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Paul Nothaft 0d8123ed4a chore(stable): release 3.45.3 (#827)
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2026-07-17 19:08:55 +00:00
Paul Nothaft db1d28a75b Merge pull request #825 from PicPeak/fix/update-instructions-production-compose-stable
fix(update): target docker-compose.production.yml in dashboard update steps + gate mailhog (stable)
2026-07-17 21:03:21 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 64bcd0ab9f fix(update): target docker-compose.production.yml in dashboard update steps
Production installs use docker-compose.production.yml (the README's documented
path, pinned GHCR images, no dev services), but the dashboard's update
instructions emitted bare `docker compose pull` / `up -d`. Bare `docker compose`
operates on docker-compose.yml — a different, build-based stack — so a
production user who followed the steps:
  - never pulled/recreated their real containers (stayed on the old version,
    e.g. stuck on 3.44.0 after "updating" to 3.45.2), and
  - started the dev-only mailhog service that docker-compose.yml defines
    (reported restart-looping).

The backend runs inside a container and can't stat the host's compose files, but
docker-compose.production.yml passes PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL into the backend env
and docker-compose.yml does not. detectEnvironment() now derives
isProductionCompose from it, and the Docker update steps prepend
`-f docker-compose.production.yml` when set. The non-production branch keeps the
bare commands but the warning now tells users to add `-f docker-compose.production.yml`
if they installed with it.

Also gates the mailhog service in docker-compose.yml behind a `dev` compose
profile so a plain `docker compose up -d` never starts it (opt in with
`docker compose --profile dev up -d`). Nothing depends on it (SMTP_HOST comes
from .env), so gating is safe. Verified: `docker compose config` lists mailhog
only with `--profile dev`; production compose is unchanged.

Adds unit tests for the production-vs-default command generation.
2026-07-17 20:56:18 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1d48f59fe1 chore(stable): release 3.45.2 (#819)
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2026-07-17 07:34:35 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e37d1fac58 Merge pull request #818 from PicPeak/fix/legacy-events-router-bola-stable
fix(security): remove unguarded legacy /api/events router on stable (GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq)
2026-07-17 09:29:24 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9ee3ff45d0 fix(security): remove unguarded legacy /api/events router (GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq)
The legacy gallery router mounted at /api/events exposed create/list/update/
delete/extend guarded by adminAuth ALONE — no requirePermission, no
requireEventOwnership. adminAuth only checks the token is a valid type:'admin'
session, which every back-office role holds, down to read-only `viewer`. So any
non-super-admin account could:
  - GET /api/events → every gallery's bcrypt password_hash, share_token, and
    client name/email (the list handler selects * and mapEventForApi keeps
    those columns),
  - PUT /api/events/:id → reset any gallery's password (full takeover),
  - DELETE /api/events/:id → delete any gallery,
all bypassing the per-photographer ownership isolation the canonical
/api/admin/events router enforces. Affects any instance with more than the
single super_admin.

Fix: remove the legacy router entirely (mount + require + src/routes/events.js).
It was a superseded duplicate of /api/admin/events and unused by the frontend
EXCEPT for one live route — POST /:id/extend (the "Extend expiration" UI action,
which hit /api/events/:id/extend via the api client's /api base). That route is
migrated to the canonical mount as POST /api/admin/events/:id/extend with the
same guards as every other gallery mutation (adminAuth + requirePermission
('events.edit') + requireEventOwnership), and the frontend is repointed to it.
Behaviour of the extend itself is unchanged (expires_at + reactivate).

Verified end-to-end on a booted instance: /api/events (all methods) now 404;
/api/admin/events/:id/extend returns 401 unauth, 200 for the owner, 403 for a
non-owning editor; the full login→create→extend flow works. Adds a regression
test pinning the router removal and the extend ownership check.
2026-07-17 09:18:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5453152f1c chore(stable): release 3.45.1 (#815)
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2026-07-16 11:44:00 +00:00
Paul Nothaft b416baec5c Merge pull request #812 from PicPeak/fix/security-advisories-backend-stable
fix(security): close 4 open security advisories on stable (backup takeover, share-login bypass, ZIP slip, chunked-upload traversal)
2026-07-16 13:37:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 38ddd70c12 Merge pull request #809 from PicPeak/fix/docker-image-os-cves-stable
chore(security): close 21 frontend image CVEs on stable — nginx 1.30 base + apk cache-bust
2026-07-16 13:37:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b00a16159e fix(security): harden .picpeak restore operator-preservation (GHSA-qxfx follow-up)
The req.admin.id fix activated reinjectCurrentAdmin(); hardening its preservation
logic (found across Codex review rounds of #811):

