chore(stable): release 3.45.7 (#881 )

fix(security): close 5 Trivy alerts — postcss/tar bumps + drop npm from the runtime image (stable) (#879 )
* fix(security): close the 5 open Trivy alerts — dep bumps + drop npm from the runtime image Backend deps: - postcss 8.5.10 -> 8.5.18 (CVE-2026-45623, GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849; the pin exists to force sanitize-html's transitive copy onto a fixed version) - tar pin/override >=7.5.16 -> >=7.5.21, resolves 7.5.22 (GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m) Runtime image: - Remove the npm CLI from the final stage instead of upgrading it: npm's bundled node_modules ship tar 7.5.19 and brace-expansion 5.0.7 (no npm release bundles the fixed versions — checked 11.18.0 and 12.0.1), and npm never runs in production. wait-for-db.sh now invokes the migration runners via node directly. This ends the recurring npm-bundled-CVE alert class; the previous 'npm install -g npm@11' line was itself a patch for the last batch. (stable) * fix(restore): run post-restore migrations via node — the image ships no npm restoreService still shelled out to 'npm run migrate:safe' after a restore; with npm removed from the runtime image that would ENOENT into the non-fatal catch, silently leaving a restored older backup on a schema behind the running code until the next container restart. Invoke migrations/run-migrations-safe.js through node directly, matching wait-for-db.sh. The PR #596 source-contract test now pins the new invocation. (stable)
2026-07-27 07:58:07 +00:00 · 2026-07-27 09:54:43 +02:00 · 2026-07-27 07:10:18 +00:00 · 2026-07-27 09:06:50 +02:00 · 2026-07-26 18:41:48 +00:00 · 2026-07-26 20:38:16 +02:00
348 changed files with 31940 additions and 19025 deletions
@@ -4,8 +4,11 @@
 # Environment
 NODE_ENV=production

-# JWT Secret (generate with: openssl rand -base64 64)
-JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here
+# JWT Secret — OPTIONAL. Leave unset and it is auto-generated on first run
+# (Docker: the secrets-init service writes it to a private volume and reuses it
+# across restarts). Set it explicitly only to pin your own value.
+# Generate one with: openssl rand -base64 64
+#JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here

 # Auth cookie Secure flag
 #   unset  - default: follows NODE_ENV (production=true, dev=false)
@@ -38,19 +41,28 @@ JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here
 # Database Configuration (PostgreSQL)
 DATABASE_CLIENT=pg
 DB_USER=picpeak
+# DB_PASSWORD — OPTIONAL. Leave unset and it is auto-generated on first run
+# (Docker). Set it explicitly to pin your own, e.g. for an external database.
 # IMPORTANT: Avoid $ character in passwords - Docker Compose interprets it as variable substitution
 # If you must use $, escape it as $$ (e.g., Pass$$word instead of Pass$word)
-DB_PASSWORD=your_secure_postgres_password_here
+#DB_PASSWORD=your_secure_postgres_password_here
 DB_NAME=picpeak_prod

 # Redis Configuration
+# REDIS_PASSWORD — OPTIONAL. Leave unset and it is auto-generated on first run (Docker).
 # IMPORTANT: Same warning applies - avoid $ or escape as $$
-REDIS_PASSWORD=your_secure_redis_password_here
+#REDIS_PASSWORD=your_secure_redis_password_here

-# Admin Account (initial setup)
-ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
-ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@yourdomain.com
-ADMIN_PASSWORD=your_secure_admin_password_here
+# Admin Account (initial setup) — OPTIONAL
+# Leave these unset (default) to create your admin IN THE BROWSER on first run:
+# open /admin and PicPeak shows a setup screen. The one-time setup token is
+# printed to the backend logs (`docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`)
+# and saved to data/SETUP_TOKEN.
+# Set ADMIN_PASSWORD to auto-create the admin on first boot instead (legacy;
+# credentials written to data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt).
+#ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
+#ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@yourdomain.com
+#ADMIN_PASSWORD=your_secure_admin_password_here

 # Email Configuration
 # For Gmail: use app-specific password
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# These are supported funding model platforms
+# https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/displaying-a-sponsor-button-in-your-repository
+
+buy_me_a_coffee: theluap
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 blank_issues_enabled: false
 contact_links:
  - name: 📚 Documentation
-    url: https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/blob/main/DEPLOYMENT.md
+    url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/blob/main/DEPLOYMENT.md
    about: Please read the documentation before opening an issue
  - name: 💬 Discussions
-    url: https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/discussions
+    url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions
    about: Ask questions and discuss with the community
  - name: 🔒 Security Issues
-    url: https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/blob/main/SECURITY.md
+    url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/blob/main/SECURITY.md
    about: Please review our security policy for reporting vulnerabilities
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ assignees: ''

 ⚠️ **IMPORTANT: For serious security vulnerabilities, please DO NOT create a public issue.**

-Instead, please use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/security/advisories/new) or email **info@picpeak.app** with the details.
+Instead, please use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new) or email **info@picpeak.app** with the details.

 For minor security improvements or questions, you can use this template:

@@ -42,16 +42,16 @@ Once published, images can be pulled using:

 ```bash
 # Pull backend image
-docker pull ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:latest
+docker pull ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:latest

 # Pull frontend image
-docker pull ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/frontend:latest
+docker pull ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/frontend:latest

 # Pull specific version
-docker pull ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:v1.0.0
+docker pull ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:v1.0.0

 # Pull for specific architecture
-docker pull --platform linux/arm64 ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:latest
+docker pull --platform linux/arm64 ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:latest
 ```

 ### Using in Docker Compose
@@ -61,14 +61,14 @@ version: '3.8'

 services:
  backend:
-    image: ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:latest
+    image: ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:latest
    environment:
      - NODE_ENV=production
    ports:
      - "3001:3000"

  frontend:
-    image: ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/frontend:latest
+    image: ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/frontend:latest
    ports:
      - "80:80"
 ```
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ spec:
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: backend
-        image: ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:latest
+        image: ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:latest
        imagePullPolicy: Always
 ```

@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ If images aren't visible after successful push:
 ### View Packages

 Your Docker images are available at:
- Backend: `https://github.com/users/the-luap/packages/container/package/picpeak%2Fbackend`
- Frontend: `https://github.com/users/the-luap/packages/container/package/picpeak%2Ffrontend`
+- Backend: `https://github.com/orgs/PicPeak/packages/container/package/picpeak%2Fbackend`
+- Frontend: `https://github.com/orgs/PicPeak/packages/container/package/picpeak%2Ffrontend`

 ### Delete Old Versions

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+name: Bypass size gate
+
+# Caps how large a PR a "review-bypass" collaborator (e.g. @Luca-Timo) can
+# self-merge without a maintainer review. The branch-protection bypass list
+# alone is binary — once a user is on it they can merge anything without
+# review. This workflow reports a REQUIRED status check that fails when a
+# bypass user's PR exceeds the configured size threshold, which blocks the
+# merge even with bypass enabled. Other contributors are unaffected (the
+# check reports success for them so the required-check gate doesn't trip).
+#
+# To tune: edit LINE_LIMIT or BYPASS_USERS below.
+#
+# Trigger note: uses `pull_request_target` so the workflow has the elevated
+# permissions of the base repo's GITHUB_TOKEN (read PR metadata, write
+# checks). The script never executes code FROM the PR — it only reads
+# metadata via the API — so this is safe against fork-PR attacks.
+
+on:
+  pull_request_target:
+    types: [opened, reopened, synchronize, ready_for_review]
+
+permissions:
+  pull-requests: read
+  checks: write
+
+jobs:
+  size-gate:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Compute PR size and report check status
+        uses: actions/github-script@v7
+        with:
+          script: |
+            // Tune these two constants if the policy shifts.
+            const LINE_LIMIT = 300;
+            const BYPASS_USERS = ['Luca-Timo'];
+
+            const pr = context.payload.pull_request;
+            const author = pr.user.login;
+            const linesChanged = pr.additions + pr.deletions;
+            const filesChanged = pr.changed_files;
+
+            let conclusion, title, summary;
+
+            if (!BYPASS_USERS.includes(author)) {
+              // Not a bypass user — this gate doesn't apply to them. They
+              // go through normal review. Report success so the required
+              // check doesn't block their merge.
+              conclusion = 'success';
+              title = 'Not applicable';
+              summary = `This gate only restricts review-bypass for: ${BYPASS_USERS.join(', ')}. PRs from other authors (${author} here) go through the normal review path and are unaffected.`;
+            } else if (linesChanged <= LINE_LIMIT) {
+              conclusion = 'success';
+              title = `OK — within bypass limit (${linesChanged} lines)`;
+              summary = `Small PR: ${linesChanged} lines changed across ${filesChanged} file(s). Within the ${LINE_LIMIT}-line self-merge limit for @${author}. Can be merged without a maintainer review.`;
+            } else {
+              conclusion = 'failure';
+              title = `Too large for bypass (${linesChanged} lines)`;
+              summary = `Large PR: ${linesChanged} lines changed across ${filesChanged} file(s). Exceeds the ${LINE_LIMIT}-line self-merge limit for @${author} — needs an approving review from a maintainer before merge. Split into smaller PRs or wait for review.`;
+            }
+
+            await github.rest.checks.create({
+              owner: context.repo.owner,
+              repo: context.repo.repo,
+              name: 'bypass-size-gate',
+              head_sha: pr.head.sha,
+              status: 'completed',
+              conclusion,
+              output: { title, summary }
+            });
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 name: Build and Push Docker Images

 # This workflow is triggered by:
-# - Push to main/beta branches (builds 'latest'/'stable' or 'beta' tagged images)
+# - Push to main/stable branches (main → ':main' rolling tag for active-dev
+#   builds; stable → ':stable' + ':latest' for the curated channel)
 # - Version tags from Release Please (e.g., v1.2.0 -> builds versioned images)
 # - GitHub Releases (created by Release Please)
 # - Pull requests (build verification only, no push by default)
@@ -20,10 +21,10 @@ name: Build and Push Docker Images

 on:
  push:
-    branches: [ main, beta ]
+    branches: [ main, stable ]
    tags: [ 'v*.*.*', 'v*.*.*-beta.*' ]  # Triggered by Release Please tags (stable and beta)
  pull_request:
-    branches: [ main, beta ]
+    branches: [ main, stable ]
  release:
    types: [ published ]  # Triggered when Release Please creates a release
  workflow_dispatch:
@@ -37,6 +38,16 @@ on:
          - 'true'
          - 'false'

+# Once release-please authors releases with a PAT (#719), a new version fires
+# BOTH the tag-push and the release-published triggers (GITHUB_TOKEN used to
+# suppress them). They build the same immutable version, so collapse them into a
+# single run by grouping on the ref. Branch and PR builds use different refs and
+# still run independently; a superseding push cancels an in-flight run for the
+# same ref (only the newest build per ref is kept).
+concurrency:
+  group: docker-build-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
 env:
  REGISTRY: ghcr.io
  # BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME and FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME are computed per job in the
@@ -245,7 +256,9 @@ jobs:
    - name: Determine build context
      id: context
      run: |
-        if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/tags/v*-beta* ]] || [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/heads/beta ]]; then
+        if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/tags/v*-beta* ]] || [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/heads/main ]]; then
+          # Active-dev branch (`main`, renamed from `beta` per #669) produces
+          # prereleases; the `-beta.N` version-suffix scheme is unchanged.
          echo "channel=beta" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
          echo "is_prerelease=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
        else
@@ -270,9 +283,14 @@ jobs:
          type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
          type=semver,pattern={{major}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
          type=sha,format=short
-          type=raw,value=latest,enable={{is_default_branch}}
-          type=raw,value=stable,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
-          type=raw,value=beta,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/beta' || steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'true' }}
+          # `:latest` + `:stable` follow the stable channel (the `stable` branch +
+          # stable release tags). The default branch is now `main` (active dev),
+          # so `is_default_branch` no longer maps to "stable" — be explicit.
+          type=raw,value=latest,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/stable' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
+          type=raw,value=stable,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/stable' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
+          # `:beta` is RETIRED post-rename (Option B / #669). Active-dev pulls
+          # are `:main` (auto via type=ref,event=branch). The pre-rename `:beta`
+          # tag remains frozen at its last build — operators should update.

    - name: Create and push multi-arch manifest
      working-directory: /tmp/digests
@@ -455,7 +473,9 @@ jobs:
    - name: Determine build context
      id: context
      run: |
-        if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/tags/v*-beta* ]] || [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/heads/beta ]]; then
+        if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/tags/v*-beta* ]] || [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/heads/main ]]; then
+          # Active-dev branch (`main`, renamed from `beta` per #669) produces
+          # prereleases; the `-beta.N` version-suffix scheme is unchanged.
          echo "channel=beta" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
          echo "is_prerelease=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
        else
@@ -480,9 +500,14 @@ jobs:
          type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
          type=semver,pattern={{major}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
          type=sha,format=short
-          type=raw,value=latest,enable={{is_default_branch}}
-          type=raw,value=stable,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
-          type=raw,value=beta,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/beta' || steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'true' }}
+          # `:latest` + `:stable` follow the stable channel (the `stable` branch +
+          # stable release tags). The default branch is now `main` (active dev),
+          # so `is_default_branch` no longer maps to "stable" — be explicit.
+          type=raw,value=latest,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/stable' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
+          type=raw,value=stable,enable=${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/stable' || (startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false') }}
+          # `:beta` is RETIRED post-rename (Option B / #669). Active-dev pulls
+          # are `:main` (auto via type=ref,event=branch). The pre-rename `:beta`
+          # tag remains frozen at its last build — operators should update.

    - name: Create and push multi-arch manifest
      working-directory: /tmp/digests
@@ -16,24 +16,17 @@ name: Fresh-install smoke
 # don't pay the build cost.

 on:
+  # No `paths:` filter — branch protection on `main` + `stable` lists
+  # `fresh-install` as a REQUIRED check, and a path-filtered trigger
+  # that skipped on unrelated PRs (e.g. frontend-only) would leave the
+  # required check "missing" forever and block the merge. Better to
+  # pay the boot cost on every PR than maintain a per-path allowlist
+  # that drifts as the install surface evolves. (Branches also updated
+  # post-#669 rename: beta → main, old main → stable.)
  push:
-    branches: [main, beta]
-    paths:
-      - 'backend/Dockerfile'
-      - 'backend/wait-for-db.sh'
-      - 'backend/migrations/**'
-      - 'backend/package*.json'
-      - 'docker-compose.production.yml'
-      - '.github/workflows/install-smoke.yml'
+    branches: [main, stable]
  pull_request:
-    branches: [main, beta]
-    paths:
-      - 'backend/Dockerfile'
-      - 'backend/wait-for-db.sh'
-      - 'backend/migrations/**'
-      - 'backend/package*.json'
-      - 'docker-compose.production.yml'
-      - '.github/workflows/install-smoke.yml'
+    branches: [main, stable]
  workflow_dispatch:

 permissions:
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+name: PR Title Lint
+
+# Release Please derives version bumps and the changelog from Conventional
+# Commit prefixes (feat:, fix:, ...). PRs whose title/commits use other
+# conventions (e.g. gitmoji) are silently ignored, so their changes ship
+# without a version bump or a changelog entry. This check fails a PR whose
+# title is not a valid Conventional Commit so the release stays automated.
+
+on:
+  pull_request_target:
+    types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened]
+
+permissions:
+  pull-requests: read
+
+jobs:
+  lint-pr-title:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Validate PR title is a Conventional Commit
+        uses: amannn/action-semantic-pull-request@v5
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        with:
+          types: |
+            feat
+            fix
+            perf
+            revert
+            docs
+            style
+            chore
+            refactor
+            test
+            build
+            ci
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: Release Please (Beta)

 on:
  push:
-    branches: [beta]
+    branches: [main]

 permissions:
  contents: write
@@ -20,10 +20,48 @@ jobs:
        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@v4
        id: release
        with:
-          token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          # A dedicated token (fine-grained PAT) makes the release PR run CI
+          # automatically (no "workflows awaiting approval") and lets it be
+          # merged without a manual review. Falls back to GITHUB_TOKEN so the
+          # workflow still works before the secret is added (#719).
+          token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          config-file: release-please-config-beta.json
          manifest-file: .release-please-manifest-beta.json
-          target-branch: beta
+          target-branch: main
+
+      # Auto-approve + enable auto-merge on the open release PR so betas publish
+      # with no manual clicks. Approval uses GITHUB_TOKEN (github-actions[bot]) —
+      # a different identity than the PR author (RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN) — so it is
+      # a valid review (requires the org's "Allow GitHub Actions to approve pull
+      # requests" + the repo's "Allow auto-merge"). Only meaningful when a PAT is
+      # set: without it the PR is bot-authored and can't be self-approved, so we
+      # skip and leave today's manual flow. Best-effort — never blocks the run.
+      - name: Auto-approve and enable auto-merge on the release PR
+        if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created != 'true' }}
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
+          # This job has no checkout, so gh can't infer the repo from a git
+          # remote — set it explicitly (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
+          GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
+            echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping auto-merge (manual review still required)."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          pr=$(gh pr list --head release-please--branches--main --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number // empty')
+          if [ -n "$pr" ]; then
+            # Approve as github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN) — a different identity
+            # than the PR author (the PAT) — so it counts as a valid review.
+            gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — release-please version bump + changelog (#719)." || true
+            # Enable auto-merge as the PAT so the eventual merge commit is
+            # attributed to a real identity. If enabled via GITHUB_TOKEN the merge
+            # push is suppressed by recursion prevention and the follow-up run that
+            # cuts the tag/release never fires (#719).
+            GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto || true
+          else
+            echo "No open release PR to auto-merge."
+          fi

      - name: Output Release Info
        if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
@@ -35,3 +73,16 @@ jobs:
          echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
          echo "Docker images will be built and tagged with this beta version." >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY

+  # Best-effort "What's New" highlights on the freshly-created release. Runs in
+  # this same workflow run (not a `release:` trigger) because release-please
+  # creates the release with GITHUB_TOKEN, which never starts new workflow runs.
+  whatsnew:
+    needs: release-please
+    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created }}
+    permissions:
+      contents: write   # edit the release body
+      models: read       # GitHub Models (free tier)
+    uses: ./.github/workflows/whatsnew-highlights.yml
+    with:
+      tag: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: Release Please

 on:
  push:
-    branches: [main]
+    branches: [stable]

 permissions:
  contents: write
@@ -20,9 +20,39 @@ jobs:
        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@v4
        id: release
        with:
-          token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          # Dedicated token so the release PR runs CI + can auto-merge without a
+          # manual review. Falls back to GITHUB_TOKEN before the secret is set (#719).
+          token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          config-file: release-please-config.json
          manifest-file: .release-please-manifest.json
+          target-branch: stable
+
+      # Auto-approve + auto-merge the open stable release PR. See the beta
+      # workflow for the full rationale. Skipped on the release-cutting run and
+      # whenever no PAT is configured.
+      - name: Auto-approve and enable auto-merge on the release PR
+        if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created != 'true' }}
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
+          # No checkout in this job — set the repo explicitly so gh works
+          # without a git remote (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
+          GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
+            echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping auto-merge (manual review still required)."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          pr=$(gh pr list --head release-please--branches--stable --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number // empty')
+          if [ -n "$pr" ]; then
+            # Approve as github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN, ≠ the PAT author) so it
+            # is a valid review; enable auto-merge as the PAT so the merge commit is
+            # attributed to a real identity and triggers the tag-cutting run (#719).
+            gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — release-please version bump + changelog (#719)." || true
+            GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto || true
+          else
+            echo "No open release PR to auto-merge."
+          fi

      - name: Output Release Info
        if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
@@ -34,3 +64,16 @@ jobs:
          echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
          echo "Docker images will be built and tagged with this version." >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY

+  # Best-effort "What's New" highlights on the freshly-created release. Runs in
+  # this same workflow run (not a `release:` trigger) because release-please
+  # creates the release with GITHUB_TOKEN, which never starts new workflow runs.
+  whatsnew:
+    needs: release-please
+    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created }}
+    permissions:
+      contents: write   # edit the release body
+      models: read       # GitHub Models (free tier)
+    uses: ./.github/workflows/whatsnew-highlights.yml
+    with:
+      tag: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+
@@ -30,20 +30,17 @@ name: Schema drift (#530)
 # the same shape is caught before merge.

 on:
+  # No `paths:` filter — branch protection on `main` + `stable` lists
+  # `upgrade-from-bootstrap` as a REQUIRED check. A path-filtered
+  # trigger that skipped on unrelated PRs would leave the required
+  # check "missing" forever, blocking every PR that doesn't touch
+  # migrations. The ~75-second cost on every PR buys an unconditional
+  # safety net. (Branches also updated post-#669 rename: beta → main,
+  # old main → stable.)
  push:
-    branches: [main, beta]
-    paths:
-      - 'backend/migrations/**'
-      - 'backend/src/database/db.js'
-      - 'backend/knexfile.js'
-      - '.github/workflows/schema-drift.yml'
+    branches: [main, stable]
  pull_request:
-    branches: [main, beta]
-    paths:
-      - 'backend/migrations/**'
-      - 'backend/src/database/db.js'
-      - 'backend/knexfile.js'
-      - '.github/workflows/schema-drift.yml'
+    branches: [main, stable]
  workflow_dispatch:

 permissions:
@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ name: Tests

 on:
  push:
-    branches: [main, beta]
+    branches: [main, beta, stable]
  pull_request:
-    branches: [main, beta]
+    branches: [main, beta, stable]
  workflow_dispatch:

 permissions:
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# What's New highlights — GitHub Models release step (reusable)
+#
+# Called by the release-please workflows AFTER a release is created
+# (release-please.yml for `stable`, release-please-beta.yml for `main`). It runs
+# as a job in the SAME workflow run rather than on its own `release: published`
+# trigger, because release-please creates the release with the default
+# GITHUB_TOKEN and GitHub does not start new workflow runs from token-generated
+# events — a standalone `release:` workflow would simply never fire.
+#
+# What it does: condenses the new release's "### Features" into <=8 short
+# bullets via GitHub Models (free tier, `models: read`) and injects a
+# `<!-- whatsnew -->` block at the top of the release notes. The app reads that
+# block (backend utils/whatsNew.parseWhatsNew) and falls back to the raw
+# Features list for releases without it — so this is purely a quality upgrade,
+# never a hard dependency. Failure is isolated by `continue-on-error` + the
+# deterministic fallback below, so it can never break a release.
+#
+# GitHub Models is OPTIONAL. If it is disabled/unavailable for the org the AI
+# step fails soft (continue-on-error) and the deterministic fallback produces
+# the bullets instead — the feature works either way, Models just polishes them.
+#
+# Validated end-to-end on a fork (extract -> openai/gpt-4o-mini -> inject into
+# real release notes; app parseWhatsNew() reads the block back).
+
+name: What's New highlights
+
+on:
+  workflow_call:
+    inputs:
+      tag:
+        description: Release tag to annotate (e.g. v2.3.0)
+        required: true
+        type: string
+
+jobs:
+  highlights:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: write   # to edit the release body
+      models: read      # GitHub Models (free tier)
+    # GH_REPO at job scope so every `gh` call targets the right repo without
+    # needing an actions/checkout step. Without this, `gh` falls back to
+    # parsing `.git/config` in the runner's empty workspace and dies with
+    # "fatal: not a git repository" — which hard-fails the whole job before
+    # any continue-on-error can save it.
+    env:
+      GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+    steps:
+      - name: Extract Features from the published release
+        id: feat
+        # Belt-and-braces: the job-level comment says "never let highlights
+        # break a release", but the original wiring only marked the AI +
+        # inject steps as continue-on-error. A hiccup here (rate limit,
+        # transient API error) would still hard-fail the job. Match the
+        # design intent and fail soft.
+        continue-on-error: true
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
+        run: |
+          BODY=$(gh release view "$TAG" --json body -q .body)
+          FEATURES=$(printf '%s\n' "$BODY" | awk '/^#{2,4} +Features/{f=1;next} /^#{1,4} +\S/{f=0} f')
+          { echo "features<<EOF"; printf '%s\n' "$FEATURES"; echo EOF; } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Summarize with GitHub Models
+        if: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features != '' }}
+        id: ai
+        continue-on-error: true   # Models may be disabled/unavailable for the org; fall back deterministically below
+        uses: actions/ai-inference@v1
+        with:
+          model: openai/gpt-4o-mini   # catalog id (verified present); openai/gpt-4.1-mini or openai/gpt-5-nano also work
+          system-prompt: >
+            You write release highlights for the admins of a self-hosted
+            photo-gallery + CRM app. Given raw changelog "Features" lines, output
+            AT MOST 8 markdown bullets, each 3-4 words, user-facing, no scopes,
+            no jargon, no issue numbers. One bullet per distinct user-visible
+            feature. Output ONLY "- " bullets, nothing else.
+          prompt: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features }}
+
+      - name: Inject the What's New block
+        if: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features != '' }}
+        continue-on-error: true   # never let highlights break a release
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
+          AI: ${{ steps.ai.outputs.response }}
+          FEATURES: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features }}
+        run: |
+          BULLETS="$AI"
+          # Deterministic fallback if the model returned nothing (e.g. Models not yet enabled).
+          if [ -z "$BULLETS" ]; then
+            BULLETS=$(printf '%s\n' "$FEATURES" | head -8 \
+              | sed -E 's/^\* \*\*[^:]+:\*\* */- /; s/ \(\[[^]]*\]\([^)]*\)\)//g')
+          fi
+          BODY=$(gh release view "$TAG" --json body -q .body)
+          # Idempotent: strip any prior block before re-injecting.
+          BODY=$(printf '%s' "$BODY" | perl -0pe 's/<!--\s*whatsnew\s*-->.*?<!--\s*\/whatsnew\s*-->\n*//is')
+          gh release edit "$TAG" --notes "$(printf '<!-- whatsnew -->\n%s\n<!-- /whatsnew -->\n\n%s' "$BULLETS" "$BODY")"
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "3.71.2-beta.0"
+  ".": "3.83.0-beta.0"
 }
@@ -1,3 +1 @@
-{
-  ".": "2.6.1"
-}
+{".":"3.45.7"}
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ We are committed to providing a welcoming and inspiring community for all photog

 ## Enforcement

-Instances of unacceptable behavior may be reported by [opening an issue](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues/new?labels=conduct) on GitHub. All complaints will be reviewed and investigated promptly and fairly.
+Instances of unacceptable behavior may be reported by [opening an issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=conduct) on GitHub. All complaints will be reviewed and investigated promptly and fairly.

 ## Attribution

@@ -33,12 +33,12 @@ Enhancement suggestions are tracked as GitHub issues. When creating an enhanceme

 Unsure where to begin? You can start by looking through these issues:

-* [Good first issues](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/labels/good%20first%20issue) - issues which should only require a few lines of code
-* [Help wanted issues](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/labels/help%20wanted) - issues which need extra attention
+* [Good first issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/labels/good%20first%20issue) - issues which should only require a few lines of code
+* [Help wanted issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/labels/help%20wanted) - issues which need extra attention

 ### Pull Requests

-1. **Fork the repo** and create your branch from `beta`
+1. **Fork the repo** and create your branch from `main` (active development)
 2. **Install dependencies**:
   ```bash
   cd backend && npm install
@@ -50,7 +50,10 @@ Unsure where to begin? You can start by looking through these issues:
   - Linting passes: `npm run lint`
 4. **Write tests** if you've added code
 5. **Update documentation** if needed
-6. **Create a Pull Request**
+6. **Attach a screenshot for any UI change** (see below)
+7. **Create a Pull Request**
+
+> **📸 Screenshots are required for UI changes.** Any PR that changes a user-facing surface — a component, page, layout, style, or in-app copy — must include at least one screenshot of the result in the PR description, showing before/after where it helps reviewers see the difference. PRs that touch the UI without a screenshot will be asked to add one before review. Backend-only or otherwise non-visual changes don't need one.

 ## 💻 Development Setup

@@ -153,16 +156,37 @@ picpeak/
 │   └── public/          # Static assets
 ```

+## 🌿 Branch model
+
+PicPeak runs on two long-lived branches:
+
+| Branch | Role | What targets it |
+|---|---|---|
+| **`main`** | Active development. The next release is being assembled here. | Feature PRs. Most bugfix PRs. |
+| **`stable`** | Curated release channel. Production-recommended. | Urgent bugfix backports only — small, surgical PRs that land cleanly without dragging in unrelated changes. |
+
+### Which branch should my PR target?
+
+- **New feature** → target `main`.
+- **Bugfix that ONLY affects active dev** → target `main`.
+- **Bugfix that current stable users need** → open a small PR against `main`, AND a separate small PR against `stable` with the same change. Keep both surgical so each lands cleanly.
+
+**Hard rule on PR scope**: bugfix PRs against `stable` must be small enough to backport without conflict. Omnibus PRs (e.g. five unrelated sub-features) are fine for `main`, but never for `stable` — they make the next `main → stable` merge painful and break the "stable is always shippable" invariant.
+
+If you're not sure which branch to target, default to `main` and a maintainer will retarget during review.
+
 ## 🔄 Release Process

-Releases are cut from the `beta` branch (rolling beta) and promoted to `main` (stable) on a 4–6 week cadence. `release-please` handles version bumps, changelog generation, and Docker image publication automatically — contributors don't update `package.json` or `CHANGELOG.md` by hand.
+Releases are cut independently from `main` (pre-release versions for the active channel) and `stable` (semver releases for the curated channel). `release-please` handles version bumps, changelog generation, and Docker image publication automatically — contributors don't update `package.json` or `CHANGELOG.md` by hand.

-See [RELEASING.md](RELEASING.md) for the full operational doc (promotion criteria, conflict-resolution checklist for the beta→main merge, hotfix backport path, versioning rules).
+Periodic `main → stable` merges promote a batch of `main` work to the stable channel. The maintainer chooses when (typically every ~4 weeks, sooner if a hot bug demands it).
+
+See [RELEASING.md](RELEASING.md) for the full operational doc (promotion criteria, conflict-resolution checklist for the `main → stable` merge, hotfix backport path, versioning rules).

 ## 📮 Contact

- Create an [issue](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues) for bugs or features
- Join [discussions](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/discussions) for questions
- Security issues: Open a [security issue](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub
+- Create an [issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) for bugs or features
+- Join [discussions](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions) for questions
+- Security issues: Open a [security issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub

 Thank you for contributing! 🎉
@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
 # 📸 PicPeak - Open Source Photo Sharing for Events

+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **PicPeak has moved to its own GitHub organization.**
+>
+> - **Docker images** are now published at `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/{backend,frontend}`. The old path (`ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/...`) is no longer served — update your `docker-compose.yml`.
+> - **Branches**: active development is now on `main` (was `beta`); the curated stable channel is now `stable` (was `main`). Existing PRs and clones auto-redirect via GitHub.
+>
+> See **[`docs/migration-to-org.md`](docs/migration-to-org.md)** for the one-line `docker-compose.yml` edit and full details.
+
 <div align="center">
  <img src="docs/picpeak-logo.png" alt="PicPeak Logo" width="300" />
  
@@ -83,21 +91,34 @@ Get PicPeak running in under 5 minutes:

 ```bash
 # Clone the repository
-git clone https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak.git
+git clone https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak.git
 cd picpeak

-# Copy environment template
+# Copy the environment template — the defaults work out of the box.
+# Machine secrets (JWT, DB, Redis) are auto-generated on first run, and the
+# admin account is created in the browser (see below). Edit .env only to
+# customise (domain, SMTP, storage paths, …) — nothing is required.
 cp .env.example .env

-# Edit configuration (required: JWT_SECRET)
-nano .env
-
 # Start with Docker Compose
 docker compose up -d

 # Access at http://localhost:3000
 ```

+### First run — create your admin account
+
+On first start with no `ADMIN_PASSWORD` set, PicPeak has **no admin account yet** and greets you with an in-browser setup screen — no credentials in `.env`:
+
+1. Open **http://localhost:3000/admin** — you'll be redirected to `/setup`.
+2. Grab the **one-time setup token** from the backend logs (it's also saved to `data/SETUP_TOKEN`):
+   ```bash
+   docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"
+   ```
+3. Paste the token, set your admin **email + password**, and you're in. The token is single-use, and the setup screen closes permanently once an admin exists.
+
+> Prefer the old behaviour? Set `ADMIN_PASSWORD` in `.env` and PicPeak auto-creates the admin on first boot instead (credentials written to `data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt`).
+
 Note on Docker file permissions
 - The backend container starts as root, chowns bind-mounted host directories (`./storage`, `./data`, `./logs`) to UID 1001 (`nodejs`), then drops privileges via `su-exec` before running the app. No host-side setup needed for fresh installs.
 - If you pin `user:` in a compose override (e.g. to map a specific host UID), the self-chown is skipped and you must pre-chown the host directories to that UID — see [docs.picpeak.app/deployment/docker#permissions](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/docker#permissions).
@@ -370,17 +391,23 @@ See our [Contributing Guide](CONTRIBUTING.md) for details.

 ## 📊 Comparison with Alternatives

-| Feature | PicPeak | PicDrop | Scrapbook.de |
-|---------|---------|---------|--------------|
-| Self-Hosted | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
-| Custom Branding | ✅ Full | Limited | Limited |
-| Monthly Cost | $0 | $29-199 | €19-99 |
-| Storage Limit | Unlimited* | 50-500GB | 100-1000GB |
-| Client Uploads | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
-| API Access | ✅ | Paid | ❌ |
-| Open Source | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
+| Feature | PicPeak | PicDrop | Scrapbook.de | Pixieset |
+|---------|---------|---------|--------------|----------|
+| Self-Hosted | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
+| Custom Branding | ✅ Full | Limited | Limited | ✅ (paid) |
+| Monthly Cost | $0* | $29-199 | €19-99 | ~$60 |
+| Storage Limit | Unlimited** | 50-500GB | 100-1000GB | 3GB–Unlimited*** |
+| Client Uploads | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Limited |
+| API Access | ✅ | Paid | ❌ | ❌ |
+| Open Source | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
+| Customer Accounts | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
+| Quotes / Contracts / Invoices | 🧪 Beta | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
+| Incoming Invoices & Accounting | 🧪 Beta | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |

-*Limited only by your server storage
+*You still bring your own server (own hardware or a VPS) and, if you want one, a domain.
+**Limited only by your server storage.
+***Pixieset's "unlimited" is photos only; video is capped by plan (roughly 0–10 h depending on tier).
+🧪 Beta = built but feature-flagged off by default (see [Beta Features](#-beta-features-use-at-your-own-risk)).

 ## 🛡️ Security

@@ -392,7 +419,7 @@ PicPeak takes security seriously:
 - 📝 Activity logging
 - 🔒 Secure file access

-Found a security issue? Please open a [security issue](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub
+Found a security issue? Please open a [security issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub

 ## 📸 Screenshots

@@ -476,6 +503,7 @@ PicPeak is inspired by the best features of commercial platforms while remaining

 A huge thank you to the people whose code, reports, and feedback have shaped PicPeak:

+- [**@the-luap**](https://github.com/the-luap) — creator and lead maintainer. Started the project and built PicPeak's foundation and the entire gallery experience (events, galleries, uploads, sharing, download protection, templates), plus backup & restore, analytics, system health, branding/theming, and WhatsApp notifications — and the architecture every later feature builds on.
 - [**@Luca-Timo**](https://github.com/Luca-Timo) — native Apple Silicon multi-arch images, external-URL toggle for legal CMS pages, the lazy-loaded folder tree picker, the admin-email picker on event creation, the data-driven self-hosted webfont system, the gallery header/banner decoupling, several typed-API refactors, and the CRM + accounting suite (quotes/contracts/invoices, hours logging, calendar, tax report, inbound supplier-invoice capture, expenses, and the Treuhänder/Banana export). Consistently raises the bar with thoughtful PRs.
 - [**@Rekoo-PS**](https://github.com/Rekoo-PS) — sharp-eyed bug reporter and product feedback. Filed the issues that drove the login-loop fix, the gallery-loading skeleton work, the redirection cleanup, the mobile-lightbox overhaul, the admin-events search-counter fix, the photo-count column, and the bulk-delete workflow. Also a [BuyMeACoffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap) supporter — the kind of feedback loop that keeps the project useful for real deployments.

@@ -537,7 +565,7 @@ PicPeak is released under the [MIT License](LICENSE). Use it freely for personal
  <br>
  <a href="https://www.picpeak.app">Homepage</a> •
  <a href="https://demo.picpeak.app">Live Demo</a> •
-  <a href="https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak">GitHub</a> •
+  <a href="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak">GitHub</a> •
  <a href="https://docs.picpeak.app">Documentation</a> •
-  <a href="https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues">Support</a>
+  <a href="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues">Support</a>
 </p>
@@ -1,74 +1,76 @@
 # Release Process

-This document describes how PicPeak releases are cut. It's the maintainer's reference, not user documentation — for the user-facing channel choice (stable vs beta) see the [Release Channels section in README.md](README.md#-release-channels).
+This document describes how PicPeak releases are cut. It's the maintainer's reference, not user documentation — for the user-facing channel choice (stable vs pre-release) see the [Release Channels section in README.md](README.md#-release-channels).

