to snake_case role_id/is_active in
  frontend updateUser service (fixes silent role update failures)

Resolves GHSA-rqg3-47p5-vgwg
2026-03-16 22:36:52 +01:00
Paul Nothaft e74e73a3a0 Merge pull request #231 from the-luap/i18n/ru-missing-keys
i18n: add missing Russian translations for thumbnails and photo dimensions
2026-03-15 20:01:15 +01:00
467 changed files with 42316 additions and 19509 deletions
+21 -8
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,11 @@
# Environment
NODE_ENV=production
# JWT Secret (generate with: openssl rand -base64 64)
JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here
# JWT Secret — OPTIONAL. Leave unset and it is auto-generated on first run
# (Docker: the secrets-init service writes it to a private volume and reuses it
# across restarts). Set it explicitly only to pin your own value.
# Generate one with: openssl rand -base64 64
#JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here
# Auth cookie Secure flag
# unset - default: follows NODE_ENV (production=true, dev=false)
@@ -38,19 +41,29 @@ JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here
# Database Configuration (PostgreSQL)
DATABASE_CLIENT=pg
DB_USER=picpeak
# DB_PASSWORD — OPTIONAL. Leave unset and it is auto-generated on first run
# (Docker). Set it explicitly to pin your own, e.g. for an external database.
# IMPORTANT: Avoid $ character in passwords - Docker Compose interprets it as variable substitution
# If you must use $, escape it as $$ (e.g., Pass$$word instead of Pass$word)
DB_PASSWORD=your_secure_postgres_password_here
#DB_PASSWORD=your_secure_postgres_password_here
DB_NAME=picpeak_prod
# Redis Configuration
# REDIS_PASSWORD — OPTIONAL. Leave unset and it is auto-generated on first run (Docker).
# IMPORTANT: Same warning applies - avoid $ or escape as $$
REDIS_PASSWORD=your_secure_redis_password_here
#REDIS_PASSWORD=your_secure_redis_password_here
# Admin Account (initial setup)
ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@yourdomain.com
ADMIN_PASSWORD=your_secure_admin_password_here
# Admin Account (initial setup) — OPTIONAL
# Leave these unset (default) to create your admin IN THE BROWSER on first run:
# open /admin and PicPeak shows a setup screen. The one-time setup token is
# written to data/SETUP_TOKEN with mode 0600 — read it with
# `docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN`. It is NOT logged
# unless that write fails, so it never sits in `docker logs`.
# Set ADMIN_PASSWORD to auto-create the admin on first boot instead (legacy;
# credentials written to data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt).
#ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
#ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@yourdomain.com
#ADMIN_PASSWORD=your_secure_admin_password_here
# Email Configuration
# For Gmail: use app-specific password
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# These are supported funding model platforms
# https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/displaying-a-sponsor-button-in-your-repository
buy_me_a_coffee: theluap
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
blank_issues_enabled: false
contact_links:
- name: 📚 Documentation
url: https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/blob/main/DEPLOYMENT.md
url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/blob/main/DEPLOYMENT.md
about: Please read the documentation before opening an issue
- name: 💬 Discussions
url: https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/discussions
url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions
about: Ask questions and discuss with the community
- name: 🔒 Security Issues
url: https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/blob/main/SECURITY.md
url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/blob/main/SECURITY.md
about: Please review our security policy for reporting vulnerabilities
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ assignees: ''
⚠️ **IMPORTANT: For serious security vulnerabilities, please DO NOT create a public issue.**
Instead, please use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/security/advisories/new) or email **info@picpeak.app** with the details.
Instead, please use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new) or email **info@picpeak.app** with the details.
For minor security improvements or questions, you can use this template:
+9 -9
View File
@@ -42,16 +42,16 @@ Once published, images can be pulled using:
```bash
# Pull backend image
docker pull ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:latest
docker pull ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:latest
# Pull frontend image
docker pull ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/frontend:latest
docker pull ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/frontend:latest
# Pull specific version
docker pull ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:v1.0.0
docker pull ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:v1.0.0
# Pull for specific architecture
docker pull --platform linux/arm64 ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:latest
docker pull --platform linux/arm64 ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:latest
```
### Using in Docker Compose
@@ -61,14 +61,14 @@ version: '3.8'
services:
backend:
image: ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:latest
image: ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:latest
environment:
- NODE_ENV=production
ports:
- "3001:3000"
frontend:
image: ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/frontend:latest
image: ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/frontend:latest
ports:
- "80:80"
```
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ spec:
spec:
containers:
- name: backend
image: ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:latest
image: ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:latest
imagePullPolicy: Always
```
@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ If images aren't visible after successful push:
### View Packages
Your Docker images are available at:
- Backend: `https://github.com/users/the-luap/packages/container/package/picpeak%2Fbackend`
- Frontend: `https://github.com/users/the-luap/packages/container/package/picpeak%2Ffrontend`
- Backend: `https://github.com/orgs/PicPeak/packages/container/package/picpeak%2Fbackend`
- Frontend: `https://github.com/orgs/PicPeak/packages/container/package/picpeak%2Ffrontend`
### Delete Old Versions
+70
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
name: Bypass size gate
# Caps how large a PR a "review-bypass" collaborator (e.g. @Luca-Timo) can
# self-merge without a maintainer review. The branch-protection bypass list
# alone is binary — once a user is on it they can merge anything without
# review. This workflow reports a REQUIRED status check that fails when a
# bypass user's PR exceeds the configured size threshold, which blocks the
# merge even with bypass enabled. Other contributors are unaffected (the
# check reports success for them so the required-check gate doesn't trip).
#
# To tune: edit LINE_LIMIT or BYPASS_USERS below.
#
# Trigger note: uses `pull_request_target` so the workflow has the elevated
# permissions of the base repo's GITHUB_TOKEN (read PR metadata, write
# checks). The script never executes code FROM the PR — it only reads
# metadata via the API — so this is safe against fork-PR attacks.
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, reopened, synchronize, ready_for_review]
permissions:
pull-requests: read
checks: write
jobs:
size-gate:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Compute PR size and report check status
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
script: |
// Tune these two constants if the policy shifts.
const LINE_LIMIT = 300;
const BYPASS_USERS = ['Luca-Timo'];
const pr = context.payload.pull_request;
const author = pr.user.login;
const linesChanged = pr.additions + pr.deletions;
const filesChanged = pr.changed_files;
let conclusion, title, summary;
if (!BYPASS_USERS.includes(author)) {
// Not a bypass user — this gate doesn't apply to them. They
// go through normal review. Report success so the required
// check doesn't block their merge.
conclusion = 'success';
title = 'Not applicable';
summary = `This gate only restricts review-bypass for: ${BYPASS_USERS.join(', ')}. PRs from other authors (${author} here) go through the normal review path and are unaffected.`;
} else if (linesChanged <= LINE_LIMIT) {
conclusion = 'success';
title = `OK — within bypass limit (${linesChanged} lines)`;
summary = `Small PR: ${linesChanged} lines changed across ${filesChanged} file(s). Within the ${LINE_LIMIT}-line self-merge limit for @${author}. Can be merged without a maintainer review.`;
} else {
conclusion = 'failure';
title = `Too large for bypass (${linesChanged} lines)`;
summary = `Large PR: ${linesChanged} lines changed across ${filesChanged} file(s). Exceeds the ${LINE_LIMIT}-line self-merge limit for @${author} — needs an approving review from a maintainer before merge. Split into smaller PRs or wait for review.`;
}
await github.rest.checks.create({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
name: 'bypass-size-gate',
head_sha: pr.head.sha,
status: 'completed',
conclusion,
output: { title, summary }
});
+52 -11
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
name: Build and Push Docker Images
# This workflow is triggered by:
# - Push to main/beta branches (builds 'latest'/'stable' or 'beta' tagged images)
# - Push to main/stable branches (main → ':main' rolling tag for active-dev
# builds; stable → ':stable' + ':latest' for the curated channel)
# - Version tags from Release Please (e.g., v1.2.0 -> builds versioned images)
# - GitHub Releases (created by Release Please)
# - Pull requests (build verification only, no push by default)
@@ -20,10 +21,10 @@ name: Build and Push Docker Images
on:
push:
branches: [ main, beta ]
branches: [ main, stable ]
tags: [ 'v*.*.*', 'v*.*.*-beta.*' ] # Triggered by Release Please tags (stable and beta)
pull_request:
branches: [ main, beta ]
branches: [ main, stable ]
release:
types: [ published ] # Triggered when Release Please creates a release
workflow_dispatch:
@@ -37,6 +38,16 @@ on:
- 'true'
- 'false'
# Once release-please authors releases with a PAT (#719), a new version fires
# BOTH the tag-push and the release-published triggers (GITHUB_TOKEN used to
# suppress them). They build the same immutable version, so collapse them into a
# single run by grouping on the ref. Branch and PR builds use different refs and
# still run independently; a superseding push cancels an in-flight run for the
# same ref (only the newest build per ref is kept).
concurrency:
group: docker-build-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
REGISTRY: ghcr.io
# BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME and FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME are computed per job in the
@@ -192,6 +203,14 @@ jobs:
format: 'sarif'
output: 'trivy-backend-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }}.sarif'
severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
# Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not actionable: the
# Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a CACHEBUST,
# so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting them
# buries the findings someone can actually do something about.
# Dropping them is also the precondition for ever setting
# exit-code: 1, which build-backend's comment flags as a
# deliberate follow-up.
ignore-unfixed: true
timeout: '10m'
- name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
@@ -245,7 +264,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Determine build context
id: context
run: |
if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/tags/v*-beta* ]] || [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/heads/beta ]]; then
if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/tags/v*-beta* ]] || [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/heads/main ]]; then
# Active-dev branch (`main`, renamed from `beta` per #669) produces
# prereleases; the `-beta.N` version-suffix scheme is unchanged.
echo "channel=beta" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "is_prerelease=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
else
@@ -270,9 +291,14 @@ jobs:
type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
type=semver,pattern={{major}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
type=sha,format=short
type=raw,value=latest,enable={{is_default_branch}}
type=raw,value=stable,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
type=raw,value=beta,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/beta' || steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'true' }}
# `:latest` + `:stable` follow the stable channel (the `stable` branch +
# stable release tags). The default branch is now `main` (active dev),
# so `is_default_branch` no longer maps to "stable" — be explicit.
type=raw,value=latest,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/stable' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
type=raw,value=stable,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/stable' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
# `:beta` is RETIRED post-rename (Option B / #669). Active-dev pulls
# are `:main` (auto via type=ref,event=branch). The pre-rename `:beta`
# tag remains frozen at its last build — operators should update.
- name: Create and push multi-arch manifest
working-directory: /tmp/digests
@@ -407,6 +433,14 @@ jobs:
format: 'sarif'
output: 'trivy-frontend-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }}.sarif'
severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
# Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not actionable: the
# Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a CACHEBUST,
# so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting them
# buries the findings someone can actually do something about.
# Dropping them is also the precondition for ever setting
# exit-code: 1, which build-backend's comment flags as a
# deliberate follow-up.
ignore-unfixed: true
timeout: '10m'
- name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
@@ -455,7 +489,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Determine build context
id: context
run: |
if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/tags/v*-beta* ]] || [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/heads/beta ]]; then
if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/tags/v*-beta* ]] || [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/heads/main ]]; then
# Active-dev branch (`main`, renamed from `beta` per #669) produces
# prereleases; the `-beta.N` version-suffix scheme is unchanged.
echo "channel=beta" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "is_prerelease=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
else
@@ -480,9 +516,14 @@ jobs:
type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
type=semver,pattern={{major}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
type=sha,format=short
type=raw,value=latest,enable={{is_default_branch}}
type=raw,value=stable,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
type=raw,value=beta,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/beta' || steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'true' }}
# `:latest` + `:stable` follow the stable channel (the `stable` branch +
# stable release tags). The default branch is now `main` (active dev),
# so `is_default_branch` no longer maps to "stable" — be explicit.
type=raw,value=latest,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/stable' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
type=raw,value=stable,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/stable' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
# `:beta` is RETIRED post-rename (Option B / #669). Active-dev pulls
# are `:main` (auto via type=ref,event=branch). The pre-rename `:beta`
# tag remains frozen at its last build — operators should update.
- name: Create and push multi-arch manifest
working-directory: /tmp/digests
+9 -16
View File
@@ -16,24 +16,17 @@ name: Fresh-install smoke
# don't pay the build cost.
on:
# No `paths:` filter — branch protection on `main` + `stable` lists
# `fresh-install` as a REQUIRED check, and a path-filtered trigger
# that skipped on unrelated PRs (e.g. frontend-only) would leave the
# required check "missing" forever and block the merge. Better to
# pay the boot cost on every PR than maintain a per-path allowlist
# that drifts as the install surface evolves. (Branches also updated
# post-#669 rename: beta → main, old main → stable.)
push:
branches: [main, beta]
paths:
- 'backend/Dockerfile'
- 'backend/wait-for-db.sh'
- 'backend/migrations/**'
- 'backend/package*.json'
- 'docker-compose.production.yml'
- '.github/workflows/install-smoke.yml'
branches: [main, stable]
pull_request:
branches: [main, beta]
paths:
- 'backend/Dockerfile'
- 'backend/wait-for-db.sh'
- 'backend/migrations/**'
- 'backend/package*.json'
- 'docker-compose.production.yml'
- '.github/workflows/install-smoke.yml'
branches: [main, stable]
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
name: PR Title Lint
# Release Please derives version bumps and the changelog from Conventional
# Commit prefixes (feat:, fix:, ...). PRs whose title/commits use other
# conventions (e.g. gitmoji) are silently ignored, so their changes ship
# without a version bump or a changelog entry. This check fails a PR whose
# title is not a valid Conventional Commit so the release stays automated.
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened]
permissions:
pull-requests: read
jobs:
lint-pr-title:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Validate PR title is a Conventional Commit
uses: amannn/action-semantic-pull-request@v5
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
with:
types: |
feat
fix
perf
revert
docs
style
chore
refactor
test
build
ci
+54 -3
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: Release Please (Beta)
on:
push:
branches: [beta]
branches: [main]
permissions:
contents: write
@@ -20,10 +20,48 @@ jobs:
uses: googleapis/release-please-action@v4
id: release
with:
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# A dedicated token (fine-grained PAT) makes the release PR run CI
# automatically (no "workflows awaiting approval") and lets it be
# merged without a manual review. Falls back to GITHUB_TOKEN so the
# workflow still works before the secret is added (#719).
token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
config-file: release-please-config-beta.json
manifest-file: .release-please-manifest-beta.json
target-branch: beta
target-branch: main
# Auto-approve + enable auto-merge on the open release PR so betas publish
# with no manual clicks. Approval uses GITHUB_TOKEN (github-actions[bot]) —
# a different identity than the PR author (RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN) — so it is
# a valid review (requires the org's "Allow GitHub Actions to approve pull
# requests" + the repo's "Allow auto-merge"). Only meaningful when a PAT is
# set: without it the PR is bot-authored and can't be self-approved, so we
# skip and leave today's manual flow. Best-effort — never blocks the run.
- name: Auto-approve and enable auto-merge on the release PR
if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created != 'true' }}
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
# This job has no checkout, so gh can't infer the repo from a git
# remote — set it explicitly (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: |
if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping auto-merge (manual review still required)."
exit 0
fi
pr=$(gh pr list --head release-please--branches--main --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number // empty')
if [ -n "$pr" ]; then
# Approve as github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN) — a different identity
# than the PR author (the PAT) — so it counts as a valid review.
gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — release-please version bump + changelog (#719)." || true
# Enable auto-merge as the PAT so the eventual merge commit is
# attributed to a real identity. If enabled via GITHUB_TOKEN the merge
# push is suppressed by recursion prevention and the follow-up run that
# cuts the tag/release never fires (#719).
GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto || true
else
echo "No open release PR to auto-merge."
fi
- name: Output Release Info
if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
@@ -35,3 +73,16 @@ jobs:
echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "Docker images will be built and tagged with this beta version." >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
# Best-effort "What's New" highlights on the freshly-created release. Runs in
# this same workflow run (not a `release:` trigger) because release-please
# creates the release with GITHUB_TOKEN, which never starts new workflow runs.
whatsnew:
needs: release-please
if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created }}
permissions:
contents: write # edit the release body
models: read # GitHub Models (free tier)
uses: ./.github/workflows/whatsnew-highlights.yml
with:
tag: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+25 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: Release Please
on:
push:
branches: [main]
branches: [stable]
permissions:
contents: write
@@ -20,9 +20,19 @@ jobs:
uses: googleapis/release-please-action@v4
id: release
with:
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# Dedicated token so the release PR runs CI + can auto-merge without a
# manual review. Falls back to GITHUB_TOKEN before the secret is set (#719).
token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
config-file: release-please-config.json
manifest-file: .release-please-manifest.json
target-branch: stable
# NOTE: stable release PRs are intentionally NOT auto-merged here
# anymore. Fixes accumulate in the rolling release PR and are cut as
# ONE patch version per day by release-stable-daily.yml (18:00 UTC,
# or on demand via workflow_dispatch / a manual merge of the release
# PR). Beta keeps instant releases — see release-please-beta.yml —
# because same-day reporter verification depends on it.
- name: Output Release Info
if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
@@ -34,3 +44,16 @@ jobs:
echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "Docker images will be built and tagged with this version." >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
# Best-effort "What's New" highlights on the freshly-created release. Runs in
# this same workflow run (not a `release:` trigger) because release-please
# creates the release with GITHUB_TOKEN, which never starts new workflow runs.
whatsnew:
needs: release-please
if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created }}
permissions:
contents: write # edit the release body
models: read # GitHub Models (free tier)
uses: ./.github/workflows/whatsnew-highlights.yml
with:
tag: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
name: Cut Stable Release (daily batch)
# Stable fixes accumulate in release-please's rolling release PR instead of
# each cutting its own patch version (the old per-merge auto-merge produced
# e.g. 3.45.8 AND 3.45.9 on the same day). This workflow merges the open
# stable release PR once a day, so a day of N bugfixes ships as ONE version
# with all N changelog entries — and one Docker build instead of N.
#
# - schedule only fires from the default branch (main); the stable copy of
# this file is inert and exists to keep the branches in sync.
# - Need a release NOW? Run this via workflow_dispatch, or merge the
# release PR by hand — the schedule is a default, not a gate.
# - Approval/merge mechanics mirror the old inline step (#719): approve as
# github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN, a valid distinct reviewer), enable
# auto-merge as the PAT so the merge attributes to a real identity and
# triggers the tag-cutting run. --auto waits for green checks.
on:
schedule:
- cron: '0 18 * * *'
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
jobs:
merge-stable-release-pr:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Approve and enable auto-merge on the open stable release PR
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
# No checkout — set the repo explicitly so gh works without a
# git remote (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: |
if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping (manual review required)."
exit 0
fi
# Strict selection (review P1): this job runs daily even without a
# stable push, and `gh pr list --head` matches the branch NAME only
# — a fork PR can spoof `release-please--branches--stable`. Pin the
# base to stable AND require a same-repo head (isCrossRepository
# == false); a fork PR is cross-repository, so it can never be
# picked and auto-merged with the privileged PAT.
pr=$(gh pr list \
--base stable \
--head release-please--branches--stable \
--state open \
--json number,isCrossRepository \
--jq '[.[] | select(.isCrossRepository == false)] | .[0].number // empty')
if [ -z "$pr" ]; then
echo "No open same-repo stable release PR — nothing to cut today."
exit 0
fi
# Approve is tolerant — a pre-existing approval already satisfies
# branch protection and re-approving can return non-zero.
gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — daily stable release batch (release-please version bump + changelog)." || echo "::warning::approve returned non-zero (PR may already be approved)"
# But the auto-merge enable is the load-bearing step: this scheduled
# job is the ONLY automatic stable cut, so DON'T swallow its failure
# (review P2) — an expired/under-scoped PAT would otherwise stop
# releases while the workflow stays green.
GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto
# `gh pr merge --auto` merges IMMEDIATELY when the required checks
# are already green — the normal case at 18:00, since the fixes
# merged hours earlier and CI passed. So success is EITHER the PR is
# already merged OR an auto-merge request is now pending; only a PR
# that is still open with no auto-merge request is a real failure
# (expired/under-scoped PAT) worth failing the job on (review round 2).
# One snapshot of both fields (review round 3): querying state and
# autoMergeRequest separately races — auto-merge can complete
# between the two calls, so the first sees OPEN and the second sees
# the request already cleared on the now-merged PR → false failure.
read -r state automerge < <(gh pr view "$pr" --json state,autoMergeRequest \
--jq '[.state, (.autoMergeRequest != null)] | @tsv')
if [ "$state" = "MERGED" ]; then
echo "Stable release PR #$pr merged immediately (checks were already green)."
elif [ "$automerge" = "true" ]; then
echo "Auto-merge enabled on stable release PR #$pr — merges when checks are green."
else
echo "::error::stable release PR #$pr is still open with no auto-merge — check RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN scope/expiry."
exit 1
fi
+9 -12
View File
@@ -30,20 +30,17 @@ name: Schema drift (#530)
# the same shape is caught before merge.
on:
# No `paths:` filter — branch protection on `main` + `stable` lists
# `upgrade-from-bootstrap` as a REQUIRED check. A path-filtered
# trigger that skipped on unrelated PRs would leave the required
# check "missing" forever, blocking every PR that doesn't touch
# migrations. The ~75-second cost on every PR buys an unconditional
# safety net. (Branches also updated post-#669 rename: beta → main,
# old main → stable.)
push:
branches: [main, beta]
paths:
- 'backend/migrations/**'
- 'backend/src/database/db.js'
- 'backend/knexfile.js'
- '.github/workflows/schema-drift.yml'
branches: [main, stable]
pull_request:
branches: [main, beta]
paths:
- 'backend/migrations/**'
- 'backend/src/database/db.js'
- 'backend/knexfile.js'
- '.github/workflows/schema-drift.yml'
branches: [main, stable]
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
+28 -2
View File
@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ name: Tests
on:
push:
branches: [main, beta]
branches: [main, beta, stable]
pull_request:
branches: [main, beta]
branches: [main, beta, stable]
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
@@ -30,6 +30,29 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
# The .picpeak restore suites gate their real-Postgres cases behind
# PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL and `describe.skip` themselves out when it is
# unset — so until now they never ran here. That hid the half that
# matters: sequence resync, operator/role preservation across a
# cross-instance restore, and (with #1041) whether a SQLite-shaped
# row actually lands in Postgres with the right STORED VALUES rather
# than merely not throwing. Everything else in the suite still runs
# on SQLite; this service only un-gates those cases.
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:15-alpine
env:
POSTGRES_USER: picpeak
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: testpass
POSTGRES_DB: picpeak_test
options: >-
--health-cmd "pg_isready -U picpeak -d picpeak_test"
--health-interval 2s
--health-timeout 2s
--health-retries 30
ports:
- 5432:5432
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -52,6 +75,9 @@ jobs:
# The S3 path itself is covered separately by the integration
# suite when MinIO is provisioned.
SKIP_S3_TESTS: 'true'
# Un-gates the real-Postgres cases in the .picpeak restore suites
# (see the `services:` note above). Absent it they silently skip.
PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL: 'postgres://picpeak:testpass@127.0.0.1:5432/picpeak_test'
run: |
# Excluded suites — fail on upstream/beta too, tracked
# separately as test-infra debt:
+98
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
# What's New highlights — GitHub Models release step (reusable)
#
# Called by the release-please workflows AFTER a release is created
# (release-please.yml for `stable`, release-please-beta.yml for `main`). It runs
# as a job in the SAME workflow run rather than on its own `release: published`
# trigger, because release-please creates the release with the default
# GITHUB_TOKEN and GitHub does not start new workflow runs from token-generated
# events — a standalone `release:` workflow would simply never fire.
#
# What it does: condenses the new release's "### Features" into <=8 short
# bullets via GitHub Models (free tier, `models: read`) and injects a
# `<!-- whatsnew -->` block at the top of the release notes. The app reads that
# block (backend utils/whatsNew.parseWhatsNew) and falls back to the raw
# Features list for releases without it — so this is purely a quality upgrade,
# never a hard dependency. Failure is isolated by `continue-on-error` + the
# deterministic fallback below, so it can never break a release.
#
# GitHub Models is OPTIONAL. If it is disabled/unavailable for the org the AI
# step fails soft (continue-on-error) and the deterministic fallback produces
# the bullets instead — the feature works either way, Models just polishes them.
#
# Validated end-to-end on a fork (extract -> openai/gpt-4o-mini -> inject into
# real release notes; app parseWhatsNew() reads the block back).
name: What's New highlights
on:
workflow_call:
inputs:
tag:
description: Release tag to annotate (e.g. v2.3.0)
required: true
type: string
jobs:
highlights:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write # to edit the release body
models: read # GitHub Models (free tier)
# GH_REPO at job scope so every `gh` call targets the right repo without
# needing an actions/checkout step. Without this, `gh` falls back to
# parsing `.git/config` in the runner's empty workspace and dies with
# "fatal: not a git repository" — which hard-fails the whole job before
# any continue-on-error can save it.
env:
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
steps:
- name: Extract Features from the published release
id: feat
# Belt-and-braces: the job-level comment says "never let highlights
# break a release", but the original wiring only marked the AI +
# inject steps as continue-on-error. A hiccup here (rate limit,
# transient API error) would still hard-fail the job. Match the
# design intent and fail soft.
continue-on-error: true
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
run: |
BODY=$(gh release view "$TAG" --json body -q .body)
FEATURES=$(printf '%s\n' "$BODY" | awk '/^#{2,4} +Features/{f=1;next} /^#{1,4} +\S/{f=0} f')
{ echo "features<<EOF"; printf '%s\n' "$FEATURES"; echo EOF; } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Summarize with GitHub Models
if: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features != '' }}
id: ai
continue-on-error: true # Models may be disabled/unavailable for the org; fall back deterministically below
uses: actions/ai-inference@v1
with:
model: openai/gpt-4o-mini # catalog id (verified present); openai/gpt-4.1-mini or openai/gpt-5-nano also work
system-prompt: >
You write release highlights for the admins of a self-hosted
photo-gallery + CRM app. Given raw changelog "Features" lines, output
AT MOST 8 markdown bullets, each 3-4 words, user-facing, no scopes,
no jargon, no issue numbers. One bullet per distinct user-visible
feature. Output ONLY "- " bullets, nothing else.
prompt: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features }}
- name: Inject the What's New block
if: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features != '' }}
continue-on-error: true # never let highlights break a release
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
AI: ${{ steps.ai.outputs.response }}
FEATURES: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features }}
run: |
BULLETS="$AI"
# Deterministic fallback if the model returned nothing (e.g. Models not yet enabled).
if [ -z "$BULLETS" ]; then
BULLETS=$(printf '%s\n' "$FEATURES" | head -8 \
| sed -E 's/^\* \*\*[^:]+:\*\* */- /; s/ \(\[[^]]*\]\([^)]*\)\)//g')
fi
BODY=$(gh release view "$TAG" --json body -q .body)
# Idempotent: strip any prior block before re-injecting.
BODY=$(printf '%s' "$BODY" | perl -0pe 's/<!--\s*whatsnew\s*-->.*?<!--\s*\/whatsnew\s*-->\n*//is')
gh release edit "$TAG" --notes "$(printf '<!-- whatsnew -->\n%s\n<!-- /whatsnew -->\n\n%s' "$BULLETS" "$BODY")"
+5 -2
View File
@@ -130,5 +130,8 @@ docker-compose.dev.yml
# New layout development files
new-layouts/
# Generated CRM/accounting documents (runtime) — never commit
backend/storage/business-docs/
# Backend runtime storage (generated media, previews, thumbnails,
# CRM/accounting documents) — never commit. Matches main: a dev instance
# writes event photos into backend/storage/, and the narrower
# business-docs-only rule let `git add -A` sweep them into a commit.
backend/storage/
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
{
".": "3.72.0-beta.0"
".": "3.83.0-beta.0"
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -1,3 +1 @@
{
".": "2.6.1"
}
{".":"3.46.2"}
+958 -788
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+1 -1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ We are committed to providing a welcoming and inspiring community for all photog
## Enforcement
Instances of unacceptable behavior may be reported by [opening an issue](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues/new?labels=conduct) on GitHub. All complaints will be reviewed and investigated promptly and fairly.
Instances of unacceptable behavior may be reported by [opening an issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=conduct) on GitHub. All complaints will be reviewed and investigated promptly and fairly.
## Attribution
+33 -9
View File
@@ -33,12 +33,12 @@ Enhancement suggestions are tracked as GitHub issues. When creating an enhanceme
Unsure where to begin? You can start by looking through these issues:
* [Good first issues](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/labels/good%20first%20issue) - issues which should only require a few lines of code
* [Help wanted issues](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/labels/help%20wanted) - issues which need extra attention
* [Good first issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/labels/good%20first%20issue) - issues which should only require a few lines of code
* [Help wanted issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/labels/help%20wanted) - issues which need extra attention
### Pull Requests
1. **Fork the repo** and create your branch from `beta`
1. **Fork the repo** and create your branch from `main` (active development)
2. **Install dependencies**:
```bash
cd backend && npm install
@@ -50,7 +50,10 @@ Unsure where to begin? You can start by looking through these issues:
- Linting passes: `npm run lint`
4. **Write tests** if you've added code
5. **Update documentation** if needed
6. **Create a Pull Request**
6. **Attach a screenshot for any UI change** (see below)
7. **Create a Pull Request**
> **📸 Screenshots are required for UI changes.** Any PR that changes a user-facing surface — a component, page, layout, style, or in-app copy — must include at least one screenshot of the result in the PR description, showing before/after where it helps reviewers see the difference. PRs that touch the UI without a screenshot will be asked to add one before review. Backend-only or otherwise non-visual changes don't need one.
## 💻 Development Setup
@@ -153,16 +156,37 @@ picpeak/
│ └── public/ # Static assets
```
## 🌿 Branch model
PicPeak runs on two long-lived branches:
| Branch | Role | What targets it |
|---|---|---|
| **`main`** | Active development. The next release is being assembled here. | Feature PRs. Most bugfix PRs. |
| **`stable`** | Curated release channel. Production-recommended. | Urgent bugfix backports only — small, surgical PRs that land cleanly without dragging in unrelated changes. |
### Which branch should my PR target?
- **New feature** → target `main`.
- **Bugfix that ONLY affects active dev** → target `main`.
- **Bugfix that current stable users need** → open a small PR against `main`, AND a separate small PR against `stable` with the same change. Keep both surgical so each lands cleanly.
**Hard rule on PR scope**: bugfix PRs against `stable` must be small enough to backport without conflict. Omnibus PRs (e.g. five unrelated sub-features) are fine for `main`, but never for `stable` — they make the next `main → stable` merge painful and break the "stable is always shippable" invariant.
If you're not sure which branch to target, default to `main` and a maintainer will retarget during review.
## 🔄 Release Process
Releases are cut from the `beta` branch (rolling beta) and promoted to `main` (stable) on a 46 week cadence. `release-please` handles version bumps, changelog generation, and Docker image publication automatically — contributors don't update `package.json` or `CHANGELOG.md` by hand.
Releases are cut independently from `main` (pre-release versions for the active channel) and `stable` (semver releases for the curated channel). `release-please` handles version bumps, changelog generation, and Docker image publication automatically — contributors don't update `package.json` or `CHANGELOG.md` by hand.
See [RELEASING.md](RELEASING.md) for the full operational doc (promotion criteria, conflict-resolution checklist for the beta→main merge, hotfix backport path, versioning rules).
Periodic `main → stable` merges promote a batch of `main` work to the stable channel. The maintainer chooses when (typically every ~4 weeks, sooner if a hot bug demands it).
See [RELEASING.md](RELEASING.md) for the full operational doc (promotion criteria, conflict-resolution checklist for the `main → stable` merge, hotfix backport path, versioning rules).
