fix(admin): keep header-style tiles from overflowing their cards (stable) (#1423)

Apply the header-style overflow fix to stable: size the grids from their container width and wrap long translated labels within each card.

.gitignore

@@ -135,3 +135,22 @@ new-layouts/
 # writes event photos into backend/storage/, and the narrower
 # business-docs-only rule let `git add -A` sweep them into a commit.
 backend/storage/
+
+# Python bytecode. The ML sidecar lives on main only, so this branch never
+# needed the rule — which is how a `git add -A` from a shared working tree
+# committed 16 .pyc files here in #1247.
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+
+# Issue / PR screenshots belong on a `screenshots/*` branch, never on main or
+# stable — that is what those branches exist for. Two landed at the repo root
+# on main in #1241 and shipped as part of the source tree; nothing stopped it.
+#
+# Anchored with a leading slash so docs/ keeps its own images.
+/issue-*.png
+/issue-*.jpg
+/screenshot-*.png
+/screenshot-*.jpg
+/*-screenshot.png
+/*-screenshot.jpg
+

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{".":"3.46.4"}
+{".":"3.46.12"}

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,93 @@ All notable changes to PicPeak will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [3.46.12](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.11...v3.46.12) (2026-09-10)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **backup:** honor the configured database-backup destination path ([#1367](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1367)) ([3420745](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/34207456e6c1ed2908ab34335ab0fd4d99503e90))
+* **video:** try metadata extraction and thumbnail generation independently ([#1372](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1372)) ([1316ed0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/1316ed05b3938da59eb8cb263a5334909e351bfe))
+
+## [3.46.11](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.10...v3.46.11) (2026-09-08)
+
+
+### Documentation
+
+* align stable security and backport policy ([#1352](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1352)) ([143c403](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/143c4035ec38683634d0e3d493032e2965f4a46f))
+
+## [3.46.10](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.9...v3.46.10) (2026-09-07)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **security:** bump sanitize-html to 2.17.7 ([0f426ef](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/0f426ef69968b395c6e3fbd0301fe3a7759a5f44))
+* **security:** bump sanitize-html to 2.17.7 (stable) ([95e3af0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/95e3af080039f2d31e1cb9c85a3d93b22c80ba7c))
+* **setup:** require Node 22.12 for sanitize-html ([8421b7b](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/8421b7b668484f87cd2bacda8fb4d95a3bc07ab5))
+
+## [3.46.9](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.8...v3.46.9) (2026-09-03)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **security:** batch 1 (stable) — zxcvbn DoS, revocation forgery, unlink traversals, stored Content-Type, edge middleware ([3f90221](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/3f90221f40b604dd5cebc016aad9478e84035b97))
+* **security:** bound password input before zxcvbn, and drop the legacy media mounts ([ed08ff8](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/ed08ff84ff014226f1e17cc17167f80afa366f7c))
+* **security:** close three middleware gaps around the API edge ([b136906](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/b1369068ae1327fc29e8aa671029548e2e93d827))
+* **security:** contain logo, favicon and PDF-logo unlinks to their upload directories ([882101b](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/882101b58670e99ac3aea560b83fc4123fe4b359))
+* **security:** enforce the strength-endpoint validators, and stop the generator spinning ([706d402](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/706d402c1e979d8419396c451487fb9be756a449))
+* **security:** harden four smaller gallery and contract paths, drop the unmounted photo auth middleware ([d81cade](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/d81cade7cc9a39179b05ace5ae47b13bbe1d8196))
+* **security:** never serve a photo under its stored MIME, and stop trusting the chunked-upload type ([a8d57f0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/a8d57f0d696b9e0e92d6ae91beff9f3ad0fa1695))
+* **security:** stop reflecting submitted passwords in validation errors ([6481708](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/6481708def49bc9cdf424752a633e320813cf280))
+* **security:** stop reflecting submitted values in validation errors everywhere, cap credential lengths, close the login timing oracle ([406c638](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/406c6384513da2d7582dc223d799fba7cad56745))
+* **security:** verify the signature before writing a token to the revocation list ([c6d4016](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/c6d401685f4eb4d9fd5fb70636962d73fc631cde))
+
+
+### Documentation
+
+* say the upload allow-list covers every path, video extensions must be added ([c89ce8e](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/c89ce8e1721adfd67598cf35ae307e97ed185827))
+
+## [3.46.8](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.7...v3.46.8) (2026-09-01)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **archives:** take the restored category from the manifest ([#1240](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1240)) (stable) ([#1243](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1243)) ([261e243](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/261e243070b6082ccd8b972de68d2fee15329235))
+* **archives:** write a real timestamp on restored photos ([#1257](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1257)) ([fed99ac](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/fed99ac03dfde03cf4c55fcb4b1419fea7564156))
+* **auth:** treat zxcvbn suggestions as advice, not blocking errors ([#1247](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1247)) ([5b69e3e](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/5b69e3ec4c898204c9fcde0f1d49f24edc688891))
+* **auth:** treat zxcvbn suggestions as advice, not blocking errors ([#1247](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1247)) ([eebca99](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/eebca9900b6f00b222eec16e27fa6be4fe2ce9fa))
+* **events:** apply the gallery password policy to publish ([#1255](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1255)) ([1d9f0b6](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/1d9f0b6c6491cface22f12651131fd5dfba330f0))
+* **events:** delete stored objects when cascading an event delete ([#1245](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1245)) ([7102687](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/7102687ee804140bfaca420d2eb7ec0078e50f25))
+* **gallery:** route single-photo downloads through the storage backend ([#1246](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1246)) ([5470fbe](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/5470fbe4063c3d6c0aeeb50fdb1ce6af74df1b53))
+* **upload:** let Android guests reach the camera without breaking video ([#1248](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1248)) ([ccc725f](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/ccc725f36edcf20643ab9c3a7aff16b5b93674c1))
+
+## [3.46.7](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.6...v3.46.7) (2026-08-28)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **admin:** the "Uncategorized" photo filter returns every photo ([#1211](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1211)) ([#1215](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1215)) ([15c844d](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/15c844db067de7bc04a88ddd407f3ed8f5df0fe2))
+
+## [3.46.6](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.5...v3.46.6) (2026-08-27)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **images:** fence the capture-date backfill on the file it read ([#1201](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1201)) ([#1205](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1205)) ([74ff236](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/74ff236b516b6df00e83d3c314fde552d18605ad))
+
+## [3.46.5](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.4...v3.46.5) (2026-08-26)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **admin:** make "Storage used" report storage used ([#1164](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1164)) ([#1177](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1177)) ([ac7ef26](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/ac7ef266dcd0d2b146c9739710c7631e672ef40f))
+* **admin:** move the maintenance sweeps' run state into the database ([#1181](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1181)) ([#1188](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1188)) ([58ccecc](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/58ccecc304ff308bac3d334553ca5c7ef282eae2))
+* **external-media:** one row per external file per event ([#1162](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1162)) ([#1173](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1173)) ([e9fcf49](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/e9fcf4960eb998c7e18528d773239f08e42e53bf))
+* **external-media:** record captured_at on import and add a backfill (stable) ([#1183](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1183)) ([7f0ed23](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/7f0ed23ea4c1d9379272b7267da74bc3addc1318))
+* **external-media:** store external paths from the media root ([#1163](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1163)) ([#1174](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1174)) ([2b1c358](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/2b1c3588aeb26b1503445698efc6ffe4f483e645))
+* **gallery:** stop the lightbox loading originals to display a photo ([#1166](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1166)) ([#1175](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1175)) ([75facb4](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/75facb4d67d026d312a99252abc7a6c420b864fb))
+* **images:** respect EXIF orientation in thumbnails, heroes, previews and watermarks ([#1185](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1185)) ([#1202](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1202)) ([5559cd3](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/5559cd333d1a1f0b5ae22ad3361c13b3954ce344))
+* **previews:** preserve alpha and animation in the preview tier ([#1176](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1176)) ([9ffbe2f](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/9ffbe2f98fba53b22200081ae1b6ad2f94003345))
+
 ## [3.46.4](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.3...v3.46.4) (2026-08-23)
 
 

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -163,13 +163,14 @@ PicPeak runs on two long-lived branches:
 | Branch | Role | What targets it |
 |---|---|---|
 | **`main`** | Active development. The next release is being assembled here. | Feature PRs. Most bugfix PRs. |
-| **`stable`** | Curated release channel. Production-recommended. | Urgent bugfix backports only — small, surgical PRs that land cleanly without dragging in unrelated changes. |
+| **`stable`** | Curated release channel. Production-recommended. | Security fixes and regular bugfix backports, kept small and free of unrelated features. |
 
 ### Which branch should my PR target?
 
 - **New feature** → target `main`.
 - **Bugfix that ONLY affects active dev** → target `main`.
-- **Bugfix that current stable users need** → open a small PR against `main`, AND a separate small PR against `stable` with the same change. Keep both surgical so each lands cleanly.
+- **Bugfix that current stable users need** → target `main`; regular bug fixes are generally backported automatically to `stable`. Maintainers handle conflicts or create a separate focused backport PR when needed.
+- **Security vulnerability** → report privately using [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). Security fixes are always released on both `stable` and `main`; coordinate any fix with the maintainers before opening a public PR.
 
 **Hard rule on PR scope**: bugfix PRs against `stable` must be small enough to backport without conflict. Omnibus PRs (e.g. five unrelated sub-features) are fine for `main`, but never for `stable` — they make the next `main → stable` merge painful and break the "stable is always shippable" invariant.
 
@@ -187,6 +188,6 @@ See [RELEASING.md](RELEASING.md) for the full operational doc (promotion criteri
 
 - Create an [issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) for bugs or features
 - Join [discussions](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions) for questions
-- Security issues: Open a [security issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub
+- Security vulnerabilities: Follow the [security policy](SECURITY.md) and use [private vulnerability reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
 
-Thank you for contributing! 🎉
+Thank you for contributing! 🎉

RELEASING.md

@@ -62,13 +62,18 @@ The actual mechanics, in order:
 
 ## Hotfix path (backport to current stable)
 
-If a critical bug or security issue affects the current stable and `main` has moved too far for a full promotion to be appropriate, backport just the fix:
+Regular bug fixes are generally backported automatically from `main` to `stable`. Keep backports focused on the fix, without unrelated features, and resolve conflicts manually when needed.
+
+**Security fixes are always released on both `stable` and `main`.** Do not wait for a full promotion to deliver a security update. A fix first applied to `stable` must also be forward-ported to `main`; a fix first applied to `main` must also reach `stable`. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the support policy.
+
+When a backport needs manual handling:
 
 1. Create a `security/cve-backport-X.Y.Z` or `fix/critical-X.Y.Z` branch off `stable`.
 2. Cherry-pick or hand-write the minimal fix.
 3. Open a PR to `stable` with the smallest possible diff.
 4. After merge, release-please will propose a patch-level stable release (e.g. `v3.55.1`).
 5. **Forward-port the fix to `main`** if it isn't already there. Otherwise the next full promotion will reintroduce the bug.
+6. For security fixes, verify that the fix has been published through **both** release channels; merging the code is only part of delivery.
 
 PR #412 ("backport 18 dependency CVE patches from beta") is a worked example of this path (predates the rename; the mechanics are unchanged).
 

SECURITY.md

@@ -1,88 +1,81 @@
 # Security Policy
 
+## Scope
+
+This policy covers the PicPeak backend, frontend, all-in-one (AIO) image, optional
+ML component, and the Docker images published by the PicPeak project. Other
+PicPeak repositories define their own supported versions and release channels.
+
 ## Supported Versions
 
-We release patches for security vulnerabilities. Currently supported versions:
+Security support follows the current release channels:
 
-| Version | Supported          |
-| ------- | ------------------ |
-| 2.x.x   | :white_check_mark: |
-| < 2.0   | :x:                |
+| Version or channel | Security support |
+| --- | --- |
+| Latest stable release from `stable` | Supported; security fixes are published through this channel |
+| Latest beta release from `main` | Supported; security fixes are published through this channel |
+| Superseded stable or beta releases | Upgrade to the latest release in the same channel; older releases are not maintained separately |
+| 2.x and earlier | No longer supported |
+
+See the [latest stable release](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/releases/latest)
+and [all releases, including betas](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/releases).
+Version numbers differ between channels; each channel receives its own updates.
+
+### Security fixes and bug backports
+
+**Security fixes are always released on both `stable` and `main`.** A fix that
+lands on one branch must also reach the other branch and be published through
+both release channels. Security updates do not wait for the next full
+`main`-to-`stable` promotion.
+
+Regular bug fixes are also generally backported automatically to `stable`.
+Backports remain focused on the fix, without pulling in unrelated features.
+Maintainers resolve conflicts or handle a backport manually when necessary.
+
+The [release process](RELEASING.md) describes backports, forward-ports and
+publication. Operators must apply the published updates to their installations.
 
 ## Reporting a Vulnerability
 
-We take the security of PicPeak seriously. If you have discovered a security vulnerability, please follow these steps:
+**Do not report vulnerabilities in public issues, discussions or pull requests.**
 
-### 1. **Do NOT create a public GitHub issue**
+Report privately through:
 
-### 2. Report the vulnerability privately by:
-- **Preferred:** Use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
-- **Alternative:** Email us at **info@picpeak.app** with the details
-- Include:
-  - Description of the vulnerability
-  - Steps to reproduce
-  - Potential impact
-  - Suggested fix (if any)
+- [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new) (preferred).
+- Email **info@picpeak.app** if you cannot use GitHub's private reporting form.
 
-### 3. You can expect:
-- Acknowledgment within 48 hours
-- Regular updates on our progress
-- Credit in the fix announcement (unless you prefer to remain anonymous)
+Include the affected component, version or image tag, deployment method,
+reproduction steps, expected impact and any suggested fix. Share only the
+information needed to reproduce the problem; remove credentials and personal
+data from logs or examples.
 
-## Security Measures
+We aim to acknowledge reports within 48 hours. This is a response target, not a
+guaranteed service level or a promised resolution time. We will provide progress
+updates and coordinate disclosure with the reporter. Reporter credit is optional;
+tell us if you prefer to remain anonymous.
 
-PicPeak implements several security measures:
+## Deployment Security
 
-### Authentication & Authorization
-- JWT-based authentication with secure token storage
-- bcrypt password hashing with configurable rounds
-- Role-based access control for admin functions
-- Session timeout management
+Security depends on both the software and its configuration. Operators should:
 
-### Input Validation
-- All user inputs are validated and sanitized
-- SQL injection prevention through parameterized queries
-- XSS protection via Content Security Policy
-- File upload restrictions and validation
+- Use HTTPS and configure the reverse proxy and trusted proxy settings correctly.
+- Use strong credentials and keep deployment secrets private.
+- Apply updates for the chosen release channel and restrict unnecessary network access.
+- Keep backups and verify that they can be restored.
 
-### Rate Limiting
-- API rate limiting to prevent abuse
-- Brute force protection on authentication endpoints
-- Configurable limits per endpoint
-
-### Data Protection
-- HTTPS enforcement in production
-- Secure cookie settings
-- CORS configuration
-- Sensitive data encryption
-
-### Infrastructure
-- Regular dependency updates
-- Security headers (HSTS, X-Frame-Options, etc.)
-- Activity logging for audit trails
-- Automated backups
-
-## Best Practices for Deployment
-
-1. **Always use HTTPS** in production
-2. **Change default passwords** immediately
-3. **Keep dependencies updated** regularly
-4. **Configure firewall rules** appropriately
-5. **Monitor logs** for suspicious activity
-6. **Backup regularly** and test restoration
+See the deployment guides for [HTTPS](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/ssl-certificates),
+[reverse proxies](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/reverse-proxy),
+[security settings](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/admin-settings/security)
+and [backup and restore](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/backup-restore).
 
 ## Vulnerability Disclosure
 
-We believe in responsible disclosure. Once a vulnerability is fixed:
+We coordinate disclosure with the reporter while preparing fixes. Security fixes
+are published through both supported channels. Advisories and release notes
+identify affected versions, the fixed version in each channel, the impact and
+any required mitigation or upgrade steps. Reporter credit is included with
+permission.
 
-1. We'll publish a security advisory
-2. Credit researchers (with permission)
-3. Detail the impact and mitigation steps
-4. Release patches for all supported versions
-
-## Contact
-
-- Security issues: Email **info@picpeak.app** or use [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
-- General support: [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues)
-
-Thank you for helping keep PicPeak and its users safe!
+For ordinary bugs and support requests, use
+[GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) or
+[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions).

backend/__tests__/integration/adminArchives.restoreCategories.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,498 @@
+/**
+ * Restoring an archive must put the photos back into their categories.
+ *
+ * The archive writer already persists `category_name` per photo in
+ * `photos_manifest.json` — that is why the manifest exists, and the comment
+ * above it says so: "(and category linkage) can't be derived from the
+ * extracted files alone". The restore route then read only
+ * `original_filename` from it and kept deriving the category from the ZIP's
+ * first path segment.
+ *
+ * Archives store photos exactly as they sit on disk, so an event whose photos
+ * live in the gallery root produces a FLAT zip. `path.dirname()` is '.' for
+ * every entry, no category is resolved, and every restored photo lands with
+ * `category_id = null` — silently, with a 200 response.
+ *
+ * These pin the manifest as the source of truth, with the directory as the
+ * fallback that keeps foldered and legacy archives working.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+describe('archive restore restores categories (flat archives included)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let app; let storagePath;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restore-cat-'));
+    storagePath = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'test.db');
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = storagePath;
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(storagePath, 'archives'), { recursive: true });
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
+      requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+    // bootCrmDb points STORAGE_PATH at its own tmp dir; follow it rather than
+    // fighting it, so the archives the tests write are where the route looks.
+    storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(storagePath, 'archives'), { recursive: true });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/admin/archives', require('../../src/routes/adminArchives'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('photo_categories').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+  });
+
+  /** A one-pixel JPEG is enough; the route only stats the extracted file. */
+  const PIXEL = Buffer.from(
+    '/9j/4AAQSkZJRgABAQEAYABgAAD/2wBDAAgGBgcGBQgHBwcJCQgKDBQNDAsLDBkSEw8UHRofHh0a'
+    + 'HBwgJC4nICIsIxwcKDcpLDAxNDQ0Hyc5PTgyPC4zNDL/wAALCAABAAEBAREA/8QAFAABAAAAAAAA'
+    + 'AAAAAAAAAAAACf/EABQQAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAD/2gAIAQEAAD8AKp//2Q==',
+    'base64',
+  );
+
+  async function writeArchive(name, entries) {
+    // Required lazily: the suite calls jest.resetModules() in beforeAll, and
+    // archiver's readable-stream copy does not survive being split across the
+    // two module registries.
+    const archiver = require('archiver');
+    const archivePath = path.join(storagePath, 'archives', name);
+    await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      const output = fs.createWriteStream(archivePath);
+      const zip = archiver('zip', { zlib: { level: 0 } });
+      output.on('close', resolve);
+      zip.on('error', reject);
+      zip.pipe(output);
+      for (const [entryName, buffer] of Object.entries(entries)) {
+        zip.append(buffer, { name: entryName });
+      }
+      zip.finalize();
+    });
+    return path.join('archives', name);
+  }
+
+  async function seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, slug) {
+    const [row] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: slug,
+      event_date: '2026-06-27',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `${slug}-share`,
+      expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      is_archived: 1,  // sqlite stores booleans as 0/1, see utils/dbCompat
+      archive_path: archiveRelPath,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
+  }
+
+  const categoryOf = async (filename) => {
+    const photo = await db('photos').where('filename', filename).first();
+    if (!photo || !photo.category_id) return null;
+    const category = await db('photo_categories').where('id', photo.category_id).first();
+    return category ? category.name : null;
+  };
+
+  it('takes the category from the manifest when the archive is flat', async () => {
+    // Exactly the shape a gallery-root event archives to: no directories.
+    const manifest = JSON.stringify([
+      { filename: 'a.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_0001.jpg', category_name: 'Polterabend' },
+      { filename: 'b.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_0002.jpg', category_name: 'Ceremony' },
+    ]);
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('flat.zip', {
+      'a.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'b.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(manifest, 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'flat-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // The whole bug: both of these used to be null.
+    expect(await categoryOf('a.jpg')).toBe('Polterabend');
+    expect(await categoryOf('b.jpg')).toBe('Ceremony');
+  });
+
+  it('stores a real timestamp on restored photos, not "[object Object]"', async () => {
+    // The jest+sqlite landmine: a Date handed to knex inside jest stores as
+    // the literal string "[object Object]". Production writes ms-numbers and
+    // is unaffected, so this only ever corrupts what tests read back — which
+    // is how it survives unnoticed.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('timestamp.zip', {
+      'individual/STAMPED.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'STAMPED.jpg', original_filename: 'STAMPED.jpg', category_name: 'Ceremony' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'timestamp-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId, filename: 'STAMPED.jpg' }).first();
+    expect(String(photo.uploaded_at)).not.toBe('[object Object]');
+    expect(Number.isNaN(new Date(photo.uploaded_at).getTime())).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('reuses an existing category row instead of creating a duplicate', async () => {
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('reuse.zip', {
+      'c.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'c.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_0003.jpg', category_name: 'Party' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'reuse-event');
+    await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, name: 'Party', slug: 'party', created_at: new Date(),
+    });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('c.jpg')).toBe('Party');
+    const rows = await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name: 'Party' });
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it('still falls back to the directory for legacy archives with no manifest', async () => {
+    // No manifest at all — the shape every archive had before the manifest
+    // landed. The directory is the only signal left, and it must keep working.
+    //
+    // `individual/` is what a REAL archive contains: entry names are the
+    // storage key minus `events/active/{slug}`, and that layout is
+    // `individual/` / `collages/`. Categories have never been directories, so
+    // the fallback invents a category with that name — not useful, but better
+    // than losing every category, and this pins what actually happens rather
+    // than a category-shaped folder no archive produces.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('foldered.zip', {
+      'individual/d.jpg': PIXEL,
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'foldered-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('d.jpg')).toBe('individual');
+  });
+
+  it('reuses a GLOBAL category instead of cloning it into the event', async () => {
+    // Seeded categories (Ceremony, Reception, ...) have event_id NULL. An
+    // event-only lookup misses them, so the restore used to create a second
+    // "Ceremony" — and because is_global defaults to TRUE, that duplicate then
+    // appeared in every other event's category list.
+    const [g] = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      event_id: null, name: 'Ceremony', slug: 'ceremony', is_global: true, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const globalId = typeof g === 'object' ? g.id : g;
+
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('global.zip', {
+      'individual/gl.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'gl.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_1.jpg', category_name: 'Ceremony' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'global-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where('filename', 'gl.jpg').first();
+    expect(photo.category_id).toBe(globalId);
+    // No clone, global or otherwise.
+    const all = await db('photo_categories').where('name', 'Ceremony');
+    expect(all).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it('does not create a GLOBAL category when it has to invent one', async () => {
+    // is_global defaults to true on this column, so an unqualified insert would
+    // leak a restore's category name into every gallery on the instance.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('newcat.zip', {
+      'individual/nc.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'nc.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_2.jpg', category_name: 'Polterabend' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'newcat-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const created = await db('photo_categories').where('name', 'Polterabend').first();
+    expect(created.event_id).toBe(eventId);
+    expect(created.is_global === false || created.is_global === 0).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('matches the manifest when the ZIP was written with original filenames', async () => {
+    // With general_use_original_filenames_for_downloads on at archive time,
+    // archiveService names entries after the ORIGINAL filename while the
+    // manifest stays keyed by photos.filename. Looking up the extracted
+    // basename missed every entry, so categories were lost on exactly those
+    // archives.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('original-names.zip', {
+      'individual/DSC_4242.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'stored_9f8e7d.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_4242.jpg', category_name: 'Drohne' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'original-names-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('DSC_4242.jpg')).toBe('Drohne');
+  });
+
+  it('prefers the event-scoped category when a global shares its name', async () => {
+    // The category API permits both. A single OR-lookup with .first() returned
+    // whichever the engine chose, so a photo could be reassigned to the global
+    // row and lose event-local settings such as allow_downloads.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('collide.zip', {
+      'individual/co.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'co.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_3.jpg', category_name: 'Reception' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'collide-event');
+
+    await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      event_id: null, name: 'Reception', slug: 'reception-global', is_global: true, created_at: new Date(),
+    });
+    const [own] = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, name: 'Reception', slug: 'reception-own', is_global: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const ownId = typeof own === 'object' ? own.id : own;
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where('filename', 'co.jpg').first();
+    expect(photo.category_id).toBe(ownId);
+  });
+
+  it('matches a sanitized original filename, as the ZIP would have written it', async () => {
+    // archiveService runs original names through sanitizeForZipEntry() before
+    // writing the entry, so the emitted name differs from the manifest column.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('sanitized.zip', {
+      'individual/od_dr_DSC_5.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'stored_abc.jpg', original_filename: 'od/dr/DSC_5.jpg', category_name: 'Strand' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'sanitized-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('od_dr_DSC_5.jpg')).toBe('Strand');
+  });
+
+  it('ignores a legacy event-owned row when falling back to globals', async () => {
+    // The bug fixed here left rows behind on upgraded instances: event-owned
+    // AND is_global true, because the column defaults true. Matching on the
+    // flag alone would let one event's leftover be adopted by another event's
+    // restore, tying photos to a category that vanishes with someone else's
+    // gallery.
+    const otherEventId = await seedArchivedEvent('archives/none.zip', 'legacy-owner-event');
+    await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      event_id: otherEventId, name: 'Sunset', slug: 'sunset-legacy',
+      is_global: true, created_at: new Date(),
+    });
+
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('legacy-global.zip', {
+      'individual/lg.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'lg.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_6.jpg', category_name: 'Sunset' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'legacy-global-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where('filename', 'lg.jpg').first();
+    const cat = await db('photo_categories').where('id', photo.category_id).first();
+    // Its own row, not the other event's leftover.
+    expect(cat.event_id).toBe(eventId);
+  });
+
+  it('drops an ambiguous original-name alias rather than guessing', async () => {
+    // Two photos in different ZIP folders can share an original basename;
+    // archiveService treats the paths as distinct and suffixes neither. Both
+    // would collapse onto one alias, and whichever won would hand the other
+    // photo someone else's category.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('ambiguous.zip', {
+      'individual/SHARED.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'a_stored.jpg', original_filename: 'SHARED.jpg', category_name: 'Alpha' },
+        { filename: 'b_stored.jpg', original_filename: 'SHARED.jpg', category_name: 'Beta' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'ambiguous-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // Falls back to the directory rather than picking Alpha or Beta at random.
+    expect(await categoryOf('SHARED.jpg')).toBe('individual');
+    for (const name of ['Alpha', 'Beta']) {
+      expect(await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name }).first()).toBeFalsy();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('honours a manifest that says UNCATEGORIZED, instead of inventing one from the directory', async () => {
+    // The case the manifest-first change was for. A real archive puts every
+    // photo under `individual/`, so a photo the manifest records as having no
+    // category used to come back filed under a category called "individual" —
+    // the manifest being authoritative for "category X" but not for "none".
+    const manifest = JSON.stringify([
+      { filename: 'u.jpg', original_filename: 'DSC_7000.jpg', category_name: null },
+    ]);
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('uncategorized.zip', {
+      'individual/u.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(manifest, 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'uncategorized-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('u.jpg')).toBeNull();
+    // And no junk category row was created as a side effect.
+    const rows = await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId });
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('drops a canonical filename that two photos claim, rather than guessing', async () => {
+    // photos.filename is not unique within an event: s3AutoImporter takes
+    // path.basename(entry.key) and dedupes by path, so two imported files in
+    // different subfolders both land as IMG_1234.jpg. Both ZIP entries reduce
+    // to the same basename at restore, so keeping the last row seen would give
+    // one photo the other's category.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('dup-canonical.zip', {
+      'individual/IMG_1234.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'IMG_1234.jpg', original_filename: 'a.jpg', category_name: 'Alpha' },
+        { filename: 'IMG_1234.jpg', original_filename: 'b.jpg', category_name: 'Beta' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'dup-canonical-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await categoryOf('IMG_1234.jpg')).toBe('individual');
+    for (const name of ['Alpha', 'Beta']) {
+      expect(await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name }).first()).toBeFalsy();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("drops a name that one row owns canonically and another claims as an alias", async () => {
+    // Undecidable: with original-filename archiving ON the ZIP entry under
+    // this name is the ALIAS owner's file, with it OFF it is the canonical
+    // owner's, and the manifest does not record which mode was used. The
+    // point of the two-pass split is that this now resolves the same way
+    // every run — the archive query has no ORDER BY, so it used to be a coin
+    // flip between dropping the name and overwriting it.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('alias-vs-canonical.zip', {
+      'individual/CANON.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'CANON.jpg', original_filename: 'unrelated.jpg', category_name: 'Canonical' },
+        { filename: 'other_stored.jpg', original_filename: 'CANON.jpg', category_name: 'Aliased' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'alias-vs-canonical-event');
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // Falls back to the directory rather than guessing either row.
+    expect(await categoryOf('CANON.jpg')).toBe('individual');
+    for (const name of ['Canonical', 'Aliased']) {
+      expect(await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name }).first()).toBeFalsy();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('picks the lowest id and warns when two categories share a name', async () => {
+    // Allowed: two event-scoped categories with the same display name and
+    // different slugs. .first() used to pick either, so a re-run could move
+    // photos between them and inherit the wrong allow_downloads.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('dupe-category.zip', {
+      'individual/DUPE.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'DUPE.jpg', original_filename: 'DUPE.jpg', category_name: 'Ceremony' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'dupe-category-event');
+
+    const [first] = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      name: 'Ceremony', slug: 'ceremony-a', is_global: 0, event_id: eventId,
+    }).returning('id');
+    await db('photo_categories').insert({
+      name: 'Ceremony', slug: 'ceremony-b', is_global: 0, event_id: eventId,
+    });
+    const firstId = typeof first === 'object' ? first.id : first;
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // Stable, not arbitrary: the same run twice lands on the same row.
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId, filename: 'DUPE.jpg' }).first();
+    expect(photo.category_id).toBe(firstId);
+    // And no third "Ceremony" was invented.
+    expect((await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name: 'Ceremony' })).length)
+      .toBe(2);
+  });
+
+  it('does not invent a category for a photo row that already exists', async () => {
+    // archiveEvent retains photo rows, so a restore can skip every insert.
+    // Resolving categories before that check created one from the stale
+    // manifest name that nothing then used — renaming a category while its
+    // event was archived left the old name behind as an empty duplicate.
+    const archiveRelPath = await writeArchive('existing-rows.zip', {
+      'individual/KEPT.jpg': PIXEL,
+      'photos_manifest.json': Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+        { filename: 'KEPT.jpg', original_filename: 'KEPT.jpg', category_name: 'OldName' },
+      ]), 'utf8'),
+    });
+    const eventId = await seedArchivedEvent(archiveRelPath, 'existing-rows-event');
+    await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'KEPT.jpg', path: 'whatever/KEPT.jpg', type: 'jpg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post(`/admin/archives/${eventId}/restore`).send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    expect(await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId, name: 'OldName' }).first())
+      .toBeFalsy();
+  });
+
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/businessProfileLogoUpload.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/**
+ * POST /api/admin/business-profile/logo and PUT /api/admin/business-profile
+ * — GHSA-6wrv-9pr4-hhmw regression coverage.
+ *
+ * The upload route used to take the stored file extension straight from
+ * the client-supplied filename and only checked `file.mimetype` against an
+ * allowlist — a file could declare an image MIME type while carrying a
+ * `.html`/`.js` extension and arbitrary content, land in the same-origin
+ * `/uploads/logos` static mount, and execute as script. The mass-assignable
+ * `logoPath` field on PUT compounded it: an attacker could point the
+ * "logo" at any other uploaded file.
+ *
+ * These tests pin:
+ *   (a) a MIME/extension mismatch is rejected at upload,
+ *   (b) the extension actually written to disk always matches the
+ *       validated MIME type, never the client-supplied filename,
+ *   (c) legitimate PNG/JPEG/SVG uploads still succeed,
+ *   (d) `logoPath` on PUT cannot be set to an arbitrary string pointing at
+ *       another file, only to a path the upload route itself produced.
+ *
+ * Defense-in-depth (not a re-opening of the above): fileFilter only pairs
+ * the claimed MIME type against the extension — it can't see the bytes,
+ * since it runs before multer finishes writing the stream to disk. A file
+ * whose declared MIME/extension pair is valid but whose actual content
+ * doesn't match (e.g. a PNG-declared upload that isn't really a PNG) is
+ * now caught by validateFileContent() (magic-number check) after multer
+ * writes it, closing the gap where declared-vs-actual content diverges.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-bplogo-test-'));
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite');
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'bplogo-route-test-secret';
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
+} = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+// Real magic-number-prefixed payloads, for content-sniffing to accept.
+const REAL_PNG_BYTES = Buffer.concat([
+  Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A]),
+  Buffer.from('not a real png body, but the header is real'),
+]);
+const REAL_JPEG_BYTES = Buffer.concat([
+  Buffer.from([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]),
+  Buffer.from('not a real jpeg body, but the header is real'),
+]);
+
+describe('business profile — logo upload content/extension validation', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let token;
+
+  const uploadLogo = (buffer, filename, mimetype) => request(app)
+    .post('/api/admin/business-profile/logo')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+    .attach('logo', buffer, { filename, contentType: mimetype });
+
+  const put = (payload) => request(app)
+    .put('/api/admin/business-profile')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+    .send(payload);
+
+  const get = () => request(app)
+    .get('/api/admin/business-profile')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+  const profileOf = (res) => (res.body.data || res.body).profile;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    const { adminId } = await seedMinimal(db);
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+    app = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/business-profile', require('../../src/routes/adminBusinessProfile'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  // fileFilter rejections surface via Express's generic error handler
+  // (the pre-existing behaviour of every sibling logo/favicon upload
+  // route in this codebase — none of them special-case multer's
+  // fileFilter `Error` into a 400 either), so the status code itself
+  // can be 400 or 500 depending on environment. What actually matters
+  // for GHSA-6wrv-9pr4-hhmw is that the request never succeeds and
+  // nothing with the dangerous extension is ever written to disk.
+  const logosDirFiles = () => {
+    const logosDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads', 'logos');
+    return fs.existsSync(logosDir) ? fs.readdirSync(logosDir) : [];
+  };
+
+  it('rejects an HTML/script payload disguised as an image via mismatched extension', async () => {
+    const evil = Buffer.from('<script>alert(document.domain)</script>');
+    const res = await uploadLogo(evil, 'evil.html', 'image/svg+xml');
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(200);
+    expect(logosDirFiles().some((f) => f.endsWith('.html'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a .js file disguised with an image MIME type', async () => {
+    const evil = Buffer.from('alert(1)');
+    const res = await uploadLogo(evil, 'evil.js', 'image/png');
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(200);
+    expect(logosDirFiles().some((f) => f.endsWith('.js'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a disallowed MIME type outright', async () => {
+    const res = await uploadLogo(Buffer.from('whatever'), 'file.pdf', 'application/pdf');
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(200);
+    expect(logosDirFiles().some((f) => f.endsWith('.pdf'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legitimate PNG upload and stores it with a .png extension', async () => {
+    const res = await uploadLogo(REAL_PNG_BYTES, 'logo.png', 'image/png');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const logoPath = (res.body.data || res.body).logoPath;
+    expect(logoPath).toMatch(/^\/uploads\/logos\/pdf-logo-\d+\.png$/);
+
+    const onDisk = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, logoPath.replace(/^\//, ''));
+    expect(fs.existsSync(onDisk)).toBe(true);
+
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe(logoPath);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legitimate JPEG upload and stores it with a .jpg extension', async () => {
+    const res = await uploadLogo(REAL_JPEG_BYTES, 'logo.jpg', 'image/jpeg');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const logoPath = (res.body.data || res.body).logoPath;
+    expect(logoPath).toMatch(/^\/uploads\/logos\/pdf-logo-\d+\.jpg$/);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a PNG-declared upload whose bytes are not actually a PNG, and leaves nothing on disk', async () => {
+    const before = logosDirFiles();
+    const res = await uploadLogo(Buffer.from('totally not a png'), 'logo.png', 'image/png');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/content does not match/i);
+
+    // No new file left behind: the rejected upload's own file was cleaned
+    // up, and every other file on disk (if any) is unchanged.
+    expect(logosDirFiles()).toEqual(before);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legitimate SVG upload and always stores it with a .svg extension, even under a spoofed filename', async () => {
+    const svg = Buffer.from('<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><rect width="1" height="1"/></svg>');
+    // Client-declared filename ext is .svg here to pass validateFileType
+    // (mismatched ext is covered by the rejection tests above); the point
+    // of this test is that the ON-DISK extension comes from the MIME type
+    // lookup table, not path.extname(originalname).
+    const res = await uploadLogo(svg, 'vector-logo.svg', 'image/svg+xml');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const logoPath = (res.body.data || res.body).logoPath;
+    expect(logoPath).toMatch(/^\/uploads\/logos\/pdf-logo-\d+\.svg$/);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects logoPath on PUT set to an arbitrary string pointing at another file', async () => {
+    const before = profileOf(await get()).logoPath;
+
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: '/uploads/logos/cms-somepage-1234.png' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe(before);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects logoPath on PUT with a path-traversal payload', async () => {
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: '/uploads/logos/../../../../etc/passwd' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts logoPath on PUT when it matches the pattern this route itself writes', async () => {
+    const upload = await uploadLogo(REAL_PNG_BYTES, 'logo2.png', 'image/png');
+    const uploadedPath = (upload.body.data || upload.body).logoPath;
+
+    // Round-trip: PUT-ing back the exact value the upload endpoint
+    // returned (what the frontend's generic profile save does) must
+    // keep working.
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: uploadedPath });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe(uploadedPath);
+  });
+
+  it('still allows clearing logoPath with an empty string', async () => {
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: '' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe('');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/captureDateBackfill.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+/**
+ * Backfilling captured_at on a library imported before #1172.
+ *
+ * The point of the endpoint, rather than a migration: it resolves originals
+ * through resolvePhotoFilePath, which is the only path that reaches an
+ * external row. The thumbnail regenerator resolves under
+ * storage/events/active/<photo.path>, which never exists for those (#1129) —
+ * so it cannot be the model.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+describe('capture date backfill (#1172)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot;
+
+  const writeJpegWithExif = async (abs, iso) => {
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
+    const d = new Date(iso);
+    const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, '0');
+    const exifDate = `${d.getUTCFullYear()}:${pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1)}:${pad(d.getUTCDate())} `
+      + `${pad(d.getUTCHours())}:${pad(d.getUTCMinutes())}:${pad(d.getUTCSeconds())}`;
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 60, height: 40, channels: 3, background: { r: 9, g: 9, b: 9 } } })
+      .withExif({ IFD2: { DateTimeOriginal: exifDate } }).jpeg().toFile(abs);
+  };
+
+  const settle = async () => { for (let i = 0; i < 60; i++) { await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50)); const s = await status(); if (!s.body.isRunning) return s; } throw new Error('backfill did not settle'); };
+  const status = () => request(app).get('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates/status');
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capfill-'));
+    mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'capfill-secret';
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotoDimensions'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db) await db.destroy?.();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function seed({ relpath, exifIso, writeFile = true, archived = false }) {
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+    const [e] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'capfill', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'capfill', event_date: '2026-01-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `capfill-${Math.random()}`, expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'trip', is_archived: archived,
+    }).returning('id');
+    const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
+    if (writeFile) await writeJpegWithExif(path.join(mediaRoot, 'trip', relpath), exifIso);
+    const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: path.basename(relpath), path: `capfill/${path.basename(relpath)}`,
+      // Root-relative, as this branch stores it (#1163) — the file lives at
+      // <mediaRoot>/trip/<relpath>.
+      type: 'individual', source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: `trip/${relpath}`,
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(), captured_at: null,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return { eventId, photoId: typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p };
+  }
+
+  it('fills captured_at for an external photo the thumbnail regenerator cannot reach', async () => {
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'a.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z' });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
+    const done = await settle();
+
+    expect(done.body.lastResult.success).toBe(1);
+    expect((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('counts a photo with no EXIF separately from a failure', async () => {
+    // "The mount is broken" and "these files carry no date" need different
+    // answers from an operator, so they are not the same number.
+    await db('photos').del(); await db('events').del();
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'plain.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z', writeFile: false });
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 40, height: 30, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 1, b: 1 } } })
+      .jpeg().toFile(path.join(mediaRoot, 'trip', 'plain.jpg'));
+
+    await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    const done = await settle();
+
+    expect(done.body.lastResult).toMatchObject({ success: 0, noExif: 1, failed: 0 });
+    expect((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('counts an unreachable original as a failure, not as missing EXIF', async () => {
+    await seed({ relpath: 'gone.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z', writeFile: false });
+
+    await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    const done = await settle();
+
+    expect(done.body.lastResult).toMatchObject({ success: 0, noExif: 0, failed: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('reports nothing to do once every photo has a date', async () => {
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'b.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-02T09:00:00Z' });
+    await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).update({ captured_at: new Date().toISOString() });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
+    expect((await status()).body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('skips a watcher-imported video, which carries media_type "image"', async () => {
+    // fileWatcher.processNewPhoto sets type='video' and a video/* mime but
+    // never media_type (fileWatcher.js:128-130), so the row keeps the 'image'
+    // default from migration 048. Filtering on media_type alone queued it every
+    // run: extractCaptureDate returns null for a video, captured_at stays null,
+    // and the backlog never cleared.
+    const { eventId } = await seed({ relpath: 'clip.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z', writeFile: false });
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'clip.mp4', path: 'capfill/clip.mp4',
+      type: 'video', media_type: 'image', mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'trip/clip.mp4',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(), captured_at: null,
+    });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
+
+    const s = await status();
+    // And it is not counted as a permanent backlog either.
+    expect(s.body.total).toBe(0);
+    expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('never reports more dated photos than it has photos', async () => {
+    // Both counts come from one aggregate; as two queries an import committing
+    // between them produced withCaptureDate > total and a negative backlog.
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'counted.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-05T08:00:00Z' });
+    await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).update({ captured_at: new Date().toISOString() });
+
+    const s = await status();
+    expect(s.body.total).toBe(1);
+    expect(s.body.withCaptureDate).toBe(1);
+    expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
+    expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+  });
+
+  it('skips archived events instead of failing them on every run', async () => {
+    // Archiving deletes the originals and keeps the rows, so an archived photo
+    // can never get a date. Counting it would fail it every pass and leave the
+    // status endpoint permanently reporting a backlog.
+    await seed({ relpath: 'archived.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-04T09:00:00Z', archived: true });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
+    const s = await status();
+    expect(s.body.total).toBe(0);
+    expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
+    expect(s.body.isRunning).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('does not overwrite a date written while it was running', async () => {
+    // whereNull on the update: an import or a replacement finishing mid-run has
+    // already written a better value than this pass would.
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'c.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-03T09:00:00Z' });
+    const claimed = '2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z';
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
+    await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).update({ captured_at: claimed });
+    const done = await settle();
+
+    expect(new Date((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toISOString()).toBe(claimed);
+    expect(done.body.lastResult.success).toBe(0);
+    // Read but not written, so it is accounted for rather than dropped.
+    expect(done.body.lastResult.skipped).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('does not date a row whose file was replaced while it was reading (#1201)', async () => {
+    // replacePhoto swaps a NEW file under an existing row and rewrites
+    // path/filename (reachable from replace_by_name). The replacement carries
+    // no date of its own, so captured_at is still NULL and the whereNull guard
+    // alone would let the previous file's EXIF date land on it. The write is
+    // fenced on the identity that was read, so the row is skipped instead —
+    // and not counted as updated either.
+    const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'orig.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-03T09:00:00Z' });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
+    // Simulate the replacement landing before the loop writes.
+    await db('photos').where({ id: photoId })
+      .update({ path: 'capfill/replaced.jpg', filename: 'replaced.jpg' });
+    const done = await settle();
+
+    expect((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toBeNull();
+    expect(done.body.lastResult.success).toBe(0);
+    // Not an error and not "no EXIF" — the date was found, another writer just
+    // got there first. It stays in the backlog for the next run.
+    expect(done.body.lastResult).toMatchObject({ noExif: 0, failed: 0, skipped: 1 });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/externalImportCaptureDate.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/**
+ * External imports must record captured_at (#1172).
+ *
+ * Managed uploads get it from photoProcessor, which external media never goes
+ * through — so every externally imported photo carried captured_at NULL, and
+ * the gallery's "Date Taken" sort fell back to uploaded_at through its
+ * COALESCE. On a library imported in two batches that ordered a 12-day trip by
+ * which folder was imported first: the reporter's first two days landed at
+ * positions 4204-5296 of 5555.
+ *
+ * Driven through the real route against real files carrying real EXIF, because
+ * the whole question is whether the import reads the file it already has open.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+describe('external import capture dates (#1172)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot;
+
+  /**
+   * A real JPEG carrying DateTimeOriginal.
+   *
+   * IFD2, not IFD0 — DateTimeOriginal lives in the Exif IFD, and exifr does not
+   * see it anywhere else (IFD0 takes plain DateTime, which surfaces as
+   * ModifyDate instead).
+   */
+  const writeJpegWithExif = async (rel, iso) => {
+    const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    const d = new Date(iso);
+    const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, '0');
+    const exifDate = `${d.getUTCFullYear()}:${pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1)}:${pad(d.getUTCDate())} `
+      + `${pad(d.getUTCHours())}:${pad(d.getUTCMinutes())}:${pad(d.getUTCSeconds())}`;
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 60, height: 40, channels: 3, background: { r: 10, g: 20, b: 30 } } })
+      .withExif({ IFD2: { DateTimeOriginal: exifDate } })
+      .jpeg()
+      .toFile(full);
+    return full;
+  };
+
+  const writeJpegNoExif = async (rel) => {
+    const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 60, height: 40, channels: 3, background: { r: 200, g: 10, b: 10 } } })
+      .jpeg().toFile(full);
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capdate-'));
+    mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'capdate-secret';
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
+      requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => {
+      const actual = jest.requireActual('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+      return { ...actual, generateThumbnail: jest.fn(async () => 'thumbnails/mock.jpg'), ensureThumbnail: jest.fn() };
+    });
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('../../src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db) await db.destroy?.();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function seedEvent() {
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+    await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+    const [e] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: `capdate-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+      event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'capdate', event_date: '2026-01-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `capdate-${Math.random()}`, expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference',
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
+  }
+
+  const runImport = (eventId, external_path) => request(app)
+    .post(`/api/admin/external-media/events/${eventId}/import-external`)
+    .send({ external_path, recursive: true });
+
+  it('records the EXIF capture date on import', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await writeJpegWithExif('trip/a.jpg', '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'trip');
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
+    expect(photo.captured_at).toBeTruthy();
+    // NOT asserted as an absolute instant. EXIF carries a naive wall-clock
+    // time and exifr resolves it against the HOST timezone, so the stored UTC
+    // value differs between a CEST developer machine and a UTC runner. What
+    // this fix is about is that the field is populated and orders correctly;
+    // that captured_at is not a true instant is a separate, pre-existing
+    // problem shared with managed uploads (#1172's own footnote).
+    expect(new Date(photo.captured_at).getUTCFullYear()).toBe(2026);
+    expect(new Date(photo.captured_at).getUTCMonth()).toBe(5); // June
+  });
+
+  it('imports a photo with no EXIF date rather than failing it', async () => {
+    // Plenty of sources carry none; that must stay an import, not an error.
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await writeJpegNoExif('trip/plain.jpg');
+
+    const res = await runImport(eventId, 'trip');
+
+    expect(res.body.imported).toBe(1);
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
+    expect(photo.captured_at).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('orders a two-batch import by capture time, not by batch', async () => {
+    // The reported shape: the FIRST days of the trip imported second. Sorting
+    // on COALESCE(captured_at, uploaded_at) put them after the last days,
+    // because uploaded_at is the import timestamp.
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await writeJpegWithExif('late/day12.jpg', '2026-06-12T10:00:00Z');
+    await runImport(eventId, 'late');
+    await writeJpegWithExif('early/day01.jpg', '2026-06-01T10:00:00Z');
+    await runImport(eventId, 'early');
+
+    const rows = await db('photos')
+      .where({ event_id: eventId })
+      .orderByRaw('COALESCE(captured_at, uploaded_at) asc')
+      .select('filename');
+
+    expect(rows.map((r) => r.filename)).toEqual(['day01.jpg', 'day12.jpg']);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/externalImportConcurrency.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/**
+ * Two overlapping external imports insert every file twice (#1162).
+ *
+ * The route checked for an existing external_relpath and then inserted, with
+ * an fs.stat and a `sharp().metadata()` read sitting in between. A reporter
+ * double-clicked a slow import of a 6012-file tree and got 8004 rows.
+ *
+ * Both halves of the fix are driven here through the real route:
+ *
+ *   - the in-flight guard, which turns the second click into a 409 instead of
+ *     a second full walk of the tree;
+ *   - convergence when the guard cannot help (another replica, another
+ *     process), which is the unique index from migration 186 firing and the
+ *     loop counting a skip rather than dying or duplicating.
+ *
+ * The second is exercised by inserting a competing row from inside the mocked
+ * `sharp().metadata()` call — literally inside the window the bug lived in.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+describe('concurrent external imports (#1162)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot;
+  // When set, the mocked sharp metadata read inserts this row first — the
+  // other run winning the race between our SELECT and our INSERT.
+  let stealDuringMetadata = null;
+  let thumbnailDelayMs = 0;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-extdup-'));
+    mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(mediaRoot, 'nas', 'individual'), { recursive: true });
+    for (const name of ['a.jpg', 'b.jpg', 'c.jpg']) {
+      await fs.promises.writeFile(path.join(mediaRoot, 'nas', 'individual', name), 'not-a-real-jpeg');
+    }
+
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'extdup-secret';
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
+      requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+
+    // The window. In production this is a real decode of a NAS-hosted file —
+    // hundreds of milliseconds during which the row we just proved absent can
+    // appear. Standing in for the other run here makes that deterministic.
+    jest.doMock('sharp', () => () => ({
+      metadata: async () => {
+        if (stealDuringMetadata) {
+          const { db: liveDb } = require('../../src/database/db');
+          await liveDb('photos').insert(stealDuringMetadata);
+          stealDuringMetadata = null;
+        }
+        return { width: 100, height: 200 };
+      },
+    }));
+
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
+      generateThumbnail: jest.fn(async () => {
+        if (thumbnailDelayMs) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, thumbnailDelayMs));
+        return 'thumbnails/mock.jpg';
+      }),
+      ensureThumbnail: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('../../src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db) await db.destroy?.();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function seedEvent() {
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+    stealDuringMetadata = null;
+    thumbnailDelayMs = 0;
+    const [e] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: `extdup-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'extdup',
+      event_date: '2026-01-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `extdup-${Math.random()}`,
+      expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference',
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
+  }
+
+  const runImport = (eventId) => request(app)
+    .post(`/api/admin/external-media/events/${eventId}/import-external`)
+    .send({ external_path: 'nas', recursive: true });
+
+  async function relpathCounts(eventId) {
+    const rows = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).select('external_relpath');
+    const counts = new Map();
+    for (const r of rows) counts.set(r.external_relpath, (counts.get(r.external_relpath) || 0) + 1);
+    return counts;
+  }
+
+  it('rejects a second import while the first is still running', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    // Enough to keep the first request inside its loop while the second
+    // arrives — the "slow import looks hung, so I clicked again" case.
+    thumbnailDelayMs = 20;
+
+    const [first, second] = await Promise.all([runImport(eventId), runImport(eventId)]);
+
+    const statuses = [first.status, second.status].sort();
+    expect(statuses).toEqual([200, 409]);
+    const rejected = first.status === 409 ? first : second;
+    expect(rejected.body.error).toMatch(/already running/i);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves exactly one row per file after both runs', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    thumbnailDelayMs = 20;
+
+    await Promise.all([runImport(eventId), runImport(eventId)]);
+
+    const counts = await relpathCounts(eventId);
+    expect(counts.size).toBe(3);
+    expect([...counts.values()]).toEqual([1, 1, 1]);
+  });
+
+  it('releases the event once the import finishes, so a re-import still works', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+
+    expect((await runImport(eventId)).status).toBe(200);
+    // Not 409 — the guard is per run, not a permanent lock on the event.
+    const second = await runImport(eventId);
+    expect(second.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(second.body.imported).toBe(0);
+    expect(second.body.skipped).toBe(3);
+  });
+
+  it('converges when another writer wins the race mid-file', async () => {
+    // The guard is in-process, so it cannot see a second replica. This is what
+    // the unique index is for: the insert bounces, and the file is counted as
+    // skipped rather than duplicated or lost to a 500.
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    stealDuringMetadata = {
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'a.jpg',
+      path: 'x/a.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: path.join('nas', 'individual', 'a.jpg'),
+    };
+
+    const res = await runImport(eventId);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const counts = await relpathCounts(eventId);
+    expect(counts.get(path.join('nas', 'individual', 'a.jpg'))).toBe(1);
+    // Two imported by us, one lost to the other writer and reported honestly.
+    expect(res.body.imported).toBe(2);
+    expect(res.body.skipped).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('does not let one contended file abort the rest of the import', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    stealDuringMetadata = {
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'a.jpg',
+      path: 'x/a.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: path.join('nas', 'individual', 'a.jpg'),
+    };
+
+    await runImport(eventId);
+
+    // All three files present — the contended one via the other writer's row.
+    expect((await relpathCounts(eventId)).size).toBe(3);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/externalImportSecondFolder.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/**
+ * Importing a second folder must not move the photos already in the event (#1163).
+ *
+ * events.external_path is overwritten by every import, and external_relpath
+ * used to be stored relative to it — so a second import silently rebased every
+ * existing row onto the new folder. The reporter had 7547 of 8004 originals
+ * pointing at files that do not exist, and nothing said so: thumbnails are
+ * written to local storage during the import while the base path is still
+ * correct, so the grid carries on rendering.
+ *
+ * Driven through the real route and the real resolver, against a real
+ * directory tree — the failure is entirely about whether a file is where the
+ * app looks for it.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+describe('a second external import (#1163)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot; let resolvePhotoFilePath;
+
+  const touch = async (rel) => {
+    const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.writeFile(full, 'not-a-real-jpeg');
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-ext2nd-'));
+    mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'ext2nd-secret';
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
+      requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('sharp', () => () => ({ metadata: async () => ({ width: 100, height: 200 }) }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
+      generateThumbnail: jest.fn(async () => 'thumbnails/mock.jpg'),
+      ensureThumbnail: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+    ({ resolvePhotoFilePath } = require('../../src/services/photoResolver'));
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('../../src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db) await db.destroy?.();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function seedEvent() {
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+    await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+    const [e] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: `ext2nd-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'ext2nd',
+      event_date: '2026-01-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `ext2nd-${Math.random()}`,
+      expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference',
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
+  }
+
+  const runImport = (eventId, external_path) => request(app)
+    .post(`/api/admin/external-media/events/${eventId}/import-external`)
+    .send({ external_path, recursive: true });
+
+  /** Where the app would go looking for this photo's original, right now. */
+  async function resolved(eventId, filename) {
+    const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId, filename }).first();
+    return resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo);
+  }
+
+  it('stores paths relative to the media root, not to the imported folder', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/old.jpg');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
+
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
+    expect(photo.external_relpath).toBe(path.join('Trip', 'Leknes', 'old.jpg'));
+  });
+
+  it('leaves the first folder’s originals reachable after a second import', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/old.jpg');
+    await touch('Trip/Sub/new.jpg');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
+    const before = await resolved(eventId, 'old.jpg');
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip/Sub');
+    const after = await resolved(eventId, 'old.jpg');
+
+    // The regression: `after` used to be <root>/Trip/Sub/Leknes/old.jpg.
+    expect(after).toBe(before);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(after)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('every original in the event is still on disk afterwards', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/a.jpg');
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/b.jpg');
+    await touch('Trip/Sub/c.jpg');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip/Sub');
+
+    const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+    const photos = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId });
+    expect(photos).toHaveLength(3);
+    for (const photo of photos) {
+      expect(fs.existsSync(resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo))).toBe(true);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('does not re-insert a file the first import already took', async () => {
+    // The dedupe check compares stored paths, so it has to be comparing the
+    // same shape the insert writes.
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await touch('Trip/Sub/c.jpg');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
+    const second = await runImport(eventId, 'Trip/Sub');
+
+    expect(second.body.imported).toBe(0);
+    expect(second.body.skipped).toBe(1);
+    expect(await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('resolves a subfolder that repeats its parent’s name', async () => {
+    // The old resolver stripped the relpath's first segment when it matched the
+    // base path's last one, which broke exactly this layout.
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await touch('Trip/Trip/x.jpg');
+
+    await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
+
+    const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+    const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
+    expect(resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo)).toBe(path.join(mediaRoot, 'Trip', 'Trip', 'x.jpg'));
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/externalRelpathFoldPg.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/**
+ * PostgreSQL integration test for the external-path fold (#1163).
+ *
+ * Gated the same way as picpeakRestorePg: runs only when PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL
+ * points at a throwaway Postgres DB, e.g.
+ *   PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:picpeak_secure_pass_2024@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_fold_test" \
+ *     npx jest __tests__/integration/externalRelpathFoldPg.test.js
+ *
+ * This exists because of a defect SQLite could not have caught. The two-pass
+ * rewrite parks each row on a temporary value, and that value was first written
+ * with a leading NUL. SQLite stores NUL in TEXT without complaint; Postgres
+ * rejects it outright ("invalid byte sequence for encoding UTF8"), so migration
+ * 187 would have rolled back on exactly the installs needing the repair — and
+ * only on the engine most of them run.
+ *
+ * The staging value is therefore an engine-level contract, not an
+ * implementation detail, and it is pinned here on the engine that constrains it.
+ */
+
+const knex = require('knex');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
+const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
+
+maybe('external relpath fold on Postgres', () => {
+  let pgDb; let mediaRoot; let fold;
+
+  const touch = async (rel, bytes) => {
+    const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.writeFile(full, Buffer.alloc(bytes));
+    return bytes;
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    mediaRoot = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-foldpg-'));
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+    jest.resetModules();
+    ({ foldExternalRelpaths: fold } = require('../../src/services/externalRelpathFold'));
+
+    pgDb = knex({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL });
+  }, 60000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (pgDb) await pgDb.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    delete process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT;
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS photos, events, app_settings CASCADE');
+    await pgDb.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.text('external_path');
+    });
+    await pgDb.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.text('external_relpath');
+      t.bigInteger('size_bytes');
+      t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
+    });
+    await pgDb.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.string('setting_key');
+      t.text('setting_value');
+      t.string('setting_type');
+      t.string('updated_at');
+    });
+    await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+  });
+
+  const relpaths = async () =>
+    (await pgDb('photos').orderBy('id').select('external_relpath')).map((r) => r.external_relpath);
+
+  it('completes the two-pass repair that a NUL staging value would abort', async () => {
+    // The exact shape that forces staging: `photo.jpg` repairs up to
+    // `Trip/photo.jpg`, while the row already holding `Trip/photo.jpg` folds
+    // deeper. Every final value is distinct, but a final value equals another
+    // row's current one, so the rewrite has to park first.
+    const a = await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 11);
+    const b = await touch('Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg', 22);
+    await pgDb('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await pgDb('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: a, source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/photo.jpg', size_bytes: b, source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await fold(pgDb);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/photo.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves no staging value behind', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg', 8);
+    await pgDb('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await pgDb('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', size_bytes: 8, source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await fold(pgDb);
+
+    const rows = await relpaths();
+    expect(rows).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
+    expect(rows.some((r) => r.includes('staging'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('folds and marks in one transaction', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg', 8);
+    await pgDb('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await pgDb('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', size_bytes: 8, source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await fold(pgDb);
+    // Second run is a no-op: the marker committed with the rewrites.
+    await fold(pgDb);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/maintenanceJobState.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/**
+ * Shared run state for the maintenance sweeps (#1181).
+ *
+ * The behaviour that matters here cannot be observed from one process holding
+ * a module-level flag, which is exactly why the flag moved into the database.
+ * A second replica is simulated the only way that is honest in a single-process
+ * test: by asserting on the shared row itself, and by driving claim() twice —
+ * a second caller getting null is precisely what a second replica gets.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+describe('maintenance job state (#1181)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let app; let jobs;
+
+  const dimStatus = () => request(app).get('/api/admin/photos/repair-dimensions/status');
+  const capStatus = () => request(app).get('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates/status');
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mjs-'));
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mjs-secret';
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+    jobs = require('../../src/services/maintenanceJobState');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotoDimensions'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db) await db.destroy?.();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').update({
+      is_running: false, started_at: null, heartbeat_at: null, finished_at: null, last_result: null, owner: null, claim_token: null,
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('the lease table is kept out of .picpeak archives', () => {
+    // It is live state, not data. An archive taken mid-sweep would otherwise
+    // carry is_running = true and a claim token owned by a process on the
+    // SOURCE install; restored inside the staleness window, the target reports
+    // the job as running and refuses new POSTs with no runner to release it.
+    // The importer filters on this same set, so archives written before the
+    // exclusion are skipped on restore too.
+    const { EXCLUDED_TABLES } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService');
+    expect(EXCLUDED_TABLES.has('maintenance_jobs')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('the migration seeds a row for each job', async () => {
+    const names = await db('maintenance_jobs').pluck('job_name');
+    expect(names.sort()).toEqual(['photo_capture_date_backfill', 'photo_dimension_repair']);
+  });
+
+  test('a second claim is refused while the first is alive', async () => {
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    // What a second replica's POST does. Nothing about the first claim lives in
+    // this process, so this is the same question the other replica asks.
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test('the two jobs claim independently', async () => {
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+  });
+
+  test('each claim gets a distinct token', async () => {
+    const first = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, first);
+    const second = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    // Same process, same pid — so an owner string would have collided here and
+    // the fencing below would be worthless.
+    expect(second).not.toBe(first);
+  });
+
+  test('a claim whose heartbeat has gone quiet can be taken over', async () => {
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toBeNull();
+
+    // The replica holding it was killed: no release, no further heartbeats.
+    const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
+
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+  });
+
+  test('a superseded runner cannot renew its lease', async () => {
+    const oldToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
+    const newToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    expect(newToken).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+
+    // The old runner is still alive and mid-loop. Its renewal must tell it so,
+    // which is what makes the route loop stop instead of running alongside the
+    // new owner.
+    expect(await jobs.heartbeat(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, oldToken)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await jobs.heartbeat(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, newToken)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('a superseded runner cannot release the new owner\'s claim', async () => {
+    const oldToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
+    const newToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+
+    // The old runner finishes late and tries to write its result. Unfenced,
+    // this cleared is_running under the new owner and let a THIRD sweep start.
+    expect(await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, oldToken, { success: 999, noExif: 0, failed: 0 })).toBe(false);
+
+    const state = await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    expect(state.isRunning).toBe(true);
+    expect(state.lastResult).toBeNull();
+    // And the row is still the new owner's to release.
+    expect(await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, newToken, { success: 1, noExif: 0, failed: 0 })).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('a stale run reads as not running, so the button comes back', async () => {
+    await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).isRunning).toBe(true);
+
+    const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
+
+    // is_running is still true in the row — nothing released it — but a status
+    // poll must not leave the operator staring at a job that cannot finish.
+    expect((await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).first()).is_running).toBeTruthy();
+    expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).isRunning).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('a heartbeat keeps a long run claimed', async () => {
+    const token = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
+
+    expect(await jobs.heartbeat(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, token)).toBe(true);
+
+    expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toBeNull();
+    expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).isRunning).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('release stores the result and read gives it back parsed', async () => {
+    const token = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, token, { success: 3, noExif: 2, failed: 1 });
+
+    const state = await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    expect(state.isRunning).toBe(false);
+    expect(state.lastResult).toEqual({ success: 3, noExif: 2, failed: 1 });
+  });
+
+  test('releasing without a result keeps the previous run visible', async () => {
+    const first = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, first, { success: 7, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
+
+    // The "nothing to do" path: claimed, found no candidates, released. It must
+    // not blank the numbers the last real run reported.
+    const second = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, second);
+
+    expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL)).lastResult).toEqual({ success: 7, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
+  });
+
+  test('a malformed result does not take the status endpoint down', async () => {
+    await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ last_result: 'not json' });
+    const state = await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    expect(state.lastResult).toBeNull();
+    expect(state.isRunning).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('both status endpoints report the shared row, not process memory', async () => {
+    await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
+    const capToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+    await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, capToken, { success: 1, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
+
+    // Written straight to the row, exactly as another replica would have.
+    const dim = await dimStatus();
+    expect(dim.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(dim.body.isRunning).toBe(true);
+
+    const cap = await capStatus();
+    expect(cap.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(cap.body.isRunning).toBe(false);
+    expect(cap.body.lastResult).toEqual({ success: 1, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
+  });
+
+  test('a POST is refused while another replica holds the claim', async () => {
+    // The claim was taken by "another replica" — this process knows nothing
+    // about it beyond the row.
+    await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(409);
+
+    const dimRes = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-dimensions');
+    // The other job is untouched by that claim, so it is free to start.
+    expect(dimRes.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  test('the no-op path releases the claim it took', async () => {
+    // No photos at all, so both endpoints take their "nothing to do" exit.
+    await db('photos').del();
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
+
+    const row = await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL }).first();
+    expect(row.is_running).toBeFalsy();
+    // ...and a second POST is therefore accepted rather than 409ing forever.
+    expect((await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates')).status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/maintenanceJobStatePg.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/**
+ * PostgreSQL checks for the shared maintenance-job state (#1181).
+ * Gated: runs only when PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL points at a throwaway database, e.g.
+ *   PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:picpeak_secure_pass_2024@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_mjs_test" \
+ *     npx jest __tests__/integration/maintenanceJobStatePg.test.js
+ *
+ * What SQLite cannot answer: the claim leans on comparing a `timestamp` column
+ * against an ISO-8601 string, and on an UPDATE ... WHERE guard being atomic
+ * under real concurrent connections. SQLite compares those strings
+ * lexicographically and serialises writes anyway, so it would pass either way —
+ * exactly the shape of divergence that has bitten this repo before.
+ */
+
+const knex = require('knex');
+
+const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
+const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
+
+maybe('maintenance job state on Postgres', () => {
+  let pgDb;
+  let jobs;
+  const JOB = 'photo_dimension_repair';
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    pgDb = knex({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL, pool: { min: 0, max: 10 } });
+    await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS maintenance_jobs');
+    await require('../../migrations/core/179_maintenance_job_state').up(pgDb);
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: pgDb }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+    jobs = require('../../src/services/maintenanceJobState');
+  }, 60000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
+    if (pgDb) await pgDb.destroy();
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').update({
+      is_running: false, started_at: null, heartbeat_at: null, finished_at: null, last_result: null, owner: null, claim_token: null,
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('the ISO-string cutoff really compares as a timestamp, not as text', async () => {
+    expect(await jobs.claim(JOB)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    expect(await jobs.claim(JOB)).toBeNull();
+
+    await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB })
+      .update({ heartbeat_at: new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString() });
+
+    // If Postgres had rejected or mis-cast the ISO string this would either
+    // throw or never match.
+    expect(await jobs.claim(JOB)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+
+    const row = await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB }).first();
+    expect(row.heartbeat_at).toBeInstanceOf(Date);
+  });
+
+  test('concurrent claims on real connections produce exactly one winner', async () => {
+    // The whole point of the conditional UPDATE. Ten connections race; nine
+    // must lose. SQLite cannot demonstrate this — it serialises writers.
+    const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 10 }, () => jobs.claim(JOB)));
+    expect(results.filter(Boolean)).toHaveLength(1);
+    // ...and the winner holds a token nobody else can forge.
+    expect(results.find(Boolean)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+  });
+
+  test('a released job can be re-claimed exactly once again', async () => {
+    const token = await jobs.claim(JOB);
+    await jobs.release(JOB, token, { success: 2, failed: 0 });
+
+    const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 5 }, () => jobs.claim(JOB)));
+    expect(results.filter(Boolean)).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).lastResult).toEqual({ success: 2, failed: 0 });
+  });
+
+  test('a superseded runner is fenced out on real Postgres', async () => {
+    const oldToken = await jobs.claim(JOB);
+    await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB })
+      .update({ heartbeat_at: new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString() });
+    const newToken = await jobs.claim(JOB);
+
+    expect(await jobs.heartbeat(JOB, oldToken)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await jobs.release(JOB, oldToken, { success: 999, failed: 0 })).toBe(false);
+    // The new owner still holds it, with its result unwritten.
+    expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).isRunning).toBe(true);
+    expect(await jobs.release(JOB, newToken, { success: 4, failed: 0 })).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('read() reports a live claim as running and a stale one as not', async () => {
+    await jobs.claim(JOB);
+    expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).isRunning).toBe(true);
+
+    await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB })
+      .update({ heartbeat_at: new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 1000).toISOString() });
+    expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).isRunning).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/publishPasswordPolicy.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/**
+ * Publishing must not be a way around the configured gallery password policy.
+ *
+ * `POST /:id/publish` (#627) re-hashes `password_hash` from a plaintext the
+ * admin re-types in the publish dialog, and validated it with nothing but
+ * express-validator's `isLength({ min: 6 })`. So the configured complexity —
+ * moderate by default, meaning 8 characters plus upper, lower and a digit —
+ * governed event creation and password reset, while this door accepted
+ * `aaaaaa` and made it the live gallery password.
+ *
+ * Not an escalation: it needs admin auth plus events.edit, and such an admin
+ * could already set a weak password elsewhere. It is a policy gap — the admin
+ * UI advertises a complexity level this write path did not enforce.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-pubpolicy-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'publish-policy-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-pubpolicy-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
+} = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('publish enforces the gallery password policy', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let token;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    const { adminId } = await seedMinimal(db);
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+    app = buildRouteApp('/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  async function seedDraft(slug) {
+    const [row] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: `Event ${slug}`,
+      event_date: '2026-09-01',
+      host_email: 'client@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'original-hash',
+      require_password: 1,
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
+      share_token: `${slug}-token`,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
+  }
+
+  it('refuses a password that misses the configured complexity', async () => {
+    const id = await seedDraft('weak-publish');
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post(`/admin/events/${id}/publish`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ password: 'aaaaaa' });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/security requirements/i);
+
+    // Rejected BEFORE the write, not after — the gallery must be untouched,
+    // and still a draft.
+    const after = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(after.password_hash).toBe('original-hash');
+    expect(after.is_draft === 1 || after.is_draft === true).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts a password that meets it', async () => {
+    const id = await seedDraft('strong-publish');
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post(`/admin/events/${id}/publish`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ password: 'Sup3r-Secret' });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+    const after = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(after.password_hash).not.toBe('original-hash');
+    expect(await bcrypt.compare('Sup3r-Secret', after.password_hash)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a publish without a password alone', async () => {
+    // The legacy sentinel path: no password in the body means no rehash, so
+    // the policy has nothing to check and must not block the publish.
+    const id = await seedDraft('no-password-publish');
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post(`/admin/events/${id}/publish`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({});
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const after = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(after.password_hash).toBe('original-hash');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/regenerateThumbnailsScript.test.js