 ## TL;DR

- **`beta` branch** receives all merged work. Every push triggers a `release-please` PR that proposes the next `vX.Y.Z-beta.N` release. Merging that PR tags the beta and publishes Docker images on the `beta` tag.
- **`main` branch** holds the stable channel. Stable releases are cut from a known-good `beta` point via a `release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-beta` branch and a manual PR to `main`. Merging that PR triggers `release-please` to propose the stable release.
- Target cadence: **a stable release every 4–6 weeks**, or sooner if a beta has been quiet and ready for promotion.
+- **`main` branch** receives all merged work (active development). Every push triggers a `release-please` PR that proposes the next `vX.Y.Z-beta.N` pre-release. Merging that PR tags the pre-release and publishes Docker images under the `:main` rolling tag + the version-specific tag.
+- **`stable` branch** holds the curated stable channel. Stable releases are cut from a known-good `main` point via a `release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-main` branch and a manual PR to `stable`. Merging that PR triggers `release-please` to propose the stable release.
+- Target cadence: **a stable release every 4–6 weeks**, or sooner if `main` has been quiet and ready for promotion.
+
+> **Branch model background** — `main` (active dev) was previously called `beta`, and `stable` (curated channel) was previously called `main`. The rename happened with #669 to match the convention every other open-source project uses. The mechanics below all reference the post-rename names.

 ## Cadence target

 4–6 weeks between stable releases is the working target. Reasoning:

 - Long enough that each stable carries meaningful changes worth the upgrade burden.
- Short enough that beta users aren't carrying the "real" project alone for months — the stable channel should actually be usable as the recommended channel for new installs.
- Aligns with how release-please surfaces beta releases (multiple beta points usually accumulate inside a 4–6 week window, which gives natural promotion candidates).
+- Short enough that pre-release users aren't carrying the "real" project alone for months — the stable channel should actually be usable as the recommended channel for new installs.
+- Aligns with how release-please surfaces pre-releases (multiple pre-release points usually accumulate inside a 4–6 week window, which gives natural promotion candidates).

-This is a target, not a hard rule. Cut sooner if a beta has been quiet and stable longer than usual. Cut later if a beta is in flux for security or migration reasons.
+This is a target, not a hard rule. Cut sooner if `main` has been quiet and stable longer than usual. Cut later if `main` is in flux for security or migration reasons.

 ## Promotion criteria

-A beta is eligible for promotion to stable when **all** of the following hold:
+A `main` tip is eligible for promotion to `stable` when **all** of the following hold:

-1. **CI green on the candidate beta tip.** Specifically: `schema-drift` (`upgrade-from-bootstrap`), `fresh-install`, `Tests` (backend Jest + frontend Vitest), the four `Build and Push Docker Images` arch matrices, and `GitGuardian Security Checks`.
-2. **No open `bug`-labelled issues against the candidate beta for at least 7 days.** Issues fixed-but-not-yet-closed count as fixed; verify their PR is in the candidate beta before closing them out.
+1. **CI green on the candidate `main` tip.** Specifically: `schema-drift` (`upgrade-from-bootstrap`), `fresh-install`, `Tests` (backend Jest + frontend Vitest), the four `Build and Push Docker Images` arch matrices, and `GitGuardian Security Checks`.
+2. **No open `bug`-labelled issues against the candidate for at least 7 days.** Issues fixed-but-not-yet-closed count as fixed; verify their PR is in the candidate `main` tip before closing them out.
 3. **An upgrade walk has been done on real production-shaped data** — apply the candidate's migration chain to a snapshot of the previous stable's DB and verify no manual intervention is required. CI proves fresh-install works; the upgrade walk is what proves the upgrade path works.
 4. **Operator-time smoke** on the candidate: log in, create event, upload photos, share gallery, open as a customer, log out. Catches binary-incompatibility regressions and UI-level breaks that unit tests don't see.

-If any of the four fail, the promotion waits. File any blockers as `bug`-labelled issues and let them bake on beta before re-evaluating.
+If any of the four fail, the promotion waits. File any blockers as `bug`-labelled issues and let them bake on `main` before re-evaluating.

 ## How a stable release is cut

 The actual mechanics, in order:

-1. **Pick the beta tip.** Confirm it satisfies the four promotion criteria above. Note the exact SHA — that's what you're promoting.
+1. **Pick the `main` tip.** Confirm it satisfies the four promotion criteria above. Note the exact SHA — that's what you're promoting.

-2. **Create the release branch from the beta tip.**
+2. **Create the release branch from the `main` tip.**
   ```bash
-   git push origin <beta-tip-sha>:refs/heads/release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-beta
+   git push origin <main-tip-sha>:refs/heads/release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-main
   ```
-   Naming convention: `release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-beta`, where `X.Y.Z` is the stable version you intend to land. release-please will write the actual `X.Y.Z` on merge — the branch name is just a human label.
+   Naming convention: `release/X.Y.Z-merge-from-main`, where `X.Y.Z` is the stable version you intend to land. release-please will write the actual `X.Y.Z` on merge — the branch name is just a human label.

-3. **Open a PR to `main`.** Title: `chore(release): promote beta → main as vX.Y.Z`. Body should summarise the major themes since the previous stable, the migration count, and any operator notes (e.g. "this release adds 22 migrations; existing installs should snapshot before upgrading"). See PR #568 as a worked example.
+3. **Open a PR to `stable`.** Title: `chore(release): promote main → stable as vX.Y.Z`. Body should summarise the major themes since the previous stable, the migration count, and any operator notes (e.g. "this release adds 22 migrations; existing installs should snapshot before upgrading"). See PR #568 as a worked example (predates the rename; the mechanics are unchanged).

-4. **Resolve conflicts.** Main almost always has commits beta doesn't (security backports, release-please's stable-channel release commits, README rewrites). For each conflicting file, decide deliberately:
-   - **`backend/package.json` / `package-lock.json` + `frontend/package.json` / `package-lock.json`** — usually take beta's version (superset), but verify any security-pinned deps (`axios`, `nodemailer`, `i18next-http-backend`, `multer`, `tar`) on beta are `>=` the pinned versions on main. If main has a newer pinned version (e.g. an emergency CVE backport beta hasn't picked up), take main's pin.
-   - **`README.md`** — keep main's version if main has had a recent rewrite that beta didn't pick up; otherwise take beta's.
-   - **`CHANGELOG.md`** — keep main's; release-please regenerates entries on its next stable cut from the commits going forward.
-   - **`.release-please-manifest.json`** — keep main's; release-please owns this file.
+4. **Resolve conflicts.** `stable` almost always has commits `main` doesn't (security backports, release-please's stable-channel release commits, README rewrites). For each conflicting file, decide deliberately:
+   - **`backend/package.json` / `package-lock.json` + `frontend/package.json` / `package-lock.json`** — usually take `main`'s version (superset), but verify any security-pinned deps (`axios`, `nodemailer`, `i18next-http-backend`, `multer`, `tar`) on `main` are `>=` the pinned versions on `stable`. If `stable` has a newer pinned version (e.g. an emergency CVE backport `main` hasn't picked up), take `stable`'s pin.
+   - **`README.md`** — keep `stable`'s version if it has had a recent rewrite that `main` didn't pick up; otherwise take `main`'s.
+   - **`CHANGELOG.md`** — keep `stable`'s; release-please regenerates entries on its next stable cut from the commits going forward.
+   - **`.release-please-manifest.json`** — keep `stable`'s; release-please owns this file.
   - Any other auto-merged file — spot-check that the auto-merge produced something sensible, especially for security-sensitive files (`backend/src/middleware/`, `backend/src/utils/tokenUtils.js`).

-5. **Wait for CI on the PR.** All ten checks (the original eight plus `merge-backend` and `merge-frontend`) must be green. If anything fails, fix on the release branch (NOT on beta — beta has already moved on).
+5. **Wait for CI on the PR.** All ten checks (the original eight plus `merge-backend` and `merge-frontend`) must be green. If anything fails, fix on the release branch (NOT on `main` — `main` has already moved on).

-6. **Merge.** Standard merge commit, not squash — the PR's history (the individual feature commits) carries forward into main's log.
+6. **Merge.** Standard merge commit, not squash — the PR's history (the individual feature commits) carries forward into `stable`'s log.

-7. **release-please picks it up.** Within minutes, release-please will open a new `chore(main): release X.Y.Z` PR proposing the stable release. Review the auto-generated CHANGELOG.md entries for accuracy, edit if needed, and merge. That merge creates the `vX.Y.Z` git tag, publishes Docker images on the `stable` and `latest` tags, and creates the GitHub Release page.
+7. **release-please picks it up.** Within minutes, release-please will open a new `chore(stable): release X.Y.Z` PR proposing the stable release. Review the auto-generated CHANGELOG.md entries for accuracy, edit if needed, and merge. That merge creates the `vX.Y.Z` git tag, publishes Docker images on the `:stable` and `:latest` tags, and creates the GitHub Release page.

 8. **Close the loop.** Bulk-close any `bug` issues that were fixed-but-not-closed and now appear in the released changelog. Reference the merge commit so reporters know which version contains the fix.

 ## Hotfix path (backport to current stable)

-If a critical bug or security issue affects the current stable and beta has moved too far for a full promotion to be appropriate, backport just the fix:
+If a critical bug or security issue affects the current stable and `main` has moved too far for a full promotion to be appropriate, backport just the fix:

-1. Create a `security/cve-backport-X.Y.Z` or `fix/critical-X.Y.Z` branch off `main`.
+1. Create a `security/cve-backport-X.Y.Z` or `fix/critical-X.Y.Z` branch off `stable`.
 2. Cherry-pick or hand-write the minimal fix.
-3. Open a PR to `main` with the smallest possible diff.
+3. Open a PR to `stable` with the smallest possible diff.
 4. After merge, release-please will propose a patch-level stable release (e.g. `v3.55.1`).
-5. **Forward-port the fix to beta** if it isn't already there. Otherwise the next full promotion will reintroduce the bug.
+5. **Forward-port the fix to `main`** if it isn't already there. Otherwise the next full promotion will reintroduce the bug.

-PR #412 ("backport 18 dependency CVE patches from beta") is a worked example of this path.
+PR #412 ("backport 18 dependency CVE patches from beta") is a worked example of this path (predates the rename; the mechanics are unchanged).

 ## Versioning

@@ -77,15 +79,15 @@ PicPeak follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/) with one project-spec
 - **MAJOR** bumps are reserved for breaking schema changes that require operator action on upgrade (e.g. a migration that's not safe to auto-apply, an env-var rename that can't be auto-detected).
 - **MINOR** bumps for new features, additive schema changes, and any change to the public HTTP API surface.
 - **PATCH** bumps for bug fixes and operator-invisible internal changes.
- **Beta suffix** (`-beta.N`) for every beta cut; the `N` counter resets on each new MINOR or MAJOR target.
+- **Pre-release suffix** (`-beta.N`) for every `main`-channel cut; the `N` counter resets on each new MINOR or MAJOR target. The suffix kept the historical `-beta` literal even after the branch rename — operators were already pinning to `v3.x.y-beta.N` and changing the literal would have broken those pins.

 release-please derives all of this from conventional commit prefixes (`feat:`, `fix:`, `BREAKING CHANGE:`, etc.) automatically.

 ## Things that don't go through this process

- **Documentation-only changes** can land on either `main` or `beta` directly (no release cut needed); release-please will pick them up on the next regular release.
+- **Documentation-only changes** can land on either `stable` or `main` directly (no release cut needed); release-please will pick them up on the next regular release.
 - **Test-only changes** — same.
- **CI / workflow changes** — same, but be aware they take effect on the branch they land on, so a CI fix targeting beta won't fix a broken stable-channel workflow until the next promotion.
+- **CI / workflow changes** — same, but be aware they take effect on the branch they land on, so a CI fix targeting `main` won't fix a broken stable-channel workflow until the next promotion.

 ## When this doc is wrong

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ We take the security of PicPeak seriously. If you have discovered a security vul
 ### 1. **Do NOT create a public GitHub issue**

 ### 2. Report the vulnerability privately by:
- **Preferred:** Use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
+- **Preferred:** Use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
 - **Alternative:** Email us at **info@picpeak.app** with the details
 - Include:
  - Description of the vulnerability
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ We believe in responsible disclosure. Once a vulnerability is fixed:

 ## Contact

- Security issues: Email **info@picpeak.app** or use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
- General support: [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues)
+- Security issues: Email **info@picpeak.app** or use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
+- General support: [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues)

 Thank you for helping keep PicPeak and its users safe!
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ This guide provides easy installation instructions for PicPeak on Linux servers

 ```bash
 # Download and run the unified setup script
-curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/the-luap/picpeak/main/scripts/picpeak-setup.sh -o picpeak-setup.sh && \
+curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PicPeak/picpeak/main/scripts/picpeak-setup.sh -o picpeak-setup.sh && \
 chmod +x picpeak-setup.sh && \
 sudo ./picpeak-setup.sh
 ```
@@ -163,6 +163,19 @@ sudo ./picpeak-setup.sh --native --unattended \
 - `picpeak-workers` - Background workers
 - `caddy` - Web server (optional)

+## 🔑 First Login — Create Your Admin
+
+If you installed with `picpeak-setup.sh` and gave an `--admin-password`, your admin account already exists — log in at `/admin` with that email and password.
+
+If you started PicPeak **without** setting `ADMIN_PASSWORD` (e.g. a plain `docker compose up`), there's **no admin yet** and you create it in the browser:
+
+1. Open `http://your-server:3000/admin` — you'll land on a setup screen.
+2. Get the **one-time setup token** from the backend logs (also saved to `data/SETUP_TOKEN`):
+   ```bash
+   docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"
+   ```
+3. Paste it, set your admin email + password. The token is single-use and the screen closes once an admin exists.
+
 ## 🌐 Access Methods

 ### Direct Access (Simplest)
@@ -472,7 +485,7 @@ sudo -u picpeak node scripts/reset-admin-password.js
   - [Deployment Guide](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment)

 3. **Support:**
-   - [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues)
+   - [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues)
   - Include: Error messages, system info (`uname -a`), installation method

 ## 🔒 Security Best Practices
@@ -550,4 +563,4 @@ sudo ./picpeak-setup.sh --native \

 ---

-**PicPeak Setup v1.0** | [Documentation](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak) | [Support](https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/issues)
+**PicPeak Setup v1.0** | [Documentation](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak) | [Support](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues)
@@ -9,6 +9,16 @@ PORT=3001
 # Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
 JWT_SECRET=your-very-secure-jwt-secret-at-least-32-characters-long-example123456

+# Admin 2FA (TOTP) secret encryption key — OPTIONAL.
+# Admin authenticator secrets are encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM). By default
+# the key is derived from JWT_SECRET, so you do NOT need to set this. Set it
+# only if you want the MFA encryption key decoupled from JWT_SECRET (e.g. so
+# rotating JWT_SECRET doesn't invalidate enrolled authenticators). If you set
+# it, changing/losing it makes existing 2FA secrets undecryptable — recover
+# with: docker compose exec backend node scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --all --yes
+# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
+#MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
+
 # Auth cookie Secure flag
 #   unset  - default: 'auto' in production, false in dev (#427)
 #   true   - always set Secure (HTTPS-only cookies; breaks plain-HTTP access —
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ARG VCS_REF
 ARG VERSION

 # Add labels for GitHub Container Registry
-LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak"
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak"
 LABEL org.opencontainers.image.description="PicPeak Backend Service"
 LABEL org.opencontainers.image.licenses="MIT"

@@ -27,12 +27,26 @@ FROM node:22-alpine

 WORKDIR /app

-# Upgrade all packages to fix security vulnerabilities (OpenSSL, libexpat, BusyBox CVEs)
-RUN apk upgrade --no-cache
+# Redeclare CACHEBUST — ARGs don't cross stage boundaries, so the builder
+# stage's declaration never reached this stage. Consuming it in the RUN below
+# busts that layer's cache every CI run (CACHEBUST=github.run_number), so the
+# image always picks up current Alpine security updates instead of reusing a
+# stale cached upgrade layer.
+ARG CACHEBUST=1

-# Upgrade npm to fix tar, minimatch, brace-expansion CVEs in npm's own deps
-# Pin to 10.x to stay compatible with Node 22 Alpine (npm 11.x has dependency issues)
-RUN npm install -g npm@10
+# Upgrade all packages to fix security vulnerabilities (OpenSSL, libexpat, BusyBox CVEs)
+RUN echo "cachebust=${CACHEBUST}" && apk upgrade --no-cache
+
+# Remove the npm CLI from the final image. Nothing runs npm here: the
+# entrypoint is node, runtime deps are COPY'd from the builder stage, and
+# wait-for-db.sh invokes the migration runners via node directly. npm's
+# bundled node_modules kept tripping Trivy (sigstore, tar 7.5.19,
+# brace-expansion 5.0.7 — even npm 12.0.1 still ships the vulnerable
+# copies), so shipping no npm ends that alert class instead of chasing
+# per-release patches. Note: `docker exec … npm run <script>` no longer
+# works in the container — use `node migrations/run-migrations-safe.js`
+# and friends instead.
+RUN rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm /usr/local/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npx