## 📮 Contact
- Create an [issue](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues) for bugs or features
- Join [discussions](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/discussions) for questions
- Security issues: Open a [security issue](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub
- Create an [issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) for bugs or features
- Join [discussions](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions) for questions
- Security issues: Open a [security issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub
Thank you for contributing! 🎉
+51 -18
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@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
# 📸 PicPeak - Open Source Photo Sharing for Events
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **PicPeak has moved to its own GitHub organization.**
>
> - **Docker images** are now published at `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/{backend,frontend}`. The old path (`ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/...`) is no longer served — update your `docker-compose.yml`.
> - **Branches**: active development is now on `main` (was `beta`); the curated stable channel is now `stable` (was `main`). Existing PRs and clones auto-redirect via GitHub.
>
> See **[`docs/migration-to-org.md`](docs/migration-to-org.md)** for the one-line `docker-compose.yml` edit and full details.
<div align="center">
<img src="docs/picpeak-logo.png" alt="PicPeak Logo" width="300" />
@@ -83,21 +91,39 @@ Get PicPeak running in under 5 minutes:
```bash
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak.git
git clone https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak.git
cd picpeak
# Copy environment template
# Copy the environment template — the defaults work out of the box.
# Machine secrets (JWT, DB, Redis) are auto-generated on first run, and the
# admin account is created in the browser (see below). Edit .env only to
# customise (domain, SMTP, storage paths, …) — nothing is required.
cp .env.example .env
# Edit configuration (required: JWT_SECRET)
nano .env
# Start with Docker Compose
docker compose up -d
# Access at http://localhost:3000
```
### First run — create your admin account
On first start with no `ADMIN_PASSWORD` set, PicPeak has **no admin account yet** and greets you with an in-browser setup screen — no credentials in `.env`:
1. Open **http://localhost:3000/admin** — you'll be redirected to `/setup`.
2. Read the **one-time setup token** from the 0600 file the backend writes it to
(it is deliberately *not* printed to the logs — that would leave a live
bootstrap credential in `docker logs`):
```bash
docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN
```
It is bind-mounted, so `sudo cat data/SETUP_TOKEN` on the host works too. Only
if that file could not be written does the backend fall back to logging the
token (`docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`).
3. Paste the token, set your admin **email + password**, and you're in. The token is single-use, and the setup screen closes permanently once an admin exists.
> Prefer the old behaviour? Set `ADMIN_PASSWORD` in `.env` and PicPeak auto-creates the admin on first boot instead (credentials written to `data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt`).
Note on Docker file permissions
- The backend container starts as root, chowns bind-mounted host directories (`./storage`, `./data`, `./logs`) to UID 1001 (`nodejs`), then drops privileges via `su-exec` before running the app. No host-side setup needed for fresh installs.
- If you pin `user:` in a compose override (e.g. to map a specific host UID), the self-chown is skipped and you must pre-chown the host directories to that UID — see [docs.picpeak.app/deployment/docker#permissions](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/docker#permissions).
@@ -370,17 +396,23 @@ See our [Contributing Guide](CONTRIBUTING.md) for details.
## 📊 Comparison with Alternatives
| Feature | PicPeak | PicDrop | Scrapbook.de |
|---------|---------|---------|--------------|
| Self-Hosted | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Custom Branding | ✅ Full | Limited | Limited |
| Monthly Cost | $0 | $29-199 | €19-99 |
| Storage Limit | Unlimited* | 50-500GB | 100-1000GB |
| Client Uploads | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| API Access | ✅ | Paid | ❌ |
| Open Source | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Feature | PicPeak | PicDrop | Scrapbook.de | Pixieset |
|---------|---------|---------|--------------|----------|
| Self-Hosted | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Custom Branding | ✅ Full | Limited | Limited | ✅ (paid) |
| Monthly Cost | $0* | $29-199 | €19-99 | ~$60 |
| Storage Limit | Unlimited** | 50-500GB | 100-1000GB | 3GBUnlimited*** |
| Client Uploads | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Limited |
| API Access | ✅ | Paid | ❌ | ❌ |
| Open Source | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Customer Accounts | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Quotes / Contracts / Invoices | 🧪 Beta | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Incoming Invoices & Accounting | 🧪 Beta | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
*Limited only by your server storage
*You still bring your own server (own hardware or a VPS) and, if you want one, a domain.
**Limited only by your server storage.
***Pixieset's "unlimited" is photos only; video is capped by plan (roughly 010 h depending on tier).
🧪 Beta = built but feature-flagged off by default (see [Beta Features](#-beta-features-use-at-your-own-risk)).
## 🛡️ Security
@@ -392,7 +424,7 @@ PicPeak takes security seriously:
- 📝 Activity logging
- 🔒 Secure file access
Found a security issue? Please open a [security issue](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub
Found a security issue? Please open a [security issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub
## 📸 Screenshots
@@ -476,6 +508,7 @@ PicPeak is inspired by the best features of commercial platforms while remaining
A huge thank you to the people whose code, reports, and feedback have shaped PicPeak:
- [**@the-luap**](https://github.com/the-luap) — creator and lead maintainer. Started the project and built PicPeak's foundation and the entire gallery experience (events, galleries, uploads, sharing, download protection, templates), plus backup & restore, analytics, system health, branding/theming, and WhatsApp notifications — and the architecture every later feature builds on.
- [**@Luca-Timo**](https://github.com/Luca-Timo) — native Apple Silicon multi-arch images, external-URL toggle for legal CMS pages, the lazy-loaded folder tree picker, the admin-email picker on event creation, the data-driven self-hosted webfont system, the gallery header/banner decoupling, several typed-API refactors, and the CRM + accounting suite (quotes/contracts/invoices, hours logging, calendar, tax report, inbound supplier-invoice capture, expenses, and the Treuhänder/Banana export). Consistently raises the bar with thoughtful PRs.
- [**@Rekoo-PS**](https://github.com/Rekoo-PS) — sharp-eyed bug reporter and product feedback. Filed the issues that drove the login-loop fix, the gallery-loading skeleton work, the redirection cleanup, the mobile-lightbox overhaul, the admin-events search-counter fix, the photo-count column, and the bulk-delete workflow. Also a [BuyMeACoffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap) supporter — the kind of feedback loop that keeps the project useful for real deployments.
@@ -537,7 +570,7 @@ PicPeak is released under the [MIT License](LICENSE). Use it freely for personal
<br>
<a href="https://www.picpeak.app">Homepage</a> •
<a href="https://demo.picpeak.app">Live Demo</a> •
<a href="https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak">GitHub</a> •
<a href="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak">GitHub</a> •
<a href="https://docs.picpeak.app">Documentation</a> •
<a href="https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues">Support</a>
<a href="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues">Support</a>
</p>
+34 -32
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@@ -1,74 +1,76 @@
# Release Process
This document describes how PicPeak releases are cut. It's the maintainer's reference, not user documentation — for the user-facing channel choice (stable vs beta) see the [Release Channels section in README.md](README.md#-release-channels).
This document describes how PicPeak releases are cut. It's the maintainer's reference, not user documentation — for the user-facing channel choice (stable vs pre-release) see the [Release Channels section in README.md](README.md#-release-channels).
## TL;DR
- **`beta` branch** receives all merged work. Every push triggers a `release-please` PR that proposes the next `vX.Y.Z-beta.N` release. Merging that PR tags the beta and publishes Docker images on the `beta` tag.
- **`main` branch** holds the stable channel. Stable releases are cut from a known-good `beta` point via a `release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-beta` branch and a manual PR to `main`. Merging that PR triggers `release-please` to propose the stable release.
- Target cadence: **a stable release every 46 weeks**, or sooner if a beta has been quiet and ready for promotion.
- **`main` branch** receives all merged work (active development). Every push triggers a `release-please` PR that proposes the next `vX.Y.Z-beta.N` pre-release. Merging that PR tags the pre-release and publishes Docker images under the `:main` rolling tag + the version-specific tag.
- **`stable` branch** holds the curated stable channel. Stable releases are cut from a known-good `main` point via a `release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-main` branch and a manual PR to `stable`. Merging that PR triggers `release-please` to propose the stable release.
- Target cadence: **a stable release every 46 weeks**, or sooner if `main` has been quiet and ready for promotion.
> **Branch model background** — `main` (active dev) was previously called `beta`, and `stable` (curated channel) was previously called `main`. The rename happened with #669 to match the convention every other open-source project uses. The mechanics below all reference the post-rename names.
## Cadence target
46 weeks between stable releases is the working target. Reasoning:
- Long enough that each stable carries meaningful changes worth the upgrade burden.
- Short enough that beta users aren't carrying the "real" project alone for months — the stable channel should actually be usable as the recommended channel for new installs.
- Aligns with how release-please surfaces beta releases (multiple beta points usually accumulate inside a 46 week window, which gives natural promotion candidates).
- Short enough that pre-release users aren't carrying the "real" project alone for months — the stable channel should actually be usable as the recommended channel for new installs.
- Aligns with how release-please surfaces pre-releases (multiple pre-release points usually accumulate inside a 46 week window, which gives natural promotion candidates).
This is a target, not a hard rule. Cut sooner if a beta has been quiet and stable longer than usual. Cut later if a beta is in flux for security or migration reasons.
This is a target, not a hard rule. Cut sooner if `main` has been quiet and stable longer than usual. Cut later if `main` is in flux for security or migration reasons.
## Promotion criteria
A beta is eligible for promotion to stable when **all** of the following hold:
A `main` tip is eligible for promotion to `stable` when **all** of the following hold:
1. **CI green on the candidate beta tip.** Specifically: `schema-drift` (`upgrade-from-bootstrap`), `fresh-install`, `Tests` (backend Jest + frontend Vitest), the four `Build and Push Docker Images` arch matrices, and `GitGuardian Security Checks`.
2. **No open `bug`-labelled issues against the candidate beta for at least 7 days.** Issues fixed-but-not-yet-closed count as fixed; verify their PR is in the candidate beta before closing them out.
1. **CI green on the candidate `main` tip.** Specifically: `schema-drift` (`upgrade-from-bootstrap`), `fresh-install`, `Tests` (backend Jest + frontend Vitest), the four `Build and Push Docker Images` arch matrices, and `GitGuardian Security Checks`.
2. **No open `bug`-labelled issues against the candidate for at least 7 days.** Issues fixed-but-not-yet-closed count as fixed; verify their PR is in the candidate `main` tip before closing them out.
3. **An upgrade walk has been done on real production-shaped data** — apply the candidate's migration chain to a snapshot of the previous stable's DB and verify no manual intervention is required. CI proves fresh-install works; the upgrade walk is what proves the upgrade path works.
4. **Operator-time smoke** on the candidate: log in, create event, upload photos, share gallery, open as a customer, log out. Catches binary-incompatibility regressions and UI-level breaks that unit tests don't see.
If any of the four fail, the promotion waits. File any blockers as `bug`-labelled issues and let them bake on beta before re-evaluating.
If any of the four fail, the promotion waits. File any blockers as `bug`-labelled issues and let them bake on `main` before re-evaluating.
## How a stable release is cut
The actual mechanics, in order:
1. **Pick the beta tip.** Confirm it satisfies the four promotion criteria above. Note the exact SHA — that's what you're promoting.
1. **Pick the `main` tip.** Confirm it satisfies the four promotion criteria above. Note the exact SHA — that's what you're promoting.
2. **Create the release branch from the beta tip.**
2. **Create the release branch from the `main` tip.**
```bash
git push origin <beta-tip-sha>:refs/heads/release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-beta
git push origin <main-tip-sha>:refs/heads/release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-main
```
Naming convention: `release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-beta`, where `X.Y.Z` is the stable version you intend to land. release-please will write the actual `X.Y.Z` on merge — the branch name is just a human label.
Naming convention: `release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-main`, where `X.Y.Z` is the stable version you intend to land. release-please will write the actual `X.Y.Z` on merge — the branch name is just a human label.
3. **Open a PR to `main`.** Title: `chore(release): promote beta → main as vX.Y.Z`. Body should summarise the major themes since the previous stable, the migration count, and any operator notes (e.g. "this release adds 22 migrations; existing installs should snapshot before upgrading"). See PR #568 as a worked example.
3. **Open a PR to `stable`.** Title: `chore(release): promote main → stable as vX.Y.Z`. Body should summarise the major themes since the previous stable, the migration count, and any operator notes (e.g. "this release adds 22 migrations; existing installs should snapshot before upgrading"). See PR #568 as a worked example (predates the rename; the mechanics are unchanged).
4. **Resolve conflicts.** Main almost always has commits beta doesn't (security backports, release-please's stable-channel release commits, README rewrites). For each conflicting file, decide deliberately:
- **`backend/package.json` / `package-lock.json` + `frontend/package.json` / `package-lock.json`** — usually take beta's version (superset), but verify any security-pinned deps (`axios`, `nodemailer`, `i18next-http-backend`, `multer`, `tar`) on beta are `>=` the pinned versions on main. If main has a newer pinned version (e.g. an emergency CVE backport beta hasn't picked up), take main's pin.
- **`README.md`** — keep main's version if main has had a recent rewrite that beta didn't pick up; otherwise take beta's.
- **`CHANGELOG.md`** — keep main's; release-please regenerates entries on its next stable cut from the commits going forward.
- **`.release-please-manifest.json`** — keep main's; release-please owns this file.
4. **Resolve conflicts.** `stable` almost always has commits `main` doesn't (security backports, release-please's stable-channel release commits, README rewrites). For each conflicting file, decide deliberately:
- **`backend/package.json` / `package-lock.json` + `frontend/package.json` / `package-lock.json`** — usually take `main`'s version (superset), but verify any security-pinned deps (`axios`, `nodemailer`, `i18next-http-backend`, `multer`, `tar`) on `main` are `>=` the pinned versions on `stable`. If `stable` has a newer pinned version (e.g. an emergency CVE backport `main` hasn't picked up), take `stable`'s pin.
- **`README.md`** — keep `stable`'s version if it has had a recent rewrite that `main` didn't pick up; otherwise take `main`'s.
- **`CHANGELOG.md`** — keep `stable`'s; release-please regenerates entries on its next stable cut from the commits going forward.
- **`.release-please-manifest.json`** — keep `stable`'s; release-please owns this file.
- Any other auto-merged file — spot-check that the auto-merge produced something sensible, especially for security-sensitive files (`backend/src/middleware/`, `backend/src/utils/tokenUtils.js`).
5. **Wait for CI on the PR.** All ten checks (the original eight plus `merge-backend` and `merge-frontend`) must be green. If anything fails, fix on the release branch (NOT on beta — beta has already moved on).
5. **Wait for CI on the PR.** All ten checks (the original eight plus `merge-backend` and `merge-frontend`) must be green. If anything fails, fix on the release branch (NOT on `main` — `main` has already moved on).
6. **Merge.** Standard merge commit, not squash — the PR's history (the individual feature commits) carries forward into main's log.
6. **Merge.** Standard merge commit, not squash — the PR's history (the individual feature commits) carries forward into `stable`'s log.
7. **release-please picks it up.** Within minutes, release-please will open a new `chore(main): release X.Y.Z` PR proposing the stable release. Review the auto-generated CHANGELOG.md entries for accuracy, edit if needed, and merge. That merge creates the `vX.Y.Z` git tag, publishes Docker images on the `stable` and `latest` tags, and creates the GitHub Release page.
7. **release-please picks it up.** Within minutes, release-please will open a new `chore(stable): release X.Y.Z` PR proposing the stable release. Review the auto-generated CHANGELOG.md entries for accuracy, edit if needed, and merge. That merge creates the `vX.Y.Z` git tag, publishes Docker images on the `:stable` and `:latest` tags, and creates the GitHub Release page.
8. **Close the loop.** Bulk-close any `bug` issues that were fixed-but-not-closed and now appear in the released changelog. Reference the merge commit so reporters know which version contains the fix.
## Hotfix path (backport to current stable)
If a critical bug or security issue affects the current stable and beta has moved too far for a full promotion to be appropriate, backport just the fix:
If a critical bug or security issue affects the current stable and `main` has moved too far for a full promotion to be appropriate, backport just the fix:
1. Create a `security/cve-backport-X.Y.Z` or `fix/critical-X.Y.Z` branch off `main`.
1. Create a `security/cve-backport-X.Y.Z` or `fix/critical-X.Y.Z` branch off `stable`.
2. Cherry-pick or hand-write the minimal fix.
3. Open a PR to `main` with the smallest possible diff.
3. Open a PR to `stable` with the smallest possible diff.
4. After merge, release-please will propose a patch-level stable release (e.g. `v3.55.1`).
5. **Forward-port the fix to beta** if it isn't already there. Otherwise the next full promotion will reintroduce the bug.
5. **Forward-port the fix to `main`** if it isn't already there. Otherwise the next full promotion will reintroduce the bug.
PR #412 ("backport 18 dependency CVE patches from beta") is a worked example of this path.
PR #412 ("backport 18 dependency CVE patches from beta") is a worked example of this path (predates the rename; the mechanics are unchanged).
## Versioning
@@ -77,15 +79,15 @@ PicPeak follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/) with one project-spec
- **MAJOR** bumps are reserved for breaking schema changes that require operator action on upgrade (e.g. a migration that's not safe to auto-apply, an env-var rename that can't be auto-detected).
- **MINOR** bumps for new features, additive schema changes, and any change to the public HTTP API surface.
- **PATCH** bumps for bug fixes and operator-invisible internal changes.
- **Beta suffix** (`-beta.N`) for every beta cut; the `N` counter resets on each new MINOR or MAJOR target.
- **Pre-release suffix** (`-beta.N`) for every `main`-channel cut; the `N` counter resets on each new MINOR or MAJOR target. The suffix kept the historical `-beta` literal even after the branch rename — operators were already pinning to `v3.x.y-beta.N` and changing the literal would have broken those pins.
release-please derives all of this from conventional commit prefixes (`feat:`, `fix:`, `BREAKING CHANGE:`, etc.) automatically.
## Things that don't go through this process
- **Documentation-only changes** can land on either `main` or `beta` directly (no release cut needed); release-please will pick them up on the next regular release.
- **Documentation-only changes** can land on either `stable` or `main` directly (no release cut needed); release-please will pick them up on the next regular release.
- **Test-only changes** — same.
- **CI / workflow changes** — same, but be aware they take effect on the branch they land on, so a CI fix targeting beta won't fix a broken stable-channel workflow until the next promotion.
- **CI / workflow changes** — same, but be aware they take effect on the branch they land on, so a CI fix targeting `main` won't fix a broken stable-channel workflow until the next promotion.
## When this doc is wrong
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ We take the security of PicPeak seriously. If you have discovered a security vul
### 1. **Do NOT create a public GitHub issue**
### 2. Report the vulnerability privately by:
- **Preferred:** Use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
- **Preferred:** Use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
- **Alternative:** Email us at **info@picpeak.app** with the details
- Include:
- Description of the vulnerability
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ We believe in responsible disclosure. Once a vulnerability is fixed:
## Contact
- Security issues: Email **info@picpeak.app** or use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
- General support: [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues)
- Security issues: Email **info@picpeak.app** or use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
- General support: [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues)
Thank you for helping keep PicPeak and its users safe!
+18 -3
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ This guide provides easy installation instructions for PicPeak on Linux servers
```bash
# Download and run the unified setup script
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/the-luap/picpeak/main/scripts/picpeak-setup.sh -o picpeak-setup.sh && \
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PicPeak/picpeak/main/scripts/picpeak-setup.sh -o picpeak-setup.sh && \
chmod +x picpeak-setup.sh && \
sudo ./picpeak-setup.sh
```
@@ -163,6 +163,21 @@ sudo ./picpeak-setup.sh --native --unattended \
- `picpeak-workers` - Background workers
- `caddy` - Web server (optional)
## 🔑 First Login — Create Your Admin
If you installed with `picpeak-setup.sh` and gave an `--admin-password`, your admin account already exists — log in at `/admin` with that email and password.
If you started PicPeak **without** setting `ADMIN_PASSWORD` (e.g. a plain `docker compose up`), there's **no admin yet** and you create it in the browser:
1. Open `http://your-server:3000/admin` — you'll land on a setup screen.
2. Read the **one-time setup token** from the 0600 file the backend writes it to
(it is not logged — that would leave a live credential in `docker logs`):
```bash
docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN
```
Only if that write fails does the backend log the token instead.
3. Paste it, set your admin email + password. The token is single-use and the screen closes once an admin exists.
## 🌐 Access Methods
### Direct Access (Simplest)
@@ -472,7 +487,7 @@ sudo -u picpeak node scripts/reset-admin-password.js
- [Deployment Guide](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment)
3. **Support:**
- [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues)
- [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues)
- Include: Error messages, system info (`uname -a`), installation method
## 🔒 Security Best Practices
@@ -550,4 +565,4 @@ sudo ./picpeak-setup.sh --native \
---
**PicPeak Setup v1.0** | [Documentation](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak) | [Support](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues)
**PicPeak Setup v1.0** | [Documentation](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak) | [Support](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues)
+10
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@@ -9,6 +9,16 @@ PORT=3001
# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
JWT_SECRET=your-very-secure-jwt-secret-at-least-32-characters-long-example123456
# Admin 2FA (TOTP) secret encryption key — OPTIONAL.
# Admin authenticator secrets are encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM). By default
# the key is derived from JWT_SECRET, so you do NOT need to set this. Set it
# only if you want the MFA encryption key decoupled from JWT_SECRET (e.g. so
# rotating JWT_SECRET doesn't invalidate enrolled authenticators). If you set
# it, changing/losing it makes existing 2FA secrets undecryptable — recover
# with: docker compose exec backend node scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --all --yes
# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
#MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
# Auth cookie Secure flag
# unset - default: 'auto' in production, false in dev (#427)
# true - always set Secure (HTTPS-only cookies; breaks plain-HTTP access —
+29 -6
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ARG VCS_REF
ARG VERSION
# Add labels for GitHub Container Registry
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak"
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak"
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.description="PicPeak Backend Service"
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.licenses="MIT"
@@ -27,12 +27,35 @@ FROM node:22-alpine
WORKDIR /app
# Upgrade all packages to fix security vulnerabilities (OpenSSL, libexpat, BusyBox CVEs)
RUN apk upgrade --no-cache
# knexfile.js picks its config block by NODE_ENV, and the `development` block
# defaults to sqlite3. Leaving NODE_ENV unset here meant every deployment that
# doesn't go through our compose files — Kubernetes, Helm, plain `docker run` —
# silently ran on SQLite and ignored DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD, while
# wait-for-db.sh (shell, reads DB_HOST directly) reported "PostgreSQL is up" in
# the same log. The compose files still override this, so nothing changes for
# compose users. See #1038.
ENV NODE_ENV=production
# Upgrade npm to fix tar, minimatch, brace-expansion CVEs in npm's own deps
# Pin to 10.x to stay compatible with Node 22 Alpine (npm 11.x has dependency issues)
RUN npm install -g npm@10
# Redeclare CACHEBUST — ARGs don't cross stage boundaries, so the builder
# stage's declaration never reached this stage. Consuming it in the RUN below
# busts that layer's cache every CI run (CACHEBUST=github.run_number), so the
# image always picks up current Alpine security updates instead of reusing a
# stale cached upgrade layer.
ARG CACHEBUST=1
# Upgrade all packages to fix security vulnerabilities (OpenSSL, libexpat, BusyBox CVEs)
RUN echo "cachebust=${CACHEBUST}" && apk upgrade --no-cache
# Remove the npm CLI from the final image. Nothing runs npm here: the
# entrypoint is node, runtime deps are COPY'd from the builder stage, and
# wait-for-db.sh invokes the migration runners via node directly. npm's
# bundled node_modules kept tripping Trivy (sigstore, tar 7.5.19,
# brace-expansion 5.0.7 — even npm 12.0.1 still ships the vulnerable
# copies), so shipping no npm ends that alert class instead of chasing
# per-release patches. Note: `docker exec … npm run <script>` no longer
# works in the container — use `node migrations/run-migrations-safe.js`
# and friends instead.
RUN rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm /usr/local/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npx
# Install dumb-init for proper signal handling, postgresql-client for database
# checks, ffmpeg for video upload support, and su-exec for the root → nodejs
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('GET /api/admin/system-health/backup-coverage', () => {
let db;
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('GET /api/admin/system-health/backup-integrity', () => {
let cleanup;
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ const path = require('path');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('backupService — configurable walker (backup_paths)', () => {
let db;
@@ -177,4 +177,203 @@ describe('backupService — configurable walker (backup_paths)', () => {
const filesOn = await backupService.getFilesToBackup(true);
expect(filesOn.map((f) => f.relativePath)).toContain('events/archived/E3/legacy.jpg');
});
// Issue #871 — the "What to Backup" checkboxes were stored but never read.
describe('UI opt-out toggles (issue #871)', () => {
it('unchecking Thumbnails excludes thumbnails/', async () => {
seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
backup_include_thumbnails: false,
});
const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
expect(rels).not.toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
});
it('unchecking Photos excludes events/active', async () => {
seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
backup_include_photos: false,
});
const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
expect(rels).toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
expect(rels).not.toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
});
it('defaults to including everything when the keys were never saved', async () => {
seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({});
const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
expect(rels).toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
});
it("accepts the UI's plural backup_include_archives for the archived gate", async () => {
seedFile('events/archived/E4/archived.jpg');
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
backup_include_archives: true,
});
expect(files.map((f) => f.relativePath)).toContain('events/archived/E4/archived.jpg');
});
it('the UI plural key beats the migration-seeded singular key', async () => {
// Migration seeds backup_include_archived=true on every install; the
// form only ever writes the plural key, so unchecking Archives must
// win over the stale seeded value.
seedFile('events/archived/E5/archived.jpg');
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
backup_include_archived: true, // seeded default
backup_include_archives: false, // what the admin actually chose
});
expect(files.map((f) => f.relativePath)).not.toContain('events/archived/E5/archived.jpg');
});
it('rsync gets the de-selected paths and noise filters as --exclude args', async () => {
const excluded = await backupService.resolveExcludedBackupPaths({
backup_include_thumbnails: false,
backup_include_archives: false,
});
expect(excluded.map((r) => r.path)).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining(['thumbnails', 'events/archived'])
);
const args = backupService.buildRsyncArgs(
{ backup_rsync_host: 'backup.example.com', backup_rsync_path: '/srv/backups' },
excluded.map((r) => `/${r.path}/`)
);
const excludes = args
.map((a, i) => (a === '--exclude' ? args[i + 1] : null))
.filter(Boolean);
expect(excludes).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
'.nfs*',
'/thumbnails/',
'/events/archived/',
]));
});
it('rows toggled off via include_in_default also become rsync excludes', async () => {
// The enabled-only loader hides these rows from the walker, but rsync
// syncs the whole storage root, so they must still appear as excludes.
await db('backup_paths').where('path', 'previews').update({
include_in_default: false,
});
const excluded = await backupService.resolveExcludedBackupPaths({});
expect(excluded.map((r) => r.path)).toContain('previews');
});
});
// Issue #871 — .nfs* silly-rename artifacts were uploaded to S3.
it('never backs up filesystem noise (.nfs*, .DS_Store)', async () => {
seedFile('thumbnails/E1/.nfs000000000000006600000008');
seedFile('events/active/E1/.DS_Store');
seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({});
const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
expect(rels.some((r) => r.includes('.nfs'))).toBe(false);
expect(rels.some((r) => r.includes('.DS_Store'))).toBe(false);
});
it('the walker honors backup_exclude_patterns (previously rsync-only)', async () => {
seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
seedFile('events/active/E1/scratch.tmp');
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
backup_exclude_patterns: ['*.tmp'],
});
const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
expect(rels).not.toContain('events/active/E1/scratch.tmp');
});
it('glob patterns are literal outside the star (.nfs* must not eat anfs-…)', async () => {
seedFile('events/active/E1/anfs-photo.jpg');
seedFile('events/active/E1/notes-tmp');
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
backup_exclude_patterns: ['*.tmp'],
});
const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
// '.nfs*' used to compile to /^.nfs.*$/ whose dot matched any char;
// '*.tmp' used to compile to /^.*.tmp$/ which also matched 'notes-tmp'.
expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/anfs-photo.jpg');
expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/notes-tmp');
});
// Issue #871 — weekly schedules silently ran daily, and the dashboard's
// "next backup" was a hardcoded "tomorrow 02:00".
describe('schedule resolution + next run (issue #871)', () => {
it('a named label beats the stray default cron the UI used to send', () => {
expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({
backup_schedule: 'weekly',
backup_schedule_cron: '0 3 * * *', // old UI default, sent unconditionally
})).toBe('0 3 * * 0');
});
it('custom schedules use the cron field', () => {
expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({
backup_schedule: 'custom',
backup_schedule_cron: '15 5 * * 2',
})).toBe('15 5 * * 2');
});
it('falls back to the default daily cron', () => {
expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({})).toBe('0 2 * * *');
});
it('getNextScheduledRun is null when backups are disabled', () => {
expect(backupService.getNextScheduledRun(null)).toBeNull();
expect(backupService.getNextScheduledRun({ backup_enabled: false })).toBeNull();
});
it('getNextScheduledRun returns the real next weekly fire time', () => {
const iso = backupService.getNextScheduledRun({
backup_enabled: true,
backup_schedule: 'weekly',
backup_schedule_cron: '0 3 * * *',
});
const next = new Date(iso);
expect(Number.isNaN(next.getTime())).toBe(false);
expect(next.getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
expect(next.getDay()).toBe(0); // Sunday
expect(next.getHours()).toBe(3); // 03:00
});
});
// Issue #871 — "Backup Size: 167.6 TB": file_size_bytes is a bigInteger
// column, node-postgres returns int8 as a string, and the S3 path did
// `backedUpSize += size` — string concatenation.
it('getDatabaseBackupInfo coerces file_size_bytes to a number', async () => {
await db('database_backup_runs').del();
await db('database_backup_runs').insert({
backup_type: 'full',
status: 'completed',
file_path: '/backups/db/dump.sql.gz',
// Simulate the PG int8-as-string driver behaviour (sqlite stores
// whatever it is handed, so the string round-trips).
file_size_bytes: '421988',
started_at: new Date().toISOString(),
completed_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
const info = await backupService.getDatabaseBackupInfo();
expect(typeof info.size).toBe('number');
expect(info.size).toBe(421988);
});
});
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/databaseBackup', () => ({
DatabaseBackupService: class {},
}));
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('backupService — inline DB dump + fail-loud guard', () => {
let db;
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ const path = require('path');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('backupService — per-Stage-B-path statistics', () => {
let db;
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
/**
* Smoke tests for backupService's config resolution + file-collection
* and manifest validation paths — safety net ahead of the god-file
* decomposition.
*
* Uses the same real-SQLite harness as
* backupService.configurableWalker.test.js (bootCrmDb + a temp
* STORAGE_PATH) rather than the broken deep-mock approach in
* backupService.enhanced.test.js.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('backupService — config + file collection + manifest (smoke)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let storagePath;
let backupService;
let backupManifest;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
backupService = require('../../src/services/backupService');
backupManifest = require('../../src/services/backupManifest');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('app_settings').del();
// Reset the storage tree so each test starts from a pristine walk.
await fs.promises.rm(storagePath, { recursive: true, force: true });
await fs.promises.mkdir(storagePath, { recursive: true });
});
function seedFile(relPath, content = 'dummy bytes') {
const abs = path.join(storagePath, relPath);
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(abs, content);
return abs;
}
async function insertBackupSetting(key, value) {
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: key,
setting_value: value,
setting_type: 'backup',
});
}
describe('getBackupConfig', () => {
it('parses booleans, numbers, JSON arrays and plain strings from app_settings', async () => {
await insertBackupSetting('backup_enabled', 'true');
await insertBackupSetting('backup_include_archived', 'false');
await insertBackupSetting('backup_retention_days', '30');
await insertBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backups/picpeak');
await insertBackupSetting('backup_email_recipients', '["a@example.com","b@example.com"]');
// Non-backup settings must not leak into the backup config.