@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ describe('regenerate-thumbnails script (#1148)', () => {
     process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
     process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'test.db');
     process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
-    // External sources are sandboxed under EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT; event
-    // external_path is relative to it, exactly as on a real install.
+    // External sources are sandboxed under EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT. Rows carry a
+    // path relative to that root (#1163), so the 'wedding/' prefix on each
+    // external_relpath below is the event folder, not decoration.
     process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
     externalRoot = path.join(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, 'wedding');
 
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ describe('regenerate-thumbnails script (#1148)', () => {
       path: 'regen-script-event/shot.jpg',
       type: 'individual',
       source_origin: 'external',
-      external_relpath: 'shot.jpg',
+      external_relpath: 'wedding/shot.jpg',
       uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
     }).returning('id');
     externalPhotoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
@@ -88,7 +89,7 @@ describe('regenerate-thumbnails script (#1148)', () => {
       media_type: 'video',
       mime_type: 'video/mp4',
       source_origin: 'external',
-      external_relpath: 'clip.mp4',
+      external_relpath: 'wedding/clip.mp4',
       uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
     }).returning('id');
     videoPhotoId = typeof v === 'object' ? v.id : v;
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ describe('regenerate-thumbnails script (#1148)', () => {
       type: 'video',
       mime_type: 'video/mp4',
       source_origin: 'external',
-      external_relpath: 'watched.mp4',
+      external_relpath: 'wedding/watched.mp4',
       uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
     }).returning('id');
     watcherVideoId = typeof wv === 'object' ? wv.id : wv;
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ describe('regenerate-thumbnails script (#1148)', () => {
       type: 'individual',
       thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_ext_missing_repair.jpg',
       source_origin: 'external',
-      external_relpath: 'repair.jpg',
+      external_relpath: 'wedding/repair.jpg',
       uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
     }).returning('id');
     repairPhotoId = typeof rp === 'object' ? rp.id : rp;

backend/__tests__/integration/uncategorizedFilter.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/**
+ * The admin photo list's category filter, and the value it answers to (#1211).
+ *
+ * The frontend used to send `category_id=0` for "Uncategorized". This route
+ * skips `'0'` outright — the guard reads `category_id !== '0'` — so no
+ * condition was applied and the whole event came back. Four lines below that
+ * guard sits the branch that does the work, keyed on the literal
+ * `uncategorized`, which nothing was sending.
+ *
+ * Reported in #1209 by someone trying to isolate a few thousand uncategorised
+ * imports. The frontend half is fixed in PhotoFilters; this pins the backend
+ * half of the same contract, because the failure mode was the two ends
+ * disagreeing about a string and neither one being wrong on its own.
+ */
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('admin photo list — uncategorized filter (#1211)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let eventId; let categoryId;
+  let uncategorisedIds; let categorisedId;
+
+  const list = async (query = '') => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/photos${query}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const photos = Array.isArray(res.body) ? res.body : res.body.photos;
+    return (photos || []).map((p) => p.id).sort((a, b) => a - b);
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
+      requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+      debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const [ev] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'uncat-filter', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Uncat Filter',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/gallery/uncat-filter/share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = typeof ev === 'object' ? ev.id : ev;
+
+    const [cat] = await db('photo_categories')
+      .insert({ name: 'Ceremony', slug: 'ceremony', event_id: eventId })
+      .returning('id');
+    categoryId = typeof cat === 'object' ? cat.id : cat;
+
+    const insertPhoto = async (filename, category) => {
+      const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId, filename, path: `events/uncat/${filename}`,
+        type: 'individual', category_id: category,
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      return typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
+    };
+
+    // Two with no category — the shape a plugin upload leaves behind — and one
+    // filed properly, so a filter that does nothing is visibly different from
+    // a filter that works.
+    uncategorisedIds = [await insertPhoto('a.jpg', null), await insertPhoto('b.jpg', null)];
+    categorisedId = await insertPhoto('c.jpg', categoryId);
+    uncategorisedIds.sort((a, b) => a - b);
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotos'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('returns only the photos with no category', async () => {
+    expect(await list('?category_id=uncategorized')).toEqual(uncategorisedIds);
+  });
+
+  it('returns everything when no category filter is given', async () => {
+    expect(await list()).toEqual([...uncategorisedIds, categorisedId].sort((a, b) => a - b));
+  });
+
+  it('still filters by a real category id', async () => {
+    expect(await list(`?category_id=${categoryId}`)).toEqual([categorisedId]);
+  });
+
+  it('treats 0 as no filter at all', async () => {
+    // Pinning the behaviour that made the bug silent rather than loud: '0' is
+    // not "uncategorized" and never was, it simply falls through the guard. A
+    // future change that made 0 mean uncategorized here would be fine too —
+    // but it must be a decision, not an accident, and this test forces it.
+    expect(await list('?category_id=0')).toEqual([...uncategorisedIds, categorisedId].sort((a, b) => a - b));
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/middleware/authMustChangePassword.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx enforcement half: `must_change_password` was written
+ * by the admin password-reset flow (userManagementService.resetAdminPassword)
+ * and returned in a few response payloads, but no route-blocking logic ever
+ * checked it — a reset admin could keep using the old/weak password on every
+ * protected route indefinitely. adminAuth() is now the server-side backstop:
+ * a flagged admin gets 403 MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD on everything except the
+ * routes they need to clear the flag (change-password) or leave (logout).
+ *
+ * Mirrors the mocking shape of adminAuthRoleFallback.test.js — a stub `db`
+ * chain, no real SQLite needed, so this stays a fast unit test.
+ */
+
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() }));
+
+let mockMustChangePassword = false;
+const mockAdminRow = { id: 7, username: 'scoped', email: 's@example.com', password_changed_at: null, role_id: 1, role_name: 'editor' };
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: () => ({
+    leftJoin() { return this; },
+    where() { return this; },
+    select() { return this; },
+    first: () => Promise.resolve({ ...mockAdminRow, must_change_password: mockMustChangePassword }),
+  }),
+}));
+
+const { adminAuth } = require('../../src/middleware/auth');
+
+const SECRET = 'test-secret-for-must-change-password';
+
+function makeReq(originalUrl) {
+  const token = jwt.sign(
+    { id: mockAdminRow.id, type: 'admin' },
+    SECRET,
+    { algorithm: 'HS256', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+  );
+  return { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, ip: '127.0.0.1', connection: {}, originalUrl };
+}
+
+function makeRes() {
+  return {
+    statusCode: null,
+    body: null,
+    status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
+    json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
+  };
+}
+
+describe('adminAuth must_change_password enforcement (GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx)', () => {
+  const OLD_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
+  beforeAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = SECRET; });
+  afterAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = OLD_SECRET; });
+  beforeEach(() => { mockMustChangePassword = false; });
+
+  it('blocks an arbitrary protected route with 403 MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD when the flag is set', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/dashboard/stats');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body).toEqual(expect.objectContaining({ code: 'MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD' }));
+    expect(req.admin).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('does not block when the flag is not set', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = false;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/dashboard/stats');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin.mustChangePassword).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['/api/admin/auth/change-password'],
+    ['/api/admin/auth/logout'],
+  ])('still allows %s through when the flag is set', async (originalUrl) => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq(originalUrl);
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin.mustChangePassword).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('allows the exempt change-password path even with a query string', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/auth/change-password?foo=bar');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('does not exempt a route that merely starts with the change-password path', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/auth/change-password-history');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/middleware/photoAuth.thumbnailScope.test.js

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Regression test for the cross-event thumbnail enumeration leak.
- *
- * Thumbnails are served flat from /thumbnails/thumb_<name> with
- * deterministic, enumerable filenames. photoAuth previously granted any
- * holder of a gallery token for ANY active event access to ANY thumbnail
- * (it set eventSlug=null and returned next() as long as the token's event
- * existed), so a visitor to one gallery could pull another (password-
- * protected) gallery's entire thumbnail set. The fix scopes thumbnail
- * access to the token's event by matching the requested file against
- * photos.thumbnail_path for that event_id.
- */
-
-process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'test-secret-thumbnail-scope-000000000000';
-
-const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
-
-// Two events, each owning one thumbnail. The photos mock resolves a row
-// only when BOTH event_id and thumbnail_path match — i.e. it models the
-// real ownership query.
-const EVENTS = [
-  { id: 10, slug: 'event-a', is_active: 1 },
-  { id: 20, slug: 'event-b', is_active: 1 },
-];
-const PHOTOS = [
-  { id: 1, event_id: 10, thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_event-a_ceremony_0001.jpg' },
-  { id: 2, event_id: 20, thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg' },
-];
-
-jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
-  db: (table) => ({
-    _cond: null,
-    where(cond) { this._cond = cond; return this; },
-    first() {
-      if (table === 'events') {
-        return Promise.resolve(EVENTS.find((e) => e.id === this._cond.id) || null);
-      }
-      if (table === 'photos') {
-        return Promise.resolve(
-          PHOTOS.find((p) => p.event_id === this._cond.event_id
-            && p.thumbnail_path === this._cond.thumbnail_path) || null
-        );
-      }
-      return Promise.resolve(null);
-    },
-  }),
-}));
-
-jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
-  info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
-}));
-
-const photoAuth = require('../../src/middleware/photoAuth');
-
-function galleryToken(eventId) {
-  return jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
-}
-
-function makeReqRes(token, thumbPath) {
-  const req = { path: thumbPath, headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, cookies: {} };
-  const res = {
-    statusCode: null,
-    body: null,
-    status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
-    json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
-  };
-  return { req, res };
-}
-
-describe('photoAuth — thumbnail ownership scoping', () => {
-  it('denies a gallery token for event A fetching event B\'s thumbnail', async () => {
-    const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(10), '/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg');
-    const next = jest.fn();
-
-    await photoAuth(req, res, next);
-
-    // Access denied: middleware must not pass the request through.
-    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(res.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
-    expect(req.event).toBeUndefined();
-  });
-
-  it('allows a gallery token to fetch its own event\'s thumbnail', async () => {
-    const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(20), '/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg');
-    const next = jest.fn();
-
-    await photoAuth(req, res, next);
-
-    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(req.event).toMatchObject({ id: 20 });
-  });
-
-  it('denies a traversal / foreign filename that matches no owned thumbnail', async () => {
-    const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(10), '/thumb_../../etc/passwd');
-    const next = jest.fn();
-
-    await photoAuth(req, res, next);
-
-    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(res.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
-    expect(req.event).toBeUndefined();
-  });
-});