- MFA hijack: reinject wrote back only password_hash/is_active/
  must_change_password, leaving a crafted backup's two_factor_* on the
  operator's row — it could strip or replace their second factor. The email-
  matched row is now updated with the operator's full AUTH set (login identity,
  password, and all two_factor_* columns). Relationship/audit FKs (role_id,
  created_by) are deliberately NOT forced from the snapshot: on a cross-instance
  restore those pre-restore ids may be absent from the backup and would dangle
  the FK (SQLite rolls back at commit); the restored row keeps its own valid
  values.

- Cross-instance restore rollback / FK safety: reinject matched only by email,
  so a backup shipping a different admin with the default `admin` username hit
  UNIQUE(username) and rolled the whole restore back; email and username could
  even collide on two different rows. Reconciliation is now non-destructive:
  the email-matching row is updated in place (id preserved → restored FKs like
  events.created_by stay valid); any different row holding the operator's
  username is RENAMED, not deleted (deletion would fire ON DELETE actions /
  dangle references); only when no row has the operator's email is a fresh row
  inserted, with created_by nulled and an explicit max(id)+1 id (batchInsert
  left the Postgres identity sequence unadvanced, so a sequence-based insert
  could collide).

- Stale session after restore: admin_users ids shift on restore, but the
  operator's live JWT is bound only to decoded.id (IP logged not enforced; the
  backup controls password_changed_at). The route now revokes the token (result
  checked and logged) and clears the admin cookie; the client redirects to a
  fresh login via a sessionInvalidated flag. Cookie clear is the unconditional
  guarantee.

Adds SQLite-backed reinject regression tests (in-place login/MFA restore with id
and FK columns preserved, username-only rename, email+username on different rows,
clean insert with created_by nulled) and the frontend redirect on
sessionInvalidated.

Deferred (design decisions / pre-existing, need a Postgres test env — see PR
discussion): global "invalidate all pre-restore sessions" cutoff; preserving the
operator's ROLE semantics across an RBAC-table replace; and resyncing Postgres
identity sequences after any restore (batchInsert leaves them behind max(id) —
pre-existing, affects every restored table).
2026-07-16 12:31:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft dcfcb67f9b fix(security): sanitize chunked-upload filename (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j)
The chunked video upload stored req.body.filename unmodified and later built
the merged path as path.join(tempDir, uploadMeta.filename). path.join does not
neutralise '../', so a filename like '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the
temp dir on merge and overwrote arbitrary files. Requires admin with
photos.upload.

Fix: path.basename() the client filename in initializeUpload() and reject
names that collapse to nothing. Adds a regression test.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cde0b465a9 fix(security): reject ZIP-slip entries in archive/backup restore (GHSA-jfhw-fj23-fx6x)
node-stream-zip's extract(null, root) writes each entry to path.join(root,
entry.name) without neutralising '../', so a crafted archive entry named
'../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the target dir and overwrote arbitrary
files (logos, .env, route files → RCE on source deploys). Requires admin with
archives.restore.

Adds assertZipEntriesWithin() to utils/safePath.js — a lexical containment
check run on the entry list BEFORE extract() — and guards both extract sinks:
adminArchives.js (the reported route) and picpeakImportService.js (the sibling
.picpeak import, same sink). Adds unit tests for traversal, absolute-path, and
sibling-prefix entries.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 28f69e4bf3 fix(security): share-login must not bypass gallery password (GHSA-9hmx-68vc-qpqw)
POST /auth/gallery/share-login validated only the 128-bit share token and then
minted a full type:'gallery' access token regardless of require_password —
computing requiresPassword at the end only to echo it, never enforce it. Anyone
holding a gallery's share link could read and download every photo in a
password-protected gallery via a direct API call, no password needed.

Fix: compute requiresPassword before minting; for a password-protected gallery
return { requires_password: true } with NO token and NO cookie. The client then
goes through /gallery/verify, which does bcrypt.compare the password. The public
(no-password) auto-login path is unchanged. The frontend already falls through
to the password prompt when share-login returns no token/event.