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: 'general_site_name',
setting_value: 'PicPeak',
setting_type: 'general',
});
const config = await backupService.getBackupConfig();
expect(config.backup_enabled).toBe(true);
expect(config.backup_include_archived).toBe(false);
expect(config.backup_retention_days).toBe(30);
expect(config.backup_destination_path).toBe('/backups/picpeak');
expect(config.backup_email_recipients).toEqual(['a@example.com', 'b@example.com']);
expect(config).not.toHaveProperty('general_site_name');
// Raw (unparsed) values are preserved on the non-enumerable __raw.
expect(String(config.__raw.backup_retention_days)).toBe('30');
});
it('returns an empty config object (not null) when nothing is configured', async () => {
const config = await backupService.getBackupConfig();
expect(config).not.toBeNull();
expect(Object.keys(config)).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
describe('getFilesToBackup', () => {
it('returns an empty list on a pristine storage tree', async () => {
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({ backup_include_archived: true });
expect(files).toEqual([]);
});
it('captures path/relativePath/size/modified metadata for backed-up files', async () => {
const content = 'not really a jpeg';
const abs = seedFile('events/active/E9/pic.jpg', content);
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({ backup_include_archived: true });
const entry = files.find((f) => f.relativePath === path.join('events/active/E9', 'pic.jpg'));
expect(entry).toBeDefined();
expect(entry.path).toBe(abs);
expect(entry.size).toBe(Buffer.byteLength(content));
// Not toBeInstanceOf(Date) — fs.stat mtime comes from a different
// realm under Jest and fails the cross-realm instanceof check.
expect(Object.prototype.toString.call(entry.modified)).toBe('[object Date]');
});
});
describe('validateBackupManifest', () => {
it('round-trips a generated manifest as valid', async () => {
seedFile('events/active/E1/a.jpg', 'aaa');
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({ backup_include_archived: true });
const manifest = await backupManifest.generateManifest({
backupType: 'full',
backupPath: '/backup/run-1',
files,
});
const manifestPath = path.join(storagePath, 'manifest-smoke.json');
await backupManifest.saveManifest(manifest, manifestPath, 'json');
const result = await backupService.validateBackupManifest(manifestPath);
expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
expect(result.manifest.backup.type).toBe('full');
expect(result.manifest.files.count).toBe(files.length);
expect(result.manifest.verification.total_checksum).toBeTruthy();
});
it('flags a manifest missing required sections as invalid', async () => {
const badPath = path.join(storagePath, 'manifest-broken.json');
fs.writeFileSync(badPath, JSON.stringify({ manifest: { version: '2.0' } }));
const result = await backupService.validateBackupManifest(badPath);
expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
expect(result.error).toMatch(/Missing required section/);
});
});
});
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
const crypto = require('crypto');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('booking cutover — draft invoices on hold', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let adminId; let customerId; let quoteService;
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
// Service-level CRM calls cold-require heavy modules (pdfService,
// nodemailer, etc.) on first use; the global 5 s per-test budget is
// too tight for that. Bump it for this file only.
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('discount line items (negative unit_price_minor)', () => {
let db;
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
// bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll.
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('event type slug rename cascade', () => {
let db;
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
/**
* HTTP-level tests for the `/s/:shortSlug` public resolver (#699).
*
* Verifies the contract the public route is expected to honour:
* - Browser UA → 302 to target_path
* - Social crawler UA → 200 with OG <meta>, canonical = /s/<slug>
* - Soft-deleted slug → 410 Gone (intentional-delete signal)
* - Unknown slug → 404 Not Found
* - Hit count increments after successful resolutions (both shapes)
*
* Mirrors the production server.js wiring but doesn't load the whole
* server — the surrounding middleware (CORS, helmet, rate limiters)
* isn't part of this route's contract.
*/
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
let db; let cleanup; let service; let app;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// Persist a business_profile + business_name so buildOgMetadata's
// settings-based fields populate consistently.
const { upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings');
await upsertAppSetting('branding_company_name', JSON.stringify('Test Studio'), 'string');
service = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
const {
isSocialCrawler, buildOgMetadata, renderOgHtml,
} = require('../../src/services/galleryOgService');
app = express();
app.get('/s/:shortSlug', async (req, res) => {
try {
const row = await service.findByShortSlug(req.params.shortSlug);
if (!row) return res.status(404).type('text/plain').send('Short URL not found');
if (row.deleted_at) return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL has been removed');
if (isSocialCrawler(req.get('user-agent'))) {
const event = await db('events').where({ id: row.event_id }).first('slug');
if (event?.slug) {
const meta = await buildOgMetadata(event.slug, req.originalUrl);
const base = (process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/$/, '');
meta.url = `${base}/s/${row.short_slug}`;
res.set('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=300');
res.set('Content-Type', 'text/html; charset=utf-8');
res.send(renderOgHtml(meta));
service.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
return;
}
return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL points at a deleted event');
}
service.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
return res.redirect(302, row.target_path);
} catch (err) {
return res.status(500).type('text/plain').send(err.message);
}
});
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
async function seedEventAndShortUrl({ slug = `evt-${Date.now()}`, shortSlug }) {
const farFuture = new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 86400000).toISOString();
const [eventId] = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Test Event',
event_date: '2026-06-05',
password_hash: 'x',
expires_at: farFuture,
is_active: true,
is_archived: false,
share_link: slug,
share_token: `tok${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 12)}`,
welcome_message: null,
});
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId, customSlug: shortSlug,
});
return { eventId, shortUrl: row };
}
// User-agent strings the production `isSocialCrawler` helper matches.
// Snapshot known-true samples here so the test stays in sync if the
// helper's allowlist evolves.
const BOT_UA_WHATSAPP = 'WhatsApp/2.23.20.0';
const BOT_UA_FACEBOOK = 'facebookexternalhit/1.1 (+http://www.facebook.com/externalhit_uatext.php)';
const BROWSER_UA = 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/605.1.15';
describe('GET /s/:shortSlug — browser (302 redirect)', () => {
it('redirects to the snapshotted target_path with a 302', async () => {
const { shortUrl } = await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'browser-redirect', shortSlug: 'go-here',
});
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/go-here')
.set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
expect(res.status).toBe(302);
expect(res.headers.location).toBe(shortUrl.target_path);
expect(res.headers.location).toMatch(/^\/gallery\//);
});
it('increments hit_count on a browser hit (fire-and-forget — wait briefly)', async () => {
await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'hit-browser', shortSlug: 'hit-from-browser',
});
await request(app).get('/s/hit-from-browser').set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
const row = await service.findByShortSlug('hit-from-browser');
expect(row.hit_count).toBe(1);
expect(row.last_hit_at).toBeTruthy();
});
});
describe('GET /s/:shortSlug — social crawler (OG metadata)', () => {
it('returns 200 with OG HTML for WhatsApp UA', async () => {
await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'whatsapp-og', shortSlug: 'wa-preview',
});
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/wa-preview')
.set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/text\/html/);
expect(res.text).toContain('<meta');
expect(res.text).toMatch(/og:title/);
expect(res.text).toMatch(/og:url/);
});
it('og:url canonical points at /s/<slug>, not the underlying gallery URL', async () => {
await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'canonical-test', shortSlug: 'canonical-short',
});
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/canonical-short')
.set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_FACEBOOK);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// The og:url meta tag must contain the short-URL path, not the
// /gallery/<slug> path — this is the cache-key invariant from #699.
expect(res.text).toMatch(/property="og:url"\s+content="[^"]*\/s\/canonical-short"/);
expect(res.text).not.toMatch(
/property="og:url"\s+content="[^"]*\/gallery\/canonical-test"/
);
});
it('sets a short cache header so scrapers can re-fetch when admin rotates the preview', async () => {
await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'cache-header', shortSlug: 'cache-test',
});
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/cache-test')
.set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
expect(res.headers['cache-control']).toMatch(/public/);
expect(res.headers['cache-control']).toMatch(/max-age=300/);
});
it('increments hit_count on a crawler hit as well', async () => {
await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'hit-bot', shortSlug: 'hit-from-bot',
});
await request(app).get('/s/hit-from-bot').set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
const row = await service.findByShortSlug('hit-from-bot');
expect(row.hit_count).toBe(1);
});
});
describe('GET /s/:shortSlug — error states', () => {
it('404 for an unknown slug', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/never-existed')
.set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
it('410 for a soft-deleted slug (intentional-delete signal)', async () => {
const { shortUrl } = await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'gone-test', shortSlug: 'gone-slug',
});
await service.softDelete(shortUrl.id, null);
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/gone-slug')
.set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
expect(res.status).toBe(410);
});
it('410 if the event was hard-deleted but the short URL row somehow survives', async () => {
const { eventId } = await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'orphan-test', shortSlug: 'orphan-slug',
});
// Hard-delete the event row (FK CASCADE would normally clean up the
// short URL too — but if CASCADE didn't fire for whatever reason
// (e.g. SQLite foreign_keys pragma off in a particular runtime), the
// resolver should still degrade safely).
// SQLite's foreign_keys pragma is OFF by default; the migration
// doesn't toggle it, so this delete leaves the short URL row.
await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).delete();
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/orphan-slug')
.set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
expect(res.status).toBe(410);
});
it('404 for a malformed slug (rejected at validation, no DB hit)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/UPPER_CASE')
.set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
describe('Regression — existing URL paths must still respond the same', () => {
// The /s/* namespace is additive: it must NOT shadow /gallery/*
// or any of the OG routes. We don't load the whole app here, but we
// can at least pin that the route param doesn't accept slashes —
// i.e. /s/foo/bar must NOT be matched by our handler.
it('the /s/:shortSlug route does not match nested paths', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/foo/bar')
.set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
// Express returns its default 404 when no route matches the path.
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
/**
* Integration tests for the branded short-URL service (#699).
*
* Exercises createShortUrl + findByShortSlug + listForEvent + softDelete
* + recordHit against a real SQLite DB, including the contracts that
* matter for production correctness:
*
* - Custom slug + collision detection (409 with `suggested`)
* - Auto-generated slug from event slug + year
* - Soft-delete preserves the row (admin can audit)
* - target_path snapshots at create time (toggling the global
* "Use short gallery URLs" setting later doesn't change existing
* short URLs — backward-compat invariant from #699)
* - hit_count increments idempotently
* - findByShortSlug returns soft-deleted rows (caller decides 410 vs 404)
*
* Boots one DB for the whole file (cheap on SQLite); each test seeds
* its own event row to keep scope clean.
*/
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
let db; let cleanup; let service; let adminId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// Minimal admin for created_by audit.
const adminInsert = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'shorturl-test',
email: 'shorturl@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
must_change_password: false,
created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
adminId = adminInsert[0]?.id ?? adminInsert[0];
service = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
// Each test seeds a fresh event so collisions / counter state don't leak.
async function seedEvent(overrides = {}) {
const slug = overrides.slug || `evt-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`;
const farFuture = new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 86400000).toISOString();
const [id] = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: overrides.event_name || 'Test Wedding',
event_date: overrides.event_date || '2026-06-05',
password_hash: 'x',
expires_at: farFuture,
is_active: true,
is_archived: false,
share_link: slug,
share_token: overrides.share_token || `tok${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 12)}`,
welcome_message: null,
});
const event = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
return event;
}
describe('createShortUrl — custom slug', () => {
it('creates with a custom slug', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'sofia-grad-1' });
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id,
customSlug: 'sofia-graduation-1',
createdBy: adminId,
});
expect(row.short_slug).toBe('sofia-graduation-1');
expect(row.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.slug}`);
expect(row.event_id).toBe(event.id);
expect(row.hit_count).toBe(0);
});
it('lowercases the input — operators pasting mixed-case still get a clean slug', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'sofia-grad-2' });
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id,
customSlug: 'Sofia-GraduAtion-2', // mixed case
createdBy: adminId,
});
expect(row.short_slug).toBe('sofia-graduation-2');
});
it('rejects an invalid slug with INVALID_SLUG code', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'invalid-test' });
await expect(service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id,
customSlug: 'invalid slug with spaces',
createdBy: adminId,
})).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'INVALID_SLUG' });
});
it('rejects a reserved slug with INVALID_SLUG code', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'reserved-test' });
await expect(service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id,
customSlug: 'admin',
createdBy: adminId,
})).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'INVALID_SLUG' });
});
it('rejects a duplicate slug with SLUG_TAKEN + suggested fallback', async () => {
const event1 = await seedEvent({ slug: 'dup-test-1' });
const event2 = await seedEvent({ slug: 'dup-test-2' });
await service.createShortUrl({ eventId: event1.id, customSlug: 'collide-me' });
await expect(service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event2.id, customSlug: 'collide-me',
})).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'SLUG_TAKEN',
suggested: expect.any(String),
});
});
it('throws EVENT_NOT_FOUND when the event id does not exist', async () => {
await expect(service.createShortUrl({
eventId: 9999999, customSlug: 'no-event',
})).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'EVENT_NOT_FOUND' });
});
});
describe('createShortUrl — auto-generated slug', () => {
it('uses event slug + year when no custom slug provided', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({
slug: 'autogen-wedding', event_date: '2026-06-05',
});
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id,
createdBy: adminId,
});
// First-choice candidate is just the slug; takes that.
expect(row.short_slug).toBe('autogen-wedding');
});
it('falls back to slug-year when the bare slug is already taken', async () => {
// Both events SHARE the same canonical slug so the first-choice
// bare-slug candidate is burned, forcing autoGen to try the
// year-suffixed variant.
const event1 = await seedEvent({
slug: 'collide-base', event_date: '2026-07-01',
});
await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event1.id, customSlug: 'collide-base',
});
const event2 = await seedEvent({
slug: 'collide-base-2', event_date: '2026-07-01',
});
// Force the bare candidate of event2 to also collide by burning it.
await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event1.id, customSlug: 'collide-base-2',
});
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event2.id, // No custom — auto-gen from event2.slug
});
// Bare candidate `collide-base-2` is taken → year-suffixed picks.
expect(row.short_slug).toBe('collide-base-2-2026');
});
});
describe('createShortUrl — target_path snapshotting (#699 backward-compat)', () => {
it('uses /gallery/<slug> when the global short-URLs setting is OFF (default)', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'snapshot-off' });
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'snap-off',
});
expect(row.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.slug}`);
});
it('uses /gallery/<share_token> when the global setting is ON at create time', async () => {
// Persist the setting.
const { upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings');
await upsertAppSetting('general_use_short_gallery_urls', JSON.stringify(true), 'system');
try {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'snapshot-on', share_token: 'tokenAbc123' });
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'snap-on',
});
expect(row.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.share_token}`);
// CRITICAL backward-compat invariant: now flip the setting OFF.
// Existing short URLs must still resolve to the same target_path
// they were created with — operator's existing share links don't
// silently change behaviour.
await upsertAppSetting('general_use_short_gallery_urls', JSON.stringify(false), 'system');
const refetched = await service.findByShortSlug('snap-on');
expect(refetched.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.share_token}`);
} finally {
await upsertAppSetting('general_use_short_gallery_urls', JSON.stringify(false), 'system');
}
});
});
describe('findByShortSlug + listForEvent', () => {
it('returns null for an unknown slug', async () => {
expect(await service.findByShortSlug('does-not-exist-xyz')).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for a malformed slug (no DB hit)', async () => {
expect(await service.findByShortSlug('UPPER_CASE')).toBeNull();
expect(await service.findByShortSlug('with spaces')).toBeNull();
expect(await service.findByShortSlug('')).toBeNull();
});
it('returns soft-deleted rows (caller decides 410 vs 404)', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'softdel-find' });
const created = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'find-deleted',
});
await service.softDelete(created.id, adminId);
const fetched = await service.findByShortSlug('find-deleted');
expect(fetched).not.toBeNull();
expect(fetched.deleted_at).toBeTruthy();
});
it('listForEvent excludes soft-deleted rows', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'list-test' });
const live = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'list-live',
});
const deleted = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'list-deleted',
});
await service.softDelete(deleted.id, adminId);
const list = await service.listForEvent(event.id);
const ids = list.map((r) => r.id);
expect(ids).toContain(live.id);
expect(ids).not.toContain(deleted.id);
});
});
describe('softDelete', () => {
it('returns true on first call, false on second (idempotent admin clicks)', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'softdel-idem' });
const created = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'idem-delete',
});
expect(await service.softDelete(created.id, adminId)).toBe(true);
expect(await service.softDelete(created.id, adminId)).toBe(false);
});
it('returns false for an unknown id (caller maps to 404)', async () => {
expect(await service.softDelete(9999999, adminId)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('createShortUrl after soft-delete — slug rotation', () => {
it('re-creating a soft-deleted slug succeeds (purges the deleted row)', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'rotate' });
const first = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'rotate-me',
});
await service.softDelete(first.id, adminId);
// The slug is now reclaimable for a fresh row.
const second = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'rotate-me',
});
expect(second.id).not.toBe(first.id);
expect(second.short_slug).toBe('rotate-me');
});
});
describe('recordHit', () => {
it('increments hit_count + stamps last_hit_at', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'hit-counter' });
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'count-me',
});
await service.recordHit(row.id);
await service.recordHit(row.id);
const fetched = await service.findByShortSlug('count-me');
expect(fetched.hit_count).toBe(2);
expect(fetched.last_hit_at).toBeTruthy();
});
it('is fire-and-forget — invalid id does not throw', async () => {
await expect(service.recordHit(9999999)).resolves.not.toThrow();
});
});
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
// Service-level CRM calls cold-require heavy modules (pdfService, nodemailer)
// on first use; bump the budget for this file.
jest.setTimeout(60000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('incoming-invoice categorise / re-bill chain', () => {
let db;
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/restoreService', () => ({
},
}));
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('installFromBackupBoot', () => {
let db;
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
// bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll; under full-suite
// parallel load on a small CI runner that can exceed the 5s default. Match the
// other migration-heavy CRM suites (discountLineItems, incomingInvoiceRebill).
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
let db;
let cleanup;
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
'use strict';
/**
* Cross-engine .picpeak restore policy (#1041): a SQLite archive restored onto
* a PostgreSQL instance — the official small-install → full-stack upgrade
* path — now allowed by validateManifest's direction rule instead of the
* former CLI-only allowEngineSwitch flag. The coercion engine itself
* (typedColumnsFor / epochToIso / coerceForTargetEngine) landed with #1039;
* these tests pin the direction policy and the coercion's cross-engine
* value-correctness.
*
* Ungated: validateManifest direction rules and the pure coercion units.
* The reverse direction (pg backup onto a sqlite instance) staying blocked is
* pinned by picpeakRoundtrip.test.js, which runs on the real sqlite harness.
*
* Gated on PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL (same contract as picpeakRestorePg.test.js):
* sqlite-shaped NDJSON rows land in real Postgres with correct stored VALUES,
* not just row counts, e.g.
* PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:pw@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_xengine_test" \
* npx jest __tests__/integration/picpeakCrossEngine.test.js
*/
const knexLib = require('knex');
describe('validateManifest cross-engine direction (pg target)', () => {
let validateManifest;
beforeAll(() => {
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg' }));
// validateManifest wraps its knex_migrations lookup in try/catch — a
// throwing stub simply skips the forward-only check, which is not under
// test here.
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: () => { throw new Error('stub'); } }));
({ validateManifest } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
});
afterAll(() => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
jest.resetModules();
});
it('allows a sqlite backup onto a pg instance (upgrade direction)', async () => {
const blockers = await validateManifest({
kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'sqlite' }, tables: {},
});
expect(blockers.filter((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('still allows same-engine pg → pg', async () => {
const blockers = await validateManifest({
kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'pg' }, tables: {},
});
expect(blockers.filter((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
describe('epochToIso (landed with #1039)', () => {
let epochToIso;
beforeAll(() => {
jest.resetModules();
({ epochToIso } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
});
it('converts epoch milliseconds', () => {
expect(epochToIso(1723400000000)).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
});
it('converts epoch SECONDS to the same instant, not January 1970', () => {
expect(epochToIso(1723400000)).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
});
it('converts numeric strings', () => {
expect(epochToIso('1723400000000')).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
});
it('passes non-numeric values through untouched', () => {
expect(epochToIso('2026-08-12 10:00:00')).toBe('2026-08-12 10:00:00');
});
});
describe('coerceForTargetEngine on sqlite-shaped rows', () => {
let coerceForTargetEngine;
beforeAll(() => {
jest.resetModules();
({ coerceForTargetEngine } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
});
const types = { timestamps: ['created_at', 'expires_at'], booleans: ['is_active'] };
it('coerces 0/1 booleans and epoch timestamps, leaves date strings alone', () => {
const [row] = coerceForTargetEngine(
[{ id: 1, is_active: 1, created_at: 1723400000000, expires_at: '2026-09-01 12:00:00' }],
types
);
expect(row.is_active).toBe(true);
expect(row.created_at).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
expect(row.expires_at).toBe('2026-09-01 12:00:00'); // pg parses this natively
});
it('coerces falsy variants and passes null/empty through', () => {
const [row] = coerceForTargetEngine(
[{ is_active: 0, created_at: null, expires_at: '' }],
types
);
expect(row.is_active).toBe(false);
expect(row.created_at).toBeNull();
expect(row.expires_at).toBe('');
});
});
// ── Real-Postgres integration (gated) ────────────────────────────────────────
const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
maybe('sqlite-shaped rows land correctly in real Postgres', () => {
let pgDb;
let svc;
beforeAll(async () => {
pgDb = knexLib({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL });
await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS xengine_events, xengine_settings CASCADE');
await pgDb.schema.createTable('xengine_events', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('slug');
t.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
t.boolean('allow_downloads').defaultTo(true);
t.timestamp('created_at');
t.timestamp('expires_at');
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('xengine_settings', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('setting_key').notNullable().unique();
t.jsonb('setting_value');
});
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg' }));
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: pgDb }));
svc = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService');
});
afterAll(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
if (pgDb) {
await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS xengine_events, xengine_settings CASCADE');
await pgDb.destroy();
}
});
it('typedColumnsFor classifies boolean and timestamp columns via columnInfo()', async () => {
const types = await svc.typedColumnsFor(pgDb, 'xengine_events');
expect(types.booleans.sort()).toEqual(['allow_downloads', 'is_active']);
expect(types.timestamps.sort()).toEqual(['created_at', 'expires_at']);
});
it('inserts a sqlite archive row (0/1 booleans, epoch dates, json text) with correct stored values', async () => {
// Exactly what a sqlite-created .picpeak carries: integers for booleans,
// epoch numbers for #485-shape timestamps (ms here, seconds covered by the
// epochToIso unit), a "YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS" string for clean ones, and
// json columns as TEXT (the crossEngine path skips serialiseJsonColumns —
// the text is already what pg wants).
const epoch = 1723400000000;
const eventRows = [
{ id: 1, slug: 'wedding', is_active: 1, allow_downloads: 0, created_at: epoch, expires_at: '2026-09-01 12:00:00' },
];
const settingRows = [{ id: 1, setting_key: 'brand', setting_value: '{"name":"PicPeak","dark":true}' }];
await pgDb.transaction(async (trx) => {
const evTypes = await svc.typedColumnsFor(trx, 'xengine_events');
await trx.batchInsert('xengine_events', svc.coerceForTargetEngine(eventRows, evTypes), 100);
const stTypes = await svc.typedColumnsFor(trx, 'xengine_settings');
await trx.batchInsert('xengine_settings', svc.coerceForTargetEngine(settingRows, stTypes), 100);
});
const ev = await pgDb('xengine_events').where({ id: 1 }).first();
expect(ev.is_active).toBe(true); // 1 → true, not backwards (#1028 class)
expect(ev.allow_downloads).toBe(false); // 0 → false
expect(new Date(ev.created_at).getTime()).toBe(epoch);
expect(new Date(ev.expires_at).toISOString().slice(0, 10)).toBe('2026-09-01');
const st = await pgDb('xengine_settings').where({ id: 1 }).first();
// jsonb parsed back by the driver — value intact, no double encoding.
expect(st.setting_value).toEqual({ name: 'PicPeak', dark: true });
});
it('id sequence works after explicit-id insert + resync (next natural insert)', async () => {
await svc.resyncSequences(['xengine_events']);
const [next] = await pgDb('xengine_events')
.insert({ slug: 'fresh', is_active: true })
.returning('id');
expect(Number(next.id || next)).toBe(2);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
'use strict';
// Validates the engine-neutral .picpeak export: it must produce a real zip with
// a manifest + per-table NDJSON, exclude knex bookkeeping, and honour the photo
// toggle. Uses the shared CRM DB harness (temp SQLite) — no docker needed.
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret-at-least-32-characters-long!!';
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const StreamZip = require('node-stream-zip');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
let tmpDir;
let createPicpeak;
// bootCrmDb MUST run before requiring the service (which transitively requires
// db.js) so the export reads this test's DB, not the default path.
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpDir; // isolate file collection to the temp dir
({ createPicpeak } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
await cleanup();
});
async function readZip(filePath) {
const zip = new StreamZip.async({ file: filePath });
const entries = Object.keys(await zip.entries());
const manifest = JSON.parse((await zip.entryData('manifest.json')).toString('utf8'));
await zip.close();
return { entries, manifest };
}
describe('picpeak export (.picpeak logical export)', () => {
it('produces a .picpeak with a manifest and per-table NDJSON', async () => {
const { filePath, manifest } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
expect(filePath.endsWith('.picpeak')).toBe(true);
expect(fs.existsSync(filePath)).toBe(true);
expect(manifest.format).toBe(1);
expect(manifest.kind).toBe('picpeak-backup');
expect(manifest.database.engine).toBe('sqlite');
expect(manifest.options.includePhotos).toBe(false);
expect(manifest.contains_secrets).toBe(true);
// Migrations seed real tables (e.g. app_settings) — expect several.
expect(Object.keys(manifest.tables).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(Object.keys(manifest.tables)).toContain('app_settings');
const { entries, manifest: zipped } = await readZip(filePath);
expect(entries).toContain('manifest.json');
expect(entries.some((n) => n.startsWith('data/') && n.endsWith('.ndjson'))).toBe(true);
expect(entries).toContain('data/app_settings.ndjson');
// Manifest inside the zip matches the returned one.
expect(zipped.tables).toEqual(manifest.tables);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('never exports knex bookkeeping tables', async () => {
const { filePath, manifest } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
const names = Object.keys(manifest.tables);
expect(names).not.toContain('knex_migrations');
expect(names).not.toContain('knex_migrations_lock');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('row counts in the manifest match the NDJSON line counts', async () => {
// Insert a couple of settings so at least one table is non-empty.
await db('app_settings')
.insert({ setting_key: 'picpeak_export_test_a', setting_value: JSON.stringify('1'), setting_type: 'string' })
.onConflict('setting_key').merge();
const { filePath, manifest } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
const zip = new StreamZip.async({ file: filePath });
const buf = await zip.entryData('data/app_settings.ndjson');
await zip.close();
const lines = buf.toString('utf8').split('\n').filter((l) => l.trim().length > 0);
expect(lines.length).toBe(manifest.tables.app_settings.rowCount);
expect(manifest.tables.app_settings.rowCount).toBeGreaterThan(0);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
'use strict';
// Full .picpeak roundtrip on a temp SQLite DB:
// 1. seed a "backup" instance (admin A + a marker setting)
// 2. export → .picpeak
// 3. simulate a reinstall: wipe, create a DIFFERENT current admin B, mutate data
// 4. import the backup with currentAdminId = B
// 5. assert the backup data is restored AND the current account (B) survives,
// while the backup's admin (A) is also present (different email → added).
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret-at-least-32-characters-long!!';
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
let tmpDir;
let createPicpeak;
let importFromPicpeak;
let validateManifest;
let superAdminRoleId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpDir;
({ createPicpeak } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService'));
({ importFromPicpeak, validateManifest } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
superAdminRoleId = role.id;
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
await cleanup();
});
const adminRow = (email, hash) => ({
username: email,
email,
password_hash: hash,
role_id: superAdminRoleId,
is_active: true,
must_change_password: false,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
});
async function setMarker(value) {
await db('app_settings')
.insert({ setting_key: 'roundtrip_marker', setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'string' })
.onConflict('setting_key').merge();
}
async function getMarker() {
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'roundtrip_marker' }).first();
return row ? JSON.parse(row.setting_value) : null;
}
describe('.picpeak roundtrip (export → import)', () => {
it('restores backup data and preserves the current account', async () => {
// 1. Seed the "source" instance.
await db('admin_users').del();
await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('backup-admin@old.example', 'HASH_A'));
await setMarker('from_backup');
// 2. Export.
const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
// 3. Simulate a reinstall: fresh current admin B, mutated data.
await db('admin_users').del();
const [bId] = await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('current-admin@new.example', 'HASH_B')).returning('id');
const currentAdminId = typeof bId === 'object' ? bId.id : bId;
await setMarker('mutated_after_backup');
// 4. Import, preserving the current admin.
const result = await importFromPicpeak({ filePath: undefined, picpeakPath: filePath, currentAdminId });
expect(result.restored).toBe(true);
expect(result.tables).toBeGreaterThan(0);
// 5a. Backup data restored (marker reverted to the backup value).
expect(await getMarker()).toBe('from_backup');
// 5b. The backup's admin is present (different email → added).
const a = await db('admin_users').whereRaw('lower(email) = lower(?)', ['backup-admin@old.example']).first();
expect(a).toBeTruthy();
expect(a.password_hash).toBe('HASH_A');
// 5c. The current account SURVIVES the override, with its own credentials.
const b = await db('admin_users').whereRaw('lower(email) = lower(?)', ['current-admin@new.example']).first();
expect(b).toBeTruthy();
expect(b.password_hash).toBe('HASH_B');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('overwrites a backup admin that collides with the current account email', async () => {
// Source has an admin at the SAME email the current operator will use.
await db('admin_users').del();
await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('shared@example.com', 'OLD_HASH'));
await setMarker('collision_case');
const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
// Reinstall: current admin uses the same email but a NEW password.
await db('admin_users').del();
const [id] = await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('shared@example.com', 'NEW_HASH')).returning('id');
const currentAdminId = typeof id === 'object' ? id.id : id;
await importFromPicpeak({ picpeakPath: filePath, currentAdminId });
// Exactly one admin at that email, and it keeps the CURRENT password.
const rows = await db('admin_users').whereRaw('lower(email) = lower(?)', ['shared@example.com']);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].password_hash).toBe('NEW_HASH');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('restores files/ and reports filesRestored', async () => {
// A business-doc that lives in storage → travels in the backup.
const docDir = path.join(tmpDir, 'business-docs');
const marker = path.join(docDir, 'roundtrip-doc.txt');
fs.mkdirSync(docDir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(marker, 'hello');
await db('admin_users').del();
const [id] = await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('files@example.com', 'H')).returning('id');
const currentAdminId = typeof id === 'object' ? id.id : id;
const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
fs.rmSync(marker); // delete on disk so the restore must bring it back
const result = await importFromPicpeak({ picpeakPath: filePath, currentAdminId });
expect(result.filesRestored).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
expect(fs.existsSync(marker)).toBe(true);
expect(fs.readFileSync(marker, 'utf8')).toBe('hello');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.rmSync(docDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
});
describe('.picpeak manifest validation', () => {
it('rejects a database-engine mismatch', async () => {
// Harness runs on SQLite, so a pg manifest must be refused.
const blockers = await validateManifest({
kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'pg' }, tables: {},
});
expect(blockers.some((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a backup from a newer schema (forward-only)', async () => {
// validateManifest reads knex_migrations for the target's latest migration;
// the harness has none, so create it with an older migration than the backup.
await db.schema.createTable('knex_migrations', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('name');
t.integer('batch');
t.timestamp('migration_time');
});
try {
await db('knex_migrations').insert({ name: '100_baseline', batch: 1 });
const blockers = await validateManifest({
kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1,
database: { engine: 'sqlite', latest_migration: '999_from_the_future' },
tables: {},
});
expect(blockers.some((b) => /newer/i.test(b))).toBe(true);
} finally {
await db.schema.dropTableIfExists('knex_migrations');
}
});
it('rejects a file that is not a PicPeak backup', async () => {
const blockers = await validateManifest({ some: 'random-json' });
expect(blockers.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
/**
* CLI test for scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js — break-glass MFA reset (#738).