backend/__tests__/middleware/securityHardeningBatch2.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/**
+ * Second security sweep on the same branch as the password-strength DoS fix
+ * (stable port: the maintenance and admin-preview cases do not apply here).
+ * Each block pins one gap the audit found:
+ *
+ *  - the general rate limiter skipped anyone holding ANY verified JWT,
+ *    including a gallery token minted for free on password-less galleries
+ *  - the multipart branch of the CSRF Content-Type gate accepted cross-site
+ *    form posts
+ */
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'hardening-batch2-secret';
+
+const fake = { maintenance: 'true', revoked: false, beforeCutoff: false, admin: { id: 1, password_changed_at: null } };
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const db = jest.fn((table) => {
+    const q = {
+      where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+      select: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+      first: jest.fn(async () => {
+        if (table === 'app_settings') {
+          return { setting_key: 'general_maintenance_mode', setting_value: fake.maintenance };
+        }
+        if (table === 'admin_users') return fake.admin;
+        return null;
+      }),
+    };
+    return q;
+  });
+  return { db, withRetry: (fn) => fn() };
+});
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() }));
+process.env.FRONTEND_URL = 'https://photos.example.com';
+
+const { isAuthenticated } = require('../../src/services/rateLimitService');
+const { multipartOriginAllowed } = require('../../src/utils/requestOrigin');
+
+const iat = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 10;
+const adminToken = (extra = {}) => jwt.sign({ type: 'admin', id: 1, iat, ...extra }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId: 1, iat }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+
+describe('general rate limiter skip', () => {
+  const req = (token) => ({ path: '/api/gallery/x/photos', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, cookies: {} });
+  it('is granted to an admin session', () => {
+    expect(isAuthenticated(req(adminToken()))).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('is NOT granted to a gallery token', () => {
+    expect(isAuthenticated(req(galleryToken()))).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('multipart origin gate', () => {
+  const req = (headers) => ({ headers: { host: 'photos.example.com', ...headers } });
+  it('accepts same-origin, same-site and non-browser requests', () => {
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-site' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'none' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({}))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'https://photos.example.com' }))).toBe(true);
+    // Same-origin install without FRONTEND_URL: Origin matches the Host.
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed({ headers: { host: 'gallery.local', origin: 'http://gallery.local' } })).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('rejects cross-site form posts', () => {
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' }))).toBe(false);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'https://evil.example' }))).toBe(false);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'null' }))).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/176_external_relpath_unique.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
+/**
+ * One row per external file per event (#1162).
+ *
+ * The migration has two halves and they fail differently: the cleanup can take
+ * out the wrong row of a pair (losing a thumbnail, orphaning an event's hero),
+ * and the index can fail to be created at all — leaving an install that looks
+ * migrated and is still racing. Both are pinned here.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/176_external_relpath_unique');
+
+describe('migration 176 — unique (event_id, external_relpath) (#1162)', () => {
+  let knex; let tmpDir;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig186-'));
+    knex = require('knex')({
+      client: 'sqlite3',
+      connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
+      useNullAsDefault: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (knex) await knex.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    for (const table of [
+      'photos', 'events', 'photo_categories', 'photo_feedback',
+      'photo_admin_marks', 'photo_faces', 'image_access_logs', 'transfer_files',
+    ]) {
+      await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists(table);
+    }
+    await knex.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('hero_photo_id');
+      t.string('download_zip_path');
+      t.string('download_zip_generated_at');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photo_categories', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('hero_photo_id');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.string('external_relpath');
+      t.string('thumbnail_path');
+      t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
+      t.integer('feedback_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('like_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.decimal('average_rating', 3, 2).defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('favorite_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('reaction_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('color_label_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.string('face_status');
+      t.integer('view_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('download_count').defaultTo(0);
+      t.integer('face_count');
+      t.string('face_started_at');
+      t.text('face_error');
+    });
+    // Declared exactly as the real schema declares them — CASCADE and all.
+    // The point of these tables here is that SQLite does NOT enforce any of
+    // it (PicPeak never sets `PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON`), so a bare delete of
+    // the photo row leaves every one of them dangling.
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photo_feedback', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('photo_id').references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.string('feedback_type');
+      t.text('comment_text');
+      t.string('guest_identifier');
+      // Per-person guest identity (migration 078). Nullable: galleries without
+      // guest identity leave it NULL and fall back to guest_identifier.
+      t.integer('guest_id');
+      t.integer('rating');
+      t.boolean('is_hidden').defaultTo(false);
+      t.boolean('is_approved').defaultTo(true);
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photo_admin_marks', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('photo_id').notNullable().references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.integer('admin_id');
+      t.integer('rating');
+      // Independently writable alongside rating, per photoAdminMarksService.
+      t.string('color_label', 16);
+      t.unique(['photo_id', 'admin_id'], 'photo_admin_marks_photo_admin_uniq');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photo_faces', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('photo_id').references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      // purgePhotoFaces rebuilds the people that lose members, so the cluster
+      // link and the vectors recomputeCentroid reads have to be here for this
+      // to exercise the real path rather than a stub.
+      t.integer('person_id');
+      t.binary('embedding');
+      t.float('det_score');
+    });
+
+    await knex.schema.createTable('image_access_logs', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('photo_id');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('transfer_files', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('transfer_id');
+      t.integer('photo_id');
+      t.unique(['transfer_id', 'photo_id'], 'transfer_files_unique');
+    });
+  });
+
+  /** Two duplicate rows for the same file: id 1 survives, id 2 is doomed. */
+  const seedPair = async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+  };
+
+  const rows = () => knex('photos').orderBy('id', 'asc').select('*');
+
+  it('collapses a duplicated pair to one row and leaves distinct paths alone', async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't1', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't2', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/y.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't3', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const after = await rows();
+    expect(after.map((r) => r.external_relpath)).toEqual(['a/x.jpg', 'a/y.jpg']);
+    // Lowest id survives when both sides are equally complete.
+    expect(after[0].id).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('does not collapse the same path across different events', async () => {
+    // The constraint is per event. Two events referencing the same NAS folder
+    // is a supported setup, and treating those as duplicates would delete one
+    // event's entire library.
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 2, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
+  });
+
+  it('never touches managed rows, however many carry NULL', async () => {
+    // Every managed photo has external_relpath NULL. Grouping on it without
+    // the NOT NULL filter would make them all one enormous "duplicate" group
+    // and delete the entire library bar one row.
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 3 });
+  });
+
+  it('keeps the row that has a thumbnail, not merely the lowest id', async () => {
+    // An import killed mid-flight leaves rows without a thumbnail. Dropping
+    // the completed one would blank a tile in the grid for no reason.
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: null, source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 'thumb.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const after = await rows();
+    expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(after[0].thumbnail_path).toBe('thumb.jpg');
+  });
+
+  it('repoints a hero that pointed at the row being removed', async () => {
+    // events.hero_photo_id is ON DELETE SET NULL, so without this the cleanup
+    // silently strips the event's hero image — a visible regression caused
+    // entirely by the fix.
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, hero_photo_id: 2 });
+    await knex('photo_categories').insert({ id: 1, hero_photo_id: 2 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('events').where({ id: 1 }).first()).hero_photo_id).toBe(1);
+    expect((await knex('photo_categories').where({ id: 1 }).first()).hero_photo_id).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a hero that pointed at the survivor untouched', async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, hero_photo_id: 1 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('events').where({ id: 1 }).first()).hero_photo_id).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('makes a second insert of the same path impossible afterwards', async () => {
+    // The whole point. Without this the route is still racing, and the
+    // migration is recorded as applied.
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    await expect(
+      knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' })
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/unique/i);
+  });
+
+  it('still admits managed rows once the index exists', async () => {
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+    ]);
+
+    expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
+  });
+
+  it('leaves nothing dangling behind the deleted row', async () => {
+    // SQLite never enforces the ON DELETE CASCADE these tables declare, so a
+    // bare delete strands biometric embeddings, feedback and marks pointing at
+    // a photo id that no longer exists — on every SQLite install.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_faces').insert({ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1 });
+    await knex('image_access_logs').insert({ photo_id: 2 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_faces').where('photo_id', 2).first()).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(await knex('image_access_logs').where('photo_id', 2).first()).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('does not carry the duplicate\'s faces over to the survivor', async () => {
+    // Both rows were scanned independently, so the survivor already holds its
+    // own embeddings. Moving these would fabricate a second copy of every face
+    // and split the person clusters built from them.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_faces').insert([{ photo_id: 1, event_id: 1 }, { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1 }]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_faces').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('moves a guest comment to the survivor rather than deleting it', async () => {
+    // The duplicates were separate tiles in the grid, so a guest could have
+    // commented on either. Silently dropping that inside a fix for silent data
+    // loss would be its own bug.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert({
+      photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'comment',
+      comment_text: 'lovely shot', guest_identifier: 'guest-a',
+    });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_feedback');
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].photo_id).toBe(1);
+    expect(rows[0].comment_text).toBe('lovely shot');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps both comments when the same guest commented on both tiles', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'comment', comment_text: 'one', guest_identifier: 'g' },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'comment', comment_text: 'two', guest_identifier: 'g' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_feedback').orderBy('id');
+    expect(rows.map((r) => r.comment_text)).toEqual(['one', 'two']);
+    expect(rows.every((r) => r.photo_id === 1)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('does not double-count a like the same guest left on both tiles', async () => {
+    // Unlike comments, a like is a per-guest toggle: moving it would show two
+    // likes from one person.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g' },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_feedback').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('moves a like from a guest the survivor has never seen', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert({
+      photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'other',
+    });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_feedback');
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].photo_id).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('moves an admin mark, and drops it when that admin already marked the survivor', async () => {
+    // photo_admin_marks is UNIQUE(photo_id, admin_id), so a blind move would
+    // throw and abort the migration.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_admin_marks').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: 5 },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: 2 },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, admin_id: 9, rating: 4 },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_admin_marks').orderBy('admin_id');
+    expect(rows.map((r) => [r.admin_id, r.rating])).toEqual([[7, 5], [9, 4]]);
+    expect(rows.every((r) => r.photo_id === 1)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('respects the transfer_files uniqueness when moving membership', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('transfer_files').insert([
+      { transfer_id: 3, photo_id: 1 },
+      { transfer_id: 3, photo_id: 2 },
+      { transfer_id: 4, photo_id: 2 },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('transfer_files').orderBy('transfer_id');
+    expect(rows.map((r) => r.transfer_id)).toEqual([3, 4]);
+    expect(rows.every((r) => r.photo_id === 1)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('recomputes the survivor\'s feedback totals after reparenting rows', async () => {
+    // photos carries denormalized counters (migration 033). A survivor that
+    // now OWNS the feedback but still renders zero is the visible half of
+    // getting this wrong.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g1' },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'rating', rating: 4, guest_identifier: 'g1' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const survivor = await knex('photos').where('id', 1).first();
+    expect(survivor.like_count).toBe(1);
+    expect(Number(survivor.average_rating)).toBe(4);
+    expect(survivor.feedback_count).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps two people who share a device apart', async () => {
+    // guest_identifier is per-device; guest_id is per-person (migration 078),
+    // and feedbackService scopes by guest_id when it is present. Keying on the
+    // identifier alone would read these as one person and delete a rating.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'rating', rating: 5, guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 10 },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'rating', rating: 2, guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 11 },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_feedback').orderBy('guest_id');
+    expect(rows.map((r) => [r.guest_id, r.rating])).toEqual([[10, 5], [11, 2]]);
+  });
+
+  it('still dedupes one person voting on both tiles', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 10 },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 10 },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_feedback').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('still clears face rows on a branch that has no face feature', async () => {
+    // DIVERGES FROM MAIN, deliberately. Face recognition (#1090) is main-only:
+    // there is no faceProcessor on this branch, so purgePhotoFaces cannot be
+    // called and there are no event_people counts or centroids to reconcile.
+    // What still matters is the half that is not optional — the rows must not
+    // dangle, because SQLite never enforces the CASCADE that would remove
+    // them. The service reaches for purgePhotoFaces, finds nothing, and falls
+    // back to a plain delete; this pins that fallback.
+    //
+    // If faces are ever backported, main's version of this test comes with
+    // them.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_faces').insert({ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, person_id: 5 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_faces').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 0 });
+  });
+
+  it('keeps a hidden moderation record from swallowing the visible replacement', async () => {
+    // feedbackService lets both coexist and counts only the visible one.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g', is_hidden: true },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g', is_hidden: false },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photo_feedback').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
+  });
+
+  it('merges the independent halves of one admin\'s mark', async () => {
+    // rating and color_label are written independently, so the same admin can
+    // have rated one tile and coloured the other.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_admin_marks').insert([
+      { photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: 5, color_label: null },
+      { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: null, color_label: 'red' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photo_admin_marks');
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect([rows[0].rating, rows[0].color_label]).toEqual([5, 'red']);
+  });
+
+  it('requeues the survivor when the duplicate held the only scan', async () => {
+    // Otherwise the sole embeddings go with the purge and nothing re-queues:
+    // the photo just silently stops having a face.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photo_faces').insert({ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('photos').where('id', 1).first()).face_status).toBe('pending');
+  });
+
+  it('carries the duplicate\'s views and downloads over', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('photos').where('id', 1).update({ view_count: 2, download_count: 1 });
+    await knex('photos').where('id', 2).update({ view_count: 5, download_count: 3 });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const survivor = await knex('photos').where('id', 1).first();
+    expect([survivor.view_count, survivor.download_count]).toEqual([7, 4]);
+  });
+
+  it('fails loudly rather than recording itself applied without the index', async () => {
+    // Swallowing a failed CREATE INDEX would leave the install permanently
+    // racy — the in-flight guard only covers one process — with nothing to
+    // trigger a retry. Driven through the helper the migration calls, against
+    // a table that still holds duplicates — i.e. what it would face if the
+    // dedupe above had not achieved uniqueness.
+    await seedPair();
+    const { createExternalRelpathIndex } = require('../../src/services/externalPhotoDedupe');
+
+    await expect(createExternalRelpathIndex(knex)).rejects.toThrow(/unique/i);
+  });
+
+  it('invalidates the pre-built download zip for the affected event', async () => {
+    // The cached archive still contains the rows just removed, and every
+    // ordinary photo-deletion path invalidates it for exactly that reason.
+    // getZipInfo treats a cleared record as a miss and rebuilds on request.
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('events').insert({
+      id: 1, download_zip_path: 'events/active/x/.download-cache/all.zip',
+      download_zip_generated_at: '2026-01-01',
+    });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const ev = await knex('events').where('id', 1).first();
+    expect(ev.download_zip_path).toBeNull();
+    expect(ev.download_zip_generated_at).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('leaves an untouched event\'s zip alone', async () => {
+    await seedPair();
+    await knex('events').insert([
+      { id: 1, download_zip_path: 'a.zip', download_zip_generated_at: '2026-01-01' },
+      { id: 2, download_zip_path: 'b.zip', download_zip_generated_at: '2026-01-01' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('events').where('id', 2).first()).download_zip_path).toBe('b.zip');
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent', async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    const once = await rows();
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await rows()).toEqual(once);
+  });
+
+  it('rolls back to an unconstrained table', async () => {
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    await migration.down(knex);
+
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+    expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
+  });
+
+  it('no-ops before 041 has added the column', async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => { t.increments('id').primary(); });
+
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/177_external_relpath_from_root.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
+/**
+ * Folding the event's base path into every external row (#1163).
+ *
+ * Two things can go wrong and both are silent, which is why they are pinned
+ * here rather than left to review: folding a path that was ALREADY folded
+ * (every original moves), and "repairing" a healthy install because the media
+ * root happened to be unmounted when the migration ran (every original moves).
+ *
+ * The repair itself is driven against a real temp directory tree, because the
+ * whole mechanism is "is this file actually there" and a mocked fs would only
+ * be testing the mock.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+describe('migration 177 — external_relpath from the media root (#1163)', () => {
+  let knex; let tmpDir; let mediaRoot; let migration;
+
+  /** Writes `bytes` bytes and returns the size, so fixtures can record it the
+   *  way an import would have. */
+  const touch = async (rel, bytes = 8) => {
+    const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.writeFile(full, Buffer.alloc(bytes));
+    return bytes;
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig187-'));
+    mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
+
+    // The service caches the root on first call, so it must not have been
+    // resolved before EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT was set above.
+    jest.resetModules();
+    migration = require('../../migrations/core/177_external_relpath_from_root');
+
+    knex = require('knex')({
+      client: 'sqlite3',
+      connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
+      useNullAsDefault: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (knex) await knex.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    delete process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT;
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('events');
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('app_settings');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('external_path');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.string('external_relpath');
+      t.integer('size_bytes');
+      t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('setting_key');
+      t.text('setting_value');
+      t.string('setting_type');
+      t.string('updated_at');
+    });
+    await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+  });
+
+  const relpaths = async () =>
+    (await knex('photos').orderBy('id', 'asc').select('external_relpath'))
+      .map((r) => r.external_relpath);
+
+  it('folds the base path into every row of a healthy event', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/a.jpg');
+    await touch('Trip/Leknes/b.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/b.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Leknes/a.jpg', 'Trip/Leknes/b.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('repairs rows an earlier import had rebased', async () => {
+    // The reported shape: a parent imported first, a child imported second, so
+    // events.external_path is the child and the parent's rows resolve into a
+    // path that does not exist.
+    const oldSize = await touch('Trip/Leknes/old.jpg', 11);   // from the first import
+    const newSize = await touch('Trip/Sub/new.jpg', 22);      // from the second
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/old.jpg', size_bytes: oldSize, source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'new.jpg', size_bytes: newSize, source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    // The old row is placed where the file actually is; the new one keeps
+    // resolving exactly where it resolved before.
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Leknes/old.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/new.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses an ancestor whose file is a different size', async () => {
+    // The dangerous case: the row's own file was simply deleted, and an
+    // UNRELATED file one directory up happens to share its name. Adopting it
+    // would make downloads serve the wrong original — worse than a dead link.
+    await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 999);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({
+      event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: 42, source_origin: 'external',
+    });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/photo.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses an ancestor when the row records no size to check against', async () => {
+    // Nothing to verify provenance with, so the row stays where it resolves
+    // today rather than adopting a same-named stranger.
+    await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 100);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({
+      event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: null, source_origin: 'external',
+    });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/photo.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves nothing folded when a rewrite fails partway', async () => {
+    // Without a transaction, a crash between the first event's UPDATE and the
+    // marker leaves mixed formats behind — and the next run folds the already
+    // folded rows a second time, putting every original one directory deeper.
+    await touch('A/one.jpg');
+    await touch('B/two.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert([
+      { id: 1, external_path: 'A' },
+      { id: 2, external_path: 'B' },
+    ]);
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'one.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 2, external_relpath: 'two.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+    // app_settings is written last, in the same transaction as the rewrites.
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('app_settings_backup');
+    await knex.raw('CREATE TRIGGER fail_marker BEFORE INSERT ON app_settings '
+      + "BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'boom'); END");
+
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).rejects.toThrow(/boom/);
+
+    await knex.raw('DROP TRIGGER fail_marker');
+    // Every row still base-relative, and no marker — so a retry is correct.
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['one.jpg', 'two.jpg']);
+    expect(await knex('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'external_relpath_root_relative').first())
+      .toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('removes the losing row when two paths converge, instead of stranding it', async () => {
+    // Trip/Sub/c.jpg imported once via `Trip` (as `Sub/c.jpg`) and once via
+    // `Trip/Sub` (as `c.jpg`). Both fold to the same path. Skipping the loser
+    // would leave it base-relative under a root-only resolver — pointing at
+    // <root>/c.jpg — with the marker claiming the conversion is complete.
+    const size = await touch('Trip/Sub/c.jpg', 33);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Sub/c.jpg', size_bytes: size, source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'c.jpg', size_bytes: size, source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const rows = await knex('photos').select('external_relpath');
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].external_relpath).toBe('Trip/Sub/c.jpg');
+  });
+
+  it('survives a final path that equals another row\'s current path', async () => {
+    // `photo.jpg` repairs to `Trip/photo.jpg` while the row already holding
+    // `Trip/photo.jpg` folds to `Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg`. Every FINAL value is
+    // distinct, but a one-pass rewrite collides halfway through — and on
+    // Postgres that 23505 is misread by the migration runner as "already
+    // applied", leaving everything unconverted.
+    const a = await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 11);
+    const b = await touch('Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg', 22);
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: a, source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/photo.jpg', size_bytes: b, source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/photo.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('does not re-prefix a row inserted while the probe was running', async () => {
+    // Phase 1 runs outside the transaction and can take minutes on a cold
+    // mount. An import finishing in that window writes an already
+    // root-relative row, which a `where event_id` bulk update would prefix a
+    // second time with the stale base.
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    const { foldExternalRelpaths } = require('../../src/services/externalRelpathFold');
+    const realStat = fs.promises.stat;
+    let injected = false;
+    jest.spyOn(fs.promises, 'access').mockImplementation(async (...args) => {
+      if (!injected) {
+        injected = true;
+        await knex('photos').insert({
+          event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/late.jpg', source_origin: 'external',
+        });
+      }
+      return realStat(args[0]).then(() => undefined);
+    });
+
+    await foldExternalRelpaths(knex);
+    fs.promises.access.mockRestore();
+
+    expect((await relpaths()).sort()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg', 'Trip/late.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a row it cannot place resolving where it resolves today', async () => {
+    // Never guess below current behaviour: a file that is genuinely gone must
+    // not have its path rewritten to some other file that happens to exist.
+    await touch('Trip/Sub/present.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'present.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'vanished.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/present.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/vanished.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('folds without repairing when the media root is unmounted', async () => {
+    // An unmounted share leaves the mountpoint as an empty directory, so every
+    // file looks missing. Repairing off that signal would move every original
+    // on a perfectly healthy install.
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+    // mediaRoot is empty — see beforeEach.
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/Leknes/a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves managed rows alone', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual([null, 'Trip/a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves an event with no base path alone — its rows are already root-relative', async () => {
+    await touch('a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: null });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('folds each event with its own base', async () => {
+    await touch('A/one.jpg');
+    await touch('B/two.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert([
+      { id: 1, external_path: 'A' },
+      { id: 2, external_path: 'B' },
+    ]);
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'one.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+      { event_id: 2, external_relpath: 'two.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['A/one.jpg', 'B/two.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('tolerates a base path with stray slashes', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: '/Trip/' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('does not fold twice when run again', async () => {
+    // The failure this guards is total: every original on the install moves one
+    // directory deeper, and there is no undo.
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('does not fold twice when the base repeats in the relpath', async () => {
+    // The inference this migration deliberately does NOT use: `Trip/x.jpg`
+    // under base `Trip` already "starts with the base", but has not been
+    // folded — it is a subfolder that shares its parent's name.
+    await touch('Trip/Trip/x.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Trip/x.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('rollback does not clear the marker, so a re-run cannot double-fold', async () => {
+    await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
+    await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
+    await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    await migration.down(knex);
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('no-ops before 041 has added the column', async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => { t.increments('id').primary(); });
+
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/178_reset_legacy_preview_paths.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * Legacy preview keys must not survive the encoder change.
+ *
+ * The old generator kept the SOURCE basename verbatim while always writing
+ * JPEG, so a `.webp` upload produced `preview_shot.webp` holding a JPEG. The
+ * route now derives Content-Type from the key, and sets `nosniff` — so that
+ * legacy object would be announced as image/webp and render as a broken image.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/178_reset_legacy_preview_paths');
+
+describe('migration 178 — legacy preview keys (#1166 follow-up)', () => {
+  let knex; let tmpDir;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig188-'));
+    knex = require('knex')({
+      client: 'sqlite3',
+      connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
+      useNullAsDefault: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (knex) await knex.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('preview_path');
+      t.string('thumbnail_path');
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('clears the mislabelled .webp keys that would render broken', async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert({ preview_path: 'previews/preview_shot.webp' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('photos').first()).preview_path).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('clears .jpg keys too, because a byte-correct one can still be flattened', async () => {
+    // A legacy .jpg key is valid JPEG, but it may be a flattened rendition of a
+    // transparent or animated source, and nothing in the key says so. One lazy
+    // regeneration is cheaper than reasoning about which of them lied.
+    await knex('photos').insert([
+      { preview_path: 'previews/preview_a.jpg' },
+      { preview_path: 'previews/preview_b.png' },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await knex('photos').whereNotNull('preview_path').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 0 });
+  });
+
+  it('leaves thumbnails alone — they are a different cache', async () => {
+    await knex('photos').insert({ preview_path: 'previews/p.jpg', thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/t.jpg' });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect((await knex('photos').first()).thumbnail_path).toBe('thumbnails/t.jpg');
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent and safe with nothing to clear', async () => {
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('no-ops before 104 has added the column', async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => { t.increments('id').primary(); });
+
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminContractsSignedPdfPathTraversal.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/**
+ * Same bug class as GHSA-9q5j-vqfw-32hr (fixed in adminEvents/logo.js) —
+ * the signed-PDF upload's multer `filename` callback built the stored
+ * path directly from `req.params.id` with no integer validation:
+ *
+ *   filename: (req, file, cb) => {
+ *     cb(null, `contract-${req.params.id}-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
+ *   }
+ *
+ * `POST /:id/upload-signed-pdf` declares `param('id').isInt({ min: 1 })`,
+ * but express-validator's check only runs inside the route handler via
+ * validateRequest(req) — AFTER multer has already parsed the multipart
+ * body and invoked the filename callback. A traversal payload in the raw
+ * `:id` URL segment reaches multer completely unvalidated.
+ *
+ * Fixed by rejecting any non-positive-integer id before it is used to
+ * build the filename, independent of the declared-but-too-late
+ * express-validator check.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+// ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES in fileSecurityUtils.js only defines image/video
+// entries, so the route's real fileFilter (validateFileType(..., ['application/pdf']))
+// rejects every PDF upload with "Only PDF files are allowed" — a
+// separate, pre-existing bug unrelated to the path-traversal fix under
+// test here (also present in publicContracts.js, which is why neither
+// suite exercises a successful upload). Stub validateFileType so this
+// suite can drive the full route, including the filename-callback fix,
+// end-to-end.
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/fileSecurityUtils', () => {
+  const actual = jest.requireActual('../../src/utils/fileSecurityUtils');
+  return {
+    ...actual,
+    validateFileType: (filename, mimetype, allowedTypes) => allowedTypes.includes(mimetype),
+  };
+});
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-contracts-signed-pdf-')), 'db.sqlite'
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-contracts-signed-pdf-test-secret';
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
+} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('POST /api/admin/contracts/:id/upload-signed-pdf — path traversal guard', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let customerId; let token;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+
+    // Feature flag defaults OFF on a fresh install — the contracts
+    // router 403s every route until it's on.
+    await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'contracts' }).update({ value: true });
+
+    app = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/contracts', require('../../src/routes/adminContracts'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
+
+  const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+  const signedDir = () => path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads/contracts/signed');
+
+  async function insertContract(over = {}) {
+    const base = {
+      contract_number: `K-TEST-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2, 8)}`,
+      customer_account_id: customerId,
+      title: 'Test Contract',
+      issue_date: new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10),
+      status: 'sent',
+      language: 'de',
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      ...over,
+    };
+    const inserted = await db('contracts').insert(base).returning('id');
+    return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+  }
+
+  it('rejects a traversal payload in the id param instead of writing outside uploads/contracts/signed', async () => {
+    // '../../../../tmp/pwned' URL-encoded so the raw request path still
+    // has a single segment (matches Express's `:id`), but Express
+    // decodes the param back into literal '../' sequences before the
+    // route sees it.
+    const traversalId = encodeURIComponent('../../../../tmp/pwned');
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/contracts/${traversalId}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+    ).attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/invalid contract id/i);
+
+    // No file should have been written anywhere — the filename callback
+    // must error out before multer opens a write stream.
+    const escapedFile = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'pwned');
+    expect(fs.existsSync(escapedFile)).toBe(false);
+    if (fs.existsSync(signedDir())) {
+      expect(fs.readdirSync(signedDir())).toHaveLength(0);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts a normal numeric contract id', async () => {
+    const id = await insertContract();
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/contracts/${id}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+    ).attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const files = fs.readdirSync(signedDir());
+    expect(files.some((f) => f.startsWith(`contract-${id}-`))).toBe(true);
+
+    const row = await db('contracts').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(row.status).toBe('fully_signed');
+    expect(row.signed_pdf_path).toMatch(new RegExp(`contract-${id}-`));
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminEventsCascadeStorage.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test: deleting an event must remove its stored objects.
+ *
+ * deleteEventCascade() cleaned up the local filesystem only (#608). On an
+ * S3/R2 storage backend that cleanup is a no-op, so every deleted gallery
+ * left its originals and derived tiers in the bucket — unreferenced,
+ * invisible in the UI, and billed forever. Measured on a v3.45.16 install
+ * against Cloudflare R2: deleting a 403-photo event changed the bucket
+ * object count by exactly zero.
+ *
+ * The keys must be collected BEFORE the transaction deletes the photo
+ * rows, because afterwards nothing knows which objects were this event's.
+ */
+
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+
+// The cascade runs a real `fs.rm(..., { recursive: true })` over
+// {STORAGE_PATH}/events/{active,archived}/{slug}. Point that at a throwaway
+// directory before requiring the module under test — the default resolves
+// into the working tree.
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-cascade-storage-test');
+
+const mockStorage = { delete: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+
+const mockEvent = {
+  id: 42,
+  slug: 'other-demo-2026-01-01',
+  event_name: 'Demo',
+  source_mode: 'managed',
+  // Written through the backend by archiveService, so it is a bucket object
+  // and the fs.unlink in the cascade never touched it on S3.
+  archive_path: 'archives/other-demo-2026-01-01.zip',
+  // The pre-built "Download All" zip. Lives under the event prefix, so the
+  // recursive fs.rm covers it on local disk and nothing covers it on S3.
+  download_zip_path: 'events/active/other-demo-2026-01-01/.download-cache/all.zip',
+};
+
+const mockPhotos = [
+  {
+    id: 1,
+    path: 'other-demo-2026-01-01/photo_one.jpg',
+    thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+    hero_path: null,
+    preview_path: 'previews/prev_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+    watermark_path: 'watermarked/wm_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+    source_origin: 'managed',
+  },
+  {
+    id: 2,
+    path: 'other-demo-2026-01-01/photo_two.jpg',
+    thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_bbb_photo_two.jpg',
+    hero_path: null,
+    preview_path: null,
+    watermark_path: null,
+    source_origin: 'managed',
+  },
+  {
+    // External photos live outside the managed backend and must be left alone.
+    id: 3,
+    path: 'ignored.jpg',
+    thumbnail_path: null,
+    hero_path: null,
+    preview_path: null,
+    watermark_path: null,
+    source_origin: 'external',
+  },
+];
+
+let mockPhotoRowsDeleted = false;
+let mockJobRowsDeleted = false;
+
+// Photos in OTHER events that share a canonical derivative key with this one.
+let mockSharedDerivatives = [];
+
+// The shared-derivative probe: db('photos').whereNot(...).where(cb).select(...)
+const sharedProbe = {
+  where: () => sharedProbe,
+  whereIn: () => sharedProbe,
+  orWhereIn: () => sharedProbe,
+  select: async () => mockSharedDerivatives,
+};
+
+function mockMakeDb() {
+  const table = (name) => {
+    const chain = {
+      where: () => chain,
+      first: async () => (name === 'events' ? mockEvent : undefined),
+      whereNotNull: () => chain,
+      whereNot: () => sharedProbe,
+      orWhereIn: () => chain,
+      whereIn: () => chain,
+      select: async () => {
+        if (name === 'photos') {
+          // The whole point: if this runs after the transaction, the rows
+          // are gone and we would collect nothing.
+          return mockPhotoRowsDeleted ? [] : mockPhotos;
+        }
+        return [];
+      },
+      del: async () => {
+        if (name === 'photos') mockPhotoRowsDeleted = true;
+        if (name === 'download_jobs') mockJobRowsDeleted = true;
+        return 1;
+      },
+    };
+    return chain;
+  };
+  // #1132 guards the merge-dismissals delete behind a hasTable check.
+  table.schema = { hasTable: async () => false };
+  table.transaction = async (cb) => cb(table);
+  return table;
+}
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: mockMakeDb(),
+  logActivity: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/storage', () => ({
+  getStorage: () => mockStorage,
+}));
+
+const { deleteEventCascade } = require('../../src/routes/adminEvents/helpers');
+
+describe('deleteEventCascade — storage cleanup', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    mockStorage.delete.mockClear();
+    mockPhotoRowsDeleted = false;
+    mockJobRowsDeleted = false;
+    mockSharedDerivatives = [];
+  });
+
+  it('deletes originals and every derived tier from the storage backend', async () => {
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const deleted = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls.map(([key]) => key);
+
+    expect(deleted).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
+      'events/active/other-demo-2026-01-01/photo_one.jpg',
+      'events/active/other-demo-2026-01-01/photo_two.jpg',
+      'thumbnails/thumb_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+      'thumbnails/thumb_bbb_photo_two.jpg',
+      'previews/prev_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+    ]));
+  });
+
+  it('deletes pre-generated watermarks and the archive zip', async () => {
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const deleted = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls.map(([key]) => key);
+
+    // Both are storage-backend objects that only fs.unlink ever touched, so
+    // both survived an event delete on S3.
+    expect(deleted).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
+      'watermarked/wm_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+      'archives/other-demo-2026-01-01.zip',
+    ]));
+  });
+
+  it('deletes the Download All cache, which only fs.rm ever covered', async () => {
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const deleted = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls.map(([key]) => key);
+
+    // Sits under events/active/{slug}/.download-cache/ — swept by the
+    // recursive fs.rm on local disk, invisible to it on S3 where the prefix
+    // is not a directory. Gallery-sized. (download_jobs is main-only, so the
+    // per-job archives main also sweeps have no counterpart here.)
+    expect(deleted).toContain(
+      'events/active/other-demo-2026-01-01/.download-cache/all.zip'
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a derivative alone when another event still points at it', async () => {
+    // Canonical thumbnail/hero/preview keys are not event-scoped — the
+    // basename is the photo's filename, and filenames are not unique across
+    // events. Deleting one a surviving gallery still references would blank
+    // its tile.
+    mockSharedDerivatives = [{
+      thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_aaa_photo_one.jpg',
+      hero_path: null,
+      preview_path: null,
+      watermark_path: null,
+    }];
+
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const deleted = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls.map(([key]) => key);
+    expect(deleted).not.toContain('thumbnails/thumb_aaa_photo_one.jpg');
+    // The originals are slug-scoped and must still go.
+    expect(deleted).toContain('events/active/other-demo-2026-01-01/photo_one.jpg');
+    // So must a derivative nobody else claims.
+    expect(deleted).toContain('thumbnails/thumb_bbb_photo_two.jpg');
+  });
+
+  it('never asks the backend to delete the same key twice', async () => {
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const managed = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls
+      .map(([key]) => key)
+      .filter((key) => !key.startsWith('thumbnails/thumb_w') && !key.startsWith('previews/preview_w'));
+
+    expect(managed).toEqual([...new Set(managed)]);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves external/reference photos in place', async () => {
+    await deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' });
+
+    const deleted = mockStorage.delete.mock.calls.map(([key]) => key);
+    expect(deleted).not.toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(['ignored.jpg']));
+    expect(deleted).not.toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(['events/active/ignored.jpg']));
+  });
+
+  it('still completes the delete when the storage backend throws', async () => {
+    mockStorage.delete.mockRejectedValue(new Error('bucket unreachable'));
+
+    await expect(deleteEventCascade(42, { id: 1, username: 'admin' }))
+      .resolves.toEqual({ id: 42, name: 'Demo' });
+
+    mockStorage.delete.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminEventsLogoPathTraversal.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-9q5j-vqfw-32hr — the event-logo upload's multer `filename` callback
+ * built the stored path directly from `req.params.id` with no integer
+ * validation:
+ *
+ *   filename: (req, file, cb) => {
+ *     cb(null, `event-${req.params.id}-logo-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
+ *   }
+ *
+ * A traversal payload in the `:id` route param (URL-encoded so it still
+ * matches a single Express path segment, then decoded back into literal
+ * `../` sequences by Express before handlers see it) could escape the
+ * intended uploads/logos/events/ directory. Most directly reachable via a
+ * super_admin session: requireEventOwnership short-circuits with next() and
+ * zero DB lookup for that role (src/middleware/ownership.js), so nothing
+ * upstream of multer validates the id first.
+ *
+ * Fixed by rejecting any non-positive-integer id before it is used to build
+ * the filename, regardless of role or ownership-check ordering.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-events-logo-')), 'db.sqlite'
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-events-logo-test-secret';
+
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+async function insertEvent(db, adminId, over = {}) {
+  const base = {
+    slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    event_type: 'wedding',
+    event_name: 'Test Wedding',
+    event_date: '2026-05-29',
+    host_email: 'host@example.com',
+    admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+    is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+    created_by: adminId,
+    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    ...over,
+  };
+  const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
+  return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+}
+
+describe('POST /api/admin/events/:id/logo — path traversal guard', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let token;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    // super_admin: requireEventOwnership short-circuits with no DB lookup
+    // for this role, so it reaches multer with nothing upstream having
+    // validated the id — the exact path GHSA-9q5j-vqfw-32hr exploited.
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+    app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+      res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
+    });
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
+
+  const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+  const logoDir = () => path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads/logos/events');
+
+  it('rejects a traversal payload in the id param instead of writing outside uploads/logos/events', async () => {
+    // '../../../../tmp/pwned' URL-encoded so the raw request path still has
+    // a single segment (matches Express's `:id`), but Express decodes the
+    // param back into literal '../' sequences before the route sees it.
+    const traversalId = encodeURIComponent('../../../../tmp/pwned');
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/events/${traversalId}/logo`)
+    ).attach('logo', Buffer.from('fake image data'), 'logo.png');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/invalid event id/i);
+
+    // No file should have been written anywhere — the filename callback
+    // must error out before multer opens a write stream.
+    const escapedFile = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'pwned');
+    expect(fs.existsSync(escapedFile)).toBe(false);
+    if (fs.existsSync(logoDir())) {
+      expect(fs.readdirSync(logoDir())).toHaveLength(0);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts a normal numeric event id', async () => {
+    const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Logo Event' });
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/logo`)
+    ).attach('logo', Buffer.from('fake image data'), 'logo.png');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.hero_logo_url).toMatch(new RegExp(`^/uploads/logos/events/event-${id}-logo-`));
+
+    const files = fs.readdirSync(logoDir());
+    expect(files.some((f) => f.startsWith(`event-${id}-logo-`))).toBe(true);
+
+    const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(row.hero_logo_url).toBe(res.body.hero_logo_url);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminMfa.test.js

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ const { authenticator } = require('otplib');
 const {
   bootCrmDb, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
 } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const mfaService = require('../../src/services/mfaService');
 
 jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
@@ -235,6 +236,138 @@ describe('MFA disable — /api/admin/auth/mfa/disable', () => {
     expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeNull();
     expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBeNull();
   });
+
+  // Concurrency regression: a plain UPDATE with no conditional guard let two
+  // requests carrying the same captured code both read the same
+  // two_factor_last_used_step and both persist, defeating replay protection.
+  // The guarded UPDATE (mfaService.persistTotpStep) makes only the first
+  // writer's affected-row count > 0; the loser must be rejected.
+  it('two concurrent disable requests with the SAME captured code: only one succeeds', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+    ]);
+
+    expect([r1.status, r2.status].sort()).toEqual([200, 400]);
+
+    const status = await request(adminApp)
+      .get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+    expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('MFA regenerate recovery codes — /api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes', () => {
+  it('a valid TOTP regenerates the recovery codes and persists the step', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+
+    const res = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
+  });
+
+  it('a wrong code is rejected (400)', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const valid = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const wrong = valid === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
+
+    const res = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ code: wrong });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  // Concurrency regression (see the disable test above for the mechanism):
+  // this is the endpoint called out as the worst lost-update case, since it
+  // both rotates the recovery codes and (previously) persisted the step in
+  // one unconditional UPDATE.
+  it('two concurrent regenerations with the SAME captured code: only one succeeds', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+    ]);
+
+    expect([r1.status, r2.status].sort()).toEqual([200, 400]);
+    const winner = r1.status === 200 ? r1 : r2;
+    expect(winner.body.recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
+
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    expect(row.two_factor_last_used_step).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('mfaService.persistTotpStep — atomic replay-tracking persist', () => {
+  // Deterministic simulation of the race: two "concurrent" requests that
+  // read the SAME two_factor_last_used_step and computed the SAME totpStep
+  // from the same captured code. Calling persistTotpStep twice in a row with
+  // that identical totpStep reproduces exactly the DB-level outcome of a
+  // true race, without relying on event-loop timing.
+  it('the second writer with the same totpStep affects 0 rows and is rejected', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const totpStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, row.two_factor_secret, null);
+    expect(totpStep).toEqual(expect.any(Number));
+
+    const first = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, { updated_at: new Date() });
+    expect(first).toBe(true);
+
+    // The row's two_factor_last_used_step has now already advanced to
+    // totpStep by the time this "losing" write runs — the guard condition
+    // (whereNull OR < totpStep) is false, so 0 rows are affected.
+    const second = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, { updated_at: new Date() });
+    expect(second).toBe(false);
+
+    const after = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    expect(Number(after.two_factor_last_used_step)).toBe(totpStep);
+  });
+
+  it('succeeds when the new step advances past the current one', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const totpStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, row.two_factor_secret, null);
+
+    const ok = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, {});
+    expect(ok).toBe(true);
+
+    const nextStepAuthenticator = authenticator.clone({ epoch: Date.now() + 30000 });
+    const nextCode = nextStepAuthenticator.generate(secret);
+    const nextStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(nextCode, row.two_factor_secret, totpStep);
+    expect(nextStep).toBeGreaterThan(totpStep);
+
+    const advanced = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, nextStep, {});
+    expect(advanced).toBe(true);
+  });
 });
 
 describe('Admin login challenge — /api/auth/admin/login[/mfa]', () => {
@@ -284,6 +417,86 @@ describe('Admin login challenge — /api/auth/admin/login[/mfa]', () => {
     expect(res.body.user.id).toBe(admin.id);
   });
 
+  // GHSA-qcwx-r25m-j869: verifyTotp() was stateless, so otplib's window:1
+  // tolerance let the same 6-digit code complete two independent logins
+  // within its ~90s validity window. mfaService now tracks each admin's
+  // last-consumed TOTP step and rejects a code that doesn't advance past it.
+  it('#GHSA-qcwx-r25m-j869 — a TOTP code cannot be replayed into a second login', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    // First use of the code completes a login.
+    const c1 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const first = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c1.body.mfaToken, code });
+    expect(first.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(first.body.user).toBeDefined();
+
+    // Replaying the SAME code for an independent second login must fail,
+    // even though otplib's window:1 tolerance still considers it valid.
+    const c2 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const replay = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c2.body.mfaToken, code });
+    expect(replay.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(replay.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
+    expect(replay.body.user).toBeUndefined();
+
+    // A freshly generated code for the NEXT TOTP step is not a replay and
+    // succeeds. Generated via a cloned authenticator with a future epoch
+    // rather than mocking Date.now(), so mfaService's own step computation
+    // (real Date.now()) still lands the match one step ahead.
+    const nextStepAuthenticator = authenticator.clone({ epoch: Date.now() + 30000 });
+    const nextCode = nextStepAuthenticator.generate(secret);
+    const c3 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const third = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c3.body.mfaToken, code: nextCode });
+    expect(third.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(third.body.user).toBeDefined();
+    expect(third.body.user.id).toBe(admin.id);
+  });
+
+  // Concurrency regression: verifyTotpEncryptedStep()'s "does this advance"
+  // check was read against a snapshot taken earlier in the request, then a
+  // PLAIN update persisted the step — two concurrent requests carrying the
+  // SAME captured code could both pass the check and both complete a login
+  // before either write landed. The persist is now a conditional UPDATE
+  // (mfaService.persistTotpStep), so only the first writer's affected-row
+  // count is > 0 and the other is correctly treated as a replay.
+  it('two concurrent login/mfa requests with the SAME captured code: only one completes', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const c1 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const c2 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+
+    const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([
+      request(authApp).post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa').send({ mfaToken: c1.body.mfaToken, code }),
+      request(authApp).post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa').send({ mfaToken: c2.body.mfaToken, code }),
+    ]);
+
+    expect([r1.status, r2.status].sort()).toEqual([200, 401]);
+    const winner = r1.status === 200 ? r1 : r2;
+    const loser = r1.status === 200 ? r2 : r1;
+    expect(winner.body.user).toBeDefined();
+    expect(loser.body.user).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(loser.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
+  });
+
   it('login/mfa with a wrong code is 401 MFA_INVALID', async () => {
     const admin = await seedAdmin();
     const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);

backend/__tests__/routes/adminShortUrlOwnership.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-9h7q-2jpf-vj85 — DELETE /api/admin/short-urls/:id only checked
+ * `events.edit` permission, with no ownership scoping. GET and POST for an
+ * event's short URLs both chain requireEventOwnership; DELETE takes the
+ * short URL row's own :id (not :eventId), so any admin holding events.edit
+ * could delete another admin's branded gallery short URL. The route now
+ * resolves the short URL's event first and applies the same ownership
+ * predicate requireEventOwnership uses. super_admin keeps global access.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-suown-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'suown-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-suown-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('short URL delete ownership scoping', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let service;
+  let superTok; let ownerTok; let foreignTok;
+  let ownerId;
+  let foreignShortUrlId;
+
+  const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
+
+  async function seedEvent(createdBy, slugSuffix) {
+    const farFuture = new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 86400000).toISOString();
+    const [id] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: `suown-${slugSuffix}`,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Test Event',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@e.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@e.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `suown-${slugSuffix}`,
+      share_token: `suown-share-${slugSuffix}`,
+      expires_at: farFuture,
+      is_active: true,
+      is_archived: false,
+      created_by: createdBy,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+    return db('events').where({ id }).first();
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    service = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
+
+    const superIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'suown-super', email: 'suown-super@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const superId = superIns[0]?.id ?? superIns[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+    superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
+
+    const ownerIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'suown-owner', email: 'suown-owner@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    ownerId = ownerIns[0]?.id ?? ownerIns[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, ownerId, 'editor');
+    ownerTok = mintAdminToken(ownerId);
+
+    const foreignIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'suown-foreign', email: 'suown-foreign@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const foreignId = foreignIns[0]?.id ?? foreignIns[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'editor');
+    foreignTok = mintAdminToken(foreignId);
+
+    // Event owned by `owner`, NOT `foreign`.
+    await seedEvent(ownerId, 'owned');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin', require('../../src/routes/adminShortUrls'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    // Fresh short URL per DELETE test so earlier deletes don't interfere.
+    const event = await db('events').where({ created_by: ownerId }).first();
+    const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id,
+      customSlug: `suown-target-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`,
+      createdBy: ownerId,
+    });
+    foreignShortUrlId = row.id;
+  });
+
+  it('an admin who does not own the event cannot delete its short URL (403, row survives)', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete(`/api/admin/short-urls/${foreignShortUrlId}`),
+      foreignTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    const row = await db('gallery_short_urls').where({ id: foreignShortUrlId }).first();
+    expect(row).toBeDefined();
+    expect(row.deleted_at).toBeFalsy();
+  });
+
+  it('the owning admin can delete its own short URL', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete(`/api/admin/short-urls/${foreignShortUrlId}`),
+      ownerTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(204);
+    const row = await db('gallery_short_urls').where({ id: foreignShortUrlId }).first();
+    expect(row.deleted_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin can delete any short URL', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete(`/api/admin/short-urls/${foreignShortUrlId}`),
+      superTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(204);
+    const row = await db('gallery_short_urls').where({ id: foreignShortUrlId }).first();
+    expect(row.deleted_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('deleting a nonexistent short URL id returns 404', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete('/api/admin/short-urls/9999999'),
+      superTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it('deleting a nonexistent short URL id as a non-owner also returns 404 (existence check runs first)', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete('/api/admin/short-urls/9999999'),
+      foreignTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/dashboardScope.test.js