Adds route regression test covering the bypass, the public path, and bad tokens.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1cf82d81a7 fix(security): preserve current admin on .picpeak restore (GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f)
adminAuth populates req.admin, not req.user, so currentAdminId was always
undefined in the /api/admin/picpeak/import handler. reinjectCurrentAdmin()
then had no account to preserve and the admin_users table was fully replaced
by the uploaded backup — a crafted .picpeak let any admin with backup.restore
take over every admin account (critical). One-line fix: pass req.admin.id.

Closes GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f and its duplicate GHSA-pjp6-jcrj-3cr5.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ae98e7ad74 chore(security): close 21 frontend image CVEs — nginx 1.30 base + apk cache-bust
The frontend image kept shipping vulnerable OS packages (nginx 1.28.3-r1,
curl/libcurl 8.19.0, c-ares 1.34.6) despite the apk upgrade line, for two
independent reasons:

1. The runtime stage's apk upgrade layer was cached indefinitely — the
   CACHEBUST build-arg CI passes (github.run_number) was only declared in
   the builder stage, and ARGs don't cross stage boundaries. Both
   Dockerfiles now redeclare CACHEBUST in the runtime stage and consume it
   in the apk RUN, so every build re-runs the upgrade and picks up current
   Alpine security updates.

2. nginx itself can never upgrade via apk on the nginx.org-based image:
   the bundled nginx-module-* packages pin the exact nginx version, so
   Alpine's patched 1.28.3-r4 is unreachable (verified empirically —
   apk add --upgrade nginx is a silent no-op). nginx fixes must come via
   the base tag, so bump to nginx:1.30-alpine (current stable, 1.30.4 on
   Alpine 3.24, same nginx.org conf.d layout — drop-in).

Verified: local image build scans clean with Trivy (0 OS findings, was 21);
container serves /health, SPA fallback, and BRAND_TITLE envsubst as non-root
nginx user.