*
* Boots a temp-SQLite DB, seeds an admin with MFA fully enabled, then runs
* the script in a child process (--email <addr> --yes) pointed at the same
* DB file, and asserts the four MFA columns are zeroed. The script runs in
* its own process with its own knex connection; the parent connection is
* idle during the spawn so the SQLite write lock isn't contended.
*/
const path = require('path');
const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
let db;
let cleanup;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
const SCRIPT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'reset-admin-mfa.js');
async function seedEnrolledAdmin(email) {
const inserted = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: email.split('@')[0],
email,
password_hash: 'x',
is_active: true,
two_factor_enabled: true,
two_factor_secret: 'iv.tag.ct',
two_factor_recovery_codes: JSON.stringify(['$2b$10$fakehashfakehashfakehashfa']),
two_factor_enrolled_at: new Date(),
created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
}
it('zeroes the four MFA columns for the targeted admin', async () => {
const email = 'reset-me@example.com';
const id = await seedEnrolledAdmin(email);
execFileSync('node', [SCRIPT, '--email', email, '--yes'], {
env: {
...process.env,
NODE_ENV: 'test',
TEST_DATABASE_PATH: process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH,
},
stdio: 'pipe',
});
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id }).first();
expect(Number(row.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(0);
expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeNull();
expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBeNull();
expect(row.two_factor_enrolled_at).toBeNull();
});
it('leaves a different admin untouched', async () => {
const targetEmail = 'target@example.com';
const bystanderEmail = 'bystander@example.com';
const targetId = await seedEnrolledAdmin(targetEmail);
const bystanderId = await seedEnrolledAdmin(bystanderEmail);
execFileSync('node', [SCRIPT, '--email', targetEmail, '--yes'], {
env: { ...process.env, NODE_ENV: 'test', TEST_DATABASE_PATH: process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH },
stdio: 'pipe',
});
const target = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
const bystander = await db('admin_users').where({ id: bystanderId }).first();
expect(Number(target.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(0);
expect(Number(bystander.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(1);
expect(bystander.two_factor_secret).toBe('iv.tag.ct');
});
@@ -183,22 +183,24 @@ describe('restoreService — PG branch scope contract (PR #596 review)', () => {
expect(window).toMatch(/was_successful:\s*true/);
});
it('npm run migrate:safe is invoked after the replay in restore()', () => {
it('the safe migration runner is invoked after the replay in restore()', () => {
// Contract from PR #596 round 4: backups taken on older picpeak
// versions must restore COMPLETELY on a newer image — even if new
// migrations have been added since the backup was taken. The
// restore() flow shells out to `npm run migrate:safe` AFTER the
// restore() flow shells out to the safe migration runner AFTER the
// operator-meta replay so the schema catches up to the running
// code WITHIN the restore boundary (not on the next container
// restart).
// restart). Invoked as `node migrations/run-migrations-safe.js` —
// the runtime image ships no npm, so the former `npm run
// migrate:safe` would ENOENT into the non-fatal catch.
//
// Contract:
// 1. A `migrate:safe` shell-out exists somewhere in restoreService
// 1. A run-migrations-safe shell-out exists somewhere in restoreService
// 2. It sits AFTER the replay drain — verification → replay →
// migrations is the documented order
// 3. It does NOT sit inside performDatabaseRestore (must run
// against the reinit'd pool from the parent restore())
const migrateLine = findFirst(/['"]migrate:safe['"]/);
const migrateLine = findFirst(/run-migrations-safe\.js/);
expect(migrateLine).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const replayLine = findLast(/this\.preservedMetaSnapshot\.length\s*>\s*0/);
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
'use strict';
// First-run bootstrap service. bootCrmDb() must run BEFORE requiring the service
// so setupService shares this test's db instance (see crmDb.js note).
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret-at-least-32-characters-long!!';
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb, buildRouteApp } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
let tmpDir;
let setupService;
let getAppSetting;
let upsertAppSetting;
let app;
const VALID_PW = 'Str0ng-Passw0rd!';
// bootCrmDb MUST run before any require of db.js (directly or transitively via a
// service/util), or db.js binds to the default path instead of the temp one.
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
process.env.DATA_DIR = tmpDir; // isolate the SETUP_TOKEN file to the temp dir
setupService = require('../../src/services/setupService');
({ getAppSetting, upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings'));
app = buildRouteApp('/api/setup', require('../../src/routes/setup'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
await cleanup();
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('admin_users').del();
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_token' }).del();
});
describe('setupService (first-run bootstrap)', () => {
it('reports needsAdmin while no admin exists', async () => {
expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: true, complete: false });
});
it('generates and persists a one-time token while no admin exists', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
expect(token).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(token.length).toBeGreaterThan(20);
expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBe(token);
// Idempotent — a second call returns the same token, not a fresh one.
expect(await setupService.ensureSetupToken()).toBe(token);
});
it('stores the token as valid JSON so the Postgres jsonb column accepts it', async () => {
// Regression guard for the SQLite-only miss: a bare token string is rejected
// by Postgres jsonb ("invalid input syntax for type json"). The raw column
// value must be JSON-parseable and round-trip back to the token.
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_token' }).first();
expect(() => JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).not.toThrow();
expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(token);
});
it('rejects a wrong token', async () => {
await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await expect(
setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token: 'nope', email: 'a@b.co', password: VALID_PW })
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: true, complete: false });
});
it('rejects a weak password', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await expect(
setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'a@b.co', password: 'weak' })
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
});
it('creates the first admin as super_admin, issues a token, and burns the setup token', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const result = await setupService.createInitialAdmin({
token, email: 'Owner@Example.com', password: VALID_PW, ip: '203.0.113.7',
});
expect(result.user.email).toBe('owner@example.com'); // normalised
expect(result.user.role.name).toBe('super_admin');
expect(result.token).toEqual(expect.any(String));
const row = await db('admin_users').first();
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
expect(row.role_id).toBe(role.id);
expect(row.password_hash).not.toBe(VALID_PW); // hashed
// One-time: token burned, status now complete.
expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBeFalsy();
expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: false, complete: true });
});
it('writes the SETUP_TOKEN file while pending and removes it once setup completes', async () => {
const tokenFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'SETUP_TOKEN');
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
expect(fs.readFileSync(tokenFile, 'utf8').trim()).toBe(token);
await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'owner@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
expect(fs.existsSync(tokenFile)).toBe(false); // burned in DB + file removed
});
it('refuses to create a second admin (setup already complete)', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
await expect(
setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'second@example.com', password: VALID_PW })
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409 });
});
it('serialises a double-submit — two concurrent valid-token calls create only one admin', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const results = await Promise.allSettled([
setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'a@example.com', password: VALID_PW }),
setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'b@example.com', password: VALID_PW }),
]);
const fulfilled = results.filter((r) => r.status === 'fulfilled');
expect(fulfilled).toHaveLength(1); // the atomic token claim lets exactly one win
const count = await db('admin_users').count({ c: '*' }).first();
expect(Number(count.c)).toBe(1);
});
it('ensureSetupToken clears any stale token once an admin exists', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
// Simulate a stale token left in settings, then re-run the boot hook.
await upsertAppSetting('setup_token', JSON.stringify('stale'), 'string');
expect(await setupService.ensureSetupToken()).toBeNull();
expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBeFalsy();
});
});
describe('setup routes', () => {
it('GET /api/setup/status reports needsAdmin', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/setup/status');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ needsAdmin: true, complete: false });
});
it('POST /api/setup/verify-token accepts the right token without burning it (200)', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const res = await request(app).post('/api/setup/verify-token').send({ token });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ valid: true });
// Token is NOT consumed — it still works for the actual create.
expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBe(token);
});
it('POST /api/setup/verify-token rejects a wrong token (400, field token)', async () => {
await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const res = await request(app).post('/api/setup/verify-token').send({ token: 'nope' });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.field).toBe('token');
});
it('POST /api/setup/verify-token is closed once an admin exists (409)', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
const res = await request(app).post('/api/setup/verify-token').send({ token });
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
});
it('POST /api/setup/admin rejects a wrong token (400)', async () => {
await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/setup/admin')
.send({ token: 'nope', email: 'a@b.co', password: VALID_PW });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toMatchObject({ needsAdmin: true });
});
it('POST /api/setup/admin creates the first admin + sets the auth cookie (201)', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/setup/admin')
.send({ token, email: 'owner@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
expect(res.body.user.role.name).toBe('super_admin');
expect((res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).join(';')).toMatch(/admin_token/);
expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: false, complete: true });
});
it('POST /api/setup/admin is closed once an admin exists (409)', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/setup/admin')
.send({ token, email: 'second@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
/**
* Slideshow photo source (#1015).
*
* The bug: with `lightbox_preview_enabled` off (the default), /photos emitted
* `preview_url: null`, so the slideshow's `preview_url || hero_url || url`
* chain fell through to `hero_url` — a 1920x1080 `fit: 'cover'` centre crop
* meant for gallery header banners. With the "Black Bars (No crop)" fit the
* show then letterboxed an already-cropped frame: portrait photos lost their
* top and bottom and the setting looked broken.
*
* The contract pinned here: `slideshow_url` points at the aspect-preserved
* preview tier and is emitted for image photos REGARDLESS of the lightbox
* toggle, so the slideshow never has a reason to reach for `hero_url`.
* `preview_url` itself must stay gated — the lightbox opt-in is unchanged.
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'slideshow-src-test-secret';
const SLUG = 'slideshow-source-event';
describe('Slideshow photo source (#1015)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let eventId;
let imagePhotoId;
let videoPhotoId;
const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const setLightboxPreview = async (on) => {
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'lightbox_preview_enabled' }).del();
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: 'lightbox_preview_enabled',
setting_value: JSON.stringify(on),
setting_type: 'general',
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
};
const fetchPhotos = async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.expect(200);
return res.body.photos;
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Slideshow Source Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'slideshow-source-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
const img = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'portrait.jpg',
path: 'events/slideshow-source/portrait.jpg',
type: 'individual',
mime_type: 'image/jpeg',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
imagePhotoId = img[0]?.id ?? img[0];
const vid = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'clip.mp4',
path: 'events/slideshow-source/clip.mp4',
type: 'individual',
media_type: 'video',
mime_type: 'video/mp4',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
videoPhotoId = vid[0]?.id ?? vid[0];
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
it('emits slideshow_url for image photos even when lightbox previews are OFF', async () => {
await setLightboxPreview(false);
const photos = await fetchPhotos();
const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
expect(image.slideshow_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/preview/${imagePhotoId}`);
// The regression: this is what used to be null, pushing the show to hero.
expect(image.preview_url).toBeNull();
});
it('leaves preview_url gated so the lightbox opt-in is unchanged', async () => {
await setLightboxPreview(true);
const photos = await fetchPhotos();
const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
expect(image.preview_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/preview/${imagePhotoId}`);
expect(image.slideshow_url).toBe(image.preview_url);
});
it('never points the slideshow at the cover-cropped hero tier', async () => {
await setLightboxPreview(false);
const photos = await fetchPhotos();
const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
// hero_url still ships (the gallery header uses it) — it just must not be
// what the slideshow resolves to.
expect(image.hero_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/hero/${imagePhotoId}`);
expect(image.slideshow_url).not.toBe(image.hero_url);
});
it('emits slideshow_url: null for videos, which have no preview tier', async () => {
await setLightboxPreview(false);
const photos = await fetchPhotos();
const video = photos.find((p) => p.id === videoPhotoId);
expect(video.slideshow_url).toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
// bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll; under full-suite
// parallel load on a small CI runner that can exceed the 5s default. Match the
// other migration-heavy CRM suites (discountLineItems, incomingInvoiceRebill).
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
let db;
let cleanup;
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
expect(again.already).toBe(true);
});
test('seeds the invoice-dunning built-in as the delegation graph (v6, disabled for first beta)', async () => {
test('seeds the invoice-dunning built-in as the delegation graph (disabled for first beta)', async () => {
const { seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot, DUNNING_KEY } = require('../../src/services/_workflowSeedBoot');
const noopLogger = { info() {}, warn() {} };
await seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot(db, noopLogger);
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
expect(wf).toBeTruthy();
expect(!!wf.is_builtin).toBe(true);
expect(!!wf.enabled).toBe(false); // first beta: ships disabled; legacy ladder runs until enabled
expect(JSON.parse(wf.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(6);
expect(JSON.parse(wf.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(7);
const nodes = await db('workflow_nodes').where({ workflow_id: wf.id, version: wf.version });
expect(nodes.filter((n) => n.type === 'trigger')).toHaveLength(1);
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
await seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot(db, noopLogger);
const reseeded = await db('workflows').where({ id: wf.id }).first();
expect(reseeded.version).toBe(wf.version + 1); // bumped
expect(JSON.parse(reseeded.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(6);
expect(JSON.parse(reseeded.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(7);
expect(!!reseeded.enabled).toBe(false); // seed default re-applied (not admin-owned → flips enabled→disabled)
const newNodes = await db('workflow_nodes').where({ workflow_id: wf.id, version: reseeded.version });
expect(newNodes.some((n) => n.type === 'gate')).toBe(false); // legacy graph replaced
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ const {
// bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll; under full-suite
// parallel load on a small CI runner that can exceed the 5s default. Match the
// other migration-heavy CRM suites (discountLineItems, incomingInvoiceRebill).
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
let db;
let cleanup;
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
/**
* The roles-join fallback in adminAuth fabricates `role_name = 'super_admin'`
* to keep existing sessions working across the RBAC upgrade window. The catch
* around it used to be unconditional, so ANY transient database failure —
* connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout, pool exhaustion — took the
* same branch and handed the caller super_admin for the duration of the fault.
*
* `roleName` is the sole discriminator for every ownership check (ownership.js,
* adminProjects, adminUsers, adminApiTokens, projectService, ...), so that
* inverted the whole authorization model rather than failing the request.
* Issue #968. Same treatment apiTokenAuth already got for the v1 surface.
*/
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() }));
// The joined query throws whatever the test stages; the role-less fallback
// query (no .leftJoin) always succeeds, which is what made the original bug
// reachable — it is the cheaper single-table read.
// `mock`-prefixed so jest's module-factory hoisting allows the reference.
let mockJoinError = null;
const mockAdminRow = { id: 7, username: 'scoped', email: 's@example.com', password_changed_at: null };
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
db: () => ({
_joined: false,
leftJoin() { this._joined = true; return this; },
where() { return this; },
select() { return this; },
first() {
if (this._joined && mockJoinError) return Promise.reject(mockJoinError);
return Promise.resolve({ ...mockAdminRow });
},
}),
}));
const { adminAuth } = require('../../src/middleware/auth');
const SECRET = 'test-secret-for-admin-auth-fallback';
function makeReq() {
const token = jwt.sign(
{ id: mockAdminRow.id, type: 'admin' },
SECRET,
{ algorithm: 'HS256', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
);
return { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, ip: '127.0.0.1', connection: {} };
}
function makeRes() {
return {
statusCode: null,
body: null,
status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
};
}
describe('adminAuth roles-join fallback (#968)', () => {
const OLD_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
beforeAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = SECRET; });
afterAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = OLD_SECRET; });
beforeEach(() => { mockJoinError = null; });
it('grants the upgrade-window fallback only for a genuinely missing roles table', async () => {
mockJoinError = new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: roles');
const req = makeReq();
const res = makeRes();
const next = jest.fn();
await adminAuth(req, res, next);
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(req.admin.roleName).toBe('super_admin');
});
it.each([
['connection reset', new Error('Connection terminated unexpectedly')],
['deadlock', new Error('deadlock detected')],
['pool exhaustion', new Error('Knex: Timeout acquiring a connection')],
['statement timeout', new Error('canceling statement due to statement timeout')],
])('does NOT fabricate super_admin on a transient failure (%s)', async (_label, err) => {
mockJoinError = err;
const req = makeReq();
const res = makeRes();
const next = jest.fn();
await adminAuth(req, res, next);
// Fails closed: request rejected, req.admin never populated. The specific
// status is 401 (adminAuth's blanket outer catch) — what matters is that
// the caller is not elevated and does not reach the route.
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(req.admin).toBeUndefined();
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
});
it('does NOT fabricate super_admin when an unrelated table is missing', async () => {
mockJoinError = new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: admin_sessions');
const req = makeReq();
const res = makeRes();
const next = jest.fn();
await adminAuth(req, res, next);
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(req.admin).toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
/**
* The roles-join fallback in apiTokenAuth grants `super_admin` (upgrade-path
* parity with adminAuth). It must therefore fire ONLY when the roles schema is
* genuinely absent — a catch-all turns any transient database failure into a
* privilege escalation that reopens GHSA-9697 for a demoted token owner.
*/
const { isMissingRolesSchema } = require('../../src/middleware/apiTokenAuth');
describe('apiTokenAuth roles-schema fallback predicate (GHSA-9697)', () => {
it('accepts a genuinely missing roles table on both engines', () => {
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: roles'))).toBe(true);
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
Object.assign(new Error('relation "roles" does not exist'), { code: '42P01' }),
)).toBe(true);
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
Object.assign(new Error('column roles.name does not exist'), { code: '42703' }),
)).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects transient failures that must not elevate the caller', () => {
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('Connection terminated unexpectedly'))).toBe(false);
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('deadlock detected'))).toBe(false);
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('Knex: Timeout acquiring a connection'))).toBe(false);
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('canceling statement due to statement timeout'))).toBe(false);
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(undefined)).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects a missing-table error for an unrelated table', () => {
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: api_tokens'))).toBe(false);
});
// knex prefixes the failing SQL to err.message, and that SQL always names
// `roles` on this join — so the message substring proves nothing about the
// error, and only an exact driver phrase (or a SQLSTATE) may be trusted.
// These are real knex message shapes, captured from the actual query.
describe('with knex\'s SQL prefix on the message (#968)', () => {
const withSql = (driverMessage) => new Error(
'select `roles`.`name` as `role_name` from `admin_users` '
+ 'left join `roles` on `roles`.`id` = `admin_users`.`role_id` '
+ `where \`admin_users\`.\`id\` = 1 limit 1 - ${driverMessage}`,
);
it('accepts both legitimate upgrade-window states', () => {
// pre-054: the roles table does not exist yet
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
Object.assign(withSql('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: roles'), { code: 'SQLITE_ERROR' }),
)).toBe(true);
// post-054, pre-057: roles exists, admin_users.role_id not added yet
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
Object.assign(withSql('SQLITE_ERROR: no such column: admin_users.role_id'), { code: 'SQLITE_ERROR' }),
)).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects an unrelated "does not exist" fault despite the SQL naming roles', () => {
// pgbouncer transaction pooling loses a named prepared statement
// (SQLSTATE 26000). Transient — the fallback query would succeed on a
// fresh connection, so accepting this would fabricate super_admin.
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
Object.assign(withSql('prepared statement "S_1" does not exist'), { code: '26000' }),
)).toBe(false);
// The DB role/user, not the roles table.
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
Object.assign(withSql('role "picpeak" does not exist'), { code: '28000' }),
)).toBe(false);
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
Object.assign(withSql('database "picpeak" does not exist'), { code: '3D000' }),
)).toBe(false);
expect(isMissingRolesSchema(withSql('Connection terminated unexpectedly'))).toBe(false);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
/**
* Regression test for the bulk archive/delete ownership bypass.
*
* bulk-archive and bulk-delete acted on body-supplied event ids with no
* ownership filter, so an admin/editor scoped to their own events (the
* single-event routes enforce requireEventOwnership) could archive or
* cascade-delete ANY event by id. filterOwnedEventIds is the helper those
* routes now use to drop foreign/non-existent ids.
*/
// events owned by admin 7; event 3 owned by someone else; event 4 is
// ownerless (legacy). The mock models:
// whereIn('id', ids).andWhere(created_by IS NULL OR created_by = admin.id)
const EVENTS = [
{ id: 1, created_by: 7 },
{ id: 2, created_by: 7 },
{ id: 3, created_by: 99 }, // foreign
{ id: 4, created_by: null }, // ownerless/legacy
];
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
db: () => {
const q = {
_ids: null,
_adminId: null,
whereIn(_col, ids) { this._ids = ids; return this; },
andWhere(cb) {
// Emulate the (created_by IS NULL OR created_by = admin.id) builder
// by capturing the admin id the callback closes over via a probe.
const probe = {
_adminId: null,
whereNull() { return this; },
orWhere(_col, id) { this._adminId = id; return this; },
};
cb(probe);
this._adminId = probe._adminId;
return this;
},
select() {
return Promise.resolve(
EVENTS
.filter((e) => this._ids.includes(e.id))
.filter((e) => e.created_by === null || e.created_by === this._adminId)
.map((e) => ({ id: e.id }))
);
},
};
return q;
},
}));
const { filterOwnedEventIds } = require('../../src/middleware/ownership');
describe('filterOwnedEventIds', () => {
it('super_admin gets every id, nothing denied', async () => {
const { allowed, denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(
{ id: 7, roleName: 'super_admin' }, [1, 3, 4, 999]
);
expect(allowed).toEqual([1, 3, 4, 999]);
expect(denied).toEqual([]);
});
it('non-super_admin keeps owned + ownerless, denies foreign and non-existent', async () => {
const { allowed, denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(
{ id: 7, roleName: 'admin' }, [1, 2, 3, 4, 999]
);
expect(allowed.sort()).toEqual([1, 2, 4]); // owns 1,2; 4 is ownerless
expect(denied.sort()).toEqual([3, 999]); // 3 foreign, 999 missing
});
it('foreign-only request yields empty allowed', async () => {
const { allowed, denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(
{ id: 7, roleName: 'editor' }, [3]
);
expect(allowed).toEqual([]);
expect(denied).toEqual([3]);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
/**
* Regression test for the cross-event thumbnail enumeration leak.
*
* Thumbnails are served flat from /thumbnails/thumb_<name> with
* deterministic, enumerable filenames. photoAuth previously granted any
* holder of a gallery token for ANY active event access to ANY thumbnail
* (it set eventSlug=null and returned next() as long as the token's event
* existed), so a visitor to one gallery could pull another (password-
* protected) gallery's entire thumbnail set. The fix scopes thumbnail
* access to the token's event by matching the requested file against
* photos.thumbnail_path for that event_id.
*/
process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'test-secret-thumbnail-scope-000000000000';
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
// Two events, each owning one thumbnail. The photos mock resolves a row
// only when BOTH event_id and thumbnail_path match — i.e. it models the
// real ownership query.
const EVENTS = [
{ id: 10, slug: 'event-a', is_active: 1 },
{ id: 20, slug: 'event-b', is_active: 1 },
];
const PHOTOS = [
{ id: 1, event_id: 10, thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_event-a_ceremony_0001.jpg' },
{ id: 2, event_id: 20, thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg' },
];
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
db: (table) => ({
_cond: null,
where(cond) { this._cond = cond; return this; },
first() {
if (table === 'events') {
return Promise.resolve(EVENTS.find((e) => e.id === this._cond.id) || null);
}
if (table === 'photos') {
return Promise.resolve(
PHOTOS.find((p) => p.event_id === this._cond.event_id
&& p.thumbnail_path === this._cond.thumbnail_path) || null
);
}
return Promise.resolve(null);
},
}),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
}));
const photoAuth = require('../../src/middleware/photoAuth');
function galleryToken(eventId) {
return jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
}
function makeReqRes(token, thumbPath) {
const req = { path: thumbPath, headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, cookies: {} };
const res = {
statusCode: null,
body: null,
status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
};
return { req, res };
}
describe('photoAuth — thumbnail ownership scoping', () => {
it('denies a gallery token for event A fetching event B\'s thumbnail', async () => {
const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(10), '/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg');
const next = jest.fn();
await photoAuth(req, res, next);
// Access denied: middleware must not pass the request through.
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
expect(req.event).toBeUndefined();
});
it('allows a gallery token to fetch its own event\'s thumbnail', async () => {
const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(20), '/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg');
const next = jest.fn();
await photoAuth(req, res, next);
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(req.event).toMatchObject({ id: 20 });
});
it('denies a traversal / foreign filename that matches no owned thumbnail', async () => {
const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(10), '/thumb_../../etc/passwd');
const next = jest.fn();
await photoAuth(req, res, next);
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
expect(req.event).toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
/**
* Migration 167 (projects.created_by) — idempotent on re-run, reversible,
* and backfills the owner from a project's single linked event (GHSA-wrg5).
*/
const path=require('path'), fs=require('fs'), os=require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV='test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH=path.join(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(),'picpeak-mig167-')),'db.sqlite');
process.env.JWT_SECRET='mig';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const mig = require('../../migrations/core/167_add_projects_created_by');
describe('migration 167', () => {
let db, cleanup;
beforeAll(async()=>{ ({db,cleanup}=await bootCrmDb()); await seedMinimal(db); },120000);
afterAll(async()=>{ if(cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('is idempotent on re-run and reversible', async () => {
await mig.up(db); // already applied by boot; must no-op
await mig.up(db); // and again
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('projects','created_by')).toBe(true);
await mig.down(db);
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('projects','created_by')).toBe(false);
await mig.up(db); // re-apply cleanly
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('projects','created_by')).toBe(true);
});
it('backfills created_by from a single linked event owner', async () => {
const p = await db('projects').insert({name:'bf',status:'active',created_at:new Date(),updated_at:new Date()}).returning('id');
const pid = p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
await db('events').insert({slug:'bf-ev',event_type:'wedding',event_name:'bf',event_date:'2026-08-01',
host_email:'h@e.com',admin_email:'a@e.com',password_hash:'x',share_token:'t1',share_link:'/g/bf-ev/t1',
created_by: 4242, project_id: pid, expires_at:new Date(Date.now()+864e5).toISOString(),
is_active:1,is_archived:0,is_draft:0,created_at:new Date().toISOString()});
await mig.up(db);
const row = await db('projects').where({id:pid}).first();
expect(row.created_by).toBe(4242);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
/**
* GHSA-jhcf round 3: scoping the activity feed does nothing about the rows
* already on disk. expenseService used to pass adminId into logActivity's
* `eventId` slot, so upgraded instances carry accounting rows whose event_id
* is an ADMIN id — and the scope predicate happily matches those against a
* same-numbered event the caller owns.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig168-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mig168-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const migration = require('../../migrations/core/168_fix_expense_activity_event_id');
describe('migration 168 — legacy accounting activity rows (GHSA-jhcf)', () => {
let db; let cleanup;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('re-attributes the admin id and clears event_id, leaving real rows alone', async () => {
await db('activity_logs').insert([
// Legacy shape: event_id is really admin #7, no actor recorded.
{
activity_type: 'expense_created',
actor_type: 'system',
actor_id: null,
event_id: 7,
metadata: JSON.stringify({ expenseId: 1 }),
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
},
{
activity_type: 'incoming_invoice_captured',
actor_type: 'system',
actor_id: null,
event_id: 9,
metadata: JSON.stringify({ inboundDocumentId: 2 }),
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
},
// A genuine event-scoped row from another subsystem must survive intact.
{
activity_type: 'photo_uploaded',
actor_type: 'admin',
actor_id: 3,
event_id: 7,
metadata: JSON.stringify({}),
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
},
]);
await migration.up(db);
const expense = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'expense_created' }).first();
expect(expense.event_id == null).toBe(true);
expect(Number(expense.actor_id)).toBe(7);
expect(expense.actor_type).toBe('admin');
const captured = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'incoming_invoice_captured' }).first();
expect(captured.event_id == null).toBe(true);
expect(Number(captured.actor_id)).toBe(9);
const photo = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'photo_uploaded' }).first();
expect(Number(photo.event_id)).toBe(7);
expect(Number(photo.actor_id)).toBe(3);
});
it('is idempotent on re-run', async () => {
await expect(migration.up(db)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
const expense = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'expense_created' }).first();
expect(Number(expense.actor_id)).toBe(7);
expect(expense.event_id == null).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ describe('admin CRM routes — auth + permission gate', () => {
// Invalid: signed with a different secret. adminAuth must reject.
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
invalidToken = jwt.sign({ id: adminId, type: 'admin' }, 'WRONG-SECRET', { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
}, 60000);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
/**
* HTTP smoke tests for the core admin event CRUD endpoints:
* POST /api/admin/events (create)
* GET /api/admin/events (list + pagination)
* GET /api/admin/events/:id (detail + stats)
* PUT /api/admin/events/:id (update)
* DELETE /api/admin/events/:id (cascade delete)
*
* Safety net ahead of the adminEvents.js god-file decomposition —
* pins the request/response contracts of the main CRUD paths using
* the same real-SQLite harness as slideshowAdmin.test.js.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-events-smoke-')), 'db.sqlite'
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-events-test-secret';
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
async function insertEvent(db, adminId, over = {}) {
const base = {
slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Test Wedding',
event_date: '2026-05-29',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_by: adminId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...over,
};
const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
}
describe('admin events CRUD endpoints (smoke)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let token;
// bootCrmDb's full migration run intermittently exceeds Jest's default
// 5s beforeAll timeout on slower CI runners; raise it.
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
});
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('email_queue').del();
await db('events').del();
});
const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
it('401s without an admin token', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/admin/events');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
describe('POST /', () => {
it('creates an event, mints slug + share link and persists the row', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/events')).send({
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Smoke Wedding',
event_date: '2026-09-01',
// Field requirements default to ON (getEventFieldRequirements)
// so customer + admin contact data must be supplied.
customer_name: 'Client Person',
customer_email: 'client@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
require_password: false,
is_draft: true,
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.id).toBeDefined();
expect(res.body.slug).toContain('wedding-smoke-wedding');
expect(typeof res.body.share_link).toBe('string');
expect(res.body.is_draft).toBe(true);
const row = await db('events').where({ id: res.body.id }).first();
expect(row).toBeDefined();
expect(row.event_name).toBe('Smoke Wedding');
expect(row.created_by).toBe(adminId);
// Folder structure is created under STORAGE_PATH/events/active/<slug>.
const eventDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', res.body.slug);
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(eventDir, 'collages'))).toBe(true);
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(eventDir, 'individual'))).toBe(true);
// Draft creates must NOT queue the gallery_created email.
const queued = await db('email_queue').where({ event_id: res.body.id });
expect(queued).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('400s on an invalid event type', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/events')).send({
event_type: 'not-a-real-type',
event_name: 'Broken',
require_password: false,
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(Array.isArray(res.body.errors)).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('GET /', () => {
it('lists events with pagination metadata and photo counts', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Alpha' });
await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Beta' });
const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/events'));
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.events).toHaveLength(2);
expect(res.body.pagination).toMatchObject({ page: 1, total: 2, totalPages: 1 });
for (const ev of res.body.events) {
expect(ev.photo_count).toBe(0);
}
});
});
describe('GET /:id', () => {
it('returns the event with photo/view stats', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Detail Event' });
const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${id}`));
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.event_name).toBe('Detail Event');
expect(res.body.photo_count).toBe(0);
expect(res.body.total_views).toBe(0);
expect(res.body.total_downloads).toBe(0);
expect(Array.isArray(res.body.recent_photos)).toBe(true);
});
it('404s for an unknown event id', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/events/999999'));
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
describe('PUT /:id', () => {
it('updates mutable fields and persists them', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Before' });
const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
event_name: 'After',
welcome_message: 'Hello guests',
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect(row.event_name).toBe('After');
expect(row.welcome_message).toBe('Hello guests');
});
it('404s when updating a missing event', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/events/999999')).send({
event_name: 'Ghost',
});
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
// #822 — hero_logo_visible/position are nullable (null = "inherit the global
// branding toggle"), but the validator used .optional() without
// { nullable: true }, so an explicit null was rejected with 400.
it('accepts hero_logo_visible: null and stores NULL (inherit)', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { hero_logo_visible: 1 });
const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
hero_logo_visible: null,
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect(row.hero_logo_visible).toBeNull();
});
it('still rejects a non-boolean hero_logo_visible', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
hero_logo_visible: 'maybe',
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
});
describe('DELETE /:id', () => {
it('cascade-deletes the event row', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/events/${id}`));
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.message).toMatch(/deleted/i);
const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect(row).toBeUndefined();
});
it('404s when deleting a missing event', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).delete('/api/admin/events/999999'));
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
});
+345
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@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
/**
* HTTP-level tests for the admin TOTP MFA feature (#738).