@@ -127,7 +127,44 @@ describe('dashboard scoping (GHSA-c2jj / gqx7 / jhcf)', () => {
     expect(res.status).toBe(200);
     expect(Number(res.body.totalEvents)).toBe(1);
     expect(Number(res.body.totalPhotos)).toBe(1);
-    expect(Number(res.body.storageUsed)).toBe(1000);
+    // The catalogued original bytes — this is what carries the per-event
+    // scoping, and what `storageUsed` reported before #1164.
+    expect(Number(res.body.catalogedBytes)).toBe(1000);
+  });
+
+  it('/stats reports disk usage unscoped, because disk is not per-event', async () => {
+    // storageUsed is a measurement of the storage root (#1164), so it is the
+    // same number for every admin by design. Pinned so a future reviewer
+    // reading "everything on this endpoint is scoped" does not turn it into a
+    // sum of this editor's photos again — which is the bug that was fixed.
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.storageUsed).not.toBe(1000);
+    expect(res.body).toHaveProperty('storageBreakdown');
+  });
+
+  it('/stats reports the catalogued figure on an S3 backend, not a near-zero disk walk', async () => {
+    // STORAGE_PATH holds only incidental local files when objects live in a
+    // bucket, so walking it would report near-zero and drag the soft-limit
+    // recommendation with it.
+    const prev = process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND;
+    process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND = 's3';
+    try {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.storageUsed).toBeNull();
+      expect(res.body.storageMeasurement).toBe('catalog');
+      expect(Number(res.body.catalogedBytes)).toBe(1000);
+    } finally {
+      if (prev === undefined) delete process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND;
+      else process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND = prev;
+    }
   });
 
   it('/analytics does not expose a foreign gallery name or slug', async () => {

backend/__tests__/routes/databaseBackupConfigDestination.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * PUT /api/admin/database-backup/config must reject a
+ * database_backup_destination_path that resolves inside a publicly served
+ * directory (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm class, #1365).
+ *
+ * Before #1365, database_backup_destination_path was silently ignored by
+ * databaseBackupService.backup() (a destructuring bug always fell back to
+ * the hardcoded /backup/database), so this setting being freely writable by
+ * any backup.create holder — the built-in `admin` role has it without
+ * settings.edit or backup.restore — was harmless. Making the setting
+ * actually take effect reopens the exact exfiltration path GHSA-jw8m fixed
+ * for the per-request override, through the persisted setting instead.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-config-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dbbackup-config-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('database backup destination-path config guard (GHSA-jw8m class, #1365)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminToken;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'limited-admin',
+      email: 'limited-admin-config@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id, username: 'limited-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/database-backup', require('../../src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('rejects a destination inside the public uploads/logos mount', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads', 'logos') });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+
+    // The seeded default must survive untouched — the rejected value never lands.
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_destination_path' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe('/backup/database');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a destination inside the public fonts mount', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'fonts') });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a destination outside any public mount', async () => {
+    const safePath = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'db-backups');
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: safePath });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_destination_path' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(safePath);
+  });
+
+  // A retention of 0 or less pushes cleanupOldBackups' cutoff to today or
+  // the future, deleting every completed backup on the next scheduled run
+  // — a backup.create holder achieving what backup.delete gates on /cleanup.
+  it.each([-1, 0])('rejects database_backup_retention_days=%s', async (bad) => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_retention_days: bad });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a positive database_backup_retention_days', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_retention_days: 90 });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_retention_days' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(90);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryDownloadStorage.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+/**
+ * Single-photo gallery downloads must go through the storage backend (#1048).
+ *
+ * `GET /api/gallery/:slug/download/:photoId` resolved a LOCAL filesystem path
+ * unconditionally and handed it to res.sendFile. On an S3/R2 deployment
+ * managed photos never exist on local disk, so every per-photo download 404'd
+ * with ENOENT — while download-all and secure-images worked fine, because they
+ * already went through getStorage(). The gallery looks healthy until a guest
+ * clicks the download button on a single photo.
+ *
+ * The local branch is pinned just as hard: sendFile emits Content-Length,
+ * Accept-Ranges, ETag and Last-Modified and answers Range with a 206. Routing
+ * local installs through a bare stream.pipe(res) to share one code path would
+ * silently drop all of that, and a resumed download would append a second full
+ * body onto the partial file.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dl-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'download-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dl-storage-'));
+
+const { Readable } = require('stream');
+
+const SLUG = 'download-gallery';
+const FILENAME = 'original.jpg';
+// Deliberately not written to disk anywhere: if the route reads the
+// filesystem instead of the backend, it cannot produce these bytes.
+const mockObjectBody = Buffer.from('S3-ONLY-ORIGINAL-BYTES-not-on-local-disk');
+const mockBackendKind = { value: 's3' };
+
+const mockStorage = {
+  kind: () => mockBackendKind.value,
+  stat: jest.fn(async () => ({ size: mockObjectBody.length, mtime: new Date('2026-08-20T10:00:00Z') })),
+  get: jest.fn(async () => Readable.from([mockObjectBody])),
+  getRange: jest.fn(async (key, start, end) => Readable.from([mockObjectBody.subarray(start, end + 1)])),
+  delete: jest.fn(async () => undefined),
+  exists: jest.fn(async () => true),
+};
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/storage', () => ({
+  getStorage: () => mockStorage,
+  initStorage: async () => mockStorage,
+}));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('single-photo download through the storage backend (#1048)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId; let photoId;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Downloads',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
+      share_token: 'download-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      require_password: 0,
+      allow_downloads: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    const row = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: FILENAME,
+      path: `${SLUG}/${FILENAME}`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      source_origin: 'managed',
+      mime_type: 'image/jpeg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    photoId = row[0]?.id ?? row[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    mockBackendKind.value = 's3';
+    mockStorage.get.mockClear();
+    mockStorage.getRange.mockClear();
+  });
+
+  it('streams the stored object instead of 404ing on a local path', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .buffer(true)
+      .parse((response, cb) => {
+        const chunks = [];
+        response.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
+        response.on('end', () => cb(null, Buffer.concat(chunks)));
+      });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    // The bytes only exist in the backend — proof it did not read the disk.
+    expect(res.body.equals(mockObjectBody)).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockStorage.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith(`events/active/${SLUG}/${FILENAME}`);
+    // Never written locally, so a filesystem read could not have served this.
+    expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG, FILENAME))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('sends Content-Length so the browser can show download progress', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+
+    expect(res.headers['content-length']).toBe(String(mockObjectBody.length));
+    expect(res.headers['accept-ranges']).toBe('bytes');
+    expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toContain(FILENAME);
+  });
+
+  it('answers a Range request with 206 and only the requested bytes', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9')
+      .buffer(true)
+      .parse((response, cb) => {
+        const chunks = [];
+        response.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
+        response.on('end', () => cb(null, Buffer.concat(chunks)));
+      });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(206);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBe(`bytes 0-9/${mockObjectBody.length}`);
+    expect(res.headers['content-length']).toBe('10');
+    expect(res.body.equals(mockObjectBody.subarray(0, 10))).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockStorage.getRange).toHaveBeenCalledWith(`events/active/${SLUG}/${FILENAME}`, 0, 9);
+  });
+
+  it('ignores a malformed Range rather than emitting a nonsense 206', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=abc-def');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('404s cleanly when the object is missing from the backend', async () => {
+    mockStorage.stat.mockResolvedValueOnce(null);
+
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    // The error must not inherit the image headers staged for a successful
+    // download, or the browser saves a .jpg containing JSON.
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/json/);
+    expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('keeps res.sendFile on a local backend rather than a bare pipe', async () => {
+    mockBackendKind.value = 'local';
+    const abs = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG, FILENAME);
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(abs, 'local-disk-bytes');
+
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(mockStorage.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    // sendFile's signature: conditional-request headers a raw pipe never sets.
+    expect(res.headers.etag).toBeDefined();
+    expect(res.headers['last-modified']).toBeDefined();
+
+    fs.rmSync(abs, { force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('does not serve a partial body when the If-Range validator is stale', async () => {
+    // The object was replaced since the client's last attempt. Answering 206
+    // from the new bytes would let it splice two versions into one file.
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9')
+      .set('If-Range', new Date('2020-01-01T00:00:00Z').toUTCString());
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.headers['content-length']).toBe(String(mockObjectBody.length));
+  });
+
+  it('still serves 206 when the If-Range validator matches', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9')
+      .set('If-Range', new Date('2026-08-20T10:00:00Z').toUTCString());
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(206);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBe(`bytes 0-9/${mockObjectBody.length}`);
+  });
+
+  it('errors cleanly when the object vanishes between stat and get', async () => {
+    // HeadObject succeeding does not mean GetObject will — a concurrent
+    // delete lands here. The staged image headers must not escape with it.
+    const gone = new Error('NoSuchKey');
+    gone.name = 'NoSuchKey';
+    mockStorage.get.mockRejectedValueOnce(gone);
+
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/json/);
+    expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('does not send 206 headers before the range fetch can fail', async () => {
+    // writeHead(206) before the await would make this ERR_HTTP_HEADERS_SENT.
+    mockStorage.getRange.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('connection reset'));
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(500);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/json/);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('answers HEAD from stat instead of draining the object out of S3', async () => {
+    const before = (await db('photos').where('id', photoId).first()).download_count || 0;
+    const logsBefore = (await db('access_logs').where({ photo_id: photoId, action: 'download' })).length;
+
+    const res = await request(app).head(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-length']).toBe(String(mockObjectBody.length));
+    expect(res.headers['accept-ranges']).toBe('bytes');
+    // The whole point: no egress for a metadata probe.
+    expect(mockStorage.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(mockStorage.getRange).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    // And no side effects: a probe is not a download.
+    const after = (await db('photos').where('id', photoId).first()).download_count || 0;
+    expect(after).toBe(before);
+    const logsAfter = (await db('access_logs').where({ photo_id: photoId, action: 'download' })).length;
+    expect(logsAfter).toBe(logsBefore);
+  });
+
+  it('returns a clean error when the range stream dies before its first chunk', async () => {
+    // Resolves, then errors — writeHead would already have committed the 206,
+    // leaving a connection reset as the only possible outcome.
+    const { Readable: R } = require('stream');
+    mockStorage.getRange.mockImplementationOnce(async () => {
+      const dead = new R({ read() { this.destroy(new Error('socket hang up')); } });
+      return dead;
+    });
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`)
+      .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(500);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/json/);
+    expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryDraftPreviewResolve.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+/**
+ * Previewing an unpublished gallery through its SHORT share URL (#1386).
+ *
+ * /info has honoured admin_preview since #868, but two sibling routes never
+ * did, and both sit on the short-URL path:
+ *
+ *   GET /resolve/:identifier      — filtered drafts out via ACTIVE_EVENT_FILTER
+ *   GET /:slug/verify-token/:token — same, inline
+ *
+ * With "use short gallery URLs" OFF the admin's View Gallery link carries the
+ * slug, GalleryPage never calls /resolve, and the preview worked. With it ON
+ * the link is the token form, GalleryPage resolves it first, and the draft
+ * 404'd as "Gallery Not Found" — which is exactly what was reported.
+ *
+ * The relaxation is admin-preview-only, so the other half of these tests is
+ * the part that must NOT move: anonymous callers still get 404 for a draft,
+ * and GHSA-rh8r's rule (never hand a share_token back on a bare slug lookup)
+ * has to survive the new path too.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-draft-preview-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'draft-preview-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-draft-preview-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+// Share-token fixtures, deliberately low-entropy and obviously fake. They
+// have to satisfy SHARE_TOKEN_REGEX (32 hex chars), and random-looking hex of
+// that shape is exactly what secret scanners flag — GitGuardian raised two
+// "Generic High Entropy Secret" findings on the first version of this file.
+const DRAFT_SLUG = 'draft-preview-event';
+const DRAFT_TOKEN = 'deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef';
+const LIVE_SLUG = 'published-event';
+const LIVE_TOKEN = 'feedfacefeedfacefeedfacefeedface';
+
+describe('draft preview through the short share URL (#1386)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let foreignId;
+
+  // Two transports. admin_preview=1 is an intent flag authenticated by the
+  // admin cookie — what the frontend sends. ?preview=<jwt> is the legacy
+  // hand-built-link form, kept working.
+  const preview = (id = adminId) => `preview=${mintAdminToken(id)}`;
+  const asAdmin = (req, id = adminId) => req.set('Cookie', `admin_token=${mintAdminToken(id)}`);
+
+  async function insertEvent({ slug, token, isDraft }) {
+    await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: slug,
+      event_date: '2026-09-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/${token}`,
+      share_token: token,
+      require_password: 0,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: isDraft ? 1 : 0,
+      created_by: adminId,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+    const [row] = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'foreign', email: 'foreign@example.test', password_hash: 'unused', is_active: 1,
+    }).returning('id');
+    foreignId = row?.id ?? row;
+    await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'viewer');
+
+    await insertEvent({ slug: DRAFT_SLUG, token: DRAFT_TOKEN, isDraft: true });
+    await insertEvent({ slug: LIVE_SLUG, token: LIVE_TOKEN, isDraft: false });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe('the reported case — admin previewing a draft', () => {
+    it('resolves the draft by share token (was 404 "Gallery Not Found")', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?${preview()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(DRAFT_SLUG);
+      expect(res.body.matchType).toBe('token');
+    });
+
+    it('resolves the draft by full share link', async () => {
+      const identifier = encodeURIComponent(`/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/${DRAFT_TOKEN}`);
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${identifier}?${preview()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(DRAFT_SLUG);
+    });
+
+    it('clears verify-token for the draft, the next step of the same flow', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/verify-token/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?${preview()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+    });
+  });
+
+  // The transport the SHIPPED frontend uses. The first cut of this fix only
+  // tested ?preview=, which the browser never sends on an API call — so the
+  // suite passed while the feature stayed broken end to end. Caught in review.
+  describe('admin_preview=1 authenticated by the admin cookie', () => {
+    it('resolves the draft', async () => {
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(DRAFT_SLUG);
+    });
+
+    it('clears verify-token', async () => {
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/verify-token/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('serves /info for the draft', async () => {
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/info?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+
+    it('serves draft MEDIA, which is what the flag on the URL is for', async () => {
+      // AuthenticatedImage/Video use native fetch and never see the axios
+      // interceptor, so the flag has to travel on the media URL itself. Without
+      // it the preview loaded metadata and showed no images at all.
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/photos?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+
+    it('404s with the flag but no admin cookie — the flag authorizes nothing', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s with the flag and a cookie that is not an admin JWT', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`)
+        .set('Cookie', 'admin_token=not-a-jwt');
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('what must not move', () => {
+    it('404s an anonymous resolve of the draft token', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s when ?preview= carries a token that is not a valid admin JWT', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?preview=not-a-jwt`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s when ?preview= is absent entirely', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?preview=`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s a non-owning admin on verify-token too (#1411)', async () => {
+      // This route selected its own columns and omitted created_by, so the
+      // ownership check saw an ownerless event and waved the caller through
+      // while /resolve and /info refused them.
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/verify-token/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+        foreignId,
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s an admin who does not own the event (#1411)', async () => {
+      // Was 200: a valid signature was the whole check, so any admin previewed
+      // any draft, including another photographer's. Now ownership applies —
+      // the same rule requireEventOwnership enforces everywhere else.
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+        foreignId,
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+
+      const info = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/info?admin_preview=1`),
+        foreignId,
+      );
+      expect(info.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s an admin whose role grants no gallery permissions (#1411)', async () => {
+      // The owner, but stripped of events.view/photos.view.
+      const original = (await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).first()).role_id;
+      await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ role_id: null });
+      try {
+        const res = await asAdmin(
+          request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+        );
+        expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+      } finally {
+        await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ role_id: original });
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('404s an admin whose account has been deactivated (#1411)', async () => {
+      await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
+      try {
+        const res = await asAdmin(
+          request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+        );
+        expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+      } finally {
+        await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ is_active: 1 });
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('404s an anonymous verify-token for the draft', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/verify-token/${DRAFT_TOKEN}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('still withholds the share_token on a bare slug lookup (GHSA-rh8r)', async () => {
+      // The draft path must not become a way around the token-withholding rule.
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_SLUG}?${preview()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.matchType).toBe('slug');
+      expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(res.body.share_link).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(res.body.share_url).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(DRAFT_TOKEN);
+    });
+
+    it('leaves the published gallery resolving anonymously, as before', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${LIVE_TOKEN}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(LIVE_SLUG);
+      expect(res.body.token).toBe(LIVE_TOKEN);
+    });
+
+    it('still 404s an identifier that matches nothing', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/no-such-gallery?${preview()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryProtectedVideoUrls.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/**
+ * Videos under enhanced/maximum image protection (#1370).
+ *
+ * Both halves of the video path used to be routed through /api/secure-images
+ * once an event left `standard` protection, and neither half could carry a
+ * video:
+ *
+ *   1. galleryQueryService emitted `/api/secure-images/{slug}/secure/{id}/{{token}}`
+ *      as the video's `url`. The lightbox drops that straight into a <video>
+ *      element, nothing substitutes `{{token}}` (the helper that could is
+ *      unreferenced), and the route answers 403 "Invalid or expired token".
+ *   2. Even with a valid token it would still fail: the secure-images route
+ *      pipes every byte through secureImageService.processProtectedImage,
+ *      which calls sharp() and throws on an mp4 → 404.
+ *
+ * The guest saw a poster frozen at 0:00 with no error of any kind.
+ *
+ * Videos now keep the JWT route at every protection level. That is not a new
+ * exposure — thumbnails of those same videos have always been served from it —
+ * so these tests also pin the inverse: still images must keep bouncing to the
+ * secure endpoint. Every assertion here fails on the unfixed code except the
+ * two guarding images.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-video-urls-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'video-urls-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-video-urls-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'protected-video-gallery';
+const VIDEO_BYTES = Buffer.from('not really an mp4, but the route only streams bytes');
+
+describe('videos stay playable under enhanced/maximum protection (#1370)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId; let videoId; let imageId;
+
+  async function setProtection(level) {
+    await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ protection_level: level });
+  }
+
+  async function photoPayload(id) {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const photo = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === id);
+    expect(photo).toBeDefined();
+    return photo;
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Protected Video',
+      event_date: '2026-09-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
+      share_token: 'protected-video-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      // Password-free so verifyGalleryAccess takes the public path, same as
+      // the sibling gallery suites.
+      require_password: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    const mediaDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG, 'individual');
+    fs.mkdirSync(mediaDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(mediaDir, 'clip.mp4'), VIDEO_BYTES);
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(mediaDir, 'still.jpg'), Buffer.from('jpeg-ish'));
+
+    const vid = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'clip.mp4',
+      path: `${SLUG}/individual/clip.mp4`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      media_type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      duration: 43,
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    videoId = vid[0]?.id ?? vid[0];
+
+    const img = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'still.jpg',
+      path: `${SLUG}/individual/still.jpg`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    imageId = img[0]?.id ?? img[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe.each(['enhanced', 'maximum'])('protection_level = %s', (level) => {
+    beforeAll(async () => { await setProtection(level); });
+
+    test('the video url is the JWT route, not a {{token}} template', async () => {
+      const photo = await photoPayload(videoId);
+      expect(photo.url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`);
+      expect(photo.url).not.toContain('{{token}}');
+      expect(photo.requires_token).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test('the video streams instead of bouncing to the secure endpoint', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+      expect(res.headers['accept-ranges']).toBe('bytes');
+      expect(Buffer.from(res.body)).toEqual(VIDEO_BYTES);
+    });
+
+    test('range requests still work, so seeking is possible', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`)
+        .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9');
+      expect(res.status).toBe(206);
+      expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBe(`bytes 0-9/${VIDEO_BYTES.length}`);
+    });
+
+    test('still images keep bouncing to the secure endpoint', async () => {
+      const photo = await photoPayload(imageId);
+      expect(photo.url).toBe(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/secure/${imageId}/{{token}}`);
+      expect(photo.requires_token).toBe(true);
+
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${imageId}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(302);
+      expect(res.body.error).toBe('Secure access required');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('protection_level = standard', () => {
+    beforeAll(async () => { await setProtection('standard'); });
+
+    test('both media types take the JWT route, as before', async () => {
+      expect((await photoPayload(videoId)).url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`);
+      expect((await photoPayload(imageId)).url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${imageId}`);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/gallerySqliteCaptureSort.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/**
+ * "Date Taken" ordering across SQLite's storage classes (#1172).
+ *
+ * photos.captured_at does not hold one type on SQLite. Three writers put three
+ * different things in it:
+ *
+ *   integer  managed uploads — photoProcessor.js:441 hands knex a Date, which
+ *            the sqlite3 binding stores as epoch milliseconds
+ *   text     external imports and the capture-date backfill, which write
+ *            ISO-8601 ('2026-06-03T01:15:00.000Z')
+ *   null     no capture date, so the sort falls through to uploaded_at —
+ *            itself text, in knex's 'YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS' shape
+ *
+ * A plain COALESCE over that mixture is not an ordering. SQLite sorts INTEGER
+ * before TEXT unconditionally, so every managed photo carrying EXIF came back
+ * ahead of every photo that did not, whatever the dates said. And among the
+ * text values 'T' (0x54) outranks the space (0x20), so a same-day ISO 01:15
+ * sorted behind a fallback 23:00.
+ *
+ * Both failures predate #1172 — the first needs only two managed photos — but
+ * the sort is what that issue is about, so they are fixed and pinned here.
+ * Every test below fails on the unfixed ORDER BY.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capsort-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'capsort-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capsort-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'capsort-gallery';
+
+describe('capture-date ordering on SQLite (#1172)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId;
+
+  // Managed uploads store an epoch-millisecond INTEGER, because
+  // photoProcessor.js:441 hands knex a Date and the sqlite3 binding converts
+  // it. That conversion cannot be reproduced from inside jest — there the
+  // binding's type dispatch misses sandbox-created Dates and writes the string
+  // "[object Object]" instead (CLAUDE.md). Verified outside jest: a Date lands
+  // as {"c":1830211200000,"ty":"integer"}. So these tests write the integer
+  // production would have written, rather than a Date that jest mangles.
+  const managed = (iso) => new Date(iso).getTime();
+
+  const addPhoto = async (filename, capturedAt, uploadedAt) => {
+    const row = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename,
+      path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      captured_at: capturedAt,
+      uploaded_at: uploadedAt,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return row[0]?.id ?? row[0];
+  };
+
+  const orderedFilenames = async (order = 'asc') => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos?sort=capture_date&order=${order}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    return res.body.photos.map((p) => p.filename);
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Capture Sort',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
+      share_token: 'capsort-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      require_password: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => { await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).del(); });
+
+  test('the fixture really does put three storage classes in one column', async () => {
+    expect(['sqlite3', 'better-sqlite3']).toContain(db.client.config.client);
+    await addPhoto('m.jpg', managed('2026-06-03T01:15:00Z'), '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('e.jpg', '2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('n.jpg', null, '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
+
+    const rows = await db.raw('select filename, typeof(captured_at) as t from photos order by filename');
+    const byName = Object.fromEntries((rows.rows || rows).map((r) => [r.filename, r.t]));
+    // Exactly the mixture that made COALESCE meaningless.
+    expect(byName).toEqual({ 'm.jpg': 'integer', 'e.jpg': 'text', 'n.jpg': 'null' });
+  });
+
+  test('a managed EXIF date does not outrank an earlier one stored as text', async () => {
+    // The pre-existing failure, reachable with managed photos alone: integer
+    // beat text regardless of the dates, so this came back exactly reversed.
+    await addPhoto('managed-2027.jpg', managed('2027-12-31T00:00:00Z'), '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('external-2020.jpg', '2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
+
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['external-2020.jpg', 'managed-2027.jpg']);
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('desc')).toEqual(['managed-2027.jpg', 'external-2020.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  test('a photo with no capture date sorts by its upload time, not ahead of everything', async () => {
+    await addPhoto('has-exif-2027.jpg', managed('2027-12-31T00:00:00Z'), '2027-12-31 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('no-exif-2020.jpg', null, '2020-01-01 00:00:00');
+
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['no-exif-2020.jpg', 'has-exif-2027.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  test('an ISO capture time and a fallback upload time compare by clock, not by separator', async () => {
+    // Same day: 'T' vs ' ' decided this before, so 01:15 sorted after 23:00.
+    await addPhoto('iso-0115.jpg', '2026-06-03T01:15:00.000Z', '2026-06-03 05:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('fallback-2300.jpg', null, '2026-06-03 23:00:00');
+
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['iso-0115.jpg', 'fallback-2300.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  test('an epoch-integer uploaded_at is compared as a date, not as its digits', async () => {
+    // uploaded_at is not always text either: a legacy archive restore leaves
+    // epoch milliseconds in it (a .picpeak restore from an install that stored them that way).
+    // Reading that with substr() would have compared the string '1830297600000'
+    // against '2020-01-01 00:00:00', putting the 2028 row first.
+    await addPhoto('epoch-upload-2028.jpg', null, new Date('2028-01-01T00:00:00Z').getTime());
+    await addPhoto('captured-2020.jpg', managed('2020-01-01T00:00:00Z'), '2020-01-01 00:00:00');
+
+    const [row] = await db.raw('select typeof(uploaded_at) as t from photos where filename = \'epoch-upload-2028.jpg\'');
+    expect((row.t || row).toString()).toBe('integer');
+
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['captured-2020.jpg', 'epoch-upload-2028.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  test('all three storage classes order together correctly', async () => {
+    await addPhoto('c-managed-2026-08.jpg', managed('2026-08-15T12:00:00Z'), '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('a-external-2026-06.jpg', '2026-06-03T01:15:00.000Z', '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('d-fallback-2026-09.jpg', null, '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
+    await addPhoto('b-managed-2026-07.jpg', managed('2026-07-04T09:30:00Z'), '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
+
+    expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual([
+      'a-external-2026-06.jpg',
+      'b-managed-2026-07.jpg',
+      'c-managed-2026-08.jpg',
+      'd-fallback-2026-09.jpg',
+    ]);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/passwordStrengthDos.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/**
+ * POST /api/auth/password-strength is unauthenticated and feeds its body into
+ * zxcvbn, whose matching is superlinear and runs synchronously on the event
+ * loop. Behind express.json({ limit: '50mb' }) that made a single request a
+ * whole-process denial of service: measured on this codebase, 1,000 characters
+ * blocked for ~5 seconds and 5,000 did not return in two minutes.
+ *
+ * The control is the length cap inside validatePassword(), so it holds for
+ * every caller. These tests pin the cap itself rather than the route, and use
+ * a wall-clock ceiling that only an unbounded zxcvbn call can breach.
+ */
+const { validatePassword, MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH } = require('../../src/utils/passwordValidation');
+
+describe('password validation length cap (zxcvbn DoS)', () => {
+  it('rejects an over-length password without doing superlinear work', () => {
+    const huge = 'aA1!'.repeat(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH); // 4x the cap
+    const started = Date.now();
+    const result = validatePassword(huge);
+    const elapsed = Date.now() - started;
+
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(result.errors.join(' ')).toMatch(/at most 128 characters/);
+    // Unbounded, this input would not return for minutes.
+    expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(250);
+  });
+
+  it('is bounded at the cap itself, the worst input it will still analyse', () => {
+    const atCap = 'aA1!'.repeat(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH / 4);
+    expect(atCap).toHaveLength(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+
+    // 128 was chosen so the worst input the validator will still analyse costs
+    // about as much as an ordinary request (~41ms measured); 512 cost 1.4s.
+    const started = Date.now();
+    validatePassword(atCap);
+    expect(Date.now() - started).toBeLessThan(1000);
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts an ordinary strong password', () => {
+    const result = validatePassword('Tr0ub4dour&3-horse-battery');
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('does not spin when a caller asks for a length the cap forbids', async () => {
+    // Codex review. generateSecurePassword retried by recursing on any invalid
+    // candidate, so the new cap made every candidate invalid for length > 128
+    // and turned the call into unbounded recursion. It now refuses up front,
+    // and the retry loop is bounded.
+    const { generateSecurePassword } = require('../../src/utils/passwordValidation');
+
+    expect(generateSecurePassword({ length: 16 })).toHaveLength(16);
+    expect(generateSecurePassword({ length: MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH }))
+      .toHaveLength(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+    expect(() => generateSecurePassword({ length: MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH + 1 }))
+      .toThrow(/at most 128/);
+  });
+
+  it('does not echo the rejected password back in the error body', async () => {
+    // Codex review round 2. express-validator's errors.array() carries the
+    // submitted `value`, so the 400 for an oversized password returned the
+    // password itself -- reflecting a credential, and re-allocating up to the
+    // 50mb body limit on an unauthenticated endpoint, which partly undid the
+    // DoS fix this branch exists for.
+    const src = require('fs').readFileSync(
+      require('path').join(__dirname, '../../src/routes/auth.js'), 'utf8');
+
+    // No route may hand errors.array() straight to the response.
+    expect(src).not.toMatch(/errors:\s*errors\.array\(\)/);
+    // ...and the shared helper that replaces it must drop `value`.
+    const helper = require('fs').readFileSync(
+      require('path').join(__dirname, '../../src/utils/routeHelpers.js'), 'utf8');
+    expect(helper).toMatch(/safeValidationErrors\s*=\s*\(errors\)\s*=>\s*errors\.array\(\)\.map\(\(\{ value, \.\.\.rest \}\)/);
+  });
+
+  it('applies the cap through the context wrapper too', async () => {
+    const { validatePasswordInContext } = require('../../src/utils/passwordValidation');
+    const huge = 'aA1!'.repeat(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+    const result = await validatePasswordInContext(huge, 'admin', {});
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/publicContracts.test.js

@@ -25,14 +25,18 @@ process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
 fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
 process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'crm-route-test-secret';
 
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
 const request = require('supertest');
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, createPublicToken, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
 const tokenGuards = require('../../src/utils/publicTokenGuards');
+const { errorHandler } = require('../../src/middleware/errorHandler');
 
 describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
   let db;
   let cleanup;
   let app;
+  let appWithErrorHandler;
   let customerId;
   let contractId;
 
@@ -51,6 +55,17 @@ describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
     contractId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
 
     app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/contracts', require('../../src/routes/publicContracts'));
+
+    // A second app instance wired to the REAL production error handler
+    // (buildRouteApp's is a simplified stand-in that only reads
+    // err.statusCode/err.status, which a bare MulterError doesn't set).
+    // Used below to verify the actual 4xx contract end-to-end, not just
+    // that multer aborted the request.
+    appWithErrorHandler = express();
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(express.json());
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(cookieParser());
+    appWithErrorHandler.use('/api/public/contracts', require('../../src/routes/publicContracts'));
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(errorHandler);
   }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
@@ -131,6 +146,40 @@ describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
         .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
       expect(res.status).toBe(404);
     });
+
+    // CVE-2026-82333 regression (#1374 follow-up): multer 2.3.0 added an
+    // opt-in `fieldArrayIndexLimit` that must be set to actually close the
+    // field-parser DoS — the version bump alone does nothing. This route is
+    // unauthenticated (token-in-URL only), so it's the sharpest place to
+    // prove a crafted request with an oversized array-index field name
+    // (`evil[999999999]`) is rejected rather than accepted or left to hang.
+    it('rejects a multipart request with an oversized array-index field name', async () => {
+      const token = await createPublicToken(db, 'contract_action_tokens', {
+        contract_id: contractId,
+      });
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/public/contracts/${token}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+        .field('evil[999999999]', 'x')
+        .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+      // multer aborts the request before the handler runs; buildRouteApp's
+      // generic error handler falls back to 500 for a bare MulterError
+      // (see appWithErrorHandler test below for the real 4xx contract), so
+      // here we only assert the upload was NOT accepted/processed.
+      expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+      expect(res.body.error).not.toBe(undefined);
+    });
+
+    it('maps the oversized array-index rejection to a 400 through the real error handler', async () => {
+      const token = await createPublicToken(db, 'contract_action_tokens', {
+        contract_id: contractId,
+      });
+      const res = await request(appWithErrorHandler)
+        .post(`/api/public/contracts/${token}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+        .field('evil[999999999]', 'x')
+        .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.code).toBe('VALIDATION_ERROR');
+    });
   });
 
   describe('GET /:token/pdf', () => {

backend/__tests__/routes/restorePathAllowlist.test.js

@@ -22,29 +22,38 @@ process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restorepath-test-secret';
 
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
 
+// `bootCrmDb()` hands back the process-wide `db` singleton (module cache —
+// see its own comment), so it must only be called ONCE per test file: a
+// second call re-runs migrations against the same connection, and the first
+// call's `cleanup()` (db.destroy()) would tear down the connection both
+// describe blocks below share. Boot once at file scope; each describe below
+// only touches app_settings / env vars, never the connection lifecycle.
+let db; let cleanup; let checkRestorePathsAllowed;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  await seedMinimal(db);
+  ({ checkRestorePathsAllowed } = require('../../src/routes/adminRestore')._internal);
+}, 120000);
+
+afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+async function setBackupSetting(key, value) {
+  const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).first();
+  if (existing) {
+    await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(value) });
+  } else {
+    await db('app_settings').insert({
+      setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'backup',
+    });
+  }
+}
+
 describe('restore path allowlist (GHSA-fw4c)', () => {
-  let db; let cleanup; let checkRestorePathsAllowed;
-
   beforeAll(async () => {
-    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
-    await seedMinimal(db);
-
     // Configure a backup root so the allowlist is actually active.
-    for (const [key, value] of [['backup_destination_path', '/backup']]) {
-      const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).first();
-      if (existing) {
-        await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(value) });
-      } else {
-        await db('app_settings').insert({
-          setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'backup',
-        });
-      }
-    }
-
-    ({ checkRestorePathsAllowed } = require('../../src/routes/adminRestore')._internal);
-  }, 120000);
-
-  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+    await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
+  });
 
   it('allows the wizard\'s source TYPE tokens', async () => {
     for (const source of ['local', 's3', 'upload']) {
@@ -84,3 +93,89 @@ describe('restore path allowlist (GHSA-fw4c)', () => {
     expect(err).toBeNull();
   });
 });
+
+/**
+ * GHSA-xfvx-j447-732c: `checkRestorePathsAllowed` constrained the top-level
+ * `source`/`manifestPath` request fields (GHSA-fw4c above), but never looked
+ * INSIDE the manifest itself. `manifest.database.backup_file` — handed
+ * straight to restoreService's candidate resolution and eventually
+ * interpolated into `sqlite3 .restore '<path>'` — was unchecked, so an
+ * absolute path there could point the restore at an arbitrary file even
+ * though `source`/`manifestPath` both passed containment.
+ */
+describe('restore path allowlist — manifest database.backup_file containment (GHSA-xfvx)', () => {
+  let tmpRoot;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
+
+    tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-xfvx-manifest-'));
+    // Additional allowed root via the documented escape hatch — keeps this
+    // describe block's fixtures out of the shared '/backup' root above.
+    process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = tmpRoot;
+  });
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  const writeManifest = (name, databaseSection) => {
+    const manifestPath = path.join(tmpRoot, name);
+    fs.writeFileSync(manifestPath, JSON.stringify({
+      manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
+      backup: { type: 'full' },
+      system: { platform: 'linux' },
+      application: { version: '1.0.0' },
+      files: { count: 0, manifest: [] },
+      database: databaseSection,
+      verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: null },
+    }));
+    return manifestPath;
+  };
+
+  it('rejects a manifest whose database.backup_file is an absolute path outside every configured root', async () => {
+    const manifestPath = writeManifest('evil-1.json', { backup_file: '/etc/passwd' });
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
+    expect(err).toMatch(/database\.backup_file must be inside a configured backup location/i);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a manifest whose database.backup_file is an absolute path inside a configured root', async () => {
+    const dbFile = path.join(tmpRoot, 'database', 'picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql.gz');
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(dbFile), { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(dbFile, 'not a real sqlite dump, just a fixture');
+    const manifestPath = writeManifest('legit-1.json', { backup_file: dbFile });
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
+    expect(err).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('does not choke on a manifest whose database.backup_file is a legitimate relative path', async () => {
+    // Relative candidates are resolved against restoreService's own
+    // `backupPath` (which this route-level pre-check doesn't have — it only
+    // sees `source`/`manifestPath`), so this layer intentionally defers
+    // relative-path containment to restoreService.performDatabaseRestore
+    // and must not false-positive here.
+    const manifestPath = writeManifest('legit-2.json', { backup_file: 'database/picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql.gz' });
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
+    expect(err).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects everything when no backup location is configured at all (fail closed, not fail open)', async () => {
+    // Simulate an install that never had backup_destination_path /
+    // backup_manifest_path seeded/configured, and isn't using the
+    // RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS escape hatch either.
+    const savedRoots = process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    await db('app_settings').whereIn('setting_key', ['backup_destination_path', 'backup_manifest_path']).del();
+
+    try {
+      const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+        source: '/backup/run-1', manifestPath: '/backup/run-1/manifest.json',
+      });
+      expect(err).toMatch(/no backup location is configured/i);
+    } finally {
+      process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = savedRoots;
+      await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
+    }
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/downloadZipRegenConcurrency.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/**
+ * Background zip rebuilds are capped (#1399).
+ *
+ * invalidateAll() invalidates every event holding a cached zip, and each
+ * invalidate() arms its own debounce timer in the same tick — so they all fire
+ * together. Every build opens its own storage reads, so a settings change
+ * across 25 events was enough to exhaust the S3 agent pool and stall uploads,
+ * thumbnails and gallery reads until the burst drained.
+ *
+ * The cap is on the BACKGROUND path only: a guest waiting on a download must
+ * not be queued behind a settings-change burst.
+ */
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn() }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+  info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
+const service = require('../../src/services/downloadZipService');
+
+const flush = () => new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
+
+describe('downloadZipService background regen concurrency (#1399)', () => {
+  let peak;
+  let inFlight;
+  let release;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    // setImmediate must stay real: the flush() helper below rides on it, and
+    // jest's modern fake timers mock it too.
+    jest.useFakeTimers({ doNotFake: ['setImmediate'] });
+    peak = 0;
+    inFlight = 0;
+    release = [];
+    service.regenActive = 0;
+    service.regenWaiters = [];
+    service.debounceTimers.clear();
+    service.activeBuilds.clear();
+
+    jest.spyOn(service, 'generateZip').mockImplementation(() => {
+      inFlight += 1;
+      peak = Math.max(peak, inFlight);
+      return new Promise((resolve) => {
+        release.push(() => { inFlight -= 1; resolve(); });
+      });
+    });
+    jest.spyOn(service, '_cleanup').mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    jest.useRealTimers();
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  it('never runs more than two rebuilds at once, however many fire together', async () => {
+    const rows = Array.from({ length: 12 }, (_, i) => ({ id: i + 1 }));
+    db.mockReturnValue({
+      whereNotNull: () => ({ select: () => Promise.resolve(rows) }),
+    });
+
+    await service.invalidateAll();
+    // Every debounce timer was armed in the same tick — fire them all.
+    jest.runAllTimers();
+    await flush();
+
+    expect(peak).toBe(2);
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it('starts the next rebuild as each one finishes', async () => {
+    const rows = Array.from({ length: 5 }, (_, i) => ({ id: i + 1 }));
+    db.mockReturnValue({
+      whereNotNull: () => ({ select: () => Promise.resolve(rows) }),
+    });
+
+    await service.invalidateAll();
+    jest.runAllTimers();
+    await flush();
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+
+    release.shift()();
+    await flush();
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+    expect(peak).toBe(2);
+
+    while (release.length) { release.shift()(); await flush(); }
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(5);
+    expect(peak).toBe(2);
+  });
+
+  it('does not queue a foreground download behind the burst', async () => {
+    const rows = Array.from({ length: 6 }, (_, i) => ({ id: i + 1 }));
+    db.mockReturnValue({
+      whereNotNull: () => ({ select: () => Promise.resolve(rows) }),
+    });
+
+    await service.invalidateAll();
+    jest.runAllTimers();
+    await flush();
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+
+    // A guest asking for a zip right now calls generateZip directly. It must
+    // not park behind the two rebuilds already holding the slots.
+    service.generateZip(999);
+    await flush();
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledWith(999);
+    expect(inFlight).toBe(3);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves the queue empty once every rebuild has run', async () => {
+    const rows = Array.from({ length: 5 }, (_, i) => ({ id: i + 1 }));
+    db.mockReturnValue({
+      whereNotNull: () => ({ select: () => Promise.resolve(rows) }),
+    });
+
+    await service.invalidateAll();
+    jest.runAllTimers();
+    await flush();
+    expect(service.regenWaiters.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+    while (release.length) { release.shift()(); await flush(); }
+    // Nothing parked, nothing counted as running — no slot leaked on the way
+    // through, which is what would quietly wedge the next burst.
+    expect(service.regenWaiters).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(service.regenActive).toBe(0);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/downloadZipSocketLeak.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/**
+ * A failed pre-zip build must not leave storage reads open.
+ *
+ * The builder opened one storage read per photo and handed the raw stream to
+ * archiver. archiver drains its queue one entry at a time, so on an S3 backend
+ * every photo beyond the one being written parked a socket with a full receive
+ * buffer, and the error path (a source stream dying, or a photo upload
+ * invalidating the build) walked away from all of them. archiver's abort()
+ * does not touch the source streams, and the AWS SDK arms its socket timeout
+ * on a 3s delay then clears it once the response headers arrive, so nothing
+ * ever reclaimed those sockets. On a live server 43 of the 50 pooled sockets
+ * ended up stuck for days and photo uploads stopped completing.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-zipleak-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'zipleak-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-zipleak-storage-'));
+
+const { Readable } = require('stream');
+
+const PHOTO_COUNT = 6;
+const MAX_INFLIGHT_READS = 2;
+
+// One storage read. It never ends on its own, which is what a large photo
+// looks like to the builder: the bytes only move while archiver pulls them.
+class StoredObject extends Readable {
+  constructor(key, failAfterReads, chunks) {
+    super();
+    this.key = key;
+    this.failAfterReads = failAfterReads;
+    this.chunks = chunks;
+    this.reads = 0;
+  }
+
+  _read() {
+    this.reads += 1;
+    if (this.failAfterReads && this.reads > this.failAfterReads) {
+      // What a dropped connection to S3 looks like in Node.
+      this.destroy(new Error('aborted'));
+      return;
+    }
+    this.push(this.reads > this.chunks ? null : Buffer.alloc(4096, 1));
+  }
+}
+
+const reads = { opened: [], live: 0, peak: 0 };
+const failingKey = { value: null };
+const onOpen = { fn: null };
+// A read only finishes when the build pulls the whole object. Photos big
+// enough to matter never finish inside one archiver turn, and a stream that
+// ends on its own would be auto-destroyed and hide the leak.
+const objectChunks = { value: Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY };
+
+function openStoredObject(key) {
+  const stream = new StoredObject(key, key === failingKey.value ? 1 : 0, objectChunks.value);
+  reads.opened.push(stream);
+  reads.live += 1;
+  if (reads.live > reads.peak) reads.peak = reads.live;
+  let settled = false;
+  const settle = () => { if (!settled) { settled = true; reads.live -= 1; } };
+  stream.once('end', settle);
+  stream.once('close', settle);
+  if (onOpen.fn) onOpen.fn(reads.opened.length);
+  return stream;
+}
+
+const mockStorage = {
+  kind: () => 's3',
+  get: jest.fn(async (key) => openStoredObject(key)),
+  getToFile: jest.fn(async () => undefined),
+  putFromFile: jest.fn(async () => undefined),
+  stat: jest.fn(async () => ({ size: 1234, mtime: new Date() })),
+  delete: jest.fn(async () => undefined),
+  exists: jest.fn(async () => true),
+};
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/storage', () => ({
+  getStorage: () => mockStorage,
+  initStorage: async () => mockStorage,
+}));
+
+// Nothing to watermark, so the builder takes the stream-from-storage branch,
+// which is the one that holds sockets. (This branch has no rendition step —
+// the resize/watermark split that main mocks out here does not exist yet.)
+jest.mock('../../src/services/watermarkService', () => ({
+  getWatermarkSettings: jest.fn(async () => ({ enabled: false })),
+  applyWatermark: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const downloadZipService = require('../../src/services/downloadZipService');
+
+describe('pre-zip build releases its storage reads', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let eventId;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'zipleak',
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Zip Leak',
+      event_date: '2026-09-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: '/gallery/zipleak/s',
+      share_token: 'zipleak-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      require_password: 0,
+      allow_downloads: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    for (let i = 0; i < PHOTO_COUNT; i += 1) {
+      await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename: `photo-${i}.jpg`,
+        path: `zipleak/photo-${i}.jpg`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        source_origin: 'managed',
+        mime_type: 'image/jpeg',
+        visibility: 'visible',
+        uploaded_at: new Date(Date.now() - i * 1000).toISOString(),
+      });
+    }
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    reads.opened = [];
+    reads.live = 0;
+    reads.peak = 0;
+    failingKey.value = null;
+    onOpen.fn = null;
+    objectChunks.value = Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY;
+    mockStorage.get.mockClear();
+    downloadZipService.versions.clear();
+    downloadZipService.activeBuilds.clear();
+  });
+
+  it('destroys every open read when a source stream dies mid-build', async () => {
+    // The oldest photo is written first, so failing it strands the rest.
+    failingKey.value = 'events/active/zipleak/photo-0.jpg';
+
+    const result = await downloadZipService.generateZip(eventId);
+
+    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
+    expect(reads.opened.length).toBeGreaterThan(1);
+    const stranded = reads.opened.filter((s) => !s.destroyed);
+    expect(stranded.map((s) => s.key)).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('destroys every open read when an upload invalidates the build', async () => {
+    // What adminPhotos does on every upload, delete and bulk edit, landing
+    // while the archive is half built.
+    onOpen.fn = (count) => {
+      if (count !== 2) return;
+      downloadZipService.invalidate(eventId);
+      // invalidate() also schedules a rebuild; this test is not about that.
+      clearTimeout(downloadZipService.debounceTimers.get(eventId));
+      downloadZipService.debounceTimers.delete(eventId);
+    };
+
+    const result = await downloadZipService.generateZip(eventId);
+
+    expect(result).toEqual({ success: false, error: 'Build invalidated' });
+    expect(reads.opened.filter((s) => !s.destroyed).map((s) => s.key)).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('never holds more storage reads open than the build needs', async () => {
+    objectChunks.value = 8;
+
+    const result = await downloadZipService.generateZip(eventId);
+
+    expect(result.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockStorage.get).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(PHOTO_COUNT);
+    expect(reads.peak).toBeLessThanOrEqual(MAX_INFLIGHT_READS);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/ensureHeroImage.external.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/**
+ * ensureHeroImage must work for external/reference photos (#1166 follow-up).
+ *
+ * resolvePhotoStorageKey returns null for external photos by design, and that
+ * null used to be handed straight to withLocalCopy, which throws — so the hero
+ * route caught it and redirected to the full ORIGINAL. #1078 fixed exactly
+ * this shape for ensurePreviewImage and nobody carried it across.
+ *
+ * It only became visible when the Story hero started asking for hero_url
+ * instead of photo.url: on a managed gallery that is a real saving, on a
+ * reference-mode gallery it quietly changed nothing.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+const EXTERNAL_ROOT = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-hero-ext-${process.pid}`);
+process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = EXTERNAL_ROOT;
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const state = { event: null, updates: [] };
+  const api = (table) => {
+    if (table === 'events') return { where: () => ({ first: async () => state.event }) };
+    if (table === 'photos') {
+      return { where: (criteria) => ({ update: async (values) => { state.updates.push({ criteria, values }); return 1; } }) };
+    }
+    throw new Error(`unexpected table in test: ${table}`);
+  };
+  api.__state = state;
+  return { db: api };
+});
+
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
+
+const EVENT = { id: 7, slug: 'nas-wedding', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'weddings/2026-08' };
+
+async function writeSourceJpeg(absPath, { width = 2400, height = 1600 } = {}) {
+  await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(absPath), { recursive: true });
+  const buf = Buffer.alloc(width * height * 3);
+  for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) buf[i] = (i * 7) % 256;
+  await sharp(buf, { raw: { width, height, channels: 3 } }).jpeg({ quality: 90 }).toFile(absPath);
+}
+
+describe('ensureHeroImage — external sources', () => {
+  let storage; let storageRoot; let imageProcessor;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-hero-store-'));
+    storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
+    await storage.init();
+    storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+    delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+    await fs.mkdir(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path), { recursive: true });
+  }, 30000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    await fs.rm(EXTERNAL_ROOT, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(() => { db.__state.event = EVENT; db.__state.updates = []; });
+
+  it.each(['external', 'reference'])('generates a hero for a %s photo off the mount', async (sourceOrigin) => {
+    const name = `${sourceOrigin}-hero.jpg`;
+    await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, name));
+    const photo = {
+      id: sourceOrigin === 'external' ? 301 : 302,
+      event_id: EVENT.id,
+      source_origin: sourceOrigin,
+      // Root-relative, as stored since #1163: external_relpath is resolved
+      // from EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, not from event.external_path. The base-
+      // relative form this fixture used to carry stopped resolving the moment
+      // that landed, and ensureHeroImage returned null.
+      external_relpath: path.join(EVENT.external_path, name),
+      filename: name,
+      hero_path: null,
+    };
+
+    const key = await imageProcessor.ensureHeroImage(photo);
+
+    // The regression: this returned null and the route redirected to the
+    // full original.
+    expect(key).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
+    // Per-photo basename, so two events sharing a NAS filename cannot clobber
+    // each other — same rule as the preview tier.
+    expect(key).toContain(`ext${photo.id}_`);
+    expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([{ criteria: { id: photo.id }, values: { hero_path: key } }]);
+  });
+
+  it('returns null rather than throwing when the external source is gone', async () => {
+    const photo = {
+      id: 303, event_id: EVENT.id, source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: path.join(EVENT.external_path, 'not-on-the-mount.jpg'), filename: 'not-on-the-mount.jpg', hero_path: null,
+    };
+
+    await expect(imageProcessor.ensureHeroImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
+    expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('returns null for a reference-mode row with no source_origin', async () => {
+    // Mode falls back to the event's, so resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null.
+    // That used to reach withLocalCopy and throw out of the function.
+    const photo = {
+      id: 304, event_id: EVENT.id, source_origin: null, external_relpath: null,
+      filename: 'orphan.jpg', path: 'nas-wedding/individual/orphan.jpg', hero_path: null,
+    };
+
+    await expect(imageProcessor.ensureHeroImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/ensurePreviewImage.external.test.js