Closes code-scanning alerts 371-374, 376-392 (nginx HTTP/2 & module CVEs,
curl CVE-2026-5773/-6276 + 6 medium, c-ares CVE-2026-33630).
2026-07-16 10:30:42 +02:00
Paul Nothaft caa9fe5d56 chore(stable): release 3.45.0 (#777)
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2026-07-09 11:22:46 +00:00
Paul Nothaft c6e61f64ba Merge pull request #775 from PicPeak/ci/release-please-target-stable-on-stable
ci(release): cut the real v3.45.0 stable (target-branch: stable)
2026-07-09 13:13:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3ec0451cbb ci(release): pin target-branch: stable so release-please cuts the real v3.45.0
Triggers the correct stable release from the stable branch (manifest
3.44.0 -> 3.45.0). Same fix as #774 (which fixes it on main for future
promotes); merging this to stable is what re-runs release-please
correctly for the promote that mis-fired as v2.7.0.
2026-07-09 11:40:44 +02:00
Paul Nothaft edac463ec3 Merge pull request #771 from PicPeak/release/3.83.0-merge-from-beta
chore(release): promote beta → stable (v3.83.0 line)
2026-07-08 20:42:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2d3537f61c ci: run the Tests workflow on stable-targeted PRs (unblock this promote)
Same one-liner as #772 — adds stable to tests.yml push/pull_request
filters so the required backend/frontend checks report on this PR
instead of hanging on 'Expected — Waiting for status to be reported'.
2026-07-08 20:29:41 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6025b3194d chore(release): align README/DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE with main (promote content) 2026-07-08 20:01:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8713ab7f60 chore(release): keep stable manifest (3.44.0) + CHANGELOG for release-please-stable 2026-07-08 20:00:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8994901e4a chore(release): promote beta → stable (v3.83.0 line)
Merge main (v3.83.0-beta.0) into stable to cut the next stable release.
Conflicts resolved toward main (the promoted code); stable release-control
files (manifest, CHANGELOG) restored separately.
2026-07-08 19:59:55 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c29ad747f2 chore(main): release 3.83.0-beta.0 (#770)
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2026-07-08 10:42:24 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a71b9b5ed7 Merge pull request #769 from Luca-Timo/feat/messages-email-client
feat(messages): unified Messages email client (flag-gated, default off)
2026-07-08 12:38:58 +02:00
Luca 1e08a4fb15 fix(messages): PR #769 nits — server-side search, bare-email recipient, DE i18n
- Search now hits the backend (debounced) so results aren't truncated to the
  first loaded page: /received gains a `q` filter (sender/subject); the frontend
  passes the debounced term to every list query. The instant client-side filter
  stays for responsiveness.
- Reply/compose recipient extracts the bare address from a "Name <addr>" From
  header (extractEmail) — also used for the customer-lookup key.
- Added the full de + en `messages.*` and `email.customerMailbox.*` translation
  namespaces (were English inline-fallbacks only). Swiss-German spelling.
2026-07-07 18:39:04 +02:00
Luca bb235e72e5 fix(messages): PR #769 review — escape reply sender (XSS), gate backend routes, exact customer match
- BLOCKER: stored XSS via inbound sender display name. The reply stub built raw
  HTML with the unsanitized From name and set it as innerHTML on the composer's
  contentEditable (admin origin) → onerror JS ran on Reply. Now HTML-escape
  from_address in the stub AND DOMPurify-sanitize the composer body before
  innerHTML (defense in depth).
- Gate the NEW Messages routes with requireFeatureFlag('messaging') per-route
  (queue/:id, received/:id, item/*, identities, accounts, accounts/test, send)
  — NOT the shared /email mount, so the pre-existing email-config endpoints stay
  ungated.
- DocumentActionModal auto-picks a customer only on an EXACT email match
  (customer search is prefix/fuzzy), else leaves the picker to the admin.
2026-07-07 18:28:26 +02:00
Luca 99d5996561 feat(messages): search bar + Archive/Delete with Archived & Deleted folders
- Search box in the header filters the current folder's list (sender/subject),
  client-side; works across the merged Archived/Deleted views too.
- Archive and Delete are now implemented as soft moves: migration 157 adds
  mailbox_state ('active'|'archived'|'deleted') to email_queue + received_emails.
  Archive → 'archived', Delete → 'deleted' (trash). Restore → 'active'. Deleting
  FROM the Deleted folder is permanent (hard row delete).
- New cross-account system folders Archived + Deleted (merge sent + received of
  that state, sorted by date). Normal folders now exclude archived/deleted.
- Backend: /queue + /received gain a `state` filter (default active + legacy
  NULL); new POST /item/:kind/:id/state (archive/delete/restore) and DELETE
  /item/:kind/:id (purge, email.edit).
- Toolbar Archive/Delete wired; Restore + "Delete permanently" shown in the
  system folders.

Frontend build + migration boot (157) verified.
2026-07-07 16:16:51 +02:00
Luca c8cb4c88ca harden(messages): SSRF guard on mailbox host, strict sandbox + sanitizer, per-account TLS
Pre-upstream review hardening:
- /accounts + /accounts/test now reject private/internal IMAP/SMTP hosts via
  isPrivateIP(), matching /config + /incoming-config (SSRF).
- QueueDetail body iframe uses sandbox="" (script-less, no same-origin) like the
  inbound pane, instead of allow-same-origin.
- /send sanitizer drops the <style> tag + data: scheme to match the stricter
  inbound sanitizeBody allowlist.
- Per-account SMTP transport sets tls.rejectUnauthorized explicitly.
2026-07-07 16:04:11 +02:00
Luca 2c5c1d561b fix(messages): show the resolved customer's name in the doc-action modal
CustomerPicker uses its 'label' prop as the selected-customer chip text, so
passing the static 'Customer' string hid the actual name. Pass the resolved
customer's name as label and add a separate field heading.
2026-07-07 15:45:59 +02:00
Luca 0dbf863f60 feat(messages): create/select quote, contract, invoice, gallery from a message
The toolbar doc buttons now open a real document-action flow instead of just
loading an email template:

- DocumentActionModal resolves the customer from the message's sender address
  (customers/search); if no match, the CustomerPicker lets you search or create
  a passive customer inline.
- Create new -> jumps to the real editor prefilled with the customer
  (quotes/contracts/bills ?customerAccountId=), so numbering, line items and PDF
  all come from the existing CRM. Gallery opens the event editor.
- Select existing -> lists that customer's quotes/contracts/invoices and drops
  the chosen document number into a reply composer.
- Toolbar buttons are gated by the global feature flags (quotes/contracts/bills).