*
* Two surfaces:
* 1. Enrollment (adminAuth-gated) — POST /mfa/setup, /mfa/enable,
* GET /mfa/status, POST /mfa/disable — mounted like server.js at
* /api/admin/auth (src/routes/adminAuth.js).
* 2. Login challenge — POST /admin/login + POST /admin/login/mfa
* (src/routes/auth.js, mounted /api/auth).
*
* Uses the same real-SQLite harness as the CRM route tests
* (bootCrmDb + seedMinimal + mintAdminToken). Valid TOTP codes are
* generated in-test via otplib's authenticator against the secret the
* /setup endpoint returns in plaintext.
*
* NOTE: env (TEST_DATABASE_PATH / JWT_SECRET) must be set BEFORE the
* first require of db.js — mirror adminCrmAuth.test.js exactly.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-adminmfa-test-'));
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite');
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mfa-route-test-secret';
// reCAPTCHA disabled (default) → verifyRecaptcha returns true, so login
// tests don't need a token. Be explicit so a leaked env can't flip it on.
delete process.env.RECAPTCHA_SECRET_KEY;
const request = require('supertest');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { authenticator } = require('otplib');
const {
bootCrmDb, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
let db;
let cleanup;
let adminApp; // /api/admin/auth (enrollment)
let authApp; // /api/auth (login challenge)
/**
* Seed a bare admin (password known) and return its id + login creds.
* seedMinimal always creates username 'tester'; we need distinct rows per
* scenario, so insert directly with a unique username/email.
*/
async function seedAdmin({ username, superAdmin = false } = {}) {
const password = 'correct-horse';
const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(password, 4);
const uname = username || `admin-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const row = {
username: uname,
email: `${uname}@example.com`,
password_hash: passwordHash,
must_change_password: false,
is_active: true,
created_at: new Date(),
};
if (superAdmin) {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
if (!role) throw new Error('super_admin role not seeded');
row.role_id = role.id;
}
const inserted = await db('admin_users').insert(row).returning('id');
const id = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
return { id, username: uname, password };
}
/** Run the full setup→enable enrollment against the live app. Returns
* the plaintext TOTP secret (for later login codes) and recovery codes. */
async function enroll(adminId) {
const token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
const setup = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(setup.status).toBe(200);
const secret = setup.body.secret;
const enable = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/enable')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.send({ code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
expect(enable.status).toBe(200);
return { secret, recoveryCodes: enable.body.recoveryCodes, token };
}
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
adminApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/auth', require('../../src/routes/adminAuth'));
authApp = buildRouteApp('/api/auth', require('../../src/routes/auth'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('MFA enrollment — /api/admin/auth/mfa/*', () => {
it('setup returns a secret + otpauth URI + QR and does NOT enable yet', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const token = mintAdminToken(admin.id);
const res = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.secret).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(res.body.otpauthUri).toMatch(/^otpauth:\/\/totp\//);
expect(res.body.qr).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
// Not yet enabled: status must still report disabled.
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
// And the row stores an encrypted secret (not the plaintext one).
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.two_factor_secret).not.toBe(res.body.secret);
expect(Number(row.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(0);
});
it('full flow: setup → enable(valid TOTP) → status shows enabled + 10 recovery codes', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { recoveryCodes, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
expect(Array.isArray(recoveryCodes)).toBe(true);
expect(recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(status.status).toBe(200);
expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(true);
expect(status.body.recoveryCodesRemaining).toBe(10);
expect(status.body.enrolledAt).toBeTruthy();
});
it('enable with a WRONG code is rejected (400) and MFA stays off', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const token = mintAdminToken(admin.id);
const setup = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
const valid = authenticator.generate(setup.body.secret);
const wrong = valid === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
const res = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/enable')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.send({ code: wrong });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
});
it('enable before setup is rejected', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const token = mintAdminToken(admin.id);
const res = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/enable')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.send({ code: '123456' });
// No provisional secret → ValidationError (400).
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it('all enrollment endpoints require a valid admin token (401 without one)', async () => {
const noToken = await request(adminApp).get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status');
expect(noToken.status).toBe(401);
const setup = await request(adminApp).post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup');
expect(setup.status).toBe(401);
});
// Regression guard for #735: super_admin used to be blocked from enrolling.
// Enrollment operates on req.admin.id and is role-agnostic — assert a
// super_admin can complete the full setup→enable flow.
it('#735 regression — a super_admin can enroll in MFA', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin({ superAdmin: true });
const { recoveryCodes, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
expect(recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('MFA disable — /api/admin/auth/mfa/disable', () => {
it('requires a valid code; a wrong code is rejected and state persists', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { token } = await enroll(admin.id);
const bad = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.send({ code: '000000' });
expect(bad.status).toBe(400);
const stillOn = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(stillOn.body.enabled).toBe(true);
});
it('a valid TOTP disables MFA and clears the stored secret', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
const res = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.send({ code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
expect(status.body.recoveryCodesRemaining).toBe(0);
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeNull();
expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('Admin login challenge — /api/auth/admin/login[/mfa]', () => {
it('an enrolled admin gets mfaRequired + mfaToken, NO session cookie', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
await enroll(admin.id);
const res = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.mfaRequired).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.mfaToken).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(res.body.user).toBeUndefined(); // no completed session
// No admin auth cookie should have been set on the challenge response.
const cookies = res.headers['set-cookie'] || [];
expect(cookies.join(';')).not.toMatch(/adminToken/i);
});
it('a NON-enrolled admin logs in directly (no mfaRequired)', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const res = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.mfaRequired).toBeUndefined();
expect(res.body.user).toBeDefined();
expect(res.body.user.username).toBe(admin.username);
});
it('login/mfa with a valid TOTP completes the session', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
const challenge = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
const { mfaToken } = challenge.body;
const res = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
.send({ mfaToken, code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.user).toBeDefined();
expect(res.body.user.id).toBe(admin.id);
});
it('login/mfa with a wrong code is 401 MFA_INVALID', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
const challenge = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
const valid = authenticator.generate(secret);
const wrong = valid === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
const res = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
.send({ mfaToken: challenge.body.mfaToken, code: wrong });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
expect(res.body.user).toBeUndefined();
});
it('a recovery code logs in and is then single-use (second use fails)', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { recoveryCodes } = await enroll(admin.id);
const recovery = recoveryCodes[0];
// First challenge + recovery-code exchange succeeds.
const c1 = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
const first = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
.send({ mfaToken: c1.body.mfaToken, code: recovery });
expect(first.status).toBe(200);
expect(first.body.user).toBeDefined();
// recoveryCodesRemaining dropped by one.
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${mintAdminToken(admin.id)}`);
expect(status.body.recoveryCodesRemaining).toBe(9);
// Second use of the SAME recovery code must fail.
const c2 = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
const second = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
.send({ mfaToken: c2.body.mfaToken, code: recovery });
expect(second.status).toBe(401);
expect(second.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
});
it('login/mfa rejects a non-mfa_pending token (e.g. a normal admin JWT)', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
await enroll(admin.id);
const res = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
.send({ mfaToken: mintAdminToken(admin.id), code: '123456' });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
/**
* Admin photo view route Content-Type (#908).
*
* The route built `image/<ext>` from the filename, producing invalid
* types like image/mp4 for videos. AdminAuthenticatedVideo fetches this
* URL into a blob whose type inherits the header, and browsers refuse to
* play a <video> blob labeled image/* — blank/grey admin video preview.
*
* Pins (incl. external-review hardening):
* - the header is ALWAYS image/* or video/*: a stored non-media MIME
* (chunked uploads store the client-sent type unvalidated) is never
* echoed — text/html inline under the app origin would be XSS
* - stored video/ MIME wins; MIME-less videos map from the extension
* (.mov → video/quicktime), unknown video extensions get video/mp4
* - images IGNORE the stored MIME (migration 039 backfilled image/jpeg
* onto every legacy row, PNGs included) and use the extension,
* normalized (jpg → image/jpeg); extensionless files get image/jpeg
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-admin-ct-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-ct-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-admin-ct-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const SLUG = 'admin-ct-test-event';
describe('admin photo view Content-Type (#908)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let eventId;
let adminToken;
const addPhoto = async (filename, extra = {}) => {
const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, filename), Buffer.from(`bytes-${filename}`));
const r = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename,
path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...extra,
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const getPhotoRes = (photoId) => request(app)
.get(`/api/admin/photos/${eventId}/photo/${photoId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Admin CT Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'admin-ct-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'admin-ct-admin',
email: 'admin-ct-admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('AdminCt123', 4),
role_id: superRole.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
adminToken = jwt.sign(
{ id: rootId, username: 'admin-ct-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotos'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('serves a video with its stored mime_type, not image/<ext>', async () => {
const id = await addPhoto('clip.mp4', { media_type: 'video', mime_type: 'video/mp4' });
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
});
it('maps MIME-less videos from their extension (.mov → video/quicktime)', async () => {
const id = await addPhoto('clip-nomime.mov', { media_type: 'video' });
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/quicktime');
});
it('falls back to video/mp4 for a video with an unknown extension', async () => {
const id = await addPhoto('clip-unknown.xyz', { media_type: 'video' });
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
});
it('rejects malformed video/ MIME values that would break setHeader', async () => {
// Header-invalid chars in the stored value must not 500 the route —
// fall back to the extension map instead.
const id = await addPhoto('crlf.mp4', {
media_type: 'video',
mime_type: 'video/mp4\r\nX-Evil: 1',
});
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
expect(res.headers['x-evil']).toBeUndefined();
const bare = await addPhoto('bare.webm', { media_type: 'video', mime_type: 'video/' });
const res2 = await getPhotoRes(bare);
expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/webm');
});
it('preserves an auto-imported avif via the safe stored-MIME allowlist', async () => {
// .avif isn't in EXTENSION_TO_MIME; s3AutoImporter stores image/avif.
// Map-only would mislabel it image/jpeg — the allowlist keeps it.
const id = await addPhoto('imported.avif', { mime_type: 'image/avif' });
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/avif');
});
it('preserves other importer raster types too (apng, x-icon)', async () => {
const apng = await addPhoto('anim.apng', { mime_type: 'image/apng' });
expect((await getPhotoRes(apng)).headers['content-type']).toBe('image/apng');
const ico = await addPhoto('fav.ico', { mime_type: 'image/x-icon' });
expect((await getPhotoRes(ico)).headers['content-type']).toBe('image/x-icon');
});
it('does NOT honor a stored scriptable image type (image/svg+xml)', async () => {
// svg is inline-scriptable and must never be echoed — allowlist excludes it.
const id = await addPhoto('vector.svg', { mime_type: 'image/svg+xml' });
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
});
it('never echoes a stored non-media MIME type (inline XSS guard)', async () => {
const id = await addPhoto('evil.png', { mime_type: 'text/html' });
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
});
it('ignores the migration-039 image/jpeg backfill on legacy PNG rows', async () => {
const id = await addPhoto('legacy.png', { mime_type: 'image/jpeg' });
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
});
it('normalizes jpg to the canonical image/jpeg', async () => {
const id = await addPhoto('shot.jpg');
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
});
it('keeps the extension fallback for images without a stored mime_type', async () => {
const id = await addPhoto('shot.png');
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
});
it('handles Object.prototype key extensions without a 500 (.constructor)', async () => {
// The extension-to-MIME lookup must be own-property only — a raw
// index access returns an inherited function for these keys and the
// downstream startsWith throws. Serve image/jpeg instead of 500.
const id = await addPhoto('payload.constructor');
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
const id2 = await addPhoto('payload.__proto__', { media_type: 'video' });
const res2 = await getPhotoRes(id2);
expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
});
it('does not synthesize types from unmapped image extensions', async () => {
// Raw interpolation would produce image/svg+xml (scriptable inline)
// or arbitrary strings from client-controlled filenames — the shared
// map is the allowlist, everything else is served as image/jpeg.
const svg = await addPhoto('vector.svg+xml');
const res = await getPhotoRes(svg);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
const weird = await addPhoto('weird.xyz');
const res2 = await getPhotoRes(weird);
expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
});
it('extensionless files get image/jpeg, never a bare image/', async () => {
const id = await addPhoto('noext');
const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
/**
* Source-inspection contract test for #1078.
*
* POST /api/admin/thumbnails/regenerate-previews hands its selected rows to
* ensurePreviewImage, which branches on `source_origin` (and then reads
* `external_relpath` / `filename`) to reach an external/reference photo on its
* media mount. When the select list omitted those columns, every external row
* looked managed, resolvePhotoStorageKey returned null, and the endpoint
* reported success while silently generating nothing for reference galleries.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
describe('regenerate-previews selects the columns ensurePreviewImage branches on (#1078)', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'routes', 'adminThumbnails.js'),
'utf8',
);
// The select feeding the regenerate-previews handler, from the route
// declaration to the end of that statement.
const selectStatement = (() => {
const routeIdx = src.indexOf('/regenerate-previews');
expect(routeIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
const selectIdx = src.indexOf('.select(', routeIdx);
expect(selectIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
return src.slice(selectIdx, src.indexOf(';', selectIdx));
})();
it.each(['source_origin', 'external_relpath', 'filename'])(
'selects %s',
(column) => {
expect(selectStatement).toContain(`'${column}'`);
}
);
it('still selects the columns the managed path needs', () => {
for (const column of ['id', 'event_id', 'path', 'media_type', 'mime_type', 'preview_path']) {
expect(selectStatement).toContain(`'${column}'`);
}
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
/**
* Regression test for GHSA-9hmx-68vc-qpqw — share-link login must not bypass
* the gallery password.
*
* POST /auth/gallery/share-login validates only the share token. For a
* password-protected gallery it previously minted a full `type:'gallery'`
* access token on the share token alone, letting anyone holding the share URL
* read the gallery without the password. The fix: when the gallery requires a
* password, return `{ requires_password: true }` with NO token and NO cookie.
*/
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'share-login-test-secret';
const events = [];
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
function dbFn(table) {
if (table === 'events') {
let filter = () => true;
return {
where(criteria) {
filter = (row) => Object.entries(criteria).every(([k, v]) => {
if (k === 'is_active') return Boolean(row.is_active) === Boolean(v);
if (k === 'is_archived') return Boolean(row.is_archived) === Boolean(v);
return row[k] === v;
});
return this;
},
async first() { return events.find(filter); },
};
}
return { where() { return this; }, async first() { return undefined; } };
}
dbFn.raw = async () => {};
return { db: dbFn, logActivity: async () => {} };
});
// Share token is stored plainly on the fake event row.
jest.mock('../../src/services/shareLinkService', () => ({
getEventShareToken: (event) => event.share_token,
resolveShareIdentifier: async () => ({ event: null }),
}));
const mockSetGalleryAuthCookies = jest.fn();
jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenUtils', () => ({
setGalleryAuthCookies: (...args) => mockSetGalleryAuthCookies(...args),
clearGalleryAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
getGalleryTokenFromRequest: jest.fn(),
setAdminAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/authSecurity', () => ({
trackFailedAttempt: jest.fn(async () => {}),
trackSuccessfulLogin: jest.fn(async () => {}),
checkAccountLockout: jest.fn(async () => ({ isLocked: false })),
resetLockout: jest.fn(async () => {}),
}));
// Collaborators the router imports at load but the share-login path doesn't hit.
jest.mock('../../src/services/recaptcha', () => ({ verifyRecaptcha: async () => true }));
jest.mock('../../src/services/mfaService', () => ({}));
jest.mock('../../src/middleware/sessionTimeout', () => ({ endSession: jest.fn(), sessionTimeoutMiddleware: (req, res, next) => next() }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ revokeToken: jest.fn(async () => {}), isTokenRevoked: async () => false }));
const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
function makeApp() {
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/auth', authRouter);
return app;
}
const SHARE_TOKEN = 'a'.repeat(64);
beforeEach(() => {
events.length = 0;
mockSetGalleryAuthCookies.mockClear();
});
describe('POST /auth/gallery/share-login password enforcement', () => {
it('does NOT mint a token for a password-protected gallery', async () => {
events.push({
id: 1, slug: 'private-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
require_password: 1, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Private',
});
const res = await request(makeApp())
.post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
.send({ slug: 'private-gallery', token: SHARE_TOKEN });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.requires_password).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('mints a token for a public (no-password) gallery', async () => {
events.push({
id: 2, slug: 'public-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
require_password: false, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Public',
});
const res = await request(makeApp())
.post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
.send({ slug: 'public-gallery', token: SHARE_TOKEN });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(typeof res.body.token).toBe('string');
expect(res.body.event).toBeDefined();
expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('rejects a wrong share token regardless of password setting', async () => {
events.push({
id: 3, slug: 'public-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
require_password: false, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Public',
});
const res = await request(makeApp())
.post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
.send({ slug: 'public-gallery', token: 'b'.repeat(64) });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
/**
* Authorization / ownership gaps (GHSA permission cluster):
* - jm7j: API-token list must scope to the caller (non-super sees only own)
* - gprq: API-token revoke must be owner-or-super_admin
* - 3rqx: event update must not mass-assign identity/secret columns
* - j2f4: category hero must belong to that category
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-authz-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'authz-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-authz-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const {
bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken,
} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('authorization / ownership gaps', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
let superId; let superTok; let adminId; let adminTok;
const grantPermissionToRole = async (roleName, permName) => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
const perm = await db('permissions').where({ name: permName }).first();
const exists = await db('role_permissions')
.where({ role_id: role.id, permission_id: perm.id }).first();
if (!exists) {
await db('role_permissions').insert({ role_id: role.id, permission_id: perm.id });
}
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
({ adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
const pass = await bcrypt.hash('x', 4);
const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'plain-admin', email: 'plain@example.com',
password_hash: pass, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
adminId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'admin');
// Grant settings.edit to the admin role BEFORE any request populates the
// 60s permission cache, so the revoke test exercises the ownership check
// (404) rather than the missing-permission gate (403). This models a
// custom role that carries settings.edit — the scenario GHSA-gprq needs.
await grantPermissionToRole('admin', 'settings.edit');
adminTok = mintAdminToken(adminId);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/admin/api-tokens', require('../../src/routes/adminApiTokens'));
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
app.use('/api/admin/categories', require('../../src/routes/adminCategories'));
// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
});
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
describe('API tokens (jm7j / gprq)', () => {
let superTokenId;
beforeAll(async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/api-tokens'), superTok)
.send({ name: 'super-token', scopes: ['read'] });
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
superTokenId = res.body.id;
});
it('non-super admin does not see another admin\'s tokens in the list', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/api-tokens'), adminTok);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.find((t) => t.id === superTokenId)).toBeUndefined();
});
it('super_admin sees all tokens', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/api-tokens'), superTok);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.find((t) => t.id === superTokenId)).toBeDefined();
});
it('a non-owner (with settings.edit) cannot revoke another admin\'s token', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/api-tokens/${superTokenId}`), adminTok);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
const row = await db('api_tokens').where({ id: superTokenId }).first();
expect(row.revoked_at).toBeFalsy();
});
it('the owner can revoke their own token', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/api-tokens/${superTokenId}`), superTok);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});
describe('event update mass-assignment (3rqx)', () => {
it('ignores identity/secret columns in the request body', async () => {
const seedShareToken = 'orig-share-token';
const ins = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'authz-mass-assign', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Before',
event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'orig-hash', share_link: '/gallery/authz/share', share_token: seedShareToken, expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const eventId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`), superTok).send({
event_name: 'After',
created_by: 99999,
slug: 'hijacked-slug',
share_token: 'hijacked-token',
password_hash: 'hijacked-hash',
is_archived: 1,
archive_path: '/hijacked/archive/path',
hero_logo_path: '/etc/passwd',
is_draft: 1,
project_id: 99999,
// Case-variant keys — SQLite matches columns case-insensitively.
Password_Hash: 'case-hijack-hash',
Created_By: 88888,
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
expect(row.event_name).toBe('After'); // legit field applied
expect(row.created_by).toBe(superId); // ownership untouched (+ case-variant)
expect(row.slug).toBe('authz-mass-assign'); // routing identity untouched
expect(row.share_token).toBe(seedShareToken); // secret untouched
expect(row.password_hash).toBe('orig-hash'); // secret untouched (+ case-variant)
expect(row.is_archived).toBeFalsy(); // archive lifecycle untouched
expect(row.archive_path).toBeFalsy(); // forged archive path rejected
expect(row.hero_logo_path).toBeFalsy(); // fs.unlink primitive blocked
expect(row.is_draft).toBeFalsy(); // publish workflow not bypassed
expect(row.project_id).toBeFalsy(); // server-managed relationship untouched
});
it('returns 200 (no-op) when the body contains only protected fields', async () => {
const ins = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'authz-empty-update', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Keep',
event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/gallery/authz-empty/share', share_token: 'authz-empty-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const id = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
// Body reduces to {} after the denylist — must not 500 (Knex rejects
// .update({})).
const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`), superTok)
.send({ created_by: 1, slug: 'x', is_archived: 1 });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect(row.event_name).toBe('Keep');
});
});
describe('category hero cross-category (j2f4)', () => {
it('rejects a hero photo that is not in the category', async () => {
const evIns = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'authz-cat', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Cat Event',
event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/gallery/authz-cat/share', share_token: 'authz-cat-share', expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const evId = evIns[0]?.id ?? evIns[0];
const mkCat = async (name) => {
const c = await db('photo_categories').insert({
event_id: evId, name, slug: name.toLowerCase(), created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return c[0]?.id ?? c[0];
};
const cat1 = await mkCat('Cat1');
const cat2 = await mkCat('Cat2');
const pIns = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: evId, filename: 'p.jpg', path: 'authz-cat/p.jpg', type: 'individual',
category_id: cat1, uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const photoInCat1 = pIns[0]?.id ?? pIns[0];
// Pointing cat2's hero at a photo that lives in cat1 must be refused.
const bad = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/categories/${cat2}/hero`), superTok)
.send({ hero_photo_id: photoInCat1 });
expect(bad.status).toBe(404);
// The photo's own category accepts it.
const ok = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/categories/${cat1}/hero`), superTok)
.send({ hero_photo_id: photoInCat1 });
expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
/**
* Full-instance export is super_admin only (GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v).
*
* GET /api/admin/backup/picpeak/export dumps every table unredacted (bcrypt
* hashes, 2FA, SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/webhook/S3 secrets). It was gated only by
* requirePermission('backup.create'), which the built-in `admin` role holds —
* so any non-super_admin admin could download the whole database. Pins that
* `admin` now gets 403 and `super_admin` passes the gate.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-bkexport-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'bkexport-test-secret';
// The export otherwise walks the whole DB and writes a zip — stub it so the
// super_admin happy path is fast and deterministic; the gate is what's tested.
// The route deletes path.dirname(filePath) recursively after download, so the
// stub MUST live in its own dir — a bare os.tmpdir() file would make the route
// wipe the whole temp root (and other jest workers' DB files).
const mockExportDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-export-stub-'));
const mockExportPath = path.join(mockExportDir, 'export.picpeak');
fs.writeFileSync(mockExportPath, 'stub');
jest.mock('../../src/services/picpeakExportService', () => ({
createPicpeak: jest.fn(async () => ({ filePath: mockExportPath })),
}));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('backup export super_admin gate (GHSA-pv6w)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let adminToken; let superToken;
const mkUser = async (username, roleName) => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username,
email: `${username}@example.com`,
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
return jwt.sign(
{ id, username, type: 'admin', role: roleName, loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
);
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
adminToken = await mkUser('limited-admin', 'admin');
superToken = await mkUser('root-admin', 'super_admin');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/backup', require('../../src/routes/adminBackup'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
fs.rmSync(mockExportDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('denies the built-in admin role (was: full DB dump)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/backup/picpeak/export')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('allows super_admin', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/backup/picpeak/export')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
expect(res.status).toBeLessThan(500);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
/**
* Dashboard endpoints must not leak other admins' data to event-scoped
* editors — GHSA-c2jj (/stats), GHSA-gqx7 (/analytics), GHSA-jhcf (/activity).
*
* All three are gated only by `analytics.view`, which the `editor` role holds.
* But the events LIST restricts editors to their own rows
* (adminEvents/crud.js: roleName === 'editor' → created_by = admin.id), so an
* editor saw instance-wide totals — and, via /analytics topGalleries, other
* admins' gallery names and SLUGS (the public gallery URL component) — for
* events invisible to them everywhere else.
*
* Scoping deliberately keys on `editor` to mirror the events list exactly, so
* the `admin` role's dashboard is unchanged.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dashscope-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dashscope-test-secret';
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('dashboard scoping (GHSA-c2jj / gqx7 / jhcf)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
let editorToken; let superToken;
let ownEventId; let foreignEventId;
const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username,
email: `${username}@example.com`,
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
const token = jwt.sign(
{ id, username, type: 'admin', role: roleName, loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
);
return { id, token };
};
const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy) => {
const r = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: `${slug}-name`,
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_token: `tok-${slug}`,
share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/tok-${slug}`,
created_by: createdBy,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const editor = await mkAdmin('scoped-editor', 'editor');
const sup = await mkAdmin('root-admin', 'super_admin');
editorToken = editor.token;
superToken = sup.token;
ownEventId = await mkEvent('own-gallery', editor.id);
foreignEventId = await mkEvent('foreign-gallery', sup.id);
// One photo + one view per event so the aggregates are non-zero.
for (const [eventId, name] of [[ownEventId, 'own'], [foreignEventId, 'foreign']]) {
await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: `${name}.jpg`,
path: `events/active/${name}.jpg`,
type: 'individual',
size_bytes: 1000,
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
await db('access_logs').insert({
event_id: eventId,
action: 'view',
ip_address: `10.0.0.${eventId}`,
user_agent: 'Mozilla/5.0',
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
});
await db('activity_logs').insert({
activity_type: 'photo_viewed',
actor_type: 'admin',
actor_name: `${name}-actor`,
event_id: eventId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
}
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/dashboard', require('../../src/routes/adminDashboard'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('/stats counts only the editor\'s own events and photos', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(Number(res.body.totalEvents)).toBe(1);
expect(Number(res.body.totalPhotos)).toBe(1);
expect(Number(res.body.storageUsed)).toBe(1000);
});
it('/analytics does not expose a foreign gallery name or slug', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/dashboard/analytics?days=7')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const body = JSON.stringify(res.body);
expect(body).not.toContain('foreign-gallery');
expect(body).not.toContain('foreign-gallery-name');
expect(res.body.topGalleries.map((g) => g.slug)).toEqual(['own-gallery']);
});
it('/activity does not surface a foreign event\'s entries', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/dashboard/activity')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const actors = res.body.map((a) => a.actorName);
expect(actors).toContain('own-actor');
expect(actors).not.toContain('foreign-actor');
});
it('leaves super_admin unscoped across all three', async () => {
const stats = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
expect(Number(stats.body.totalEvents)).toBe(2);
const analytics = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/dashboard/analytics?days=7')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
expect(analytics.body.topGalleries.map((g) => g.slug).sort())
.toEqual(['foreign-gallery', 'own-gallery']);
const activity = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/dashboard/activity')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
expect(activity.body.map((a) => a.actorName)).toContain('foreign-actor');
});
});
/**
* Codex round 2: the /activity filter trusts `activity_logs.event_id`, but
* expenseService was passing `adminId` into logActivity's third positional
* parameter — which is `eventId`. Admin and event id sequences overlap, so a
* foreign admin's expense metadata could surface under an editor's event.
* Those writers now pass the actor instead, leaving event_id NULL.
*/
describe('activity writers do not put admin ids in event_id (GHSA-jhcf)', () => {
it('expenseService passes the actor, not adminId, as the event id', () => {
const fs2 = require('fs');
const src = fs2.readFileSync(
require('path').join(__dirname, '../../src/services/expenseService.js'), 'utf8',
);
// No logActivity call may end with a bare `, adminId)` — that slot is eventId.
const offenders = src.split('\n').filter(
(l) => l.includes('logActivity(') && /,\s*adminId\s*\)/.test(l),
);
expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
// And the actor form must actually be in use.
expect(src).toContain("{ type: 'admin', id: adminId }");
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
/**
* Manual database backup must not honour a caller-supplied destination
* (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm).
*
* POST /api/admin/database-backup/backup forwarded req.body straight into
* databaseBackupService.backup(), which merges options over its config:
* const { destinationPath = '/backup/database', ... } = { ...config, ...options }
* `destinationPath` is not a persistable setting (the /config allowlist only
* accepts `database_backup_*` keys), so the request body was its ONLY source.
*
* The `admin` role holds backup.create but neither settings.edit nor
* backup.restore — so it could aim a full DB dump (bcrypt hashes, gallery
* password hashes, encrypted SMTP creds) at the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
* (server.js mounts it with no auth middleware) and fetch it unauthenticated.
*
* Pins that destinationPath from the body is ignored, while the legitimate
* knobs still pass through.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dbbackup-test-secret';
// Capture what the route hands the service; never run a real backup.
const mockBackup = jest.fn(async () => ({ success: true }));
jest.mock('../../src/services/databaseBackup', () => ({
databaseBackupService: {
get isRunning() { return false; },
backup: (...args) => mockBackup(...args),
},
}));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('manual database backup destination (GHSA-jw8m)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminToken;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'limited-admin',
email: 'limited-admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
adminToken = jwt.sign(
{ id, username: 'limited-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/database-backup', require('../../src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
beforeEach(() => mockBackup.mockClear());
it('ignores a caller-supplied destinationPath', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({ destinationPath: '/app/storage/uploads' });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// Give the fire-and-forget call a tick to land.
await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
expect(mockBackup).toHaveBeenCalled();
const opts = mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(opts).not.toHaveProperty('destinationPath');
expect(JSON.stringify(opts)).not.toContain('uploads');
});
it('still forwards the legitimate backup knobs', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({ compress: false, validateIntegrity: false, destinationPath: '/tmp/evil' });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
const opts = mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(opts.compress).toBe(false);
expect(opts.validateIntegrity).toBe(false);
expect(opts).not.toHaveProperty('destinationPath');
});
it('omits absent knobs entirely so service/config defaults still apply', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
// An explicit `{compress: undefined}` would override config on spread —
// absent keys must simply not be present.
expect(mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0]).toEqual({});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
/**
* GHSA-2qc2 / GHSA-32h4 / GHSA-3335 — feedback moderation, deletion, and the
* pending-moderation list are by-feedback-id (or global) and lacked ownership
* scoping, so a restricted editor could act on / enumerate feedback for events
* it does not own. super_admin keeps global access.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-fbown-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'fbown-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-fbown-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('feedback ownership scoping', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
let superTok; let editorTok; let editorId;
let foreignFeedbackId;
const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
const { adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db);
await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'editor', email: 'editor@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('x', 4), must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
editorId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
await assignAdminRole(db, editorId, 'editor');
editorTok = mintAdminToken(editorId);
// Event owned by super_admin (NOT the editor).
const ev = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'fbown-foreign', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Foreign',
event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com',
password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/g/fbown/s', share_token: 'fbown-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
const ph = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId, filename: 'p.jpg', path: 'fbown-foreign/p.jpg', type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const photoId = ph[0]?.id ?? ph[0];
const fb = await db('photo_feedback').insert({
photo_id: photoId, event_id: eventId, feedback_type: 'comment',
comment_text: 'hi', is_approved: 0, is_hidden: 0, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
foreignFeedbackId = fb[0]?.id ?? fb[0];
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/admin/feedback', require('../../src/routes/adminFeedback'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('editor cannot moderate feedback on an event it does not own (404)', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}/approve`), editorTok);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
const row = await db('photo_feedback').where({ id: foreignFeedbackId }).first();
expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.is_approved); // untouched
});
it('editor cannot delete foreign feedback, row survives', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}`), editorTok);
// Denied either at the events.delete permission layer (editor lacks it →
// 403) or the ownership layer (404) — both must leave the row intact.
expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
expect(await db('photo_feedback').where({ id: foreignFeedbackId }).first()).toBeDefined();
});
it('editor sees no foreign feedback in pending-moderation', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/feedback/feedback/pending-moderation'), editorTok);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.find((f) => f.id === foreignFeedbackId)).toBeUndefined();
});
it('super_admin CAN moderate and see it', async () => {
const pending = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/feedback/feedback/pending-moderation'), superTok);
expect(pending.body.find((f) => f.id === foreignFeedbackId)).toBeDefined();
const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}/approve`), superTok);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
/**
* GHSA-rh8r-7x3h-36rv — the unauthenticated GET /api/gallery/resolve/:identifier
* must NOT return a gallery's secret share_token (nor the share links that
* embed it) for a bare *slug* lookup. Slugs appear in gallery URLs and are
* guessable; handing back the secret turns a known slug into share-link
* access to a no-password gallery. The token is only returned when the caller
* resolved via the token / full share link (i.e. already holds it).