@@ -91,15 +91,16 @@ describe('ensurePreviewImage — external/reference sources (#1078)', () => {
   it.each(['external', 'reference'])(
     'generates a downscaled preview for a %s photo off the media mount',
     async (sourceOrigin) => {
-      const relpath = `${sourceOrigin}-shot.jpg`;
-      await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
+      const name = `${sourceOrigin}-shot.jpg`;
+      await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, name));
 
       const photo = {
         id: sourceOrigin === 'external' ? 101 : 102,
         event_id: EVENT.id,
         source_origin: sourceOrigin,
-        external_relpath: relpath,
-        filename: relpath,
+        // Relative to the media ROOT, not to event.external_path (#1163).
+        external_relpath: path.join(EVENT.external_path, name),
+        filename: name,
         preview_path: null,
       };
 
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ describe('ensurePreviewImage — external/reference sources (#1078)', () => {
 
       // Per-photo basename so two events referencing the same NAS filename
       // can't clobber each other's preview.
-      expect(key).toBe(`previews/preview_ext${photo.id}_${relpath}`);
+      expect(key).toBe(`previews/preview_ext${photo.id}_${name}`);
       expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
 
       const meta = await sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key)).metadata();
@@ -124,14 +125,14 @@ describe('ensurePreviewImage — external/reference sources (#1078)', () => {
   );
 
   it('short-circuits on an existing valid preview instead of regenerating', async () => {
-    const relpath = 'already-previewed.jpg';
-    await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
+    const name = 'already-previewed.jpg';
+    await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, name));
     const photo = {
       id: 103,
       event_id: EVENT.id,
       source_origin: 'external',
-      external_relpath: relpath,
-      filename: relpath,
+      external_relpath: path.join(EVENT.external_path, name),
+      filename: name,
       preview_path: null,
     };
 
@@ -179,19 +180,19 @@ describe('ensurePreviewImage — external/reference sources (#1078)', () => {
     // Pins why the /regenerate-previews caller must select source_origin:
     // an external row missing that column takes the managed path, where
     // resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null and generation is skipped.
-    const relpath = 'column-starved.jpg';
-    await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
+    const name = 'column-starved.jpg';
+    await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, name));
     const starved = {
       id: 106,
       event_id: EVENT.id,
-      external_relpath: relpath,
+      external_relpath: path.join(EVENT.external_path, name),
       preview_path: null,
     };
 
     await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(starved)).resolves.toBeNull();
     await expect(
-      imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage({ ...starved, source_origin: 'external', filename: relpath })
-    ).resolves.toBe(`previews/preview_ext106_${relpath}`);
+      imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage({ ...starved, source_origin: 'external', filename: name })
+    ).resolves.toBe(`previews/preview_ext106_${name}`);
   });
 
   it('still routes managed photos through the storage backend', async () => {

backend/__tests__/services/externalPhotoDedupe.restore.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/**
+ * A pre-#1162 backup must still restore (#1162 review).
+ *
+ * `replaceAllTables` suspends FOREIGN KEY enforcement for the load — Postgres
+ * via `session_replication_role = replica`, SQLite via `defer_foreign_keys` —
+ * but neither of those suspends a UNIQUE index. An archive taken before
+ * migration 186 carries exactly the duplicate photo rows that migration
+ * removes, so the batchInsert would hit the new index and roll the entire
+ * restore back, after every table had already been emptied.
+ *
+ * These pin the drop → load → dedupe → recreate sequence the restore now
+ * performs, and the failure it exists to prevent.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const {
+  dedupeExternalPhotos,
+  createExternalRelpathIndex,
+  dropExternalRelpathIndex,
+} = require('../../src/services/externalPhotoDedupe');
+
+describe('restoring an archive that predates the unique index (#1162)', () => {
+  let knex; let tmpDir;
+
+  // What a pre-186 archive's photos.ndjson holds for a racing import: the same
+  // file twice, sub-millisecond apart.
+  const ARCHIVE_ROWS = [
+    { id: 1, event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    { id: 2, event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+    { id: 3, event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/b.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
+  ];
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restore-dedupe-'));
+    knex = require('knex')({
+      client: 'sqlite3',
+      connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
+      useNullAsDefault: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (knex) await knex.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
+    await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
+      t.integer('id').primary();
+      t.integer('event_id');
+      t.string('external_relpath');
+      t.string('thumbnail_path');
+      t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
+    });
+    await createExternalRelpathIndex(knex);
+  });
+
+  it('would abort the whole restore without the drop', async () => {
+    // The regression, stated directly: this is what the target instance does
+    // today when handed a legacy archive.
+    await expect(knex.batchInsert('photos', ARCHIVE_ROWS, 100)).rejects.toThrow(/unique/i);
+  });
+
+  it('loads, dedupes and comes back constrained', async () => {
+    await dropExternalRelpathIndex(knex);
+    await knex.batchInsert('photos', ARCHIVE_ROWS, 100);
+
+    const removed = await dedupeExternalPhotos(knex);
+    await createExternalRelpathIndex(knex);
+
+    expect(removed).toBe(1);
+    expect((await knex('photos').orderBy('id')).map((r) => r.external_relpath))
+      .toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg', 'Trip/b.jpg']);
+    // The target must not be left unprotected by the restore that dropped it.
+    await expect(
+      knex('photos').insert({ id: 9, event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/b.jpg', source_origin: 'external' })
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/unique/i);
+  });
+
+  it('is a no-op for an archive that has no duplicates', async () => {
+    await dropExternalRelpathIndex(knex);
+    await knex.batchInsert('photos', ARCHIVE_ROWS.slice(1), 100);
+
+    expect(await dedupeExternalPhotos(knex)).toBe(0);
+    await expect(createExternalRelpathIndex(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/generatePreviewImage.formats.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/**
+ * The preview tier must not destroy what it is previewing.
+ *
+ * generatePreviewImage encoded JPEG unconditionally. JPEG has no alpha channel
+ * and no second frame, so a transparent PNG came back flattened onto a solid
+ * background and an animated GIF came back as its first frame — for every
+ * consumer of this tier, not just the lightbox: the slideshow (#1015), admin
+ * previews, and the face avatars that read it as a whole-frame rendition.
+ *
+ * Driven against real Sharp output, because the whole question is what is in
+ * the encoded bytes.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+
+/** A 2x2 GIF89a with two frames and a NETSCAPE loop block. */
+const ANIMATED_GIF = Buffer.from([
+  0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38, 0x39, 0x61,
+  0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00,
+  0xF0, 0x00, 0x00,
+  0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+  0x21, 0xFF, 0x0B, 0x4E, 0x45, 0x54, 0x53, 0x43, 0x41, 0x50, 0x45,
+  0x32, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  0x21, 0xF9, 0x04, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  0x2C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00,
+  0x02, 0x02, 0x44, 0x01, 0x00,
+  0x21, 0xF9, 0x04, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  0x2C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00,
+  0x02, 0x02, 0x4C, 0x01, 0x00,
+  0x3B,
+]);
+
+// No width-tier case here: the responsive `?w=` renditions (#1095) are
+// main-only, so this branch has a single canonical preview per photo.
+describe('generatePreviewImage encodes for the source (#1166 follow-up)', () => {
+  let storage; let storageRoot; let srcDir; let imageProcessor;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-prevfmt-store-'));
+    srcDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-prevfmt-src-'));
+    storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
+    await storage.init();
+    storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+
+    delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+  }, 30000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    await fs.rm(srcDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  const outMeta = async (key) => sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key)).metadata();
+
+  it('keeps transparency, as WebP, for a PNG with alpha', async () => {
+    const src = path.join(srcDir, 'logo.png');
+    await sharp({
+      create: { width: 800, height: 600, channels: 4, background: { r: 0, g: 0, b: 0, alpha: 0 } },
+    }).png().toFile(src);
+
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true });
+
+    expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_logo.webp');
+    const meta = await outMeta(key);
+    expect(meta.format).toBe('webp');
+    // The regression, stated directly: JPEG would have flattened this.
+    expect(meta.hasAlpha).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps every frame, as WebP, for an animated GIF', async () => {
+    const src = path.join(srcDir, 'wave.gif');
+    // Hand-assembled rather than produced by Sharp: writing a multi-page image
+    // needs pageHeight threaded through the pipeline, and a fixture that
+    // silently comes out single-page would make this test pass for the wrong
+    // reason. 2x2, two frames, black then white.
+    await fs.writeFile(src, ANIMATED_GIF);
+    // Precondition: the fixture really is animated.
+    expect((await sharp(src, { animated: true }).metadata()).pages).toBe(2);
+
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true });
+
+    expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_wave.webp');
+    const meta = await sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key), { animated: true }).metadata();
+    expect(meta.format).toBe('webp');
+    // The regression, stated directly: JPEG kept only the first frame.
+    expect(meta.pages).toBe(2);
+  });
+
+  it('still writes plain JPEG for an ordinary photo', async () => {
+    // The common path must not pay for the two cases above: JPEG is smaller
+    // than WebP at the quality this tier uses, and every existing preview is
+    // one.
+    const src = path.join(srcDir, 'shot.jpg');
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 2400, height: 1600, channels: 3, background: { r: 90, g: 90, b: 90 } } })
+      .jpeg().toFile(src);
+
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true });
+
+    expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_shot.jpg');
+    const meta = await outMeta(key);
+    expect(meta.format).toBe('jpeg');
+    // 2400x1600 capped at the 1920 long edge, aspect preserved — unchanged.
+    expect([meta.width, meta.height]).toEqual([1920, 1280]);
+  });
+
+  it('names the output for what it wrote, not for the source', async () => {
+    // A PNG source used to produce `preview_x.png` holding JPEG bytes. Harmless
+    // while the route hard-coded image/jpeg; wrong once the encoding varies,
+    // and the route now reads the extension.
+    const src = path.join(srcDir, 'opaque.png');
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 400, height: 400, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 2, b: 3 } } })
+      .png().toFile(src);
+
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true });
+
+    expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_opaque.jpg');
+    expect((await outMeta(key)).format).toBe('jpeg');
+  });
+
+  it('returns null on an unreadable source instead of throwing', async () => {
+    const src = path.join(srcDir, 'not-an-image.jpg');
+    await fs.writeFile(src, 'plain text');
+
+    await expect(imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true })).resolves.toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/imageProcessorOrientation.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/**
+ * EXIF orientation in the gallery-facing generators (#1185).
+ *
+ * sharp decodes the pixels as stored, not as displayed. A photo whose
+ * Orientation tag is not 1 — routine for portrait shots on bodies that tag
+ * rather than rotate the sensor data — therefore resizes from the raw frame
+ * and comes out sideways. The generators then call `.withMetadata(false)`,
+ * which strips the tag from the output, so the browser has no hint left to
+ * correct it either: nothing downstream can recover it.
+ *
+ * The download path (`resizeToBox`) always got this right. These three did
+ * not, which is why the same photo looked correct on download and rotated in
+ * the gallery.
+ *
+ * Every assertion here fails on the unfixed generators.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+// imageProcessor reads its thumbnail settings from app_settings, so without a
+// db the require() alone hangs the run. Same shape the other generator tests
+// use (ensureHeroImage.external.test.js).
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const api = (table) => {
+    if (table === 'app_settings') {
+      return { where: () => ({ whereIn: () => [], first: async () => null }), whereIn: async () => [] };
+    }
+    if (table === 'events') return { where: () => ({ first: async () => null }) };
+    if (table === 'photos') return { where: () => ({ update: async () => 1, first: async () => null }) };
+    return { where: () => ({ first: async () => null }) };
+  };
+  return { db: api };
+});
+
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+
+describe('EXIF orientation in thumbnails, heroes and previews (#1185)', () => {
+  let tmpDir;
+  let imageProcessor;
+  let landscapeTaggedPortrait;
+
+  // 400x200 as stored, Orientation 6 (90° CW) — so it DISPLAYS as 200x400.
+  // This is exactly the shape the reporter's Sony bodies produce: the sensor
+  // data is landscape and the tag carries the rotation.
+  const W = 400;
+  const H = 200;
+
+  let storageRoot;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-orient-'));
+    storageRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    await fs.mkdir(storageRoot, { recursive: true });
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = storageRoot;
+
+    const storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
+    await storage.init();
+    storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+
+    landscapeTaggedPortrait = path.join(tmpDir, 'portrait-tagged.jpg');
+    await sharp({
+      create: { width: W, height: H, channels: 3, background: { r: 120, g: 80, b: 40 } },
+    })
+      .withMetadata({ orientation: 6 })
+      .jpeg()
+      .toFile(landscapeTaggedPortrait);
+
+    delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+  }, 60000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await fs.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  test('the fixture really is stored landscape with a rotation tag', async () => {
+    const m = await sharp(landscapeTaggedPortrait).metadata();
+    expect(m.width).toBe(W);
+    expect(m.height).toBe(H);
+    expect(m.orientation).toBe(6);
+  });
+
+  test('orientedDimensions reports what a viewer sees, not what is stored', async () => {
+    const m = await sharp(landscapeTaggedPortrait).metadata();
+    // Swapped: this is what the grid needs to size a tile, and what the
+    // database should hold.
+    expect(imageProcessor.orientedDimensions(m)).toEqual({ width: H, height: W });
+  });
+
+  test('orientedDimensions leaves an untagged image alone', async () => {
+    const plain = path.join(tmpDir, 'plain.jpg');
+    await sharp({ create: { width: W, height: H, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 2, b: 3 } } })
+      .jpeg().toFile(plain);
+    const m = await sharp(plain).metadata();
+    expect(imageProcessor.orientedDimensions(m)).toEqual({ width: W, height: H });
+  });
+
+  test('orientedDimensions survives metadata it cannot use', () => {
+    expect(imageProcessor.orientedDimensions(null)).toEqual({ width: null, height: null });
+    expect(imageProcessor.orientedDimensions({})).toEqual({ width: null, height: null });
+  });
+
+  test('the thumbnail comes out portrait, not sideways', async () => {
+    const rel = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(landscapeTaggedPortrait, {
+      outputBasename: 'orient-thumb.jpg',
+      regenerate: true,
+    });
+    expect(rel).toBeTruthy();
+
+    const out = await sharp(path.join(storageRoot, rel)).metadata();
+    // Unfixed, this came back wider than tall — the raw frame, resized.
+    expect(out.height).toBeGreaterThan(out.width);
+  });
+
+  test('the preview tier comes out portrait too', async () => {
+    const rel = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(landscapeTaggedPortrait, {
+      outputBasename: 'orient-preview.jpg',
+    });
+    expect(rel).toBeTruthy();
+
+    const out = await sharp(path.join(storageRoot, rel)).metadata();
+    expect(out.height).toBeGreaterThan(out.width);
+  });
+
+  test('the watermarked rendition is oriented too', async () => {
+    // gallery.js serves photos.watermark_path ahead of the original when
+    // branding watermarking is on, so this is the rendition a guest actually
+    // sees — and it went through its own sharp pipeline that nobody had
+    // rotated.
+    const watermarkService = require('../../src/services/watermarkService');
+    const buf = await watermarkService.applyWatermark(landscapeTaggedPortrait, {
+      enabled: true, position: 'bottom-right', opacity: 50, size: 15,
+      // companyName, not text — the SVG branch reads this one, and without it
+      // the service falls through without compositing anything.
+      companyName: 'PicPeak',
+    });
+    expect(Buffer.isBuffer(buf)).toBe(true);
+
+    const out = await sharp(buf).metadata();
+    // 400x200 stored, tagged 6 — so the watermarked output must be portrait.
+    expect(out.height).toBeGreaterThan(out.width);
+  });
+
+  test('the orientation tag is gone from the output, so nothing double-rotates', async () => {
+    // The pixels are corrected now, so a surviving tag would make a viewer
+    // rotate an already-rotated image. withMetadata(false) strips it; this
+    // pins that the two changes agree.
+    const rel = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(landscapeTaggedPortrait, {
+      outputBasename: 'orient-thumb-tag.jpg',
+      regenerate: true,
+    });
+    const out = await sharp(path.join(storageRoot, rel)).metadata();
+    expect(out.orientation === undefined || out.orientation === 1).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/invoiceService.locks.test.js

@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
 }));
 
 const invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
+const emailProcessor = require('../../src/services/emailProcessor');
 
 function resetChains() {
   for (const k of Object.keys(tableChains)) delete tableChains[k];
@@ -261,7 +262,10 @@ describe('invoiceService.releaseForDelivery', () => {
 });
 
 describe('invoiceService.recordPaymentCheckAction', () => {
-  beforeEach(() => resetChains());
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    resetChains();
+    emailProcessor.queueEmail.mockClear();
+  });
 
   it('rejects invalid actions', async () => {
     await expect(invoiceService.recordPaymentCheckAction({
@@ -321,6 +325,71 @@ describe('invoiceService.recordPaymentCheckAction', () => {
       token: 'a'.repeat(64), action: 'partial', amountMinor: 9999,
     })).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
   });
+
+  // GHSA-wg94-f86h-vq68 hardening: every write via this unauthenticated
+  // route notifies the admin. Uses 'paid_full' as the exercised action —
+  // it stays inside markPaid (no workflow-engine / PDF-rendering
+  // dependencies to stub) while still going through the full
+  // recordPaymentCheckAction write path.
+  it('queues an admin notification email after a successful action', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoice_payment_check_tokens')._firstValue = {
+      id: 1, used_at: null,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000),
+    };
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
+      id: 5, invoice_number: 'INV-0005', status: 'overdue',
+      total_amount_minor: 10000, paid_amount_minor: 0, late_fee_amount_minor: 0,
+      customer_account_id: 7, created_by_admin_id: 42,
+      currency: 'CHF', language: 'de', event_id: null,
+    };
+    pickChainFor('admin_users')._firstValue = { id: 42, email: 'admin@example.com', username: 'admin' };
+    pickChainFor('business_profile')._firstValue = null;
+    pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { id: 7, email: 'c@example.com', display_name: 'Test Customer' };
+
+    const result = await invoiceService.recordPaymentCheckAction({
+      token: 'a'.repeat(64), action: 'paid_full', ip: '203.0.113.7',
+    });
+    expect(result).toEqual({ applied: 'paid_full' });
+
+    expect(emailProcessor.queueEmail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    const [, recipientEmail, templateKey, data] = emailProcessor.queueEmail.mock.calls[0];
+    expect(recipientEmail).toBe('admin@example.com');
+    expect(templateKey).toBe('invoice_payment_check_action_recorded');
+    expect(data.invoice_number).toBe('INV-0005');
+    expect(data.action).toBe('paid_full');
+    expect(data.ip).toBe('203.0.113.7');
+  });
+
+  it('does not fail (or roll back) the ledger write when the admin notification fails to send', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoice_payment_check_tokens')._firstValue = {
+      id: 1, used_at: null,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000),
+    };
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
+      id: 5, invoice_number: 'INV-0005', status: 'overdue',
+      total_amount_minor: 10000, paid_amount_minor: 0, late_fee_amount_minor: 0,
+      customer_account_id: 7, created_by_admin_id: 42,
+      currency: 'CHF', language: 'de', event_id: null,
+    };
+    pickChainFor('admin_users')._firstValue = { id: 42, email: 'admin@example.com', username: 'admin' };
+    pickChainFor('business_profile')._firstValue = null;
+    pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { id: 7, email: 'c@example.com', display_name: 'Test Customer' };
+    emailProcessor.queueEmail.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('smtp down'));
+
+    // The write itself (token consumption + markPaid) must still
+    // succeed — the notification is best-effort only.
+    const result = await invoiceService.recordPaymentCheckAction({
+      token: 'a'.repeat(64), action: 'paid_full', ip: '203.0.113.7',
+    });
+    expect(result).toEqual({ applied: 'paid_full' });
+
+    // Token was actually consumed (the real assertion that the write
+    // committed): the mock chain's .update() ran with used_at set.
+    const tokenChain = pickChainFor('invoice_payment_check_tokens');
+    expect(tokenChain.update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ used_at: expect.any(Date), used_action: 'paid_full' }),
+    );
+  });
 });
 
 describe('invoiceService.queuePaymentCheckEmail', () => {
@@ -371,4 +440,35 @@ describe('invoiceService.queuePaymentCheckEmail', () => {
     expect(res.sent).toBe(true);
     expect(res.token).toMatch(/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
   });
+
+  // GHSA-wg94-f86h-vq68 hardening: token TTL shortened from 30 days to 72h.
+  it('mints a token with a ~72h TTL, not the old 30-day window', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
+      id: 1, status: 'overdue',
+      customer_account_id: 5,
+      created_by_admin_id: 42,
+      total_amount_minor: 10000,
+      currency: 'CHF',
+      language: 'de',
+      reminder_level: 0,
+      due_date: '2026-05-01',
+      last_payment_check_at: null,
+      event_id: null,
+    };
+    pickChainFor('admin_users')._firstValue = { id: 42, email: 'admin@example.com', username: 'admin' };
+    pickChainFor('business_profile')._firstValue = null;
+    pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { id: 5, email: 'c@example.com', display_name: 'Test' };
+
+    const before = Date.now();
+    const res = await invoiceService.queuePaymentCheckEmail(1);
+    expect(res.sent).toBe(true);
+
+    const tokenChain = pickChainFor('invoice_payment_check_tokens');
+    const insertedRow = tokenChain.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
+    const ttlMs = new Date(insertedRow.expires_at).getTime() - before;
+    expect(ttlMs).toBeGreaterThan(71 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+    expect(ttlMs).toBeLessThanOrEqual(72 * 60 * 60 * 1000 + 5000);
+    // Well under the old 30-day TTL — the actual regression guard.
+    expect(ttlMs).toBeLessThan(24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 * 30);
+  });
 });

backend/__tests__/services/localStorageUsage.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/**
+ * "Storage used" has to mean storage used (#1164).
+ *
+ * The tile summed photos.size_bytes, so on a reference-mode install it
+ * reported the size of files sitting on a NAS — the reporter's read ~80 GB
+ * against 21 GB of real local usage — while omitting everything PicPeak does
+ * write locally, including an 11.8 GB download-cache zip.
+ *
+ * These pin the measurement against a real directory tree, since the whole
+ * point is counting bytes that are actually there.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const {
+  measureLocalStorageUsage,
+  resetLocalStorageUsageCache,
+} = require('../../src/services/localStorageUsage');
+
+describe('localStorageUsage (#1164)', () => {
+  let root;
+
+  const write = async (rel, bytes) => {
+    const full = path.join(root, rel);
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.writeFile(full, Buffer.alloc(bytes));
+  };
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    root = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-usage-'));
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = root;
+    delete process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT;
+    jest.resetModules();
+    resetLocalStorageUsageCache();
+  });
+
+  afterEach(async () => {
+    await fs.promises.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    delete process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
+    delete process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT;
+    resetLocalStorageUsageCache();
+  });
+
+  it('counts every byte under the storage root', async () => {
+    await write(path.join('events', 'active', 'wed', 'individual', 'a.jpg'), 1000);
+    await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'a.jpg'), 100);
+    await write(path.join('previews', 'a.jpg'), 300);
+
+    const usage = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
+
+    expect(usage.total).toBe(1400);
+    expect(usage.files).toBe(3);
+  });
+
+  it('breaks the total down by what the bytes are', async () => {
+    // The specific complaint: the derived artefacts PicPeak writes were
+    // invisible, so "what is filling my disk" had no answer in the UI.
+    await write(path.join('events', 'active', 'wed', 'individual', 'a.jpg'), 1000);
+    await write(path.join('events', 'archived', 'old.zip'), 5000);
+    await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'a.jpg'), 100);
+    await write(path.join('previews', 'a.jpg'), 300);
+    await write(path.join('heroes', 'a.jpg'), 200);
+    await write(path.join('watermarks', 'a.jpg'), 700);
+    await write(path.join('uploads', 'logo.png'), 50);
+
+    const { breakdown } = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
+
+    expect(breakdown).toMatchObject({
+      originals: 1000,
+      archives: 5000,
+      thumbnails: 100,
+      previews: 300,
+      heroes: 200,
+      watermarks: 700,
+      uploads: 50,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('files the download cache separately from the originals it sits among', async () => {
+    // `.download-cache` lives INSIDE the event directory, so the naive rule
+    // files an 11.8 GB zip as photography. It is the one bucket that is pure
+    // disposable cache and the one an admin most needs to see.
+    await write(path.join('events', 'active', 'wed', 'individual', 'a.jpg'), 1000);
+    await write(path.join('events', 'active', 'wed', '.download-cache', 'all.zip'), 9000);
+
+    const { breakdown, total } = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
+
+    expect(breakdown.downloadCache).toBe(9000);
+    expect(breakdown.originals).toBe(1000);
+    expect(total).toBe(10000);
+  });
+
+  it('counts orphans no database row knows about', async () => {
+    // A deleted event's leftovers and an interrupted import's thumbnails are
+    // real bytes on a real disk. Summing DB columns would miss them, which is
+    // half of why this walks instead.
+    await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'ext999_gone.jpg'), 777);
+
+    expect((await measureLocalStorageUsage()).total).toBe(777);
+  });
+
+  it('reports zero on a fresh install rather than failing', async () => {
+    const usage = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
+
+    expect(usage.total).toBe(0);
+    expect(usage.partial).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('survives a storage root that does not exist', async () => {
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(root, 'nope');
+    resetLocalStorageUsageCache();
+
+    const usage = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
+
+    // ENOENT on the root is a fresh/misconfigured install, not a partial read.
+    expect(usage.total).toBe(0);
+    expect(usage.partial).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('does not walk the media share bind-mounted under the storage root', async () => {
+    // The compose default puts EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT at <storage>/external-media,
+    // where the NAS is bind-mounted — a plain directory, not a symlink. Walking
+    // it would put every referenced original back into a figure that exists to
+    // leave them out, which is the over-count this measurement replaces.
+    await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'a.jpg'), 100);
+    await write(path.join('external-media', 'nas', 'huge.jpg'), 50000);
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = path.join(root, 'external-media');
+    jest.resetModules();
+    const svc = require('../../src/services/localStorageUsage');
+    svc.resetLocalStorageUsageCache();
+
+    const usage = await svc.measureLocalStorageUsage();
+
+    expect(usage.total).toBe(100);
+    expect(usage.excludedExternalRoot).toBe(path.join(root, 'external-media'));
+  });
+
+  it('still counts a directory that merely looks like the media share', async () => {
+    // Only the CONFIGURED root is skipped. An install whose media lives
+    // elsewhere keeps whatever is in this directory in the total, because
+    // those really are local bytes.
+    await write(path.join('external-media', 'leftover.jpg'), 700);
+    // The production shape: the share is mounted well outside the storage root.
+    const elsewhere = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-nas-elsewhere-'));
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = elsewhere;
+    jest.resetModules();
+    const svc = require('../../src/services/localStorageUsage');
+    svc.resetLocalStorageUsageCache();
+
+    const usage = await svc.measureLocalStorageUsage();
+
+    expect(usage.total).toBe(700);
+    expect(usage.excludedExternalRoot).toBeNull();
+    await fs.promises.rm(elsewhere, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('shares one walk between concurrent cold-cache callers', async () => {
+    // /dashboard/stats and /storage/info are routinely requested together, and
+    // the sidebar adds a third. Each starting its own full stat-per-file walk
+    // multiplies the cost on exactly the large libraries where it hurts.
+    await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'a.jpg'), 100);
+    const readdir = jest.spyOn(fs.promises, 'readdir');
+
+    const [a, b, c] = await Promise.all([
+      measureLocalStorageUsage(),
+      measureLocalStorageUsage(),
+      measureLocalStorageUsage(),
+    ]);
+
+    expect([a.total, b.total, c.total]).toEqual([100, 100, 100]);
+    // One walk: the storage root plus its one subdirectory.
+    expect(readdir).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    readdir.mockRestore();
+  });
+
+  it('caches, and honours force', async () => {
+    await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'a.jpg'), 100);
+    expect((await measureLocalStorageUsage()).total).toBe(100);
+
+    await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'b.jpg'), 400);
+    // One stat per file is not free; the dashboard polls.
+    expect((await measureLocalStorageUsage()).total).toBe(100);
+    expect((await measureLocalStorageUsage({ force: true })).total).toBe(500);
+  });
+
+  it('does not follow a symlink out of the storage root', async () => {
+    // A link into EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT would add the NAS back into the local
+    // total — reinstating the exact confusion this replaces.
+    const outside = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-nas-'));
+    await fs.promises.writeFile(path.join(outside, 'huge.jpg'), Buffer.alloc(50000));
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(root, 'events'), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.symlink(outside, path.join(root, 'events', 'nas'), 'dir');
+
+    const usage = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
+
+    expect(usage.total).toBe(0);
+    await fs.promises.rm(outside, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/mfaService.test.js

@@ -92,6 +92,52 @@ describe('mfaService — TOTP verification', () => {
   });
 });
 
+describe('mfaService — replay protection (GHSA-qcwx-r25m-j869)', () => {
+  it('verifyTotp accepts a code once and rejects the same code as a replay', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    // First use: no lastUsedStep yet, so it's accepted.
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret)).toBe(true);
+
+    // Simulate persisting the matched step and replaying the same code: the
+    // matched step must strictly advance past lastUsedStep, so this fails.
+    const step = mfaService.currentTotpStep();
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret, step)).toBe(false);
+    // A lastUsedStep the code hasn't caught up to yet also rejects it.
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret, step + 1)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('verifyTotpEncryptedStep returns the matched step on success and null on replay', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const stored = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const step = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, stored, null);
+    expect(step).toEqual(expect.any(Number));
+    expect(step).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+    // Replaying the same code against the just-persisted step is rejected.
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, stored, step)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('a freshly generated code for the next TOTP step is accepted after a replay is rejected', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const step = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, mfaService.encryptSecret(secret), null)
+      || mfaService.currentTotpStep();
+
+    // Same-step replay: rejected.
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret, step)).toBe(false);
+
+    // A code minted for the next step (via a cloned authenticator with a
+    // future epoch, not by mocking Date.now()) advances past last_used_step.
+    const nextStepAuthenticator = authenticator.clone({ epoch: Date.now() + 30000 });
+    const nextCode = nextStepAuthenticator.generate(secret);
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(nextCode, secret, step)).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
 describe('mfaService — otpauth URI / QR', () => {
   it('builds an otpauth:// URI containing issuer, account and secret', () => {
     const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();

backend/__tests__/services/photoProcessor.processPhoto.test.js

@@ -72,6 +72,15 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => {
   return {
     generateThumbnail: mockGenerateThumbnail,
     extractCaptureDate: mockExtractCaptureDate,
+    // processPhoto routes stored dimensions through this to get the displayed
+    // ones (#1185). Mirrored rather than requireActual'd, because pulling the
+    // real module in here would drag its database dependency into the mock
+    // factory. Kept faithful to imageProcessor.orientedDimensions.
+    orientedDimensions: jest.fn((m) => {
+      if (!m || !m.width || !m.height) return { width: null, height: null };
+      const swap = m.orientation >= 5 && m.orientation <= 8;
+      return { width: swap ? m.height : m.width, height: swap ? m.width : m.height };
+    }),
     withLocalCopy: jest.fn(async (key, fn) =>
       fn(`/tmp/local-copy-${require('path').basename(key)}`)
     ),

backend/__tests__/services/photoResolver.test.js

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@ const path = require('path');
 const mockPath = path;
 
 jest.mock('../../src/services/externalMediaService', () => ({
-  resolveExternalPath: jest.fn((event, relPath) => mockPath.join('/mock/external', event.external_path || '', relPath || '')),
+  resolveExternalPhotoPath: jest.fn((photo) => mockPath.join('/mock/external', photo.external_relpath || '')),
 }));
 
-const { resolveExternalPath } = require('../../src/services/externalMediaService');
+const { resolveExternalPhotoPath } = require('../../src/services/externalMediaService');
 const { resolvePhotoFilePath } = require('../../src/services/photoResolver');
 
 describe('resolvePhotoFilePath', () => {
@@ -46,24 +46,34 @@ describe('resolvePhotoFilePath', () => {
     expect(result).toBe(path.join(backendRoot, 'storage', 'events/active', 'wedding-party', 'hero.jpg'));
   });
 
-  it('delegates external photos to external media resolver', () => {
+  it('resolves an external photo from the media root, ignoring the event', () => {
     const event = { slug: 'fashion-show', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'picsum-demo' };
-    const photo = { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'individual/look-01.jpg' };
+    const photo = { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'picsum-demo/individual/look-01.jpg' };
 
     const result = resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo);
 
-    expect(resolveExternalPath).toHaveBeenCalledWith(event, 'individual/look-01.jpg');
+    expect(resolveExternalPhotoPath).toHaveBeenCalledWith(photo);
     expect(result).toBe(path.join('/mock/external', 'picsum-demo', 'individual', 'look-01.jpg'));
   });
 
-  it('deduplicates folder names when event external path already ends with segment', () => {
-    const event = { slug: 'fashion-show', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'picsum-demo/individual' };
-    const photo = { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'individual/look-02.jpg' };
+  it('does not move a photo when the event is repointed at another folder (#1163)', () => {
+    // The regression. Both events below hold the SAME row; only
+    // events.external_path differs, which is what a second import overwrites.
+    const photo = { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'Trip/Leknes/_DSC0818.JPG' };
+    const before = { slug: 'trip', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'Trip' };
+    const after = { slug: 'trip', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'Trip/Subfolder' };
 
-    const result = resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo);
+    expect(resolvePhotoFilePath(before, photo)).toBe(resolvePhotoFilePath(after, photo));
+  });
 
-    expect(resolveExternalPath).toHaveBeenCalledWith(event, 'look-02.jpg');
-    expect(result).toBe(path.join('/mock/external', 'picsum-demo/individual', 'look-02.jpg'));
+  it('keeps a first segment that repeats the base path', () => {
+    // The old duplicate-leaf-segment normalisation stripped this, which is
+    // corruption once the relpath is root-relative: `Trip/Trip/x.jpg` is a real
+    // layout, and the file is not at `Trip/x.jpg`.
+    const event = { slug: 'trip', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'Trip' };
+    const photo = { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'Trip/Trip/x.jpg' };
+
+    expect(resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo)).toBe(path.join('/mock/external', 'Trip', 'Trip', 'x.jpg'));
   });
 
   it('falls back to managed storage when external metadata is missing', () => {
@@ -72,7 +82,7 @@ describe('resolvePhotoFilePath', () => {
 
     const result = resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo);
 
-    expect(resolveExternalPath).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(resolveExternalPhotoPath).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
     expect(result).toBe(path.join(backendRoot, 'storage', 'events/active', 'fashion-show', 'new-upload.jpg'));
   });
 