 # Install dumb-init for proper signal handling, postgresql-client for database
 # checks, ffmpeg for video upload support, and su-exec for the root → nodejs
@@ -177,4 +177,203 @@ describe('backupService — configurable walker (backup_paths)', () => {
    const filesOn = await backupService.getFilesToBackup(true);
    expect(filesOn.map((f) => f.relativePath)).toContain('events/archived/E3/legacy.jpg');
  });
+
+  // Issue #871 — the "What to Backup" checkboxes were stored but never read.
+  describe('UI opt-out toggles (issue #871)', () => {
+    it('unchecking Thumbnails excludes thumbnails/', async () => {
+      seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_thumbnails: false,
+      });
+      const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+      expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+      expect(rels).not.toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('unchecking Photos excludes events/active', async () => {
+      seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_photos: false,
+      });
+      const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+      expect(rels).toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      expect(rels).not.toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('defaults to including everything when the keys were never saved', async () => {
+      seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({});
+      const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+      expect(rels).toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it("accepts the UI's plural backup_include_archives for the archived gate", async () => {
+      seedFile('events/archived/E4/archived.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_archives: true,
+      });
+      expect(files.map((f) => f.relativePath)).toContain('events/archived/E4/archived.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('the UI plural key beats the migration-seeded singular key', async () => {
+      // Migration seeds backup_include_archived=true on every install; the
+      // form only ever writes the plural key, so unchecking Archives must
+      // win over the stale seeded value.
+      seedFile('events/archived/E5/archived.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_archived: true,   // seeded default
+        backup_include_archives: false,  // what the admin actually chose
+      });
+      expect(files.map((f) => f.relativePath)).not.toContain('events/archived/E5/archived.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('rsync gets the de-selected paths and noise filters as --exclude args', async () => {
+      const excluded = await backupService.resolveExcludedBackupPaths({
+        backup_include_thumbnails: false,
+        backup_include_archives: false,
+      });
+      expect(excluded.map((r) => r.path)).toEqual(
+        expect.arrayContaining(['thumbnails', 'events/archived'])
+      );
+
+      const args = backupService.buildRsyncArgs(
+        { backup_rsync_host: 'backup.example.com', backup_rsync_path: '/srv/backups' },
+        excluded.map((r) => `/${r.path}/`)
+      );
+      const excludes = args
+        .map((a, i) => (a === '--exclude' ? args[i + 1] : null))
+        .filter(Boolean);
+      expect(excludes).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
+        '.nfs*',
+        '/thumbnails/',
+        '/events/archived/',
+      ]));
+    });
+
+    it('rows toggled off via include_in_default also become rsync excludes', async () => {
+      // The enabled-only loader hides these rows from the walker, but rsync
+      // syncs the whole storage root, so they must still appear as excludes.
+      await db('backup_paths').where('path', 'previews').update({
+        include_in_default: false,
+      });
+
+      const excluded = await backupService.resolveExcludedBackupPaths({});
+      expect(excluded.map((r) => r.path)).toContain('previews');
+    });
+  });
+
+  // Issue #871 — .nfs* silly-rename artifacts were uploaded to S3.
+  it('never backs up filesystem noise (.nfs*, .DS_Store)', async () => {
+    seedFile('thumbnails/E1/.nfs000000000000006600000008');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/.DS_Store');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+    const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({});
+    const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    expect(rels.some((r) => r.includes('.nfs'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(rels.some((r) => r.includes('.DS_Store'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('the walker honors backup_exclude_patterns (previously rsync-only)', async () => {
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/scratch.tmp');
+
+    const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+      backup_exclude_patterns: ['*.tmp'],
+    });
+    const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    expect(rels).not.toContain('events/active/E1/scratch.tmp');
+  });
+
+  it('glob patterns are literal outside the star (.nfs* must not eat anfs-…)', async () => {
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/anfs-photo.jpg');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/notes-tmp');
+
+    const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+      backup_exclude_patterns: ['*.tmp'],
+    });
+    const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+    // '.nfs*' used to compile to /^.nfs.*$/ whose dot matched any char;
+    // '*.tmp' used to compile to /^.*.tmp$/ which also matched 'notes-tmp'.
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/anfs-photo.jpg');
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/notes-tmp');
+  });
+
+  // Issue #871 — weekly schedules silently ran daily, and the dashboard's
+  // "next backup" was a hardcoded "tomorrow 02:00".
+  describe('schedule resolution + next run (issue #871)', () => {
+    it('a named label beats the stray default cron the UI used to send', () => {
+      expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({
+        backup_schedule: 'weekly',
+        backup_schedule_cron: '0 3 * * *', // old UI default, sent unconditionally
+      })).toBe('0 3 * * 0');
+    });
+
+    it('custom schedules use the cron field', () => {
+      expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({
+        backup_schedule: 'custom',
+        backup_schedule_cron: '15 5 * * 2',
+      })).toBe('15 5 * * 2');
+    });
+
+    it('falls back to the default daily cron', () => {
+      expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({})).toBe('0 2 * * *');
+    });
+
+    it('getNextScheduledRun is null when backups are disabled', () => {
+      expect(backupService.getNextScheduledRun(null)).toBeNull();
+      expect(backupService.getNextScheduledRun({ backup_enabled: false })).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('getNextScheduledRun returns the real next weekly fire time', () => {
+      const iso = backupService.getNextScheduledRun({
+        backup_enabled: true,
+        backup_schedule: 'weekly',
+        backup_schedule_cron: '0 3 * * *',
+      });
+      const next = new Date(iso);
+      expect(Number.isNaN(next.getTime())).toBe(false);
+      expect(next.getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
+      expect(next.getDay()).toBe(0);   // Sunday
+      expect(next.getHours()).toBe(3); // 03:00
+    });
+  });
+
+  // Issue #871 — "Backup Size: 167.6 TB": file_size_bytes is a bigInteger
+  // column, node-postgres returns int8 as a string, and the S3 path did
+  // `backedUpSize += size` — string concatenation.
+  it('getDatabaseBackupInfo coerces file_size_bytes to a number', async () => {
+    await db('database_backup_runs').del();
+    await db('database_backup_runs').insert({
+      backup_type: 'full',
+      status: 'completed',
+      file_path: '/backups/db/dump.sql.gz',
+      // Simulate the PG int8-as-string driver behaviour (sqlite stores
+      // whatever it is handed, so the string round-trips).
+      file_size_bytes: '421988',
+      started_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      completed_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+
+    const info = await backupService.getDatabaseBackupInfo();
+    expect(typeof info.size).toBe('number');
+    expect(info.size).toBe(421988);
+  });
 });
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/**
+ * Smoke tests for backupService's config resolution + file-collection
+ * and manifest validation paths — safety net ahead of the god-file
+ * decomposition.
+ *
+ * Uses the same real-SQLite harness as
+ * backupService.configurableWalker.test.js (bootCrmDb + a temp
+ * STORAGE_PATH) rather than the broken deep-mock approach in
+ * backupService.enhanced.test.js.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+jest.setTimeout(30000);
+
+describe('backupService — config + file collection + manifest (smoke)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let storagePath;
+  let backupService;
+  let backupManifest;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
+    backupService = require('../../src/services/backupService');
+    backupManifest = require('../../src/services/backupManifest');
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('app_settings').del();
+    // Reset the storage tree so each test starts from a pristine walk.
+    await fs.promises.rm(storagePath, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(storagePath, { recursive: true });
+  });
+
+  function seedFile(relPath, content = 'dummy bytes') {
+    const abs = path.join(storagePath, relPath);
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(abs, content);
+    return abs;
+  }
+
+  async function insertBackupSetting(key, value) {
+    await db('app_settings').insert({
+      setting_key: key,
+      setting_value: value,
+      setting_type: 'backup',
+    });
+  }
+
+  describe('getBackupConfig', () => {
+    it('parses booleans, numbers, JSON arrays and plain strings from app_settings', async () => {
+      await insertBackupSetting('backup_enabled', 'true');
+      await insertBackupSetting('backup_include_archived', 'false');
+      await insertBackupSetting('backup_retention_days', '30');
+      await insertBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backups/picpeak');
+      await insertBackupSetting('backup_email_recipients', '["a@example.com","b@example.com"]');
+      // Non-backup settings must not leak into the backup config.
+      await db('app_settings').insert({
+        setting_key: 'general_site_name',
+        setting_value: 'PicPeak',
+        setting_type: 'general',
+      });
+
+      const config = await backupService.getBackupConfig();
+
+      expect(config.backup_enabled).toBe(true);
+      expect(config.backup_include_archived).toBe(false);
+      expect(config.backup_retention_days).toBe(30);
+      expect(config.backup_destination_path).toBe('/backups/picpeak');
+      expect(config.backup_email_recipients).toEqual(['a@example.com', 'b@example.com']);
+      expect(config).not.toHaveProperty('general_site_name');
+      // Raw (unparsed) values are preserved on the non-enumerable __raw.
+      expect(String(config.__raw.backup_retention_days)).toBe('30');
+    });
+
+    it('returns an empty config object (not null) when nothing is configured', async () => {
+      const config = await backupService.getBackupConfig();
+      expect(config).not.toBeNull();
+      expect(Object.keys(config)).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('getFilesToBackup', () => {
+    it('returns an empty list on a pristine storage tree', async () => {
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({ backup_include_archived: true });
+      expect(files).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it('captures path/relativePath/size/modified metadata for backed-up files', async () => {
+      const content = 'not really a jpeg';
+      const abs = seedFile('events/active/E9/pic.jpg', content);
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({ backup_include_archived: true });
+      const entry = files.find((f) => f.relativePath === path.join('events/active/E9', 'pic.jpg'));
+
+      expect(entry).toBeDefined();
+      expect(entry.path).toBe(abs);
+      expect(entry.size).toBe(Buffer.byteLength(content));
+      // Not toBeInstanceOf(Date) — fs.stat mtime comes from a different
+      // realm under Jest and fails the cross-realm instanceof check.
+      expect(Object.prototype.toString.call(entry.modified)).toBe('[object Date]');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('validateBackupManifest', () => {
+    it('round-trips a generated manifest as valid', async () => {
+      seedFile('events/active/E1/a.jpg', 'aaa');
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({ backup_include_archived: true });
+
+      const manifest = await backupManifest.generateManifest({
+        backupType: 'full',
+        backupPath: '/backup/run-1',
+        files,
+      });
+      const manifestPath = path.join(storagePath, 'manifest-smoke.json');
+      await backupManifest.saveManifest(manifest, manifestPath, 'json');
+
+      const result = await backupService.validateBackupManifest(manifestPath);
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
+      expect(result.manifest.backup.type).toBe('full');
+      expect(result.manifest.files.count).toBe(files.length);
+      expect(result.manifest.verification.total_checksum).toBeTruthy();
+    });
+
+    it('flags a manifest missing required sections as invalid', async () => {
+      const badPath = path.join(storagePath, 'manifest-broken.json');
+      fs.writeFileSync(badPath, JSON.stringify({ manifest: { version: '2.0' } }));
+
+      const result = await backupService.validateBackupManifest(badPath);
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+      expect(result.error).toMatch(/Missing required section/);
+    });
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/**
+ * Booking cutover — prepare_invoice's draft seam. convertToInvoiceOnly({draft})
+ * must create the invoice(s) but leave scheduled_send_at NULL so the scheduler
+ * never auto-sends them before the workflow's review gate + explicit
+ * send_document.
+ */
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+jest.setTimeout(30000);
+
+describe('booking cutover — draft invoices on hold', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let adminId; let customerId; let quoteService;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    quoteService = require('../../src/services/quoteService');
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  async function acceptedQuote() {
+    const dealUuid = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const [id] = await db('quotes').insert({
+      quote_number: `Q-${dealUuid.slice(0, 8)}`,
+      customer_account_id: customerId,
+      status: 'accepted',
+      currency: 'CHF',
+      issue_date: '2026-01-01',
+      net_amount_minor: 100000, vat_amount_minor: 0, shipping_amount_minor: 0, total_amount_minor: 100000,
+      // A non-delivery installment so the contrast (scheduled date vs null) is meaningful.
+      payment_term_snapshot: JSON.stringify({ installments: [{ percent: 100, trigger: 'quote_accepted', offset_days: 0, label: 'Total' }], net_days: 30 }),
+      deal_uuid: dealUuid,
+      created_by_admin_id: adminId,
+    });
+    return id;
+  }
+
+  it('draft mode creates the invoice with scheduled_send_at = NULL (held), and returns its id', async () => {
+    const quoteId = await acceptedQuote();
+    const res = await quoteService.convertToInvoiceOnly(quoteId, adminId, { draft: true });
+    expect(Array.isArray(res.invoiceIds)).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.invoiceIds.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+
+    const inv = await db('invoices').where({ id: res.invoiceIds[0] }).first();
+    expect(inv.status).toBe('scheduled');     // editable + sendInvoice can issue it
+    expect(inv.scheduled_send_at == null).toBe(true); // held — scheduler won't auto-send
+  });
+
+  it('without draft, the same installment IS scheduled (scheduled_send_at set)', async () => {
+    const quoteId = await acceptedQuote();
+    const res = await quoteService.convertToInvoiceOnly(quoteId, adminId);
+    const inv = await db('invoices').where({ id: res.invoiceIds[0] }).first();
+    expect(inv.status).toBe('scheduled');
+    expect(inv.scheduled_send_at == null).toBe(false); // normal convert → auto-send date set
+  });
+
+  it('prepare_event path (convertToEvent hold) creates a DRAFT event with held invoices', async () => {
+    const quoteId = await acceptedQuote();
+    const res = await quoteService.convertToEvent(quoteId, adminId, { hold: true });
+    expect(res.eventId).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+    expect(Array.isArray(res.invoiceIds)).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.invoiceIds.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').where({ id: res.eventId }).first();
+    expect(ev.is_draft == true || ev.is_draft === 1).toBe(true); // created as a draft gallery
+
+    // Every invoice the event scheduled is held (no auto-send before the gate).
+    const invs = await db('invoices').whereIn('id', res.invoiceIds);
+    for (const inv of invs) expect(inv.scheduled_send_at == null).toBe(true);
+
+    // Quote is now linked to the event — convertToInvoiceOnly must NOT be called
+    // again for it (the flow's prepare_invoice adopts these ids instead).
+    const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first();
+    expect(q.converted_event_id).toBe(res.eventId);
+  });
+
+  it('draft mode with the DEFAULT (after_delivery) payment term yields a SENDABLE scheduled invoice, not pending_delivery', async () => {
+    // Reproduces the booking_invoice_only flow on a quote with no explicit
+    // payment timing: the default installment is after_delivery, which would
+    // otherwise be pending_delivery — a status sendInvoice (send_document) rejects.
+    const dealUuid = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const [quoteId] = await db('quotes').insert({
+      quote_number: `Q-${dealUuid.slice(0, 8)}`,
+      customer_account_id: customerId,
+      status: 'accepted',
+      currency: 'CHF',
+      issue_date: '2026-01-01',
+      net_amount_minor: 50000, vat_amount_minor: 0, shipping_amount_minor: 0, total_amount_minor: 50000,
+      // No payment_term_snapshot → spawnInstallmentInvoices falls back to a single
+      // 100% after_delivery installment.
+      deal_uuid: dealUuid,
+      created_by_admin_id: adminId,
+    });
+    const res = await quoteService.convertToInvoiceOnly(quoteId, adminId, { draft: true });
+    const inv = await db('invoices').where({ id: res.invoiceIds[0] }).first();
+    expect(inv.status).toBe('scheduled');            // sendInvoice accepts this
+    expect(inv.scheduled_send_at == null).toBe(true); // still held — no auto-send
+  });
+
+  it('finalizeQuoteResponses only fires once the 15-min response window has locked', async () => {
+    const mk = async (lockOffsetMs) => {
+      const dealUuid = crypto.randomUUID();
+      const [id] = await db('quotes').insert({
+        quote_number: `Q-${dealUuid.slice(0, 8)}`,
+        customer_account_id: customerId,
+        status: 'accepted',
+        currency: 'CHF', issue_date: '2026-01-01',
+        net_amount_minor: 1000, vat_amount_minor: 0, shipping_amount_minor: 0, total_amount_minor: 1000,
+        responded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        response_locked_at: new Date(Date.now() + lockOffsetMs).toISOString(),
+        accepted_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        deal_uuid: dealUuid,
+        created_by_admin_id: adminId,
+      });
+      return id;
+    };
+    const openId = await mk(15 * 60 * 1000);   // still inside the window
+    const lockedId = await mk(-60 * 1000);      // window already closed
+
+    const emitted = await quoteService.finalizeQuoteResponses();
+    expect(emitted).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+
+    const open = await db('quotes').where({ id: openId }).first();
+    const locked = await db('quotes').where({ id: lockedId }).first();
+    expect(open.workflow_response_emitted_at == null).toBe(true);   // deferred — not yet fired
+    expect(locked.workflow_response_emitted_at == null).toBe(false); // fired + stamped
+
+    // Idempotent: a second sweep doesn't re-fire the already-stamped one.
+    const again = await db('quotes').where({ id: lockedId })
+      .whereNull('workflow_response_emitted_at').update({ workflow_response_emitted_at: new Date() });
+    expect(again).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('reserve_date path (convertToEvent skipInvoices) creates a draft event with NO invoices', async () => {
+    const quoteId = await acceptedQuote();
+    const res = await quoteService.convertToEvent(quoteId, adminId, { hold: true, skipInvoices: true });
+    expect(res.eventId).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+    expect(res.invoiceIds).toEqual([]);
+    const invCount = await db('invoices').where({ event_id: res.eventId }).count({ c: '*' }).first();
+    expect(Number(invCount.c)).toBe(0); // pure date hold — no money documents
+  });
+
+  it('prepare_quote path (duplicateQuote) creates a new DRAFT quote — no in-trx deadlock', async () => {
+    const quoteId = await acceptedQuote();
+    const newId = await quoteService.duplicateQuote(quoteId, adminId);
+    expect(newId).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+    expect(newId).not.toBe(quoteId);
+    const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: newId }).first();
+    expect(q.status).toBe('draft');
+  });
+
+  it('registers prepare_gallery / reserve_date / prepare_quote as real actions', () => {
+    const { registry } = require('../../src/services/workflows'); // loads actions.js (side-effect registration)
+    for (const a of ['prepare_gallery', 'reserve_date', 'prepare_quote', 'prepare_event', 'prepare_invoice', 'send_document']) {
+      expect(typeof registry.getAction(a)).toBe('function');
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('prepare_contract path (createFromQuote) completes under SQLite — no in-trx deadlock', async () => {
+    const contractService = require('../../src/services/contractService');
+    const quoteId = await acceptedQuote();
+    const res = await contractService.createFromQuote(quoteId, adminId);
+    expect(res.contractId).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+    expect(res.alreadyConverted).toBe(false);
+    const c = await db('contracts').where({ id: res.contractId }).first();
+    expect(c).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+/**
+ * HTTP-level tests for the `/s/:shortSlug` public resolver (#699).
+ *
+ * Verifies the contract the public route is expected to honour:
+ *   - Browser UA → 302 to target_path
+ *   - Social crawler UA → 200 with OG <meta>, canonical = /s/<slug>
+ *   - Soft-deleted slug → 410 Gone (intentional-delete signal)
+ *   - Unknown slug → 404 Not Found
+ *   - Hit count increments after successful resolutions (both shapes)
+ *
+ * Mirrors the production server.js wiring but doesn't load the whole
+ * server — the surrounding middleware (CORS, helmet, rate limiters)
+ * isn't part of this route's contract.
+ */
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+jest.setTimeout(60000);
+
+let db; let cleanup; let service; let app;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+
+  // Persist a business_profile + business_name so buildOgMetadata's
+  // settings-based fields populate consistently.
+  const { upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings');
+  await upsertAppSetting('branding_company_name', JSON.stringify('Test Studio'), 'string');
+
+  service = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
+  const {
+    isSocialCrawler, buildOgMetadata, renderOgHtml,
+  } = require('../../src/services/galleryOgService');
+
+  app = express();
+  app.get('/s/:shortSlug', async (req, res) => {
+    try {
+      const row = await service.findByShortSlug(req.params.shortSlug);
+      if (!row) return res.status(404).type('text/plain').send('Short URL not found');
+      if (row.deleted_at) return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL has been removed');
+
+      if (isSocialCrawler(req.get('user-agent'))) {
+        const event = await db('events').where({ id: row.event_id }).first('slug');
+        if (event?.slug) {
+          const meta = await buildOgMetadata(event.slug, req.originalUrl);
+          const base = (process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/$/, '');
+          meta.url = `${base}/s/${row.short_slug}`;
+          res.set('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=300');
+          res.set('Content-Type', 'text/html; charset=utf-8');
+          res.send(renderOgHtml(meta));
+          service.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
+          return;
+        }
+        return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL points at a deleted event');
+      }
+
+      service.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
+      return res.redirect(302, row.target_path);
+    } catch (err) {
+      return res.status(500).type('text/plain').send(err.message);
+    }
+  });
+}, 120000);
+
+afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+async function seedEventAndShortUrl({ slug = `evt-${Date.now()}`, shortSlug }) {
+  const farFuture = new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 86400000).toISOString();
+  const [eventId] = await db('events').insert({
+    slug,
+    event_type: 'wedding',
+    event_name: 'Test Event',
+    event_date: '2026-06-05',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    expires_at: farFuture,
+    is_active: true,
+    is_archived: false,
+    share_link: slug,
+    share_token: `tok${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 12)}`,
+    welcome_message: null,
+  });
+  const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+    eventId, customSlug: shortSlug,
+  });
+  return { eventId, shortUrl: row };
+}
+
+// User-agent strings the production `isSocialCrawler` helper matches.
+// Snapshot known-true samples here so the test stays in sync if the
+// helper's allowlist evolves.
+const BOT_UA_WHATSAPP = 'WhatsApp/2.23.20.0';
+const BOT_UA_FACEBOOK = 'facebookexternalhit/1.1 (+http://www.facebook.com/externalhit_uatext.php)';
+const BROWSER_UA = 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/605.1.15';
+
+describe('GET /s/:shortSlug — browser (302 redirect)', () => {
+  it('redirects to the snapshotted target_path with a 302', async () => {
+    const { shortUrl } = await seedEventAndShortUrl({
+      slug: 'browser-redirect', shortSlug: 'go-here',
+    });
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/s/go-here')
+      .set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(302);
+    expect(res.headers.location).toBe(shortUrl.target_path);
+    expect(res.headers.location).toMatch(/^\/gallery\//);
+  });
+
+  it('increments hit_count on a browser hit (fire-and-forget — wait briefly)', async () => {
+    await seedEventAndShortUrl({
+      slug: 'hit-browser', shortSlug: 'hit-from-browser',
+    });
+    await request(app).get('/s/hit-from-browser').set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
+    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
+    const row = await service.findByShortSlug('hit-from-browser');
+    expect(row.hit_count).toBe(1);
+    expect(row.last_hit_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('GET /s/:shortSlug — social crawler (OG metadata)', () => {
+  it('returns 200 with OG HTML for WhatsApp UA', async () => {
+    await seedEventAndShortUrl({
+      slug: 'whatsapp-og', shortSlug: 'wa-preview',
+    });
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/s/wa-preview')
+      .set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/text\/html/);
+    expect(res.text).toContain('<meta');
+    expect(res.text).toMatch(/og:title/);
+    expect(res.text).toMatch(/og:url/);
+  });
+
+  it('og:url canonical points at /s/<slug>, not the underlying gallery URL', async () => {
+    await seedEventAndShortUrl({
+      slug: 'canonical-test', shortSlug: 'canonical-short',
+    });
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/s/canonical-short')
+      .set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_FACEBOOK);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    // The og:url meta tag must contain the short-URL path, not the
+    // /gallery/<slug> path — this is the cache-key invariant from #699.
+    expect(res.text).toMatch(/property="og:url"\s+content="[^"]*\/s\/canonical-short"/);
+    expect(res.text).not.toMatch(
+      /property="og:url"\s+content="[^"]*\/gallery\/canonical-test"/
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('sets a short cache header so scrapers can re-fetch when admin rotates the preview', async () => {
+    await seedEventAndShortUrl({
+      slug: 'cache-header', shortSlug: 'cache-test',
+    });
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/s/cache-test')
+      .set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
+    expect(res.headers['cache-control']).toMatch(/public/);
+    expect(res.headers['cache-control']).toMatch(/max-age=300/);
+  });
+
+  it('increments hit_count on a crawler hit as well', async () => {
+    await seedEventAndShortUrl({
+      slug: 'hit-bot', shortSlug: 'hit-from-bot',
+    });
+    await request(app).get('/s/hit-from-bot').set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
+    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
+    const row = await service.findByShortSlug('hit-from-bot');
+    expect(row.hit_count).toBe(1);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('GET /s/:shortSlug — error states', () => {
+  it('404 for an unknown slug', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/s/never-existed')
+      .set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it('410 for a soft-deleted slug (intentional-delete signal)', async () => {
+    const { shortUrl } = await seedEventAndShortUrl({
+      slug: 'gone-test', shortSlug: 'gone-slug',
+    });
+    await service.softDelete(shortUrl.id, null);
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/s/gone-slug')
+      .set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(410);
+  });
+
+  it('410 if the event was hard-deleted but the short URL row somehow survives', async () => {
+    const { eventId } = await seedEventAndShortUrl({
+      slug: 'orphan-test', shortSlug: 'orphan-slug',
+    });
+    // Hard-delete the event row (FK CASCADE would normally clean up the
+    // short URL too — but if CASCADE didn't fire for whatever reason
+    // (e.g. SQLite foreign_keys pragma off in a particular runtime), the
+    // resolver should still degrade safely).
+    // SQLite's foreign_keys pragma is OFF by default; the migration
+    // doesn't toggle it, so this delete leaves the short URL row.
+    await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).delete();
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/s/orphan-slug')
+      .set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(410);
+  });
+
+  it('404 for a malformed slug (rejected at validation, no DB hit)', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/s/UPPER_CASE')
+      .set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Regression — existing URL paths must still respond the same', () => {
+  // The /s/* namespace is additive: it must NOT shadow /gallery/*
+  // or any of the OG routes. We don't load the whole app here, but we
+  // can at least pin that the route param doesn't accept slashes —
+  // i.e. /s/foo/bar must NOT be matched by our handler.
+  it('the /s/:shortSlug route does not match nested paths', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/s/foo/bar')
+      .set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
+    // Express returns its default 404 when no route matches the path.
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+/**
+ * Integration tests for the branded short-URL service (#699).
+ *
+ * Exercises createShortUrl + findByShortSlug + listForEvent + softDelete
+ * + recordHit against a real SQLite DB, including the contracts that
+ * matter for production correctness:
+ *
+ *   - Custom slug + collision detection (409 with `suggested`)
+ *   - Auto-generated slug from event slug + year
+ *   - Soft-delete preserves the row (admin can audit)
+ *   - target_path snapshots at create time (toggling the global
+ *     "Use short gallery URLs" setting later doesn't change existing
+ *     short URLs — backward-compat invariant from #699)
+ *   - hit_count increments idempotently
+ *   - findByShortSlug returns soft-deleted rows (caller decides 410 vs 404)
+ *
+ * Boots one DB for the whole file (cheap on SQLite); each test seeds
+ * its own event row to keep scope clean.
+ */
+const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+jest.setTimeout(60000);
+
+let db; let cleanup; let service; let adminId;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+
+  // Minimal admin for created_by audit.
+  const adminInsert = await db('admin_users').insert({
+    username: 'shorturl-test',
+    email: 'shorturl@example.com',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    must_change_password: false,
+    created_at: new Date(),
+  }).returning('id');
+  adminId = adminInsert[0]?.id ?? adminInsert[0];
+
+  service = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
+}, 120000);
+
+afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+// Each test seeds a fresh event so collisions / counter state don't leak.
+async function seedEvent(overrides = {}) {
+  const slug = overrides.slug || `evt-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`;
+  const farFuture = new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 86400000).toISOString();
+  const [id] = await db('events').insert({
+    slug,
+    event_type: 'wedding',
+    event_name: overrides.event_name || 'Test Wedding',
+    event_date: overrides.event_date || '2026-06-05',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    expires_at: farFuture,
+    is_active: true,
+    is_archived: false,
+    share_link: slug,
+    share_token: overrides.share_token || `tok${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 12)}`,
+    welcome_message: null,
+  });
+  const event = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+  return event;
+}
+
+describe('createShortUrl — custom slug', () => {
+  it('creates with a custom slug', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'sofia-grad-1' });
+    const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id,
+      customSlug: 'sofia-graduation-1',
+      createdBy: adminId,
+    });
+    expect(row.short_slug).toBe('sofia-graduation-1');
+    expect(row.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.slug}`);
+    expect(row.event_id).toBe(event.id);
+    expect(row.hit_count).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('lowercases the input — operators pasting mixed-case still get a clean slug', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'sofia-grad-2' });
+    const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id,
+      customSlug: 'Sofia-GraduAtion-2',  // mixed case
+      createdBy: adminId,
+    });
+    expect(row.short_slug).toBe('sofia-graduation-2');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an invalid slug with INVALID_SLUG code', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'invalid-test' });
+    await expect(service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id,
+      customSlug: 'invalid slug with spaces',
+      createdBy: adminId,
+    })).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'INVALID_SLUG' });
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a reserved slug with INVALID_SLUG code', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'reserved-test' });
+    await expect(service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id,
+      customSlug: 'admin',
+      createdBy: adminId,
+    })).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'INVALID_SLUG' });
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a duplicate slug with SLUG_TAKEN + suggested fallback', async () => {
+    const event1 = await seedEvent({ slug: 'dup-test-1' });
+    const event2 = await seedEvent({ slug: 'dup-test-2' });
+    await service.createShortUrl({ eventId: event1.id, customSlug: 'collide-me' });
+    await expect(service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event2.id, customSlug: 'collide-me',
+    })).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      code: 'SLUG_TAKEN',
+      suggested: expect.any(String),
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('throws EVENT_NOT_FOUND when the event id does not exist', async () => {
+    await expect(service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: 9999999, customSlug: 'no-event',
+    })).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'EVENT_NOT_FOUND' });
+  });
+});
+
+describe('createShortUrl — auto-generated slug', () => {
+  it('uses event slug + year when no custom slug provided', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({
+      slug: 'autogen-wedding', event_date: '2026-06-05',
+    });
+    const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id,
+      createdBy: adminId,
+    });
+    // First-choice candidate is just the slug; takes that.
+    expect(row.short_slug).toBe('autogen-wedding');
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to slug-year when the bare slug is already taken', async () => {
+    // Both events SHARE the same canonical slug so the first-choice
+    // bare-slug candidate is burned, forcing autoGen to try the
+    // year-suffixed variant.
+    const event1 = await seedEvent({
+      slug: 'collide-base', event_date: '2026-07-01',
+    });
+    await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event1.id, customSlug: 'collide-base',
+    });
+    const event2 = await seedEvent({
+      slug: 'collide-base-2', event_date: '2026-07-01',
+    });
+    // Force the bare candidate of event2 to also collide by burning it.
+    await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event1.id, customSlug: 'collide-base-2',
+    });
+    const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event2.id,  // No custom — auto-gen from event2.slug
+    });
+    // Bare candidate `collide-base-2` is taken → year-suffixed picks.
+    expect(row.short_slug).toBe('collide-base-2-2026');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('createShortUrl — target_path snapshotting (#699 backward-compat)', () => {
+  it('uses /gallery/<slug> when the global short-URLs setting is OFF (default)', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'snapshot-off' });
+    const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'snap-off',
+    });
+    expect(row.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.slug}`);
+  });
+
+  it('uses /gallery/<share_token> when the global setting is ON at create time', async () => {
+    // Persist the setting.
+    const { upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings');
+    await upsertAppSetting('general_use_short_gallery_urls', JSON.stringify(true), 'system');
+    try {
+      const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'snapshot-on', share_token: 'tokenAbc123' });
+      const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+        eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'snap-on',
+      });
+      expect(row.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.share_token}`);
+
+      // CRITICAL backward-compat invariant: now flip the setting OFF.
+      // Existing short URLs must still resolve to the same target_path
+      // they were created with — operator's existing share links don't
+      // silently change behaviour.
+      await upsertAppSetting('general_use_short_gallery_urls', JSON.stringify(false), 'system');
+      const refetched = await service.findByShortSlug('snap-on');
+      expect(refetched.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.share_token}`);
+    } finally {
+      await upsertAppSetting('general_use_short_gallery_urls', JSON.stringify(false), 'system');
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe('findByShortSlug + listForEvent', () => {
+  it('returns null for an unknown slug', async () => {
+    expect(await service.findByShortSlug('does-not-exist-xyz')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('returns null for a malformed slug (no DB hit)', async () => {
+    expect(await service.findByShortSlug('UPPER_CASE')).toBeNull();
+    expect(await service.findByShortSlug('with spaces')).toBeNull();
+    expect(await service.findByShortSlug('')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('returns soft-deleted rows (caller decides 410 vs 404)', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'softdel-find' });
+    const created = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'find-deleted',
+    });
+    await service.softDelete(created.id, adminId);
+    const fetched = await service.findByShortSlug('find-deleted');
+    expect(fetched).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(fetched.deleted_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('listForEvent excludes soft-deleted rows', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'list-test' });
+    const live = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'list-live',
+    });
+    const deleted = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'list-deleted',
+    });
+    await service.softDelete(deleted.id, adminId);
+    const list = await service.listForEvent(event.id);
+    const ids = list.map((r) => r.id);
+    expect(ids).toContain(live.id);
+    expect(ids).not.toContain(deleted.id);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('softDelete', () => {
+  it('returns true on first call, false on second (idempotent admin clicks)', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'softdel-idem' });
+    const created = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'idem-delete',
+    });
+    expect(await service.softDelete(created.id, adminId)).toBe(true);
+    expect(await service.softDelete(created.id, adminId)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('returns false for an unknown id (caller maps to 404)', async () => {
+    expect(await service.softDelete(9999999, adminId)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('createShortUrl after soft-delete — slug rotation', () => {
+  it('re-creating a soft-deleted slug succeeds (purges the deleted row)', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'rotate' });
+    const first = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'rotate-me',
+    });
+    await service.softDelete(first.id, adminId);
+    // The slug is now reclaimable for a fresh row.
+    const second = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'rotate-me',
+    });
+    expect(second.id).not.toBe(first.id);
+    expect(second.short_slug).toBe('rotate-me');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('recordHit', () => {
+  it('increments hit_count + stamps last_hit_at', async () => {
+    const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'hit-counter' });
+    const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'count-me',
+    });
+    await service.recordHit(row.id);
+    await service.recordHit(row.id);
+    const fetched = await service.findByShortSlug('count-me');
+    expect(fetched.hit_count).toBe(2);
+    expect(fetched.last_hit_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('is fire-and-forget — invalid id does not throw', async () => {
+    await expect(service.recordHit(9999999)).resolves.not.toThrow();
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Validates the engine-neutral .picpeak export: it must produce a real zip with
+// a manifest + per-table NDJSON, exclude knex bookkeeping, and honour the photo
+// toggle. Uses the shared CRM DB harness (temp SQLite) — no docker needed.
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret-at-least-32-characters-long!!';
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const StreamZip = require('node-stream-zip');
+const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+let db;
+let cleanup;
+let tmpDir;
+let createPicpeak;
+
+// bootCrmDb MUST run before requiring the service (which transitively requires
+// db.js) so the export reads this test's DB, not the default path.
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
+  process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpDir; // isolate file collection to the temp dir
+  ({ createPicpeak } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService'));
+}, 60000);
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await cleanup();
+});
+
+async function readZip(filePath) {
+  const zip = new StreamZip.async({ file: filePath });
+  const entries = Object.keys(await zip.entries());
+  const manifest = JSON.parse((await zip.entryData('manifest.json')).toString('utf8'));
+  await zip.close();
+  return { entries, manifest };
+}
+
+describe('picpeak export (.picpeak logical export)', () => {
+  it('produces a .picpeak with a manifest and per-table NDJSON', async () => {
+    const { filePath, manifest } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
+    try {
+      expect(filePath.endsWith('.picpeak')).toBe(true);
+      expect(fs.existsSync(filePath)).toBe(true);
+
+      expect(manifest.format).toBe(1);
+      expect(manifest.kind).toBe('picpeak-backup');
+      expect(manifest.database.engine).toBe('sqlite');
+      expect(manifest.options.includePhotos).toBe(false);
+      expect(manifest.contains_secrets).toBe(true);
+      // Migrations seed real tables (e.g. app_settings) — expect several.
+      expect(Object.keys(manifest.tables).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+      expect(Object.keys(manifest.tables)).toContain('app_settings');
+
+      const { entries, manifest: zipped } = await readZip(filePath);
+      expect(entries).toContain('manifest.json');
+      expect(entries.some((n) => n.startsWith('data/') && n.endsWith('.ndjson'))).toBe(true);
+      expect(entries).toContain('data/app_settings.ndjson');
+      // Manifest inside the zip matches the returned one.
+      expect(zipped.tables).toEqual(manifest.tables);
+    } finally {
+      fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('never exports knex bookkeeping tables', async () => {
+    const { filePath, manifest } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
+    try {
+      const names = Object.keys(manifest.tables);
+      expect(names).not.toContain('knex_migrations');
+      expect(names).not.toContain('knex_migrations_lock');
+    } finally {
+      fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('row counts in the manifest match the NDJSON line counts', async () => {
+    // Insert a couple of settings so at least one table is non-empty.
+    await db('app_settings')
+      .insert({ setting_key: 'picpeak_export_test_a', setting_value: JSON.stringify('1'), setting_type: 'string' })
+      .onConflict('setting_key').merge();
+
+    const { filePath, manifest } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
+    try {
+      const zip = new StreamZip.async({ file: filePath });
+      const buf = await zip.entryData('data/app_settings.ndjson');
+      await zip.close();
+      const lines = buf.toString('utf8').split('\n').filter((l) => l.trim().length > 0);
+      expect(lines.length).toBe(manifest.tables.app_settings.rowCount);
+      expect(manifest.tables.app_settings.rowCount).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    } finally {
+      fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Full .picpeak roundtrip on a temp SQLite DB:
+//   1. seed a "backup" instance (admin A + a marker setting)
+//   2. export → .picpeak
+//   3. simulate a reinstall: wipe, create a DIFFERENT current admin B, mutate data
+//   4. import the backup with currentAdminId = B
+//   5. assert the backup data is restored AND the current account (B) survives,
+//      while the backup's admin (A) is also present (different email → added).
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret-at-least-32-characters-long!!';
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+let db;
+let cleanup;
+let tmpDir;
+let createPicpeak;
+let importFromPicpeak;
+let validateManifest;
+let superAdminRoleId;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
+  process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpDir;
+  ({ createPicpeak } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService'));
+  ({ importFromPicpeak, validateManifest } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
+  const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
+  superAdminRoleId = role.id;
+}, 60000);
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await cleanup();
+});
+
+const adminRow = (email, hash) => ({
+  username: email,
+  email,
+  password_hash: hash,
+  role_id: superAdminRoleId,
+  is_active: true,
+  must_change_password: false,
+  created_at: new Date(),
+  updated_at: new Date(),
+});
+
+async function setMarker(value) {
+  await db('app_settings')
+    .insert({ setting_key: 'roundtrip_marker', setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'string' })
+    .onConflict('setting_key').merge();
+}
+async function getMarker() {
+  const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'roundtrip_marker' }).first();
+  return row ? JSON.parse(row.setting_value) : null;
+}
+
+describe('.picpeak roundtrip (export → import)', () => {
+  it('restores backup data and preserves the current account', async () => {
+    // 1. Seed the "source" instance.
+    await db('admin_users').del();
+    await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('backup-admin@old.example', 'HASH_A'));
+    await setMarker('from_backup');
+
+    // 2. Export.
+    const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
+
+    try {
+      // 3. Simulate a reinstall: fresh current admin B, mutated data.
+      await db('admin_users').del();
+      const [bId] = await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('current-admin@new.example', 'HASH_B')).returning('id');
+      const currentAdminId = typeof bId === 'object' ? bId.id : bId;
+      await setMarker('mutated_after_backup');
+
+      // 4. Import, preserving the current admin.
+      const result = await importFromPicpeak({ filePath: undefined, picpeakPath: filePath, currentAdminId });
+      expect(result.restored).toBe(true);
+      expect(result.tables).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+      // 5a. Backup data restored (marker reverted to the backup value).
+      expect(await getMarker()).toBe('from_backup');
+
+      // 5b. The backup's admin is present (different email → added).
+      const a = await db('admin_users').whereRaw('lower(email) = lower(?)', ['backup-admin@old.example']).first();
+      expect(a).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(a.password_hash).toBe('HASH_A');
+
+      // 5c. The current account SURVIVES the override, with its own credentials.
+      const b = await db('admin_users').whereRaw('lower(email) = lower(?)', ['current-admin@new.example']).first();
+      expect(b).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(b.password_hash).toBe('HASH_B');
+    } finally {
+      fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('overwrites a backup admin that collides with the current account email', async () => {
+    // Source has an admin at the SAME email the current operator will use.
+    await db('admin_users').del();
+    await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('shared@example.com', 'OLD_HASH'));
+    await setMarker('collision_case');
+    const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
+
+    try {
+      // Reinstall: current admin uses the same email but a NEW password.
+      await db('admin_users').del();
+      const [id] = await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('shared@example.com', 'NEW_HASH')).returning('id');
+      const currentAdminId = typeof id === 'object' ? id.id : id;
+
+      await importFromPicpeak({ picpeakPath: filePath, currentAdminId });
+
+      // Exactly one admin at that email, and it keeps the CURRENT password.
+      const rows = await db('admin_users').whereRaw('lower(email) = lower(?)', ['shared@example.com']);
+      expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(rows[0].password_hash).toBe('NEW_HASH');
+    } finally {
+      fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('restores files/ and reports filesRestored', async () => {
+    // A business-doc that lives in storage → travels in the backup.
+    const docDir = path.join(tmpDir, 'business-docs');
+    const marker = path.join(docDir, 'roundtrip-doc.txt');
+    fs.mkdirSync(docDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(marker, 'hello');
+    await db('admin_users').del();
+    const [id] = await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('files@example.com', 'H')).returning('id');
+    const currentAdminId = typeof id === 'object' ? id.id : id;
+
+    const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
+    try {
+      fs.rmSync(marker); // delete on disk so the restore must bring it back
+      const result = await importFromPicpeak({ picpeakPath: filePath, currentAdminId });
+      expect(result.filesRestored).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+      expect(fs.existsSync(marker)).toBe(true);
+      expect(fs.readFileSync(marker, 'utf8')).toBe('hello');
+    } finally {
+      fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
+      fs.rmSync(docDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe('.picpeak manifest validation', () => {
+  it('rejects a database-engine mismatch', async () => {
+    // Harness runs on SQLite, so a pg manifest must be refused.
+    const blockers = await validateManifest({
+      kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'pg' }, tables: {},
+    });
+    expect(blockers.some((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a backup from a newer schema (forward-only)', async () => {
+    // validateManifest reads knex_migrations for the target's latest migration;
+    // the harness has none, so create it with an older migration than the backup.
+    await db.schema.createTable('knex_migrations', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.string('name');
+      t.integer('batch');
+      t.timestamp('migration_time');
+    });
+    try {
+      await db('knex_migrations').insert({ name: '100_baseline', batch: 1 });
+      const blockers = await validateManifest({
+        kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1,
+        database: { engine: 'sqlite', latest_migration: '999_from_the_future' },
+        tables: {},
+      });
+      expect(blockers.some((b) => /newer/i.test(b))).toBe(true);
+    } finally {
+      await db.schema.dropTableIfExists('knex_migrations');
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a file that is not a PicPeak backup', async () => {
+    const blockers = await validateManifest({ some: 'random-json' });
+    expect(blockers.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/**
+ * CLI test for scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js — break-glass MFA reset (#738).
+ *
+ * Boots a temp-SQLite DB, seeds an admin with MFA fully enabled, then runs
+ * the script in a child process (--email <addr> --yes) pointed at the same
+ * DB file, and asserts the four MFA columns are zeroed. The script runs in
+ * its own process with its own knex connection; the parent connection is
+ * idle during the spawn so the SQLite write lock isn't contended.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
+
+const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+jest.setTimeout(60000);
+
+let db;
+let cleanup;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+}, 60000);
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+});
+
+const SCRIPT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'reset-admin-mfa.js');
+
+async function seedEnrolledAdmin(email) {
+  const inserted = await db('admin_users').insert({
+    username: email.split('@')[0],
+    email,
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    is_active: true,
+    two_factor_enabled: true,
+    two_factor_secret: 'iv.tag.ct',
+    two_factor_recovery_codes: JSON.stringify(['$2b$10$fakehashfakehashfakehashfa']),
+    two_factor_enrolled_at: new Date(),
+    created_at: new Date(),
+  }).returning('id');
+  return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+}
+
+it('zeroes the four MFA columns for the targeted admin', async () => {
+  const email = 'reset-me@example.com';
+  const id = await seedEnrolledAdmin(email);
+
+  execFileSync('node', [SCRIPT, '--email', email, '--yes'], {
+    env: {
+      ...process.env,
+      NODE_ENV: 'test',
+      TEST_DATABASE_PATH: process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH,
+    },
+    stdio: 'pipe',
+  });
+
+  const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id }).first();
+  expect(Number(row.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(0);
+  expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeNull();
+  expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBeNull();
+  expect(row.two_factor_enrolled_at).toBeNull();
+});
+
+it('leaves a different admin untouched', async () => {
+  const targetEmail = 'target@example.com';
+  const bystanderEmail = 'bystander@example.com';
+  const targetId = await seedEnrolledAdmin(targetEmail);
+  const bystanderId = await seedEnrolledAdmin(bystanderEmail);
+
+  execFileSync('node', [SCRIPT, '--email', targetEmail, '--yes'], {
+    env: { ...process.env, NODE_ENV: 'test', TEST_DATABASE_PATH: process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH },
+    stdio: 'pipe',
+  });
+
+  const target = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
+  const bystander = await db('admin_users').where({ id: bystanderId }).first();
+  expect(Number(target.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(0);
+  expect(Number(bystander.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(1);
+  expect(bystander.two_factor_secret).toBe('iv.tag.ct');
+});
@@ -183,22 +183,24 @@ describe('restoreService — PG branch scope contract (PR #596 review)', () => {
    expect(window).toMatch(/was_successful:\s*true/);
  });

-  it('npm run migrate:safe is invoked after the replay in restore()', () => {
+  it('the safe migration runner is invoked after the replay in restore()', () => {
    // Contract from PR #596 round 4: backups taken on older picpeak
    // versions must restore COMPLETELY on a newer image — even if new
    // migrations have been added since the backup was taken. The
-    // restore() flow shells out to `npm run migrate:safe` AFTER the
+    // restore() flow shells out to the safe migration runner AFTER the
    // operator-meta replay so the schema catches up to the running
    // code WITHIN the restore boundary (not on the next container
-    // restart).
+    // restart). Invoked as `node migrations/run-migrations-safe.js` —
+    // the runtime image ships no npm, so the former `npm run
+    // migrate:safe` would ENOENT into the non-fatal catch.
    //
    // Contract:
-    //   1. A `migrate:safe` shell-out exists somewhere in restoreService
+    //   1. A run-migrations-safe shell-out exists somewhere in restoreService
    //   2. It sits AFTER the replay drain — verification → replay →
    //      migrations is the documented order
    //   3. It does NOT sit inside performDatabaseRestore (must run
    //      against the reinit'd pool from the parent restore())
-    const migrateLine = findFirst(/['"]migrate:safe['"]/);
+    const migrateLine = findFirst(/run-migrations-safe\.js/);
    expect(migrateLine).toBeGreaterThan(0);

    const replayLine = findLast(/this\.preservedMetaSnapshot\.length\s*>\s*0/);
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// First-run bootstrap service. bootCrmDb() must run BEFORE requiring the service
+// so setupService shares this test's db instance (see crmDb.js note).
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret-at-least-32-characters-long!!';
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const { bootCrmDb, buildRouteApp } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+let db;
+let cleanup;
+let tmpDir;
+let setupService;
+let getAppSetting;
+let upsertAppSetting;
+let app;
+
+const VALID_PW = 'Str0ng-Passw0rd!';
+
+// bootCrmDb MUST run before any require of db.js (directly or transitively via a
+// service/util), or db.js binds to the default path instead of the temp one.
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
+  process.env.DATA_DIR = tmpDir; // isolate the SETUP_TOKEN file to the temp dir
+  setupService = require('../../src/services/setupService');
+  ({ getAppSetting, upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings'));
+  app = buildRouteApp('/api/setup', require('../../src/routes/setup'));
+}, 60000);
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await cleanup();
+});
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  await db('admin_users').del();
+  await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_token' }).del();
+});
+
+describe('setupService (first-run bootstrap)', () => {
+  it('reports needsAdmin while no admin exists', async () => {
+    expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: true, complete: false });
+  });
+
+  it('generates and persists a one-time token while no admin exists', async () => {
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    expect(token).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    expect(token.length).toBeGreaterThan(20);
+    expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBe(token);
+    // Idempotent — a second call returns the same token, not a fresh one.
+    expect(await setupService.ensureSetupToken()).toBe(token);
+  });
+
+  it('stores the token as valid JSON so the Postgres jsonb column accepts it', async () => {
+    // Regression guard for the SQLite-only miss: a bare token string is rejected
+    // by Postgres jsonb ("invalid input syntax for type json"). The raw column
+    // value must be JSON-parseable and round-trip back to the token.
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_token' }).first();
+    expect(() => JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).not.toThrow();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(token);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a wrong token', async () => {
+    await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    await expect(
+      setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token: 'nope', email: 'a@b.co', password: VALID_PW })
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+    expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: true, complete: false });
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a weak password', async () => {
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    await expect(
+      setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'a@b.co', password: 'weak' })
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+  });
+
+  it('creates the first admin as super_admin, issues a token, and burns the setup token', async () => {
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    const result = await setupService.createInitialAdmin({
+      token, email: 'Owner@Example.com', password: VALID_PW, ip: '203.0.113.7',
+    });
+
+    expect(result.user.email).toBe('owner@example.com'); // normalised
+    expect(result.user.role.name).toBe('super_admin');
+    expect(result.token).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+
+    const row = await db('admin_users').first();
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
+    expect(row.role_id).toBe(role.id);
+    expect(row.password_hash).not.toBe(VALID_PW); // hashed
+
+    // One-time: token burned, status now complete.
+    expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBeFalsy();
+    expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: false, complete: true });
+  });
+
+  it('writes the SETUP_TOKEN file while pending and removes it once setup completes', async () => {
+    const tokenFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'SETUP_TOKEN');
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    expect(fs.readFileSync(tokenFile, 'utf8').trim()).toBe(token);
+    await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'owner@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
+    expect(fs.existsSync(tokenFile)).toBe(false); // burned in DB + file removed
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to create a second admin (setup already complete)', async () => {
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
+    await expect(
+      setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'second@example.com', password: VALID_PW })
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409 });
+  });
+
+  it('serialises a double-submit — two concurrent valid-token calls create only one admin', async () => {
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    const results = await Promise.allSettled([
+      setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'a@example.com', password: VALID_PW }),
+      setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'b@example.com', password: VALID_PW }),
+    ]);
+    const fulfilled = results.filter((r) => r.status === 'fulfilled');
+    expect(fulfilled).toHaveLength(1); // the atomic token claim lets exactly one win
+    const count = await db('admin_users').count({ c: '*' }).first();
+    expect(Number(count.c)).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('ensureSetupToken clears any stale token once an admin exists', async () => {
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
+    // Simulate a stale token left in settings, then re-run the boot hook.
+    await upsertAppSetting('setup_token', JSON.stringify('stale'), 'string');
+    expect(await setupService.ensureSetupToken()).toBeNull();
+    expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBeFalsy();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('setup routes', () => {
+  it('GET /api/setup/status reports needsAdmin', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get('/api/setup/status');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body).toEqual({ needsAdmin: true, complete: false });
+  });
+
+  it('POST /api/setup/verify-token accepts the right token without burning it (200)', async () => {
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/setup/verify-token').send({ token });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body).toEqual({ valid: true });
+    // Token is NOT consumed — it still works for the actual create.
+    expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBe(token);
+  });
+
+  it('POST /api/setup/verify-token rejects a wrong token (400, field token)', async () => {
+    await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/setup/verify-token').send({ token: 'nope' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.field).toBe('token');
+  });
+
+  it('POST /api/setup/verify-token is closed once an admin exists (409)', async () => {
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/setup/verify-token').send({ token });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(409);
+  });
+
+  it('POST /api/setup/admin rejects a wrong token (400)', async () => {
+    await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/setup/admin')
+      .send({ token: 'nope', email: 'a@b.co', password: VALID_PW });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toMatchObject({ needsAdmin: true });
+  });
+
+  it('POST /api/setup/admin creates the first admin + sets the auth cookie (201)', async () => {
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/setup/admin')
+      .send({ token, email: 'owner@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(201);
+    expect(res.body.user.role.name).toBe('super_admin');
+    expect((res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).join(';')).toMatch(/admin_token/);
+    expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: false, complete: true });
+  });
+
+  it('POST /api/setup/admin is closed once an admin exists (409)', async () => {
+    const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
+    await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/setup/admin')
+      .send({ token, email: 'second@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(409);
+  });
+});
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
    expect(again.already).toBe(true);
  });

-  test('seeds the invoice-dunning built-in as the delegation graph (v6, disabled for first beta)', async () => {
+  test('seeds the invoice-dunning built-in as the delegation graph (disabled for first beta)', async () => {
    const { seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot, DUNNING_KEY } = require('../../src/services/_workflowSeedBoot');
    const noopLogger = { info() {}, warn() {} };
    await seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot(db, noopLogger);
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
    expect(wf).toBeTruthy();
    expect(!!wf.is_builtin).toBe(true);
    expect(!!wf.enabled).toBe(false); // first beta: ships disabled; legacy ladder runs until enabled
-    expect(JSON.parse(wf.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(6);
+    expect(JSON.parse(wf.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(7);

    const nodes = await db('workflow_nodes').where({ workflow_id: wf.id, version: wf.version });
    expect(nodes.filter((n) => n.type === 'trigger')).toHaveLength(1);
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
    await seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot(db, noopLogger);
    const reseeded = await db('workflows').where({ id: wf.id }).first();
    expect(reseeded.version).toBe(wf.version + 1); // bumped
-    expect(JSON.parse(reseeded.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(6);
+    expect(JSON.parse(reseeded.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(7);
    expect(!!reseeded.enabled).toBe(false); // seed default re-applied (not admin-owned → flips enabled→disabled)
    const newNodes = await db('workflow_nodes').where({ workflow_id: wf.id, version: reseeded.version });
    expect(newNodes.some((n) => n.type === 'gate')).toBe(false); // legacy graph replaced
@@ -71,16 +71,37 @@ describe('admin workflows API', () => {
    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/unknown node type/i);
  });