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-resolve-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'resolve-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-resolve-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const SLUG = 'resolve-test-event';
const SHARE_TOKEN = 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6';
describe('GET /api/gallery/resolve/:identifier (GHSA-rh8r)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Resolve Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/${SHARE_TOKEN}`,
share_token: SHARE_TOKEN,
require_password: 0, // no-password → the token IS the access credential
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('does NOT leak the share_token (or share links) for a bare slug lookup', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${SLUG}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.slug).toBe(SLUG);
expect(res.body.matchType).toBe('slug');
// The secret must be absent — and must not sneak out via the share links.
expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
expect(res.body.share_link).toBeUndefined();
expect(res.body.share_url).toBeUndefined();
expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(SHARE_TOKEN);
});
it('DOES return the token when the caller already resolved via the token', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${SHARE_TOKEN}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBe(SHARE_TOKEN);
expect(res.body.matchType).toMatch(/token/);
});
it('does NOT leak the token via SQL LIKE wildcards in the link_partial fallback', async () => {
// Before the escaping fix, an anonymous request of 32 underscores matched
// any share_link ending in a 32-char token (`_` = single-char wildcard),
// resolved as matchType 'link_partial', and handed back the bearer token.
// The share_token here has no underscores, so an escaped LIKE must miss.
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${'_'.repeat(SHARE_TOKEN.length)}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(SHARE_TOKEN);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
/**
* SQLite boolean coercion in the guest gallery surface (#1028).
*
* SQLite stores booleans as 0/1; Postgres stores true/false. The /photos
* payload and every download guard compared strictly against `true`/`false`,
* so on SQLite:
*
* allow_downloads: 0 !== false → true (button shown while disabled)
* allow_user_uploads: 1 === true → false (button hidden while enabled)
* if (allow_downloads === false) → never fires, so ALL download endpoints
* kept serving with downloads switched off
*
* (The download-jobs route asserted on main is #858, which is beta-only —
* this branch covers the three download endpoints that exist here.)
*
* The harness runs on SQLite, so these assertions exercise the real engine
* values rather than a mock. Every test here fails on the unfixed code.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sqlite-flags-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'sqlite-flags-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sqlite-flags-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const SLUG = 'sqlite-flags-gallery';
describe('gallery flags survive SQLite 0/1 storage (#1028)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId; let photoId;
async function setEventFlags(patch) {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update(patch);
}
async function getPayload() {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
return res.body.event;
}
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const ev = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'SQLite Flags',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
share_token: 'sqlite-flags-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
// Password-free so verifyGalleryAccess takes the public path and loads
// the row with SELECT * — i.e. the raw 0/1 values, same as production.
require_password: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
const ph = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'p.jpg',
path: `${SLUG}/p.jpg`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
photoId = ph[0]?.id ?? ph[0];
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
test('the engine under test really is SQLite storing 0/1', async () => {
expect(['sqlite3', 'better-sqlite3']).toContain(db.client.config.client);
await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 0 });
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first('allow_downloads');
expect(row.allow_downloads).toBe(0);
});
describe('with downloads disabled (allow_downloads = 0)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 0, allow_user_uploads: 1 });
});
test('payload reports allow_downloads false (was true — header button shown)', async () => {
expect((await getPayload()).allow_downloads).toBe(false);
});
test('payload reports allow_user_uploads true (was false — upload button hidden)', async () => {
expect((await getPayload()).allow_user_uploads).toBe(true);
});
test('single-photo download is refused', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
test('download-all is refused', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
test('download-selected is refused', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
.send({ photo_ids: [photoId] });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
});
describe('with downloads enabled (allow_downloads = 1)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 1, allow_user_uploads: 0 });
});
test('payload reports allow_downloads true / allow_user_uploads false', async () => {
const event = await getPayload();
expect(event.allow_downloads).toBe(true);
expect(event.allow_user_uploads).toBe(false);
});
test('download-all is no longer refused', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`);
expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
});
});
describe('protection flags', () => {
test('0/1 protection toggles are reported the way they are stored', async () => {
await setEventFlags({
disable_right_click: 1,
enable_devtools_protection: 1,
use_canvas_rendering: 1,
watermark_downloads: 1,
overlay_protection: 0,
});
const event = await getPayload();
expect(event.disable_right_click).toBe(true);
expect(event.enable_devtools_protection).toBe(true);
expect(event.use_canvas_rendering).toBe(true);
expect(event.watermark_downloads).toBe(true);
expect(event.overlay_protection).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('per-category download blocking (#640) on SQLite', () => {
test('a category with allow_downloads = 0 is reported as blocked', async () => {
const cat = await db('photo_categories').insert({
name: 'Blocked', slug: 'blocked', event_id: eventId, is_global: 0, allow_downloads: 0,
}).returning('id');
const categoryId = cat[0]?.id ?? cat[0];
await db('photos').where('id', photoId).update({ category_id: categoryId });
await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 1 });
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const category = res.body.categories.find((c) => c.id === categoryId);
expect(category.allow_downloads).toBe(false);
const photo = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoId);
expect(photo.category_allow_downloads).toBe(false);
// …and the per-category guard on the single-photo route fires.
const dl = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
expect(dl.status).toBe(403);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
/**
* Hidden/client-only photo access control across the bulk + secure photo
* routes (GHSA cluster: fpwq / ghf8 / 3jvw / 9cc4 / 2hqg / jc22).
*
* A photo with visibility='hidden' is client-only. The main photo-list and
* single-photo download/view routes enforced this, but the bulk-download,
* protected-image, and secure-image routes shipped without the check —
* letting an ordinary guest reach hidden photos. These tests pin that
* guests are refused and PIN-clients (accessLevel='client') still succeed.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-hidden-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'hidden-photo-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-hidden-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const SLUG = 'hidden-photo-test-event';
describe('hidden-photo access control (GHSA cluster)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let eventId;
let visibleId;
let hiddenId;
const guestToken = () => jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const clientToken = () => jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery', accessLevel: 'client' },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Hidden Photo Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'hidden-photo-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, allow_downloads: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
const photoDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
fs.mkdirSync(photoDir, { recursive: true });
// A real 1x1 PNG so the protected /view route's Sharp processing path
// succeeds (fake bytes 500 on metadata()). Content, not extension,
// drives Sharp's format detection.
const PNG_1x1 = Buffer.from(
'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk+M8AAAMCAQGV2rY9AAAAAElFTkSuQmCC',
'base64'
);
const mkPhoto = async (filename, visibility) => {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(photoDir, filename), PNG_1x1);
const p = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename,
path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
type: 'individual',
visibility,
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
};
visibleId = await mkPhoto('visible.jpg', 'visible');
hiddenId = await mkPhoto('hidden.jpg', 'hidden');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
app.use('/api/images', require('../../src/routes/protectedImages'));
app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
describe('download-selected (GHSA-ghf8, medium)', () => {
it('omits a hidden photo for a guest even when its id is requested', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
.send({ photo_ids: [visibleId, hiddenId] });
// The visible photo still zips; the hidden one is filtered out. If
// only the hidden id were requested, the filter empties the set → 404.
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const solo = await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
.send({ photo_ids: [hiddenId] });
expect(solo.status).toBe(404);
});
it('includes the hidden photo for a client', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`)
.send({ photo_ids: [hiddenId] });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});
describe('download-all (GHSA-fpwq, medium)', () => {
it('streams for a guest without erroring (hidden photos filtered)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});
describe('protected-image view (GHSA-9cc4)', () => {
it('403s a hidden photo for a guest', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/view`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('serves a visible photo for a guest', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/view`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('serves a hidden photo for a client', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/view`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});
describe('signed-URL mint (GHSA-3jvw)', () => {
it('403s minting a signed URL for a hidden photo as a guest', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-url`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('mints for a client', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-url`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.url).toContain('/signed/');
});
});
describe('legacy secure-token mint (protectedImages generate-secure-token)', () => {
it('403s a hidden photo for a guest', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-secure-token`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('mints for a client', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-secure-token`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeDefined();
});
});
describe('secure-token mint (GHSA-2hqg)', () => {
it('403s minting a secure token for a hidden photo as a guest', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/generate-token`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
.send({ photoId: hiddenId });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('mints for a client', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/generate-token`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`)
.send({ photoId: hiddenId });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeDefined();
});
});
// A capability minted while a photo is visible must stop serving once the
// photo is hidden — unless minted by a client (clientBypass in the token).
describe('signed-URL TOCTOU (hidden AFTER minting)', () => {
afterEach(async () => {
await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'visible' });
});
it("a guest's pre-minted signed URL stops serving once the photo is hidden", async () => {
const mint = await request(app)
.post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/generate-url`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
expect(mint.status).toBe(200);
const url = mint.body.url;
// Still visible → serves.
expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(200);
// Hide it → the guest token (no clientBypass) must now be refused.
await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'hidden' });
expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(403);
});
it("a client's pre-minted signed URL keeps serving after the photo is hidden", async () => {
const mint = await request(app)
.post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/generate-url`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
expect(mint.status).toBe(200);
const url = mint.body.url;
await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'hidden' });
expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(200);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
/**
* Regression test for GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq — broken access control in the legacy
* /api/events router.
*
* The legacy router exposed create/list/update/delete/extend guarded by
* adminAuth ALONE (no requirePermission, no requireEventOwnership), so any
* back-office account — down to a read-only viewer — could read every gallery's
* password_hash/share_token and take over any gallery. The fix removes that
* router entirely and migrates its one UI-used route (POST /:id/extend) to the
* canonical /api/admin/events mount, where it inherits the permission +
* ownership guards.
*
* This test pins two invariants:
* 1. The legacy source file is gone (nothing can re-mount it).
* 2. The migrated extend route enforces ownership — a non-owning editor gets
* 403, the owner succeeds.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-legacy-acl-')), 'db.sqlite'
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'legacy-acl-test-secret';
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
async function insertEvent(db, ownerId, over = {}) {
const base = {
slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Owner Gallery',
event_date: '2026-05-29',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_by: ownerId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...over,
};
const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
}
describe('GHSA-4j34: legacy /api/events router removed + extend guarded', () => {
it('the legacy events router source file no longer exists', () => {
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../src/routes/events.js'))).toBe(false);
});
describe('POST /api/admin/events/:id/extend ownership enforcement', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
let ownerId; let ownerToken;
let editorId; let editorToken;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
({ adminId: ownerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, ownerId, 'super_admin');
ownerToken = mintAdminToken(ownerId);
// A second, non-owning account with the low-trust editor role.
[editorId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'editor1', email: 'editor1@example.com',
password_hash: 'x', is_active: 1,
}).returning('id');
editorId = editorId?.id ?? editorId;
await assignAdminRole(db, editorId, 'editor');
editorToken = mintAdminToken(editorId);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
});
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
it('lets the owner extend their own gallery', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId, { expires_at: '2026-06-01T00:00:00.000Z' });
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${ownerToken}`)
.send({ days: 10 });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(new Date(res.body.expires_at).toISOString()).toBe('2026-06-11T00:00:00.000Z');
});
it('403s a non-owning editor trying to extend someone else\'s gallery', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId); // owned by the super_admin
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`)
.send({ days: 30 });
expect(res.status).toBe(403); // requireEventOwnership blocks it
});
it('validates the days field', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId);
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${ownerToken}`)
.send({ days: 9999 });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
/**
* Logo diagnostic must not leak the filesystem layout, and must mirror what
* resolveLogoFile actually tries (GHSA-29vm, codex round 2).
*
* Round 1 relativised `resolvedTo` and the candidate paths but still echoed
* `sources[].value` verbatim — and branding_logo_path is stored ABSOLUTE by
* multer, so the layout went out anyway. It also dropped the raw-absolute
* candidate, which the resolver retains (subject to containment), making the
* diagnostic report every candidate as missing for a legitimately contained
* absolute logo while `resolvedTo` named the file.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-logodiag-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'logodiag-test-secret';
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('logo diagnostic disclosure (GHSA-29vm)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let token;
// bootCrmDb() sets STORAGE_PATH itself, so resolve these AFTER it runs.
let STORAGE; let logoDir; let logoPath;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
// A legitimately contained absolute logo in a NON-standard storage subdir.
STORAGE = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
logoDir = path.join(STORAGE, 'custom');
logoPath = path.join(logoDir, 'logo.png');
fs.mkdirSync(logoDir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(logoPath, 'png');
const setting = { setting_key: 'branding_logo_path', setting_value: JSON.stringify(logoPath), setting_type: 'branding' };
const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' }).first();
if (existing) await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' }).update(setting);
else await db('app_settings').insert(setting);
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'diag-admin', email: 'diag@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
token = jwt.sign(
{ id, username: 'diag-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/business-profile', require('../../src/routes/adminBusinessProfile'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('does not leak absolute paths, cwd or storage root anywhere in the payload', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/business-profile/logo-diagnostic')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const body = JSON.stringify(res.body);
expect(body).not.toContain(STORAGE);
expect(body).not.toContain(process.cwd());
expect(res.body.storageRoot).toBeUndefined();
expect(res.body.cwd).toBeUndefined();
});
it('still finds a contained absolute logo outside the standard subdirs', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/business-profile/logo-diagnostic')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
const source = res.body.sources.find((s) => s.label === 'app_settings.branding_logo_path');
expect(source).toBeTruthy();
// The resolver keeps the contained absolute candidate, so the diagnostic
// must show it existing rather than reporting everything missing.
expect(source.candidates.some((c) => c.exists)).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.resolvedTo).toMatch(/^<STORAGE>\//);
});
it('shows the <STORAGE>/<value> candidate for a ROOT-RELATIVE logo URL (round 3)', async () => {
// `/custom/logo.png` is a URL, not a disk path, but path.isAbsolute() says
// true for both. Gating the stripped joins on isAbsolute() therefore hid
// `<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png` — a candidate resolveLogoFile does try and
// can resolve — so the diagnostic claimed nothing existed for a logo that
// renders fine, and collapsed the configured value to its basename.
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' })
.update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify('/custom/logo.png') });
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/business-profile/logo-diagnostic')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const source = res.body.sources.find((s) => s.label === 'app_settings.branding_logo_path');
expect(source.candidates.some((c) => c.path === '<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png' && c.exists)).toBe(true);
// …and the disclosure guarantee still holds for this shape.
const body = JSON.stringify(res.body);
expect(body).not.toContain(STORAGE);
expect(body).not.toContain(process.cwd());
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' })
.update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(logoPath) });
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
/**
* Per-photo engagement counters (#895).
*
* Pins the contract that the admin EVENT > IMAGES table depends on:
* - photos.view_count increments when the full-size photo is served
* (it existed in the schema + admin UI but had NO writer at all)
* - the slideshow kiosk never increments views (migration 138 design)
* - single-photo downloads increment download_count (regression pin)
* - zip downloads (download-all, download-selected) increment
* download_count for the contained photos — previously they didn't,
* so zip-heavy galleries showed 0 per-photo downloads forever
* - the admin event-detail total_downloads counts singles AND zips
* (it counted action='download' only, disagreeing with the dashboard)
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-engagement-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'engagement-test-secret';
// Real files on disk so /photo and the zip routes actually stream bytes.
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-engagement-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const SLUG = 'engagement-test-event';
describe('photo engagement counters (#895)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let eventId;
let photoIds;
let adminToken;
const galleryToken = (extra = {}) => jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const getPhoto = async (id) => db('photos').where('id', id).first();
// The counter writes are fire-and-forget on purpose — give the event
// loop a beat before asserting.
const settle = () => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 400));
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Engagement Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'engagement-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
allow_downloads: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
const photoDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
fs.mkdirSync(photoDir, { recursive: true });
photoIds = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
const filename = `photo-${i}.jpg`;
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(photoDir, filename), Buffer.from(`fake-jpeg-bytes-${i}`));
const p = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename,
path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
photoIds.push(p[0]?.id ?? p[0]);
}
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'engagement-admin',
email: 'engagement-admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('EngagementAdmin123', 4),
role_id: superRole.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
adminToken = jwt.sign(
{ id: rootId, username: 'engagement-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotos'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('photos').where('event_id', eventId).update({ view_count: 0, download_count: 0 });
await db('access_logs').where('event_id', eventId).del();
});
describe('view_count via the view beacon (#895 — previously never written)', () => {
const beacon = (photoId, token = galleryToken()) => request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoId}/view`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
it('increments exactly the beaconed photo', async () => {
expect((await beacon(photoIds[0])).status).toBe(204);
expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(1);
expect((await beacon(photoIds[0])).status).toBe(204);
expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(2);
// Other photos untouched
expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[1])).view_count).toBe(0);
});
it('serving the image bytes does NOT count (preloads must not inflate)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await settle();
expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(0);
});
it('rejects the slideshow kiosk (migration 138 design)', async () => {
const res = await beacon(photoIds[0], galleryToken({ accessLevel: 'slideshow' }));
expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(0);
});
it("404s a photo that isn't in the event", async () => {
const res = await beacon(999999);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
describe('download_count', () => {
it('single-photo download increments (regression pin)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoIds[0]}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await settle();
expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).download_count).toBe(1);
expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[1])).download_count).toBe(0);
});
it('download-selected increments exactly the selected photos (#895)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.send({ photo_ids: [photoIds[0], photoIds[1]] });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await settle();
expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).download_count).toBe(1);
expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[1])).download_count).toBe(1);
expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[2])).download_count).toBe(0);
});
it('download-all increments every downloadable photo (#895)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await settle();
for (const id of photoIds) {
expect((await getPhoto(id)).download_count).toBe(1);
}
});
it('skipped archive entries do not count (missing source file)', async () => {
// Own event so the on-the-fly archiver path is guaranteed — the
// main event may have a cached zip from the previous test's
// background generation, and racing its build/invalidate hangs.
// The route also fires a background pre-zip build after streaming;
// against this event's intentionally missing file it crashes with
// an async ENOENT that jest attributes to whatever test is running
// by then — neutralize it, it's not under test here.
const downloadZipService = require('../../src/services/downloadZipService');
const generateZipSpy = jest.spyOn(downloadZipService, 'generateZip')
.mockResolvedValue({ success: false, error: 'disabled in test' });
const slug2 = `${SLUG}-skip`;
const ev = await db('events').insert({
slug: slug2,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Engagement Skip Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${slug2}/share`,
share_token: 'engagement-skip-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
allow_downloads: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const eventId2 = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
const dir2 = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', slug2);
fs.mkdirSync(dir2, { recursive: true });
const ids2 = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
// Only photo 0 gets a real file — photo 1's source is missing.
if (i === 0) fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir2, `photo-${i}.jpg`), Buffer.from('skip-test-bytes'));
const p = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId2,
filename: `photo-${i}.jpg`,
path: `${slug2}/photo-${i}.jpg`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
ids2.push(p[0]?.id ?? p[0]);
}
const token2 = jwt.sign(
{ eventId: eventId2, eventSlug: slug2, type: 'gallery' },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${slug2}/download-all`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token2}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await settle();
expect((await db('photos').where('id', ids2[0]).first()).download_count).toBe(1);
// photo-1's source was missing → skipped from the zip → not counted
expect((await db('photos').where('id', ids2[1]).first()).download_count).toBe(0);
generateZipSpy.mockRestore();
});
});
describe('admin photos list exposes the counters (#895 follow-up)', () => {
it('returns view_count and download_count so the Engagement column can render them', async () => {
// The list mapper builds an explicit object — before this fix it
// omitted both fields, so the admin table showed 0 forever even
// though the DB counted correctly.
await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}/view`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoIds[0]}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
await settle();
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/admin/photos/${eventId}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoIds[0]);
expect(row.view_count).toBe(1);
expect(row.download_count).toBe(1);
const untouched = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoIds[1]);
expect(untouched.view_count).toBe(0);
expect(untouched.download_count).toBe(0);
});
});
describe('admin event-detail total_downloads (#895 — one definition everywhere)', () => {
it('counts singles and every zip variant, one row each', async () => {
const row = (action) => ({
event_id: eventId,
ip_address: '127.0.0.1',
user_agent: 'jest',
action,
});
await db('access_logs').insert([
row('download'),
row('download_all'),
row('download_all_presigned'),
row('download_selected'),
row('view'), // not a download
]);
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.total_downloads).toBe(4);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
/**
* Project ownership — GHSA-wrg5 (project routes) and GHSA-93x4 (project email
* endpoints).
*
* Project routes authorized on generic events.view / events.edit with NO
* ownership check, so an editor could enumerate, read, update and aggregate
* projects belonging to other admins' events. The email endpoints keyed on an
* email_queue id alone, so any id could be previewed/resent/cancelled.
*
* `projects` had no owner column. It was added in migration 167 (backfilled
* from linked events) rather than relying only on the transitive
* events.project_id -> events.created_by path, because a brand-new EMPTY
* project has no linked event to infer an owner from — which is exactly where
* the create -> attach flow begins.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-projown-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'projown-test-secret';
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('project ownership (GHSA-wrg5 / GHSA-93x4)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
let editorToken; let superToken; let editorId; let superId;
let ownProjectId; let foreignProjectId; let foreignEventId; let foreignEmailId;
const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username,
email: `${username}@example.com`,
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
return {
id,
token: jwt.sign(
{ id, username, type: 'admin', role: roleName, loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
),
};
};
const mkProject = async (name, createdBy) => {
const r = await db('projects').insert({
name, status: 'active', created_by: createdBy,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'projects', value: 1 })
.onConflict('key').merge({ value: 1 });
const editor = await mkAdmin('proj-editor', 'editor');
const sup = await mkAdmin('proj-super', 'super_admin');
editorToken = editor.token; editorId = editor.id;
superToken = sup.token; superId = sup.id;
ownProjectId = await mkProject('own-project', editorId);
foreignProjectId = await mkProject('foreign-project', superId);
// A foreign event linked to the foreign project, plus a queued email on it.
const ev = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'foreign-ev',
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Foreign Event',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_token: 'ftok', share_link: '/gallery/foreign-ev/ftok',
created_by: superId,
project_id: foreignProjectId,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
foreignEventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
const em = await db('email_queue').insert({
event_id: foreignEventId,
recipient_email: 'client@example.com',
email_type: 'gallery_created',
status: 'sent',
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
foreignEmailId = em[0]?.id ?? em[0];
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/projects', require('../../src/routes/adminProjects'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('lists only the editor\'s own projects', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/projects')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const names = (res.body.projects || res.body.data?.projects || []).map((p) => p.name);
expect(names).toContain('own-project');
expect(names).not.toContain('foreign-project');
});
it('refuses to read a foreign project', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
});
it('refuses to update or aggregate a foreign project', async () => {
const update = await request(app)
.put(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`)
.send({ name: 'hijacked' });
expect([403, 404]).toContain(update.status);
const overview = await request(app)
.get(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}/overview`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect([403, 404]).toContain(overview.status);
// And the name must not have changed.
const row = await db('projects').where({ id: foreignProjectId }).first();
expect(row.name).toBe('foreign-project');
});
it('refuses to attach a FOREIGN event to an owned project', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/projects/${ownProjectId}/events`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`)
.send({ eventId: foreignEventId });
expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
const ev = await db('events').where({ id: foreignEventId }).first();
expect(ev.project_id).toBe(foreignProjectId); // still attached to its own
});
it('refuses to preview or act on a foreign queued email (GHSA-93x4)', async () => {
const preview = await request(app)
.get(`/api/admin/projects/email/${foreignEmailId}/preview`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect([403, 404]).toContain(preview.status);
const cancel = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/projects/email/${foreignEmailId}/cancel`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect([403, 404]).toContain(cancel.status);
});
it('leaves super_admin unrestricted', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
/**
* Project ownership edge cases (GHSA-wrg5, codex round 2).
*
* The first predicate union'd "any linked event I can see" with the stored
* owner, which opened two holes:
* - a project owned by B containing ONE legacy ownerless event became
* readable by everyone (and /overview aggregates B's other events,
* invoices and emails);
* - migration 167 deliberately leaves multi-owner projects NULL, and a NULL
* owner was treated as "everyone's".
* The stored owner is now authoritative, and a NULL owner only derives access
* when EVERY linked event is accessible.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-projedge-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'projedge-test-secret';
const bcrypt3 = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb: boot3, seedMinimal: seed3 } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('project ownership edge cases (GHSA-wrg5, round 2)', () => {
let db3; let cleanup3; let ownership; let editorA; let editorB;
const mkAdmin3 = async (username, roleName) => {
const role = await db3('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
const r = await db3('admin_users').insert({
username, email: `${username}@example.com`,
password_hash: await bcrypt3.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkProject3 = async (name, createdBy) => {
const r = await db3('projects').insert({
name, status: 'active', created_by: createdBy,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkEvent3 = async (slug, createdBy, projectId) => {
const r = await db3('events').insert({
slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com', password_hash: 'x',
share_token: `t-${slug}`, share_link: `/g/${slug}/t-${slug}`,
created_by: createdBy, project_id: projectId,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db: db3, cleanup: cleanup3 } = await boot3());
await seed3(db3);
ownership = require('../../src/middleware/ownership');
editorA = await mkAdmin3('edge-a', 'editor');
editorB = await mkAdmin3('edge-b', 'editor');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup3) await cleanup3(); });
it('one ownerless event in B\'s project does not expose it to A', async () => {
const pid = await mkProject3('b-project', editorB);
await mkEvent3('b-owned-ev', editorB, pid);
await mkEvent3('legacy-ev', null, pid); // ownerless legacy event
const idsA = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
expect(idsA).not.toContain(Number(pid));
const idsB = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorB, roleName: 'editor' });
expect(idsB).toContain(Number(pid));
});
it('a mixed-owner project left NULL by migration 167 is not global', async () => {
const pid = await mkProject3('ambiguous', null);
await mkEvent3('mix-a-ev', editorA, pid);
await mkEvent3('mix-b-ev', editorB, pid);
for (const who of [editorA, editorB]) {
const ids = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: who, roleName: 'editor' });
expect(ids).not.toContain(Number(pid));
}
});
it('a NULL-owner project whose events are all mine IS mine', async () => {
const pid = await mkProject3('legacy-mine', null);
await mkEvent3('mine-ev', editorA, pid);
const ids = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
expect(ids).toContain(Number(pid));
});
it('a project whose creator was deleted falls back to its events', async () => {
const ghost = await mkAdmin3('ghost-admin', 'editor');
const pid = await mkProject3('orphaned', ghost);
await mkEvent3('orphan-ev', editorA, pid);
await db3('admin_users').where({ id: ghost }).del();
const ids = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
expect(ids).toContain(Number(pid));
});
it('super_admin stays unrestricted', async () => {
expect(await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: 1, roleName: 'super_admin' })).toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
contractId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/contracts', require('../../src/routes/publicContracts'));
}, 60000);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ describe('publicPaymentCheck routes', () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/payment-check', require('../../src/routes/publicPaymentCheck'));
}, 60000);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ describe('publicQuotes routes', () => {
quoteId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/quotes', require('../../src/routes/publicQuotes'));
}, 60000);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
/**
* Restore path containment must not break the normal restore wizard
* (GHSA-fw4c, codex round 2).
*
* `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE, not a path: RestoreWizard posts
* 'local' | 's3' | 'upload', and restoreService.restore() branches on those
* literals before deriving a directory. The first version of the containment
* check treated `source` as a path, so path.resolve('local') landed outside
* the configured backup roots and BOTH /validate and /start returned 400 —
* blocking every normal restore.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restorepath-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restorepath-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('restore path allowlist (GHSA-fw4c)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let checkRestorePathsAllowed;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
// Configure a backup root so the allowlist is actually active.
for (const [key, value] of [['backup_destination_path', '/backup']]) {
const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).first();
if (existing) {
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(value) });
} else {
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'backup',
});
}
}
({ checkRestorePathsAllowed } = require('../../src/routes/adminRestore')._internal);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('allows the wizard\'s source TYPE tokens', async () => {
for (const source of ['local', 's3', 'upload']) {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source, manifestPath: '/backup/manifests/backup-manifest-1.json',
});
expect(err).toBeNull();
}
});
it('allows an s3:// source URL', async () => {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source: 's3://bucket/key/backup.tar.gz',
manifestPath: '/backup/manifests/backup-manifest-1.json',
});
expect(err).toBeNull();
});
it('still rejects a manifestPath outside the configured roots', async () => {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source: 'local', manifestPath: '/etc/passwd',
});
expect(err).toMatch(/inside a configured backup location/i);
});
it('still rejects a traversal manifestPath', async () => {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source: 'local', manifestPath: '/backup/../etc/shadow',
});
expect(err).toBeTruthy();
});
it('accepts a real path source inside the roots', async () => {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source: '/backup/run-1', manifestPath: '/backup/run-1/manifest.json',
});
expect(err).toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
/**
* Secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f).
*
* The view route GET /api/secure-images/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token serves
* via <img src> with the token in the URL, so it can't carry a gallery-token
* header like the download sibling. Before the fix it validated only the
* token signature and took the gallery/photo from the URL — so a token minted
* on any PUBLIC gallery read every other gallery's photos with no password.