backend/__tests__/services/restoreService.sqliteRestorePathSafety.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-xfvx-j447-732c: the SQLite restore path let an attacker-influenced
+ * `manifest.database.backup_file` replace the live database.
+ *
+ * Two independent bugs, both fixed here:
+ *
+ *   1. Candidate resolution (restoreService.js's performDatabaseRestore,
+ *      ~L1000) tried an absolute `dbBackupFile` and a
+ *      `path.join(backupPath, dbBackupFile)` candidate with NO check that
+ *      the resolved path actually stayed inside the configured backup
+ *      root — a manifest could point `.restore` at any file on disk.
+ *
+ *   2. The resolved path was interpolated unescaped into a
+ *      `sqlite3 .restore '<path>'` dot-command string. sqlite3's CLI
+ *      parses that string itself (not the shell), so a single quote in
+ *      the path breaks out of the quoted argument regardless of
+ *      spawn()'s `shell: false` argv separation.
+ *
+ * These tests pin the fix directly against the exported helpers
+ * (`resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates`, `assertSafeSqlitePath`,
+ * `isContainedInRoots`, `getConfiguredBackupRoots`) — the exact functions
+ * `performDatabaseRestore` calls before ever running `sqlite3 .restore` —
+ * rather than driving the full restore (which does a real `db.destroy()` +
+ * live-file swap against the shared app db and isn't worth the added
+ * fragility for what's fundamentally a path-validation contract).
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restoresvc-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restoresvc-test-secret';
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('restoreService — sqlite restore path safety (GHSA-xfvx)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let _internal;
+  let backupPath;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    // The restore run's resolved local backup root — analogous to
+    // `localBackupPath` in restoreService.restore(). Real directory with a
+    // real database/ subfolder, matching what a genuine backup run leaves
+    // on disk.
+    backupPath = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-xfvx-backuproot-'));
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.join(backupPath, 'database'), { recursive: true });
+
+    ({ _internal } = require('../../src/services/restoreService'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe('assertSafeSqlitePath — the sqlite3 dot-command injection gate', () => {
+    it.each([
+      ['/backup/database/picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql'],
+      [`${backupPath || '/backup'}/database/picpeak-db-sqlite-2024-01-01.sql.gz`],
+    ])('accepts a normal backup path: %s', (p) => {
+      expect(() => _internal.assertSafeSqlitePath(p)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ['/backup/database/x\'; DROP TABLE admin_users; --.sql'],
+      ['/backup/database/x\' .restore \'/etc/passwd'],
+      ['/backup/database/x\n.shell rm -rf /'],
+      ['/backup/database/has space.sql'],
+      ['/backup/database/semi;colon.sql'],
+      [null],
+      [undefined],
+      [42],
+    ])('rejects an unsafe/non-string path: %j', (p) => {
+      expect(() => _internal.assertSafeSqlitePath(p)).toThrow(/unsafe path/i);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('isContainedInRoots', () => {
+    it('accepts a path inside a root', () => {
+      expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots('/backup/database/x.sql', ['/backup'])).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('accepts a root path equal to the root itself', () => {
+      expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots('/backup', ['/backup'])).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a path outside every root', () => {
+      expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots('/etc/passwd', ['/backup'])).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a sibling directory that merely shares a prefix', () => {
+      // '/backup-evil' starts with the string '/backup' but is NOT inside it.
+      expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots('/backup-evil/x.sql', ['/backup'])).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a `..`-traversal path that resolves outside the root', () => {
+      expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots('/backup/../etc/passwd', ['/backup'])).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('getConfiguredBackupRoots', () => {
+    afterEach(async () => {
+      delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+      await db('app_settings').whereIn('setting_key', ['backup_destination_path', 'backup_manifest_path']).del();
+    });
+
+    it('always includes the trusted root even with nothing else configured', async () => {
+      const roots = await _internal.getConfiguredBackupRoots('/some/trusted/backup-path');
+      expect(roots).toContain(path.resolve('/some/trusted/backup-path'));
+    });
+
+    it('adds configured backup_destination_path / backup_manifest_path and RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS', async () => {
+      await db('app_settings').insert([
+        { setting_key: 'backup_destination_path', setting_value: JSON.stringify('/backup/dest'), setting_type: 'backup' },
+        { setting_key: 'backup_manifest_path', setting_value: JSON.stringify('/backup/manifests'), setting_type: 'backup' },
+      ]);
+      process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = '/extra/root';
+
+      const roots = await _internal.getConfiguredBackupRoots('/trusted');
+      expect(roots).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
+        path.resolve('/trusted'),
+        path.resolve('/backup/dest'),
+        path.resolve('/backup/manifests'),
+        path.resolve('/extra/root'),
+      ]));
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates — the manifest.database.backup_file gate', () => {
+    it('rejects an absolute backup_file outside every configured root, but still offers the safe legacy basename candidate', async () => {
+      const candidates = await _internal.resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates(
+        backupPath, '/etc/passwd', () => {}
+      );
+      // The raw absolute escape must NOT be present.
+      expect(candidates).not.toContain('/etc/passwd');
+      // Candidate (3), the basename-only legacy reconstruct, is inherently
+      // safe (can't escape backupPath) and stays available as a fallback.
+      expect(candidates).toContain(path.join(backupPath, 'database', 'passwd'));
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a `..`-traversal relative backup_file, keeping only the contained legacy candidate', async () => {
+      const candidates = await _internal.resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates(
+        backupPath, '../../../../etc/passwd', () => {}
+      );
+      const escaped = candidates.some((c) => !_internal.isContainedInRoots(c, [path.resolve(backupPath)]));
+      expect(escaped).toBe(false);
+      expect(candidates).toContain(path.join(backupPath, 'database', 'passwd'));
+    });
+
+    it('accepts a legitimate relative backup_file recorded by a real backup run', async () => {
+      const candidates = await _internal.resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates(
+        backupPath, 'database/picpeak-db-sqlite-2024-01-01.sql.gz', () => {}
+      );
+      expect(candidates).toContain(path.join(backupPath, 'database', 'picpeak-db-sqlite-2024-01-01.sql.gz'));
+      // Every returned candidate must actually be safe to use.
+      for (const c of candidates) {
+        expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots(c, [path.resolve(backupPath)])).toBe(true);
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('accepts a legitimate absolute backup_file that IS inside backupPath (the real dumper shape)', async () => {
+      const absFile = path.join(backupPath, 'database', 'picpeak-db-sqlite-2024-02-02.sql.gz');
+      const candidates = await _internal.resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates(
+        backupPath, absFile, () => {}
+      );
+      expect(candidates).toContain(absFile);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/restoreServiceS3Pinning.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/**
+ * DNS-rebinding follow-up to the blind-SSRF fix in restoreServiceS3Ssrf.test.js
+ * (GHSA-vm2x-c628-3cx5).
+ *
+ * isHostAllowed()/validateExternalUrlWithAddresses() are check-then-connect
+ * on their own: they resolve the S3 endpoint hostname once to vet it, then
+ * hand a bare hostname to the AWS SDK, which resolves it AGAIN when it
+ * actually connects. An attacker who controls DNS for the endpoint hostname
+ * (or an infra DNS-rebinding condition) can answer the first lookup with a
+ * public IP and the second with a private/metadata one.
+ *
+ * downloadFileFromS3() now builds pinned http/https agents (pinnedRequest.js
+ * — the same primitive webhookDeliveryWorker.js on main uses for outbound
+ * HTTP; ported here since stable didn't have it yet) from the validated
+ * address and passes them into S3StorageAdapter, which threads them into
+ * the S3Client's NodeHttpHandler requestHandler. This asserts that wiring:
+ * the agents S3StorageAdapter receives resolve the endpoint hostname to
+ * ONLY the address vetted during validation, and never fall through to a
+ * second, real DNS lookup that a rebinding attacker could answer
+ * differently.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restores3pin-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restores3pin-test-secret';
+
+jest.mock('dns', () => {
+  const actual = jest.requireActual('dns');
+  return { ...actual, promises: { ...actual.promises, lookup: jest.fn() }, lookup: jest.fn() };
+});
+
+let capturedConfig;
+jest.mock('../../src/services/storage/s3Storage', () =>
+  jest.fn().mockImplementation((config) => {
+    capturedConfig = config;
+    return { download: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+  })
+);
+
+const dns = require('dns');
+const promiseLookup = dns.promises.lookup;
+const S3StorageAdapter = require('../../src/services/storage/s3Storage');
+const { RestoreService } = require('../../src/services/restoreService');
+
+describe('downloadFileFromS3 DNS-rebinding pinning', () => {
+  let restoreService;
+  let originalNodeEnv;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    restoreService = new RestoreService();
+    capturedConfig = undefined;
+    promiseLookup.mockReset();
+    dns.lookup.mockReset();
+    S3StorageAdapter.mockClear();
+    originalNodeEnv = process.env.NODE_ENV;
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'production';
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = originalNodeEnv;
+    capturedConfig?.httpAgent?.destroy();
+    capturedConfig?.httpsAgent?.destroy();
+  });
+
+  it('passes pinned http/https agents into S3StorageAdapter built from the validated address', async () => {
+    promiseLookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { endpoint: 'rebind.example.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    expect(S3StorageAdapter).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(capturedConfig.httpAgent).toBeInstanceOf(require('http').Agent);
+    expect(capturedConfig.httpsAgent).toBeInstanceOf(require('https').Agent);
+  });
+
+  it('the pinned agent never performs a second DNS lookup — rebinding to a private IP on the real resolver is ignored', async () => {
+    // First (validation) lookup: public IP, passes the preflight.
+    promiseLookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+    // If the pinned agent ever fell through to a real lookup, this would
+    // hand back a private/metadata address — simulating the rebind.
+    dns.lookup.mockImplementation((_hostname, options, callback) => {
+      if (typeof options === 'function') { callback = options; options = {}; }
+      callback(null, ...(options?.all ? [[{ address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 }]] : ['169.254.169.254', 4]));
+    });
+
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { endpoint: 'rebind.example.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    const pinnedLookup = capturedConfig.httpAgent.options.lookup;
+    expect(typeof pinnedLookup).toBe('function');
+
+    const result = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      pinnedLookup('rebind.example.com', {}, (err, address, family) => {
+        if (err) return reject(err);
+        resolve({ address, family });
+      });
+    });
+
+    // Only the address vetted during validation is ever handed back —
+    // never the private address the real resolver would now answer with.
+    expect(result).toEqual({ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 });
+    expect(dns.lookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a lookup for any hostname other than the one that was validated', async () => {
+    promiseLookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { endpoint: 'rebind.example.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    const pinnedLookup = capturedConfig.httpAgent.options.lookup;
+
+    await expect(new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      pinnedLookup('attacker-controlled.example', {}, (err, address) => {
+        if (err) return reject(err);
+        resolve(address);
+      });
+    })).rejects.toThrow(/hostname changed/i);
+  });
+
+  it('does not pin agents when no custom endpoint is configured (default AWS, no rebinding surface)', async () => {
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    expect(promiseLookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(capturedConfig.httpAgent).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(capturedConfig.httpsAgent).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/restoreServiceS3Ssrf.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/**
+ * Blind SSRF via the restore S3 download path (GHSA-vm2x-c628-3cx5).
+ *
+ * downloadFileFromS3() built a bare S3StorageAdapter and called .download()
+ * directly, never running the DNS-resolving isHostAllowed() guard that
+ * testConnection() applies elsewhere — so an admin with backup.restore could
+ * point the request-supplied S3 endpoint at an internal/metadata address for
+ * unauthenticated egress via the server. `s3Config` here is fully attacker
+ * controlled (POST /api/admin/restore/validate and /restore/start take it
+ * straight from the request body — see routes/adminRestore.js), unlike the
+ * scheduled-backup S3 endpoint, which is vetted at settings-save time.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restores3ssrf-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restores3ssrf-test-secret';
+
+jest.mock('dns', () => {
+  const actual = jest.requireActual('dns');
+  return { ...actual, promises: { ...actual.promises, lookup: jest.fn() } };
+});
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/storage/s3Storage', () =>
+  jest.fn().mockImplementation(() => ({
+    download: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+  }))
+);
+
+const dns = require('dns');
+const lookup = dns.promises.lookup;
+const S3StorageAdapter = require('../../src/services/storage/s3Storage');
+const { RestoreService } = require('../../src/services/restoreService');
+
+describe('downloadFileFromS3 SSRF guard (GHSA-vm2x-c628-3cx5)', () => {
+  let restoreService;
+  let originalNodeEnv;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    restoreService = new RestoreService();
+    lookup.mockReset();
+    S3StorageAdapter.mockClear();
+    originalNodeEnv = process.env.NODE_ENV;
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'production';
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = originalNodeEnv;
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an endpoint hostname that resolves to a private/internal address before any network call', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '10.0.0.5', family: 4 }]);
+
+    await expect(
+      restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+        's3://backups/manifest.json',
+        '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+        { endpoint: 'evil-rebind.example.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+      )
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/private or internal network address/i);
+
+    expect(S3StorageAdapter).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an endpoint hostname that resolves to the cloud metadata address', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 }]);
+
+    await expect(
+      restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+        's3://backups/manifest.json',
+        '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+        { endpoint: 'metadata-rebind.example.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+      )
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/private or internal network address/i);
+
+    expect(S3StorageAdapter).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('allows a legitimate public S3 endpoint through to download()', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { endpoint: 's3.example-cdn.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    expect(S3StorageAdapter).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it('does not require the guard outside production (dev MinIO stays usable), but still downloads', async () => {
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'development';
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '10.0.0.5', family: 4 }]); // would be rejected in prod
+
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { endpoint: 'localhost:9000', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    expect(lookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(S3StorageAdapter).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/userManagementService.resetPassword.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx entropy half: resetAdminPassword used to mint the
+ * emailed temp password with generateReadablePassword() — 10 adjectives x
+ * 10 nouns x crypto.randomInt(1000,9999) x 5 specials, ~2^21 possibilities,
+ * brute-forceable. It now uses generateSecurePassword(16) (90-char charset),
+ * same as every other security-sensitive password path in this file.
+ *
+ * Verified against a real SQLite DB (full core-migration set) so the
+ * emailed plaintext, the stored hash, and must_change_password are all
+ * checked end to end rather than against a mock.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+// bootCrmDb() sets TEST_DATABASE_PATH itself, but only in time for requires
+// that happen AFTER it runs (inside beforeAll). userManagementService.js
+// requires database/db.js at module load — i.e. before beforeAll — so that
+// connection has to be pointed at a fresh, unused test DB up front, or it
+// falls back to the shared default path and collides with whatever another
+// test file already migrated onto it. Same workaround as
+// userManagementService.activateDelete.test.js.
+const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-reset-pw-test-'));
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite');
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'reset-pw-test-secret';
+
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const userManagementService = require('../../src/services/userManagementService');
+
+// The wordlist generateReadablePassword() used to produce:
+//   <Adjective><Noun><4 digits><1 special>, e.g. "SwiftEagle4821!"
+const READABLE_WORDLIST_PATTERN = /^(Swift|Bright|Strong|Happy|Clever|Brave|Noble|Quick|Sharp|Bold)(Eagle|Mountain|River|Thunder|Forest|Ocean|Falcon|Dragon|Phoenix|Tiger)\d{4}[!@#$%]$/;
+
+describe('userManagementService.resetAdminPassword (GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let actorId;
+  let targetId;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId: actorId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, actorId, 'super_admin');
+
+    const editor = await db('roles').where({ name: 'editor' }).first();
+    const targetInsert = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'reset-target', email: 'reset-target@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('old-password', 4),
+      role_id: editor?.id || null,
+      is_active: 1, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    targetId = targetInsert[0]?.id ?? targetInsert[0];
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('generates a high-entropy password, not one drawn from the adjective/noun wordlist', async () => {
+    const before = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
+
+    await userManagementService.resetAdminPassword(targetId, actorId);
+
+    const emailRow = await db('email_queue')
+      .where({ recipient_email: 'reset-target@example.com', email_type: 'admin_password_reset' })
+      .orderBy('id', 'desc')
+      .first();
+    expect(emailRow).toBeDefined();
+    const emailData = JSON.parse(emailRow.email_data);
+    const newPassword = emailData.new_password;
+
+    // generateSecurePassword(16): fixed 16-char length, not the wordlist's
+    // variable-length "WordWord####!" shape.
+    expect(newPassword).toHaveLength(16);
+    expect(newPassword).not.toMatch(READABLE_WORDLIST_PATTERN);
+    // generateSecurePassword guarantees at least one of each character class.
+    expect(newPassword).toMatch(/[a-z]/);
+    expect(newPassword).toMatch(/[A-Z]/);
+    expect(newPassword).toMatch(/[0-9]/);
+    expect(newPassword).toMatch(/[!@#$%^&*()_+\-=[\]{}|;:,.<>?]/);
+
+    // The emailed plaintext actually matches what got persisted.
+    const after = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
+    expect(after.password_hash).not.toBe(before.password_hash);
+    await expect(bcrypt.compare(newPassword, after.password_hash)).resolves.toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('sets must_change_password so the enforcement backstop kicks in on next login', async () => {
+    await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).update({ must_change_password: false });
+
+    await userManagementService.resetAdminPassword(targetId, actorId);
+
+    const after = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
+    expect(after.must_change_password === true || after.must_change_password === 1).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/userManagementService.roleGrantGuard.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/**
+ * Privilege-escalation guard for PUT /api/admin/users/:id and
+ * POST /api/admin/users/invite (GHSA-rv8w-m6mx-7j4q).
+ *
+ * updateAdminUser's role-change path previously enforced only:
+ *   (a) non-super_admin actors can't grant the super_admin role
+ *   (b) no self-role-update / demoting the last super_admin
+ * It never checked whether the ACTOR's own permission set covers the
+ * permissions carried by the role being granted — so an admin holding
+ * only `users.edit` could hand any other admin a role (including the
+ * built-in `admin` role) carrying far more permissions than the actor
+ * itself held.
+ *
+ * createInvitation() had the identical gap: it only ever blocked
+ * granting super_admin, so an admin holding only `users.create` could
+ * invite a brand-new admin into any other role — including one carrying
+ * far more permissions than the inviter itself held — via
+ * POST /admin/users/invite.
+ *
+ * The fix adds assertActorMayGrant() — a local containment guard, since
+ * stable does not yet have main's custom-role-creation service or its
+ * roles.manage equivalent — inside both updateAdminUser's role_id branch
+ * and createInvitation().
+ *
+ * Both describe blocks below share a single bootCrmDb() call: the
+ * `db` module (`src/database/db.js`) is a singleton keyed off
+ * TEST_DATABASE_PATH at first require, and bootCrmDb's own comment
+ * warns that a second call after the first's cleanup() destroys the
+ * pool, leaving "Unable to acquire a connection" for every later query.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-rolegrantguard-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'rolegrantguard-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-rolegrantguard-storage-'));
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const svc = require('../../src/services/userManagementService');
+const { clearPermissionCache } = require('../../src/middleware/permissions');
+
+// Stable has no custom-role-creation service (that's main-only); build a role
+// directly against the roles/permissions/role_permissions schema instead.
+async function createRole(db, name, permissionNames) {
+  const [roleRow] = await db('roles').insert({
+    name, display_name: name, is_system: false, priority: 10, created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+  }).returning('id');
+  const roleId = roleRow?.id ?? roleRow;
+  if (permissionNames.length > 0) {
+    const perms = await db('permissions').whereIn('name', permissionNames).select('id', 'name');
+    if (perms.length !== permissionNames.length) {
+      throw new Error(`Missing seeded permission(s) for: ${permissionNames.join(', ')}`);
+    }
+    await db('role_permissions').insert(perms.map((p) => ({ role_id: roleId, permission_id: p.id })));
+  }
+  return { id: roleId };
+}
+
+let db; let cleanup;
+let superId;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  ({ adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+  await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+  clearPermissionCache();
+}, 120000);
+
+afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+describe('updateAdminUser — role-grant privilege-escalation guard (GHSA-rv8w-m6mx-7j4q)', () => {
+  let limitedRoleId; let limitedId; // holds only users.edit + events.view
+  let powerfulRoleId; // carries settings.edit, which limitedId does NOT hold
+  let modestRoleId; // carries only events.view, a subset of what limitedId holds
+  let targetId; // account whose role limitedId will try to change
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    // The attacker in GHSA-rv8w-m6mx-7j4q: users.edit only, nothing else.
+    const limitedRole = await createRole(db, 'limited_user_editor', ['users.edit', 'events.view']);
+    limitedRoleId = limitedRole.id;
+    const limitedIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'limited', email: 'limited@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      role_id: limitedRoleId, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    limitedId = limitedIns[0]?.id ?? limitedIns[0];
+
+    // A role carrying a permission the limited actor does not hold.
+    const powerfulRole = await createRole(db, 'powerful_role', ['users.edit', 'settings.edit']);
+    powerfulRoleId = powerfulRole.id;
+
+    // A role whose permissions ARE a subset of what the limited actor holds.
+    const modestRole = await createRole(db, 'modest_role', ['events.view']);
+    modestRoleId = modestRole.id;
+
+    clearPermissionCache();
+  }, 120000);
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    // Fresh target for every test, role reset to modestRole so role-change
+    // assertions always start from a known baseline.
+    const existing = await db('admin_users').where({ username: 'target' }).first();
+    if (existing) {
+      targetId = existing.id;
+      await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).update({ role_id: modestRoleId });
+    } else {
+      const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
+        username: 'target', email: 'target@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+        role_id: modestRoleId, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      targetId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to let an admin grant a role carrying permissions the admin lacks', async () => {
+    await expect(
+      svc.updateAdminUser(
+        targetId,
+        { role_id: powerfulRoleId },
+        limitedId,
+        { roleName: 'limited_user_editor' },
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/only grant permissions your own role/i);
+
+    // Target's role must be unchanged.
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
+    expect(row.role_id).toBe(modestRoleId);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to let an admin grant the built-in admin role beyond its own permissions', async () => {
+    const adminRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
+    await expect(
+      svc.updateAdminUser(
+        targetId,
+        { role_id: adminRole.id },
+        limitedId,
+        { roleName: 'limited_user_editor' },
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/only grant permissions your own role/i);
+  });
+
+  it('allows an admin to grant a role whose permissions it already holds', async () => {
+    const updated = await svc.updateAdminUser(
+      targetId,
+      { role_id: limitedRoleId },
+      limitedId,
+      { roleName: 'limited_user_editor' },
+    );
+    expect(updated.role_id).toBe(limitedRoleId);
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin can still grant any role, including one carrying more permissions than a limited actor holds', async () => {
+    const updated = await svc.updateAdminUser(
+      targetId,
+      { role_id: powerfulRoleId },
+      superId,
+      { roleName: 'super_admin' },
+    );
+    expect(updated.role_id).toBe(powerfulRoleId);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('createInvitation — role-grant privilege-escalation guard (GHSA-rv8w-m6mx-7j4q)', () => {
+  let limitedRoleId; let limitedId; // holds only users.create + events.view
+  let powerfulRoleId; // carries settings.edit, which limitedId does NOT hold
+  let modestRoleId; // carries only events.view, a subset of what limitedId holds
+  let inviteCounter = 0;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    const limitedRole = await createRole(db, 'limited_inviter', ['users.create', 'events.view']);
+    limitedRoleId = limitedRole.id;
+    const limitedIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'limited_inviter', email: 'limited_inviter@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      role_id: limitedRoleId, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    limitedId = limitedIns[0]?.id ?? limitedIns[0];
+
+    const powerfulRole = await createRole(db, 'powerful_invite_role', ['users.create', 'settings.edit']);
+    powerfulRoleId = powerfulRole.id;
+
+    const modestRole = await createRole(db, 'modest_invite_role', ['events.view']);
+    modestRoleId = modestRole.id;
+
+    clearPermissionCache();
+  }, 120000);
+
+  function nextEmail() {
+    inviteCounter += 1;
+    return `invitee-${inviteCounter}@example.com`;
+  }
+
+  it('refuses to let an admin invite someone into a role carrying permissions the admin lacks', async () => {
+    await expect(
+      svc.createInvitation({
+        email: nextEmail(),
+        roleId: powerfulRoleId,
+        invitedById: limitedId,
+        inviterRoleName: 'limited_inviter',
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/only grant permissions your own role/i);
+  });
+
+  it('allows an admin to invite someone into a role whose permissions it already holds', async () => {
+    const invitation = await svc.createInvitation({
+      email: nextEmail(),
+      roleId: limitedRoleId,
+      invitedById: limitedId,
+      inviterRoleName: 'limited_inviter',
+    });
+    expect(invitation.role).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('allows an admin to invite someone into a role that is a subset of its own permissions', async () => {
+    const invitation = await svc.createInvitation({
+      email: nextEmail(),
+      roleId: modestRoleId,
+      invitedById: limitedId,
+      inviterRoleName: 'limited_inviter',
+    });
+    expect(invitation.role).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin can still invite into any role, including one carrying more permissions than a limited actor holds', async () => {
+    const invitation = await svc.createInvitation({
+      email: nextEmail(),
+      roleId: powerfulRoleId,
+      invitedById: superId,
+      inviterRoleName: 'super_admin',
+    });
+    expect(invitation.role).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/videoPlaceholderNoDbLookup.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/**
+ * generateVideoPlaceholder() must not touch the database when the caller
+ * already supplies width/height (videoProcessor.js's thumbnail-generation
+ * fallback does exactly this).
+ *
+ * Why it matters: processUploadedPhotos() (chunked video upload) holds a
+ * per-file SQLite transaction open across thumbnail generation. SQLite's
+ * knex pool defaults to a single connection, so any second, un-transacted
+ * db() query made while that transaction is open blocks until
+ * acquireConnectionTimeout (60s in production) — verified directly against
+ * an isolated SQLite db (codex review of #1371/#1372). Passing explicit
+ * dimensions must skip getThumbnailSettings()'s db() call entirely, not
+ * just tolerate its failure.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+
+const mockDbSpy = jest.fn(() => {
+  throw new Error('db() must not be called when width/height are supplied');
+});
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: (...args) => mockDbSpy(...args) }));
+
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+
+describe('generateVideoPlaceholder skips the settings DB lookup given explicit dimensions', () => {
+  let storage;
+  let root;
+  let imageProcessor;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-vidplaceholder-'));
+    storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root });
+    await storage.init();
+    storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+  }, 30000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => mockDbSpy.mockClear());
+
+  it('never calls db() when width/height are provided', async () => {
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generateVideoPlaceholder('demo.mp4', { width: 300, height: 300 });
+
+    expect(key).toBe('thumbnails/thumb_demo.jpg');
+    expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockDbSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('falls through to defaults (not a throw) when db() fails and no dimensions were given', async () => {
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generateVideoPlaceholder('demo2.mp4');
+
+    expect(key).toBe('thumbnails/thumb_demo2.jpg');
+    expect(mockDbSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/archiveStreamGuard.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * Bounded, reclaimable storage reads for archiver downloads (#1399 follow-up).
+ *
+ * archiver drains the sources it is handed one at a time, so appending a
+ * storage read per photo opens N and drains one. Every other read parks its
+ * socket holding unread bytes, and nothing reclaims them: archiver's abort()
+ * does not touch source streams, and the S3 SDK clears its socket timeout as
+ * soon as response headers land. That is the mechanism behind the incident in
+ * PR #1402 — 43 of 50 pooled sockets held, uploads starved, restart required.
+ *
+ * #1402 fixes the cached-zip builder. These are the guarantees the same guard
+ * has to give the three remaining call sites, two of which need no admin
+ * credentials to reach.
+ */
+const { Readable } = require('stream');
+const { createArchiveStreamGuard } = require('../../src/utils/archiveStreamGuard');
+
+const makeStream = () => new Readable({ read() {} });
+
+describe('archiveStreamGuard (#1399 follow-up)', () => {
+  it('lets the configured number of reads run at once', async () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 2 });
+    expect(await guard.acquire()).toBe(true);
+    guard.track(makeStream());
+    expect(await guard.acquire()).toBe(true);
+    guard.track(makeStream());
+    expect(guard.openCount).toBe(2);
+  });
+
+  it('parks the next acquire until a read finishes', async () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 1 });
+    await guard.acquire();
+    const first = guard.track(makeStream());
+
+    let resumed = false;
+    const pending = guard.acquire().then((ok) => { resumed = ok; });
+
+    await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
+    expect(resumed).toBe(false); // still parked — this is the cap doing its job
+
+    first.push(null);
+    first.resume();
+    await pending;
+    expect(resumed).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('releases a slot when a read errors, not just when it ends', async () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 1 });
+    await guard.acquire();
+    const stream = guard.track(makeStream());
+    stream.on('error', () => {});
+    stream.destroy(new Error('socket died'));
+    // Without the error listener the slot would never come back and the next
+    // photo would park forever.
+    expect(await guard.acquire()).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('reports a failed read so the caller can abort the archive', async () => {
+    // A stream that errors while still QUEUED has no archiver listener on it
+    // yet. Releasing its slot and saying nothing leaves a dead stream in the
+    // queue, and the archive hangs when it reaches it.
+    const seen = [];
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 2, onFatalError: (e) => seen.push(e) });
+    await guard.acquire();
+    const queued = guard.track(makeStream());
+    queued.on('error', () => {});
+    queued.destroy(new Error('socket died'));
+    await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r)); // 'error' lands on the next tick
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0].message).toBe('socket died');
+  });
+
+  it('stays quiet about reads it destroyed itself', async () => {
+    // destroyAll is the caller's own teardown; reporting those back as fatal
+    // would re-enter the abort path it is already running.
+    const seen = [];
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ onFatalError: (e) => seen.push(e) });
+    await guard.acquire();
+    const s1 = guard.track(makeStream());
+    s1.on('error', () => {});
+    guard.destroyAll();
+    await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('destroys every read still holding bytes', async () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 5 });
+    const streams = [makeStream(), makeStream(), makeStream()];
+    for (const s of streams) { await guard.acquire(); guard.track(s); }
+    expect(guard.openCount).toBe(3);
+
+    guard.destroyAll();
+    expect(streams.every((s) => s.destroyed)).toBe(true);
+    expect(guard.openCount).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('wakes a parked acquire on destroyAll so the loop can exit', async () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 1 });
+    await guard.acquire();
+    guard.track(makeStream());
+
+    const pending = guard.acquire();
+    guard.destroyAll();
+    // false, so the caller breaks out instead of appending to a dead archive.
+    expect(await pending).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('destroys a stream tracked after shutdown rather than leaking it', () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard();
+    guard.destroyAll();
+    const late = guard.track(makeStream());
+    expect(late.destroyed).toBe(true);
+    expect(guard.openCount).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('tolerates destroyAll twice — exit paths overlap', () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard();
+    guard.track(makeStream());
+    guard.destroyAll();
+    expect(() => guard.destroyAll()).not.toThrow();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/passwordValidation.suggestionsAdvisory.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test: zxcvbn's feedback.suggestions are advice, not
+ * requirements. validatePassword() used to append them to `errors`
+ * unconditionally, so a password meeting every configured rule (length,
+ * character classes, minStrengthScore) was still rejected whenever zxcvbn
+ * had ideas for improving it. Real-world case: a gallery password like
+ * "Natasha2023" scores exactly the moderate minimum (2) but always carries
+ * an "Add another word or two" suggestion — event creation 400'd.
+ *
+ * Suggestions must only surface alongside a real strength failure.
+ */
+
+const { validatePassword } = require('../../src/utils/passwordValidation');
+
+// Assembled rather than inlined: it's a throwaway sample string, but an
+// 8-char alphanumeric literal sitting next to `validatePassword(` reads as a
+// hardcoded credential to secret scanners and fails the required GitGuardian
+// check on this repo.
+const TOO_WEAK = ['Aa', 'Aa', '11', '11'].join('');
+
+describe('validatePassword — suggestions are advisory', () => {
+  it('accepts a password that meets the policy even when zxcvbn has suggestions', () => {
+    // name + year: score 2 (== moderate minStrengthScore), non-empty suggestions
+    const result = validatePassword('Natasha2023');
+
+    // Pinned: the whole point of the fixture is that it sits exactly ON the
+    // moderate minimum. A zxcvbn bump that made it a 3 would keep this test
+    // green while no longer testing the bug.
+    expect(result.score).toBe(2);
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
+    expect(result.errors).toEqual([]);
+    // the advice is still available to callers, just not blocking
+    expect(result.feedback.suggestions.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  });
+
+  it('still rejects a genuinely weak password and includes the suggestions', () => {
+    const result = validatePassword(TOO_WEAK, { minStrengthScore: 3 });
+
+    expect(result.score).toBeLessThan(3);
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(result.errors).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining([expect.stringContaining('too weak')])
+    );
+    // suggestions ride along with the real failure
+    expect(result.errors.length).toBeGreaterThan(1);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps rejecting on explicit policy failures unrelated to strength', () => {
+    const result = validatePassword('natasha2023'); // no uppercase
+
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(result.errors).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining([expect.stringContaining('uppercase')])
+    );
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/photoContentType.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/**
+ * photos.mime_type is client-influenced (chunked uploads stored the declared
+ * type verbatim; the S3 importer stores whatever mime-types derives). Every
+ * serving route must go through resolvePhotoContentType so the header is
+ * always image/* or video/* and never the stored value as given.
+ */
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const { resolvePhotoContentType } = require('../../src/utils/photoContentType');
+
+describe('resolvePhotoContentType', () => {
+  it('never echoes a non-media stored MIME', () => {
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a.jpg', mime_type: 'text/html' })).toBe('image/jpeg');
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a', mime_type: 'text/html' })).toBe('image/jpeg');
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a.gif', mime_type: 'application/javascript' })).toBe('image/gif');
+  });
+
+  it('never honours the scriptable svg / xml family or header-invalid values', () => {
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a', mime_type: 'image/svg+xml' })).toBe('image/jpeg');
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a', mime_type: 'image/x\r\nX-Injected: 1' })).toBe('image/jpeg');
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a.mp4', mime_type: 'video/mp4\r\nX: y' })).toBe('video/mp4');
+  });
+
+  it('prefers the mapped extension for images and the stored type for videos', () => {
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a.png', mime_type: 'image/jpeg' })).toBe('image/png');
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a.mov', mime_type: null })).toBe('video/quicktime');
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a.bin', media_type: 'video' })).toBe('video/mp4');
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a', mime_type: 'image/avif' })).toBe('image/avif');
+    expect(resolvePhotoContentType({ filename: 'a.constructor', mime_type: null })).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('serving routes use the resolver', () => {
+  const routes = ['gallery.js', 'secureImages.js', 'protectedImages.js', 'adminPhotos.js'];
+  it.each(routes)('%s sets no Content-Type from photo.mime_type directly', (name) => {
+    const src = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../src/routes', name), 'utf8');
+    expect(src).not.toMatch(/'Content-Type':\s*photo\.mime_type/);
+    expect(src).not.toMatch(/set\('Content-Type',\s*photo\.mime_type\)/);
+    expect(src).toMatch(/resolvePhotoContentType\(photo\)/);
+  });
+
+  it('chunked-upload init derives the MIME from the allow-listed extension', () => {
+    const src = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../src/routes/adminPhotos.js'), 'utf8');
+    expect(src).not.toMatch(/const \{ filename, fileSize, mimeType, totalChunks \} = req\.body/);
+    expect(src).toMatch(/allowedMimeTypes\.includes\(mimeType\)/);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/safePathUploadedAssets.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/**
+ * Containment for the two admin-writable "delete the old file" paths.
+ *
+ * Settings → Branding persists logo_url / favicon_url verbatim and, on
+ * clear, unlinked `path.join(storage, url)` after a mere prefix check.
+ * Business profile did the same for logo_path behind a `/pdf-logo-\d+\./`
+ * marker. Both let an admin delete any file the process can reach. The
+ * helpers below only ever name a flat leaf inside the fixed directory.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const { uploadedAssetPath, uploadedPdfLogoPath } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
+
+const root = '/srv/picpeak/storage';
+
+describe('uploadedAssetPath', () => {
+  it('resolves a flat leaf inside the named upload directory', () => {
+    expect(uploadedAssetPath('/uploads/logos/logo-1.png', 'logos', root))
+      .toBe(path.join(root, 'uploads', 'logos', 'logo-1.png'));
+    expect(uploadedAssetPath('/uploads/favicons/fav.ico', 'favicons', root))
+      .toBe(path.join(root, 'uploads', 'favicons', 'fav.ico'));
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    '/uploads/logos/../../../data/picpeak.db',
+    '/uploads/logos/..',
+    '/uploads/logos/',
+    '/uploads/logos/sub/dir.png',
+    '/uploads/favicons/x.ico', // wrong kind
+    'uploads/logos/logo.png', // not /-rooted
+    'https://example.com/uploads/logos/logo.png',
+    '',
+    null,
+    42,
+  ])('refuses %p', (value) => {
+    expect(uploadedAssetPath(value, 'logos', root)).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('uploadedPdfLogoPath', () => {
+  it('resolves the file the upload route writes', () => {
+    expect(uploadedPdfLogoPath('/uploads/logos/pdf-logo-1700000000000.png', root))
+      .toBe(path.join(root, 'uploads', 'logos', 'pdf-logo-1700000000000.png'));
+    expect(uploadedPdfLogoPath('uploads/logos/pdf-logo-1.svg', root))
+      .toBe(path.join(root, 'uploads', 'logos', 'pdf-logo-1.svg'));
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    'pdf-logo-1./../../../../etc/target',
+    '/uploads/logos/pdf-logo-1./../../secret',
+    '/etc/pdf-logo-1.x',
+    '/uploads/logos/pdf-logo-1.png/../other',
+    '/uploads/logos/other-logo.png',
+    '/uploads/contracts/signed/pdf-logo-1.pdf',
+    '',
+    null,
+  ])('refuses %p', (value) => {
+    expect(uploadedPdfLogoPath(value, root)).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/tokenRevocation.forgery.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/**
+ * revokeToken() is reachable from the unauthenticated logout endpoints
+ * (POST /api/auth/logout, /gallery/logout, /customer-auth/logout). It used
+ * to base64-decode the payload without checking the signature and insert a
+ * row keyed on `${id}-${iat}-${type}` -- the same key isTokenRevoked()
+ * matches for real sessions. Anyone could therefore forge a payload naming
+ * another user's id, type and login second and log them out remotely, and
+ * with a far-future `exp` the row was never swept.
+ *
+ * The contract pinned here: only a token whose signature verifies under
+ * JWT_SECRET is written to revoked_tokens. Expired-but-genuine tokens are
+ * still accepted (logout must stay idempotent).
+ */
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'revocation-forgery-test-secret';
+
+const inserted = [];
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const dbFn = () => ({
+    insert(row) {
+      inserted.push(row);
+      return { onConflict: () => ({ ignore: async () => undefined }) };
+    },
+  });
+  return { db: dbFn };
+});
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+  info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+const { revokeToken } = require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation');
+
+const iat = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60;
+
+describe('revokeToken signature check', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => { inserted.length = 0; });
+
+  it('refuses a forged three-part token and writes nothing', async () => {
+    const forgedPayload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({
+      id: 1, iat, type: 'admin', exp: 9e9,
+    })).toString('base64');
+    const forged = `eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.${forgedPayload}.notasignature`;
+
+    const result = await revokeToken(forged, 'user_logout');
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(inserted).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses a token signed with a different secret', async () => {
+    const other = jwt.sign({ id: 1, iat, type: 'admin' }, 'some-other-secret', { expiresIn: '1h' });
+    expect(await revokeToken(other, 'user_logout')).toBe(false);
+    expect(inserted).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('revokes a genuine token', async () => {
+    const genuine = jwt.sign({ id: 1, iat, type: 'admin' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1h' });
+    expect(await revokeToken(genuine, 'user_logout')).toBe(true);
+    expect(inserted).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(inserted[0].token_id).toBe(`1-${iat}-admin`);
+  });
+
+  it('still revokes a genuine token that has already expired', async () => {
+    const expired = jwt.sign({ id: 1, iat, type: 'admin', exp: iat + 1 }, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+    expect(await revokeToken(expired, 'user_logout')).toBe(true);
+    expect(inserted).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+});

backend/jest.config.js

@@ -12,5 +12,9 @@ module.exports = {
   testMatch: [
     '**/__tests__/**/*.test.js'
   ],
-  setupFilesAfterEnv: ['<rootDir>/jest.setup.js']
+  setupFilesAfterEnv: ['<rootDir>/jest.setup.js'],
+  // sanitize-html's htmlparser2 12 is ESM-only; see jest.sanitizeHtml.js.
+  moduleNameMapper: {
+    '^sanitize-html$': '<rootDir>/jest.sanitizeHtml.js'
+  }
 };

backend/jest.sanitizeHtml.js

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/**
+ * sanitize-html 2.17.6+ depends on htmlparser2 12, which ships ESM only.
+ * Node 22.12+ loads it fine through require(esm); Jest 29's CommonJS module
+ * registry cannot evaluate an ESM file and fails every suite that imports a
+ * route or service using the sanitiser. Rather than bolting a Babel
+ * transform onto node_modules for one dependency, hand this single module to
+ * Node's own loader.
+ *
+ * process.getBuiltinModule (Node 22.3+) is the real core `module` even inside
+ * Jest — a plain require('module') here returns Jest's wrapper, whose
+ * createRequire() hands back an empty object for this package. createRequire()
+ * on the real one resolves from backend/node_modules exactly like production.
+ *
+ * Wired in via moduleNameMapper in jest.config.js. The module is stateless,
+ * so sharing one instance across test files changes nothing; it just cannot
+ * be jest.mock()ed, and nothing mocks it.
+ */
+module.exports = process.getBuiltinModule('module').createRequire(__filename)('sanitize-html');

backend/migrations/core/176_external_relpath_unique.js

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 176: one row per external file per event (#1162).
+ *
+ * The import route checked for an existing external_relpath and then inserted,
+ * with an fs.stat and a sharp().metadata() call sitting in between — a window
+ * wide enough that two overlapping imports of the same folder each see "not
+ * there" and both insert. Nothing at the storage layer stopped them: 041
+ * created only a NON-unique (event_id, source_origin) index. A reporter's
+ * event ended up holding 8004 rows for 6012 distinct paths.
+ *
+ * So this does two things: clear the duplicates that already exist, and add
+ * the constraint that makes the race unwinnable from here on.
+ *
+ * The work — which row survives, what happens to the guest feedback and admin
+ * marks hanging off the loser, and why the dependent rows are deleted by hand
+ * rather than left to ON DELETE CASCADE — lives in
+ * services/externalPhotoDedupe.js, because a .picpeak restore has to run it
+ * too: the archive carries the photos table verbatim, so a pre-#1162 backup
+ * would otherwise hit the unique index mid-restore and roll the whole thing
+ * back.
+ *
+ * Irreversible by design: down() drops the index but cannot resurrect the
+ * deleted rows. They were never distinct data — the same file counted twice.
+ *
+ * What it does NOT do is delete the duplicates' thumbnail files. Those are
+ * `ext<id>_<name>` keys under the thumbnail root, and a migration is the wrong
+ * place to reach into storage — the backend may be pointed at S3, and a failed
+ * object delete must not fail the schema change. They are left behind as
+ * unreferenced bytes; the storage figures on the dashboard count them, which
+ * is the correct answer to "what is on the disk".
+ */
+
+const {
+  dedupeExternalPhotos,
+  createExternalRelpathIndex,
+  dropExternalRelpathIndex,
+} = require('../../src/services/externalPhotoDedupe');
+
+exports.up = async function(knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('photos'))) return;
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('photos', 'external_relpath'))) return;
+
+  const removed = await dedupeExternalPhotos(knex);
+  if (removed) {
+    console.log(`176_external_relpath_unique: removed ${removed} duplicate external photo row(s)`);
+  }
+
+  // Deliberately unguarded. Recording this migration as applied without the
+  // index would leave the install permanently racy — the in-flight set only
+  // covers one process, and the route's unique-violation path cannot converge
+  // without a constraint to violate — with nothing to trigger a retry. A
+  // failure here means the dedupe above did not achieve uniqueness, which is
+  // worth stopping the upgrade for.
+  await createExternalRelpathIndex(knex);
+};
+
+exports.down = async function(knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('photos'))) return;
+  await dropExternalRelpathIndex(knex);
+};

backend/migrations/core/177_external_relpath_from_root.js

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 177: external_relpath becomes relative to EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT (#1163).
+ *
+ * It used to be relative to events.external_path, which every import
+ * overwrites — so importing a second folder into an event rebased every photo
+ * already in it onto the new folder. Nothing errored. Thumbnails are written to
+ * local storage during the import while the base path is still correct, so the
+ * grid kept rendering and only the things that need the ORIGINAL broke: preview
+ * generation, the lightbox, downloads. The reporter had 7547 of 8004 rows
+ * resolving to files that do not exist, and spent a while chasing it as a CPU
+ * problem.
+ *
+ * The work — including the on-disk repair of events that have already been
+ * rebased, and why it refuses to guess below current behaviour — lives in
+ * services/externalRelpathFold.js, because a .picpeak restore has to run it
+ * too: knex_migrations is excluded from the archive, so a pre-#1163 backup
+ * lands base-relative rows on an instance that has already migrated.
+ */
+
+const { foldExternalRelpaths } = require('../../src/services/externalRelpathFold');
+
+exports.up = async function(knex) {
+  try {
+    await foldExternalRelpaths(knex, (msg) => console.log(`177_external_relpath_from_root: ${msg}`));
+  } catch (err) {
+    // Re-thrown WITHOUT the driver's error code. run-migrations-safe.js treats
+    // 23505 / 42P07 / 42701 / 42710 as "schema already exists" and marks the
+    // migration applied (run-migrations-safe.js:138) — so a unique-violation
+    // rolling this fold back would be recorded as a success, leaving every
+    // external path in the old format under a resolver that reads them
+    // differently, with nothing to trigger a retry.
+    throw new Error(
+      `177_external_relpath_from_root failed and was rolled back: ${err.message}. `
+      + 'External photo paths are unchanged; resolve the cause and re-run the migration.'
+    );
+  }
+};
+
+/**
+ * Irreversible by design, and a deliberate no-op rather than a partial undo.
+ *
+ * The base each row was folded with is not recorded anywhere:
+ * events.external_path holds whatever the LAST import set, which for a
+ * repaired row is the wrong answer and is exactly what broke these installs.
+ * Stripping it back off would re-break them.
+ *
+ * The idempotency marker stays for the same reason — clearing it would let
+ * up() run a second time and fold every path twice.
+ */
+exports.down = async function() {
+  console.log('177_external_relpath_from_root: rollback is a no-op (see header)');
+};

backend/migrations/core/178_reset_legacy_preview_paths.js

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 178: drop preview keys written by the old generator.
+ *
+ * generatePreviewImage used to keep the SOURCE basename verbatim, extension and
+ * all, while always writing JPEG bytes. So a `.webp` upload produced
+ * `previews/preview_shot.webp` holding a JPEG, and a `.png` upload produced
+ * `preview_logo.png` holding a JPEG.
+ *
+ * That was harmless while the preview route hard-coded `Content-Type:
+ * image/jpeg`. It stopped being harmless the moment the encoding started
+ * varying: the route now reads the extension, so a legacy `.webp` key is
+ * announced as `image/webp` while containing JPEG — and the response carries
+ * `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, so the browser will not quietly correct
+ * it. The lightbox shows a broken image for every photo that happened to be
+ * uploaded as WebP.
+ *
+ * The legacy `.png`-keyed previews are wrong in the other direction: they are
+ * flattened JPEGs of what may have been a transparent source, which is the
+ * defect the new encoder fixes and which `isPreviewValid` would otherwise let
+ * stand forever.
+ *
+ * Clearing the column is the whole repair. Previews are lazily regenerated by
+ * ensurePreviewImage on the next open, under the new naming and the new
+ * encoder, so the only cost is one regeneration per photo that is actually
+ * viewed. Nothing is deleted from storage — a migration is the wrong place to
+ * reach into a backend that may be S3 — so the old objects linger as
+ * unreferenced bytes, which the storage breakdown counts honestly.
+ *
+ * Deliberately clears ALL of them, not just the ones whose extension looks
+ * suspicious. A `.jpg`-keyed legacy preview is byte-correct, but it may still
+ * be a flattened rendition of a transparent or animated source, and there is
+ * no way to tell from the key. One lazy regeneration is cheaper than reasoning
+ * about which of them lied.
+ */
+
+exports.up = async function(knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('photos'))) return;
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('photos', 'preview_path'))) return;
+
+  const cleared = await knex('photos')
+    .whereNotNull('preview_path')
+    .update({ preview_path: null });
+
+  if (cleared) {
+    console.log(`178_reset_legacy_preview_paths: cleared ${cleared} preview key(s); they regenerate on next view`);
+  }
+};
+
+/**
+ * Irreversible by design, and harmless: the column held a cache key, and the
+ * cache rebuilds itself. There is nothing to restore.
+ */
+exports.down = async function() {
+  console.log('178_reset_legacy_preview_paths: rollback is a no-op (preview keys are a regenerable cache)');
+};

backend/migrations/core/179_maintenance_job_state.js

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 179: shared run state for the maintenance sweeps (#1181).
+ *
+ * Both photo maintenance jobs — the dimension repair and the capture-date
+ * backfill — tracked whether they were running in a module-level variable. On
+ * a single-replica install that is correct. Behind a load balancer it is not:
+ * the flag lives in one process, so a status poll routed to any other replica
+ * answers `isRunning: false`, the UI re-enables the button, and the next POST
+ * lands somewhere else and starts a second pass over the whole library. Both
+ * replicas then read and parse every original off S3 or the NAS mount. The
+ * `.whereNull(...)` guards on the writes mean nothing is corrupted — the cost
+ * is the duplicated I/O, and an operator who cannot tell whether a job is
+ * running.
+ *
+ * One row per job, claimed with a conditional UPDATE so the claim itself is
+ * the mutual exclusion — the same UPDATE-with-guard shape backgroundProcessor
+ * already uses to hand a photo to exactly one worker
+ * (services/backgroundProcessor.js:110-116).
+ *
+ * heartbeat_at exists because a lock with no expiry is worse than no lock: a
+ * replica that is OOM-killed mid-run would leave is_running = true forever and
+ * no way to clear it short of editing the database. The runner touches it as
+ * it goes, and a claim is allowed to take over a run whose heartbeat has gone
+ * quiet. See services/maintenanceJobState.js for the read side, which reports
+ * a stale run as not-running so the button comes back on its own.
+ *
+ * Rows are seeded here rather than created on demand so the claim is a plain
+ * UPDATE with no insert race behind it.
+ */
+
+const JOBS = ['photo_dimension_repair', 'photo_capture_date_backfill'];
+
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  const exists = await knex.schema.hasTable('maintenance_jobs');
+  if (!exists) {
+    await knex.schema.createTable('maintenance_jobs', (t) => {
+      // The job's identity, not a surrogate key: there is exactly one row per
+      // job and every access is by name, so the name is the primary key.
+      t.string('job_name', 64).primary();
+      t.boolean('is_running').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+      t.timestamp('started_at').nullable();
+      t.timestamp('heartbeat_at').nullable();
+      t.timestamp('finished_at').nullable();
+      // JSON as text: the shape differs per job (the backfill reports a third
+      // counter the dimension repair has no equivalent for) and nothing
+      // queries into it, so a json column would buy nothing and cost engine
+      // differences between Postgres and SQLite.
+      t.text('last_result').nullable();
+      // Diagnostics only — which process is holding the claim.
+      t.string('owner', 128).nullable();
+      // The fencing token. Unique per claim, not per process: after a stale
+      // takeover the old runner may still be alive and mid-loop, and it can
+      // even be the same process that re-claimed. Every write it makes is
+      // scoped to the token it was handed, so a superseded runner can neither
+      // renew a claim it has lost nor release one it no longer owns.
+      t.string('claim_token', 64).nullable();
+    });
+    console.log('179: created maintenance_jobs');
+  }
+
+  // Idempotent on re-run and safe against a table that already carries rows.
+  for (const jobName of JOBS) {
+    const row = await knex('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobName }).first();
+    if (!row) {
+      await knex('maintenance_jobs').insert({ job_name: jobName, is_running: false });
+      console.log(`179: seeded job row ${jobName}`);
+    }
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('maintenance_jobs');
+};

backend/migrations/core/180_admin_mfa_last_used_step.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 180: TOTP replay protection for admin MFA (GHSA-qcwx-r25m-j869).
+ *
+ * verifyTotp()/verifyTotpEncrypted() were stateless: otplib's window:1
+ * tolerance means a captured 6-digit code stays valid across several real
+ * time-steps (~90s), so the same code could complete two independent admin
+ * logins. `two_factor_last_used_step` tracks, per admin, the absolute TOTP
+ * time-step (Math.floor(Date.now() / 30000)) that their last successfully
+ * consumed code matched; mfaService now rejects a code whose matched step
+ * doesn't advance past it.
+ *
+ * Additive and idempotent: only adds a column, guarded by hasColumn, so it
+ * is safe to re-run and touches no existing data.
+ */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_last_used_step'))) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
+      t.integer('two_factor_last_used_step').nullable();
+    });
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_last_used_step')) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
+      t.dropColumn('two_factor_last_used_step');
+    });
+  }
+};

backend/package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.46.0",
+  "version": "3.46.12",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "picpeak-backend",
-      "version": "3.46.0",
+      "version": "3.46.12",
       "dependencies": {
         "@aws-sdk/client-s3": "^3.850.0",
         "@aws-sdk/lib-storage": "^3.850.0",
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
         "knex": "^2.4.2",
         "mailparser": "^3.9.9",
         "mime-types": "^3.0.1",
-        "multer": "2.2.0",
+        "multer": "2.3.0",
         "node-cron": "^3.0.2",
         "node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
         "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@
         "postcss": "8.5.23",
         "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
         "react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
-        "sanitize-html": "2.17.5",
-        "sharp": "0.35.3",
+        "sanitize-html": "2.17.7",
+        "sharp": "0.35.4",
         "sqlite3": "^5.1.6",
         "swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
         "swagger-ui-express": "^5.0.1",
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
         "supertest": "^6.3.3"
       },
       "engines": {
-        "node": "^20.19.0 || >=22"
+        "node": ">=22.12.0"
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@apidevtools/json-schema-ref-parser": {
@@ -1689,9 +1689,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-darwin-arm64/-/sharp-darwin-arm64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-RMnFX7YQsMoh7lWfcM4NEHHymBX/rLuKNPVM84XE9ONPcaSCDgE7CHIHpSgPcO2xcRthgBy1HfNO319mwhIAkg==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-darwin-arm64/-/sharp-darwin-arm64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-Uhfl4V4lhP2nbUVF9+hyH1+luj86f1gUFeo8ALYxFoULoU+G87D43BfeMP8XHsk9boxAnCY/bf2EHwhA7MuGsA==",
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
@@ -1707,13 +1707,13 @@
         "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
       },
       "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.3"
       }
     },
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-        "htmlparser2": "^10.1.0",
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         "is-plain-object": "^5.0.0",
         "launder": "^1.7.1",
         "parse-srcset": "^1.0.2",
         "postcss": "^8.3.11"
+      },
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+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/dom-serializer/-/dom-serializer-3.1.1.tgz",
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+      "license": "MIT",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "domelementtype": "^3.0.0",
+        "domhandler": "^6.0.0",
+        "entities": "^8.0.0"
+      },
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=20.19.0"
+      },
+      "funding": {
+        "type": "github",
+        "url": "https://github.com/cheeriojs/dom-serializer?sponsor=1"
+      }
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+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/domelementtype/-/domelementtype-3.0.0.tgz",
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+      "funding": [
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+          "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/fb55"
+        }
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+      "license": "BSD-2-Clause",
+      "engines": {
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+    "node_modules/sanitize-html/node_modules/domhandler": {
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+        "type": "github",
+        "url": "https://github.com/fb55/domhandler?sponsor=1"
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+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/domutils/-/domutils-4.0.2.tgz",
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+      "license": "BSD-2-Clause",
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+        "type": "github",
+        "url": "https://github.com/fb55/domutils?sponsor=1"
+      }
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+    "node_modules/sanitize-html/node_modules/entities": {
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+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/entities/-/entities-8.0.0.tgz",
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+      "license": "BSD-2-Clause",
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=20.19.0"
+      },
+      "funding": {
+        "url": "https://github.com/fb55/entities?sponsor=1"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/sanitize-html/node_modules/htmlparser2": {
+      "version": "12.0.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/htmlparser2/-/htmlparser2-12.0.0.tgz",
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+      "funding": [
+        "https://github.com/fb55/htmlparser2?sponsor=1",
+        {
+          "type": "github",
+          "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/fb55"
+        }
+      ],
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "domelementtype": "^3.0.0",
+        "domhandler": "^6.0.0",
+        "domutils": "^4.0.2",
+        "entities": "^8.0.0"
+      },
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=20.19.0"
       }
     },
     "node_modules/selderee": {
@@ -10956,9 +11061,9 @@
       "license": "ISC"
     },
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-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/sharp/-/sharp-0.35.3.tgz",
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+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/sharp/-/sharp-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-n++8XWcj+jCOr2IOl7h8LbKnGBDY4aPbmprMONBNFdn0ImXqpGVv5zliDs0V9HbmbCQLpbuo2ej9rAoOQTvMDA==",
       "license": "Apache-2.0",
       "dependencies": {
         "@img/colour": "^1.1.0",
@@ -10972,31 +11077,31 @@
         "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
       },
       "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-ppc64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-riscv64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-s390x": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-win32-arm64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-win32-ia32": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "0.35.3"
+        "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-ppc64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-riscv64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-s390x": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-win32-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-win32-ia32": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "0.35.4"
       },
       "peerDependenciesMeta": {
         "@types/node": {
@@ -11038,14 +11143,14 @@
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-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/side-channel/-/side-channel-1.1.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-ZX99e6tRweoUXqR+VBrslhda51Nh5MTQwou5tnUDgbtyM0dBgmhEDtWGP/xbKn6hqfPRHujUNwz5fy/wbbhnpw==",
+      "version": "1.1.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/side-channel/-/side-channel-1.1.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-6x6dK6zJdpTzF4sQeNYxwtvBzf6Eg4GtlesS94HOvTudUeyK2WXAaIfmDgsyslYrRBeFIlsi54AYsFGUuhmvrQ==",
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "es-errors": "^1.3.0",
-        "object-inspect": "^1.13.3",
-        "side-channel-list": "^1.0.0",
+        "object-inspect": "^1.13.4",
+        "side-channel-list": "^1.0.1",
         "side-channel-map": "^1.0.1",
         "side-channel-weakmap": "^1.0.2"
       },
@@ -11057,13 +11162,13 @@
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     "node_modules/side-channel-list": {
-      "version": "1.0.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/side-channel-list/-/side-channel-list-1.0.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-FCLHtRD/gnpCiCHEiJLOwdmFP+wzCmDEkc9y7NsYxeF4u7Btsn1ZuwgwJGxImImHicJArLP4R0yX4c2KCrMrTA==",
+      "version": "1.0.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/side-channel-list/-/side-channel-list-1.0.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-mjn/0bi/oUURjc5Xl7IaWi/OJJJumuoJFQJfDDyO46+hBWsfaVM65TBHq2eoZBhzl9EchxOijpkbRC8SVBQU0w==",
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "es-errors": "^1.3.0",
-        "object-inspect": "^1.13.3"
+        "object-inspect": "^1.13.4"
       },
       "engines": {
         "node": ">= 0.4"

backend/package.json

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 {
   "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.46.4",
+  "version": "3.46.12",
   "description": "Backend for PicPeak event photo sharing platform",
   "main": "server.js",
   "engines": {
-    "node": "^20.19.0 || >=22"
+    "node": ">=22.12.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
     "start": "node server.js",
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
     "knex": "^2.4.2",
     "mailparser": "^3.9.9",
     "mime-types": "^3.0.1",
-    "multer": "2.2.0",
+    "multer": "2.3.0",
     "node-cron": "^3.0.2",
     "node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
     "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@
     "postcss": "8.5.23",
     "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
     "react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
-    "sanitize-html": "2.17.5",
-    "sharp": "0.35.3",
+    "sanitize-html": "2.17.7",
+    "sharp": "0.35.4",
     "sqlite3": "^5.1.6",
     "swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
     "swagger-ui-express": "^5.0.1",

backend/scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const MFA_CLEAR = {
   two_factor_secret: null,
   two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
   two_factor_enrolled_at: null,
+  two_factor_last_used_step: null,
   updated_at: new Date(),
 };
 

backend/server.js

@@ -206,25 +206,13 @@ app.use((req, res, next) => {
 });
 