-  test('refuses to enable a flow that uses an unimplemented action', async () => {
+  test('refuses to enable a flow that uses an unregistered action', async () => {
    const create = await request(app).post('/api/admin/workflows').set(auth(token)).send({
      name: 'Stub flow', trigger_type: 'quote.accepted', enabled: false,
-      nodes: [{ node_key: 't', type: 'trigger' }, { node_key: 'a', type: 'action', config: { action: 'prepare_invoice' } }],
+      nodes: [{ node_key: 't', type: 'trigger' }, { node_key: 'a', type: 'action', config: { action: 'totally_not_a_real_action' } }],
      edges: [{ from_node: 't', to_node: 'a' }],
    });
    expect(create.status).toBe(201);
    const res = await request(app).patch(`/api/admin/workflows/${create.body.id}/enabled`).set(auth(token)).send({ enabled: true });
    expect(res.status).toBe(409);
-    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not.*implemented|prepare_invoice/i);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not.*implemented|totally_not_a_real_action/i);
+  });
+
+  test('allows enabling a flow using the now-implemented booking invoice actions', async () => {
+    const create = await request(app).post('/api/admin/workflows').set(auth(token)).send({
+      name: 'Invoice-only booking', trigger_type: 'quote.accepted', enabled: false,
+      nodes: [
+        { node_key: 't', type: 'trigger' },
+        { node_key: 'p', type: 'action', config: { action: 'prepare_invoice' } },
+        { node_key: 'g', type: 'gate', config: {} },
+        { node_key: 's', type: 'action', config: { action: 'send_document', document: 'invoice' } },
+      ],
+      edges: [
+        { from_node: 't', to_node: 'p' },
+        { from_node: 'p', to_node: 'g' },
+        { from_node: 'g', from_handle: 'confirm', to_node: 's' },
+      ],
+    });
+    expect(create.status).toBe(201);
+    const res = await request(app).patch(`/api/admin/workflows/${create.body.id}/enabled`).set(auth(token)).send({ enabled: true });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.enabled).toBe(true);
  });

  test('get one returns the graph', async () => {
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test for the bulk archive/delete ownership bypass.
+ *
+ * bulk-archive and bulk-delete acted on body-supplied event ids with no
+ * ownership filter, so an admin/editor scoped to their own events (the
+ * single-event routes enforce requireEventOwnership) could archive or
+ * cascade-delete ANY event by id. filterOwnedEventIds is the helper those
+ * routes now use to drop foreign/non-existent ids.
+ */
+
+// events owned by admin 7; event 3 owned by someone else; event 4 is
+// ownerless (legacy). The mock models:
+//   whereIn('id', ids).andWhere(created_by IS NULL OR created_by = admin.id)
+const EVENTS = [
+  { id: 1, created_by: 7 },
+  { id: 2, created_by: 7 },
+  { id: 3, created_by: 99 },   // foreign
+  { id: 4, created_by: null }, // ownerless/legacy
+];
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: () => {
+    const q = {
+      _ids: null,
+      _adminId: null,
+      whereIn(_col, ids) { this._ids = ids; return this; },
+      andWhere(cb) {
+        // Emulate the (created_by IS NULL OR created_by = admin.id) builder
+        // by capturing the admin id the callback closes over via a probe.
+        const probe = {
+          _adminId: null,
+          whereNull() { return this; },
+          orWhere(_col, id) { this._adminId = id; return this; },
+        };
+        cb(probe);
+        this._adminId = probe._adminId;
+        return this;
+      },
+      select() {
+        return Promise.resolve(
+          EVENTS
+            .filter((e) => this._ids.includes(e.id))
+            .filter((e) => e.created_by === null || e.created_by === this._adminId)
+            .map((e) => ({ id: e.id }))
+        );
+      },
+    };
+    return q;
+  },
+}));
+
+const { filterOwnedEventIds } = require('../../src/middleware/ownership');
+
+describe('filterOwnedEventIds', () => {
+  it('super_admin gets every id, nothing denied', async () => {
+    const { allowed, denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(
+      { id: 7, roleName: 'super_admin' }, [1, 3, 4, 999]
+    );
+    expect(allowed).toEqual([1, 3, 4, 999]);
+    expect(denied).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('non-super_admin keeps owned + ownerless, denies foreign and non-existent', async () => {
+    const { allowed, denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(
+      { id: 7, roleName: 'admin' }, [1, 2, 3, 4, 999]
+    );
+    expect(allowed.sort()).toEqual([1, 2, 4]);   // owns 1,2; 4 is ownerless
+    expect(denied.sort()).toEqual([3, 999]);      // 3 foreign, 999 missing
+  });
+
+  it('foreign-only request yields empty allowed', async () => {
+    const { allowed, denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(
+      { id: 7, roleName: 'editor' }, [3]
+    );
+    expect(allowed).toEqual([]);
+    expect(denied).toEqual([3]);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test for the cross-event thumbnail enumeration leak.
+ *
+ * Thumbnails are served flat from /thumbnails/thumb_<name> with
+ * deterministic, enumerable filenames. photoAuth previously granted any
+ * holder of a gallery token for ANY active event access to ANY thumbnail
+ * (it set eventSlug=null and returned next() as long as the token's event
+ * existed), so a visitor to one gallery could pull another (password-
+ * protected) gallery's entire thumbnail set. The fix scopes thumbnail
+ * access to the token's event by matching the requested file against
+ * photos.thumbnail_path for that event_id.
+ */
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'test-secret-thumbnail-scope-000000000000';
+
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+// Two events, each owning one thumbnail. The photos mock resolves a row
+// only when BOTH event_id and thumbnail_path match — i.e. it models the
+// real ownership query.
+const EVENTS = [
+  { id: 10, slug: 'event-a', is_active: 1 },
+  { id: 20, slug: 'event-b', is_active: 1 },
+];
+const PHOTOS = [
+  { id: 1, event_id: 10, thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_event-a_ceremony_0001.jpg' },
+  { id: 2, event_id: 20, thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg' },
+];
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: (table) => ({
+    _cond: null,
+    where(cond) { this._cond = cond; return this; },
+    first() {
+      if (table === 'events') {
+        return Promise.resolve(EVENTS.find((e) => e.id === this._cond.id) || null);
+      }
+      if (table === 'photos') {
+        return Promise.resolve(
+          PHOTOS.find((p) => p.event_id === this._cond.event_id
+            && p.thumbnail_path === this._cond.thumbnail_path) || null
+        );
+      }
+      return Promise.resolve(null);
+    },
+  }),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+  info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+const photoAuth = require('../../src/middleware/photoAuth');
+
+function galleryToken(eventId) {
+  return jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+}
+
+function makeReqRes(token, thumbPath) {
+  const req = { path: thumbPath, headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, cookies: {} };
+  const res = {
+    statusCode: null,
+    body: null,
+    status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
+    json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
+  };
+  return { req, res };
+}
+
+describe('photoAuth — thumbnail ownership scoping', () => {
+  it('denies a gallery token for event A fetching event B\'s thumbnail', async () => {
+    const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(10), '/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg');
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await photoAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    // Access denied: middleware must not pass the request through.
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+    expect(req.event).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('allows a gallery token to fetch its own event\'s thumbnail', async () => {
+    const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(20), '/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg');
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await photoAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.event).toMatchObject({ id: 20 });
+  });
+
+  it('denies a traversal / foreign filename that matches no owned thumbnail', async () => {
+    const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(10), '/thumb_../../etc/passwd');
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await photoAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+    expect(req.event).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+/**
+ * HTTP smoke tests for the core admin event CRUD endpoints:
+ *   POST   /api/admin/events           (create)
+ *   GET    /api/admin/events           (list + pagination)
+ *   GET    /api/admin/events/:id       (detail + stats)
+ *   PUT    /api/admin/events/:id       (update)
+ *   DELETE /api/admin/events/:id       (cascade delete)
+ *
+ * Safety net ahead of the adminEvents.js god-file decomposition —
+ * pins the request/response contracts of the main CRUD paths using
+ * the same real-SQLite harness as slideshowAdmin.test.js.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-events-smoke-')), 'db.sqlite'
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-events-test-secret';
+
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+async function insertEvent(db, adminId, over = {}) {
+  const base = {
+    slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    event_type: 'wedding',
+    event_name: 'Test Wedding',
+    event_date: '2026-05-29',
+    host_email: 'host@example.com',
+    admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+    is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+    created_by: adminId,
+    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    ...over,
+  };
+  const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
+  return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+}
+
+describe('admin events CRUD endpoints (smoke)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let token;
+
+  // bootCrmDb's full migration run intermittently exceeds Jest's default
+  // 5s beforeAll timeout on slower CI runners; raise it.
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+    app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+      res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
+    });
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('email_queue').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+  });
+
+  const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+  it('401s without an admin token', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get('/api/admin/events');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+
+  describe('POST /', () => {
+    it('creates an event, mints slug + share link and persists the row', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/events')).send({
+        event_type: 'wedding',
+        event_name: 'Smoke Wedding',
+        event_date: '2026-09-01',
+        // Field requirements default to ON (getEventFieldRequirements)
+        // so customer + admin contact data must be supplied.
+        customer_name: 'Client Person',
+        customer_email: 'client@example.com',
+        admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+        require_password: false,
+        is_draft: true,
+      });
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.id).toBeDefined();
+      expect(res.body.slug).toContain('wedding-smoke-wedding');
+      expect(typeof res.body.share_link).toBe('string');
+      expect(res.body.is_draft).toBe(true);
+
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id: res.body.id }).first();
+      expect(row).toBeDefined();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('Smoke Wedding');
+      expect(row.created_by).toBe(adminId);
+
+      // Folder structure is created under STORAGE_PATH/events/active/<slug>.
+      const eventDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', res.body.slug);
+      expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(eventDir, 'collages'))).toBe(true);
+      expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(eventDir, 'individual'))).toBe(true);
+
+      // Draft creates must NOT queue the gallery_created email.
+      const queued = await db('email_queue').where({ event_id: res.body.id });
+      expect(queued).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('400s on an invalid event type', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/events')).send({
+        event_type: 'not-a-real-type',
+        event_name: 'Broken',
+        require_password: false,
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(Array.isArray(res.body.errors)).toBe(true);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('GET /', () => {
+    it('lists events with pagination metadata and photo counts', async () => {
+      await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Alpha' });
+      await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Beta' });
+
+      const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/events'));
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.events).toHaveLength(2);
+      expect(res.body.pagination).toMatchObject({ page: 1, total: 2, totalPages: 1 });
+      for (const ev of res.body.events) {
+        expect(ev.photo_count).toBe(0);
+      }
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('GET /:id', () => {
+    it('returns the event with photo/view stats', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Detail Event' });
+      const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${id}`));
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.event_name).toBe('Detail Event');
+      expect(res.body.photo_count).toBe(0);
+      expect(res.body.total_views).toBe(0);
+      expect(res.body.total_downloads).toBe(0);
+      expect(Array.isArray(res.body.recent_photos)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('404s for an unknown event id', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/events/999999'));
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('PUT /:id', () => {
+    it('updates mutable fields and persists them', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Before' });
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
+        event_name: 'After',
+        welcome_message: 'Hello guests',
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('After');
+      expect(row.welcome_message).toBe('Hello guests');
+    });
+
+    it('404s when updating a missing event', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/events/999999')).send({
+        event_name: 'Ghost',
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    // #822 — hero_logo_visible/position are nullable (null = "inherit the global
+    // branding toggle"), but the validator used .optional() without
+    // { nullable: true }, so an explicit null was rejected with 400.
+    it('accepts hero_logo_visible: null and stores NULL (inherit)', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { hero_logo_visible: 1 });
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
+        hero_logo_visible: null,
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.hero_logo_visible).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('still rejects a non-boolean hero_logo_visible', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
+        hero_logo_visible: 'maybe',
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('DELETE /:id', () => {
+    it('cascade-deletes the event row', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
+      const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/events/${id}`));
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.message).toMatch(/deleted/i);
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('404s when deleting a missing event', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).delete('/api/admin/events/999999'));
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+/**
+ * HTTP-level tests for the admin TOTP MFA feature (#738).
+ *
+ * Two surfaces:
+ *   1. Enrollment (adminAuth-gated) — POST /mfa/setup, /mfa/enable,
+ *      GET /mfa/status, POST /mfa/disable — mounted like server.js at
+ *      /api/admin/auth (src/routes/adminAuth.js).
+ *   2. Login challenge — POST /admin/login + POST /admin/login/mfa
+ *      (src/routes/auth.js, mounted /api/auth).
+ *
+ * Uses the same real-SQLite harness as the CRM route tests
+ * (bootCrmDb + seedMinimal + mintAdminToken). Valid TOTP codes are
+ * generated in-test via otplib's authenticator against the secret the
+ * /setup endpoint returns in plaintext.
+ *
+ * NOTE: env (TEST_DATABASE_PATH / JWT_SECRET) must be set BEFORE the
+ * first require of db.js — mirror adminCrmAuth.test.js exactly.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-adminmfa-test-'));
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite');
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mfa-route-test-secret';
+// reCAPTCHA disabled (default) → verifyRecaptcha returns true, so login
+// tests don't need a token. Be explicit so a leaked env can't flip it on.
+delete process.env.RECAPTCHA_SECRET_KEY;
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const { authenticator } = require('otplib');
+
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
+} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+jest.setTimeout(60000);
+
+let db;
+let cleanup;
+let adminApp; // /api/admin/auth  (enrollment)
+let authApp; // /api/auth        (login challenge)
+
+/**
+ * Seed a bare admin (password known) and return its id + login creds.
+ * seedMinimal always creates username 'tester'; we need distinct rows per
+ * scenario, so insert directly with a unique username/email.
+ */
+async function seedAdmin({ username, superAdmin = false } = {}) {
+  const password = 'correct-horse';
+  const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(password, 4);
+  const uname = username || `admin-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
+  const row = {
+    username: uname,
+    email: `${uname}@example.com`,
+    password_hash: passwordHash,
+    must_change_password: false,
+    is_active: true,
+    created_at: new Date(),
+  };
+  if (superAdmin) {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
+    if (!role) throw new Error('super_admin role not seeded');
+    row.role_id = role.id;
+  }
+  const inserted = await db('admin_users').insert(row).returning('id');
+  const id = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+  return { id, username: uname, password };
+}
+
+/** Run the full setup→enable enrollment against the live app. Returns
+ * the plaintext TOTP secret (for later login codes) and recovery codes. */
+async function enroll(adminId) {
+  const token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+  const setup = await request(adminApp)
+    .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+  expect(setup.status).toBe(200);
+  const secret = setup.body.secret;
+
+  const enable = await request(adminApp)
+    .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/enable')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+    .send({ code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
+  expect(enable.status).toBe(200);
+  return { secret, recoveryCodes: enable.body.recoveryCodes, token };
+}
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  adminApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/auth', require('../../src/routes/adminAuth'));
+  authApp = buildRouteApp('/api/auth', require('../../src/routes/auth'));
+}, 60000);
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+});
+
+describe('MFA enrollment — /api/admin/auth/mfa/*', () => {
+  it('setup returns a secret + otpauth URI + QR and does NOT enable yet', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const token = mintAdminToken(admin.id);
+
+    const res = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.secret).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    expect(res.body.otpauthUri).toMatch(/^otpauth:\/\/totp\//);
+    expect(res.body.qr).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
+
+    // Not yet enabled: status must still report disabled.
+    const status = await request(adminApp)
+      .get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+    expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
+
+    // And the row stores an encrypted secret (not the plaintext one).
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(row.two_factor_secret).not.toBe(res.body.secret);
+    expect(Number(row.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('full flow: setup → enable(valid TOTP) → status shows enabled + 10 recovery codes', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { recoveryCodes, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+
+    expect(Array.isArray(recoveryCodes)).toBe(true);
+    expect(recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
+
+    const status = await request(adminApp)
+      .get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+    expect(status.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(true);
+    expect(status.body.recoveryCodesRemaining).toBe(10);
+    expect(status.body.enrolledAt).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('enable with a WRONG code is rejected (400) and MFA stays off', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const token = mintAdminToken(admin.id);
+    const setup = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+    const valid = authenticator.generate(setup.body.secret);
+    const wrong = valid === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
+
+    const res = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/enable')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ code: wrong });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+
+    const status = await request(adminApp)
+      .get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+    expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('enable before setup is rejected', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const token = mintAdminToken(admin.id);
+    const res = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/enable')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ code: '123456' });
+    // No provisional secret → ValidationError (400).
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('all enrollment endpoints require a valid admin token (401 without one)', async () => {
+    const noToken = await request(adminApp).get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status');
+    expect(noToken.status).toBe(401);
+    const setup = await request(adminApp).post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup');
+    expect(setup.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+
+  // Regression guard for #735: super_admin used to be blocked from enrolling.
+  // Enrollment operates on req.admin.id and is role-agnostic — assert a
+  // super_admin can complete the full setup→enable flow.
+  it('#735 regression — a super_admin can enroll in MFA', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin({ superAdmin: true });
+    const { recoveryCodes, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    expect(recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
+
+    const status = await request(adminApp)
+      .get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+    expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('MFA disable — /api/admin/auth/mfa/disable', () => {
+  it('requires a valid code; a wrong code is rejected and state persists', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+
+    const bad = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ code: '000000' });
+    expect(bad.status).toBe(400);
+
+    const stillOn = await request(adminApp)
+      .get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+    expect(stillOn.body.enabled).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('a valid TOTP disables MFA and clears the stored secret', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+
+    const res = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const status = await request(adminApp)
+      .get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+    expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
+    expect(status.body.recoveryCodesRemaining).toBe(0);
+
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeNull();
+    expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Admin login challenge — /api/auth/admin/login[/mfa]', () => {
+  it('an enrolled admin gets mfaRequired + mfaToken, NO session cookie', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    await enroll(admin.id);
+
+    const res = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.mfaRequired).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.body.mfaToken).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    expect(res.body.user).toBeUndefined(); // no completed session
+    // No admin auth cookie should have been set on the challenge response.
+    const cookies = res.headers['set-cookie'] || [];
+    expect(cookies.join(';')).not.toMatch(/adminToken/i);
+  });
+
+  it('a NON-enrolled admin logs in directly (no mfaRequired)', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const res = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.mfaRequired).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.body.user).toBeDefined();
+    expect(res.body.user.username).toBe(admin.username);
+  });
+
+  it('login/mfa with a valid TOTP completes the session', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+
+    const challenge = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const { mfaToken } = challenge.body;
+
+    const res = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken, code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.user).toBeDefined();
+    expect(res.body.user.id).toBe(admin.id);
+  });
+
+  it('login/mfa with a wrong code is 401 MFA_INVALID', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const challenge = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+
+    const valid = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const wrong = valid === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
+    const res = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: challenge.body.mfaToken, code: wrong });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(res.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
+    expect(res.body.user).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('a recovery code logs in and is then single-use (second use fails)', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { recoveryCodes } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const recovery = recoveryCodes[0];
+
+    // First challenge + recovery-code exchange succeeds.
+    const c1 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const first = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c1.body.mfaToken, code: recovery });
+    expect(first.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(first.body.user).toBeDefined();
+
+    // recoveryCodesRemaining dropped by one.
+    const status = await request(adminApp)
+      .get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${mintAdminToken(admin.id)}`);
+    expect(status.body.recoveryCodesRemaining).toBe(9);
+
+    // Second use of the SAME recovery code must fail.
+    const c2 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const second = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c2.body.mfaToken, code: recovery });
+    expect(second.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(second.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
+  });
+
+  it('login/mfa rejects a non-mfa_pending token (e.g. a normal admin JWT)', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    await enroll(admin.id);
+    const res = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: mintAdminToken(admin.id), code: '123456' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test for GHSA-9hmx-68vc-qpqw — share-link login must not bypass
+ * the gallery password.
+ *
+ * POST /auth/gallery/share-login validates only the share token. For a
+ * password-protected gallery it previously minted a full `type:'gallery'`
+ * access token on the share token alone, letting anyone holding the share URL
+ * read the gallery without the password. The fix: when the gallery requires a
+ * password, return `{ requires_password: true }` with NO token and NO cookie.
+ */
+
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'share-login-test-secret';
+
+const events = [];
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  function dbFn(table) {
+    if (table === 'events') {
+      let filter = () => true;
+      return {
+        where(criteria) {
+          filter = (row) => Object.entries(criteria).every(([k, v]) => {
+            if (k === 'is_active') return Boolean(row.is_active) === Boolean(v);
+            if (k === 'is_archived') return Boolean(row.is_archived) === Boolean(v);
+            return row[k] === v;
+          });
+          return this;
+        },
+        async first() { return events.find(filter); },
+      };
+    }
+    return { where() { return this; }, async first() { return undefined; } };
+  }
+  dbFn.raw = async () => {};
+  return { db: dbFn, logActivity: async () => {} };
+});
+
+// Share token is stored plainly on the fake event row.
+jest.mock('../../src/services/shareLinkService', () => ({
+  getEventShareToken: (event) => event.share_token,
+  resolveShareIdentifier: async () => ({ event: null }),
+}));
+
+const mockSetGalleryAuthCookies = jest.fn();
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenUtils', () => ({
+  setGalleryAuthCookies: (...args) => mockSetGalleryAuthCookies(...args),
+  clearGalleryAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
+  getGalleryTokenFromRequest: jest.fn(),
+  setAdminAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/authSecurity', () => ({
+  trackFailedAttempt: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+  trackSuccessfulLogin: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+  checkAccountLockout: jest.fn(async () => ({ isLocked: false })),
+  resetLockout: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+}));
+
+// Collaborators the router imports at load but the share-login path doesn't hit.
+jest.mock('../../src/services/recaptcha', () => ({ verifyRecaptcha: async () => true }));
+jest.mock('../../src/services/mfaService', () => ({}));
+jest.mock('../../src/middleware/sessionTimeout', () => ({ endSession: jest.fn(), sessionTimeoutMiddleware: (req, res, next) => next() }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ revokeToken: jest.fn(async () => {}), isTokenRevoked: async () => false }));
+
+const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
+
+function makeApp() {
+  const app = express();
+  app.use(express.json());
+  app.use('/auth', authRouter);
+  return app;
+}
+
+const SHARE_TOKEN = 'a'.repeat(64);
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  events.length = 0;
+  mockSetGalleryAuthCookies.mockClear();
+});
+
+describe('POST /auth/gallery/share-login password enforcement', () => {
+  it('does NOT mint a token for a password-protected gallery', async () => {
+    events.push({
+      id: 1, slug: 'private-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
+      require_password: 1, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Private',
+    });
+    const res = await request(makeApp())
+      .post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
+      .send({ slug: 'private-gallery', token: SHARE_TOKEN });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.requires_password).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('mints a token for a public (no-password) gallery', async () => {
+    events.push({
+      id: 2, slug: 'public-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
+      require_password: false, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Public',
+    });
+    const res = await request(makeApp())
+      .post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
+      .send({ slug: 'public-gallery', token: SHARE_TOKEN });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(typeof res.body.token).toBe('string');
+    expect(res.body.event).toBeDefined();
+    expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a wrong share token regardless of password setting', async () => {
+    events.push({
+      id: 3, slug: 'public-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
+      require_password: false, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Public',
+    });
+    const res = await request(makeApp())
+      .post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
+      .send({ slug: 'public-gallery', token: 'b'.repeat(64) });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test for GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq — broken access control in the legacy
+ * /api/events router.
+ *
+ * The legacy router exposed create/list/update/delete/extend guarded by
+ * adminAuth ALONE (no requirePermission, no requireEventOwnership), so any
+ * back-office account — down to a read-only viewer — could read every gallery's
+ * password_hash/share_token and take over any gallery. The fix removes that
+ * router entirely and migrates its one UI-used route (POST /:id/extend) to the
+ * canonical /api/admin/events mount, where it inherits the permission +
+ * ownership guards.
+ *
+ * This test pins two invariants:
+ *   1. The legacy source file is gone (nothing can re-mount it).
+ *   2. The migrated extend route enforces ownership — a non-owning editor gets
+ *      403, the owner succeeds.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-legacy-acl-')), 'db.sqlite'
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'legacy-acl-test-secret';
+
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+async function insertEvent(db, ownerId, over = {}) {
+  const base = {
+    slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    event_type: 'wedding',
+    event_name: 'Owner Gallery',
+    event_date: '2026-05-29',
+    host_email: 'host@example.com',
+    admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+    is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+    created_by: ownerId,
+    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    ...over,
+  };
+  const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
+  return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+}
+
+describe('GHSA-4j34: legacy /api/events router removed + extend guarded', () => {
+  it('the legacy events router source file no longer exists', () => {
+    expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../src/routes/events.js'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  describe('POST /api/admin/events/:id/extend ownership enforcement', () => {
+    let db; let cleanup; let app;
+    let ownerId; let ownerToken;
+    let editorId; let editorToken;
+
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+      ({ adminId: ownerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+      await assignAdminRole(db, ownerId, 'super_admin');
+      ownerToken = mintAdminToken(ownerId);
+
+      // A second, non-owning account with the low-trust editor role.
+      [editorId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
+        username: 'editor1', email: 'editor1@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'x', is_active: 1,
+      }).returning('id');
+      editorId = editorId?.id ?? editorId;
+      await assignAdminRole(db, editorId, 'editor');
+      editorToken = mintAdminToken(editorId);
+
+      app = express();
+      app.use(express.json());
+      app.use(cookieParser());
+      app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+      app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+        res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
+      });
+    }, 120000);
+
+    afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
+
+    it('lets the owner extend their own gallery', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId, { expires_at: '2026-06-01T00:00:00.000Z' });
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${ownerToken}`)
+        .send({ days: 10 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(new Date(res.body.expires_at).toISOString()).toBe('2026-06-11T00:00:00.000Z');
+    });
+
+    it('403s a non-owning editor trying to extend someone else\'s gallery', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId); // owned by the super_admin
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`)
+        .send({ days: 30 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403); // requireEventOwnership blocks it
+    });
+
+    it('validates the days field', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId);
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${ownerToken}`)
+        .send({ days: 9999 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    });
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+
+// Point storage at a throwaway temp dir before requiring the service so the
+// module-level getStoragePath() picks it up if evaluated.
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-chunk-test-${process.pid}`);
+
+const chunkedUpload = require('../../src/services/chunkedUploadService');
+
+describe('chunkedUploadService.initializeUpload filename sanitisation (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j)', () => {
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await fs.rm(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  it('strips directory-traversal components from the stored filename', async () => {
+    const { uploadId } = await chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
+      filename: '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg',
+      fileSize: 10,
+      mimeType: 'video/mp4',
+      eventId: 1,
+      totalChunks: 1,
+    });
+    const meta = chunkedUpload.getUploadStatus(uploadId);
+    // basename('../../uploads/logos/evil.svg') === 'evil.svg' — the traversal
+    // is gone, so path.join(tempDir, filename) can no longer escape tempDir.
+    expect(meta.filename).toBe('evil.svg');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps a normal filename intact', async () => {
+    const { uploadId } = await chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
+      filename: 'clip.mp4',
+      fileSize: 10,
+      mimeType: 'video/mp4',
+      eventId: 1,
+      totalChunks: 1,
+    });
+    expect(uploadId).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a filename that collapses to nothing', async () => {
+    await expect(
+      chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
+        filename: '../',
+        fileSize: 10,
+        mimeType: 'video/mp4',
+        eventId: 1,
+        totalChunks: 1,
+      })
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/Invalid filename/);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/**
+ * Regression tests for the Docker update instructions (environmentService).
+ *
+ * A production install (docker-compose.production.yml) must get `-f
+ * docker-compose.production.yml` in every update command — bare `docker compose`
+ * targets docker-compose.yml, a different build-based stack that also starts the
+ * dev-only mailhog, which left production users stranded on the old version
+ * (reported against 3.44.0 → 3.45.2).
+ */
+const { detectEnvironment, generateUpdateInstructions } = require('../../src/services/environmentService');
+
+describe('detectEnvironment — production compose detection', () => {
+  const orig = process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL;
+  afterEach(() => {
+    if (orig === undefined) delete process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL;
+    else process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL = orig;
+  });
+
+  it('flags isProductionCompose when PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL is set', async () => {
+    process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL = 'stable';
+    const env = await detectEnvironment();
+    expect(env.isProductionCompose).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('does not flag it when the var is absent (default docker-compose.yml)', async () => {
+    delete process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL;
+    const env = await detectEnvironment();
+    expect(env.isProductionCompose).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('generateUpdateInstructions — Docker commands', () => {
+  const cmds = (env) => generateUpdateInstructions(env, '3.45.2').steps.map((s) => s.command);
+
+  it('targets docker-compose.production.yml for a production install', () => {
+    const commands = cmds({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: true });
+    expect(commands).toEqual([
+      'docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml pull',
+      'docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml up -d',
+      'docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml logs -f backend',
+    ]);
+    // And the warning tells them where to run it.
+    const { warnings } = generateUpdateInstructions({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: true }, '3.45.2');
+    expect(warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/docker-compose\.production\.yml/);
+  });
+
+  it('uses bare commands + a hint when not a production compose', () => {
+    const commands = cmds({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: false });
+    expect(commands).toEqual([
+      'docker compose pull',
+      'docker compose up -d',
+      'docker compose logs -f backend',
+    ]);
+    const { warnings } = generateUpdateInstructions({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: false }, '3.45.2');
+    // Still nudges production users to add -f in case detection missed.
+    expect(warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/-f docker-compose\.production\.yml/);
+  });
+});
@@ -72,9 +72,16 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/businessProfileService', () => ({
  resolveBankAccountForCurrency: jest.fn(async () => null),
 }));

-jest.mock('../../src/utils/documentSequences', () => ({
-  claimNextSequence: jest.fn(async () => 42),
-}));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/documentSequences', () => {
+  const claimNextSequence = jest.fn(async () => 42);
+  // Delegates to the claimNextSequence mock so call-count assertions
+  // below keep observing sequence claims.
+  const nextDocumentNumber = jest.fn(async (kind, settingKey, defaultFormat, trx) => {
+    const seq = await claimNextSequence(kind, 2026, trx);
+    return `R-2026-${String(seq).padStart(4, '0')}`;
+  });
+  return { claimNextSequence, nextDocumentNumber };
+});