*
* Pins that the route now enforces the scope inside the token:
* - the URL photoId must equal the token's minted photoId
* - the gallery embedded in the token's sessionId must equal the URL gallery
* A token minted on gallery A cannot read gallery B under either check; a
* token used on its own gallery+photo passes the binding.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-secimg-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'secimg-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-secimg-storage-'));
// Stub the anti-bot/rate-limit middleware so the fingerprint is deterministic
// — the token below is minted with the same fingerprint, so verifySecureToken
// passes and the binding logic under test is what decides the outcome.
jest.mock('../../src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware', () => ({
secureImageAccess: (req, _res, next) => {
req.clientInfo = { fingerprint: 'test-fp', ip: '127.0.0.1', userAgent: 'jest' };
next();
},
getSecurityStatus: (_req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }),
}));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const secureImageService = require('../../src/services/secureImageService');
describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let galleryA; let galleryB;
let photoA; let photoB;
const mkEvent = async (slug, requirePassword) => {
const r = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: slug,
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
require_password: requirePassword ? 1 : 0,
share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
share_token: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkPhoto = async (eventId, slug, filename) => {
const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', slug);
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, filename), Buffer.from('img'));
const r = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename,
path: `${slug}/${filename}`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
// Mint a token exactly as the mint route does — bound to (photoId, gallery
// sessionId, fingerprint) — bypassing the anti-bot HTTP path.
const mint = (photoId, eventId) => secureImageService.generateSecureToken(
photoId,
`gallery_public_${eventId}_${Date.now()}`,
{ clientFingerprint: 'test-fp', maxUses: 100, expiresIn: 3600 },
);
const view = (slug, photoId, token) => request(app)
.get(`/api/secure-images/${slug}/secure/${photoId}/${token}`);
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
galleryA = await mkEvent('secimg-public-a', false); // public — token source
galleryB = await mkEvent('secimg-private-b', true); // password-protected — victim
photoA = await mkPhoto(galleryA, 'secimg-public-a', 'a.jpg');
photoB = await mkPhoto(galleryB, 'secimg-private-b', 'b.jpg');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('rejects a gallery-A token used against gallery B (cross-photo)', async () => {
const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoB, token);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this photo/i);
});
it('rejects a gallery-A token replayed on gallery B with A\'s photoId', async () => {
const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
// URL photoId matches the token, so the photo check passes — the gallery
// check (sessionId gallery A != URL gallery B) must catch it.
const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoA, token);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this gallery/i);
});
it('lets a token read its own gallery + photo (binding passes)', async () => {
const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
const res = await view('secimg-public-a', photoA, token);
// Binding passes; serving may 200/404/500 depending on the pipeline, but
// it must NOT be rejected as a token mismatch.
expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
});
});
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ describe('admin Live Slideshow endpoints', () => {
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
});
}, 30000);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
@@ -67,11 +67,10 @@ async function insertEvent(db, over = {}) {
describe('public Live Slideshow routes', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
// bootCrmDb runs the full migration set against a fresh SQLite file, which
// takes <2s locally but has been observed to exceed Jest's default 5s
// `beforeAll` timeout on slower GitHub Actions runners (~5.4s — runner-to-
// runner I/O variance). Raise the hook timeout so this doesn't intermittently
// block PRs on CI; doesn't affect happy-path local runs.
// bootCrmDb runs the full migration set against a fresh SQLite file and the
// chain keeps growing via backports. Hook-argument timeouts OVERRIDE the
// 120s jest.config default (same trap as the jest.setTimeout pins) — keep
// this at 120000, matching the config.
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ describe('public Live Slideshow routes', () => {
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
});
}, 30000);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
/**
* v1 API tokens must respect event ownership (GHSA-9697).
*
* migration 081 documents the intent — "the token's effective permissions are
* the intersection of the user's role permissions and the token's own scope
* flags" — but it was never implemented:
*
* - apiTokenAuth selected only id/username/email/role_id, so
* req.admin.roleName was undefined and every ownership helper (which all
* key on roleName) could not distinguish a super_admin from a viewer.
* - No v1 route applied requirePermission or a created_by predicate, so any
* valid token listed every event and — worst — GET /events/:id/share-link
* returned ANY event's share_token, which is the gallery access credential.
*
* Scenario pinned here: a token owned by a restricted (non-super_admin) admin
* must see only its owner's events, and must not obtain a foreign share_token.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-v1own-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'v1own-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-v1own-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const { generateApiToken } = require('../../src/middleware/apiTokenAuth');
describe('v1 event ownership (GHSA-9697)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
let editorToken; let superToken;
let ownEventId; let foreignEventId;
const FOREIGN_SHARE_TOKEN = 'f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0';
const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username,
email: `${username}@example.com`,
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkToken = async (adminId, scopes = 'admin') => {
const { plaintext, hashed } = generateApiToken();
await db('api_tokens').insert({
name: `tok-${adminId}`,
hashed_token: hashed,
scopes,
created_by: adminId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
return plaintext;
};
const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy, shareToken) => {
const r = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: slug,
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_token: shareToken,
share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/${shareToken}`,
created_by: createdBy,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const editorId = await mkAdmin('restricted-editor', 'editor');
const superId = await mkAdmin('root-admin', 'super_admin');
editorToken = await mkToken(editorId);
superToken = await mkToken(superId);
ownEventId = await mkEvent('own-event', editorId, 'a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1');
foreignEventId = await mkEvent('foreign-event', superId, FOREIGN_SHARE_TOKEN);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/v1', require('../../src/routes/v1/events'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('lists only the token owner\'s events', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/v1/events')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const slugs = res.body.events.map((e) => e.slug);
expect(slugs).toContain('own-event');
expect(slugs).not.toContain('foreign-event');
});
it('refuses to read a foreign event', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/v1/events/${foreignEventId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
});
it('does NOT hand out a foreign event\'s share_token', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/v1/events/${foreignEventId}/share-link`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(FOREIGN_SHARE_TOKEN);
});
it('still allows the owner to read their own event and share link', async () => {
const detail = await request(app)
.get(`/api/v1/events/${ownEventId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect(detail.status).toBe(200);
const share = await request(app)
.get(`/api/v1/events/${ownEventId}/share-link`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect(share.status).toBe(200);
expect(share.body.share_token).toBe('a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1');
});
it('leaves super_admin tokens unrestricted', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/v1/events/${foreignEventId}/share-link`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.share_token).toBe(FOREIGN_SHARE_TOKEN);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
/**
* v1 token scopes must intersect the owner's CURRENT role permissions
* (GHSA-9697, codex round 2).
*
* Migration 081 documents effective permissions as the intersection of the
* owner's role permissions and the token's scope flags. requireApiScope only
* ever checked the scope half, so a token minted while its owner was
* super_admin kept full write access after the owner was demoted to viewer —
* userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlives the
* demotion. Ownership scoping alone does not close this: the demoted owner
* still *owns* their events.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-v1perm-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'v1perm-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-v1perm-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const { generateApiToken } = require('../../src/middleware/apiTokenAuth');
describe('v1 token scopes intersect role permissions (GHSA-9697)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let viewerToken; let viewerEventId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'viewer' }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'demoted-owner',
email: 'demoted@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
const ownerId = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
// A token still carrying the broad 'admin' scope from before demotion.
const { plaintext, hashed } = generateApiToken();
await db('api_tokens').insert({
name: 'stale-token',
hashed_token: hashed,
scopes: 'admin',
created_by: ownerId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
viewerToken = plaintext;
const ev = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'viewer-ev',
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Viewer Event',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_token: 'vtok',
share_link: '/gallery/viewer-ev/vtok',
created_by: ownerId,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
viewerEventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/v1', require('../../src/routes/v1/events'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('denies event creation to a demoted viewer despite an admin-scope token', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/v1/events')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerToken}`)
.send({ event_name: 'Nope', event_type: 'wedding' });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('denies photo upload to a demoted viewer on their OWN event', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/v1/events/${viewerEventId}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerToken}`)
.attach('photo', Buffer.from('x'), 'a.jpg');
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('still allows the viewer to READ their own event', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/v1/events/${viewerEventId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ const crypto = require('crypto');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(30000);
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('backupIntegrityService.verifyDocumentArtefacts', () => {
let db;
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
/**
* Backup/restore hardening — GHSA-h652 (unbounded gunzip) and GHSA-hgp8
* (unkeyed manifest checksum).
*
* h652: decompressFile() piped gunzip straight to disk with no expanded-size
* bound, so a small crafted .gz could fill the volume.
*
* hgp8: the manifest checksum is a plain SHA-256 — it proves the manifest was
* not corrupted, not that it is authentic. BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY upgrades new
* manifests to a keyed HMAC. It is deliberately OPT-IN and verify-if-present:
* the key cannot live in the database (the database is inside the backup), so
* a mandatory HMAC would lock an operator out of the exact disaster-recovery
* case this system exists for.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const zlib = require('zlib');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-bkharden-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'bkharden-test-secret';
const { restoreService } = require('../../src/services/restoreService');
const backupManifest = require('../../src/services/backupManifest');
describe('decompressFile expanded-size bound (GHSA-h652)', () => {
let dir;
beforeAll(() => { dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-gz-')); });
afterAll(() => { fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
afterEach(() => { delete process.env.RESTORE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES; });
it('aborts when the decompressed stream exceeds the limit', async () => {
// 5 MB of zeroes compresses to a few KB — the classic shape of the attack.
const gzPath = path.join(dir, 'bomb.gz');
fs.writeFileSync(gzPath, zlib.gzipSync(Buffer.alloc(5 * 1024 * 1024, 0)));
process.env.RESTORE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES = String(64 * 1024); // 64 KB
await expect(
restoreService.decompressFile(gzPath, path.join(dir, 'out-bomb'))
).rejects.toThrow(/exceeds limit/i);
});
it('still decompresses a normal file within the limit', async () => {
const payload = Buffer.from('SELECT 1;\n'.repeat(100));
const gzPath = path.join(dir, 'ok.gz');
fs.writeFileSync(gzPath, zlib.gzipSync(payload));
const outPath = path.join(dir, 'out-ok');
await restoreService.decompressFile(gzPath, outPath);
expect(fs.readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(payload);
});
});
describe('manifest checksum keying (GHSA-hgp8)', () => {
// validateManifest requires all of these sections to be present.
const baseManifest = () => ({
manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
backup: { type: 'full' },
system: { platform: 'linux' },
application: { version: '1.0.0' },
files: { count: 1, manifest: [{ path: 'a.jpg', size: 1 }] },
database: { type: 'sqlite' },
verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: null },
});
afterEach(() => { delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY; });
it('produces a different digest when a key is set', () => {
const m = baseManifest();
const unkeyed = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
const keyed = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: 'secret-key' });
expect(keyed).not.toBe(unkeyed);
});
it('validates a legacy unkeyed manifest even when a key IS configured', () => {
// Disaster recovery: manifests written before keying must not become
// un-restorable the moment the operator sets a key.
const m = baseManifest();
m.verification.checksum_algorithm = 'sha256';
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY = 'secret-key';
expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).not.toThrow();
});
it('accepts a keyed manifest when the matching key is configured', () => {
process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY = 'secret-key';
const m = baseManifest();
m.verification.checksum_algorithm = 'hmac-sha256';
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: 'secret-key' });
expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).not.toThrow();
});
it('rejects a keyed manifest whose body was tampered with', () => {
process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY = 'secret-key';
const m = baseManifest();
m.verification.checksum_algorithm = 'hmac-sha256';
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: 'secret-key' });
m.files.manifest[0].path = '../../etc/passwd';
expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).toThrow(/checksum verification failed/i);
});
it('does NOT brick restore when a keyed manifest meets a missing key', () => {
// Key lost with the host — the precise moment a restore is needed.
const m = baseManifest();
m.verification.checksum_algorithm = 'hmac-sha256';
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: 'secret-key' });
delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY;
expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).not.toThrow();
});
});
describe('manifest checksum coverage (canonicalization)', () => {
const fullManifest = () => ({
manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
backup: { type: 'full' },
system: { platform: 'linux' },
application: { version: '1.0.0' },
files: { count: 1, manifest: [{ path: 'a.jpg', size: 1 }] },
database: { type: 'sqlite' },
verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: 'sha256' },
});
afterEach(() => { delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY; });
it('covers nested file entries (the old replacer dropped them)', () => {
const m = fullManifest();
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
// Tampering a file path must now change the digest.
m.files.manifest[0].path = '../../etc/passwd';
expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).toThrow(/checksum verification failed/i);
});
it('still accepts a manifest written with the legacy serialization', () => {
const m = fullManifest();
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(
m, { keyed: false, legacy: true }
);
expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).not.toThrow();
});
});
describe('checksum verification is shared and downgrade-aware (codex round 2)', () => {
const fullManifest = () => ({
manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
backup: { type: 'full' },
system: { platform: 'linux' },
application: { version: '1.0.0' },
files: { count: 1, manifest: [{ path: 'a.jpg', size: 1 }] },
database: { type: 'sqlite' },
verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: 'sha256' },
});
afterEach(() => {
delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY;
delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED;
});
it('accepts a legacy-serialized manifest through the SHARED verifier', () => {
// restoreService recomputed the digest itself with the canonical
// serializer, which rejected every pre-existing backup.
const m = fullManifest();
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(
m, { keyed: false, legacy: true },
);
const res = backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m);
expect(res.valid).toBe(true);
expect(res.warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/legacy checksum serialization/i);
});
it('warns but accepts an unkeyed manifest when a key is configured', () => {
const m = fullManifest();
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY = 'secret-key';
const res = backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m);
expect(res.valid).toBe(true);
expect(res.warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/authenticity NOT established/i);
});
it('REJECTS the algorithm downgrade once REQUIRE_KEYED is on', () => {
// Attacker rewrites the manifest, strips checksum_algorithm and recomputes
// a plain SHA-256. With the strict flag set that must not verify.
const m = fullManifest();
m.files.manifest[0].path = '../../etc/passwd';
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY = 'secret-key';
process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED = 'true';
const res = backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m);
expect(res.valid).toBe(false);
expect(res.error).toMatch(/downgrade/i);
});
it('rejects a keyed manifest with no key when REQUIRE_KEYED is on', () => {
const m = fullManifest();
m.verification.checksum_algorithm = 'hmac-sha256';
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: 'k' });
process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED = 'true';
expect(backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m).valid).toBe(false);
});
it('REJECTS a manifest whose checksum was stripped entirely', () => {
// The cheapest bypass of every rule above: delete the field instead of
// forging it. Both the helper's early return and restoreService's
// `if (…total_checksum)` guard used to wave that through.
const m = fullManifest();
delete m.verification.total_checksum;
const res = backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m);
expect(res.valid).toBe(false);
expect(res.error).toMatch(/no checksum/i);
delete m.verification;
expect(backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m).valid).toBe(false);
});
it('REJECTS an unkeyed manifest under REQUIRE_KEYED even with no key configured', () => {
// Strict mode is a claim about the manifests, not about this host — so a
// fresh disaster-recovery box that lost BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY must not
// silently start accepting plain SHA-256 manifests again.
const m = fullManifest();
m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED = 'true';
delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY;
const res = backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m);
expect(res.valid).toBe(false);
expect(res.error).toMatch(/downgrade/i);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
/**
* Regression test: business documents must be written under STORAGE_PATH.
*
* quoteService.persistDocPdf, the invoice sending/reminder writers and the
* contract signature writers all built their target from
* `path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'business-docs', ...)`. Both compose
* files pin STORAGE_PATH=/app/storage and the image's WORKDIR is /app, so the
* two expressions name the same directory and the bug was invisible on a stock
* deployment. Point STORAGE_PATH anywhere else — a NAS mount, a second disk,
* the single-container image's /data volume — and quotes, invoices, Mahnungen
* and contract PDFs were written outside the configured storage root, so they
* were missed by backups and lost when the container was replaced.
*
* Rather than assert on internals, this drives the module boundary the fix
* changed: getStoragePath() is the one resolver, so a temporary STORAGE_PATH
* must be where the bytes land.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
describe('business documents honour STORAGE_PATH', () => {
let tmpRoot;
let originalStoragePath;
beforeEach(() => {
originalStoragePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-storage-'));
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpRoot;
jest.resetModules();
});
afterEach(() => {
if (originalStoragePath === undefined) delete process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
else process.env.STORAGE_PATH = originalStoragePath;
fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('getStoragePath is the resolver the writers share', () => {
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
expect(getStoragePath()).toBe(tmpRoot);
});
it('no business-document writer still targets process.cwd()/storage', () => {
// Whitespace is collapsed before matching on purpose. The first version of
// this test compared against the single-line literal and therefore missed
// persistSignatureImage(), whose identical path.join was simply spread over
// seven lines — it reported green while signature PNGs still wrote outside
// STORAGE_PATH. Formatting must not decide whether a bug is visible.
const writers = [
'src/services/quoteService.js',
'src/services/invoice/sending.js',
'src/services/invoice/reminders.js',
'src/services/contract/signatureAssets.js',
'src/routes/adminDev.js',
];
const offenders = writers.filter((rel) => {
const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../', rel), 'utf8');
return /process\.cwd\(\),'storage'/.test(source.replace(/\s+/g, ''));
});
expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
});
it('generated contract PDFs pass the containment check that serves them', () => {
// assertContractPdfPath guards the admin and public contract download
// routes. It listed only <cwd>/storage/business-docs/contract, so once the
// writers moved to STORAGE_PATH every freshly generated contract was
// refused with PATH_OUTSIDE_STORAGE — a worse failure than the bug being
// fixed. Both roots must be accepted.
const { assertContractPdfPath } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
// assertPathInside realpaths both the file and each root, so the guard only
// means anything against a filesystem that actually has them — write them.
const write = (...segments) => {
const p = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'business-docs', 'contract', ...segments);
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(p), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(p, 'bytes');
return p;
};
const generated = write('2026', 'C-2026-0001.pdf');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(generated)).not.toThrow();
// Signature PNGs live under the same root and are served by the same guard.
const signature = write('signatures', '7', 'customer-1.png');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(signature)).not.toThrow();
// And the guard still refuses a real file outside every allowed root.
const foreign = path.join(tmpRoot, 'outside.pdf');
fs.writeFileSync(foreign, 'bytes');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(foreign)).toThrow(/outside the storage roots/i);
});
it('the guard takes its root from the shared resolver, not its own fallback', () => {
// The regression this pins: the guard used to compute
// `STORAGE_PATH || <cwd>/storage` itself. That agrees with getStoragePath()
// only while STORAGE_PATH is set — unset, the shared resolver falls back
// module-relative to <repo>/storage while the guard fell back to
// <cwd>/storage, and the backend is normally started from backend/. Writers
// and guard then disagreed and contract downloads 403'd.
//
// Mocking the resolver is what makes this provable AND safe. If the guard
// consumes getStoragePath(), the mock moves its root; if it rolled its own
// expression, the mock would have no effect and the assertion fails. It
// also keeps every path inside the tmpdir — an earlier version of this test
// deleted `<resolved root>/business-docs` in cleanup, which with
// STORAGE_PATH unset resolves to a developer's real, gitignored
// <repo>/storage and would have destroyed local documents on `npm test`.
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/config/storage', () => ({ getStoragePath: () => tmpRoot }));
const { assertContractPdfPath } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
const root = path.join(tmpRoot, 'business-docs', 'contract', '2026');
fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
const generated = path.join(root, 'C-2026-0002.pdf');
fs.writeFileSync(generated, 'bytes');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(generated)).not.toThrow();
jest.dontMock('../../src/config/storage');
});
it('writes land under STORAGE_PATH, not the working directory', () => {
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
// Mirror what persistDocPdf does: derive the root, create it, write.
const root = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'business-docs', 'quote', '2026');
fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
const filePath = path.join(root, 'Q-2026-0001.pdf');
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, 'pdf-bytes');
expect(fs.existsSync(filePath)).toBe(true);
expect(filePath.startsWith(tmpRoot)).toBe(true);
// And crucially NOT beside the process working directory.
expect(filePath.startsWith(path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage'))).toBe(false);
});
it('the PDF font lookup consults the storage root before the legacy path', () => {
// A custom font under STORAGE_PATH/fonts used to be unreachable, so the
// document silently rendered with the built-in face instead.
const fontDir = path.join(tmpRoot, 'fonts');
fs.mkdirSync(fontDir, { recursive: true });
const fontPath = path.join(fontDir, 'Brand.ttf');
fs.writeFileSync(fontPath, 'ttf');
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
const raw = 'Brand.ttf';
const candidates = [
path.join(getStoragePath(), raw.replace(/^\/+/, '')),
path.join(getStoragePath(), 'fonts', path.basename(raw)),
path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'fonts', path.basename(raw)),
];
const found = candidates.find((p) => fs.existsSync(p));
expect(found).toBe(fontPath);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
// Point storage at a throwaway temp dir before requiring the service so the
// module-level getStoragePath() picks it up if evaluated.
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-chunk-test-${process.pid}`);
const chunkedUpload = require('../../src/services/chunkedUploadService');
describe('chunkedUploadService.initializeUpload filename sanitisation (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j)', () => {
afterAll(async () => {
await fs.rm(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
it('strips directory-traversal components from the stored filename', async () => {
const { uploadId } = await chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
filename: '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg',
fileSize: 10,
mimeType: 'video/mp4',
eventId: 1,
totalChunks: 1,
});
const meta = chunkedUpload.getUploadStatus(uploadId);
// basename('../../uploads/logos/evil.svg') === 'evil.svg' — the traversal
// is gone, so path.join(tempDir, filename) can no longer escape tempDir.
expect(meta.filename).toBe('evil.svg');
});
it('keeps a normal filename intact', async () => {
const { uploadId } = await chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
filename: 'clip.mp4',
fileSize: 10,
mimeType: 'video/mp4',
eventId: 1,
totalChunks: 1,
});
expect(uploadId).toBeTruthy();
});
it('rejects a filename that collapses to nothing', async () => {
await expect(
chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
filename: '../',
fileSize: 10,
mimeType: 'video/mp4',
eventId: 1,
totalChunks: 1,
})
).rejects.toThrow(/Invalid filename/);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
/**
* Inbound-mail resource caps (GHSA-2qf9).
*
* emailIntakeService downloaded, parsed and persisted every message with no
* size, attachment-count or attachment-byte limit. Anyone who can email the
* operator's mailbox reaches this path unauthenticated.
*
* The teeth were in the dedup key: on failure the service wrote an error row
* keyed `err-<uid>-<Date.now()>`, which can never match the envelope-derived
* `messageId` the dedup pass compares against. So the same oversized message
* was re-downloaded every poll interval forever — and an OOM-kill/restart just
* resumed the loop. This pins that an over-limit message is (a) never
* downloaded and (b) recorded under its REAL message id so it dedups.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-intake-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'intake-test-secret';
process.env.EMAIL_INTAKE_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES = '1000';
const OVERSIZED_UID = 11;
const NORMAL_UID = 12;
const OVERSIZED_MSGID = '<huge@example.com>';
const fetchOneCalls = [];
jest.mock('imapflow', () => ({
ImapFlow: class {
async connect() {}
async logout() {}
async getMailboxLock() { return { release() {} }; }
async search() { return [OVERSIZED_UID, NORMAL_UID]; }
// Envelope pass now also returns `size`.
async *fetch() {
yield { uid: OVERSIZED_UID, size: 50_000, envelope: { messageId: OVERSIZED_MSGID } };
yield { uid: NORMAL_UID, size: 500, envelope: { messageId: '<ok@example.com>' } };
}
async fetchOne(uid) {
fetchOneCalls.push(String(uid));
return { source: Buffer.from('Subject: ok\r\n\r\nbody') };
}
async messageFlagsAdd() { return true; }
},
}));
jest.mock('mailparser', () => ({
simpleParser: async () => ({
messageId: '<ok@example.com>',
subject: 'ok',
date: new Date(),
attachments: [],
text: 'body',
html: null,
}),
}));
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('email intake caps (GHSA-2qf9)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let intake;
let pollResult;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
// pollOnce short-circuits unless the feature flag is on AND an IMAP
// account is configured — without both, this suite would pass vacuously.
await db('feature_flags')
.insert({ key: 'incomingMail', value: 1 })
.onConflict('key').merge({ value: 1 });
// getImapConfig() reads email_configs.first() — seedMinimal may already
// have inserted a row, so update that one rather than adding a second
// (the first row would win and report "unconfigured").
const imapFields = {
imap_host: 'imap.example.com',
imap_user: 'intake@example.com',
imap_pass: 'x',
imap_folder: 'INBOX',
};
const existingCfg = await db('email_configs').first();
if (existingCfg) {
await db('email_configs').where({ id: existingCfg.id }).update(imapFields);
} else {
await db('email_configs').insert({
smtp_host: 'smtp.example.com',
smtp_port: 587,
from_email: 'intake@example.com',
...imapFields,
});
}
intake = require('../../src/services/emailIntakeService');
pollResult = await intake.pollOnce().catch((e) => ({ thrown: e.message }));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('actually ran the poll (guards against a vacuous suite)', () => {
expect(pollResult).toBeDefined();
expect(pollResult.skipped).toBeUndefined();
});
it('never downloads a message whose envelope size exceeds the cap', () => {
// The oversized uid must never reach fetchOne (the source download) —
// that download is the DoS. The normal one must still be processed.
expect(fetchOneCalls).not.toContain(String(OVERSIZED_UID));
expect(fetchOneCalls).toContain(String(NORMAL_UID));
});
it('records the skip under the REAL message id so it dedups next poll', async () => {
const row = await db('received_emails').where({ message_id: OVERSIZED_MSGID }).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.status).toBe('error');
expect(String(row.error)).toMatch(/too large/i);
// The whole point: keyed by messageId, NOT err-<uid>-<timestamp>, which
// could never match the dedup pass and so looped forever.
expect(row.message_id).not.toMatch(/^err-/);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
/**
* Regression tests for #1078 — ensurePreviewImage must generate previews for
* external/reference photos, not silently fall back to the full-size original.
*
* resolvePhotoStorageKey returns null for external photos by design, and that
* null used to be handed straight to withLocalCopy, which throws. The lightbox
* preview route caught the throw and redirected to the original, so a gallery
* whose photos all live on an external mount paid full size on every open —
* the exact cost the preview tier (#492) exists to avoid.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const os = require('os');
const sharp = require('sharp');
// Must be set before externalMediaService is first required: it caches the
// resolved root on first call, and the dir has to exist to win over the
// container default.
const EXTERNAL_ROOT = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-ext-media-${process.pid}`);
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = EXTERNAL_ROOT;
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
const state = { event: null, updates: [] };
const api = (table) => {
if (table === 'events') {
return { where: () => ({ first: async () => state.event }) };
}
if (table === 'photos') {
return {
where: (criteria) => ({
update: async (values) => {
state.updates.push({ criteria, values });
return 1;
},
}),
};
}
throw new Error(`unexpected table in test: ${table}`);
};
api.__state = state;
return { db: api };
});
const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
const EVENT = {
id: 7,
slug: 'nas-wedding',
source_mode: 'reference',
external_path: 'weddings/2026-08-smith',
};
async function writeSourceJpeg(absPath, { width = 2400, height = 1600 } = {}) {
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(absPath), { recursive: true });
const buf = Buffer.alloc(width * height * 3);
for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) buf[i] = (i * 7) % 256;
await sharp(buf, { raw: { width, height, channels: 3 } }).jpeg({ quality: 90 }).toFile(absPath);
}
describe('ensurePreviewImage — external/reference sources (#1078)', () => {
let storage;
let storageRoot;
let imageProcessor;
beforeAll(async () => {
storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-preview-store-'));
storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
await storage.init();
storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
// Require AFTER the storage injection so the module sees it.
delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
await fs.mkdir(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path), { recursive: true });
}, 30000);
afterAll(async () => {
storageModule.resetStorage();
await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
await fs.rm(EXTERNAL_ROOT, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(() => {
db.__state.event = EVENT;
db.__state.updates = [];
});
it.each(['external', 'reference'])(
'generates a downscaled preview for a %s photo off the media mount',
async (sourceOrigin) => {
const relpath = `${sourceOrigin}-shot.jpg`;
await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
const photo = {
id: sourceOrigin === 'external' ? 101 : 102,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: sourceOrigin,
external_relpath: relpath,
filename: relpath,
preview_path: null,
};
const key = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
// Per-photo basename so two events referencing the same NAS filename
// can't clobber each other's preview.
expect(key).toBe(`previews/preview_ext${photo.id}_${relpath}`);
expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
const meta = await sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key)).metadata();
expect(meta.format).toBe('jpeg');
// 2400x1600 capped at the 1920 long edge, aspect preserved.
expect(meta.width).toBe(1920);
expect(meta.height).toBe(1280);
// The generated key is persisted so the next open short-circuits.
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([
{ criteria: { id: photo.id }, values: { preview_path: key } },
]);
}
);
it('short-circuits on an existing valid preview instead of regenerating', async () => {
const relpath = 'already-previewed.jpg';
await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
const photo = {
id: 103,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: relpath,
filename: relpath,
preview_path: null,
};
const first = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
db.__state.updates = [];
const second = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage({ ...photo, preview_path: first });
expect(second).toBe(first);
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
});
it('returns null (never throws) when the external source is missing', async () => {
const photo = {
id: 104,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: 'not-on-the-mount.jpg',
filename: 'not-on-the-mount.jpg',
preview_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
});
it('returns null (never throws) for a row with no source_origin in a reference event', async () => {
// Mode falls back to event.source_mode = 'reference', so
// resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null. That used to reach withLocalCopy and
// throw out of ensurePreviewImage instead of honouring null-on-failure.
const photo = {
id: 105,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: null,
external_relpath: null,
filename: 'orphan.jpg',
path: 'nas-wedding/individual/orphan.jpg',
preview_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
});
it('branches on source_origin, so a row selected without it looks managed', async () => {
// Pins why the /regenerate-previews caller must select source_origin:
// an external row missing that column takes the managed path, where
// resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null and generation is skipped.
const relpath = 'column-starved.jpg';
await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
const starved = {
id: 106,
event_id: EVENT.id,
external_relpath: relpath,
preview_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(starved)).resolves.toBeNull();
await expect(
imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage({ ...starved, source_origin: 'external', filename: relpath })
).resolves.toBe(`previews/preview_ext106_${relpath}`);
});
it('still routes managed photos through the storage backend', async () => {
const sourceKey = 'events/active/managed-event/individual/managed.jpg';
const localSource = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-managed-${process.pid}.jpg`);
await writeSourceJpeg(localSource, { width: 800, height: 600 });
await storage.put(sourceKey, await fs.readFile(localSource), { contentType: 'image/jpeg' });
await fs.rm(localSource, { force: true });
db.__state.event = { id: 8, slug: 'managed-event', source_mode: 'managed' };
const photo = {
id: 201,
event_id: 8,
source_origin: 'managed',
path: 'managed-event/individual/managed.jpg',
filename: 'managed.jpg',
preview_path: null,
};
const key = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_managed.jpg');
expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
/**
* Regression tests for the Docker update instructions (environmentService).
*
* A production install (docker-compose.production.yml) must get `-f
* docker-compose.production.yml` in every update command — bare `docker compose`
* targets docker-compose.yml, a different build-based stack that also starts the
* dev-only mailhog, which left production users stranded on the old version
* (reported against 3.44.0 → 3.45.2).
*/
const { detectEnvironment, generateUpdateInstructions } = require('../../src/services/environmentService');
describe('detectEnvironment — production compose detection', () => {
const orig = process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL;
afterEach(() => {
if (orig === undefined) delete process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL;
else process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL = orig;
});
it('flags isProductionCompose when PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL is set', async () => {
process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL = 'stable';
const env = await detectEnvironment();
expect(env.isProductionCompose).toBe(true);
});
it('does not flag it when the var is absent (default docker-compose.yml)', async () => {
delete process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL;
const env = await detectEnvironment();
expect(env.isProductionCompose).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('generateUpdateInstructions — Docker commands', () => {
const cmds = (env) => generateUpdateInstructions(env, '3.45.2').steps.map((s) => s.command);
it('targets docker-compose.production.yml for a production install', () => {
const commands = cmds({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: true });
expect(commands).toEqual([
'docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml pull',
'docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml up -d',
'docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml logs -f backend',
]);
// And the warning tells them where to run it.
const { warnings } = generateUpdateInstructions({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: true }, '3.45.2');
expect(warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/docker-compose\.production\.yml/);
});
it('uses bare commands + a hint when not a production compose', () => {
const commands = cmds({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: false });
expect(commands).toEqual([
'docker compose pull',
'docker compose up -d',
'docker compose logs -f backend',
]);
const { warnings } = generateUpdateInstructions({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: false }, '3.45.2');
// Still nudges production users to add -f in case detection missed.
expect(warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/-f docker-compose\.production\.yml/);
});
});
@@ -72,9 +72,16 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/businessProfileService', () => ({
resolveBankAccountForCurrency: jest.fn(async () => null),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/documentSequences', () => ({
claimNextSequence: jest.fn(async () => 42),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/documentSequences', () => {
const claimNextSequence = jest.fn(async () => 42);
// Delegates to the claimNextSequence mock so call-count assertions
// below keep observing sequence claims.
const nextDocumentNumber = jest.fn(async (kind, settingKey, defaultFormat, trx) => {
const seq = await claimNextSequence(kind, 2026, trx);
return `R-2026-${String(seq).padStart(4, '0')}`;
});
return { claimNextSequence, nextDocumentNumber };
});
jest.mock('../../src/services/pdfService', () => ({
renderInvoiceToBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('pdf')),
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
/**
* Smoke tests for invoiceService's primary flows ahead of the god-file
* decomposition — createInvoice happy path (incl. the line-item
* totals/VAT math), list/get reads, and the status-transition guards
* on cancelInvoice / releaseForDelivery.