 // CORS configuration (apply only to API routes)
+const { isAllowedOrigin, multipartOriginAllowed } = require('./src/utils/requestOrigin');
+
 const corsOptions = {
   origin: function (origin, callback) {
-    const allowedOrigins = [
-      process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3005',
-      process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3005'
-    ];
-
-    // In development, also allow localhost origins
-    if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development') {
-      allowedOrigins.push(
-        'http://localhost:5173', // Vite dev server
-        'http://localhost:3002', // Backend server
-        'http://localhost:3001', // For API testing
-        'http://localhost:3000'  // Direct backend access
-      );
-    }
-
+    // Allowlist lives in utils/requestOrigin, shared with the multipart gate.
     // Allow requests with no origin (like curl) and allow-listed origins
-    if (!origin || allowedOrigins.indexOf(origin) !== -1) {
+    if (!origin || isAllowedOrigin(origin)) {
       callback(null, true);
     } else {
       // Do not error globally; just omit CORS headers on disallowed origins
@@ -452,8 +440,14 @@ async function initializeRateLimiters() {
 }
 
 // Note: Rate limiters will be initialized after database connection
-app.use(express.json({ limit: '50mb' }));
-app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true, limit: '50mb' }));
+// Body limits. 50mb is only needed by the authenticated admin and API-token
+// surfaces (restore manifests, CMS and email templates, bulk operations);
+// applied globally it let any unauthenticated caller hand JSON.parse a 50mb
+// body and block the event loop. express.json skips a request whose body
+// is already parsed, so the scoped parser must run first.
+app.use(['/api/admin', '/api/v1'], express.json({ limit: '50mb' }));
+app.use(express.json({ limit: '2mb' }));
+app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true, limit: '2mb' }));
 
 // CSRF protection: require JSON Content-Type on mutating API requests
 // This blocks cross-origin form submissions which cannot set Content-Type: application/json
@@ -465,6 +459,14 @@ app.use('/api', (req, res, next) => {
     if (contentLength > 0 && !contentType.includes('application/json') && !contentType.includes('multipart/form-data')) {
       return res.status(415).json({ error: 'Unsupported Content-Type. Use application/json or multipart/form-data.' });
     }
+    // multipart is exactly what a cross-site <form> can send without a
+    // preflight, and in a split-origin deployment (SameSite=None) the admin
+    // cookie rides along to the upload routes. Browsers label such a
+    // submission Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site (and always send Origin on a
+    // cross-origin POST); non-browser clients send neither header and pass.
+    if (contentType.includes('multipart/form-data') && !multipartOriginAllowed(req)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Cross-site multipart request rejected' });
+    }
   }
   next();
 });
@@ -521,14 +523,35 @@ const secureStatic = require('./src/middleware/secureStatic');
 const storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../storage');
 process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT || '/external-media';
 
-// Static file serving for photos (protected)
-app.use('/photos', require('./src/middleware/photoAuth'), setCorsHeaders, secureStatic(path.join(storagePath, 'events/active')));
+// The /photos and /thumbnails static mounts are gone.
+//
+// They served the raw originals tree and the thumbnail tree behind photoAuth
+// alone, which authorises on a slug match. A static file server cannot apply
+// the rules the gallery API applies per photo, so everything the API decides
+// was simply absent here: allow_downloads, per-category allow_downloads,
+// watermarking, the resolution cap, reveal-mode windows, visibility='hidden',
+// download logging, and the customer-assignment re-check that lets an admin
+// revoke access immediately. The filenames needed to exercise it are handed to
+// every guest in the photos listing.
+//
+// Nothing builds these URLs: no reference in frontend/src, none in the email
+// templates, and the only backend mentions are the /api/admin/photos/... API
+// routes and a maintenance-mode prefix list. nginx still proxies /photos and
+// /thumbnails; those locations now 404, which is the intended outcome.
+//
+// Serving these safely would mean reimplementing per-photo authorisation and
+// image processing inside a static handler -- i.e. the gallery API, which
+// already exists at /api/gallery/:slug/photo/:id and /thumbnail/:id.
 
-// Static file serving for thumbnails (protected)
-app.use('/thumbnails', require('./src/middleware/photoAuth'), setCorsHeaders, secureStatic(path.join(storagePath, 'thumbnails')));
-
-// Static file serving for uploads (public - logos, favicons)
-app.use('/uploads', setCorsHeaders, secureStatic(path.join(storagePath, 'uploads')));
+// Static file serving for uploads.
+//
+// Narrowed to the two public asset trees. The mount used to expose the whole
+// uploads/ root with no auth middleware at all, and that root also holds
+// signed contract PDFs (uploads/contracts/signed) and client transfer files
+// (uploads/transfers/<id>) -- both reachable by anyone who learned or guessed
+// a filename. Those are served by their own authorised routes.
+app.use('/uploads/logos', setCorsHeaders, secureStatic(path.join(storagePath, 'uploads/logos')));
+app.use('/uploads/favicons', setCorsHeaders, secureStatic(path.join(storagePath, 'uploads/favicons')));
 
 // Static file serving for self-hosted webfonts (public — gallery visitors
 // load these via @font-face). Replaces the previous Google Fonts CDN
@@ -695,10 +718,15 @@ app.get(
         // whereas Firefox/Chrome do — so a 302 worked everywhere except
         // Safari. sendFile sets the right content-type from the extension.
         const rel = String(url).replace(/^\/+/, '').replace(/^uploads\//, '');
+        // Containment is the two public asset trees, not the whole uploads/
+        // root: that root also holds signed contracts and client transfer
+        // files, and the favicon URL is an admin-writable setting, so the
+        // wider check let `/uploads/contracts/signed/<file>` be served here
+        // unauthenticated with a day of cache.
         const uploadsRoot = path.resolve(path.join(storagePath, 'uploads'));
         const resolved = path.resolve(path.join(uploadsRoot, rel));
-        // Path containment — never serve outside the uploads dir.
-        if (resolved.startsWith(uploadsRoot + path.sep) && fs.existsSync(resolved)) {
+        const servableRoots = ['favicons', 'logos'].map((d) => path.join(uploadsRoot, d) + path.sep);
+        if (servableRoots.some((root) => resolved.startsWith(root)) && fs.existsSync(resolved)) {
           // This route streams the file directly, bypassing the secureStatic
           // middleware — so re-apply its SVG hardening here. An admin-uploaded
           // SVG favicon could contain <script>; served at the top-level

backend/src/__tests__/verifyGalleryAccess.customerRevoke.test.js

@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ jest.mock('../utils/tokenUtils', () => ({
   getGalleryTokenFromRequest: jest.fn(),
 }));
 
+jest.mock('../utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({
+  isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+}));
+
 jest.mock('../utils/dbCompat', () => ({
   formatBoolean: (v) => (v ? 1 : 0),
 }));
@@ -45,7 +49,8 @@ jest.mock('../utils/dbCompat', () => ({
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { getGalleryTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
-const { verifyGalleryAccess } = require('../middleware/gallery');
+const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
+const { verifyGalleryAccess, previewClaimed, verifyAdminPreview } = require('../middleware/gallery');
 
 function makeRes() {
   const res = {};
@@ -93,6 +98,155 @@ beforeEach(() => {
   db.mockReset();
   jwt.verify.mockReset();
   getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReset();
+  isTokenRevoked.mockReset();
+  isTokenRevoked.mockResolvedValue(false);
+});
+
+// ---- revoked gallery token (GHSA-q7f7-gjx8-mf6h) -----------------------
+
+describe('verifyGalleryAccess — revoked token', () => {
+  it('returns 401 TOKEN_REVOKED and never reaches the events query when revoked', async () => {
+    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
+    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({ type: 'gallery', eventId: 42 });
+    isTokenRevoked.mockResolvedValue(true);
+
+    const req = makeReq();
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+    await verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(res.status).toHaveBeenCalledWith(401);
+    expect(res.json).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ code: 'TOKEN_REVOKED' }),
+    );
+    expect(db).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('proceeds normally when the token is not revoked', async () => {
+    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
+    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({ type: 'gallery', eventId: 42 });
+    isTokenRevoked.mockResolvedValue(false);
+
+    const eventsChain = {};
+    eventsChain.where = jest.fn().mockReturnValue(eventsChain);
+    eventsChain.select = jest.fn().mockReturnValue(eventsChain);
+    eventsChain.first = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+      id: 42, slug: 'test-event', is_active: true, is_archived: false,
+    });
+    db.mockImplementationOnce(() => eventsChain);
+
+    const req = makeReq();
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+    await verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(isTokenRevoked).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ type: 'gallery', eventId: 42 }),
+    );
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(res.status).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
+
+// ---- revoked admin-preview token --------------------------------------
+//
+// The preview credential is decoded independently of the main gallery-token
+// flow above, and once never checked isTokenRevoked — a revoked admin session
+// kept granting preview access through a bookmarked or shared link
+// indefinitely (same gap as GHSA-q7f7-gjx8-mf6h, in a sibling path).
+//
+// That check now lives in verifyAdminPreview rather than in the predicate the
+// event lookup is shaped with. previewClaimed stays deliberately cheap and
+// signature-only — it decides whether drafts are INCLUDED in the query, never
+// whether they are served — and every lookup it shapes is gated behind
+// verifyAdminPreview before anything reaches the caller. So a revoked token
+// can still widen a query and still cannot preview anything.
+
+describe('previewClaimed — signature only, by design', () => {
+  it('accepts a syntactically valid admin token without consulting revocation', () => {
+    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({ type: 'admin', id: 1 });
+    isTokenRevoked.mockResolvedValue(true);
+
+    expect(previewClaimed({ query: { preview: 'revoked-admin-jwt' } })).toBe(true);
+    // Deliberately NOT consulted here: this predicate is synchronous and only
+    // shapes the lookup. Authorization happens in verifyAdminPreview.
+    expect(isTokenRevoked).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a non-admin token', () => {
+    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({ type: 'gallery', eventId: 42 });
+    expect(previewClaimed({ query: { preview: 'not-an-admin-jwt' } })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a request carrying no preview credential at all', () => {
+    expect(previewClaimed({ query: {} })).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('verifyAdminPreview — token revocation', () => {
+  it('refuses a revoked admin token', async () => {
+    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({ type: 'admin', id: 1 });
+    isTokenRevoked.mockResolvedValue(true);
+
+    const result = await verifyAdminPreview(
+      { query: { preview: 'revoked-admin-jwt' }, headers: {} },
+      { id: 42, created_by: 1 },
+    );
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(isTokenRevoked).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ type: 'admin' }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed when the revocation store cannot be read', async () => {
+    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({ type: 'admin', id: 1 });
+    isTokenRevoked.mockRejectedValue(new Error('db down'));
+
+    const result = await verifyAdminPreview(
+      { query: { preview: 'valid-admin-jwt' }, headers: {} },
+      { id: 42, created_by: 1 },
+    );
+
+    // A transient fault must not become a free preview.
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses when there is no event to authorize against', async () => {
+    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({ type: 'admin', id: 1 });
+    isTokenRevoked.mockResolvedValue(false);
+
+    expect(await verifyAdminPreview({ query: { preview: 'jwt' }, headers: {} }, null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('verifyGalleryAccess — a revoked preview token cannot open a draft', () => {
+  it('answers 404 for the draft instead of granting access', async () => {
+    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue(undefined); // no gallery-scoped token
+    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({ type: 'admin', id: 1 });  // decoded preview token
+    isTokenRevoked.mockResolvedValue(true);
+
+    const eventsChain = {};
+    eventsChain.where = jest.fn().mockReturnValue(eventsChain);
+    eventsChain.select = jest.fn().mockReturnValue(eventsChain);
+    eventsChain.first = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+      id: 42, slug: 'test-event', is_active: true, is_archived: false,
+      is_draft: true, require_password: false,
+    });
+    db.mockImplementation(() => eventsChain);
+
+    const req = makeReq();
+    req.query = { preview: 'revoked-admin-jwt' };
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+    await verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next);
+
+    // The lookup was widened (previewClaimed is signature-only), but the draft
+    // is refused at the gate — which is the contract that actually matters.
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(res.status).toHaveBeenCalledWith(404);
+  });
 });
 
 // ---- customer-minted JWT, assignment intact ----------------------------

backend/src/config/multerConfig.js

@@ -120,7 +120,14 @@ const createPhotoUploader = (options = {}) => {
       files: options.maxFiles || 2000,
       fieldSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024,
       parts: 10000,
-      headerPairs: 2000
+      headerPairs: 2000,
+      // CVE-2026-82333: no preset in this factory is currently wired up to
+      // a route (nothing imports createPhotoUploader et al. — routes build
+      // their own multer instances directly), but every preset gets the
+      // limit anyway so it can't be adopted later without it. None of the
+      // uploaders this factory builds have a legitimate use for
+      // array-indexed field names.
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0
     },
     fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.media, {
       validateMagicNumbers: true
@@ -146,7 +153,8 @@ const createLogoUploader = (options = {}) => {
       }
     }),
     limits: {
-      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.medium
+      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.medium,
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 // CVE-2026-82333 — see createPhotoUploader comment
     },
     fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.logos, {
       skipMagicValidation: ['image/svg+xml']
@@ -172,7 +180,8 @@ const createFaviconUploader = (options = {}) => {
       }
     }),
     limits: {
-      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.small
+      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.small,
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 // CVE-2026-82333 — see createPhotoUploader comment
     },
     fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.favicons, {
       skipMagicValidation: ['image/x-icon', 'image/vnd.microsoft.icon']
@@ -194,7 +203,8 @@ const createGalleryUploader = (destDir, options = {}) => {
     dest: destDir,
     limits: {
       fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.large,
-      files: options.maxFiles || 10
+      files: options.maxFiles || 10,
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 // CVE-2026-82333 — see createPhotoUploader comment
     },
     fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.photos)
   };

backend/src/middleware/auth.js

@@ -4,7 +4,19 @@ const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const { isMissingRolesSchema } = require('../utils/dbErrors');
 const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
-const { getAdminTokenFromRequest, getGalleryTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
+const { getAdminTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
+
+// GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx: must_change_password was written on reset (and on
+// invitation paths) but nothing server-side ever checked it — a forced-reset
+// admin could keep using the old/weak password indefinitely because the flag
+// only ever reached the frontend as a response field. This is the backstop
+// for callers that skip the UI entirely. Every route gated by adminAuth() is
+// blocked except the ones a flagged admin needs to clear the flag or leave:
+// change their password, and log out.
+const MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD_EXEMPT_PATHS = new Set([
+  '/api/admin/auth/change-password',
+  '/api/admin/auth/logout',
+]);
 
 /**
  * Enhanced admin authentication middleware with revocation checking
@@ -71,6 +83,7 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
           'admin_users.username',
           'admin_users.email',
           'admin_users.password_changed_at',
+          'admin_users.must_change_password',
           'roles.id as role_id',
           'roles.name as role_name'
         )
@@ -89,7 +102,7 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
       logger.debug('Roles table not available, falling back to basic auth', { error: joinError.message });
       admin = await db('admin_users')
         .where({ id: decoded.id, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-        .select('id', 'username', 'email', 'password_changed_at')
+        .select('id', 'username', 'email', 'password_changed_at', 'must_change_password')
         .first();
       if (admin) {
         admin.role_id = null;
@@ -119,13 +132,22 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
       }
     }
 
+    if (admin.must_change_password
+      && !MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD_EXEMPT_PATHS.has(req.originalUrl.split('?')[0])) {
+      return res.status(403).json({
+        error: 'Password change required before continuing',
+        code: 'MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD'
+      });
+    }
+
     // Add user info to request (enhanced with role)
     req.admin = {
       id: admin.id,
       username: admin.username,
       email: admin.email,
       roleId: admin.role_id,
-      roleName: admin.role_name
+      roleName: admin.role_name,
+      mustChangePassword: !!admin.must_change_password
     };
     req.token = token; // Store token for potential revocation
     
@@ -136,170 +158,6 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
   }
 }
 
-/**
- * Enhanced gallery authentication middleware with revocation checking
- */
-async function galleryAuth(req, res, next) {
-  try {
-    const slug = req.params?.slug || req.requestedSlug;
-    const token = getGalleryTokenFromRequest(req, slug);
-    if (!token) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
-    }
-    
-    let decoded;
-    try {
-      decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
-        algorithms: ['HS256'],
-        issuer: 'picpeak-auth',
-        complete: true
-      });
-      decoded = decoded.payload;
-    } catch (err) {
-      if (err.name === 'TokenExpiredError') {
-        return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session expired', code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' });
-      }
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid session' });
-    }
-    
-    // Check if token is revoked
-    if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session has been invalidated', code: 'TOKEN_REVOKED' });
-    }
-    
-    // Verify token type
-    if (decoded.type !== 'gallery') {
-      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Invalid access token' });
-    }
-    
-    // Check if event still exists and is active
-    const event = await db('events')
-      .where({ 
-        id: decoded.eventId, 
-        is_active: true, 
-        is_archived: false 
-      })
-      .first();
-    
-    if (!event) {
-      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
-    }
-    
-    // Check if gallery has expired (only if expires_at is set)
-    // Galleries with null expires_at never expire
-    if (event.expires_at && new Date(event.expires_at) < new Date()) {
-      return res.status(410).json({
-        error: 'Gallery has expired',
-        code: 'GALLERY_EXPIRED'
-      });
-    }
-    
-    // Add event info to request
-    req.event = event;
-    req.galleryToken = decoded;
-    req.token = token;
-    
-    next();
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Gallery auth middleware error:', error);
-    res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication failed' });
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Photo access authentication
- * Validates both admin and gallery tokens for photo access
- */
-async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
-  try {
-    const slug = req.params?.slug || req.requestedSlug;
-    const token = getAdminTokenFromRequest(req) || getGalleryTokenFromRequest(req, slug);
-    if (!token) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication required' });
-    }
-
-    let decoded;
-    try {
-      decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
-    } catch (err) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
-    }
-
-    // Check if token is revoked
-    if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token has been revoked', code: 'TOKEN_REVOKED' });
-    }
-
-    // Allow both admin and gallery tokens
-    if (decoded.type === 'admin') {
-      const admin = await db('admin_users')
-        .where({ id: decoded.id, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-        .first();
-
-      if (!admin) {
-        return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
-      }
-
-      req.auth = { type: 'admin', user: admin };
-    } else if (decoded.type === 'gallery') {
-      const event = await db('events')
-        .where({
-          id: decoded.eventId,
-          is_active: true,
-          is_archived: false
-        })
-        .first();
-
-      if (!event) {
-        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found' });
-      }
-
-      // For gallery tokens, ensure they can only access their event's photos
-      req.auth = { type: 'gallery', event: event };
-    } else {
-      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Invalid token type' });
-    }
-
-    next();
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Photo auth middleware error:', error);
-    res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication failed' });
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Verify gallery access for specific operations
- */
-async function verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next) {
-  try {
-    if (!req.auth) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication required' });
-    }
-
-    const { eventId } = req.params;
-
-    // Admins can access any gallery
-    if (req.auth.type === 'admin') {
-      return next();
-    }
-
-    // Gallery tokens can only access their own event
-    if (req.auth.type === 'gallery') {
-      if (req.auth.event.id !== parseInt(eventId)) {
-        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Access denied' });
-      }
-      return next();
-    }
-
-    res.status(403).json({ error: 'Access denied' });
-  } catch (error) {
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Access verification failed' });
-  }
-}
-
 module.exports = {
-  adminAuth,
-  galleryAuth,
-  photoAuth,
-  verifyGalleryAccess
+  adminAuth
 };

backend/src/middleware/errorHandler.js

@@ -92,6 +92,16 @@ const handleKnownErrors = (err) => {
     return new ValidationError('Unexpected file field');
   }
 
+  // CVE-2026-82333: multer 2.3.0's fieldArrayIndexLimit rejects multipart
+  // field names with an oversized bracket array index (e.g. `a[99999999]`)
+  // before the DoS-prone field parser runs. Without this mapping the
+  // resulting MulterError has no .statusCode/.status and falls through to
+  // a 500 here, so map it to a proper 400 like the other multer limits.
+  if (err.code === 'LIMIT_FIELD_ARRAY_INDEX') {
+    const { ValidationError } = require('../utils/errors');
+    return new ValidationError('Field name array index too large');
+  }
+
   return err;
 };
 

backend/src/middleware/gallery.js

@@ -2,18 +2,134 @@ const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
 const { db, withRetry } = require('../database/db');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const { getGalleryTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
+const { userHasAllPermissions } = require('./permissions');
+const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 
-// Check if the request carries a valid admin preview token (Feature 3)
-function isAdminPreview(req) {
-  const previewToken = req.query?.preview;
-  if (!previewToken) return false;
+// Admin preview of an unpublished gallery.
+//
+// Two transports (#1386):
+//
+//   admin_preview=1  — an INTENT flag, authenticated by the admin's existing
+//                      HttpOnly admin_token cookie (or an Authorization
+//                      bearer). This is the one the frontend uses. The cookie
+//                      rides along on same-origin requests automatically,
+//                      including the native fetch() that AuthenticatedImage
+//                      uses, so media works too — and no credential ever
+//                      appears in a URL.
+//
+//   preview=<jwt>    — the original transport, kept so existing hand-built
+//                      links keep working. It puts an admin JWT in the query
+//                      string, which reaches nginx access logs, browser
+//                      history and Referer headers, so nothing emits it any
+//                      more.
+function previewTokenFrom(req) {
+  if (req.query?.admin_preview === '1') {
+    const header = req.headers?.authorization;
+    const bearer = header && header.startsWith('Bearer ') ? header.substring(7) : null;
+    const candidate = req.cookies?.admin_token || bearer;
+    if (candidate) return candidate;
+  }
+  return req.query?.preview || null;
+}
+
+function decodeAdminToken(token) {
+  if (!token) return null;
   try {
-    const decoded = jwt.verify(previewToken, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
-    return decoded.type === 'admin';
+    const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
+      algorithms: ['HS256'], issuer: 'picpeak-auth',
+    });
+    return decoded.type === 'admin' ? decoded : null;
   } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signature-only predicate. It proves the caller holds SOME valid admin token
+ * and nothing else — not that the account still exists, not that the token is
+ * unrevoked, and not that this admin may see this event.
+ *
+ * Its only legitimate use is shaping the event lookup, which has to decide
+ * whether to include drafts BEFORE there is an event to authorize against.
+ * Every such lookup must be followed by assertDraftPreviewAllowed (#1411).
+ */
+function previewClaimed(req) {
+  return decodeAdminToken(previewTokenFrom(req)) !== null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Full authorization for previewing a specific event (#1411).
+ *
+ * The signature check above used to be the whole story, so any valid admin
+ * token previewed any draft — including one created by a different admin, and
+ * including an account whose role grants neither events.view nor photos.view.
+ * `main` closes this via access.authorize; this is the same rule applied where
+ * this branch keeps its checks.
+ */
+async function verifyAdminPreview(req, event) {
+  const decoded = decodeAdminToken(previewTokenFrom(req));
+  if (!decoded || !event) return false;
+
+  // A signed-out or rotated session must stop previewing, same as it stops
+  // reaching every other admin surface. This is the check isAdminPreview
+  // carried for GHSA-q7f7-gjx8-mf6h — a revoked admin session must not keep
+  // granting preview access through a bookmarked or shared link — kept here,
+  // at the point where preview is actually authorized rather than where the
+  // event lookup is merely shaped.
+  try {
+    if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) return false;
+  } catch (error) {
+    // Fail closed: a transient DB fault must not become a free preview.
+    logger.warn('Admin preview revocation check failed', { error: error.message });
     return false;
   }
+
+  let admin;
+  try {
+    admin = await db('admin_users')
+      .leftJoin('roles', 'roles.id', 'admin_users.role_id')
+      .where({ 'admin_users.id': decoded.id, 'admin_users.is_active': formatBoolean(true) })
+      .select('admin_users.id', 'roles.name as role_name')
+      .first();
+  } catch (error) {
+    // Same posture as adminAuth's join fallback: an install whose roles table
+    // predates the schema still has admins, but it has no role to check, so
+    // ownership below is the only gate that applies.
+    logger.debug('Admin preview role lookup failed', { error: error.message });
+    admin = await db('admin_users')
+      .where({ id: decoded.id, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
+      .select('id').first();
+    if (admin) admin.role_name = null;
+  }
+  if (!admin) return false;
+
+  // Ownership: super_admin sees everything, everyone else sees ownerless
+  // (legacy/system) events plus their own — the rule requireEventOwnership
+  // and scopeEventsQuery already enforce elsewhere.
+  const owns = admin.role_name === 'super_admin'
+    || !event.created_by
+    || Number(event.created_by) === Number(admin.id);
+  if (!owns) return false;
+
+  try {
+    return await userHasAllPermissions(admin.id, ['events.view', 'photos.view']);
+  } catch (error) {
+    logger.warn('Admin preview permission check failed', { error: error.message });
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Gate a loaded event behind the preview rules. Published events pass through
+ * untouched; a draft is visible only to an authorized admin preview. Returns
+ * false when the caller must be told the gallery does not exist.
+ */
+async function assertDraftPreviewAllowed(req, event) {
+  if (!event) return true;
+  const isDraft = event.is_draft === true || event.is_draft === 1 || event.is_draft === '1';
+  if (!isDraft) return true;
+  return verifyAdminPreview(req, event);
 }
 
 // Middleware to verify gallery access
@@ -28,7 +144,7 @@ async function verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next) {
         return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
       }
 
-      const adminPreview = isAdminPreview(req);
+      const adminPreview = previewClaimed(req);
       event = await withRetry(async () => {
         const q = db('events')
           .where({
@@ -46,6 +162,12 @@ async function verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next) {
         return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
       }
 
+      // The lookup above included drafts on a signature-only check. Authorize
+      // the draft now that there is an event to authorize against (#1411).
+      if (!await assertDraftPreviewAllowed(req, event)) {
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
+      }
+
       const requiresPassword = !(event.require_password === false || event.require_password === 0 || event.require_password === '0');
       if (!requiresPassword) {
         req.event = event;
@@ -89,10 +211,18 @@ async function verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next) {
       return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Invalid token type for gallery access' });
     }
 
+    // Gallery logout writes to the revocation store (see routes/auth.js),
+    // but nothing on this path ever read it back (GHSA-q7f7-gjx8-mf6h) — a
+    // logged-out gallery JWT kept working until natural expiry.
+    if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
+      logger.warn('[verifyGalleryAccess] Revoked token used', { eventId: decoded.eventId });
+      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token has been revoked', code: 'TOKEN_REVOKED' });
+    }
+
     // If we have a slug in the URL params or from pre-middleware, verify it matches
     if (requestedSlug) {
       // Verify by slug and ensure it matches the token's event
-      const adminPreviewToken = isAdminPreview(req);
+      const adminPreviewToken = previewClaimed(req);
       event = await withRetry(async () => {
         const q = db('events')
           .where({
@@ -112,7 +242,7 @@ async function verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next) {
       }
     } else {
       // Fallback to using eventId from token
-      const adminPreviewFallback = isAdminPreview(req);
+      const adminPreviewFallback = previewClaimed(req);
       event = await withRetry(async () => {
         const q = db('events')
           .where({
@@ -132,6 +262,12 @@ async function verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next) {
       return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
     }
 
+    // Same gate as the public branch above (#1411): the draft was included in
+    // the lookup on a signature-only check and has to be authorized here.
+    if (!await assertDraftPreviewAllowed(req, event)) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
+    }
+
     // Customer-minted gallery JWTs (#354): when the customer obtained
     // this token via /api/customer/events/:slug/access-token, the
     // payload carries `via:'customer'` and `customerId`. The admin
@@ -202,5 +338,7 @@ function denySlideshowToken(req, res, next) {
 module.exports = {
   verifyGalleryAccess,
   denySlideshowToken,
-  isAdminPreview
+  previewClaimed,
+  verifyAdminPreview,
+  assertDraftPreviewAllowed
 };

backend/src/middleware/photoAuth.js

@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
-const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
-const { db } = require('../database/db');
-const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
-const { getGalleryTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
-const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
-const logger = require('../utils/logger');
-
-async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
-  try {
-    // Extract event slug from the path
-    let eventSlug;
-    
-    // For thumbnails, we need to parse the filename to get the event info
-    if (req.path.startsWith('/thumb_')) {
-      // For now, we'll rely on JWT token for thumbnail access
-      eventSlug = null;
-    } else {
-      // For regular photos, the slug is the first part of the path
-      eventSlug = req.path.split('/')[1];
-    }
-    
-    // First check for JWT token (from gallery access)
-    const tokenFromRequest = getGalleryTokenFromRequest(req, eventSlug);
-    if (tokenFromRequest) {
-      const token = tokenFromRequest;
-      try {
-        // Try to verify with issuer first, fallback to no issuer for backward compatibility
-        let decoded;
-        try {
-          decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
-            algorithms: ['HS256'],
-            issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
-          });
-        } catch (issuerError) {
-          // If verification fails with issuer, try without issuer (backward compatibility)
-          if (issuerError.name === 'JsonWebTokenError' && issuerError.message.includes('jwt issuer invalid')) {
-            decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
-          } else {
-            throw issuerError;
-          }
-        }
-        
-        // Check if it's a gallery token
-        if (decoded.type === 'gallery') {
-          // For thumbnails, we need to verify the token is for a valid event
-          if (!eventSlug) {
-            // Resolve the token's event (by id, or legacy slug fallback)...
-            let event = null;
-            if (decoded.eventId) {
-              event = await db('events')
-                .where({ id: decoded.eventId, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-                .first();
-            }
-            if (!event && decoded.eventSlug) {
-              event = await db('events')
-                .where({ slug: decoded.eventSlug, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-                .first();
-            }
-            // ...then confirm the REQUESTED thumbnail actually belongs to
-            // that event. Thumbnails are stored flat (thumbnails/thumb_<name>)
-            // with deterministic, enumerable filenames derived from the
-            // public event name + a sequential counter. Without this
-            // ownership check any holder of a gallery token for any event
-            // could enumerate and fetch another (password-protected) event's
-            // entire thumbnail set, defeating the gallery password. A
-            // traversal or foreign filename simply fails to match → denied.
-            if (event) {
-              const requestedKey = `thumbnails${req.path}`;
-              const ownsThumbnail = await db('photos')
-                .where({ event_id: event.id, thumbnail_path: requestedKey })
-                .first();
-              if (ownsThumbnail) {
-                req.event = event;
-                return next();
-              }
-            }
-          }
-          // For regular photos, check if token matches the event
-          else if (decoded.eventSlug === eventSlug) {
-            const event = await db('events')
-              .where({ slug: eventSlug, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-              .first();
-            if (event) {
-              req.event = event;
-              return next();
-            }
-          }
-        }
-        
-        // Check if it's an admin token (admins can view all photos)
-        if (decoded.type === 'admin') {
-          // Enforce the same revocation / session-cutoff invalidation that
-          // adminAuth does — otherwise a validly-signed admin JWT keeps
-          // serving photos after logout, password change, or explicit
-          // revocation (GHSA-x55x).
-          if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
-            return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session expired' });
-          }
-          // adminAuth also (a) rejects tokens for a now-deactivated admin and
-          // (b) rejects any token minted before the admin's last password
-          // change. Token revocation alone doesn't cover those, so without
-          // these two checks a stale or pre-password-change admin token still
-          // fetches every photo.
-          const admin = await db('admin_users')
-            .where({ id: decoded.id, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-            .select('id', 'password_changed_at')
-            .first();
-          if (!admin) {
-            return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session expired' });
-          }
-          if (admin.password_changed_at) {
-            const passwordChangedSeconds = Math.floor(
-              new Date(admin.password_changed_at).getTime() / 1000
-            );
-            if (decoded.iat < passwordChangedSeconds) {
-              return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session expired' });
-            }
-          }
-          return next();
-        }
-    } catch (err) {
-      // Token invalid, fall through to password check
-      logger.warn('JWT verification failed in photoAuth', { error: err.message });
-      }
-    }
-    
-    // Check for password header (legacy support)
-    const password = req.headers['x-gallery-password'];
-    
-    // If no eventSlug (thumbnails), and we don't have valid auth yet, deny access
-    if (!eventSlug && !password && !tokenFromRequest) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication required for thumbnails' });
-    }
-
-    const event = await db('events').where({ slug: eventSlug, is_active: formatBoolean(true) }).first();
-    if (!event) {
-      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found' });
-    }
-
-    const requiresPassword = !(event.require_password === false || event.require_password === 0 || event.require_password === '0');
-
-    if (!requiresPassword) {
-      req.event = event;
-      return next();
-    }
-    
-    if (!password && !tokenFromRequest) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication required' });
-    }
-
-    if (password) {
-      const validPassword = await bcrypt.compare(password, event.password_hash);
-      if (!validPassword) {
-        await db('access_logs').insert({
-          event_id: event.id,
-          ip_address: req.ip,
-          user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
-          action: 'login_fail'
-        });
-        return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid password' });
-      }
-    } else {
-      // No valid authentication
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid authentication' });
-    }
-    
-    req.event = event;
-    next();
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Photo auth error', { error: error.message, stack: error.stack });
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Authentication error' });
-  }
-}
-
-module.exports = photoAuth;

backend/src/routes/adminApiTokens.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 const express = require('express');
 const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
+const { safeValidationErrors } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
 const { adminAuth } = require('./../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('./../middleware/permissions');
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ router.post(
     try {
       const errors = validationResult(req);
       if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-        return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+        return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
       }
       const { name, scopes, expires_at } = req.body;
       const { plaintext, hashed, preview } = generateApiToken();

backend/src/routes/adminArchives.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const archiver = require('archiver');
 const StreamZip = require('node-stream-zip');
 const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
 const { assertZipEntriesWithin } = require('../utils/safePath');
+const { sanitizeForZipEntry } = require('../utils/filenameSanitizer');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const router = express.Router();
@@ -204,15 +205,111 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
       // manifest the archive process writes. Older archives have no manifest;
       // we fall back to filename for those.
       const manifestByFilename = new Map();
+      // Aliases that more than one manifest row claims — see the loop below.
+      const ambiguousAliases = new Set();
       try {
         const manifestRaw = await fs.readFile(
           path.join(eventDir, 'photos_manifest.json'), 'utf8',
         );
         const parsed = JSON.parse(manifestRaw);
         if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {
-          for (const m of parsed) {
-            if (m && m.filename) manifestByFilename.set(m.filename, m);
+          // Two passes, and the order is the point. Canonical photos.filename
+          // keys are claimed first and never yielded afterwards; aliases only
+          // fill names no canonical row wanted. Interleaving them made the
+          // result depend on manifest iteration order — the query has no
+          // ORDER BY — and could delete a canonical key because some OTHER
+          // row's original_filename happened to collide with it.
+          const rows = parsed.filter((m) => m && m.filename);
+
+          // photos.filename is not unique within an event: s3AutoImporter
+          // takes path.basename(entry.key) and dedupes by path, so two
+          // imported files in different subfolders both land as `IMG_1234.jpg`
+          // with different `path` values. At restore both ZIP entries reduce
+          // to the same basename, so whichever row won the key would hand the
+          // other photo someone else's category. Contested names are dropped
+          // rather than guessed.
+          const contestedFilenames = new Set();
+          for (const m of rows) {
+            const held = manifestByFilename.get(m.filename);
+            if (held && held !== m) {
+              contestedFilenames.add(m.filename);
+              continue;
+            }
+            manifestByFilename.set(m.filename, m);
           }
+          for (const name of contestedFilenames) manifestByFilename.delete(name);
+          if (contestedFilenames.size) {
+            logger.warn(
+              `Photos manifest: ${contestedFilenames.size} filename(s) claimed by more than one photo; `
+              + 'those fall back to the directory for their category.'
+            );
+          }
+
+          // Every canonical name, contested ones included — an alias must not
+          // claim a name that a canonical row wanted and lost, either.
+          const canonicalNames = new Set(rows.map((m) => m.filename));
+
+          for (const m of rows) {
+            // Also index by original_filename. When
+            // general_use_original_filenames_for_downloads was on at archive
+            // time, archiveService names each ZIP entry after the ORIGINAL
+            // filename, while the manifest stays keyed by the internal
+            // photos.filename — so a lookup by the extracted basename misses
+            // every entry and the restore silently loses categories on exactly
+            // those archives. Never overwrite a real filename key: that one is
+            // authoritative if both happen to collide.
+            // Index the name as the ZIP would have EMITTED it, not the raw
+            // column: archiveService runs original names through
+            // sanitizeForZipEntry() before writing the entry, so an original
+            // with a slash or a control byte lands under a different name than
+            // the manifest records. Index both, so either spelling resolves.
+            //
+            // Still not total: uniquifyZipNames() appends `_1` when two photos
+            // in one event share an original name, and that suffix cannot be
+            // reconstructed from the manifest. Those few fall through to the
+            // directory, exactly as they did before this fix — no worse, just
+            // not better. Closing that needs the emitted name recorded at
+            // archive time, which is a writer change and a new archive format.
+            for (const alias of [m.original_filename, sanitizeForZipEntry(m.original_filename)]) {
+              if (!alias) continue;
+              // An alias colliding with someone else's canonical name is
+              // genuinely undecidable, so it is dropped rather than resolved
+              // either way. Which photo the ZIP emitted under that name
+              // depends on whether original-filename archiving was on at
+              // archive time, and the manifest does not record that: with it
+              // ON the entry is the ALIAS owner's file, with it OFF it is the
+              // canonical owner's. Preferring either one silently mislabels
+              // the other half of the time.
+              //
+              // What the two-pass split buys is that this is now decided the
+              // same way every run — the archive query has no ORDER BY, so
+              // interleaving the passes previously made it a coin flip
+              // between dropping the name and overwriting it.
+              if (canonicalNames.has(alias)) {
+                if (manifestByFilename.get(alias) !== m) ambiguousAliases.add(alias);
+                continue;
+              }
+              if (manifestByFilename.has(alias)) {
+                // Two rows want the same alias — e.g. `individual/IMG.jpg` and
+                // `collages/IMG.jpg`, which archiveService treats as distinct
+                // paths and does not suffix, but which collapse to one basename
+                // here. Whichever won would give the other photo someone else's
+                // category. Drop the alias so both fall through to the
+                // directory instead: an unresolved category is recoverable, a
+                // confidently wrong one is not.
+                if (manifestByFilename.get(alias) !== m) ambiguousAliases.add(alias);
+                continue;
+              }
+              manifestByFilename.set(alias, m);
+            }
+          }
+        }
+        for (const alias of ambiguousAliases) manifestByFilename.delete(alias);
+        if (ambiguousAliases.size) {
+          logger.warn(
+            `Photos manifest: ${ambiguousAliases.size} original-filename alias(es) claimed by more than one `
+            + 'photo; those fall back to the directory for their category.'
+          );
         }
         logger.info(`Loaded photos manifest: ${manifestByFilename.size} entries`);
       } catch (e) {
@@ -226,9 +323,84 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
       // Get list of extracted files to update database
       const extractedPhotos = [];
 
-      // First, collect all category information from the ZIP structure
+      // Category name -> id, resolved once per name for the whole restore.
       const categoriesMap = new Map();
 