Adds the missing customerAccountId prefill to ContractEditorPage (quotes + bills
already had it). Frontend-only; reuses existing endpoints. Build verified.
2026-07-07 13:16:18 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 72cbb95b44 chore(main): release 3.82.6-beta.0 (#768)
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2026-07-07 10:35:31 +00:00
Luca c622a35033 Merge pull request #358 from Luca-Timo/feat/messages-email-client
fix(messages): show only the mailbox local part in the sidebar (full …
2026-07-07 12:33:18 +02:00
Luca 88fe9f9844 fix(messages): show only the mailbox local part in the sidebar (full address on hover) 2026-07-07 12:32:08 +02:00
Luca 9596342d6a Merge pull request #764 from Luca-Timo/fix/dunning-backfill-on-enable
fix(workflows): backfill existing invoices + anchor dunning grace to due date when enabled (#750)
2026-07-07 12:31:15 +02:00
Luca 7cc1c59661 Merge pull request #357 from Luca-Timo/feat/messages-email-client
fix(messages): dynamic addresses, branding accent, compose/sync, per-identity SMTP
2026-07-07 12:08:59 +02:00
Luca f9c2b4ed75 fix(messages): dynamic addresses, branding accent, compose/sync, per-identity SMTP
Addresses dev-test feedback:
- Sidebar + reading-pane addresses (rechnungen@ / hello@ / no-reply@) are now
  read from the mail config via GET /admin/email/identities, not hardcoded.
- Highlight/selection now uses the branding accent (bg-accent-soft /
  text-on-accent-soft / accent-dark) instead of hardcoded blue, so it follows
  the admin's CI colour like the sidebar.
- Header gains "New message" (compose) and "Sync" (poll mailboxes now) buttons.
- Composer modal enlarged (920px, taller editable body).
- Customer mailbox (hello@) now has BOTH incoming (IMAP) and outgoing (SMTP)
  settings — migration 156 adds smtp_* + from_* to mail_accounts;
  emailProcessor.sendRawEmail takes an accountKey and sends via that mailbox's
  SMTP identity (falls back to the global from). Manual/reply sends from the
  Messages UI use the 'customers' identity, so replies come from hello@.

Frontend build + migration boot (156) verified.
2026-07-07 11:58:41 +02:00
Luca 976d52280e Merge pull request #356 from Luca-Timo/feat/messages-email-client
Feat/messages email client
2026-07-07 11:11:21 +02:00
Luca 0ed3bbefa1 chore(messages): describe the feature as 'unified' rather than by a third-party product name 2026-07-07 11:10:00 +02:00
Luca b96ad36f5d fix(messages): make the Messaging feature flag toggleable
The Messaging FeatureCard was a hardcoded-disabled 'roadmap' placeholder
(no-op toggle), so the messaging flag could never be turned on — the Messages
sidebar item + page stayed hidden. Wire the toggle to setFlag, mark it 'new',
and describe the actual admin Messages client.
2026-07-07 11:06:16 +02:00
Luca d0bdcb1a6a Merge pull request #355 from Luca-Timo/feat/messages-email-client
feat(messages): Outlook-style Messages email client (3 phases, flag-gated)
2026-07-07 10:48:46 +02:00
Luca 768e84711f feat(messages): Phase 3 — editable-template composer, reply + create actions
The CRM action buttons and Reply now open a send-composer, not a silent
templated send.

- New send-composer (MessageComposer): loads the rendered template (via
  previewTemplate) or a reply stub into a fully-editable body — the admin can
  rewrite it or drop a note anywhere before sending. On send it goes out as-is
  (server-sanitized), no template re-render.
- Backend: emailProcessor.sendRawEmail() sends admin-edited HTML via the
  configured SMTP identity; POST /admin/email/send sanitizes + sends + records
  the message in email_queue as a 'manual' send.
- Migration 155: email_queue.origin ('system' default | 'manual'). The Sent
  stream now splits by origin — Automated ▸ Sent = system, Customers ▸ Sent =
  the human/edited messages (which finally populates that folder). /queue gains
  an origin filter + returns origin.
- Toolbar wired: Reply enabled on inbound customer mail (prefilled + quoted);
  Create Quote/Contract/Invoice open the composer with that template loaded;
  Gallery opens a blank compose. Accounting/Forward/Archive/Delete stay disabled
  (later phases). After send, jumps to Customers ▸ Sent.