 jest.mock('../../src/services/pdfService', () => ({
  renderInvoiceToBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('pdf')),
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+/**
+ * Smoke tests for invoiceService's primary flows ahead of the god-file
+ * decomposition — createInvoice happy path (incl. the line-item
+ * totals/VAT math), list/get reads, and the status-transition guards
+ * on cancelInvoice / releaseForDelivery.
+ *
+ * Uses the same deep-mocked db pattern as
+ * invoiceService.installmentPlan.test.js — chains are queued per table
+ * and assertions probe insert/update call shapes rather than SQL.
+ */
+
+const chains = [];
+function makeChain() {
+  const c = {
+    _firstValue: undefined,
+    _updateResult: 1,
+    _insertResult: [{ id: 999 }],
+    _selectResult: [],
+    then: function (onResolve, onReject) {
+      return Promise.resolve(this._selectResult).then(onResolve, onReject);
+    },
+    where: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    whereNot: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    whereIn: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    whereNull: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    whereNotNull: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    andWhere: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    orderBy: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    limit: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    select: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    sum: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    count: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    clone: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    clearSelect: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    clearOrder: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    offset: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    first: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(this._firstValue); }),
+    update: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(this._updateResult); }),
+    insert: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    returning: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(this._insertResult); }),
+    del: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(1); }),
+    onConflict: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    ignore: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(1); }),
+    merge: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(1); }),
+    increment: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    forUpdate: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+    leftJoin: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
+  };
+  chains.push(c);
+  return c;
+}
+
+const tableChains = {};
+function pickChainFor(name) {
+  if (!tableChains[name]) tableChains[name] = makeChain();
+  return tableChains[name];
+}
+
+const mockDbFn = jest.fn((name) => pickChainFor(name));
+mockDbFn.transaction = jest.fn(async (cb) => cb(mockDbFn));
+mockDbFn.schema = { hasTable: jest.fn(async () => false) };
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: mockDbFn,
+  withRetry: jest.fn(async (fn) => fn()),
+  logActivity: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/appSettings', () => ({
+  getAppSetting: jest.fn(async () => null),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/businessProfileService', () => ({
+  getProfile: jest.fn(async () => ({ profile: { default_currency: 'CHF' } })),
+  resolveBankAccountForCurrency: jest.fn(async () => null),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/documentSequences', () => {
+  const claimNextSequence = jest.fn(async () => 42);
+  // Delegates to the claimNextSequence mock so call-count assertions
+  // below keep observing sequence claims.
+  const nextDocumentNumber = jest.fn(async (kind, settingKey, defaultFormat, trx) => {
+    const seq = await claimNextSequence(kind, 2026, trx);
+    return `R-2026-${String(seq).padStart(4, '0')}`;
+  });
+  return { claimNextSequence, nextDocumentNumber };
+});
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/pdfService', () => ({
+  renderInvoiceToBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('pdf')),
+  renderQuoteToBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('pdf')),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/emailProcessor', () => ({
+  queueEmail: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+  info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+const invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
+
+function resetChains() {
+  for (const k of Object.keys(tableChains)) delete tableChains[k];
+  jest.clearAllMocks();
+}
+
+const activeCustomer = {
+  id: 5, is_active: 1, feature_bills: 1,
+  billing_cadence: 'per_event', preferred_language: 'de',
+};
+
+describe('createInvoice — happy path + totals', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => resetChains());
+
+  it('creates a single invoice with a claimed sequence number and computed totals/VAT', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { ...activeCustomer };
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._insertResult = [{ id: 777 }];
+
+    const result = await invoiceService.createInvoice({
+      customerAccountId: 5,
+      vatRate: 8.1,
+      lineItems: [
+        // 2 × 100.00 = 200.00
+        { position: 1, description: 'Shoot', quantity: 2, unit_price_minor: 10000 },
+        // 50.00 with 10% discount = 45.00
+        { position: 2, description: 'Discounted extra', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 5000, discount_percent: 10 },
+        // Parent header — total auto-resolves from priced sub-items (350.00)
+        { position: 3, description: 'Package', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 0 },
+        { position: 4, description: 'Camera', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 15000, parent_position: 3 },
+        { position: 5, description: 'Lens', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 20000, parent_position: 3 },
+      ],
+    }, 1);
+
+    expect(result.invoiceIds).toEqual([777]);
+
+    // Net = 20000 + 4500 + 35000 (resolved parent) — sub-items must NOT
+    // double-count. VAT = round(59500 × 8.1%) = 4820.
+    expect(pickChainFor('invoices').insert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({
+      invoice_number: 'R-2026-0042',
+      customer_account_id: 5,
+      currency: 'CHF',
+      status: 'scheduled',
+      net_amount_minor: 59500,
+      vat_rate: 8.1,
+      vat_amount_minor: 4820,
+      shipping_amount_minor: 0,
+      total_amount_minor: 64320,
+      installment_total: 1,
+    }));
+    // Exactly one sequence number claimed for a single-row create.
+    const { claimNextSequence } = require('../../src/utils/documentSequences');
+    expect(claimNextSequence).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    // Line items landed in invoice_line_items.
+    expect(pickChainFor('invoice_line_items').insert).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('409s on a deactivated customer before touching the sequence', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { ...activeCustomer, is_active: 0 };
+    await expect(invoiceService.createInvoice({
+      customerAccountId: 5, vatRate: 0, lineItems: [],
+    }, 1)).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409 });
+    const { claimNextSequence } = require('../../src/utils/documentSequences');
+    expect(claimNextSequence).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('400s + INVOICE_TOTAL_NEGATIVE when discounts push the total below zero', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { ...activeCustomer };
+    await expect(invoiceService.createInvoice({
+      customerAccountId: 5,
+      vatRate: 7.7,
+      lineItems: [
+        { position: 1, description: 'Shoot', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 5000 },
+        { position: 2, description: 'Rabatt', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: -8000 },
+      ],
+    }, 1)).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400, code: 'INVOICE_TOTAL_NEGATIVE' });
+    const { claimNextSequence } = require('../../src/utils/documentSequences');
+    expect(claimNextSequence).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('listInvoices / getInvoiceById — read paths (smoke)', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => resetChains());
+
+  it('lists invoices with total + pagination echo', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._selectResult = [
+      { id: 1, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0001' },
+      { id: 2, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0002' },
+    ];
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = { total: 7 };
+
+    const result = await invoiceService.listInvoices({ page: 2, pageSize: 10 });
+
+    expect(result.rows).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(result.total).toBe(7);
+    expect(result.page).toBe(2);
+    expect(result.pageSize).toBe(10);
+    expect(pickChainFor('invoices').offset).toHaveBeenCalledWith(10);
+    expect(pickChainFor('invoices').limit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(10);
+  });
+
+  it('getInvoiceById returns { invoice, lineItems, payments } when found', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = { id: 3, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0003' };
+    pickChainFor('invoice_line_items as li')._selectResult = [
+      { id: 30, position: 1, description: 'Shoot' },
+    ];
+    pickChainFor('invoice_payment_log')._selectResult = [];
+
+    const result = await invoiceService.getInvoiceById(3);
+    expect(result.invoice).toMatchObject({ id: 3, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0003' });
+    expect(result.lineItems).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(result.payments).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('getInvoiceById returns null for an unknown id', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = undefined;
+    await expect(invoiceService.getInvoiceById(404)).resolves.toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('status transitions — cancelInvoice / releaseForDelivery guards', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => resetChains());
+
+  it('soft-cancels a scheduled (never-issued) invoice without a Storno', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
+      id: 9, status: 'scheduled', kind: 'invoice', event_id: null,
+    };
+    const result = await invoiceService.cancelInvoice(9, 1);
+    expect(result).toEqual({ cancelled: true, stornoId: null });
+    expect(pickChainFor('invoices').update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ status: 'cancelled' })
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('409s + ALREADY_CANCELLED on a second cancel', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
+      id: 9, status: 'cancelled', kind: 'invoice',
+    };
+    await expect(invoiceService.cancelInvoice(9, 1))
+      .rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409, code: 'ALREADY_CANCELLED' });
+  });
+
+  it('409s + IS_STORNO when trying to cancel a Storno document', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
+      id: 10, status: 'sent', kind: 'storno',
+    };
+    await expect(invoiceService.cancelInvoice(10, 1))
+      .rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409, code: 'IS_STORNO' });
+  });
+
+  it('releaseForDelivery 409s + NOT_PENDING_DELIVERY on a non-pending invoice', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
+      id: 11, status: 'sent', kind: 'invoice',
+    };
+    await expect(invoiceService.releaseForDelivery(11, 1))
+      .rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409, code: 'NOT_PENDING_DELIVERY' });
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/**
+ * Unit tests for mfaService — admin TOTP MFA (#738).
+ *
+ * Pure unit: no DB, no Express. Exercises the crypto/verification surface
+ * directly. JWT_SECRET is set at the top so getEncryptionKey()'s scrypt
+ * derivation has key material (the service derives the AES key from
+ * MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY, falling back to JWT_SECRET).
+ */
+
+// Must be set BEFORE the service is required — the key is derived lazily per
+// call, but keep it explicit and stable so encrypt/decrypt round-trips.
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mfa-unit-test-secret';
+delete process.env.MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY; // ensure we derive from JWT_SECRET
+
+const { authenticator } = require('otplib');
+const mfaService = require('../../src/services/mfaService');
+
+describe('mfaService — secret encryption (AES-256-GCM)', () => {
+  it('round-trips encrypt → decrypt to the original secret', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const blob = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
+    expect(blob).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    expect(blob).not.toContain(secret); // stored form is not plaintext
+    expect(blob.split('.')).toHaveLength(3); // iv.tag.ciphertext
+    expect(mfaService.decryptSecret(blob)).toBe(secret);
+  });
+
+  it('produces a different ciphertext each time (random IV) but decrypts identically', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const a = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
+    const b = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
+    expect(a).not.toBe(b);
+    expect(mfaService.decryptSecret(a)).toBe(secret);
+    expect(mfaService.decryptSecret(b)).toBe(secret);
+  });
+
+  it('throws when decrypting a malformed blob (wrong segment count)', () => {
+    expect(() => mfaService.decryptSecret('garbage')).toThrow();
+    expect(() => mfaService.decryptSecret('only.two')).toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('throws when the auth tag / ciphertext is tampered with', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const [iv, tag, ct] = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret).split('.');
+    // Flip a character in the ciphertext → GCM auth check must fail.
+    const tampered = ct.slice(0, -2) + (ct.slice(-2) === 'AA' ? 'BB' : 'AA');
+    expect(() => mfaService.decryptSecret([iv, tag, tampered].join('.'))).toThrow();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('mfaService — TOTP verification', () => {
+  it('accepts a freshly generated code for the plaintext secret', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('tolerates whitespace in the submitted code', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(` ${code} `, secret)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a wrong code', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const wrong = code === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(wrong, secret)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('returns false for empty inputs rather than throwing', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp('', secret)).toBe(false);
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp('123456', '')).toBe(false);
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(null, secret)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('verifies through the encrypted blob (verifyTotpEncrypted)', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const stored = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(code, stored)).toBe(true);
+
+    const wrong = code === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(wrong, stored)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('verifyTotpEncrypted returns false (no throw) for a corrupt blob', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(code, 'not-a-valid-blob')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('mfaService — otpauth URI / QR', () => {
+  it('builds an otpauth:// URI containing issuer, account and secret', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const uri = mfaService.buildOtpauthUri('admin@example.com', secret);
+    expect(uri).toMatch(/^otpauth:\/\/totp\//);
+    expect(uri).toContain(encodeURIComponent(mfaService.ISSUER));
+    expect(uri).toContain(`secret=${secret}`);
+  });
+
+  it('builds a PNG data-URL QR for the URI', async () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const uri = mfaService.buildOtpauthUri('admin@example.com', secret);
+    const qr = await mfaService.buildQrDataUrl(uri);
+    expect(qr).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('mfaService — recovery codes', () => {
+  it('generates 10 distinct plaintext codes and 10 distinct hashes', async () => {
+    const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
+    expect(plain).toHaveLength(mfaService.RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT);
+    expect(hashed).toHaveLength(mfaService.RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT);
+    expect(new Set(plain).size).toBe(10);
+    expect(new Set(hashed).size).toBe(10);
+    // Hashes are bcrypt, not the plaintext.
+    hashed.forEach((h) => expect(h).toMatch(/^\$2[aby]\$/));
+    plain.forEach((p) => expect(hashed).not.toContain(p));
+  });
+
+  it('formats a raw code into 4-char groups', () => {
+    expect(mfaService.formatRecoveryCode('abcdefghij')).toBe('abcd-efgh-ij');
+  });
+
+  it('consumes a valid recovery code once and removes it (single-use)', async () => {
+    const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
+    const target = plain[3];
+
+    const first = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(target, hashed);
+    expect(first.matched).toBe(true);
+    expect(first.remainingHashes).toHaveLength(9);
+
+    // Reusing the same code against the reduced set must now fail.
+    const reuse = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(target, first.remainingHashes);
+    expect(reuse.matched).toBe(false);
+    expect(reuse.remainingHashes).toHaveLength(9);
+  });
+
+  it('matches case-insensitively and trims whitespace', async () => {
+    const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
+    const res = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(`  ${plain[0].toUpperCase()}  `, hashed);
+    expect(res.matched).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a wrong code and leaves the hash set unchanged', async () => {
+    const { hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
+    const res = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode('zzzz-zzzz-zz', hashed);
+    expect(res.matched).toBe(false);
+    expect(res.remainingHashes).toHaveLength(10);
+  });
+
+  it('handles empty / missing input safely', async () => {
+    const { hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
+    const res = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode('', hashed);
+    expect(res.matched).toBe(false);
+    expect(res.remainingHashes).toBe(hashed);
+    const noHashes = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode('abcd-efgh-ij', null);
+    expect(noHashes.matched).toBe(false);
+    expect(noHashes.remainingHashes).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('mfaService — parseRecoveryCodes', () => {
+  it('parses a JSON string array', () => {
+    expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(JSON.stringify(['a', 'b']))).toEqual(['a', 'b']);
+  });
+  it('passes an already-array through', () => {
+    expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(['a', 'b'])).toEqual(['a', 'b']);
+  });
+  it('returns [] for null / garbage / non-array JSON', () => {
+    expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(null)).toEqual([]);
+    expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes('{not json')).toEqual([]);
+    expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(JSON.stringify({ a: 1 }))).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('mfaService — isEnrolled coercion', () => {
+  it('treats true / 1 / "1" as enrolled', () => {
+    expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: true })).toBe(true);
+    expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: 1 })).toBe(true);
+    expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: '1' })).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('treats false / 0 / null / missing as not enrolled', () => {
+    expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: false })).toBe(false);
+    expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: 0 })).toBe(false);
+    expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: null })).toBe(false);
+    expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({})).toBe(false);
+    expect(mfaService.isEnrolled(null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/**
+ * Regression tests for reinjectCurrentAdmin — the operator-preservation step of
+ * the .picpeak restore (GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f follow-up). Runs against a real
+ * in-memory SQLite DB so the UNIQUE(email)/UNIQUE(username) constraints behave
+ * as in production. Reconciliation is non-destructive (update-in-place / rename,
+ * never delete) so restored rows referenced by FKs keep their ids.
+ */
+const knex = require('knex');
+
+let db;
+let reinjectCurrentAdmin;
+
+beforeAll(() => {
+  jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'sqlite3' }), { virtual: false });
+  reinjectCurrentAdmin = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService').reinjectCurrentAdmin;
+});
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
+  await db.schema.createTable('admin_users', (t) => {
+    t.increments('id');
+    t.string('username').notNullable().unique();
+    t.string('email').notNullable().unique();
+    t.string('password_hash');
+    t.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
+    t.boolean('must_change_password').defaultTo(false);
+    t.integer('role_id');
+    t.integer('created_by');
+    t.boolean('two_factor_enabled').defaultTo(false);
+    t.string('two_factor_secret');
+    t.text('two_factor_recovery_codes');
+  });
+});
+
+afterEach(async () => { await db.destroy(); });
+
+const operator = {
+  id: 1, username: 'admin', email: 'op@example.com',
+  password_hash: 'OP_HASH', is_active: 1, must_change_password: 0, role_id: 1, created_by: 99,
+  two_factor_enabled: 1, two_factor_secret: 'OP_SECRET', two_factor_recovery_codes: '["a","b"]',
+};
+
+test('restores login + MFA in place, keeping the row id and its FK columns (FK-safe)', async () => {
+  await db('admin_users').insert({
+    id: 7, username: 'someoneelse', email: 'OP@example.com',
+    password_hash: 'ATTACKER', is_active: 1, must_change_password: 0, role_id: 4, created_by: 5,
+    two_factor_enabled: 0, two_factor_secret: 'ATTACKER_SECRET', two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
+  });
+  await db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator));
+
+  const rows = await db('admin_users');
+  expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+  const row = rows[0];
+  expect(row.id).toBe(7);                            // id preserved → FK refs hold
+  expect(row.username).toBe('admin');
+  expect(row.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
+  expect(Boolean(row.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(true);
+  expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBe('OP_SECRET');   // attacker MFA secret gone
+  expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBe('["a","b"]');
+  // Relationship/audit FKs are NOT forced from the operator snapshot (avoids
+  // dangling role_id/created_by on a cross-instance restore) — the restored
+  // row keeps its own already-valid values.
+  expect(row.role_id).toBe(4);
+  expect(row.created_by).toBe(5);
+});
+
+test('renames (not deletes) a different row holding the operator username', async () => {
+  await db('admin_users').insert({
+    id: 3, username: 'admin', email: 'other@instance.test',
+    password_hash: 'OTHER', is_active: 1, role_id: 4,
+  });
+  await expect(db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator))).resolves.not.toThrow();
+
+  const rows = await db('admin_users').orderBy('id');
+  expect(rows).toHaveLength(2);                       // the other admin survives (FK-safe)
+  const other = rows.find((r) => r.id === 3);
+  expect(other.username).toBe('admin__restored_3');  // renamed, id kept
+  expect(other.email).toBe('other@instance.test');
+  const op = rows.find((r) => r.username === 'admin');
+  expect(op.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
+});
+
+test('reconciles email and username colliding with DIFFERENT rows without deleting either', async () => {
+  await db('admin_users').insert([
+    { id: 4, username: 'someoneelse', email: 'op@example.com', password_hash: 'A', role_id: 4 },
+    { id: 5, username: 'admin', email: 'other@instance.test', password_hash: 'B', role_id: 4 },
+  ]);
+  await expect(db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator))).resolves.not.toThrow();
+
+  const rows = await db('admin_users').orderBy('id');
+  expect(rows).toHaveLength(2);                       // both rows survive
+  const opRow = rows.find((r) => r.id === 4);         // email match updated in place
+  expect(opRow.username).toBe('admin');
+  expect(opRow.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
+  const renamed = rows.find((r) => r.id === 5);       // username holder renamed, not deleted
+  expect(renamed.username).toBe('admin__restored_5');
+});
+
+test('inserts the operator with a non-colliding id when neither key exists in the backup', async () => {
+  await db('admin_users').insert({
+    id: 9, username: 'backupadmin', email: 'backup@instance.test', password_hash: 'B', role_id: 1,
+  });
+  await db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator));
+
+  const rows = await db('admin_users').orderBy('id');
+  expect(rows).toHaveLength(2);                       // backup admin untouched
+  const opRow = rows.find((r) => r.username === 'admin');
+  expect(opRow.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
+  expect(opRow.id).toBe(10);                          // max(9)+1, no collision
+  expect(opRow.created_by).toBeNull();                // self-ref FK nulled so the insert can't dangle
+});
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ function release(tag, body = '', publishedAt = '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z') {
    name: tag,
    body,
    published_at: publishedAt,
-    html_url: `https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/releases/tag/${tag}`,
+    html_url: `https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/releases/tag/${tag}`,
  };
 }

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ describe('updateCheckService.getReleasesSince', () => {
      tag: 'v3.55.0',
      name: 'v3.55.0',
      body: 'stable notes 3.55.0',
-      htmlUrl: 'https://github.com/the-luap/picpeak/releases/tag/v3.55.0',
+      htmlUrl: 'https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/releases/tag/v3.55.0',
    });
  });

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/**
+ * Pure-function tests for the slug validator in galleryShortUrlService.
+ * The validator is the security boundary for the `/s/<slug>` public
+ * route — bad shapes leak into a UNIQUE column that's used in URLs
+ * without further escaping, so the rules need to be tight.
+ */
+
+// Provide a minimal db stub so requiring the service doesn't crash —
+// the validator path doesn't touch the DB.
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn() }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+  info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
+}));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/appSettings', () => ({
+  getAppSetting: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+}));
+
+const {
+  validateSlug,
+  _RESERVED_SLUGS,
+} = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
+
+describe('validateSlug', () => {
+  describe('accepts', () => {
+    test.each([
+      'sofia-graduation',
+      'sofia',
+      'a',                   // single char (alphanumeric)
+      '1',                   // single digit
+      'abc123',
+      '123-abc',
+      'sofia-2026-06-05',
+      'sofia-2026',
+      'a-b-c-d',
+      'wedding-2026',
+      'xK7p2'.toLowerCase(), // lowercase 5-char
+      'a'.repeat(64),        // exactly at the limit
+    ])('%j', (slug) => {
+      expect(validateSlug(slug)).toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('rejects', () => {
+    test.each([
+      ['', 'cannot be empty'],
+      ['   ', 'cannot be empty'],          // trimmed → empty
+      ['-sofia', 'lowercase letters'],     // leading hyphen
+      ['sofia-', 'lowercase letters'],     // trailing hyphen
+      ['Sofia', 'lowercase letters'],      // uppercase
+      ['sofia_graduation', 'lowercase letters'],  // underscore
+      ['sofia.graduation', 'lowercase letters'],  // dot
+      ['sofia graduation', 'lowercase letters'],  // space
+      ['sofia/graduation', 'lowercase letters'],  // slash (path traversal vector)
+      ['sofia%20graduation', 'lowercase letters'],
+      ['a'.repeat(65), 'at most 64'],      // one over limit
+    ])('%j → %s', (slug, expectedReason) => {
+      const result = validateSlug(slug);
+      expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+      expect(result.toLowerCase()).toContain(expectedReason);
+    });
+
+    test('null', () => {
+      expect(validateSlug(null)).toContain('must be a string');
+    });
+
+    test('undefined', () => {
+      expect(validateSlug(undefined)).toContain('must be a string');
+    });
+
+    test('number', () => {
+      expect(validateSlug(42)).toContain('must be a string');
+    });
+
+    test('object', () => {
+      expect(validateSlug({})).toContain('must be a string');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('reserved slugs', () => {
+    test.each([
+      'admin',
+      'api',
+      'auth',
+      'gallery',
+      'og',
+      'health',
+      's',           // can't shadow the shortener itself
+      'login',
+      'favicon.ico', // even with the dot — covered by SLUG_REGEX fail too
+    ])('reserves %j', (slug) => {
+      expect(_RESERVED_SLUGS.has(slug)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test('"admin" → rejected with "reserved" reason', () => {
+      // validateSlug short-circuits at the regex for slugs containing
+      // dots (favicon.ico fails the regex first). Test a clean
+      // alphanumeric reserved word.
+      const result = validateSlug('admin');
+      expect(result).toBe('short_slug is reserved');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('path-traversal + URL-injection vectors are rejected at the regex', () => {
+    test.each([
+      '../etc/passwd',
+      'foo/../bar',
+      'foo?query=1',
+      'foo#fragment',
+      'foo&bar',
+      'foo bar',
+      'foo<script>',
+      'foo>',
+      'foo"',
+      'foo\'',
+      'foo;rm -rf',
+    ])('%j', (slug) => {
+      expect(validateSlug(slug)).not.toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+const { cleanNetMinor, exactLineMinor } = require('../../src/utils/invoiceRounding');
+
+// Sum the per-line ROUNDED totals the way computeTotals / createInvoice do,
+// so each test can compare "sum of rounded lines" against cleanNetMinor.
+function roundedNet(items, parentKey = 'parent_position') {
+  return items
+    .filter((li) => li[parentKey] == null || li[parentKey] === '')
+    .reduce((s, li) => s + Math.round(li.line_total_minor), 0);
+}
+
+function mkLine(position, quantity, unitPriceMinor, extra = {}) {
+  const discount = extra.discount_percent || 0;
+  return {
+    position,
+    quantity,
+    unit_price_minor: unitPriceMinor,
+    discount_percent: discount,
+    line_total_minor: Math.round(Math.round(quantity * unitPriceMinor) * (1 - discount / 100)),
+    parent_position: extra.parent_position ?? null,
+  };
+}
+
+describe('cleanNetMinor — sub-cent reconciliation', () => {
+  it('reconciles the real 68h × 32.25 invoice (sum-of-lines 2193.02 → clean 2193.00)', () => {
+    const qtys = [5.25, 3.25, 5.25, 2.75, 2, 1, 1.75, 5, 5.25, 5.25, 2.75,
+      4.5, 3.5, 2.5, 4.5, 2, 1.75, 3.25, 1.75, 3.5, 1.25];
+    const items = qtys.map((q, i) => mkLine(i + 1, q, 3225));
+    expect(roundedNet(items)).toBe(219302); // sum of the 21 rounded lines
+    expect(cleanNetMinor(items)).toBe(219300); // full-precision, rounded once
+    expect(cleanNetMinor(items) - roundedNet(items)).toBe(-2); // the -0.02 drift
+  });
+
+  it('is a no-op when every line is already cent-exact (adjustment 0)', () => {
+    const items = [mkLine(1, 2, 5000), mkLine(2, 3, 4000)];
+    expect(cleanNetMinor(items)).toBe(roundedNet(items));
+  });
+
+  it('is rate-agnostic: mixed hourly rates reconcile to one clean net', () => {
+    const items = [mkLine(1, 2.5, 3225), mkLine(2, 1.25, 3225), mkLine(3, 3.5, 4850), mkLine(4, 1.75, 4850)];
+    // sum-of-lines = 80.63 + 40.31 + 169.75 + 84.88 = 375.57; clean = 375.56
+    expect(roundedNet(items)).toBe(37557);
+    expect(cleanNetMinor(items)).toBe(37556);
+  });
+
+  it('honours per-line discounts at full precision', () => {
+    const items = [mkLine(1, 3, 1000, { discount_percent: 33 })];
+    // exact = 3 × 1000 × 0.67 = 2010 exactly → clean 2010
+    expect(cleanNetMinor(items)).toBe(2010);
+  });
+
+  it('migration-119 hierarchy: a parent with priced sub-items derives from the children', () => {
+    // Parent (pos 1) has two priced sub-items; parent own price ignored.
+    const parent = mkLine(1, 1, 9999); // own price should NOT count
+    const subA = mkLine(2, 2.5, 3225, { parent_position: 1 });
+    const subB = mkLine(3, 1.75, 3225, { parent_position: 1 });
+    const items = [parent, subA, subB];
+    // exact children = (2.5 + 1.75) × 3225 = 4.25 × 3225 = 13706.25 → 13706
+    expect(cleanNetMinor(items)).toBe(13706);
+    // parent's own 9999 must not leak in
+    expect(cleanNetMinor(items)).not.toBe(9999);
+  });
+
+  it('exactLineMinor returns the un-rounded product', () => {
+    expect(exactLineMinor({ quantity: 2.5, unit_price_minor: 3225 })).toBeCloseTo(8062.5, 5);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/**
+ * Regression tests for clampIntOrUndefined — the slideshow-seed NaN bug.
+ *
+ * The event-create route seeds show_interval_ms/show_transition_ms from
+ * app_settings via an int-parse-and-clamp. The old inline guard
+ * (`Number.isFinite(+v) ? parseInt(v) : undefined`) disagreed with itself
+ * for null/''/true: `+null` is 0 (finite) but `parseInt(null)` is NaN, so
+ * NaN flowed through Math.min/Math.max into the INSERT. PostgreSQL
+ * rejects NaN for integer columns ("invalid input syntax for type
+ * integer: NaN") while SQLite silently stores NULL — so POST
+ * /api/admin/events 500'd on PG whenever the slideshow settings rows
+ * were absent (getAppSetting returns its null default).
+ */
+
+const { clampIntOrUndefined } = require('../../src/utils/numericHelpers');
+
+describe('clampIntOrUndefined', () => {
+  it('returns undefined for null (the getAppSetting missing-row default)', () => {
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined(null, 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('returns undefined for undefined, empty string, and booleans', () => {
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined(undefined, 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined('', 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined(true, 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined(false, 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('returns undefined for non-numeric garbage', () => {
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined('fast', 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined({}, 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('never returns NaN for any of the failure-mode inputs', () => {
+    for (const v of [null, undefined, '', true, false, 'x', {}, []]) {
+      const out = clampIntOrUndefined(v, 100, 5000);
+      expect(Number.isNaN(out)).toBe(false);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('parses and clamps valid values', () => {
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined('2500', 1000, 120000)).toBe(2500);
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined(2500, 1000, 120000)).toBe(2500);
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined('500', 1000, 120000)).toBe(1000);
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined(999999, 1000, 120000)).toBe(120000);
+    expect(clampIntOrUndefined('2500.9', 1000, 120000)).toBe(2500);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/**
+ * Regression tests for the password-complexity setting read path.
+ *
+ * Bug 1 (key mismatch): the settings UI saves the admin's choice as
+ * `security_password_complexity` (useSettingsState.ts prefixes every
+ * security field with `security_`), but getPasswordComplexitySettings()
+ * queried `security_password_complexity_level` — a key nothing writes —
+ * so the configured level was silently ignored.
+ *
+ * Bug 2 (driver shape, codex review of #843): on SQLite the TEXT column
+ * returns the JSON-stringified value ('"very_strong"'), but on Postgres
+ * (production default) `setting_value` is a json column and comes back
+ * already decoded ('very_strong'). A bare JSON.parse throws on the
+ * decoded shape and the outer catch fell back to 'moderate' — the
+ * setting stayed unenforced on Postgres even with the right key.
+ */
+
+const mockQueriedKeys = [];
+let mockStoredValue;
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: () => ({
+    where(_col, key) {
+      mockQueriedKeys.push(key);
+      return this;
+    },
+    first() {
+      return Promise.resolve(
+        mockQueriedKeys[mockQueriedKeys.length - 1] === 'security_password_complexity'
+          ? { setting_key: 'security_password_complexity', setting_value: mockStoredValue }
+          : undefined
+      );
+    },
+  }),
+  withRetry: (fn) => fn(),
+}));
+
+const { getPasswordComplexitySettings } = require('../../src/utils/passwordValidation');
+
+describe('getPasswordComplexitySettings', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => { mockQueriedKeys.length = 0; });
+
+  it('reads the key the settings UI actually writes (SQLite shape: JSON-stringified)', async () => {
+    mockStoredValue = JSON.stringify('very_strong'); // '"very_strong"'
+    const level = await getPasswordComplexitySettings();
+    expect(mockQueriedKeys).toContain('security_password_complexity');
+    expect(level).toBe('very_strong');
+  });
+
+  it('accepts the Postgres json-column shape (already decoded, no quotes)', async () => {
+    mockStoredValue = 'very_strong'; // pg driver auto-parses the json column
+    const level = await getPasswordComplexitySettings();
+    expect(level).toBe('very_strong');
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to moderate on an empty value', async () => {
+    mockStoredValue = '';
+    const level = await getPasswordComplexitySettings();
+    expect(level).toBe('moderate');
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+const path = require('path');
+const { assertZipEntriesWithin } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
+
+describe('assertZipEntriesWithin (ZIP-slip guard, GHSA-jfhw-fj23-fx6x)', () => {
+  const root = path.join('/tmp', 'picpeak-extract-root');
+
+  it('accepts entries that stay within the extraction root', () => {
+    const entries = [
+      { name: 'photo.jpg' },
+      { name: 'category/nested/photo.png' },
+      { name: 'photos_manifest.json' },
+      { name: 'subdir/' },
+    ];
+    expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, root)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a parent-traversal entry', () => {
+    const entries = [{ name: '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' }];
+    expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, root)).toThrow(/escapes the extraction directory/);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an absolute-path entry', () => {
+    const entries = [{ name: '/etc/cron.d/evil' }];
+    expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, root)).toThrow(/escapes the extraction directory/);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects when a safe entry is mixed with a traversal entry', () => {
+    const entries = [{ name: 'ok.jpg' }, { name: '../escape.txt' }];
+    expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, root)).toThrow(/escapes the extraction directory/);
+  });
+
+  it('tolerates empty / nameless entries', () => {
+    expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin([{}, { name: '' }, null], root)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('does not treat a sibling prefix directory as inside the root', () => {
+    // root is .../picpeak-extract-root; ../picpeak-extract-root-evil must not pass
+    const entries = [{ name: '../picpeak-extract-root-evil/x' }];
+    expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, root)).toThrow(/escapes the extraction directory/);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+const { parseWhatsNew } = require('../../src/utils/whatsNew');
+
+describe('parseWhatsNew', () => {
+  it('prefers the curated <!-- whatsnew --> block', () => {
+    const body = [
+      '<!-- whatsnew -->',
+      '- Invoice drafts in list',
+      '- Bank transfer payments',
+      '<!-- /whatsnew -->',
+      '',
+      '### Features',
+      '* **invoices:** something long that should be ignored ([#1](http://x))',
+    ].join('\n');
+    expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual(['Invoice drafts in list', 'Bank transfer payments']);
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to the Features section, stripping scope + commit links', () => {
+    const body = [
+      '## [3.73.0-beta.0](http://x) (2026-06-29)',
+      '',
+      '### Features',
+      '',
+      '* **dashboard:** revenue tile toggles 365 days ([d1c9e02](http://c))',
+      '* **invoices:** surface monthly drafts in the Bills list ([e457656](http://c))',
+      '',
+      '### Bug Fixes',
+      '',
+      '* **invoices:** add bank transfer ([e96ef4c](http://c))',
+    ].join('\n');
+    expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual([
+      'revenue tile toggles 365 days',
+      'surface monthly drafts in the Bills list',
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('decodes HTML entities release-please escapes into changelog text', () => {
+    const body = '### Features\n* **gallery:** supports A &amp; B &lt;tags&gt; &quot;quoted&quot; ([#1](http://x))';
+    expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual(['supports A & B <tags> "quoted"']);
+  });
+
+  it('trims a trailing "— implementation detail" clause to the headline', () => {
+    const body = '### Features\n* **gallery:** branded URL shortener — /s/&lt;slug&gt; with OG injection ([#699](http://x))';
+    expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual(['branded URL shortener']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves hyphenated words and dash-free bullets intact', () => {
+    const body = '### Features\n* **invoices:** mark-paid now supports bank transfer ([#2](http://x))';
+    expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual(['mark-paid now supports bank transfer']);
+  });
+
+  it('excludes Bug Fixes from the fallback', () => {
+    const body = '### Features\n* **a:** feature one\n### Bug Fixes\n* **b:** fix one';
+    expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual(['feature one']);
+  });
+
+  it('caps at 8 bullets and de-dups', () => {
+    const lines = Array.from({ length: 12 }, (_, i) => `- bullet ${i % 9}`);
+    const body = `<!-- whatsnew -->\n${lines.join('\n')}\n<!-- /whatsnew -->`;
+    const out = parseWhatsNew(body);
+    expect(out.length).toBe(8);
+    expect(new Set(out).size).toBe(8);
+  });
+
+  it('returns [] for empty / non-string input', () => {
+    expect(parseWhatsNew('')).toEqual([]);
+    expect(parseWhatsNew(null)).toEqual([]);
+    expect(parseWhatsNew(undefined)).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
@@ -11,9 +11,16 @@ exports.up = async function(knex) {
    // Initialize tables
    await initializeDatabase();
    