+      // Find-or-create the category by name, among the ones this event can see.
+      const resolveCategoryId = async (categoryName) => {
+        if (!categoryName) return null;
+        if (categoriesMap.has(categoryName)) return categoriesMap.get(categoryName);
+
+        // Globals count as existing. A photo filed under the seeded "Ceremony"
+        // has event_id NULL on its category row, so an event-only lookup misses
+        // it and creates a second "Ceremony" — and since is_global defaults to
+        // TRUE, that duplicate then shows up in every other event's category
+        // list. Same visibility rule the photo routes use: own rows or global.
+        // Two queries, not one with an OR: an event-scoped category and a
+        // global one may share a name, and a single .first() would return
+        // whichever the engine felt like — silently reassigning a photo to the
+        // global row and losing event-local settings like allow_downloads.
+        // The event's own row is the more specific answer, so it wins.
+        //
+        // The global arm requires event_id IS NULL, not just is_global. The
+        // bug fixed here left legacy rows behind on upgraded instances —
+        // event-owned AND is_global true, because the column defaults true —
+        // and matching on the flag alone would let one event's leftover row be
+        // adopted by another event's restore, tying photos to a category that
+        // vanishes with someone else's gallery.
+        // Two event-scoped categories CAN share a display name when their
+        // slugs differ, and .first() would then pick one arbitrarily — both
+        // manifest names collapse onto a single id and half the photos
+        // inherit the wrong per-category settings (allow_downloads above all).
+        // Resolving that properly needs a stable category identifier in the
+        // manifest, which is a writer change and an archive-format bump, and
+        // could not help any archive already written. So: surface it instead
+        // of fixing it blind. If this never fires in real logs, the format
+        // change is not worth making; if it does, this is the evidence for it.
+        const ownRows = await db('photo_categories')
+          .where({ event_id: archive.id, name: categoryName })
+          .select('id');
+        if (ownRows.length > 1) {
+          logger.warn(
+            `Photos manifest: category name "${categoryName}" matches ${ownRows.length} rows in event `
+            + `${archive.id}; picking the lowest id. Photos from the other row(s) will inherit its settings.`
+          );
+        }
+
+        const existingCategory =
+          // Lowest id, not engine order — an arbitrary-but-stable choice beats
+          // a nondeterministic one, so a re-run lands the same way.
+          (ownRows.length
+            ? await db('photo_categories')
+              .where('id', Math.min(...ownRows.map((r) => r.id)))
+              .first()
+            : null)
+          || await db('photo_categories')
+            .where('name', categoryName)
+            .whereNull('event_id')
+            .where('is_global', formatBoolean(true))
+            .first();
+
+        if (existingCategory) {
+          categoriesMap.set(categoryName, existingCategory.id);
+        } else {
+          const insertResult = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+            event_id: archive.id,
+            name: categoryName,
+            slug: slugify(categoryName),
+            // Explicit: the column defaults to true, and a restore inventing a
+            // GLOBAL category would leak this event's naming into every other
+            // gallery. Anything created here belongs to this event alone.
+            is_global: formatBoolean(false),
+            created_at: new Date()
+          }).returning('id');
+
+          categoriesMap.set(categoryName, insertResult[0]?.id || insertResult[0]);
+        }
+
+        return categoriesMap.get(categoryName);
+      };
+
       for (const entry of entries) {
         if (!entry.isDirectory && entry.name.match(/\.(jpg|jpeg|png|gif|webp)$/i)) {
           const filename = path.basename(entry.name);
@@ -239,48 +411,47 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
             // Check if file was extracted successfully
             const stats = await fs.stat(actualFilePath);
             
-            // Determine category from directory structure
-            let categoryId = null;
-            if (dirPath && dirPath !== '.') {
-              // Get the first level directory as category
-              const categoryName = dirPath.split(path.sep)[0];
-              
-              if (!categoriesMap.has(categoryName)) {
-                // Check if this category exists in the database
-                const existingCategory = await db('photo_categories')
-                  .where('event_id', archive.id)
-                  .where('name', categoryName)
-                  .first();
-                
-                if (existingCategory) {
-                  categoriesMap.set(categoryName, existingCategory.id);
-                } else {
-                  // Create the category if it doesn't exist
-                  const insertResult = await db('photo_categories').insert({
-                    event_id: archive.id,
-                    name: categoryName,
-                    slug: slugify(categoryName),
-                    created_at: new Date()
-                  }).returning('id');
-                  
-                  const newCategoryId = insertResult[0]?.id || insertResult[0];
-                  categoriesMap.set(categoryName, newCategoryId);
-                }
-              }
-              
-              categoryId = categoriesMap.get(categoryName);
-            }
-          
+            const manifestEntry = manifestByFilename.get(filename);
+
+            // The manifest is the only faithful source for the category, and
+            // it is authoritative INCLUDING when it says "none". A manifest
+            // entry with a null category_name means the photo was genuinely
+            // uncategorized, so falling through to the directory would
+            // contradict the very record being restored from.
+            //
+            // That matters because the directory is not a category. Archive
+            // entry names are the storage key minus `events/active/{slug}`,
+            // and that layout is `individual/{filename}` / `collages/…` —
+            // categories have never been directories there. Reading the first
+            // path segment on a real archive therefore invents categories
+            // literally named "individual" and "collages".
+            //
+            // So the fallback is confined to photos with NO manifest entry at
+            // all: archives written before the manifest existed, where the
+            // directory is the only signal left and inventing those two names
+            // is still better than losing every category.
             // Check if photo already exists in database
             const existingPhoto = await db('photos')
               .where('event_id', archive.id)
               .where('filename', filename)
               .first();
-            
+
             if (!existingPhoto) {
+              // Resolved HERE, not above: resolveCategoryId find-or-CREATES,
+              // and archiveEvent retains photo rows. Resolving before this
+              // check meant restoring an archive whose rows still exist
+              // created a category from the stale manifest name that nothing
+              // then used — so renaming a category while its event was
+              // archived left the old name behind as an empty duplicate.
+              let categoryId = null;
+              if (manifestEntry) {
+                categoryId = await resolveCategoryId(manifestEntry.category_name);
+              } else if (dirPath && dirPath !== '.') {
+                categoryId = await resolveCategoryId(dirPath.split(path.sep)[0]);
+              }
+
               // Store relative path from storage root
               const relativePath = path.relative(storagePath, actualFilePath);
-              const manifestEntry = manifestByFilename.get(filename);
               extractedPhotos.push({
                 event_id: archive.id,
                 filename: filename,
@@ -293,7 +464,13 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
                 type: path.extname(filename).substring(1).toLowerCase(),
                 size_bytes: stats.size,
                 category_id: categoryId,
-                uploaded_at: new Date()
+                // .toISOString(), not a Date: inside jest the sqlite3 binding's
+                // type dispatch misses sandbox-created Dates and stores the
+                // literal string "[object Object]", so every restored photo
+                // gets a garbage timestamp that any test reading it would
+                // believe. Production stores Dates as ms-numbers and is
+                // unaffected — which is exactly why this survives unnoticed.
+                uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString()
               });
             }
           } catch (statError) {

backend/src/routes/adminAuth.js

@@ -254,6 +254,11 @@ router.post('/mfa/setup', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
 
 // Complete enrollment: verify a code against the provisional secret, enable
 // MFA, and return one-time recovery codes (shown exactly once).
+//
+// No replay tracking here: this confirms an already-authenticated session
+// still holds the authenticator (no new session is granted), and starting
+// the last-used-step counter here would reject the very next login if it
+// lands in the same 30s TOTP step as this call.
 router.post('/mfa/enable', [
   adminAuth,
   body('code').notEmpty().withMessage('Verification code is required')
@@ -304,7 +309,17 @@ router.post('/mfa/disable', [
     throw new ValidationError('Two-factor authentication is not enabled');
   }
 
-  const totpOk = mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret);
+  // Persist the matched step atomically right here (see mfaService.persistTotpStep):
+  // two concurrent requests carrying the same captured code can't both read the
+  // same last-used step and both win — only the first writer's UPDATE affects a
+  // row, so a losing concurrent request is correctly treated as invalid below.
+  const totpStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(
+    req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret, admin.two_factor_last_used_step
+  );
+  let totpOk = false;
+  if (totpStep !== null) {
+    totpOk = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, { updated_at: new Date() });
+  }
   let recoveryOk = false;
   if (!totpOk) {
     const stored = mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(admin.two_factor_recovery_codes);
@@ -319,6 +334,7 @@ router.post('/mfa/disable', [
     two_factor_secret: null,
     two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
     two_factor_enrolled_at: null,
+    two_factor_last_used_step: null,
     updated_at: new Date()
   });
 
@@ -343,7 +359,16 @@ router.post('/mfa/recovery-codes', [
   if (!isMfaEnabled(admin)) {
     throw new ValidationError('Two-factor authentication is not enabled');
   }
-  if (!mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret)) {
+  // Persist the matched step atomically right here (see mfaService.persistTotpStep):
+  // two concurrent requests carrying the same captured code can't both read the
+  // same last-used step and both win — only the first writer's UPDATE affects a
+  // row, so a losing concurrent request is correctly treated as invalid below.
+  const totpStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(
+    req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret, admin.two_factor_last_used_step
+  );
+  const totpOk = totpStep !== null
+    && await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, { updated_at: new Date() });
+  if (!totpOk) {
     throw new ValidationError('Invalid verification code');
   }
 

backend/src/routes/adminBackup.js

@@ -191,7 +191,11 @@ const picpeakUpload = multer({
     destination: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, os.tmpdir()),
     filename: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, `picpeak-upload-${Date.now()}-${crypto.randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}.picpeak`),
   }),
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5 GB — .picpeak with photos can be large
+  // CVE-2026-82333: this route only ever consumes a single unnamed file
+  // field (`backup`) — no legitimate bracket-indexed field name (e.g.
+  // `a[0]`) exists in its form. fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 rejects any field
+  // name using array-index syntax at all, closing multer's field-parser DoS.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 5 GB — .picpeak with photos can be large
 });
 
 // Upload + restore a .picpeak onto THIS instance. DESTRUCTIVE: full override of
@@ -240,6 +244,11 @@ router.post('/picpeak/import', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.restore'), p
       tables: result.tables,
       filesRestored: result.filesRestored,
       usesExternalMedia: result.usesExternalMedia,
+      // False when the pre-#1163 external-path conversion failed. The rows and
+      // files are in place, but no external original resolves until it is
+      // retried — the UI must say so rather than showing a plain success.
+      externalPathsConverted: result.externalPathsConverted !== false,
+      externalPathError: result.externalPathError || null,
       crossEngine: result.crossEngine,
       sessionInvalidated: true,
     });

backend/src/routes/adminBusinessProfile.js

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { handleAsync, validateRequest, successResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { getStoragePath } = require('../config/storage');
+const { uploadedPdfLogoPath } = require('../utils/safePath');
+const { validateFileType, validateFileContent, ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES } = require('../utils/fileSecurityUtils');
 const businessProfileService = require('../services/businessProfileService');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { validateIban } = require('../utils/iban');
@@ -94,6 +96,19 @@ const router = express.Router();
 // but accepts SVG in addition to PNG / JPEG — the PDF renderer
 // rasterises SVGs to PNG on the fly via resolveLogoFile() so the
 // admin can drop a vector logo here and have it work in print.
+//
+// GHSA-6wrv-9pr4-hhmw: this route used to take the stored extension
+// straight from `file.originalname` and only checked `file.mimetype`
+// against an allowlist — a file could declare an image MIME type
+// while carrying a `.html`/`.js` extension and arbitrary content, get
+// served same-origin from /uploads/logos with that extension, and
+// execute as script in the browser. Fixed the same way every sibling
+// upload route (adminSettings.js, adminCMS.js) already does it:
+// `validateFileType()` pairs the claimed MIME type against the
+// extension, and the extension actually written to disk is looked up
+// from the validated MIME type — never taken from client input.
+const PDF_LOGO_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES = ['image/png', 'image/jpeg', 'image/svg+xml'];
+
 const pdfLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({
   destination: async (_req, _file, cb) => {
     const dir = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'uploads/logos');
@@ -101,18 +116,26 @@ const pdfLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({
     cb(null, dir);
   },
   filename: (_req, file, cb) => {
-    const ext = path.extname(file.originalname) || '.png';
+    // fileFilter (below) runs before this and already rejected any
+    // mimetype outside PDF_LOGO_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES, so the lookup below
+    // always hits. The extension is derived from the validated MIME
+    // type, never from file.originalname.
+    const ext = ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES[file.mimetype]?.extensions[0] || '.png';
     cb(null, `pdf-logo-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
   },
 });
 
 const pdfLogoUpload = multer({
   storage: pdfLogoStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 },
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `logo` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
   fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
-    const allowed = ['image/png', 'image/jpeg', 'image/svg+xml'];
-    if (allowed.includes(file.mimetype)) cb(null, true);
-    else cb(new Error('Only PNG, JPEG and SVG logos are allowed'));
+    if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, PDF_LOGO_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES)) {
+      cb(null, true);
+    } else {
+      cb(new Error('Only PNG, JPEG and SVG logos are allowed'));
+    }
   },
 });
 
@@ -352,18 +375,27 @@ router.post(
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No logo file uploaded' });
     }
 
+    // fileFilter above only pairs the claimed MIME type against the
+    // extension — it runs on the in-flight stream, before any bytes are
+    // written, so it can't inspect content. Content-sniff the bytes multer
+    // just wrote to disk (magic numbers) before trusting them; SVG has no
+    // magic-number check (validateFileContent returns true for it), it's
+    // protected by the CSP header instead. Matches the cleanup-then-reject
+    // pattern createFileUploadValidator() uses for other upload routes.
+    const contentIsValid = await validateFileContent(req.file.path, req.file.mimetype);
+    if (!contentIsValid) {
+      try { await fs.unlink(req.file.path); } catch (_) { /* ignore */ }
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'File content does not match its declared type' });
+    }
+
     // Clean up the previous PDF logo on disk if it was uploaded via
     // this same endpoint (matches the pdf-logo-* prefix). We leave
     // anything else untouched — the admin may have set logo_path to
     // a path managed by a different system.
     try {
       const previous = await db('business_profile').where({ id: 1 }).first();
-      const prev = previous?.logo_path;
-      if (prev && typeof prev === 'string' && /pdf-logo-\d+\./.test(prev)) {
-        const stripped = prev.replace(/^\/+/, '');
-        const prevDisk = path.isAbsolute(prev)
-          ? prev
-          : path.join(getStoragePath(), stripped);
+      const prevDisk = uploadedPdfLogoPath(previous?.logo_path, getStoragePath());
+      if (prevDisk) {
         try { await fs.unlink(prevDisk); } catch (_) { /* ignore */ }
       }
     } catch (_) { /* ignore */ }
@@ -383,12 +415,8 @@ router.delete(
   requirePermission('settings.edit'),
   handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
     const existing = await db('business_profile').where({ id: 1 }).first();
-    const prev = existing?.logo_path;
-    if (prev && typeof prev === 'string' && /pdf-logo-\d+\./.test(prev)) {
-      const stripped = prev.replace(/^\/+/, '');
-      const prevDisk = path.isAbsolute(prev)
-        ? prev
-        : path.join(getStoragePath(), stripped);
+    const prevDisk = uploadedPdfLogoPath(existing?.logo_path, getStoragePath());
+    if (prevDisk) {
       try { await fs.unlink(prevDisk); } catch (_) { /* ignore */ }
     }
     await businessProfileService.updateProfile(
@@ -433,7 +461,19 @@ router.put(
     body('defaultLocale').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 8 }),
     body('defaultQrFormat').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isIn(['swiss', 'epc', 'none']),
     body('footerLine').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 255 }),
-    body('logoPath').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 512 }),
+    // GHSA-6wrv-9pr4-hhmw: logoPath is mass-assignable here, so it must
+    // only ever be settable to a path the POST /logo upload route itself
+    // produced (or '' to clear it, allowed by `values: 'falsy'` above) —
+    // not an arbitrary string chaining in a file uploaded elsewhere.
+    // uploadedPdfLogoPath() is the same pattern check the delete/replace
+    // cleanup path already trusts to name a file this route wrote.
+    body('logoPath').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 512 })
+      .custom((value) => {
+        if (!uploadedPdfLogoPath(value, getStoragePath())) {
+          throw new Error('logoPath must be a path produced by the logo upload endpoint');
+        }
+        return true;
+      }),
     // Bundled-fonts dropdown (migration 121). Free-text upload field
     // (pdfFontTtfPath, migration 103) was retired from the UI in
     // favour of this dropdown; the column stays in the DB so any

backend/src/routes/adminCMS.js

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ const path = require('path');
 const fs = require('fs').promises;
 const multer = require('multer');
 const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
+const { safeValidationErrors } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
@@ -30,7 +31,9 @@ const pageLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({
 
 const pageLogoUpload = multer({
   storage: pageLogoStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 },
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `logo` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
   fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
     const allowed = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/svg+xml'];
     if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowed)) cb(null, true);
@@ -80,7 +83,7 @@ router.put('/pages/:slug', adminAuth, requirePermission('cms.edit'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { slug } = req.params;

backend/src/routes/adminCategories.js

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 const express = require('express');
 const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
+const { safeValidationErrors } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ router.post('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
     
     const { name, slug, is_global = true, event_id = null } = req.body;
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ router.put('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { id } = req.params;
@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ router.put('/:id/hero', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { id } = req.params;

backend/src/routes/adminContracts.js

@@ -65,14 +65,20 @@ const signedPdfStorage = multer.diskStorage({
     cb(null, uploadDir);
   },
   filename: (req, file, cb) => {
+    const contractId = Number(req.params.id);
+    if (!Number.isInteger(contractId) || contractId <= 0) {
+      return cb(new Error('Invalid contract id'));
+    }
     const ext = path.extname(file.originalname) || '.pdf';
-    cb(null, `contract-${req.params.id}-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
+    cb(null, `contract-${contractId}-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
   },
 });
 
 const signedPdfUpload = multer({
   storage: signedPdfStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 10 MB
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `file` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 10 MB
   fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
     const allowed = ['application/pdf'];
     if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowed)) return cb(null, true);

backend/src/routes/adminCssTemplates.js

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 const express = require('express');
 const router = express.Router();
 const { body, param, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
+const { safeValidationErrors } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { db, withRetry } = require('../database/db');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ router.get('/:slotNumber', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.view'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { slotNumber } = req.params;
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ router.put('/:slotNumber', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.edit'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { slotNumber } = req.params;
@@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ router.post('/:slotNumber/reset', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.edit'),
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     await withRetry(() =>

backend/src/routes/adminDashboard.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const { resolveAdapter } = require('../services/trackers');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { errorResponse, getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { measureLocalStorageUsage } = require('../services/localStorageUsage');
 const router = express.Router();
 
 /**
@@ -88,11 +89,33 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
       .count('id as count')
       .first();
 
-    // Get storage usage (sum of all photo sizes)
-    const storageUsed = await applyEventScope(db('photos'), req.admin, 'event_id')
+    // The catalogued size of the ORIGINALS. Kept, and still worth showing —
+    // it answers "how much photography is in here" — but it is emphatically
+    // NOT storage used, which is what it was labelled for years (#1164).
+    const catalogedBytes = await applyEventScope(db('photos'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .sum('size_bytes as total')
       .first();
 
+    // Storage used: what is actually on this machine. In reference mode the
+    // originals above live on a NAS and contribute nothing here; conversely
+    // this counts what the sum never did — thumbnails, previews, hero
+    // renditions, watermarks and the per-event download cache.
+    //
+    // Deliberately NOT event-scoped, unlike everything else on this endpoint:
+    // it is a disk measurement, and disk is not divisible by which admin owns
+    // which event.
+    //
+    // Skipped entirely on an S3 backend: the objects are in the bucket and a
+    // walk of STORAGE_PATH would report near-zero, which is worse than the
+    // catalogued figure those installs had before #1164.
+    const usesLocalBackend = (process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND || 'local').toLowerCase() !== 's3';
+    let localStorage = null;
+    try {
+      if (usesLocalBackend) localStorage = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
+    } catch (err) {
+      logger.warn(`Dashboard storage measurement failed: ${err.message}`);
+    }
+
     // Get total views (last 30 days)
     const thirtyDaysAgo = new Date();
     thirtyDaysAgo.setDate(thirtyDaysAgo.getDate() - 30);
@@ -154,7 +177,19 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
       activeEvents: activeEvents.count || 0,
       expiringEvents: expiringEvents.count || 0,
       totalPhotos: totalPhotos.count || 0,
-      storageUsed: storageUsed.total || 0,
+      // Real bytes on this disk. Null when the measurement failed or was
+      // skipped, which the UI shows as "unavailable" rather than substituting
+      // a number that means something else.
+      storageUsed: localStorage ? localStorage.total : null,
+      // Three states, not two: 'catalog' means the backend is S3 and the
+      // objects are in the bucket, which is a fact about the install;
+      // 'unavailable' means the walk failed, which is a fault. Collapsing them
+      // made a failed local measurement claim the objects live in S3.
+      storageMeasurement: localStorage ? 'disk' : (usesLocalBackend ? 'unavailable' : 'catalog'),
+      storageBreakdown: localStorage ? localStorage.breakdown : null,
+      storagePartial: localStorage ? localStorage.partial : false,
+      // Catalogued original bytes — what `storageUsed` used to report (#1164).
+      catalogedBytes: Number(catalogedBytes.total) || 0,
       totalViews: totalViews.count || 0,
       totalDownloads: totalDownloads.count || 0,
       viewsTrend: Math.round(viewsTrend * 10) / 10,

backend/src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ const express = require('express');
 const router = express.Router();
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
-const { databaseBackupService } = require('../services/databaseBackup');
+const { databaseBackupService, isUnderPubliclyServableRoot } = require('../services/databaseBackup');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
@@ -60,7 +60,28 @@ router.put('/config', requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
       'database_backup_email_on_failure',
       'database_backup_email_on_success'
     ];
-    
+
+    // A backup.create holder (the built-in `admin` role has it without
+    // settings.edit or backup.restore) could otherwise point backups at a
+    // public static mount and fetch the dump unauthenticated — see
+    // isUnderPubliclyServableRoot's comment (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm class).
+    if (
+      typeof req.body.database_backup_destination_path === 'string'
+      && isUnderPubliclyServableRoot(req.body.database_backup_destination_path)
+    ) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Destination path must not be inside a publicly served directory' });
+    }
+
+    // A retention of 0 or less pushes cleanupOldBackups' cutoff to today or
+    // the future, deleting every completed backup on the next scheduled run
+    // — a backup.create holder achieving what backup.delete gates on /cleanup.
+    if (
+      req.body.database_backup_retention_days !== undefined
+      && (!Number.isFinite(req.body.database_backup_retention_days) || req.body.database_backup_retention_days < 1)
+    ) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'database_backup_retention_days must be a positive number' });
+    }
+
     const updates = [];
     
     for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(req.body)) {

backend/src/routes/adminEmail.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { requireFeatureFlag } = require('../middleware/requireFeatureFlag');
 const messagingGate = requireFeatureFlag('messaging');
 const { wrapEmailHtml, processEmailQueue } = require('../services/emailProcessor');
-const { errorResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { errorResponse, safeValidationErrors } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const router = express.Router();
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ router.post('/config', [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const {
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config', [
 ], async (req, res) => {
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
-    if (!errors.isEmpty()) return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+    if (!errors.isEmpty()) return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     const { imap_host, imap_port, imap_secure, imap_user, imap_pass, imap_folder } = req.body;
     const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
     if (!(await isHostAllowed(imap_host))) {
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const page = req.query.page ? parseInt(req.query.page, 10) : 1;

backend/src/routes/adminEventRename.js

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 
 const express = require('express');
 const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
+const { safeValidationErrors } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), req
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ success: false, errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ success: false, errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { eventId } = req.params;
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/validate-rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.ed
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ valid: false, errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ valid: false, errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { eventId } = req.params;

backend/src/routes/adminEventTypes.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 const express = require('express');
 const { body, param, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
+const { safeValidationErrors } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { logActivity } = require('../database/db');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ router.get('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { id } = req.params;
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ router.post('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const {
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ router.put('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { id } = req.params;
@@ -196,7 +197,7 @@ router.delete('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { id } = req.params;
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ router.post('/reorder', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
   try {
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+      return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
     }
 
     const { orderedIds } = req.body;

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/archiveBulk.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ const { adminAuth } = require('../../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../../middleware/permissions');
 const { archiveEvent } = require('../../services/archiveService');
 const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
-const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { errorResponse, safeValidationErrors } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { requireEventOwnership, filterOwnedEventIds } = require('../../middleware/ownership');
 const { deleteEventCascade } = require('./helpers');
 
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     try {
       const errors = validationResult(req);
       if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-        return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+        return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
       }
 
       const { eventIds } = req.body;
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     try {
       const errors = validationResult(req);
       if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-        return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+        return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
       }
 
       const { eventIds } = req.body;

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/crud.js

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const { escapeLikePattern } = require('../../utils/sqlSecurity');
 const { validatePasswordInContext, getBcryptRounds } = require('../../utils/passwordValidation');
 const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
 const { sanitizeForLog, sanitizeValidationErrors } = require('../../utils/sanitizeForLog');
-const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { errorResponse, safeValidationErrors } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { buildShareLinkVariants } = require('../../services/shareLinkService');
 const { parseBooleanInput } = require('../../utils/parsers');
 const eventTypeService = require('../../services/eventTypeService');
@@ -30,6 +30,29 @@ const { getFrontendBaseUrl } = require('../../utils/frontendUrl');
 const downloadZipService = require('../../services/downloadZipService');
 const { validateHeroImageAnchor, getEventFieldRequirements, readBooleanSetting, getDownloadProtectionDefaults, getBrandingDefaults, getCustomerNameFromPayload, getCustomerEmailFromPayload, getCustomerPhoneFromPayload, isPhoneFieldEnabled, mapEventForApi, hasCustomerContactColumns, deleteEventCascade, SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS, SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS } = require('./helpers');
 
+/**
+ * Validate a gallery password the admin re-typed, against the SAME policy
+ * event creation applies.
+ *
+ * The publish dialog (#627) re-hashes `password_hash` from a plaintext the
+ * admin types again, and validated it with nothing but express-validator's
+ * `isLength({ min: 6 })`. So the configured complexity — moderate by default
+ * — governed creation and reset while this door accepted `aaaaaa` and made it
+ * the live gallery password.
+ *
+ * Returns null when the password passes; otherwise the response body to send.
+ */
+async function checkGalleryPasswordPolicy(password, eventName) {
+  const result = await validatePasswordInContext(password, 'gallery', { eventName });
+  if (result.valid) return null;
+  return {
+    error: 'Password does not meet security requirements',
+    details: result.errors,
+    score: result.score,
+    feedback: result.feedback,
+  };
+}
+
 module.exports = (router) => {
 
 
@@ -134,7 +157,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         // errors.array() embeds the SUBMITTED value per field — including a
         // rejected plaintext password (GHSA-r794).
         logger.error('Validation errors:', sanitizeValidationErrors(errors.array()));
-        return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+        return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
       }
 
       // Get field requirements from settings
@@ -833,7 +856,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     try {
       const errors = validationResult(req);
       if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-        return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+        return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
       }
 
       const { id } = req.params;
@@ -854,6 +877,9 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
       // Re-hash so the stored hash matches what the email carries — even if
       // the admin mistypes vs. what was set at draft creation, the gallery
       // password the customer receives is the one that actually works.
+        const policyError = await checkGalleryPasswordPolicy(password, event.event_name);
+        if (policyError) return res.status(400).json(policyError);
+
         publishUpdates.password_hash = await bcrypt.hash(password, getBcryptRounds());
       }
       await db('events').where('id', id).update(publishUpdates);
@@ -991,7 +1017,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     try {
       const errors = validationResult(req);
       if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-        return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+        return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
       }
 
       const { id } = req.params;
@@ -1269,7 +1295,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
       if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
         // Redact credentials — an invalid update still logs the whole body (GHSA-pgmp).
         logger.debug('Update event validation errors', { errors: sanitizeValidationErrors(errors.array()), body: sanitizeForLog(req.body) });
-        return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+        return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
       }
 
       const { id } = req.params;
@@ -1669,7 +1695,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     try {
       const errors = validationResult(req);
       if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-        return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
+        return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
       }
 
       const { id } = req.params;

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/helpers.js

@@ -224,6 +224,117 @@ async function deleteEventCascade(eventId, adminContext) {
     throw err;
   }
 
+  // Collect this event's storage keys BEFORE the transaction removes the
+  // photo rows. Afterwards nothing records which objects belonged to this
+  // event — the DB was the only place that knew, and on an S3/R2 backend the
+  // objects are still sitting in the bucket, unreferenced and billable.
+  //
+  // The filesystem cleanup below (#608) only ever touched local disk: in S3
+  // mode those paths don't exist, `fs.rm` succeeds against nothing, and the
+  // real objects are never touched. Measured on a 403-photo event: bucket
+  // object count unchanged, 679 referenced rows gone.
+  //
+  // A Set because a photo can carry the same key in two columns (an unresized
+  // gallery's hero and preview can resolve to one object) and deleting it
+  // twice would log a spurious failure for the second attempt.
+  const storageKeys = new Set();
+  // Derived keys separately: unlike the originals, whose keys embed the event
+  // slug, these are not event-scoped and need a shared-ownership check below.
+  const derivedKeys = new Set();
+  try {
+    const { resolvePhotoStorageKey } = require('../../services/photoResolver');
+    const photos = await db('photos')
+      .where('event_id', eventId)
+      .select('id', 'path', 'thumbnail_path', 'hero_path', 'preview_path', 'watermark_path', 'source_origin');
+
+    for (const photo of photos) {
+      try {
+        // Returns null for reference/external photos, which live on a mount
+        // outside the managed backend and must NOT be deleted — PicPeak does
+        // not own those bytes.
+        const originalKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(event, photo);
+        if (originalKey) storageKeys.add(originalKey);
+      } catch (keyErr) {
+        logger.warn('Could not resolve storage key during cascade delete', {
+          eventId, photoId: photo.id, error: keyErr.message
+        });
+      }
+      // Derived tiers are stored as canonical keys and pass through verbatim.
+      // watermark_path included: it is storage-backed on the single-photo
+      // path (watermarkService.deleteWatermarkFile) and leaked here the same
+      // way the originals did.
+      for (const derived of [photo.thumbnail_path, photo.hero_path, photo.preview_path, photo.watermark_path]) {
+        if (derived) {
+          storageKeys.add(derived);
+          derivedKeys.add(derived);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  } catch (collectErr) {
+    logger.warn('Could not enumerate stored objects before cascade delete', {
+      eventId, error: collectErr.message
+    });
+  }
+
+  // A canonical derivative can belong to more than one gallery. Its basename
+  // comes from the photo's filename — imageProcessor passes no outputBasename
+  // for managed photos, so the key is `thumbnails/thumb_w300_<filename>` with
+  // nothing event-scoped in it — and filenames are not unique across events.
+  // The responsive-tier code says exactly that, which is why THOSE keys carry
+  // a p{id}_ prefix; the canonical ones predate it. Deleting a shared key here
+  // would blank a surviving gallery's tile until something regenerated it, so
+  // anything another event still points at is left alone. Originals need no
+  // such check: their keys embed the slug.
+  const derived = Array.from(derivedKeys);
+  try {
+    // Chunked: SQLite caps bind variables at 999 and this is four columns wide.
+    for (let i = 0; i < derived.length; i += 200) {
+      const chunk = derived.slice(i, i + 200);
+      const shared = await db('photos')
+        .whereNot('event_id', eventId)
+        .where((qb) => qb
+          .whereIn('thumbnail_path', chunk)
+          .orWhereIn('hero_path', chunk)
+          .orWhereIn('preview_path', chunk)
+          .orWhereIn('watermark_path', chunk))
+        .select('thumbnail_path', 'hero_path', 'preview_path', 'watermark_path');
+      for (const row of shared) {
+        for (const key of [row.thumbnail_path, row.hero_path, row.preview_path, row.watermark_path]) {
+          if (key && derivedKeys.has(key)) storageKeys.delete(key);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  } catch (sharedErr) {
+    // Can't prove ownership — keep the objects. An orphan costs storage; a
+    // deleted derivative costs someone else's gallery.
+    logger.warn('Could not check for shared derivatives; leaving them in place', {
+      eventId, error: sharedErr.message
+    });
+    for (const key of derivedKeys) storageKeys.delete(key);
+  }
+
+  // The archive zip is typically the largest single object an event owns, and
+  // archiveService writes it through the backend (`storage.putFromFile`) — so
+  // the `fs.unlink` below is a no-op on S3 and the zip outlives its event.
+  if (event.archive_path) storageKeys.add(event.archive_path);
+
+  // The pre-built "Download All" zip is the subtle one: it lives UNDER
+  // events/active/{slug}/.download-cache/ (downloadZipService.js:42), so the
+  // recursive fs.rm below covers it on local disk and nothing covers it on
+  // S3, where that prefix is not a directory. It is gallery-sized.
+  // downloadZipService exposes a cleanup() documented as "used on event
+  // deletion" that this cascade never called.
+  // NOTE: an in-flight "Download All" build that started before this delete
+  // can still upload its zip after the sweep and write the path onto a row
+  // that no longer exists, orphaning it. downloadZipService.cleanup() is the
+  // service's cancel primitive, but calling it here made the backend CI job
+  // exceed its 10-minute budget on this branch — its _cleanup() reaches
+  // getStorage() and, in a suite where the S3 backend is configured but
+  // unreachable, every cascade delete then pays the adapter's retry backoff.
+  // Left as a follow-up rather than shipped as a timeout: the race is narrow
+  // and costs one orphaned object, the regression cost the whole suite.
+  if (event.download_zip_path) storageKeys.add(event.download_zip_path);
+
   await db.transaction(async (trx) => {
     // 1. Delete activity logs (audit trail)
     await trx('activity_logs').where('event_id', eventId).del();
@@ -284,6 +395,57 @@ async function deleteEventCascade(eventId, adminContext) {
     }
   });
 
+  // Managed objects, deleted AFTER the commit: a rolled-back transaction must
+  // never leave files destroyed for an event that still exists. Failures are
+  // logged rather than thrown, matching the philosophy of the filesystem
+  // cleanup above — the database is the source of truth, an orphaned object
+  // is recoverable noise, a half-deleted event is not.
+  if (storageKeys.size > 0) {
+    const { getStorage } = require('../../services/storage');
+    let removed = 0;
+    try {
+      const storage = getStorage();
+      const keys = Array.from(storageKeys);
+
+      // Bounded concurrency rather than one await per key. A 400-photo gallery
+      // owns well over a thousand objects once the derived tiers are counted,
+      // and on S3 that many sequential DeleteObject round trips runs to
+      // minutes — long enough for a proxy to time the request out AFTER the
+      // commit, leaving the event deleted and the sweep half-finished.
+      // Deleting is idempotent and order-independent, so there is nothing to
+      // serialise for.
+      //
+      // A pool, not Promise.all over every key: an unbounded fan-out would
+      // open one socket per object and exhaust the S3 client's connection
+      // pool.
+      const CONCURRENCY = 16;
+      let cursor = 0;
+      const worker = async () => {
+        while (cursor < keys.length) {
+          const key = keys[cursor++];
+          try {
+            await storage.delete(key);
+            removed++;
+          } catch (delErr) {
+            logger.warn('Failed to delete stored object during cascade delete', {
+              eventId, key, error: delErr.message
+            });
+          }
+        }
+      };
+      await Promise.all(
+        Array.from({ length: Math.min(CONCURRENCY, keys.length) }, worker)
+      );
+    } catch (storageErr) {
+      logger.warn('Storage backend unavailable during cascade delete', {
+        eventId, error: storageErr.message
+      });
+    }
+    logger.info('Cascade delete removed stored objects', {
+      eventId, removed, total: storageKeys.size
+    });
+  }
+
   // Audit trail (outside the transaction so a logging failure can't undo
   // the actual delete).
   await logActivity('event_deleted',

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/logo.js

@@ -23,14 +23,20 @@ const eventLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({
     cb(null, uploadDir);
   },
   filename: (req, file, cb) => {
+    const eventId = Number(req.params.id);
+    if (!Number.isInteger(eventId) || eventId <= 0) {
+      return cb(new Error('Invalid event id'));
+    }
     const ext = path.extname(file.originalname);
-    cb(null, `event-${req.params.id}-logo-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
+    cb(null, `event-${eventId}-logo-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
   }
 });
 
 const eventLogoUpload = multer({
   storage: eventLogoStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5MB
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `logo` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 5MB
   fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
     const allowedMimeTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/svg+xml'];
     if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowedMimeTypes)) {

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/slideshow.js

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../../middleware/permissions');
 const crypto = require('crypto');
-const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { errorResponse, safeValidationErrors } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { parseBooleanInput } = require('../../utils/parsers');
 const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../../middleware/ownership');
 const { requireFeatureFlag } = require('../../middleware/requireFeatureFlag');
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     try {
       const errors = validationResult(req);
       if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid slideshow settings', details: errors.array() });
+        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid slideshow settings', details: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
       }
 
       const event = await loadOwnedEvent(req);

backend/src/routes/adminExpenses.js

@@ -41,7 +41,10 @@ function diskUpload(subdir) {
       },
       filename: (_req, file, cb) => cb(null, `${subdir.split('/').pop()}-${Date.now()}${path.extname(file.originalname) || ''}`),
     }),
-    limits: { fileSize: 15 * 1024 * 1024 },
+    // CVE-2026-82333: both callers (`inboundUpload` → 'file', `proofUpload`
+    // → 'proof') take a single unnamed field — no legitimate array-indexed
+    // field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+    limits: { fileSize: 15 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
     fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => (ALLOWED_MIME.includes(file.mimetype) ? cb(null, true) : cb(new Error('Only PDF, JPEG or PNG files are allowed'))),
   });
 }

backend/src/routes/adminExternalMedia.js

@@ -8,10 +8,25 @@ const { list, resolveExternalPath, getExternalMediaRoot } = require('../services
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
 const sharp = require('sharp');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
-const { generateThumbnail } = require('../services/imageProcessor');
+const { generateThumbnail, extractCaptureDate } = require('../services/imageProcessor');
+const { isUniqueViolation } = require('../utils/dbErrors');
 
 const router = express.Router();
 
+// Events with an import running in THIS process (#1162).
+//
+// The second line of defence, not the first: migration 176 puts a unique index
+// on (event_id, external_relpath), and that is what actually makes a duplicate
+// impossible — it holds across replicas, across restarts, and against anything
+// that inserts external rows without going through this route.
+//
+// This set exists for the reason the duplicates got filed in the first place:
+// a large tree takes long enough that the run LOOKS hung, so admins click
+// again. Letting that second run walk the whole tree only to have every insert
+// bounce off the index wastes minutes of CPU and reports a nonsense
+// `skipped: 6012` back. Failing it immediately with 409 says what happened.
+const importsInFlight = new Set();
+
 // GET /api/admin/external-media/list?path=relative/dir
 router.get('/list', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view'), async (req, res) => {
   try {
@@ -50,8 +65,14 @@ async function walkDir(dir, baseDir) {
 // POST /api/admin/events/:id/import-external
 // Body: { external_path: string, recursive?: boolean, map?: { individual?: string, collages?: string } }
 router.post('/events/:id/import-external', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), requireEventOwnership, async (req, res) => {
+  const eventId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+  if (importsInFlight.has(eventId)) {
+    return res.status(409).json({
+      error: 'An import is already running for this event. Wait for it to finish before starting another.'
+    });
+  }
+  importsInFlight.add(eventId);
   try {
-    const eventId = parseInt(req.params.id);
     const { external_path, recursive = true, map = { individual: 'individual', collages: 'collages' } } = req.body || {};
     if (!external_path) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'external_path is required' });
 
@@ -60,6 +81,14 @@ router.post('/events/:id/import-external', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
     if (!event) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
 
     const baseAbs = resolveExternalPath({ external_path }, '');
+
+    // What gets STORED on the row (#1163). `f.rel` stays relative to the
+    // imported folder because the type inference below reads its first segment
+    // ('individual' / 'collages'); external_relpath is written relative to
+    // EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT so the row does not depend on a column this very
+    // handler is about to overwrite.
+    const basePrefix = String(external_path).replace(/^\/+|\/+$/g, '');
+    const toRootRelative = (rel) => (basePrefix ? path.join(basePrefix, rel) : rel);
     // Collect files
     const files = recursive ? await walkDir(baseAbs, baseAbs) : (await fs.readdir(baseAbs, { withFileTypes: true }))
       .filter(e => e.isFile())
@@ -106,10 +135,18 @@ router.post('/events/:id/import-external', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
       if (segs[0] === map.collages) type = 'collage';
       if (segs[0] === map.individual) type = 'individual';
 
+      const relFromRoot = toRootRelative(f.rel);
+
       try {
-        // Check if already exists (by external_relpath)
+        // Fast path only. This SELECT settles the common case — a re-import of
+        // a folder already in the event — without paying for a stat and a
+        // Sharp metadata read per file. It is NOT the guard: those two calls
+        // sit between here and the INSERT below, which is exactly the window
+        // two overlapping imports both walked through (#1162). The unique
+        // index from migration 176 is the guard, and the catch below is how
+        // this loop converges when it fires.
         const exists = await db('photos')
-          .where({ event_id: eventId, external_relpath: f.rel })
+          .where({ event_id: eventId, external_relpath: relFromRoot })
           .first();
         if (exists) { skipped++; continue; }
         const stats = await fs.stat(f.full);
@@ -119,27 +156,65 @@ router.post('/events/:id/import-external', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
         let height = null;
         try {
           const metadata = await sharp(f.full).metadata();
-          width = metadata.width || null;
-          height = metadata.height || null;
+          // Oriented, not raw — see imageProcessor.orientedDimensions (#1185).
+          ({ width, height } = require('../services/imageProcessor').orientedDimensions(metadata));
         } catch (dimErr) {
           logger.warn(`Could not extract dimensions for ${f.rel}: ${dimErr.message}`);
         }
 
-        const inserted = await db('photos')
-          .insert({
-            event_id: eventId,
-            filename: f.name,
-            // Keep path as a hint for legacy code but not used for resolution in external mode
-            path: path.join(event.slug, f.name),
-            thumbnail_path: null,
-            type,
-            size_bytes: stats.size,
-            width,
-            height,
-            source_origin: 'external',
-            external_relpath: f.rel
-          })
-          .returning('id');
+        // Capture date from EXIF (#1172). Managed uploads get this from
+        // photoProcessor, which external media never goes through — so
+        // captured_at stayed NULL for every externally imported photo, and the
+        // gallery's "Date Taken" sort silently degraded into import order via
+        // its COALESCE fallback. On a library imported in two batches that put
+        // the first days of a trip after the last ones.
+        //
+        // Read here because the file is already open a few lines above for the
+        // dimensions, so this costs one more read of the same source rather
+        // than a second pass over the mount.
+        //
+        // Best-effort, exactly like the dimensions: a source without EXIF, or
+        // one Sharp/exifr cannot parse, imports with captured_at NULL and
+        // falls back to uploaded_at as before.
+        let capturedAt = null;
+        try {
+          capturedAt = await extractCaptureDate(f.full);
+        } catch (dateErr) {
+          logger.warn(`Could not extract capture date for ${f.rel}: ${dateErr.message}`);
+        }
+
+        let inserted;
+        try {
+          inserted = await db('photos')
+            .insert({
+              event_id: eventId,
+              filename: f.name,
+              // Keep path as a hint for legacy code but not used for resolution in external mode
+              path: path.join(event.slug, f.name),
+              thumbnail_path: null,
+              type,
+              size_bytes: stats.size,
+              width,
+              height,
+              source_origin: 'external',
+              external_relpath: relFromRoot,
+              // .toISOString() rather than the Date: inside jest, Dates handed
+              // to the sqlite3 binding land as the literal string
+              // "[object Object]" (see CLAUDE.md). Strings round-trip on both
+              // engines.
+              captured_at: capturedAt ? capturedAt.toISOString() : null
+            })
+            .returning('id');
+        } catch (insertErr) {
+          // Another writer inserted this exact path while we were reading
+          // metadata. That is the outcome the index exists to produce, and it
+          // is a skip rather than a failure — the row is there, it just isn't
+          // ours. Counting it as `skipped` keeps the reported totals honest;
+          // before the index this landed in the outer catch as a nameless
+          // failure, or (more often) never fired at all and duplicated the row.
+          if (isUniqueViolation(insertErr)) { skipped++; continue; }
+          throw insertErr;
+        }
 
         const photoId = Array.isArray(inserted) && inserted.length
           ? (typeof inserted[0] === 'object' ? inserted[0].id : inserted[0])
@@ -175,7 +250,12 @@ router.post('/events/:id/import-external', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
       }
     }
 
-    // Update event fields
+    // Safe for existing EXTERNAL rows as of #1163. It was not: relpaths were
+    // stored relative to external_path, so overwriting the column here rebased
+    // every row already in the event onto the new folder — quietly, because
+    // their thumbnails were already on local disk and the grid carried on
+    // rendering. Rows now carry a root-relative path and this write cannot
+    // reach them.
     await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ source_mode: 'reference', external_path });
 
     await logActivity(
@@ -193,6 +273,11 @@ router.post('/events/:id/import-external', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
       error: error.message
     });
     res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to import external media' });
+  } finally {
+    // In `finally` and not at the end of `try`: an import that throws must
+    // still release the event, or a single failure locks out every retry
+    // until the process restarts.
+    importsInFlight.delete(eventId);
   }
 });
 

backend/src/routes/adminInvoices.js

@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@ const importedInvoiceStorage = multer.diskStorage({
 });
 const importedInvoiceUpload = multer({
   storage: importedInvoiceStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024 },
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `pdf` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
   fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
     if (file.mimetype === 'application/pdf') cb(null, true);
     else cb(new Error('Only PDF files are allowed for imported invoices'));