Deferred to a later phase: two-way IMAP write-back; per-identity SMTP (manual
sends currently use the global from address). Frontend build + migration boot
verified.
2026-07-07 10:42:54 +02:00
Luca da3a77dac4 fix(workflows): scope dunning backfill to its own flow via targetWorkflowId
Address review on #764: backfillDunningRuns emitted invoice.sent without a
target, so enabling dunning would also enroll every historical open invoice
into any custom invoice.sent flow. Pass the enabled flow's id through to
emitWorkflowEvent so the backfill only touches dunning. Also note the
computeWakeAt both-fields (untilVar + delay) behaviour change in its comment.
2026-07-07 10:33:01 +02:00
Luca ee46cf2125 feat(messages): Phase 2 — customer (hello@) mailbox + inbound body capture
Second inbound mailbox and real message bodies for the Messages viewer.

Backend:
- Migration 154: mail_accounts table (additional inbound mailboxes beyond the
  primary accounting IMAP) + received_emails.{account_key,to_address,body_html,
  body_text}. Additive/guarded.
- emailIntakeService now polls the accounting mailbox AND every enabled
  mail_accounts row. Extracted pollAccountOnce(cfg, {accountKey, routeToExpenses});
  accounting keeps its exact attachment->expenses behavior, customer mail is
  logged with its body and NOT routed to accounting. Inbound HTML is sanitized
  server-side (sanitize-html) on ingest.
- adminEmail: /received gains an account filter + returns account_key/to_address
  (bodies excluded from the list); new GET /received/:id returns the body;
  GET/POST /accounts + /accounts/test manage the extra mailboxes.

Frontend:
- Customers inbox now pulls the hello@ mailbox; reading pane renders the
  sanitized body in a strict (script-less, no same-origin) sandboxed iframe.
  Accounting inbox shows bodies too. Toolbar context keys off the mailbox.
- CustomerMailboxCard in Settings -> Email (behind the messaging flag) to
  configure + test the hello@ IMAP box.

No behavior change to the existing accounting inbound flow. Frontend build +
migration boot verified.
2026-07-07 10:11:58 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c0ac5c36a4 chore(main): release 3.82.5-beta.0 (#767)
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2026-07-07 07:08:02 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 760a201b60 Merge pull request #766 from PicPeak/fix/date-input-invalid-crash
fix(admin): stop the event-date field crashing the page on backspace
2026-07-07 09:04:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 945026d446 fix(admin): stop the event-date field crashing the page on backspace
Repro: create an event, click into the date field, backspace a day digit.
The whole page white-screened and needed a reload.

Root cause: LocalizedDateInput's `toIso` only checked the day/month were
1-2 digits, not that they formed a real date — so a mid-backspace value
like "0/07/2026" was coerced to the string "2026-07-00" and committed to
`event_date`. CreateEventPage then rendered
`format(addDays(new Date('2026-07-00'), days))`, and date-fns `format`
throws RangeError on an Invalid Date — thrown during render, so React
tore the tree down to the error boundary.

Two complementary fixes:
- `toIso` round-trips the parsed y/m/d through `Date` and rejects
  impossible dates (day 00, month 13, 31 Feb…), so the field never
  commits a value that isn't a real calendar date.
- `useLocalizedDate.format`/`formatDistanceToNow` guard with `isValid`
  and return '' instead of throwing — defence in depth for the ~57 call
  sites that could otherwise white-screen on a bad date.

Verified live: backspacing to a partial/invalid date no longer crashes
(the form stays rendered), a valid date still commits + the expiry
preview renders. Adds a LocalizedDateInput regression test; tsc + build
green.
2026-07-07 08:56:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2522d7e1ce chore(main): release 3.82.4-beta.0 (#765)
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2026-07-07 05:13:53 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 0c2d319fc1 Merge pull request #763 from Luca-Timo/fix/email-language-and-payment-confirm
fix(email,ui): billing emails follow customer language + readable payment-check confirmation
2026-07-07 07:10:09 +02:00
Luca 26eeb76197 feat(messages): Phase 1 read-only Messages viewer (email client shell)
New admin "Messages" page — a three-pane mail viewer over the mail picpeak
already stores, feature-flagged behind `messaging` (default off):