-    // Create default admin user if none exists
+    // Create default admin user if none exists.
+    //
+    // Legacy path — only when ADMIN_PASSWORD is explicitly provided (keeps
+    // existing docker-compose installs working unchanged). When it is NOT set,
+    // we deliberately leave admin_users empty so the first-run setup wizard
+    // (setupService / /setup) creates the admin in-browser — no ADMIN_PASSWORD
+    // in .env. Existing deployments already ran this migration, so this only
+    // affects fresh installs.
    const adminExists = await knex('admin_users').first();
-    if (!adminExists) {
+    if (!adminExists && process.env.ADMIN_PASSWORD) {
      // Use ADMIN_PASSWORD from environment if set, otherwise generate a random one
      const generatedPassword = process.env.ADMIN_PASSWORD || generateReadablePassword();
      const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(generatedPassword, 12); // Increased rounds for better security
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
 * Migration: Add Customer Accounts (recurring user logins)
 *
- * Implements the customer tier from discussion the-luap/picpeak#354.
+ * Implements the customer tier from discussion PicPeak/picpeak#354.
 *
 * Three new tables:
 *  - customer_accounts        : the user record (email + bcrypt password)
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 149: defer the quote.accepted/declined workflow emit past the
+ * 15-min response window.
+ *
+ * A customer's accept/decline can be toggled for crm_quotes_accept_window_minutes
+ * (default 15) before it locks. The booking workflow used to fire on the FIRST
+ * click and immediately convert the quote (status -> 'converted'), which made the
+ * quote un-declinable inside that window — defeating the grace period the public
+ * page promises ("you can change your answer within 15 minutes").
+ *
+ * The fix moves the response emit to AFTER the window locks: the scheduler sweeps
+ * locked-but-not-yet-emitted responses and fires quote.<final status> once. This
+ * column is the idempotency marker so each response is emitted exactly once,
+ * regardless of how many times the customer toggled inside the window.
+ */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('quotes'))) return;
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('quotes', 'workflow_response_emitted_at'))) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('quotes', (t) => {
+      t.timestamp('workflow_response_emitted_at');
+    });
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('quotes'))) return;
+  if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('quotes', 'workflow_response_emitted_at')) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('quotes', (t) => t.dropColumn('workflow_response_emitted_at'));
+  }
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 150: branded URL shortener for gallery share links (#699).
+ *
+ * Lets admins create custom-named short URLs that resolve to a gallery's
+ * full link (e.g. `/s/sofia-graduation` → `/gallery/<slug>`). The short
+ * URL itself answers bot-UA requests with server-rendered OG metadata,
+ * so the SHORT URL is the one that shows the rich preview in iMessage /
+ * Facebook / WhatsApp — not just the destination.
+ *
+ * Backward-compat invariant: this migration only ADDS a new table. No
+ * existing route, table, or column is touched. Operators upgrading
+ * through this migration can opt into creating short URLs per event,
+ * but every existing `/gallery/...` link continues to resolve identically
+ * — the new feature is additive.
+ */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (await knex.schema.hasTable('gallery_short_urls')) return;
+
+  await knex.schema.createTable('gallery_short_urls', (t) => {
+    t.increments('id').primary();
+    // Public-facing slug — what appears in /s/<short_slug>. Case-folded
+    // to lowercase at write time by the service; the UNIQUE index here
+    // is the last line of defence against collisions.
+    t.string('short_slug', 64).notNullable().unique();
+    // Hard FK to events — when an admin deletes an event, its short
+    // URLs go with it. ON DELETE CASCADE is the natural model: a short
+    // URL that points at a vanished gallery has no useful behaviour.
+    t.integer('event_id').notNullable()
+      .references('id').inTable('events').onDelete('CASCADE');
+    // Where the short URL resolves to — usually `/gallery/<slug>` or
+    // `/gallery/<share_token>` depending on the operator's #525
+    // "Use short gallery URLs" setting at create time. Stored at create
+    // time so a later flip of the global toggle doesn't silently change
+    // what existing short URLs redirect to.
+    t.text('target_path').notNullable();
+    // For the audit trail + admin UI ("created by Alex two days ago").
+    t.integer('created_by').references('id').inTable('admin_users');
+    t.timestamp('created_at').notNullable().defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
+    // Tiny analytics — admins want to know "is this branded link
+    // actually being clicked?" without a separate analytics service.
+    t.integer('hit_count').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
+    t.timestamp('last_hit_at');
+    // Soft-delete semantics: a deleted short URL returns 410 Gone (not
+    // 404) so the admin sees their delete was intentional, and so a
+    // re-create with the same slug is an explicit "yes, replace" rather
+    // than accidentally taking over a stale link. The UNIQUE constraint
+    // on short_slug means re-create after delete requires either NULLing
+    // the deleted row's slug or hard-deleting it; service layer handles
+    // that explicitly.
+    t.timestamp('deleted_at');
+    t.integer('deleted_by').references('id').inTable('admin_users');
+  });
+
+  // Read patterns:
+  //  - /s/:slug hot path — UNIQUE constraint on short_slug already
+  //    provides the index. No additional index needed.
+  //  - Admin UI "list short URLs for this event" — index event_id.
+  await knex.schema.alterTable('gallery_short_urls', (t) => {
+    t.index(['event_id'], 'gallery_short_urls_event_id_idx');
+  });
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (await knex.schema.hasTable('gallery_short_urls')) {
+    await knex.schema.dropTable('gallery_short_urls');
+  }
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 151: admin MFA (TOTP) enrollment support — issue #738.
+ *
+ * The `admin_users.two_factor_enabled` / `two_factor_secret` columns already
+ * exist from the legacy migration 016 but were never wired to any code. This
+ * migration adds the two columns the real TOTP flow needs on top of them:
+ *
+ *   - two_factor_recovery_codes: JSON array of one-time backup codes, stored
+ *     HASHED (never plaintext), so a locked-out admin can log in without the
+ *     authenticator. Consumed on use.
+ *   - two_factor_enrolled_at: when the admin completed enrollment (audit /
+ *     display only).
+ *
+ * The TOTP secret itself continues to live in the existing `two_factor_secret`
+ * column, but is now stored ENCRYPTED at rest (AES-256-GCM) by mfaService —
+ * the column type is unchanged (the encrypted blob is short).
+ *
+ * Additive and idempotent: only adds columns, guarded by hasColumn, so it is
+ * safe to re-run and touches no existing data.
+ */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  const hasRecovery = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_recovery_codes');
+  const hasEnrolledAt = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_enrolled_at');
+  const hasEnabled = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_enabled');
+  const hasSecret = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_secret');
+
+  await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
+    // Backfill the legacy columns too, in case an install somehow lacks them
+    // (016 is a legacy migration; guard defensively).
+    if (!hasEnabled) {
+      t.boolean('two_factor_enabled').defaultTo(false);
+    }
+    if (!hasSecret) {
+      t.string('two_factor_secret').nullable();
+    }
+    if (!hasRecovery) {
+      t.text('two_factor_recovery_codes').nullable();
+    }
+    if (!hasEnrolledAt) {
+      t.timestamp('two_factor_enrolled_at').nullable();
+    }
+  });
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  const hasRecovery = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_recovery_codes');
+  const hasEnrolledAt = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_enrolled_at');
+
+  await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
+    // Only drop what THIS migration added; leave the legacy 016 columns.
+    if (hasRecovery) {
+      t.dropColumn('two_factor_recovery_codes');
+    }
+    if (hasEnrolledAt) {
+      t.dropColumn('two_factor_enrolled_at');
+    }
+  });
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 152: make events.hero_logo_visible NULL-able so NULL means
+ * "inherit the global branding_logo_display_hero setting" (#756).
+ *
+ * Before: hero_logo_visible was `boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT true`, and every
+ * event got a concrete true/false snapshotted at creation. The global
+ * "Show logo in hero section" toggle (branding_logo_display_hero) was only a
+ * creation-time default and never affected existing galleries — so disabling
+ * it did nothing to already-published galleries.
+ *
+ * After: NULL = inherit. gallery read-resolution falls back to the global
+ * setting when the per-event value is NULL, so the global toggle controls
+ * every gallery that hasn't been deliberately overridden per-event.
+ *
+ * Data backfill: NULL out the DEFAULTED `true` rows so they start inheriting
+ * the global. A deliberate per-gallery hide (`false`) is kept — we can't tell a
+ * defaulted-true from a chosen-true, but `false` is almost always a conscious
+ * "hide it here", and nulling it could silently re-show a hidden logo.
+ */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'hero_logo_visible'))) return;
+
+  const client = (knex.client.config.client || '').toLowerCase();
+  if (client === 'pg' || client === 'postgresql') {
+    await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_visible DROP DEFAULT');
+    await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_visible DROP NOT NULL');
+  } else {
+    // SQLite (and others): knex recreates the table without the NOT NULL/default.
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
+      t.boolean('hero_logo_visible').nullable().alter();
+    });
+  }
+
+  // Existing defaulted-`true` galleries now inherit the global toggle.
+  await knex('events').where('hero_logo_visible', true).update({ hero_logo_visible: null });
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'hero_logo_visible'))) return;
+  // Re-materialise NULLs as the old default (true) before restoring NOT NULL.
+  await knex('events').whereNull('hero_logo_visible').update({ hero_logo_visible: true });
+
+  const client = (knex.client.config.client || '').toLowerCase();
+  if (client === 'pg' || client === 'postgresql') {
+    await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_visible SET DEFAULT true');
+    await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_visible SET NOT NULL');
+  } else {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
+      t.boolean('hero_logo_visible').notNullable().defaultTo(true).alter();
+    });
+  }
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 153: make events.hero_logo_size NULL-able so NULL means "inherit
+ * the global branding_logo_size" (#756 follow-up — the size counterpart of 152).
+ *
+ * Before: hero_logo_size was `varchar NOT NULL DEFAULT 'medium'`, snapshotted
+ * from the global branding_logo_size at creation. The two gallery render paths
+ * then disagreed — GalleryLayout read the global size live, while the
+ * hero-header path used the per-event snapshot — so a hero logo could render at
+ * different sizes on different layouts, and changing the global size didn't
+ * update hero-header galleries.
+ *
+ * After: NULL = inherit. gallery read-resolution falls back to
+ * branding_logo_size when the per-event value is NULL, and both render paths
+ * consume that resolved size.
+ *
+ * Data backfill: NULL out ALL existing hero_logo_size so every gallery inherits
+ * the global size going forward. Unlike a boolean we can't tell a defaulted
+ * value from a chosen one — but nulling is the safe choice here: it restores the
+ * live-global behaviour GalleryLayout already had, and the per-event size can be
+ * re-set from the event's edit page.
+ */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'hero_logo_size'))) return;
+
+  const client = (knex.client.config.client || '').toLowerCase();
+  if (client === 'pg' || client === 'postgresql') {
+    await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_size DROP DEFAULT');
+    await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_size DROP NOT NULL');
+  } else {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
+      t.string('hero_logo_size', 20).nullable().alter();
+    });
+  }
+
+  await knex('events').update({ hero_logo_size: null });
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'hero_logo_size'))) return;
+  await knex('events').whereNull('hero_logo_size').update({ hero_logo_size: 'medium' });
+
+  const client = (knex.client.config.client || '').toLowerCase();
+  if (client === 'pg' || client === 'postgresql') {
+    await knex.raw("ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_size SET DEFAULT 'medium'");
+    await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_size SET NOT NULL');
+  } else {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
+      t.string('hero_logo_size', 20).notNullable().defaultTo('medium').alter();
+    });
+  }
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/**
+ * Messages Phase 2 — additional inbound mailboxes + captured message bodies.
+ *
+ * `mail_accounts` holds inbound mailboxes BEYOND the primary accounting IMAP
+ * that already lives in `email_configs` (e.g. the customer `hello@` mailbox).
+ * The intake poller (emailIntakeService) polls the accounting mailbox AND every
+ * enabled row here; customer mail is logged with its body but not routed to the
+ * accounting inbox.
+ *
+ * The new `received_emails` columns capture the parsed message so the Messages
+ * reading pane can show it: `account_key` tags which mailbox it came from,
+ * `body_html`/`body_text` hold the (server-sanitized) body, `to_address` the
+ * envelope recipient. All additive + guarded.
+ */
+exports.up = async function up(knex) {
+  const hasAccounts = await knex.schema.hasTable('mail_accounts');
+  if (!hasAccounts) {
+    await knex.schema.createTable('mail_accounts', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('account_key', 64).notNullable().unique(); // e.g. 'customers'
+      t.string('label', 120);
+      t.string('imap_host', 255);
+      t.integer('imap_port').defaultTo(993);
+      t.boolean('imap_secure').defaultTo(true);
+      t.string('imap_user', 255);
+      t.string('imap_pass', 512);
+      t.string('imap_folder', 255).defaultTo('INBOX');
+      t.boolean('enabled').defaultTo(false);
+      t.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
+      t.timestamp('updated_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
+    });
+  }
+
+  const cols = [
+    ['account_key', (t) => t.string('account_key', 64)],
+    ['to_address', (t) => t.string('to_address', 512)],
+    ['body_html', (t) => t.text('body_html')],
+    ['body_text', (t) => t.text('body_text')],
+  ];
+  for (const [name, add] of cols) {
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+    const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('received_emails', name);
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+    if (!has) await knex.schema.alterTable('received_emails', add);
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function down(knex) {
+  // Non-destructive on the audit log: leave the added columns in place (they're
+  // nullable and harmless). Only drop the new table.
+  await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('mail_accounts');
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/**
+ * Messages Phase 3 — distinguish human-composed sends from system mail.
+ *
+ * `origin` is 'system' for everything the app queues automatically (invoices,
+ * reminders, gallery notices — the Automated stream) and 'manual' for emails an
+ * admin composed/edited in the Messages composer (replies + document messages —
+ * the Customers ▸ Sent stream). Existing rows default to 'system'.
+ */
+exports.up = async function up(knex) {
+  const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('email_queue', 'origin');
+  if (!has) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('email_queue', (t) => {
+      t.string('origin', 16).defaultTo('system');
+    });
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function down(knex) {
+  const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('email_queue', 'origin');
+  if (has) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('email_queue', (t) => {
+      t.dropColumn('origin');
+    });
+  }
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/**
+ * Messages Phase 3 follow-up — outgoing (SMTP) settings per mail account.
+ *
+ * The customer mailbox (hello@) needs BOTH incoming (IMAP, migration 154) and
+ * outgoing (SMTP) config, so replies to customers send from hello@ instead of
+ * the global no-reply@ identity. All additive/guarded.
+ */
+exports.up = async function up(knex) {
+  const cols = [
+    ['smtp_host', (t) => t.string('smtp_host', 255)],
+    ['smtp_port', (t) => t.integer('smtp_port')],
+    ['smtp_secure', (t) => t.boolean('smtp_secure').defaultTo(false)],
+    ['smtp_user', (t) => t.string('smtp_user', 255)],
+    ['smtp_pass', (t) => t.string('smtp_pass', 512)],
+    ['from_email', (t) => t.string('from_email', 255)],
+    ['from_name', (t) => t.string('from_name', 120)],
+  ];
+  for (const [name, add] of cols) {
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+    const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('mail_accounts', name);
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+    if (!has) await knex.schema.alterTable('mail_accounts', add);
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function down(knex) {
+  const cols = ['smtp_host', 'smtp_port', 'smtp_secure', 'smtp_user', 'smtp_pass', 'from_email', 'from_name'];
+  for (const name of cols) {
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+    const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('mail_accounts', name);
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+    if (has) await knex.schema.alterTable('mail_accounts', (t) => t.dropColumn(name));
+  }
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/**
+ * Messages — Archive / Delete (trash) support.
+ *
+ * `mailbox_state` on both mail tables: 'active' (normal folders), 'archived'
+ * (Archived folder), or 'deleted' (Deleted/trash folder). Delete is soft — the
+ * row moves to 'deleted' and is only removed for good when purged FROM the
+ * Deleted folder. Legacy rows have NULL, treated as 'active'. Additive/guarded.
+ */
+exports.up = async function up(knex) {
+  for (const table of ['email_queue', 'received_emails']) {
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+    const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn(table, 'mailbox_state');
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+    if (!has) {
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+      await knex.schema.alterTable(table, (t) => {
+        t.string('mailbox_state', 16).defaultTo('active');
+      });
+    }
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function down(knex) {
+  for (const table of ['email_queue', 'received_emails']) {
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+    const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn(table, 'mailbox_state');
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+    if (has) {
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+      await knex.schema.alterTable(table, (t) => { t.dropColumn('mailbox_state'); });
+    }
+  }
+};
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 {
  "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.71.2-beta.0",
+  "version": "3.45.7",
  "description": "Backend for PicPeak event photo sharing platform",
  "main": "server.js",
+  "engines": {
+    "node": "^20.19.0 || >=22"
+  },
  "scripts": {
    "start": "node server.js",
    "dev": "nodemon server.js",
@@ -18,45 +21,49 @@
    "@aws-sdk/lib-storage": "^3.850.0",
    "@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner": "^3.850.0",
    "archiver": "^5.3.1",
-    "axios": "1.15.2",
+    "axios": "1.18.1",
    "bcrypt": "6.0.0",
    "chokidar": "4.0.3",
    "cookie-parser": "^1.4.7",
    "cors": "^2.8.5",
+    "cron-parser": "^4.9.0",
    "dotenv": "^16.0.3",
    "exifr": "^7.1.3",
    "express": "^4.18.2",
    "express-rate-limit": "^6.7.0",
    "express-validator": "^7.0.1",
    "fluent-ffmpeg": "^2.1.3",
-    "form-data": "^4.0.4",
+    "form-data": "4.0.6",
    "helmet": "^7.0.0",
    "i18next": "25.3.2",
    "i18next-browser-languagedetector": "^8.2.0",
-    "i18next-http-backend": "^3.0.2",
+    "i18next-http-backend": "3.0.5",
    "imapflow": "^1.4.0",
    "ipaddr.js": "^2.3.0",
-    "joi": "^17.9.1",
-    "js-yaml": "^4.1.1",
+    "joi": "^17.13.4",
+    "js-yaml": "^4.2.0",
    "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.0",
    "knex": "^2.4.2",
    "mailparser": "^3.9.9",
    "mime-types": "^3.0.1",
-    "multer": "^2.0.2",
+    "multer": "2.2.0",
    "node-cron": "^3.0.2",
    "node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
-    "nodemailer": "^8.0.5",
+    "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
+    "otplib": "^12.0.1",
    "pdf-lib": "^1.17.1",
    "pdfkit": "^0.17.2",
    "pg": "^8.16.3",
+    "postcss": "8.5.18",
    "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
    "react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
    "sanitize-html": "^2.17.0",
-    "sharp": "0.34.3",
+    "sharp": "0.35.3",
    "sqlite3": "^5.1.6",
    "swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
    "swagger-ui-express": "^5.0.1",
    "swissqrbill": "^4.3.0",
+    "tar": ">=7.5.21",
    "uuid": "^11.1.1",
    "winston": "^3.8.2",
    "zxcvbn": "^4.4.2"
@@ -73,17 +80,18 @@
      "tar-fs": "2.1.4"
    },
    "glob": "^11.1.0",
-    "js-yaml": "^4.1.1",
+    "js-yaml": "^4.2.0",
    "fast-xml-parser": ">=5.7.0",
    "qs": ">=6.15.2",
-    "tar": ">=7.5.13",
-    "brace-expansion": ">=5.0.6",
+    "tar": ">=7.5.21",
+    "brace-expansion": ">=5.0.7",
    "minimatch": ">=9.0.7",
    "path-to-regexp": "0.1.13",
    "lodash": ">=4.18.1",
    "follow-redirects": ">=1.16.0",
    "@tootallnate/once": ">=3.0.1",
    "ip-address": ">=10.1.1",
-    "uuid": "^11.1.1"
+    "uuid": "^11.1.1",
+    "nodemailer": "^9.0.1"
  }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * reset-admin-mfa.js — disable two-factor auth for a locked-out admin (#738).
+ *
+ * Break-glass recovery for when an admin loses their authenticator AND their
+ * recovery codes. Clears the MFA state so the admin can log in with just their
+ * password and re-enroll from Settings.
+ *
+ * Usage (inside the running backend container):
+ *   docker compose exec backend node scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --email admin@example.com
+ *   docker compose exec backend node scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --all --yes
+ *
+ * Flags:
+ *   --email <addr>   target a single admin by email (or --username <name>)
+ *   --all            reset MFA for EVERY admin (full lockout / break-glass)
+ *   --yes            non-interactive (skip the confirmation prompt)
+ */
+
+const readline = require('readline');
+const { db, logActivity } = require('../src/database/db');
+
+const args = process.argv.slice(2);
+const hasFlag = (f) => args.includes(f);
+const getOption = (name) => {
+  const i = args.indexOf(`--${name}`);
+  return i !== -1 && i + 1 < args.length ? args[i + 1] : null;
+};
+
+const force = hasFlag('--yes') || hasFlag('--force') || hasFlag('--non-interactive');
+const all = hasFlag('--all');
+const email = getOption('email');
+const username = getOption('username');
+
+const MFA_CLEAR = {
+  two_factor_enabled: false,
+  two_factor_secret: null,
+  two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
+  two_factor_enrolled_at: null,
+  updated_at: new Date(),
+};
+
+function ask(prompt) {
+  if (force) return Promise.resolve('yes');
+  const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
+  return new Promise((resolve) => rl.question(prompt, (a) => { rl.close(); resolve(a); }));
+}
+
+async function main() {
+  console.log('\n========================================');
+  console.log('PicPeak Admin MFA Reset Tool');
+  console.log('========================================\n');
+
+  if (!all && !email && !username) {
+    console.error('❌ Specify a target: --email <addr>, --username <name>, or --all');
+    console.log('   e.g. node scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --email admin@example.com');
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  // Resolve target admins.
+  let targets;
+  if (all) {
+    targets = await db('admin_users').select('id', 'username', 'email', 'two_factor_enabled');
+  } else {
+    const q = db('admin_users');
+    if (email) q.where({ email });
+    if (username) q.where({ username });
+    targets = await q.select('id', 'username', 'email', 'two_factor_enabled');
+  }
+
+  if (targets.length === 0) {
+    console.error('❌ No matching admin user found.');
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  const enrolled = targets.filter((t) => t.two_factor_enabled === true || t.two_factor_enabled === 1);
+  console.log(`Matched ${targets.length} admin(s); ${enrolled.length} currently have MFA enabled:`);
+  for (const t of targets) {
+    const flag = (t.two_factor_enabled === true || t.two_factor_enabled === 1) ? 'MFA ON' : 'mfa off';
+    console.log(`  - ${t.username} <${t.email}>  [${flag}]`);
+  }
+
+  const confirm = await ask('\nDisable MFA for the above? (yes/no): ');
+  const normalized = String(confirm).trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (normalized !== 'yes' && normalized !== 'y') {
+    console.log('\n❌ Cancelled. No changes made.');
+    process.exit(0);
+  }
+
+  const ids = targets.map((t) => t.id);
+  const updated = await db('admin_users').whereIn('id', ids).update(MFA_CLEAR);
+
+  for (const t of targets) {
+    try {
+      await logActivity('admin_mfa_reset_cli',
+        { admin_id: t.id, via: 'cli' },
+        null,
+        { type: 'system', id: 0, name: 'reset-admin-mfa.js' }
+      );
+    } catch (_) { /* activity log is best-effort */ }
+  }
+
+  console.log(`\n✅ MFA disabled for ${updated} admin(s). They can now log in with just their password and re-enroll from Settings → Security.`);
+  process.exit(0);
+}
+
+main().catch((err) => {
+  console.error('❌ Failed to reset MFA:', err.message);
+  process.exit(1);
+});
@@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ const {

 // Import routes
 const authRoutes = require('./src/routes/auth');
-const eventRoutes = require('./src/routes/events');
 const galleryRoutes = require('./src/routes/gallery');
 const adminRoutes = require('./src/routes/admin');
 const adminAuthRoutes = require('./src/routes/adminAuth');
 const secureImagesRoutes = require('./src/routes/secureImages');
+const setupRoutes = require('./src/routes/setup');

 const app = express();
 const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3000;
@@ -397,6 +397,8 @@ async function initializeRateLimiters() {
  app.use('/api/auth', authRateLimiter);
  app.use('/api/gallery/:slug/verify', authRateLimiter);
  app.use('/api/admin/auth/login', authRateLimiter);
+  app.use('/api/setup/admin', authRateLimiter);
+  app.use('/api/setup/verify-token', authRateLimiter);
 }

 // Note: Rate limiters will be initialized after database connection
@@ -543,6 +545,68 @@ app.get('/og/gallery/:slug', handleGalleryOgRequest);
 // returns 404 unless the opt-in is on AND a hero_photo_id is set.
 app.get('/og/gallery/:slug/cover', handleGalleryOgCover);

+// Branded URL shortener (#699). /s/<short_slug> is bot-UA aware:
+//   - Social crawler → server-render OG for the target event so the
+//     SHORT URL itself is what scrapes cache against. The og:url canonical
+//     in the rendered HTML points back at /s/<slug>, not the underlying
+//     gallery URL — so a re-share of the same short URL keeps the cache
+//     warm even if the underlying gallery slug rotates.
+//   - Browser → 302 to the stored target_path. The target_path was
+//     captured at create time from the event's slug + share_token + the
+//     global "Use short gallery URLs" setting, so it doesn't silently
+//     change later.
+//   - Soft-deleted → 410 Gone so the admin can tell their delete worked
+//     vs. a typo'd unknown slug (which returns 404).
+const galleryShortUrlService = require('./src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
+const { buildOgMetadata, renderOgHtml } = require('./src/services/galleryOgService');
+app.get('/s/:shortSlug', async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const row = await galleryShortUrlService.findByShortSlug(req.params.shortSlug);
+    if (!row) {
+      return res.status(404).type('text/plain').send('Short URL not found');
+    }
+    if (row.deleted_at) {
+      return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL has been removed');
+    }
+
+    // Bot UA → render OG metadata for the target event. We look up the
+    // event via the short URL's event_id rather than re-parsing the
+    // target_path so a future migration that adds new target shapes
+    // (slideshow, client-access) doesn't need to rewrite the URL parser.
+    if (isSocialCrawler(req.get('user-agent'))) {
+      const event = await require('./src/database/db').db('events')
+        .where({ id: row.event_id })
+        .first('slug');
+      if (event?.slug) {
+        const meta = await buildOgMetadata(event.slug, req.originalUrl);
+        // Override the canonical to point at the SHORT URL itself —
+        // social platforms cache OG by URL, and the short URL is the
+        // one operators actually share, so that's the cache key we
+        // want them to stick with.
+        const base = (process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/$/, '');
+        meta.url = `${base}/s/${row.short_slug}`;
+        res.set('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=300');
+        res.set('Content-Type', 'text/html; charset=utf-8');
+        res.send(renderOgHtml(meta));
+        // Hit accounting is fire-and-forget — don't block the bot.
+        galleryShortUrlService.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
+        return;
+      }
+      // Event disappeared (FK CASCADE in flight, or admin hard-deleted
+      // outside the normal soft-delete path) — fall through to 410 so
+      // the scraper sees a clean signal.
+      return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL points at a deleted event');
+    }
+
+    // Browser path: redirect. Hit accounting is fire-and-forget.
+    galleryShortUrlService.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
+    return res.redirect(302, row.target_path);
+  } catch (err) {
+    logger.error('Short URL resolver failed', { slug: req.params.shortSlug, error: err.message });
+    return res.status(500).type('text/plain').send('Internal server error');
+  }
+});
+
 // robots.txt endpoint (dynamic, served from DB settings)
 const { generateRobotsTxt } = require('./src/services/robotsTxtService');
 app.get('/robots.txt', async (req, res) => {
@@ -628,9 +692,9 @@ app.get('/health', async (req, res) => {
 });

 // Routes
+app.use('/api/setup', setupRoutes); // public first-run bootstrap (self-closes after setup)
 app.use('/api/auth', authRoutes);
-  app.use('/api/events', eventRoutes);
-  app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('./src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
+app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('./src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
 // Gallery routes - main routes first, then feedback routes
 app.use('/api/gallery', galleryRoutes);
 app.use('/api/gallery', require('./src/routes/galleryFeedback'));
@@ -638,6 +702,10 @@ app.use('/api/gallery', require('./src/routes/galleryGuests'));
 app.use('/api/admin', adminRoutes);
 app.use('/api/admin/auth', adminAuthRoutes);
 app.use('/api/admin/system', require('./src/routes/adminSystem'));
+// Branded URL shortener admin CRUD (#699) — list/create/delete short URLs
+// per event. Mounted at /api/admin so the routes appear at
+// /api/admin/events/:eventId/short-urls and /api/admin/short-urls/:id.
+app.use('/api/admin', require('./src/routes/adminShortUrls'));
 app.use('/api/admin/feature-flags', require('./src/routes/adminFeatureFlags'));
 app.use('/api/admin/whatsapp', require('./src/routes/adminWhatsapp'));
 app.use('/api/admin/backup', require('./src/routes/adminBackup'));
@@ -769,12 +837,21 @@ try {
    // SPA fallback for admin + gallery routes. For gallery URLs we intercept
    // social-crawler User-Agents and serve OG/Twitter-card metadata so link
    // previews show the event name + branding instead of the SPA stub.
-    app.get('/gallery/:slug/:token?', (req, res, next) => {
+    //
+    // Two route shapes — 1-2 segments (`/gallery/:slug/:token?`) and the
+    // 3-segment slideshow form (`/gallery/:slug/show/:token`). The slideshow
+    // shape was previously falling through to the SPA-catchall below and
+    // skipping OG injection entirely (#699). Both patterns route to the
+    // same handler — buildOgMetadata only looks at `slug`, so the extra
+    // /show/ segment is harmless.
+    const ogIntercept = (req, res, next) => {
      if (isSocialCrawler(req.get('user-agent'))) {
        return handleGalleryOgRequest(req, res);
      }
      return next();
-    }, (req, res) => res.sendFile(indexPath));
+    };
+    app.get('/gallery/:slug/:token?', ogIntercept, (req, res) => res.sendFile(indexPath));
+    app.get('/gallery/:slug/show/:token', ogIntercept, (req, res) => res.sendFile(indexPath));

    app.get(['/admin', '/admin/*', '/gallery/*'], (req, res) => {
      res.sendFile(indexPath);
@@ -924,6 +1001,16 @@ async function startServer() {
      logger.warn('Install-from-backup hook threw:', err.message);
    }

+    // First-run: surface a one-time setup token while no admin account exists.
+    // Runs AFTER install-from-backup so a restored instance (which repopulates
+    // admin_users) never prints a throwaway token. Best-effort — never blocks boot.
+    let setupToken = null;
+    try {
+      setupToken = await require('./src/services/setupService').ensureSetupToken();
+    } catch (err) {
+      logger.warn(`[setup] ensureSetupToken skipped: ${err.message}`);
+    }
+
    // Start backup service
    await startBackupService();

@@ -939,6 +1026,13 @@ async function startServer() {
      logger.info(`Server running on port ${PORT}`);
      logger.info(`Admin interface: ${process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}`);
      logger.info(`Frontend: ${process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3001'}`);
+      // First-run: print the one-time setup token to STDOUT (the file logger
+      // doesn't reach `docker logs`), as the last + most visible thing at boot.
+      if (setupToken) {
+        const url = `${process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}/admin`;
+        const line = '='.repeat(64);
+        console.log(`\n${line}\n  PicPeak first-run setup — no admin account yet.\n  Open:                  ${url}\n  One-time setup token:  ${setupToken}\n  (also saved to data/SETUP_TOKEN)\n${line}\n`);
+      }
    });
  } catch (error) {
    logger.error('Failed to start server:', error);
@@ -208,6 +208,79 @@ function makeRes() {
  return res;
 }

+// ---- buildOgMetadata: share-token fallback (#699) ----------------------
+//
+// The public share URL after migration 525's short-URLs option strips the
+// slug down to `/gallery/<32-hex-share-token>`. The OG handler was looking
+// up that token as if it were a slug, finding nothing, and serving the
+// generic site-wide OG instead of the event-specific one (alex's symptom
+// in #699 — Cloudflare Worker had to compensate). resolveSlug now falls
+// back to events.share_token when the slug shape matches a 32-char hex.
+
+describe('buildOgMetadata — share-token fallback', () => {
+  it('resolves a 32-char hex slug via the share_token column when no slug match', async () => {
+    // Obviously-fake 32-hex test fixture — GitGuardian flagged a
+    // real-looking token (copied from the bug report) as a Generic
+    // High Entropy Secret. Using a non-entropy literal sidesteps the
+    // heuristic without changing what the test pins.
+    const token = '00000000000000000000000000000001';
+    const event = {
+      id: 10,
+      slug: 'senior-2026-06-05',
+      share_token: token,
+      event_name: 'Senior Photo Gallery',
+      event_date: '2026-06-05',
+      welcome_message: null,
+      hero_photo_id: null,
+      og_image_share_enabled: false,
+    };
+    // First db() — events.where('slug', token) returns null.
+    db.mockImplementationOnce(() => chain({ first: null }));
+    db.schema = { hasTable: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) };
+    // Second db() — events.where('share_token', token) returns the event.
+    db.mockImplementationOnce(() => chain({ first: event }));
+    mockBranding();
+
+    const meta = await buildOgMetadata(token, `/gallery/${token}`);
+
+    // Rich event-specific OG, not the site-wide fallback.
+    expect(meta.title).toContain('Senior Photo Gallery');
+    expect(meta.eventName).toBe('Senior Photo Gallery');
+    // og:url canonicalises to the slug-based URL even when the share-token
+    // URL was the entry point — keeps social-share canonicals stable.
+    expect(meta.url).toBe('https://gallery.example.com/gallery/senior-2026-06-05');
+  });
+
+  it('returns the site-wide fallback when the 32-hex slug matches NO event at all', async () => {
+    // Defensive: a malformed/expired token shouldn't 500 or leak any
+    // event info — it must look identical to the generic fallback path.
+    const token = '00000000000000000000000000000002';
+    db.mockImplementationOnce(() => chain({ first: null }));
+    db.schema = { hasTable: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) };
+    db.mockImplementationOnce(() => chain({ first: null })); // share_token also misses
+    mockBranding();
+
+    const meta = await buildOgMetadata(token, `/gallery/${token}`);
+
+    expect(meta.title).toBe('PicPeak');
+    expect(meta.eventName).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT attempt the share_token lookup for slugs that don\'t look like a 32-char hex', async () => {
+    // Real slugs are kebab/dot/underscore mixes — never pure 32-hex.
+    // Skipping the extra query keeps the un-needed-DB-hit cost off the
+    // hot path for every legitimate slug.
+    mockResolveSlug(null); // events lookup misses; no redirects table
+    mockBranding();
+
+    await buildOgMetadata('senior-2026-06-05', '/gallery/senior-2026-06-05');
+
+    // Only 2 db() calls — events + app_settings. No share_token
+    // fallback was attempted for a non-hex slug.
+    expect(db).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+});
+
 describe('handleGalleryOgCover — 404 unless explicitly opted in', () => {
  it('returns 400 on an invalid slug shape', async () => {
    const req = { params: { slug: '../../etc/passwd' }, headers: {} };
@@ -270,12 +343,34 @@ describe('isSocialCrawler — extended bot coverage (#521)', () => {
      // 3rd-party preview services used by business-messaging stacks
      'LinkPreview/1.0',
      'Slack-ImgProxy/1.0',
+      // Viber + broader crawler set (#699 follow-up)
+      'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Viber)',
+      'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Bluesky Cardyb/1.1)',
+      'facebookcatalog/1.0',
+      'kakaotalk-scrap/1.0',
+      'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Synapse/1.98)',
+      'Rocket.Chat/6.0',
    ];
    for (const ua of knownBots) {
      expect(isSocialCrawler(ua)).toBe(true);
    }
  });

+  it('does NOT match human in-app-browser UAs (our OG response is meta-only, no redirect)', () => {
+    // These share a token with a preview bot but are also sent by real users
+    // browsing inside the app's webview — matching them would serve a human
+    // the bare OG stub. Deliberately excluded; guard against re-adding them.
+    const inAppBrowsers = [
+      'Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone) AppleWebKit MicroMessenger/8.0.0',        // WeChat in-app
+      'Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone) AppleWebKit Line/13.0.0',                // LINE in-app
+      'Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android) Zalo',                          // Zalo in-app
+      'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh) Chrome/120.0 Safari/537.36 boxing',  // "XING" substring trap
+    ];
+    for (const ua of inAppBrowsers) {
+      expect(isSocialCrawler(ua)).toBe(false);
+    }
+  });
+
  it('does not match a regular browser UA', () => {
    const browsers = [
      'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0 Safari/537.36',
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT with active assignment', (
  it('allows access when the event_customer_assignments row exists', async () => {
    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
+      type: 'gallery',
      eventId: 42,
      via: 'customer',
      customerId: 7,
@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT after revocation', () => {
  it('returns 403 CUSTOMER_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKED when the junction row is gone', async () => {
    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
+      type: 'gallery',
      eventId: 42,
      via: 'customer',
      customerId: 7,
@@ -160,6 +162,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT after revocation', () => {
    // and start 403'ing per-event-password sessions.
    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
+      type: 'gallery',
      eventId: 42,
      customerId: 7,
      // intentionally no `via` claim
@@ -191,6 +194,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — per-event-password JWT', () => {
  it('does NOT touch event_customer_assignments and passes through', async () => {
    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
+      type: 'gallery',
      eventId: 42,
      // No via, no customerId — this is the legacy per-event-password
      // flow where every guest mints their own JWT after entering the
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ const multer = require('multer');
 const path = require('path');
 const fs = require('fs');
 const { validateFileType } = require('../utils/fileSecurityUtils');
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');

 /**
 * Get the storage path from environment or default
@@ -220,14 +221,14 @@ const createCustomUploader = (config) => {
 const uploadTimeoutMiddleware = (timeout = 300000) => {
  return (req, res, next) => {
    req.setTimeout(timeout, () => {
-      console.error('Upload request timed out');
+      logger.error('Upload request timed out');
      if (!res.headersSent) {
        res.status(408).json({ error: 'Upload request timed out' });
      }
    });

    res.setTimeout(timeout, () => {
-      console.error('Upload response timed out');
+      logger.error('Upload response timed out');
    });

    next();
@@ -645,8 +645,14 @@ async function ensureGlobalCategories() {
 }

 // Helper function to log activities
-async function logActivity(activityType, metadata = {}, eventId = null, actor = null) {
+async function logActivity(activityType, metadata = {}, eventId = null, actor = null, executor = null) {
  try {
+    // Callers issuing the log from inside a knex transaction must pass that
+    // trx as `executor`, otherwise the global-`db` insert tries to grab a
+    // second connection from the single-connection SQLite pool while the
+    // trx still holds it → deadlock. Defaults to the global db for the
+    // common after-commit / outside-trx callers.
+    const conn = executor || db;
    // actor_id is integer-typed; some legacy callers pass a hex-string
    // identifier (e.g. a 16-char guest fingerprint) which makes Postgres
    // throw "invalid input syntax for type integer" and drop the entire
@@ -659,7 +665,7 @@ async function logActivity(activityType, metadata = {}, eventId = null, actor =
    const actorName = actor?.name
      || (actorIdInt === null && rawId !== undefined && rawId !== null ? String(rawId) : null);

-    await db('activity_logs').insert({
+    await conn('activity_logs').insert({
      activity_type: activityType,
      actor_type: actor?.type || 'system',
      actor_id: actorIdInt,
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
    let decoded;
    try {
      decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
+        algorithms: ['HS256'],
        issuer: 'picpeak-auth',
        complete: true
      });
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ async function galleryAuth(req, res, next) {
    let decoded;
    try {
      decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
+        algorithms: ['HS256'],
        issuer: 'picpeak-auth',
        complete: true
      });
@@ -209,7 +211,7 @@ async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {

    let decoded;
    try {
-      decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+      decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
    } catch (err) {
      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
    }
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ async function customerAuth(req, res, next) {
    let decoded;
    try {
      const verified = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
+        algorithms: ['HS256'],
        issuer: 'picpeak-auth',
        complete: true,
      });
@@ -66,18 +66,29 @@ async function verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next) {
    let decoded;
    try {
      decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
+        algorithms: ['HS256'],
        issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
      });
    } catch (error) {
      // If verification fails with issuer, try without issuer (backward compatibility)
      if (error.name === 'JsonWebTokenError' && error.message.includes('jwt issuer invalid')) {
-        decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+        decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
      } else {
        throw error;
      }
    }
    logger.debug('[verifyGalleryAccess] Token decoded successfully', { eventId: decoded.eventId, slug: requestedSlug });
-    
+
+    // Only gallery-scoped tokens grant gallery access. Every legitimate
+    // path (password login, share link, client access, customer-minted,
+    // slideshow) mints type:'gallery'. Reject anything else — e.g. a guest
+    // identity token (type:'guest', for feedback attribution) that carries a
+    // matching eventId — instead of relying on other token types incidentally
+    // lacking an eventId to fail the id match below.
+    if (decoded.type !== 'gallery') {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Invalid token type for gallery access' });
+    }
+
    // If we have a slug in the URL params or from pre-middleware, verify it matches
    if (requestedSlug) {
      // Verify by slug and ensure it matches the token's event
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ async function resolveGuest(req, res, next) {
    let decoded;
    try {
      const verified = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
+        algorithms: ['HS256'],
        issuer: 'picpeak-auth',
        complete: true,
      });
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');

 // Cache maintenance mode status to avoid DB queries on every request
 let maintenanceMode = false;
@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ async function queryWithRetry(queryFn, retries = MAX_RETRIES) {
        error.code === 'ECONNRESET';
      
      if (isConnectionError) {
-        console.warn(`Database connection error, retrying in ${RETRY_DELAY}ms... (attempt ${i + 1}/${retries})`);
+        logger.warn(`Database connection error, retrying in ${RETRY_DELAY}ms... (attempt ${i + 1}/${retries})`);
        await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, RETRY_DELAY));
      } else {
        throw error; // Don't retry non-connection errors
@@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ async function checkMaintenanceMode() {
    
    return maintenanceMode;
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error checking maintenance mode after retries:', error.message);
+    logger.error('Error checking maintenance mode after retries:', error.message);
    // Return cached value or false if no cache
    return maintenanceMode;
  }
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ async function maintenanceMiddleware(req, res, next) {
    }
  } catch (error) {
    // If we can't check maintenance mode, allow the request to proceed
-    console.error('Failed to check maintenance mode, allowing request:', error.message);
+    logger.error('Failed to check maintenance mode, allowing request:', error.message);
  }
  
  next();
@@ -32,4 +32,36 @@ function requireEventOwnership(req, res, next) {
    });
 }

-module.exports = { requireEventOwnership };
+/**
+ * Return the subset of `eventIds` the admin may act on, mirroring
+ * requireEventOwnership for bulk routes that can't use it (they take an
+ * array in the body, not an :id param). super_admin gets everything;
+ * other roles get events they created plus ownerless legacy/system
+ * events (created_by IS NULL). Ids that are foreign OR non-existent both
+ * land in `denied` — deliberately indistinguishable, so bulk routes
+ * don't become an ownership/existence oracle.
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<{allowed: Array, denied: Array}>}
+ */
+async function filterOwnedEventIds(admin, eventIds) {
+  if (admin.roleName === 'super_admin') {
+    return { allowed: [...eventIds], denied: [] };
+  }
+  const rows = await db('events')
+    .whereIn('id', eventIds)
+    .andWhere((q) => q.whereNull('created_by').orWhere('created_by', admin.id))
+    .select('id');
+  const allowedSet = new Set(rows.map((r) => r.id));
+  const allowed = [];
+  const denied = [];
+  for (const id of eventIds) {
+    if (allowedSet.has(id) || allowedSet.has(Number(id))) {
+      allowed.push(id);
+    } else {
+      denied.push(id);
+    }
+  }
+  return { allowed, denied };
+}
+
+module.exports = { requireEventOwnership, filterOwnedEventIds };
@@ -28,12 +28,13 @@ async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
        let decoded;
        try {
          decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
+            algorithms: ['HS256'],
            issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
          });
        } catch (issuerError) {
          // If verification fails with issuer, try without issuer (backward compatibility)
          if (issuerError.name === 'JsonWebTokenError' && issuerError.message.includes('jwt issuer invalid')) {
-            decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+            decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
          } else {
            throw issuerError;
          }
@@ -43,24 +44,36 @@ async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
        if (decoded.type === 'gallery') {
          // For thumbnails, we need to verify the token is for a valid event
          if (!eventSlug) {
-            // Extract event ID from the decoded token
+            // Resolve the token's event (by id, or legacy slug fallback)...
+            let event = null;
            if (decoded.eventId) {
-              const event = await db('events')
+              event = await db('events')
                .where({ id: decoded.eventId, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
                .first();
-              if (event) {
+            }
+            if (!event && decoded.eventSlug) {
+              event = await db('events')
+                .where({ slug: decoded.eventSlug, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
+                .first();
+            }
+            // ...then confirm the REQUESTED thumbnail actually belongs to
+            // that event. Thumbnails are stored flat (thumbnails/thumb_<name>)
+            // with deterministic, enumerable filenames derived from the
+            // public event name + a sequential counter. Without this
+            // ownership check any holder of a gallery token for any event
+            // could enumerate and fetch another (password-protected) event's
+            // entire thumbnail set, defeating the gallery password. A
+            // traversal or foreign filename simply fails to match → denied.
+            if (event) {
+              const requestedKey = `thumbnails${req.path}`;
+              const ownsThumbnail = await db('photos')
+                .where({ event_id: event.id, thumbnail_path: requestedKey })
+                .first();
+              if (ownsThumbnail) {
                req.event = event;
                return next();
              }
            }
-            // Fallback to slug
-            const event = await db('events')
-              .where({ slug: decoded.eventSlug, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-              .first();
-            if (event) {
-              req.event = event;
-              return next();
-            }
          }
          // For regular photos, check if token matches the event
          else if (decoded.eventSlug === eventSlug) {
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
      'X-Frame-Options': 'DENY',
      'X-XSS-Protection': '1; mode=block',
      'Referrer-Policy': 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',
-      'Content-Security-Policy': "default-src 'none'; img-src 'self'",
+      'Content-Security-Policy': 'default-src \'none\'; img-src \'self\'',
      
      // Custom security headers
      'X-Protected-Content': 'true',
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
        await db('security_logs').insert(logData).catch(console.error);
      }
    } catch (error) {
-      console.error('Error logging security event:', error);
+      logger.error('Error logging security event:', error);
    }
  }

@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
        perHour: config.perHour || 500
      };
    } catch (error) {
-      console.error('Error getting rate limit settings:', error);
+      logger.error('Error getting rate limit settings:', error);
      return { perMinute: 30, per5Minutes: 100, perHour: 500 };
    }
  }
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 const path = require('path');
 const express = require('express');
 const { safePathJoin, isPathSafe } = require('../utils/fileSecurityUtils');
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');