*
* Uses the same deep-mocked db pattern as
* invoiceService.installmentPlan.test.js — chains are queued per table
* and assertions probe insert/update call shapes rather than SQL.
*/
const chains = [];
function makeChain() {
const c = {
_firstValue: undefined,
_updateResult: 1,
_insertResult: [{ id: 999 }],
_selectResult: [],
then: function (onResolve, onReject) {
return Promise.resolve(this._selectResult).then(onResolve, onReject);
},
where: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
whereNot: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
whereIn: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
whereNull: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
whereNotNull: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
andWhere: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
orderBy: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
limit: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
select: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
sum: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
count: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
clone: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
clearSelect: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
clearOrder: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
offset: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
first: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(this._firstValue); }),
update: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(this._updateResult); }),
insert: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
returning: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(this._insertResult); }),
del: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(1); }),
onConflict: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
ignore: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(1); }),
merge: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(1); }),
increment: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
forUpdate: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
leftJoin: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
};
chains.push(c);
return c;
}
const tableChains = {};
function pickChainFor(name) {
if (!tableChains[name]) tableChains[name] = makeChain();
return tableChains[name];
}
const mockDbFn = jest.fn((name) => pickChainFor(name));
mockDbFn.transaction = jest.fn(async (cb) => cb(mockDbFn));
mockDbFn.schema = { hasTable: jest.fn(async () => false) };
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
db: mockDbFn,
withRetry: jest.fn(async (fn) => fn()),
logActivity: jest.fn(async () => {}),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/appSettings', () => ({
getAppSetting: jest.fn(async () => null),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/businessProfileService', () => ({
getProfile: jest.fn(async () => ({ profile: { default_currency: 'CHF' } })),
resolveBankAccountForCurrency: jest.fn(async () => null),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/documentSequences', () => {
const claimNextSequence = jest.fn(async () => 42);
// Delegates to the claimNextSequence mock so call-count assertions
// below keep observing sequence claims.
const nextDocumentNumber = jest.fn(async (kind, settingKey, defaultFormat, trx) => {
const seq = await claimNextSequence(kind, 2026, trx);
return `R-2026-${String(seq).padStart(4, '0')}`;
});
return { claimNextSequence, nextDocumentNumber };
});
jest.mock('../../src/services/pdfService', () => ({
renderInvoiceToBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('pdf')),
renderQuoteToBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('pdf')),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/emailProcessor', () => ({
queueEmail: jest.fn(async () => {}),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
}));
const invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
function resetChains() {
for (const k of Object.keys(tableChains)) delete tableChains[k];
jest.clearAllMocks();
}
const activeCustomer = {
id: 5, is_active: 1, feature_bills: 1,
billing_cadence: 'per_event', preferred_language: 'de',
};
describe('createInvoice — happy path + totals', () => {
beforeEach(() => resetChains());
it('creates a single invoice with a claimed sequence number and computed totals/VAT', async () => {
pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { ...activeCustomer };
pickChainFor('invoices')._insertResult = [{ id: 777 }];
const result = await invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: 5,
vatRate: 8.1,
lineItems: [
// 2 × 100.00 = 200.00
{ position: 1, description: 'Shoot', quantity: 2, unit_price_minor: 10000 },
// 50.00 with 10% discount = 45.00
{ position: 2, description: 'Discounted extra', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 5000, discount_percent: 10 },
// Parent header — total auto-resolves from priced sub-items (350.00)
{ position: 3, description: 'Package', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 0 },
{ position: 4, description: 'Camera', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 15000, parent_position: 3 },
{ position: 5, description: 'Lens', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 20000, parent_position: 3 },
],
}, 1);
expect(result.invoiceIds).toEqual([777]);
// Net = 20000 + 4500 + 35000 (resolved parent) — sub-items must NOT
// double-count. VAT = round(59500 × 8.1%) = 4820.
expect(pickChainFor('invoices').insert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({
invoice_number: 'R-2026-0042',
customer_account_id: 5,
currency: 'CHF',
status: 'scheduled',
net_amount_minor: 59500,
vat_rate: 8.1,
vat_amount_minor: 4820,
shipping_amount_minor: 0,
total_amount_minor: 64320,
installment_total: 1,
}));
// Exactly one sequence number claimed for a single-row create.
const { claimNextSequence } = require('../../src/utils/documentSequences');
expect(claimNextSequence).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// Line items landed in invoice_line_items.
expect(pickChainFor('invoice_line_items').insert).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('409s on a deactivated customer before touching the sequence', async () => {
pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { ...activeCustomer, is_active: 0 };
await expect(invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: 5, vatRate: 0, lineItems: [],
}, 1)).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409 });
const { claimNextSequence } = require('../../src/utils/documentSequences');
expect(claimNextSequence).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('400s + INVOICE_TOTAL_NEGATIVE when discounts push the total below zero', async () => {
pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { ...activeCustomer };
await expect(invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: 5,
vatRate: 7.7,
lineItems: [
{ position: 1, description: 'Shoot', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 5000 },
{ position: 2, description: 'Rabatt', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: -8000 },
],
}, 1)).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400, code: 'INVOICE_TOTAL_NEGATIVE' });
const { claimNextSequence } = require('../../src/utils/documentSequences');
expect(claimNextSequence).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('listInvoices / getInvoiceById — read paths (smoke)', () => {
beforeEach(() => resetChains());
it('lists invoices with total + pagination echo', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._selectResult = [
{ id: 1, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0001' },
{ id: 2, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0002' },
];
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = { total: 7 };
const result = await invoiceService.listInvoices({ page: 2, pageSize: 10 });
expect(result.rows).toHaveLength(2);
expect(result.total).toBe(7);
expect(result.page).toBe(2);
expect(result.pageSize).toBe(10);
expect(pickChainFor('invoices').offset).toHaveBeenCalledWith(10);
expect(pickChainFor('invoices').limit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(10);
});
it('getInvoiceById returns { invoice, lineItems, payments } when found', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = { id: 3, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0003' };
pickChainFor('invoice_line_items as li')._selectResult = [
{ id: 30, position: 1, description: 'Shoot' },
];
pickChainFor('invoice_payment_log')._selectResult = [];
const result = await invoiceService.getInvoiceById(3);
expect(result.invoice).toMatchObject({ id: 3, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0003' });
expect(result.lineItems).toHaveLength(1);
expect(result.payments).toEqual([]);
});
it('getInvoiceById returns null for an unknown id', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = undefined;
await expect(invoiceService.getInvoiceById(404)).resolves.toBeNull();
});
});
describe('status transitions — cancelInvoice / releaseForDelivery guards', () => {
beforeEach(() => resetChains());
it('soft-cancels a scheduled (never-issued) invoice without a Storno', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
id: 9, status: 'scheduled', kind: 'invoice', event_id: null,
};
const result = await invoiceService.cancelInvoice(9, 1);
expect(result).toEqual({ cancelled: true, stornoId: null });
expect(pickChainFor('invoices').update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ status: 'cancelled' })
);
});
it('409s + ALREADY_CANCELLED on a second cancel', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
id: 9, status: 'cancelled', kind: 'invoice',
};
await expect(invoiceService.cancelInvoice(9, 1))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409, code: 'ALREADY_CANCELLED' });
});
it('409s + IS_STORNO when trying to cancel a Storno document', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
id: 10, status: 'sent', kind: 'storno',
};
await expect(invoiceService.cancelInvoice(10, 1))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409, code: 'IS_STORNO' });
});
it('releaseForDelivery 409s + NOT_PENDING_DELIVERY on a non-pending invoice', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
id: 11, status: 'sent', kind: 'invoice',
};
await expect(invoiceService.releaseForDelivery(11, 1))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409, code: 'NOT_PENDING_DELIVERY' });
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
/**
* Unit tests for mfaService — admin TOTP MFA (#738).
*
* Pure unit: no DB, no Express. Exercises the crypto/verification surface
* directly. JWT_SECRET is set at the top so getEncryptionKey()'s scrypt
* derivation has key material (the service derives the AES key from
* MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY, falling back to JWT_SECRET).
*/
// Must be set BEFORE the service is required — the key is derived lazily per
// call, but keep it explicit and stable so encrypt/decrypt round-trips.
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mfa-unit-test-secret';
delete process.env.MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY; // ensure we derive from JWT_SECRET
const { authenticator } = require('otplib');
const mfaService = require('../../src/services/mfaService');
describe('mfaService — secret encryption (AES-256-GCM)', () => {
it('round-trips encrypt → decrypt to the original secret', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const blob = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
expect(blob).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(blob).not.toContain(secret); // stored form is not plaintext
expect(blob.split('.')).toHaveLength(3); // iv.tag.ciphertext
expect(mfaService.decryptSecret(blob)).toBe(secret);
});
it('produces a different ciphertext each time (random IV) but decrypts identically', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const a = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
const b = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
expect(a).not.toBe(b);
expect(mfaService.decryptSecret(a)).toBe(secret);
expect(mfaService.decryptSecret(b)).toBe(secret);
});
it('throws when decrypting a malformed blob (wrong segment count)', () => {
expect(() => mfaService.decryptSecret('garbage')).toThrow();
expect(() => mfaService.decryptSecret('only.two')).toThrow();
});
it('throws when the auth tag / ciphertext is tampered with', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const [iv, tag, ct] = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret).split('.');
// Flip a character in the ciphertext → GCM auth check must fail.
const tampered = ct.slice(0, -2) + (ct.slice(-2) === 'AA' ? 'BB' : 'AA');
expect(() => mfaService.decryptSecret([iv, tag, tampered].join('.'))).toThrow();
});
});
describe('mfaService — TOTP verification', () => {
it('accepts a freshly generated code for the plaintext secret', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret)).toBe(true);
});
it('tolerates whitespace in the submitted code', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(` ${code} `, secret)).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a wrong code', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
const wrong = code === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(wrong, secret)).toBe(false);
});
it('returns false for empty inputs rather than throwing', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp('', secret)).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp('123456', '')).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(null, secret)).toBe(false);
});
it('verifies through the encrypted blob (verifyTotpEncrypted)', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const stored = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(code, stored)).toBe(true);
const wrong = code === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(wrong, stored)).toBe(false);
});
it('verifyTotpEncrypted returns false (no throw) for a corrupt blob', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(code, 'not-a-valid-blob')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('mfaService — otpauth URI / QR', () => {
it('builds an otpauth:// URI containing issuer, account and secret', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const uri = mfaService.buildOtpauthUri('admin@example.com', secret);
expect(uri).toMatch(/^otpauth:\/\/totp\//);
expect(uri).toContain(encodeURIComponent(mfaService.ISSUER));
expect(uri).toContain(`secret=${secret}`);
});
it('builds a PNG data-URL QR for the URI', async () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const uri = mfaService.buildOtpauthUri('admin@example.com', secret);
const qr = await mfaService.buildQrDataUrl(uri);
expect(qr).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
});
});
describe('mfaService — recovery codes', () => {
it('generates 10 distinct plaintext codes and 10 distinct hashes', async () => {
const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
expect(plain).toHaveLength(mfaService.RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT);
expect(hashed).toHaveLength(mfaService.RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT);
expect(new Set(plain).size).toBe(10);
expect(new Set(hashed).size).toBe(10);
// Hashes are bcrypt, not the plaintext.
hashed.forEach((h) => expect(h).toMatch(/^\$2[aby]\$/));
plain.forEach((p) => expect(hashed).not.toContain(p));
});
it('formats a raw code into 4-char groups', () => {
expect(mfaService.formatRecoveryCode('abcdefghij')).toBe('abcd-efgh-ij');
});
it('consumes a valid recovery code once and removes it (single-use)', async () => {
const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
const target = plain[3];
const first = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(target, hashed);
expect(first.matched).toBe(true);
expect(first.remainingHashes).toHaveLength(9);
// Reusing the same code against the reduced set must now fail.
const reuse = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(target, first.remainingHashes);
expect(reuse.matched).toBe(false);
expect(reuse.remainingHashes).toHaveLength(9);
});
it('matches case-insensitively and trims whitespace', async () => {
const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
const res = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(` ${plain[0].toUpperCase()} `, hashed);
expect(res.matched).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a wrong code and leaves the hash set unchanged', async () => {
const { hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
const res = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode('zzzz-zzzz-zz', hashed);
expect(res.matched).toBe(false);
expect(res.remainingHashes).toHaveLength(10);
});
it('handles empty / missing input safely', async () => {
const { hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
const res = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode('', hashed);
expect(res.matched).toBe(false);
expect(res.remainingHashes).toBe(hashed);
const noHashes = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode('abcd-efgh-ij', null);
expect(noHashes.matched).toBe(false);
expect(noHashes.remainingHashes).toEqual([]);
});
});
describe('mfaService — parseRecoveryCodes', () => {
it('parses a JSON string array', () => {
expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(JSON.stringify(['a', 'b']))).toEqual(['a', 'b']);
});
it('passes an already-array through', () => {
expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(['a', 'b'])).toEqual(['a', 'b']);
});
it('returns [] for null / garbage / non-array JSON', () => {
expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(null)).toEqual([]);
expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes('{not json')).toEqual([]);
expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(JSON.stringify({ a: 1 }))).toEqual([]);
});
});
describe('mfaService — isEnrolled coercion', () => {
it('treats true / 1 / "1" as enrolled', () => {
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: true })).toBe(true);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: 1 })).toBe(true);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: '1' })).toBe(true);
});
it('treats false / 0 / null / missing as not enrolled', () => {
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: false })).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: 0 })).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: null })).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({})).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled(null)).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
/**
* Regression tests for reinjectCurrentAdmin — the operator-preservation step of
* the .picpeak restore (GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f follow-up). Runs against a real
* in-memory SQLite DB so the UNIQUE(email)/UNIQUE(username) constraints behave
* as in production. Reconciliation is non-destructive (update-in-place / rename,
* never delete) so restored rows referenced by FKs keep their ids.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
let db;
let reinjectCurrentAdmin;
beforeAll(() => {
jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'sqlite3' }), { virtual: false });
reinjectCurrentAdmin = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService').reinjectCurrentAdmin;
});
beforeEach(async () => {
db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
await db.schema.createTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('username').notNullable().unique();
t.string('email').notNullable().unique();
t.string('password_hash');
t.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
t.boolean('must_change_password').defaultTo(false);
t.integer('role_id');
t.integer('created_by');
t.boolean('two_factor_enabled').defaultTo(false);
t.string('two_factor_secret');
t.text('two_factor_recovery_codes');
});
});
afterEach(async () => { await db.destroy(); });
const operator = {
id: 1, username: 'admin', email: 'op@example.com',
password_hash: 'OP_HASH', is_active: 1, must_change_password: 0, role_id: 1, created_by: 99,
two_factor_enabled: 1, two_factor_secret: 'OP_SECRET', two_factor_recovery_codes: '["a","b"]',
};
test('restores login + MFA in place, keeping the row id and its FK columns (FK-safe)', async () => {
await db('admin_users').insert({
id: 7, username: 'someoneelse', email: 'OP@example.com',
password_hash: 'ATTACKER', is_active: 1, must_change_password: 0, role_id: 4, created_by: 5,
two_factor_enabled: 0, two_factor_secret: 'ATTACKER_SECRET', two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
});
await db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator));
const rows = await db('admin_users');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
const row = rows[0];
expect(row.id).toBe(7); // id preserved → FK refs hold
expect(row.username).toBe('admin');
expect(row.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
expect(Boolean(row.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(true);
expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBe('OP_SECRET'); // attacker MFA secret gone
expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBe('["a","b"]');
// Relationship/audit FKs are NOT forced from the operator snapshot (avoids
// dangling role_id/created_by on a cross-instance restore) — the restored
// row keeps its own already-valid values.
expect(row.role_id).toBe(4);
expect(row.created_by).toBe(5);
});
test('renames (not deletes) a different row holding the operator username', async () => {
await db('admin_users').insert({
id: 3, username: 'admin', email: 'other@instance.test',
password_hash: 'OTHER', is_active: 1, role_id: 4,
});
await expect(db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator))).resolves.not.toThrow();
const rows = await db('admin_users').orderBy('id');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(2); // the other admin survives (FK-safe)
const other = rows.find((r) => r.id === 3);
expect(other.username).toBe('admin__restored_3'); // renamed, id kept
expect(other.email).toBe('other@instance.test');
const op = rows.find((r) => r.username === 'admin');
expect(op.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
});
test('reconciles email and username colliding with DIFFERENT rows without deleting either', async () => {
await db('admin_users').insert([
{ id: 4, username: 'someoneelse', email: 'op@example.com', password_hash: 'A', role_id: 4 },
{ id: 5, username: 'admin', email: 'other@instance.test', password_hash: 'B', role_id: 4 },
]);
await expect(db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator))).resolves.not.toThrow();
const rows = await db('admin_users').orderBy('id');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(2); // both rows survive
const opRow = rows.find((r) => r.id === 4); // email match updated in place
expect(opRow.username).toBe('admin');
expect(opRow.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
const renamed = rows.find((r) => r.id === 5); // username holder renamed, not deleted
expect(renamed.username).toBe('admin__restored_5');
});
test('inserts the operator with a non-colliding id when neither key exists in the backup', async () => {
await db('admin_users').insert({
id: 9, username: 'backupadmin', email: 'backup@instance.test', password_hash: 'B', role_id: 1,
});
await db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator));
const rows = await db('admin_users').orderBy('id');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(2); // backup admin untouched
const opRow = rows.find((r) => r.username === 'admin');
expect(opRow.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
expect(opRow.id).toBe(10); // max(9)+1, no collision
expect(opRow.created_by).toBeNull(); // self-ref FK nulled so the insert can't dangle
});
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
/**
* Deal-lineage ownership on project attach (GHSA-wrg5, codex round 3).
*
* requireProjectOwnership vets only the DESTINATION project. Attaching a quote
* cascades through linkDealToProject, which re-points every event the deal
* produced into that project — so an editor could create an empty project of
* their own, attach another admin's quote, and pull that admin's events (and
* the invoices, emails and gallery that roll up with them) into a project they
* own and can read via /:id/overview. An unassigned project offered no
* resistance either: it ADOPTS the deal's customer rather than rejecting it.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-deallineage-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'deallineage-test-secret';
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('linkDealToProject enforces lineage ownership (GHSA-wrg5, round 3)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let projectService;
let editorA; let editorB; let superAdmin;
let customerId;
const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username, email: `${username}@example.com`,
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkProject = async (name, createdBy) => {
const r = await db('projects').insert({
name, status: 'active', created_by: createdBy,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy) => {
const r = await db('events').insert({
slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com', password_hash: 'x',
share_token: `t-${slug}`, share_link: `/g/${slug}/t-${slug}`,
created_by: createdBy,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkQuote = async (dealUuid, convertedEventId) => {
const r = await db('quotes').insert({
quote_number: `Q-${dealUuid}`,
customer_account_id: customerId,
deal_uuid: dealUuid,
converted_event_id: convertedEventId,
status: 'accepted',
currency: 'EUR',
issue_date: '2026-08-01',
total_amount_minor: 1000,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
projectService = require('../../src/services/projectService');
editorA = await mkAdmin('deal-a', 'editor');
editorB = await mkAdmin('deal-b', 'editor');
superAdmin = await mkAdmin('deal-root', 'super_admin');
const c = await db('customer_accounts').first('id');
customerId = c.id;
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it("refuses to move another admin's event into the caller's project", async () => {
const victimEvent = await mkEvent('victim-gala', editorB);
const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-foreign', victimEvent);
const attackerProject = await mkProject('attacker-empty', editorA);
await expect(
projectService.assignQuote(attackerProject, quoteId, { id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'DEAL_EVENT_FORBIDDEN' });
// Nothing may be half-applied: neither the event nor the quote moved.
const ev = await db('events').where({ id: victimEvent }).first('project_id');
expect(ev.project_id == null).toBe(true);
const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
expect(q.project_id == null).toBe(true);
});
it("allows the caller's own event through the same path", async () => {
const ownEvent = await mkEvent('own-gala', editorA);
const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-own', ownEvent);
const project = await mkProject('attacker-own', editorA);
await projectService.assignQuote(project, quoteId, { id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
const ev = await db('events').where({ id: ownEvent }).first('project_id');
expect(Number(ev.project_id)).toBe(Number(project));
});
it('leaves super_admin unrestricted', async () => {
const victimEvent = await mkEvent('root-gala', editorB);
const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-root', victimEvent);
const project = await mkProject('root-project', superAdmin);
await projectService.assignQuote(project, quoteId, { id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin' });
const ev = await db('events').where({ id: victimEvent }).first('project_id');
expect(Number(ev.project_id)).toBe(Number(project));
});
it('resolves the role from a bare admin id (quote/contract create+update paths)', async () => {
// Those services thread `adminId`, not req.admin — the lookup must still
// scope them, and must fail closed rather than assume super_admin.
const victimEvent = await mkEvent('bare-gala', editorB);
const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-bare', victimEvent);
const project = await mkProject('bare-project', editorA);
await expect(
projectService.assignQuote(project, quoteId, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'DEAL_EVENT_FORBIDDEN' });
});
// The lineage guard above only fires once a deal has produced an event. The
// quote/contract create+update paths call linkDealToProject with a
// body-supplied projectId and NO route-level ownership guard, so a brand-new
// deal (eventIds empty) skipped every check and wrote into a foreign project.
describe('destination ownership (codex review follow-up)', () => {
it('refuses a foreign project even when the deal has no events yet', async () => {
const victimProject = await mkProject('victim-destination', editorB);
const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-no-events', null);
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-no-events', victimProject, db, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
expect(q.project_id == null).toBe(true);
});
it('refuses an OWNERLESS project with no events (the escalation path)', async () => {
// created_by NULL + no linked events is exactly the shape that would let
// the caller claim the project via ownedProjectsSubquery's second branch
// once their quote converts to an event.
const orphan = await mkProject('orphan-destination', null);
await mkQuote('deal-orphan', null);
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-orphan', orphan, db, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
});
it("still allows the caller's own project with no events", async () => {
const own = await mkProject('own-destination', editorA);
const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-own-dest', null);
await projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-own-dest', own, db, { id: editorA });
const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
expect(Number(q.project_id)).toBe(Number(own));
});
it('refuses a foreign project when the deal_uuid is NULL (codex round 1)', async () => {
// deal_uuid is nullable (migration 107) and quoteService.update passes the
// EXISTING row's value, so a legacy quote reaches linkDealToProject with
// null. The old `if (!dealUuid || !projectId) return` bailed before the
// guard — while the caller had already written project_id onto its row.
const victimProject = await mkProject('victim-nulldeal', editorB);
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject(null, victimProject, db, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
});
it('still no-ops on a NULL deal_uuid pointed at the caller-s own project', async () => {
// The destination is vetted, then it returns without cascading — there is
// no lineage to move.
const own = await mkProject('own-nulldeal', editorA);
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject(null, own, db, { id: editorA }),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it('does not leak customer association through the error code', async () => {
// The customer check used to run first, so a foreign project whose
// customer differed answered 422 PROJECT_CUSTOMER_MISMATCH while an
// unknown id answered 404 — enough to enumerate projects and infer their
// customer. Both must now be indistinguishable to a scoped caller.
const foreignWithCustomer = await mkProject('victim-customer', editorB);
await db('projects').where({ id: foreignWithCustomer }).update({ customer_account_id: customerId });
await mkQuote('deal-oracle', null);
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-oracle', foreignWithCustomer, db, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-oracle', 999999, db, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
});
it('leaves super_admin unrestricted on a foreign destination', async () => {
const victimProject = await mkProject('root-destination', editorB);
const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-root-dest', null);
await projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-root-dest', victimProject, db, {
id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin',
});
const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
expect(Number(q.project_id)).toBe(Number(victimProject));
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
/**
* getProjectOverview stamps each email with `canAct` — whether the queued-mail
* routes (requireOwnedQueuedEmail) would actually accept an action on it.
*
* The cockpit used to derive this client-side from `event_id != null`, which is
* weaker than the backend rule in a way that still produced dead controls:
* requireOwnedQueuedEmail ALSO requires ownership of that event, while
* getProjectOverview lists the project's events by project_id alone. Project
* ownership does not imply event ownership — ownedProjectsSubquery's
* `projects.created_by = admin.id` branch places no constraint on the linked
* events' owners, so a super_admin can attach admin B's event to admin A's
* project. See #969 / codex review round 1.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-canact-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'canact-test-secret';
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('getProjectOverview email canAct (#969)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let projectService;
let adminA; let adminB; let superAdmin;
let projectId; let ownEventId; let foreignEventId; let ownerlessEventId;
const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username, email: `${username}@example.com`,
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(), updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy, project) => {
const r = await db('events').insert({
slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com', password_hash: 'x',
share_token: `t-${slug}`, share_link: `/g/${slug}/t-${slug}`,
created_by: createdBy, project_id: project,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkMail = async (eventId, type) => {
const r = await db('email_queue').insert({
recipient_email: 'kunde@example.com', email_type: type, status: 'sent',
event_id: eventId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(), sent_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
projectService = require('../../src/services/projectService');
adminA = await mkAdmin('canact-a', 'editor');
adminB = await mkAdmin('canact-b', 'editor');
superAdmin = await mkAdmin('canact-root', 'super_admin');
const p = await db('projects').insert({
name: 'Cockpit canAct', status: 'active', created_by: adminA,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(), updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
projectId = p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
// All three hang off adminA's project. Only the first is adminA's; the
// third is an ownerless legacy row, which filterOwnedEventIds treats as
// owned by whoever asks — but only once we know who is asking.
ownEventId = await mkEvent('canact-own', adminA, projectId);
foreignEventId = await mkEvent('canact-foreign', adminB, projectId);
ownerlessEventId = await mkEvent('canact-legacy', null, projectId);
await mkMail(ownEventId, 'gallery_ready');
await mkMail(foreignEventId, 'gallery_ready');
await mkMail(ownerlessEventId, 'gallery_ready');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
const byEvent = (overview) => {
const m = new Map();
for (const e of overview.emails) m.set(e.eventId, e);
return m;
};
it('clears mail on an event the caller owns', async () => {
const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(
projectId, {}, { id: adminA, roleName: 'editor' },
);
expect(byEvent(overview).get(ownEventId).canAct).toBe(true);
});
it('denies mail on a foreign admin\'s event inside the caller\'s own project', async () => {
const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(
projectId, {}, { id: adminA, roleName: 'editor' },
);
// event_id is non-null here — the old client-side rule would have offered
// controls, and requireOwnedQueuedEmail would have 404'd them.
const row = byEvent(overview).get(foreignEventId);
expect(row.eventId).not.toBeNull();
expect(row.canAct).toBe(false);
});
it('clears everything for a super_admin', async () => {
const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(
projectId, {}, { id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin' },
);
expect(overview.emails.every((e) => e.canAct === true)).toBe(true);
});
it('clears mail on an ownerless legacy event for an identified caller', async () => {
// Parity with filterOwnedEventIds, which allows created_by IS NULL.
const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(
projectId, {}, { id: adminA, roleName: 'editor' },
);
expect(byEvent(overview).get(ownerlessEventId).canAct).toBe(true);
});
it('denies everything when no admin context is supplied', async () => {
// Including the ownerless event: `created_by == null` must not read as
// "owned" when we do not know who is asking (codex review round 2).
const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(projectId, {});
expect(overview.emails.length).toBe(3);
expect(overview.emails.every((e) => e.canAct === false)).toBe(true);
});
it('does not leak event ownership to the client', async () => {
const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(
projectId, {}, { id: adminA, roleName: 'editor' },
);
expect(overview.events.length).toBe(3);
for (const e of overview.events) expect(e).not.toHaveProperty('created_by');
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
/**
* Brand-token substitution must not reintroduce markup after sanitization
* (GHSA-j347).
*
* buildCachedPayload sanitizes the operator's HTML and THEN calls
* applyBrandTokens on the result, which did a plain `String.replace` with no
* escaping. The default templates interpolate tokens into text and into quoted
* attributes (`<img src="{{brand_logo_url}}" alt="{{company_name}} logo">`,
* `href="mailto:{{support_email}}"`), so a token value could close the
* attribute and inject markup into the public origin.
*
* The writer is settings.edit (super_admin only) and the CSP blocks inline
* script, so this is defence-in-depth rather than a live RCE — but the
* sanitize-then-substitute ordering is a real bug either way.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-brandtok-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'brandtok-test-secret';
const { _internal } = require('../../src/services/publicSiteService');
// applyBrandTokens / sanitizeBrandUrl are module-private; the service exports
// them under _internal for testing (see publicSiteService module.exports).
const { applyBrandTokens, sanitizeBrandUrl } = _internal || {};
const maybe = applyBrandTokens ? describe : describe.skip;
maybe('applyBrandTokens escaping (GHSA-j347)', () => {
it('escapes markup in a text-position token', () => {
const out = applyBrandTokens('<p>{{company_name}}</p>', {
companyName: '<script>alert(1)</script>',
});
expect(out).not.toContain('<script>');
expect(out).toContain('&lt;script&gt;');
});
it('escapes a quote that would break out of an attribute', () => {
const out = applyBrandTokens(
'<img src="/x.png" alt="{{company_name}} logo">',
{ companyName: '" onerror="alert(1)' },
);
// The injected quotes must be entity-encoded, so the payload stays INSIDE
// the alt value as text instead of terminating it and forming a real
// onerror attribute. (`onerror=` still appears as literal characters —
// that is inert; what matters is that no raw `"` closed the attribute.)
expect(out).not.toContain('" onerror="');
expect(out).toContain('&quot; onerror=&quot;');
});
it('escapes the logo url token used inside src="..."', () => {
const out = applyBrandTokens('<img src="{{brand_logo_url}}">', {
logoUrl: '" onerror="alert(1)',
});
expect(out).not.toContain('" onerror="');
expect(out).toContain('&quot;');
});
it('leaves ordinary values readable', () => {
const out = applyBrandTokens('<p>{{company_name}}</p>', { companyName: 'Acme Photos' });
expect(out).toContain('Acme Photos');
});
});
const maybeUrl = sanitizeBrandUrl ? describe : describe.skip;
maybeUrl('sanitizeBrandUrl scheme allowlist (GHSA-j347)', () => {
it('rejects javascript: regardless of case', () => {
expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('javascript:alert(1)')).toBeNull();
// The old check was a case-sensitive startsWith and missed these.
expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('JavaScript:alert(1)')).toBeNull();
expect(sanitizeBrandUrl(' JAVASCRIPT:alert(1)')).toBeNull();
});
it('rejects other non-http schemes', () => {
expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('data:text/html;base64,PHN2Zz4=')).toBeNull();
expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('vbscript:msgbox(1)')).toBeNull();
});
it('keeps http(s) and relative logo paths working', () => {
expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('https://cdn.example.com/logo.png'))
.toBe('https://cdn.example.com/logo.png');
expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('/uploads/logos/logo.png')).toBe('/uploads/logos/logo.png');
});
});
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ let db; let cleanup;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
}, 30000);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ function release(tag, body = '', publishedAt = '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z') {
name: tag,
body,
published_at: publishedAt,
html_url: `https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/releases/tag/${tag}`,
html_url: `https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/releases/tag/${tag}`,
};
}
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ describe('updateCheckService.getReleasesSince', () => {
tag: 'v3.55.0',
name: 'v3.55.0',
body: 'stable notes 3.55.0',
htmlUrl: 'https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/releases/tag/v3.55.0',
htmlUrl: 'https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/releases/tag/v3.55.0',
});
});

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