 /**
 * Create a secure static file serving middleware that prevents path traversal attacks
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ function secureStatic(basePath, options = {}) {
    
    // Validate the path doesn't contain dangerous patterns
    if (!isPathSafe(requestedPath)) {
-      console.warn(`Potential path traversal attempt blocked: ${requestedPath}`);
+      logger.warn(`Potential path traversal attempt blocked: ${requestedPath}`);
      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Access denied' });
    }
    
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ function secureStatic(basePath, options = {}) {
          // `default-src 'none'` already implies script-src 'none';
          // style-src + img-src(data:) keep normal SVG rendering working.
          if (/\.svg$/i.test(filePath)) {
-            resp.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:");
+            resp.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', 'default-src \'none\'; style-src \'unsafe-inline\'; img-src \'self\' data:');
            resp.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
          }
        }
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ function secureStatic(basePath, options = {}) {
      return staticMiddleware(req, res, next);
    } catch (error) {
      // Path traversal detected
-      console.error(`Path traversal blocked: ${requestedPath}`, error.message);
+      logger.error(`Path traversal blocked: ${requestedPath}`, error.message);
      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Access denied' });
    }
  };
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { getAdminTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');

 // In-memory session tracking (in production, use Redis)
 const sessions = new Map();
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ async function getSessionTimeout() {
  } catch (error) {
    // Only log if it's not a connection error (to avoid spam)
    if (error.code !== 'ECONNRESET' && !error.message?.includes('Connection terminated')) {
-      console.error('Error getting session timeout:', error.message);
+      logger.error('Error getting session timeout:', error.message);
    }
  }
  
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ async function sessionTimeoutMiddleware(req, res, next) {
  
  try {
    // Verify token is valid
-    const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+    const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
    
    // Check if this is an admin token
    if (!decoded.id) {
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ async function sessionTimeoutMiddleware(req, res, next) {
    for (const [oldToken, _] of sessions.entries()) {
      if (oldToken !== token) {
        try {
-          const oldDecoded = jwt.verify(oldToken, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+          const oldDecoded = jwt.verify(oldToken, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
          if (oldDecoded.id === userId) {
            sessions.delete(oldToken);
          }
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ async function validateUploadedFile(filePath) {
      let metadata;
      try {
        metadata = await sharp(filePath, {
-          failOnError: false, // Don't fail on recoverable errors
+          failOn: 'none', // Don't fail on recoverable errors
          limitInputPixels: 268402689 // ~16k x 16k max
        }).metadata();
      } catch (metadataError) {
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ async function validateUploadedFile(filePath) {
      // Additional check: verify we can actually decode a small portion of the image
      try {
        await sharp(filePath, {
-          failOnError: false,
+          failOn: 'none',
          limitInputPixels: 268402689
        })
        .resize(10, 10) // Try to resize to very small size
@@ -9,14 +9,15 @@ const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const archiver = require('archiver');
 const StreamZip = require('node-stream-zip');
 const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
+const { assertZipEntriesWithin } = require('../utils/safePath');
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');
+const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const router = express.Router();

 // Get all archived events
 router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.view'), async (req, res) => {
  try {
-    const page = parseInt(req.query.page) || 1;
-    const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit) || 20;
-    const offset = (page - 1) * limit;
+    const { page, limit, offset } = getPagination(req);

    // Get total count
    const totalCount = await db('events')
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.view'), async (req, res)
          const stats = await fs.stat(fullArchivePath);
          archiveFileSize = stats.size;
        } catch (error) {
-          console.error(`Archive file not found: ${archive.archive_path}`);
+          logger.error(`Archive file not found: ${archive.archive_path}`);
        }
      }

@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.view'), async (req, res)
      }
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Archives list error:', error);
+    logger.error('Archives list error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch archives' });
  }
 });
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ router.get('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.view'), requireEventOw
          path: archive.archive_path
        };
      } catch (error) {
-        console.error('Archive file not found:', error);
+        logger.error('Archive file not found:', error);
      }
    }

@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ router.get('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.view'), requireEventOw
      archiveFile: archiveFileInfo
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Archive details error:', error);
+    logger.error('Archive details error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch archive details' });
  }
 });
@@ -179,9 +180,19 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
      await fs.mkdir(eventDir, { recursive: true });

      // Log ZIP contents for debugging
-      console.log(`Extracting archive to: ${eventDir}`);
+      logger.info(`Extracting archive to: ${eventDir}`);
      const entries = Object.values(await zip.entries());
-      console.log(`Archive contains ${entries.length} entries`);
+      logger.info(`Archive contains ${entries.length} entries`);
+
+      // Reject ZIP-slip entries before writing anything to disk — extract()
+      // does not neutralise `../` in entry names (GHSA-jfhw-fj23-fx6x).
+      try {
+        assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, eventDir);
+      } catch (slipErr) {
+        await zip.close();
+        logger.warn(`Refusing archive restore — unsafe entry path: ${slipErr.message}`);
+        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Archive contains invalid entry paths' });
+      }

      // Stream-extract everything to disk
      await zip.extract(null, eventDir);
@@ -203,12 +214,12 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
            if (m && m.filename) manifestByFilename.set(m.filename, m);
          }
        }
-        console.log(`Loaded photos manifest: ${manifestByFilename.size} entries`);
+        logger.info(`Loaded photos manifest: ${manifestByFilename.size} entries`);
      } catch (e) {
        if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') {
-          console.warn('Photos manifest present but unreadable; falling back to filenames', e.message);
+          logger.warn('Photos manifest present but unreadable; falling back to filenames', e.message);
        } else {
-          console.log('No photos manifest in archive (older archive); original_filename falls back to filename');
+          logger.info('No photos manifest in archive (older archive); original_filename falls back to filename');
        }
      }

@@ -286,9 +297,9 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
              });
            }
          } catch (statError) {
-            console.error(`Failed to stat file: ${actualFilePath}`);
-            console.error(`Entry name was: ${entry.name}`);
-            console.error('Error:', statError.message);
+            logger.error(`Failed to stat file: ${actualFilePath}`);
+            logger.error(`Entry name was: ${entry.name}`);
+            logger.error('Error:', statError.message);
            // Skip this file if we can't stat it
            continue;
          }
@@ -301,7 +312,7 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
      }
      
    } catch (extractError) {
-      console.error('Archive extraction error:', extractError);
+      logger.error('Archive extraction error:', extractError);
      return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to extract archive: ' + extractError.message });
    }
    
@@ -331,7 +342,7 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re

    res.json({ message: 'Archive restored successfully' });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Archive restore error:', error);
+    logger.error('Archive restore error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to restore archive' });
  }
 });
@@ -380,7 +391,7 @@ router.get('/:id/download', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.download'), r
      metadata: JSON.stringify({ event_name: archive.event_name })
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Archive download error:', error);
+    logger.error('Archive download error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to download archive' });
  }
 });
@@ -404,7 +415,7 @@ router.delete('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.delete'), requireEv
        const fullArchivePath = path.join(storagePath, archive.archive_path);
        await fs.unlink(fullArchivePath);
      } catch (error) {
-        console.error('Failed to delete archive file:', error);
+        logger.error('Failed to delete archive file:', error);
      }
    }

@@ -440,7 +451,7 @@ router.delete('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.delete'), requireEv

    res.json({ message: 'Archive deleted permanently' });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Archive delete error:', error);
+    logger.error('Archive delete error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to delete archive' });
  }
 });
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const { handleAsync, validateRequest, successResponse } = require('../utils/rout
 const { NotFoundError, ConflictError, ValidationError } = require('../utils/errors');
 const { setAdminAuthCookie } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
 const { IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL } = require('../utils/emailNormalization');
+const mfaService = require('../services/mfaService');
 const router = express.Router();

 // Get admin profile
@@ -184,4 +185,175 @@ router.post('/logout', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
  successResponse(res, { message: 'Logged out successfully' });
 }));

+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Multi-factor authentication (TOTP) — issue #738.
+//
+// All endpoints operate on the AUTHENTICATED admin's own account
+// (req.admin.id) — enrollment is per-user and works for every role,
+// super_admin included (closes #735). The TOTP secret is stored encrypted
+// at rest and recovery codes are hashed; see services/mfaService.js.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const isMfaEnabled = mfaService.isEnrolled;
+
+// Current MFA state for the logged-in admin.
+router.get('/mfa/status', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+  const admin = await db('admin_users').where('id', req.admin.id).first();
+  if (!admin) throw new NotFoundError('Admin user');
+  const enabled = isMfaEnabled(admin);
+  res.json({
+    enabled,
+    enrolledAt: enabled ? admin.two_factor_enrolled_at || null : null,
+    recoveryCodesRemaining: enabled
+      ? mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(admin.two_factor_recovery_codes).length
+      : 0
+  });
+}));
+
+// Begin enrollment: mint a provisional secret, store it encrypted (NOT yet
+// enabled), and return the otpauth URI + QR for the authenticator app. Calling
+// this again before /enable simply regenerates the provisional secret.
+router.post('/mfa/setup', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+  const admin = await db('admin_users').where('id', req.admin.id).first();
+  if (!admin) throw new NotFoundError('Admin user');
+  if (isMfaEnabled(admin)) {
+    throw new ConflictError('Two-factor authentication is already enabled');
+  }
+
+  const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+  await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
+    two_factor_secret: mfaService.encryptSecret(secret),
+    two_factor_enabled: false,
+    two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
+    two_factor_enrolled_at: null,
+    updated_at: new Date()
+  });
+
+  const accountName = admin.email || admin.username;
+  const otpauthUri = mfaService.buildOtpauthUri(accountName, secret);
+  const qr = await mfaService.buildQrDataUrl(otpauthUri);
+
+  res.json({
+    // `secret` is returned for manual entry when a QR can't be scanned.
+    secret,
+    otpauthUri,
+    qr,
+    issuer: mfaService.ISSUER,
+    account: accountName
+  });
+}));
+
+// Complete enrollment: verify a code against the provisional secret, enable
+// MFA, and return one-time recovery codes (shown exactly once).
+router.post('/mfa/enable', [
+  adminAuth,
+  body('code').notEmpty().withMessage('Verification code is required')
+], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+  validateRequest(req);
+  const admin = await db('admin_users').where('id', req.admin.id).first();
+  if (!admin) throw new NotFoundError('Admin user');
+  if (isMfaEnabled(admin)) {
+    throw new ConflictError('Two-factor authentication is already enabled');
+  }
+  if (!admin.two_factor_secret) {
+    throw new ValidationError('Start setup before enabling two-factor authentication');
+  }
+  if (!mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret)) {
+    throw new ValidationError('Invalid verification code');
+  }
+
+  const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
+  await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
+    two_factor_enabled: true,
+    two_factor_enrolled_at: new Date(),
+    two_factor_recovery_codes: JSON.stringify(hashed),
+    updated_at: new Date()
+  });
+
+  await logActivity('admin_mfa_enabled',
+    { admin_id: admin.id },
+    null,
+    { type: 'admin', id: admin.id, name: admin.username }
+  );
+
+  successResponse(res, {
+    message: 'Two-factor authentication enabled',
+    recoveryCodes: plain
+  });
+}));
+
+// Disable MFA. Requires a fresh TOTP or recovery code so a hijacked session
+// can't silently strip the second factor.
+router.post('/mfa/disable', [
+  adminAuth,
+  body('code').notEmpty().withMessage('A current code is required to disable 2FA')
+], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+  validateRequest(req);
+  const admin = await db('admin_users').where('id', req.admin.id).first();
+  if (!admin) throw new NotFoundError('Admin user');
+  if (!isMfaEnabled(admin)) {
+    throw new ValidationError('Two-factor authentication is not enabled');
+  }
+
+  const totpOk = mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret);
+  let recoveryOk = false;
+  if (!totpOk) {
+    const stored = mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(admin.two_factor_recovery_codes);
+    recoveryOk = (await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(req.body.code, stored)).matched;
+  }
+  if (!totpOk && !recoveryOk) {
+    throw new ValidationError('Invalid verification code');
+  }
+
+  await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
+    two_factor_enabled: false,
+    two_factor_secret: null,
+    two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
+    two_factor_enrolled_at: null,
+    updated_at: new Date()
+  });
+
+  await logActivity('admin_mfa_disabled',
+    { admin_id: admin.id },
+    null,
+    { type: 'admin', id: admin.id, name: admin.username }
+  );
+
+  successResponse(res, { message: 'Two-factor authentication disabled' });
+}));
+
+// Regenerate recovery codes (invalidates the old set). Requires a fresh TOTP
+// code. Returns the new codes once.
+router.post('/mfa/recovery-codes', [
+  adminAuth,
+  body('code').notEmpty().withMessage('A current authenticator code is required')
+], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+  validateRequest(req);
+  const admin = await db('admin_users').where('id', req.admin.id).first();
+  if (!admin) throw new NotFoundError('Admin user');
+  if (!isMfaEnabled(admin)) {
+    throw new ValidationError('Two-factor authentication is not enabled');
+  }
+  if (!mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret)) {
+    throw new ValidationError('Invalid verification code');
+  }
+
+  const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
+  await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
+    two_factor_recovery_codes: JSON.stringify(hashed),
+    updated_at: new Date()
+  });
+
+  await logActivity('admin_mfa_recovery_regenerated',
+    { admin_id: admin.id },
+    null,
+    { type: 'admin', id: admin.id, name: admin.username }
+  );
+
+  successResponse(res, {
+    message: 'Recovery codes regenerated',
+    recoveryCodes: plain
+  });
+}));
+
 module.exports = router;
@@ -2,8 +2,12 @@ const express = require('express');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
+const { clearAdminAuthCookie } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
+const { revokeToken } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
 const { triggerManualBackup, getBackupStatus, cleanupOldBackupRuns, getBackupManifest, validateBackupManifest } = require('../services/backupService');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
+const { errorResponse, getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { formatBytes } = require('../utils/formatBytes');
 const fs = require('fs').promises;
 const path = require('path');
 const crypto = require('crypto');
@@ -30,8 +34,7 @@ router.get('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, r
    
    res.json(config);
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to get backup configuration:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get backup configuration' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get backup configuration');
  }
 });

@@ -43,22 +46,22 @@ router.put('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req,
    // Validate required fields based on destination type
    if (updates.backup_destination_type) {
      switch (updates.backup_destination_type) {
-        case 'local':
-          if (!updates.backup_destination_path) {
-            return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Local backup requires destination path' });
-          }
-          break;
-        case 'rsync':
-          if (!updates.backup_rsync_host || !updates.backup_rsync_path) {
-            return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Rsync backup requires host and path' });
-          }
-          break;
-        case 's3':
-          if (!updates.backup_s3_endpoint || !updates.backup_s3_bucket || 
+      case 'local':
+        if (!updates.backup_destination_path) {
+          return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Local backup requires destination path' });
+        }
+        break;
+      case 'rsync':
+        if (!updates.backup_rsync_host || !updates.backup_rsync_path) {
+          return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Rsync backup requires host and path' });
+        }
+        break;
+      case 's3':
+        if (!updates.backup_s3_endpoint || !updates.backup_s3_bucket || 
              !updates.backup_s3_access_key || !updates.backup_s3_secret_key) {
-            return res.status(400).json({ error: 'S3 backup requires endpoint, bucket, and credentials' });
-          }
-          break;
+          return res.status(400).json({ error: 'S3 backup requires endpoint, bucket, and credentials' });
+        }
+        break;
      }
    }
    
@@ -92,21 +95,19 @@ router.put('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req,
    
    res.json({ success: true, message: 'Backup configuration updated' });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to update backup configuration:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update backup configuration' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update backup configuration');
  }
 });

 // Get backup status and history
 router.get('/status', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
  try {
-    const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit) || 10;
+    const { limit } = getPagination(req, { limit: 10 });
    const status = await getBackupStatus(limit);
    
    res.json(status);
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to get backup status:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get backup status' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get backup status');
  }
 });

@@ -126,8 +127,103 @@ router.post('/run', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, r
    
    res.json({ success: true, message: 'Backup started' });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to trigger manual backup:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to trigger backup' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to trigger backup');
+  }
+});
+
+// Generate + download a portable ".picpeak" export — an engine-neutral logical
+// snapshot (DB rows as NDJSON + PDFs/business-docs) that can be re-uploaded to
+// another instance via the web UI. `?includePhotos=true` also bundles original
+// gallery photos (larger); otherwise the admin re-uploads them per gallery.
+//
+// SECURITY: the file contains plaintext secrets (SMTP password, admin password
+// hashes, API keys). The download UI must warn before offering it. We surface
+// the flag as a response header too so the client can double-confirm.
+router.get('/picpeak/export', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
+  const fsSync = require('fs');
+  try {
+    const includePhotos = req.query.includePhotos === 'true' || req.query.includePhotos === '1';
+    const { createPicpeak } = require('../services/picpeakExportService');
+    const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos });
+    const filename = path.basename(filePath);
+    res.setHeader('X-Picpeak-Contains-Secrets', 'true');
+    res.download(filePath, filename, (err) => {
+      // Best-effort cleanup of the temp .picpeak (and its temp dir) after send.
+      fsSync.rm(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true }, () => {});
+      if (err) logger.error('[picpeak-export] download failed', { error: err.message });
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    logger.error('[picpeak-export] failed to create export', { error: error.message });
+    if (!res.headersSent) res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create .picpeak export' });
+  }
+});
+
+// Multipart upload for .picpeak restore — streamed to a temp file. Runs AFTER
+// auth so an unauthenticated request can't push a large file to disk.
+const os = require('os');
+const multer = require('multer');
+const picpeakUpload = multer({
+  storage: multer.diskStorage({
+    destination: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, os.tmpdir()),
+    filename: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, `picpeak-upload-${Date.now()}-${crypto.randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}.picpeak`),
+  }),
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5 GB — .picpeak with photos can be large
+});
+
+// Upload + restore a .picpeak onto THIS instance. DESTRUCTIVE: full override of
+// all data except the current logged-in account (the client shows an explicit
+// confirmation before calling this). Returns `usesExternalMedia` so the UI can
+// prompt the admin to reconfigure the external-media mount afterwards.
+router.post('/picpeak/import', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.restore'), picpeakUpload.single('backup'), async (req, res) => {
+  const fsSync = require('fs');
+  if (!req.file) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No backup file uploaded' });
+  const picpeakPath = req.file.path;
+  try {
+    const { importFromPicpeak } = require('../services/picpeakImportService');
+    // adminAuth populates req.admin, not req.user. Passing req.user.id here
+    // left currentAdminId undefined, so reinjectCurrentAdmin() had no account
+    // to preserve and the admin_users table was fully replaced by the backup —
+    // letting a crafted .picpeak take over every admin account (GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f).
+    const result = await importFromPicpeak({ picpeakPath, currentAdminId: req.admin && req.admin.id });
+
+    // The restore rewrote admin_users, so ids may have shifted. The operator's
+    // current JWT is bound only to the pre-restore admin id (adminAuth trusts
+    // `decoded.id` — IP is logged, not enforced, and the backup controls
+    // password_changed_at), which could now resolve to a DIFFERENT restored
+    // account and silently grant its permissions. Force a fresh login instead
+    // of trusting the old session: revoke the token and clear the cookie.
+    // Clearing the cookie is the guarantee — it drops the operator's browser
+    // session unconditionally. Revocation is the extra layer that also kills a
+    // Bearer-header copy of the JWT; revokeToken() swallows DB errors and
+    // returns false, so check the result and log loudly if the denylist write
+    // didn't land (the operator should still re-login, which the cookie clear
+    // forces).
+    let tokenRevoked = false;
+    try {
+      if (req.token) {
+        tokenRevoked = await revokeToken(req.token, 'picpeak-import', { adminId: req.admin && req.admin.id });
+      }
+    } catch (revokeErr) {
+      logger.warn('[picpeak-import] failed to revoke session token after restore', { error: revokeErr.message });
+    }
+    if (req.token && !tokenRevoked) {
+      logger.warn('[picpeak-import] session token was NOT added to the revocation denylist after restore; relying on cookie clear to force re-login');
+    }
+    clearAdminAuthCookie(res);
+
+    res.json({
+      success: true,
+      tables: result.tables,
+      filesRestored: result.filesRestored,
+      usesExternalMedia: result.usesExternalMedia,
+      sessionInvalidated: true,
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    const status = error.statusCode || 500;
+    logger.error('[picpeak-import] restore failed', { error: error.message });
+    res.status(status).json({ error: error.message || 'Restore failed', validation: error.validation });
+  } finally {
+    fsSync.unlink(picpeakPath, () => {});
  }
 });

@@ -155,8 +251,7 @@ router.get('/runs/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req,
    
    res.json(run);
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to get backup run details:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get backup run details' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get backup run details');
  }
 });

@@ -190,8 +285,7 @@ router.get('/files', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, re
      }
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to get backup file states:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get file states' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get file states');
  }
 });

@@ -204,8 +298,7 @@ router.delete('/cleanup', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.delete'), async (
    
    res.json({ success: true, message: `Cleaned up backup runs older than ${days} days` });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to cleanup old backup runs:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to cleanup backup runs' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to cleanup backup runs');
  }
 });

@@ -215,129 +308,128 @@ router.post('/test-connection', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), a
    const { destination_type, ...config } = req.body;
    
    switch (destination_type) {
-      case 'local':
-        // Test local path access
-        const fs = require('fs').promises;
-        try {
-          await fs.access(config.path, fs.constants.W_OK);
-          res.json({ success: true, message: 'Local path is writable' });
-        } catch (error) {
-          logger.warn('Local backup path not writable', {
-            path: config.path,
-            error: error.message
-          });
-          res.json({ success: false, message: 'Cannot write to local path. Check server logs for details.' });
-        }
-        break;
+    case 'local':
+      // Test local path access
+      const fs = require('fs').promises;
+      try {
+        await fs.access(config.path, fs.constants.W_OK);
+        res.json({ success: true, message: 'Local path is writable' });
+      } catch (error) {
+        logger.warn('Local backup path not writable', {
+          path: config.path,
+          error: error.message
+        });
+        res.json({ success: false, message: 'Cannot write to local path. Check server logs for details.' });
+      }
+      break;
        
-      case 'rsync':
-        // Test rsync connection using spawn with argument arrays to prevent command injection
-        const { spawn } = require('child_process');
+    case 'rsync':
+      // Test rsync connection using spawn with argument arrays to prevent command injection
+      const { spawn } = require('child_process');

-        // Validate and sanitize inputs to prevent command injection
-        const sanitizeInput = (input) => {
-          if (!input || typeof input !== 'string') return null;
-          // Remove any shell metacharacters and limit length
-          return input.replace(/[;&|`$(){}[\]<>\\!#*?"'\n\r]/g, '').substring(0, 255);
-        };
+      // Validate and sanitize inputs to prevent command injection
+      const sanitizeInput = (input) => {
+        if (!input || typeof input !== 'string') return null;
+        // Remove any shell metacharacters and limit length
+        return input.replace(/[;&|`$(){}[\]<>\\!#*?"'\n\r]/g, '').substring(0, 255);
+      };

-        const host = sanitizeInput(config.host);
-        const user = sanitizeInput(config.user);
-        const sshKeyPath = sanitizeInput(config.ssh_key);
+      const host = sanitizeInput(config.host);
+      const user = sanitizeInput(config.user);
+      const sshKeyPath = sanitizeInput(config.ssh_key);

-        if (!host) {
-          res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid host specified' });
+      if (!host) {
+        res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid host specified' });
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // Validate host format (hostname or IP only)
+      const hostRegex = /^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?(\.[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?)*$/;
+      const ipRegex = /^(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/;
+      if (!hostRegex.test(host) && !ipRegex.test(host)) {
+        res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid host format' });
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // SSRF protection: block connections to private/internal addresses
+      const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+      if (isPrivateIP(host)) {
+        res.json({ success: false, message: 'Host cannot be a private or internal network address' });
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // Validate username format if provided
+      if (user && !/^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_-]*$/.test(user)) {
+        res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid username format' });
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // Build SSH arguments as array (safe from injection)
+      const sshArgs = [];
+      if (sshKeyPath) {
+        // Validate SSH key path exists and is a file
+        const fsSync = require('fs');
+        if (!fsSync.existsSync(sshKeyPath) || !fsSync.statSync(sshKeyPath).isFile()) {
+          res.json({ success: false, message: 'SSH key file not found' });
          break;
        }
+        sshArgs.push('-i', sshKeyPath);
+      }
+      sshArgs.push('-o', 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no');
+      sshArgs.push('-o', 'ConnectTimeout=10');
+      sshArgs.push('-o', 'BatchMode=yes');

-        // Validate host format (hostname or IP only)
-        const hostRegex = /^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?(\.[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?)*$/;
-        const ipRegex = /^(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/;
-        if (!hostRegex.test(host) && !ipRegex.test(host)) {
-          res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid host format' });
-          break;
-        }
+      // Add target (user@host or just host)
+      const target = user ? `${user}@${host}` : host;
+      sshArgs.push(target);
+      sshArgs.push('echo', 'Connection successful');

-        // SSRF protection: block connections to private/internal addresses
-        const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-        if (isPrivateIP(host)) {
-          res.json({ success: false, message: 'Host cannot be a private or internal network address' });
-          break;
-        }
-
-        // Validate username format if provided
-        if (user && !/^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_-]*$/.test(user)) {
-          res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid username format' });
-          break;
-        }
-
-        // Build SSH arguments as array (safe from injection)
-        const sshArgs = [];
-        if (sshKeyPath) {
-          // Validate SSH key path exists and is a file
-          const fsSync = require('fs');
-          if (!fsSync.existsSync(sshKeyPath) || !fsSync.statSync(sshKeyPath).isFile()) {
-            res.json({ success: false, message: 'SSH key file not found' });
-            break;
-          }
-          sshArgs.push('-i', sshKeyPath);
-        }
-        sshArgs.push('-o', 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no');
-        sshArgs.push('-o', 'ConnectTimeout=10');
-        sshArgs.push('-o', 'BatchMode=yes');
-
-        // Add target (user@host or just host)
-        const target = user ? `${user}@${host}` : host;
-        sshArgs.push(target);
-        sshArgs.push('echo', 'Connection successful');
-
-        try {
-          const result = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-            const sshProcess = spawn('ssh', sshArgs, {
-              timeout: 15000,
-              stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe']
-            });
-
-            let stdout = '';
-            let stderr = '';
-
-            sshProcess.stdout.on('data', (data) => { stdout += data; });
-            sshProcess.stderr.on('data', (data) => { stderr += data; });
-
-            sshProcess.on('close', (code) => {
-              if (code === 0) {
-                resolve({ success: true, stdout });
-              } else {
-                reject(new Error(stderr || `SSH exited with code ${code}`));
-              }
-            });
-
-            sshProcess.on('error', (err) => {
-              reject(err);
-            });
+      try {
+        const result = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+          const sshProcess = spawn('ssh', sshArgs, {
+            timeout: 15000,
+            stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe']
          });

-          res.json({ success: true, message: 'Rsync connection successful' });
-        } catch (error) {
-          logger.warn('Rsync connection test failed', {
-            destination: host,
-            error: error.message
+          let stdout = '';
+          let stderr = '';
+
+          sshProcess.stdout.on('data', (data) => { stdout += data; });
+          sshProcess.stderr.on('data', (data) => { stderr += data; });
+
+          sshProcess.on('close', (code) => {
+            if (code === 0) {
+              resolve({ success: true, stdout });
+            } else {
+              reject(new Error(stderr || `SSH exited with code ${code}`));
+            }
          });
-          res.json({ success: false, message: 'Rsync connection failed. Check server logs for details.' });
-        }
-        break;
+
+          sshProcess.on('error', (err) => {
+            reject(err);
+          });
+        });
+
+        res.json({ success: true, message: 'Rsync connection successful' });
+      } catch (error) {
+        logger.warn('Rsync connection test failed', {
+          destination: host,
+          error: error.message
+        });
+        res.json({ success: false, message: 'Rsync connection failed. Check server logs for details.' });
+      }
+      break;
        
-      case 's3':
-        // Test S3 connection (would need AWS SDK)
-        res.json({ success: false, message: 'S3 testing not implemented yet' });
-        break;
+    case 's3':
+      // Test S3 connection (would need AWS SDK)
+      res.json({ success: false, message: 'S3 testing not implemented yet' });
+      break;
        
-      default:
-        res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid destination type' });
+    default:
+      res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid destination type' });
    }
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to test backup connection:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to test connection' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to test connection');
  }
 });

@@ -380,8 +472,7 @@ router.post('/manifest/validate', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), a
      manifestPath
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to validate manifest:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to validate manifest' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to validate manifest');
  }
 });

@@ -493,8 +584,7 @@ router.post('/manifests/validate', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'),
      manifestPath
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to validate manifest:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to validate manifest' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to validate manifest');
  }
 });

@@ -525,8 +615,7 @@ router.get('/s3/buckets', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (re
      owner: result.Owner || null
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to list S3 buckets:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to list S3 buckets' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to list S3 buckets');
  }
 });

@@ -562,8 +651,7 @@ router.get('/s3/files', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req,
      prefix: prefix
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to list S3 files:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to list S3 files' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to list S3 files');
  }
 });

@@ -624,8 +712,7 @@ router.delete('/s3/cleanup', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.delete'), asyn
      message: `Cleaned up ${deletedCount} S3 backup files older than ${retentionDays} days`
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to cleanup S3 backups:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to cleanup S3 backups' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to cleanup S3 backups');
  }
 });

@@ -676,8 +763,7 @@ router.post('/s3/test-upload', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), as
      message: 'S3 upload test completed successfully'
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('S3 upload test failed:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'S3 upload test failed' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'S3 upload test failed');
  }
 });

@@ -703,69 +789,68 @@ router.get('/download/:backupId', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), a
    
    // Handle different backup types
    switch (config.backup_destination_type) {
-      case 'local':
-        // Stream local backup as zip
-        const backupPath = path.join(config.backup_destination_path, `backup-${backupRun.id}`);
-        const archive = archiver('zip', { zlib: { level: 9 } });
+    case 'local':
+      // Stream local backup as zip
+      const backupPath = path.join(config.backup_destination_path, `backup-${backupRun.id}`);
+      const archive = archiver('zip', { zlib: { level: 9 } });
        
-        res.attachment(`picpeak-backup-${backupRun.id}.zip`);
-        archive.pipe(res);
+      res.attachment(`picpeak-backup-${backupRun.id}.zip`);
+      archive.pipe(res);
        
-        // Add backup directory contents
-        archive.directory(backupPath, false);
+      // Add backup directory contents
+      archive.directory(backupPath, false);
        
-        // Add manifest if exists
-        if (backupRun.manifest_path && await fs.access(backupRun.manifest_path).then(() => true).catch(() => false)) {
-          archive.file(backupRun.manifest_path, { name: 'manifest.json' });
-        }
+      // Add manifest if exists
+      if (backupRun.manifest_path && await fs.access(backupRun.manifest_path).then(() => true).catch(() => false)) {
+        archive.file(backupRun.manifest_path, { name: 'manifest.json' });
+      }
        
-        await archive.finalize();
-        break;
+      await archive.finalize();
+      break;
        
-      case 's3':
-        // For S3, provide pre-signed URLs or stream files
-        const s3Adapter = new S3StorageAdapter({
-          endpoint: config.backup_s3_endpoint,
-          bucket: config.backup_s3_bucket,
-          accessKeyId: config.backup_s3_access_key,
-          secretAccessKey: config.backup_s3_secret_key,
-          region: config.backup_s3_region || 'us-east-1',
-          forcePathStyle: config.backup_s3_force_path_style || false
+    case 's3':
+      // For S3, provide pre-signed URLs or stream files
+      const s3Adapter = new S3StorageAdapter({
+        endpoint: config.backup_s3_endpoint,
+        bucket: config.backup_s3_bucket,
+        accessKeyId: config.backup_s3_access_key,
+        secretAccessKey: config.backup_s3_secret_key,
+        region: config.backup_s3_region || 'us-east-1',
+        forcePathStyle: config.backup_s3_force_path_style || false
+      });
+        
+      // List all files for this backup
+      const prefix = `backups/${backupRun.id}/`;
+      const files = await s3Adapter.list(prefix, { maxKeys: 1000 });
+        
+      // Generate pre-signed URLs
+      const urls = [];
+      for (const file of files.objects || []) {
+        const url = await s3Adapter.getSignedUrl('getObject', file.key, { expiresIn: 3600 }); // 1 hour
+        urls.push({
+          key: file.key,
+          size: file.size,
+          url: url
        });
+      }
        
-        // List all files for this backup
-        const prefix = `backups/${backupRun.id}/`;
-        const files = await s3Adapter.list(prefix, { maxKeys: 1000 });
+      res.json({
+        backupId: backupRun.id,
+        type: 's3',
+        files: urls,
+        expiresIn: 3600,
+        message: 'Use the provided URLs to download individual files'
+      });
+      break;
        
-        // Generate pre-signed URLs
-        const urls = [];
-        for (const file of files.objects || []) {
-          const url = await s3Adapter.getSignedUrl('getObject', file.key, { expiresIn: 3600 }); // 1 hour
-          urls.push({
-            key: file.key,
-            size: file.size,
-            url: url
-          });
-        }
+    case 'rsync':
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Direct download not available for rsync backups' });
        
-        res.json({
-          backupId: backupRun.id,
-          type: 's3',
-          files: urls,
-          expiresIn: 3600,
-          message: 'Use the provided URLs to download individual files'
-        });
-        break;
-        
-      case 'rsync':
-        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Direct download not available for rsync backups' });
-        
-      default:
-        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Unknown backup type' });
+    default:
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Unknown backup type' });
    }
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to download backup:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to download backup' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to download backup');
  }
 });

@@ -837,8 +922,7 @@ router.get('/checksums', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req
      path: targetPath || '/'
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to get file checksums:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get file checksums' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get file checksums');
  }
 });

@@ -940,21 +1024,11 @@ router.post('/estimate', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req
      warnings: totalSize > 10 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 ? ['Backup size exceeds 10GB, may take significant time'] : []
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to estimate backup size:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to estimate backup size' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to estimate backup size');
  }
 });

 // Helper function to format bytes
-function formatBytes(bytes, decimals = 2) {
-  if (bytes === 0) return '0 Bytes';
-  const k = 1024;
-  const dm = decimals < 0 ? 0 : decimals;
-  const sizes = ['Bytes', 'KB', 'MB', 'GB', 'TB'];
-  const i = Math.floor(Math.log(bytes) / Math.log(k));
-  return parseFloat((bytes / Math.pow(k, i)).toFixed(dm)) + ' ' + sizes[i];
-}
-
 // Helper function to get backup configuration
 async function getBackupConfig() {
  try {
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { validateFileType } = require('../utils/fileSecurityUtils');
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const router = express.Router();

 const getStoragePath = () => process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../storage');
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ router.get('/pages', adminAuth, requirePermission('cms.view'), async (req, res)
    const pages = await db('cms_pages').select('*').orderBy('slug', 'asc');
    res.json(pages);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error fetching CMS pages:', error);
+    logger.error('Error fetching CMS pages:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch pages' });
  }
 });
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ router.get('/pages/:slug', adminAuth, requirePermission('cms.view'), async (req,

    res.json(page);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error fetching CMS page:', error);
+    logger.error('Error fetching CMS page:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch page' });
  }
 });
@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@ router.put('/pages/:slug', adminAuth, requirePermission('cms.edit'), [

    res.json(updated);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error updating CMS page:', error);
+    logger.error('Error updating CMS page:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update page' });
  }
 });
@@ -184,7 +185,7 @@ router.post(

      res.json({ logo_url: logoUrl });
    } catch (error) {
-      console.error('Error uploading CMS page logo:', error);
+      logger.error('Error uploading CMS page logo:', error);
      res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to upload logo' });
    }
  }
@@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ router.delete(

      res.json({ logo_url: null });
    } catch (error) {
-      console.error('Error clearing CMS page logo:', error);
+      logger.error('Error clearing CMS page logo:', error);
      res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to clear logo' });
    }
  }
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const router = express.Router();

 // Get all global categories
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@ router.get('/global', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
    
    res.json(categories);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error fetching categories:', error);
+    logger.error('Error fetching categories:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch categories' });
  }
 });
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ router.get('/event/:eventId', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), asy
    
    res.json(categories);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error fetching event categories:', error);
+    logger.error('Error fetching event categories:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch categories' });
  }
 });
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ router.post('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
    
    res.json(category);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error creating category:', error);
+    logger.error('Error creating category:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create category' });
  }
 });
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ router.put('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [

    res.json(updated);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error updating category:', error);
+    logger.error('Error updating category:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update category' });
  }
 });
@@ -214,7 +215,7 @@ router.put('/:id/hero', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [

    res.json(updated);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error updating category hero:', error);
+    logger.error('Error updating category hero:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update category hero' });
  }
 });
@@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ router.delete('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (req,
    
    res.json({ message: 'Category deleted successfully' });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error deleting category:', error);
+    logger.error('Error deleting category:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to delete category' });
  }
 });
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { sanitizeCSS, validateCSS, MAX_CSS_SIZE } = require('../utils/cssSanitizer');
 const { DEFAULT_CSS_TEMPLATE } = require('../../migrations/core/052_add_css_templates');
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');

 /**
 * GET /admin/css-templates
@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.view'), async (req, res)
    );
    res.json({ success: true, templates });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Get CSS templates error:', error);
+    logger.error('Get CSS templates error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch templates' });
  }
 });
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ router.get('/enabled', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.view'), async (req
    );
    res.json({ success: true, templates });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Get enabled templates error:', error);
+    logger.error('Get enabled templates error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch templates' });
  }
 });
@@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ router.get('/:slotNumber', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.view'), [

    res.json({ success: true, template });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Get template error:', error);
+    logger.error('Get template error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch template' });
  }
 });
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ router.put('/:slotNumber', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.edit'), [
      sanitization_warnings: warnings
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Update template error:', error);
+    logger.error('Update template error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update template' });
  }
 });
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ router.post('/:slotNumber/reset', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.edit'),

    res.json({ success: true, template });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Reset template error:', error);
+    logger.error('Reset template error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to reset template' });
  }
 });
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ const { sanitizeDays, addDateRangeCondition } = require('../utils/sqlSecurity');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const { resolveAdapter } = require('../services/trackers');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
+const { errorResponse, getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const router = express.Router();

 /**
@@ -126,16 +127,15 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
      totalEvents: totalEvents.count || 0
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Dashboard stats error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch dashboard statistics' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch dashboard statistics');
  }
 });

 // Get recent activity
 router.get('/activity', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req, res) => {
  try {
-    const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit) || 10;
-    
+    const { limit } = getPagination(req, { limit: 10 });
+
    const activities = await db('activity_logs')
      .select('activity_logs.*', 'events.event_name')
      .leftJoin('events', 'activity_logs.event_id', 'events.id')
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ router.get('/activity', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (r
          if (typeof activity.metadata === 'object') return activity.metadata;
          return JSON.parse(activity.metadata);
        } catch (e) {
-          console.warn('Failed to parse metadata for activity:', activity.id, e.message);
+          logger.warn('Failed to parse metadata for activity:', activity.id, e.message);
          return {};
        }
      })(),
@@ -164,8 +164,7 @@ router.get('/activity', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (r

    res.json(formattedActivities);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Activity log error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch activity log' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch activity log');
  }
 });

@@ -233,7 +232,7 @@ router.get('/health', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
      }
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Health check error:', error);
+    logger.error('Health check error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ 
      overall: 'error',
      error: 'Failed to check system health' 
@@ -400,8 +399,7 @@ router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (
      }
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Analytics error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch analytics data' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch analytics data');
  }
 });

@@ -439,6 +437,10 @@ router.get('/crm-stats', adminAuth, async (req, res) => {
    const monthCutoff   = new Date(now -  30 * DAY);
    const quarterCutoff = new Date(now -  90 * DAY);
    const yearCutoff    = new Date(now - 365 * DAY);
+    // Calendar year-to-date (Jan 1 of the current year, local time) —
+    // the dashboard's revenue "year" tile can toggle between this and
+    // the trailing-365-day window.
+    const calendarYearCutoff = new Date(new Date(now).getFullYear(), 0, 1);

    // ---- quotes: counts by status ---------------------------------
    let quoteCounts = { draft: 0, sent: 0, accepted: 0, declined: 0, expired: 0, converted: 0 };
@@ -459,6 +461,7 @@ router.get('/crm-stats', adminAuth, async (req, res) => {
    let revenueMonthMinor = 0;
    let revenueQuarterMinor = 0;
    let revenueYearMinor = 0;
+    let revenueCalendarYearMinor = 0;
    let outstandingTotalMinor = 0;
    let outstandingCount = 0;

@@ -504,9 +507,10 @@ router.get('/crm-stats', adminAuth, async (req, res) => {
            .first();
          return Number(row?.total || 0);
        };
-        revenueMonthMinor   = await winSum(monthCutoff);
-        revenueQuarterMinor = await winSum(quarterCutoff);
-        revenueYearMinor    = await winSum(yearCutoff);
+        revenueMonthMinor        = await winSum(monthCutoff);
+        revenueQuarterMinor      = await winSum(quarterCutoff);
+        revenueYearMinor         = await winSum(yearCutoff);
+        revenueCalendarYearMinor = await winSum(calendarYearCutoff);

        // Outstanding: every invoice that's been sent but not fully
        // paid (sent + overdue). Outstanding = total - paid. We sum
@@ -568,9 +572,10 @@ router.get('/crm-stats', adminAuth, async (req, res) => {
      quotes: quoteCounts,
      invoices: invoiceCounts,
      revenue: {
-        monthMinor:   revenueMonthMinor,
-        quarterMinor: revenueQuarterMinor,
-        yearMinor:    revenueYearMinor,
+        monthMinor:        revenueMonthMinor,
+        quarterMinor:      revenueQuarterMinor,
+        yearMinor:         revenueYearMinor,
+        calendarYearMinor: revenueCalendarYearMinor,
      },
      outstanding: {
        totalMinor: outstandingTotalMinor,
@@ -579,8 +584,7 @@ router.get('/crm-stats', adminAuth, async (req, res) => {
      generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    require('../utils/logger').error('CRM stats error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load CRM stats' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load CRM stats');
  }
 });

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { databaseBackupService } = require('../services/databaseBackup');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
+const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');

 // All routes require admin authentication
 router.use(adminAuth);
@@ -154,10 +155,8 @@ router.get('/progress', requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
 */
 router.get('/history', requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
  try {
-    const page = parseInt(req.query.page) || 1;
-    const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit) || 20;
-    const offset = (page - 1) * limit;
-    
+    const { page, limit, offset } = getPagination(req);
+
    const [backups, totalCount] = await Promise.all([
      db('database_backup_runs')
        .orderBy('started_at', 'desc')
@@ -4,7 +4,13 @@ const { body, query, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
+// Gate the NEW Messages routes on the `messaging` flag (per-route, NOT the whole
+// /email mount — the pre-existing config/queue/received endpoints stay ungated).
+const { requireFeatureFlag } = require('../middleware/requireFeatureFlag');
+const messagingGate = requireFeatureFlag('messaging');
 const { wrapEmailHtml, processEmailQueue } = require('../services/emailProcessor');
+const { errorResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const router = express.Router();

 // Get email configuration
@@ -31,8 +37,7 @@ router.get('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, re
      smtp_pass: config.smtp_pass ? '********' : ''
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Email config fetch error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch email configuration' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch email configuration');
  }
 });

@@ -113,8 +118,7 @@ router.post('/config', [

    res.json({ message: 'Email configuration updated successfully' });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Email config update error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update email configuration' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update email configuration');
  }
 });

@@ -131,8 +135,7 @@ router.get('/incoming-config', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), async
      imap_folder: c?.imap_folder || 'INBOX',
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Incoming mail config fetch error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch incoming mail configuration' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch incoming mail configuration');
  }
 });

@@ -168,8 +171,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config', [
    await logActivity('incoming_mail_config_updated', { imap_host }, null, { type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username });
    res.json({ message: 'Incoming mail configuration updated successfully' });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Incoming mail config update error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update incoming mail configuration' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update incoming mail configuration');
  }
 });

@@ -192,7 +194,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/folders', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view
    );
    res.json({ folders });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('IMAP folder detection error:', error);
+    logger.error('IMAP folder detection error:', error);
    res.status(422).json({ error: `Could not connect to the mailbox (${error.message}). Check host, port (IMAP is usually 993) and credentials.` });
  }
 });
@@ -217,7 +219,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/test', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'),
    }
    res.json(result);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('IMAP connection test error:', error);
+    logger.error('IMAP connection test error:', error);
    res.status(422).json({ error: `Could not connect to the mailbox (${error.message}). Check host, port (IMAP is usually 993), credentials and folder.` });
  }
 });
@@ -239,7 +241,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/roundtrip', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.se
    return res.status(result.reason === 'not_received' ? 504 : 400)
      .json({ error: map[result.reason] || 'Round-trip test failed.', sent: !!result.sent, recipient: result.recipient });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Round-trip test error:', error);
+    logger.error('Round-trip test error:', error);
    res.status(422).json({ error: `Round-trip test failed (${error.message}) — check both SMTP and IMAP settings.` });
  }
 });
@@ -253,7 +255,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/poll', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'),
    const result = await emailIntakeService.pollOnce();
    res.json(result); // { processed } or { skipped: 'disabled'|'unconfigured'|'busy' }
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Manual poll error:', error);
+    logger.error('Manual poll error:', error);
    res.status(422).json({ error: `Mailbox poll failed (${error.message}).` });
  }
 });
@@ -262,14 +264,193 @@ router.get('/received', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req,
  try {
    const page = Math.max(1, parseInt(req.query.page, 10) || 1);
    const pageSize = Math.min(100, Math.max(1, parseInt(req.query.pageSize, 10) || 25));
-    const base = db('received_emails');
-    const countRow = await base.clone().count({ c: '*' }).first();
+    const account = req.query.account ? String(req.query.account) : null;
+    // mailbox_state filter: no param → active (+ legacy NULL); else exact.
+    const state = ['archived', 'deleted'].includes(String(req.query.state)) ? String(req.query.state) : 'active';
+    // Optional full-table search (sender / subject) so results aren't truncated
+    // to the first page before matching.
+    const q = req.query.q ? String(req.query.q).trim().slice(0, 255) : '';
+    // 'accounting' matches legacy rows too (account_key was NULL before mig 154).
+    const applyAccount = (qb) => {
+      if (account === 'accounting') qb.where((b) => b.where('account_key', 'accounting').orWhereNull('account_key'));
+      else if (account) qb.where('account_key', account);
+      if (state === 'active') qb.where((b) => b.where('mailbox_state', 'active').orWhereNull('mailbox_state'));
+      else qb.where('mailbox_state', state);
+      if (q) qb.where((b) => b.where('from_address', 'like', `%${q}%`).orWhere('subject', 'like', `%${q}%`));
+      return qb;
+    };
+    const countRow = await applyAccount(db('received_emails')).count({ c: '*' }).first();
    const total = parseInt(countRow?.c || 0, 10);
-    const items = await base.clone().orderBy('received_at', 'desc').limit(pageSize).offset((page - 1) * pageSize);
+    // Bodies are excluded from the list (can be large); fetched per-message.
+    const items = await applyAccount(db('received_emails'))
+      .select('id', 'message_id', 'account_key', 'from_address', 'to_address', 'subject',
+        'received_at', 'attachment_count', 'status', 'inbound_document_id', 'error')
+      .orderBy('received_at', 'desc').limit(pageSize).offset((page - 1) * pageSize);
    res.json({ items, pagination: { page, pageSize, total, totalPages: Math.ceil(total / pageSize) } });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Received emails fetch error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch received emails' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch received emails');
+  }
+});
+
+// Single received email WITH its captured (server-sanitized) body — Messages
+// reading pane. body_html was already sanitized on ingest; the viewer renders
+// it in a script-less sandboxed iframe as well.
+router.get('/received/:id', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
+    if (!Number.isInteger(id)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid id' });
+    const row = await db('received_emails').where({ id }).first();
+    if (!row) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Email not found' });
+    res.json(row);
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch email');
+  }
+});
+
+// Move an email between mailbox states: Archive / Delete (soft) or Restore
+// (back to active). kind = 'queue' | 'received'. Delete is a soft move to the
+// trash; the row is only removed for good by the DELETE handler below.
+router.post('/item/:kind/:id/state', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const table = req.params.kind === 'received' ? 'received_emails' : req.params.kind === 'queue' ? 'email_queue' : null;
+    if (!table) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid kind' });
+    const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
+    if (!Number.isInteger(id)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid id' });
+    const state = String(req.body?.state || '');
+    if (!['active', 'archived', 'deleted'].includes(state)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid state' });
+    const n = await db(table).where({ id }).update({ mailbox_state: state });
+    if (!n) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    res.json({ ok: true });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update email');
+  }
+});
+
+// Permanently delete an email row — only offered from the Deleted folder.
+router.delete('/item/:kind/:id', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.edit'), async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const table = req.params.kind === 'received' ? 'received_emails' : req.params.kind === 'queue' ? 'email_queue' : null;
+    if (!table) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid kind' });
+    const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
+    if (!Number.isInteger(id)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid id' });
+    await db(table).where({ id }).del();
+    res.json({ ok: true });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to delete email');
+  }
+});
+
+// Additional inbound mailboxes (beyond the primary accounting IMAP in
+// email_configs) — e.g. the customer hello@ box. Passwords are masked out.
+router.get('/accounts', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const rows = await db('mail_accounts').orderBy('id');
+    res.json({ items: rows.map((a) => ({
+      ...a,
+      imap_pass: a.imap_pass ? '********' : '',
+      smtp_pass: a.smtp_pass ? '********' : '',
+    })) });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load mail accounts');
+  }
+});
+
+// Resolved sender/mailbox addresses for the Messages UI — so the sidebar shows
+// the REAL configured addresses instead of hardcoded placeholders. Accounting =
+// the primary IMAP login (rechnungen@); customers = the hello@ mailbox; the
+// automated stream sends from the global SMTP from-address.
+router.get('/identities', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const cfg = await db('email_configs').first();
+    let customers = null;
+    try {
+      const cust = await db('mail_accounts').where({ account_key: 'customers' }).first();
+      customers = cust?.imap_user || cust?.from_email || null;
+    } catch (_) { customers = null; }
+    res.json({
+      automated: cfg?.from_email || null,
+      accounting: cfg?.imap_user || null,
+      customers,
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load mail identities');
+  }
+});
+
+// Upsert a mailbox by account_key. A masked password ('********') keeps the
+// stored value so the admin never has to re-type it.
+router.post('/accounts', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.edit'), async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const b = req.body || {};
+    if (!b.account_key) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'account_key is required' });
+    // SSRF guard — mirror /config + /incoming-config: neither the IMAP nor the
+    // SMTP host may point at a private/internal address.
+    const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+    if (b.imap_host && isPrivateIP(b.imap_host)) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
+    }
+    if (b.smtp_host && isPrivateIP(b.smtp_host)) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'SMTP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
+    }
+    const patch = {
+      label: b.label || null,
+      imap_host: b.imap_host || null,
+      imap_port: b.imap_port ? parseInt(b.imap_port, 10) : 993,
+      imap_secure: b.imap_secure !== false,
+      imap_user: b.imap_user || null,
+      imap_folder: b.imap_folder || 'INBOX',
+      // Outgoing (SMTP) identity — replies from this mailbox send from here.
+      smtp_host: b.smtp_host || null,
+      smtp_port: b.smtp_port ? parseInt(b.smtp_port, 10) : 587,
+      smtp_secure: b.smtp_secure === true,
+      smtp_user: b.smtp_user || null,
+      from_email: b.from_email || null,
+      from_name: b.from_name || null,
+      enabled: !!b.enabled,
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    };
+    if (b.imap_pass && b.imap_pass !== '********') patch.imap_pass = b.imap_pass;
+    if (b.smtp_pass && b.smtp_pass !== '********') patch.smtp_pass = b.smtp_pass;
+    const existing = await db('mail_accounts').where({ account_key: b.account_key }).first();
+    if (existing) {
+      await db('mail_accounts').where({ account_key: b.account_key }).update(patch);
+    } else {
+      await db('mail_accounts').insert({
+        account_key: b.account_key,
+        imap_pass: (b.imap_pass && b.imap_pass !== '********') ? b.imap_pass : '',
+        smtp_pass: (b.smtp_pass && b.smtp_pass !== '********') ? b.smtp_pass : '',
+        created_at: new Date(),
+        ...patch,
+      });
+    }
+    res.json({ ok: true });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to save mail account');
+  }
+});
+
+// Test an inbound mailbox's IMAP connection (before or after saving). Resolves
+// a masked/blank password from the stored row for the given account_key.
+router.post('/accounts/test', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const b = req.body || {};
+    const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+    if (b.imap_host && isPrivateIP(b.imap_host)) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
+    }
+    let pass = b.imap_pass;
+    if ((!pass || pass === '********') && b.account_key) {
+      const stored = await db('mail_accounts').where({ account_key: b.account_key }).first();
+      pass = stored?.imap_pass || '';
+    }
+    const emailIntakeService = require('../services/emailIntakeService');
+    const result = await emailIntakeService.testConnection({
+      host: b.imap_host, port: b.imap_port, secure: b.imap_secure,
+      user: b.imap_user, pass, folder: b.imap_folder || 'INBOX',
+    });
+    res.json(result);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(422).json({ ok: false, error: `Mailbox test failed (${error.message}).` });
  }
 });

@@ -322,7 +503,7 @@ router.post('/test', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.send'), async (req, res
      debug: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development'
    };

-    console.log('Creating email transporter with config:', {
+    logger.info('Creating email transporter with config:', {
      host: transportConfig.host,
      port: transportConfig.port,
      secure: transportConfig.secure,
@@ -356,8 +537,8 @@ router.post('/test', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.send'), async (req, res

    res.json({ message: 'Test email sent successfully' });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Test email error:', error);
-    console.error('Error stack:', error.stack);
+    logger.error('Test email error:', error);
+    logger.error('Error stack:', error.stack);

    // Provide more specific error messages with translation keys
    let errorMessage = 'Error sending email';
@@ -428,7 +609,7 @@ router.post('/flush-queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.send'), async (r
    } catch (_) { /* activity logging is best-effort */ }
    res.json({ message: 'Email queue flushed', ...summary });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Flush email queue error:', error);
+    logger.error('Flush email queue error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to flush email queue', details: error.message });
  }
 });
@@ -441,6 +622,8 @@ router.post('/flush-queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.send'), async (r
 router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
  query('status').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isIn(['pending', 'sent', 'failed']),
  query('emailType').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 64 }),
+  query('origin').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isIn(['system', 'manual']),
+  query('state').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isIn(['active', 'archived', 'deleted']),
  query('q').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 255 }),
  query('from').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isISO8601(),
  query('to').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isISO8601(),
@@ -459,6 +642,13 @@ router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
    const applyFilters = (qb) => {
      if (req.query.status) qb.where('email_queue.status', req.query.status);
      if (req.query.emailType) qb.where('email_queue.email_type', req.query.emailType);
+      // 'system' includes legacy rows (origin was NULL before migration 155).
+      if (req.query.origin === 'manual') qb.where('email_queue.origin', 'manual');
+      else if (req.query.origin === 'system') qb.where((b) => b.where('email_queue.origin', 'system').orWhereNull('email_queue.origin'));
+      // mailbox_state: default active (+ legacy NULL); Archived/Deleted folders pass it explicitly.
+      const st = ['archived', 'deleted'].includes(String(req.query.state)) ? String(req.query.state) : 'active';
+      if (st === 'active') qb.where((b) => b.where('email_queue.mailbox_state', 'active').orWhereNull('email_queue.mailbox_state'));
+      else qb.where('email_queue.mailbox_state', st);
      if (req.query.from) qb.where('email_queue.created_at', '>=', new Date(req.query.from));
      if (req.query.to) qb.where('email_queue.created_at', '<=', new Date(req.query.to));
      if (req.query.q) {
@@ -487,6 +677,7 @@ router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
          'email_queue.sent_at',
          'email_queue.error_message',
          'email_queue.retry_count',
+          'email_queue.origin',
          'email_queue.event_id',
          'events.event_name as event_name',
          'events.slug as event_slug'
@@ -506,6 +697,7 @@ router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
      sentAt: r.sent_at,
      errorMessage: r.error_message,
      retryCount: r.retry_count,
+      origin: r.origin || 'system',
      eventId: r.event_id,
      eventName: r.event_name || null,
      eventSlug: r.event_slug || null,
@@ -516,11 +708,116 @@ router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
      pagination: { total, page, pageSize, totalPages: Math.ceil(total / pageSize) || 1 },
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('List email queue error:', error);
+    logger.error('List email queue error:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load email queue', details: error.message });
  }
 });

+// Single queued/sent email WITH its rendered body — powers the Messages
+// reading pane. `rendered_html` is the exact HTML that was sent (migration
+// 119); rows sent before that migration have none. Attachment disk paths in
+// `email_data` are never exposed — only the filenames, so the pane can list
+// attachments without leaking storage paths (same PII posture as the list).
+router.get('/queue/:id', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
+    if (!Number.isInteger(id)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid id' });
+    const row = await db('email_queue')
+      .leftJoin('events', 'events.id', 'email_queue.event_id')
+      .select('email_queue.*', 'events.event_name as event_name', 'events.slug as event_slug')
+      .where('email_queue.id', id)
+      .first();
+    if (!row) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Email not found' });
+
+    let cc = null;
+    let attachments = [];
+    try {
+      const data = row.email_data ? JSON.parse(row.email_data) : {};
+      if (data.cc) cc = Array.isArray(data.cc) ? data.cc.join(', ') : String(data.cc);
+      if (Array.isArray(data.attachments)) {
+        attachments = data.attachments
+          .filter((a) => a && a.filename)
+          .map((a) => ({ filename: a.filename, contentType: a.contentType || null }));
+      }
+    } catch (_) { /* malformed email_data → no cc/attachments, still return the body */ }
+
+    res.json({
+      id: row.id,
+      recipientEmail: row.recipient_email,
+      emailType: row.email_type,
+      status: row.status,
+      createdAt: row.created_at,
+      scheduledAt: row.scheduled_at,
+      sentAt: row.sent_at,
+      errorMessage: row.error_message,
+      retryCount: row.retry_count,
+      eventId: row.event_id,
+      eventName: row.event_name || null,
+      eventSlug: row.event_slug || null,
+      renderedHtml: row.rendered_html || null,
+      cc,
+      attachments,
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    logger.error('Get email queue item error:', error);
+    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load email', details: error.message });
+  }
+});
+
+// Send a human-composed email from the Messages composer. The admin already
+// edited the body (reply or document message), so it is sent as-is — no
+// template render — after a sanitize pass. Recorded in email_queue as a
+// 'manual' send so it surfaces under Customers > Sent.
+router.post('/send', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.send'), async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const b = req.body || {};
+    const to = String(b.to || '').trim();
+    const subject = String(b.subject || '').trim();
+    if (!to || !/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(to)) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'A valid recipient email is required.' });
+    }
+    if (!subject) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'A subject is required.' });
+
+    const sanitizeHtml = require('sanitize-html');
+    // Match the stricter inbound sanitizeBody allowlist: no <style> tag, no
+    // data: scheme — inline style/class attributes are enough for composed mail.
+    const html = sanitizeHtml(String(b.html || ''), {
+      allowedTags: sanitizeHtml.defaults.allowedTags.concat(['img']),
+      allowedAttributes: {
+        ...sanitizeHtml.defaults.allowedAttributes,
+        img: ['src', 'alt', 'width', 'height'],
+        '*': ['style', 'class'],
+      },
+      allowedSchemes: ['http', 'https', 'mailto', 'cid'],
+    });
+    const cc = b.cc ? String(b.cc).trim() : null;
+    const accountKey = b.accountKey ? String(b.accountKey) : undefined;
+
+    const emailProcessor = require('../services/emailProcessor');
+    const result = await emailProcessor.sendRawEmail({ to, cc, subject, html, accountKey });
+
+    await db('email_queue').insert({
+      recipient_email: to,
+      email_type: 'manual_message',
+      email_data: JSON.stringify({
+        subject,
+        cc: cc || undefined,
+        replyToReceivedId: b.replyToReceivedId || undefined,
+        messageId: result.messageId,
+      }),
+      status: 'sent',
+      origin: 'manual',
+      rendered_html: html,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      sent_at: new Date(),
+    });
+    res.json({ ok: true });
+  } catch (error) {
+    logger.error('Manual send error:', error);
+    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to send message', details: error.message });
+  }
+});
+
 // Helper: parse variables JSON safely
 function parseVariables(template) {
  try {
@@ -528,7 +825,7 @@ function parseVariables(template) {
    if (typeof template.variables === 'object') return template.variables;
    return JSON.parse(template.variables);
  } catch (e) {
-    console.warn('Failed to parse variables for template:', template.template_key, e.message);
+    logger.warn('Failed to parse variables for template:', template.template_key, e.message);
    return [];
  }
 }
@@ -611,8 +908,7 @@ router.get('/templates', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req,

    res.json(formattedTemplates);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Email templates fetch error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch email templates' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch email templates');
  }
 });

@@ -641,8 +937,7 @@ router.get('/templates/:key', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), async
      updated_at: template.updated_at,
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Email template fetch error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch email template' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch email template');
  }
 });

@@ -730,8 +1025,7 @@ router.put('/templates/:key', [

    res.json({ message: 'Email template updated successfully' });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Email template update error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update email template' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update email template');
  }
 });

@@ -818,8 +1112,7 @@ router.post('/templates', [

    return res.status(201).json({ template_key: templateKey, id: templateId });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Email template create error:', error);
-    return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create email template' });
+    return errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to create email template');
  }
 });

@@ -897,8 +1190,7 @@ router.post('/templates/:key/preview', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'
      language
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Email template preview error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to preview email template' });
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to preview email template');
  }
 });

@@ -7,14 +7,16 @@ const express = require('express');
 const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
+const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
 const eventRenameService = require('../services/eventRenameService');
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const router = express.Router();

 /**
 * POST /api/admin/events/:eventId/rename
 * Rename an event
 */
-router.post('/:eventId/rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), [
+router.post('/:eventId/rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireEventOwnership, [
  body('newEventName')
    .trim()
    .isLength({ min: 3, max: 100 })
@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), [
      data: result.data
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error renaming event:', error);
+    logger.error('Error renaming event:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Failed to rename event' });
  }
 });
@@ -59,7 +61,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), [
 * POST /api/admin/events/:eventId/validate-rename
 * Validate a potential rename without executing it
 */
-router.post('/:eventId/validate-rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), [
+router.post('/:eventId/validate-rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireEventOwnership, [
  body('newEventName')
    .trim()
    .isLength({ min: 3, max: 100 })
@@ -81,7 +83,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/validate-rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.ed

    res.json(validation);
  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error validating rename:', error);
+    logger.error('Error validating rename:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ valid: false, error: 'Validation failed' });
  }
 });
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-// This is a partial file showing the enhanced event creation with password validation
-// Only the relevant parts are shown - merge with existing adminEvents.js
-
-const { validatePasswordInContext, getBcryptRounds } = require('../utils/passwordValidation');
-const { buildShareLinkVariants } = require('../services/shareLinkService');
-const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
-const { IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL } = require('../utils/emailNormalization');
-
-// Enhanced event creation with password validation
-// Note: This is a partial/reference file - dynamic event type validation should be implemented
-// similar to adminEvents.js using eventTypeService.isValidEventType()
-router.post('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.create'), [
-  body('event_type').notEmpty().trim(), // Dynamic validation via eventTypeService
-  body('event_name').notEmpty().trim(),
-  body('event_date').isDate(),
-  body('customer_email').isEmail().normalizeEmail(IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL),
-  body('admin_email').isEmail().normalizeEmail(IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL),
-  body('password').notEmpty(), // Remove the weak isLength validation
-  body('expiration_days').isInt({ min: 1, max: 365 }).optional(),
-  body('welcome_message').optional().trim(),
-  body('color_theme').optional().trim(),
-  body('allow_user_uploads').optional().isBoolean().toBoolean(),
-  body('upload_category_id').optional({ nullable: true, checkFalsy: true }).isInt(),
-  body('customer_name').notEmpty().trim()
-], async (req, res) => {
-  try {
-    console.log('Create event request body:', req.body);
-    const errors = validationResult(req);
-    if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      console.error('Validation errors:', errors.array());
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
-    }
-    
-    const {
-      event_type,
-      event_name,
-      event_date,
-      customer_name,
-      customer_email,
-      admin_email,
-      password,
-      welcome_message = '',
-      color_theme = null,
-      expiration_days = 30,
-      allow_user_uploads = false,
-      upload_category_id = null,
-      photo_cap = null
-    } = req.body;
-    
-    // Validate password strength for gallery
-    const passwordValidation = await validatePasswordInContext(password, 'gallery', {
-      eventName: event_name
-    });
-    
-    if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ 
-        error: 'Password does not meet security requirements',
-        details: passwordValidation.errors,
-        score: passwordValidation.score,
-        feedback: passwordValidation.feedback
-      });
-    }
-    
-    // Generate unique slug
-    const baseSlug = `${event_type}-${event_name.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, '-')}-${event_date}`;
-    let slug = baseSlug;
-    let counter = 1;
-    
-    while (await db('events').where({ slug }).first()) {
-      slug = `${baseSlug}-${counter}`;
-      counter++;
-    }
-    
-    // Generate share link based on configured style
-    const shareToken = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
-    const { shareUrl, shareLinkToStore } = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug, shareToken });
-    
-    // Hash password with configurable rounds
-    const password_hash = await bcrypt.hash(password, getBcryptRounds());
-    
-    // Calculate expiration date (days after event date)
-    const expires_at = new Date(event_date);
-    expires_at.setDate(expires_at.getDate() + parseInt(expiration_days, 10));
-    
-    // Create folder structure
-    const storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../storage');
-    const eventPath = path.join(storagePath, 'events/active', slug);
-    await fs.mkdir(path.join(eventPath, 'collages'), { recursive: true });
-    await fs.mkdir(path.join(eventPath, 'individual'), { recursive: true });
-    
-    // Insert into database
-    const insertResult = await db('events').insert({
-      slug,
-      event_type,
-      event_name,
-      event_date,
-      customer_name,
-      customer_email,
-      host_name: customer_name,
-      host_email: customer_email,
-      admin_email,
-      password_hash,
-      welcome_message,
-      color_theme,
-      share_link: shareLinkToStore,
-      share_token: shareToken,
-      expires_at: expires_at.toISOString(),
-      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
-      allow_user_uploads,
-      upload_category_id,
-      photo_cap: photo_cap || null
-    }).returning('id');
-    
-    // Handle both PostgreSQL (returns array of objects) and SQLite (returns array of IDs)
-    const eventId = insertResult[0]?.id || insertResult[0];
-    
-    // Log activity
-    await logActivity('event_created', 
-      { 
-        event_type, 
-        expires_at,
-        password_strength: passwordValidation.score 
-      }, 
-      eventId, 
-      { type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
-    );
-    
-    // Rest of the implementation remains the same...
-    // Queue creation email, etc.
-  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error creating event:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create event' });
-  }
-});
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+// Extracted verbatim from the original routes/adminEvents.js (see ./index.js).
+// Exports a register function; ./index.js calls the sub-routers in the original
+// registration order so Express route matching is unchanged.
+
+const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
+const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
+const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
+const { adminAuth } = require('../../middleware/auth');
+const { requirePermission } = require('../../middleware/permissions');
+const { archiveEvent } = require('../../services/archiveService');
+const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
+const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { requireEventOwnership, filterOwnedEventIds } = require('../../middleware/ownership');
+const { deleteEventCascade } = require('./helpers');
+
+
+// Bulk delete — destructive, irreversible. Caps at 100 events per request
+// to keep request time bounded; the per-event cascade touches 5 DB tables
+// + 3 filesystem paths so 1000 events would risk timing out the request.
+// Loops via deleteEventCascade so the per-event delete behaviour stays in
+// lock-step with DELETE /:id.
+//
+// Confirmation is enforced client-side via the typed-DELETE pattern in
+// BulkDeleteModal (#417). The previous server-side bcrypt-password gate
+// was dropped because the destructive single-event DELETE /:id has never
+// required a password either — events.delete permission + admin session
+// is the auth boundary for both. The typed-literal client gate is the
+// "accidental click" safeguard, and unlike a password input it isn't
+// affected by passkey/Windows Hello autofill that auto-submits the form.
+const BULK_DELETE_MAX = 100;
+
+module.exports = (router) => {
+
+
+  // Archive event
+  router.post('/:id/archive', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.archive'), requireEventOwnership, async (req, res) => {
+    try {
+      const { id } = req.params;
+
+      const event = await db('events').where('id', id).first();
+      if (!event) {
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
+      }
+
+      if (event.is_archived) {
+        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Event is already archived' });
+      }
+
+      // Use the archive service to create ZIP archive
+      await archiveEvent(event);
+
+      // Log activity
+      await logActivity('event_archived',
+        { eventName: event.event_name },
+        id,
+        { type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
+      );
+
+      res.json({ message: 'Event archived successfully' });
+    } catch (error) {
+      errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to archive event');
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Bulk archive events
+  router.post('/bulk-archive', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.archive'), [
+    body('eventIds').isArray().withMessage('eventIds must be an array'),
+    body('eventIds.*').isInt().withMessage('Each eventId must be an integer')
+  ], async (req, res) => {
+    try {
+      const errors = validationResult(req);
+      if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
+        return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      }
+
+      const { eventIds } = req.body;
+
+      if (eventIds.length === 0) {
+        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No events selected for archiving' });
+      }
+
+      // Ownership scope: a non-super_admin may only archive events they own.
+      // Foreign/non-existent ids are dropped and reported as failures so this
+      // route can't archive another admin's events (the single-event
+      // /:id/archive route enforces the same via requireEventOwnership).
+      const { allowed: allowedIds, denied: deniedIds } = await filterOwnedEventIds(req.admin, eventIds);
+
+      const results = {
+        successful: [],
+        failed: deniedIds.map((id) => ({ id, name: null, error: 'Access denied or event not found' }))
+      };
+
+      // Get all events to archive
+      const events = allowedIds.length
+        ? await db('events')
+          .whereIn('id', allowedIds)
+          .where('is_archived', formatBoolean(false))
+        : [];
+
+      if (events.length === 0) {
+        if (results.failed.length > 0) {
+          return res.json({
+            message: `Bulk archive completed: 0 succeeded, ${results.failed.length} failed`,
+            results
+          });
+        }
+        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No valid events found to archive' });
+      }
+
+      // Process each event
+      for (const event of events) {
+        try {
+        // Use the archive service to create ZIP archive
+          await archiveEvent(event);
+        
+          // Log activity
+          await logActivity('event_archived',
+            { eventName: event.event_name, bulkOperation: true },
+            event.id,
+            { type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
+          );
+        
+          results.successful.push({
+            id: event.id,
+            name: event.event_name
+          });
+        } catch (error) {
+          logger.error(`Failed to archive event ${event.id}:`, error);
+          results.failed.push({
+            id: event.id,
+            name: event.event_name,
+            error: 'Failed to archive event. Check server logs for details.'
+          });
+        }
+      }
+
+      // Log bulk archive activity
+      await logActivity('bulk_archive_completed',
+        { 
+          totalEvents: eventIds.length,
+          successfulCount: results.successful.length,
+          failedCount: results.failed.length
+        },
+        null,
+        { type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
+      );
+
+      res.json({
+        message: `Bulk archive completed: ${results.successful.length} succeeded, ${results.failed.length} failed`,
+        results
+      });
+    } catch (error) {
+      errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to perform bulk archive');
+    }
+  });
+  router.post('/bulk-delete', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.delete'), [
+    body('eventIds').isArray({ min: 1, max: BULK_DELETE_MAX }).withMessage(`eventIds must be an array of 1-${BULK_DELETE_MAX} ids`),
+    body('eventIds.*').isInt().withMessage('Each eventId must be an integer')
+  ], async (req, res) => {
+    try {
+      const errors = validationResult(req);
+      if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
+        return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      }
+
+      const { eventIds } = req.body;
+
+      // Ownership scope: a non-super_admin may only delete events they own.
+      // The single-event DELETE /:id route enforces this via
+      // requireEventOwnership; this bulk route must match it, otherwise an
+      // admin/editor scoped to their own events could cascade-delete any
+      // event by id. Foreign/non-existent ids are dropped and reported as
+      // failures (indistinguishable, to avoid an existence oracle).
+      const { allowed: allowedIds, denied: deniedIds } = await filterOwnedEventIds(req.admin, eventIds);
+
+      const results = {
+        successful: [],
+        failed: deniedIds.map((id) => ({ id, name: null, error: 'Access denied or event not found' }))
+      };
+      const adminContext = { id: req.admin.id, username: req.admin.username };
+
+      for (const eventId of allowedIds) {
+        try {
+          const deleted = await deleteEventCascade(eventId, adminContext);
+          results.successful.push(deleted);
+        } catch (err) {
+          results.failed.push({
+            id: eventId,
+            name: null,
+            error: err.code === 'EVENT_NOT_FOUND' ? 'Event not found' : 'Failed to delete event'
+          });
+          logger.warn('Bulk-delete: per-event failure', { eventId, error: err.message });
+        }
+      }
+
+      await logActivity('bulk_delete_completed',
+        {
+          totalEvents: eventIds.length,
+          successfulCount: results.successful.length,
+          failedCount: results.failed.length
+        },
+        null,
+        { type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
+      );
+
+      res.json({
+        message: `Bulk delete completed: ${results.successful.length} succeeded, ${results.failed.length} failed`,
+        results
+      });
+    } catch (error) {
+      errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to perform bulk delete');
+    }
+  });
+
+};
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More