- Sidebar account tree: All mail / Customers (hello@) / Accounting (rechnungen@)
  / Automated (no-reply@), matching the agreed IA.
- Automated + All Sent = email_queue (listQueue); Accounting + All Inbox =
  received_emails (listReceived). Customers folders show an explanatory empty
  state pending the hello@ mailbox (Phase 2).
- Reading pane renders the sent body from rendered_html (migration 119) in a
  sandboxed iframe; new GET /admin/email/queue/:id returns body + cc +
  attachment filenames (disk paths never exposed).
- Received supplier invoices: envelope + rasterized PDF viewer reusing the
  accounting inbound blob endpoint, plus "Open in Accounting inbox".
- Context toolbar (Reply/Forward/Create Quote-Contract-Gallery-Invoice /
  Book-as-expense-Re-bill) present but disabled — wired in later phases.

Reuses email.service, accounting inbound blob endpoint, RequireFeature +
PermissionGate (email.view), Tailwind dark: theming. No schema change.
2026-07-07 03:15:41 +02:00
Luca c0008be39b fix(email): sibling billing emails follow customer language too
Addresses the PR #763 review: the invoice_sent / storno_issued / payment-check
/ paid-admin-notification emails share the identical event-first language bug
and never set __language, so a German customer on an English-gallery event got
an English email body with German-formatted amounts.

Each call site already computes the locale it formats amounts in, so this is a
one-liner per call — the body language now matches the amount formatting:
- invoice_sent, storno_issued (sending.js) -> __language: ctx.locale
- payment-check, invoice_paid_admin_notification (payments.js) -> __language: locale

Leak-safe (no template references {{__language}}) and falls back to the
existing event-first resolution when unset, per the mechanism added in #763.
2026-07-06 22:10:18 +02:00
Luca 2c7b351458 fix(workflows): backfill existing invoices + anchor grace to due date when dunning is enabled (#750)
Enabling the invoice-dunning built-in suppressed the legacy reminder ladder
but only created runs for invoices sent AFTER enabling — already-sent unpaid
invoices got dunned by neither. Now:

- Turning dunning ON enrolls every open sent/overdue unpaid invoice via
  emitWorkflowEvent('invoice.sent') (engine.backfillDunningRuns(), wired into
  the workflow enable toggle). Idempotent via the per-(flow,entity) dedup.
- The grace wait is anchored to the invoice's due date: computeWakeAt now
  treats { untilVar, delayDays } as "var + offset" (was var-only OR now+offset),
  and the built-in's waitGrace becomes { untilVar: 'dueDate', delayDays:
  firstDays } (seed v6 -> v7). An already-overdue invoice duns on its real
  timeline instead of restarting a fresh grace clock.

Note: the due-date-anchored graph applies to freshly seeded built-ins; an
already-admin-enabled dunning workflow still enrolls via backfill but keeps its
current grace timing until re-seeded.
2026-07-06 21:57:23 +02:00
Luca ea86871b81 Merge pull request #354 from Luca-Timo/fix/email-language-and-payment-confirm
fix(email,ui): billing emails follow customer language + readable pay…
2026-07-06 19:33:47 +02:00
Luca fcc3e9195d fix(email,ui): billing emails follow customer language + readable payment-check confirmation
- Billing/dunning emails no longer render in the gallery event's language.
  emailProcessor now honors an explicit `__language` in the email data
  (else falls back to the event-first recipient resolution), and the invoice
  reminder passes the customer/invoice locale (customer.preferred_language
  || invoice.language || 'de'). Fixes German customers getting English
  dunning notices. (#760)
- Payment-check confirmation card ("Action recorded") is now theme-adaptive
  (green tint + readable text on both light and dark surfaces) instead of a
  hardcoded light-green mix + dark-green title that vanished in dark mode. (#759)
- The per-customer "Preferred language" field already exists
  (CustomerDetailPage) plus the business-profile default; updated the helper
  text to note billing emails now honor it too. (#761)
2026-07-06 19:27:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a52317d8a5 chore(main): release 3.82.3-beta.0 (#758)
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2026-07-06 09:53:29 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a88da99c8d Merge pull request #757 from PicPeak/fix/hero-logo-global-inherit-756
fix(branding): make 'Show logo in hero' a true global toggle with per-event override (#756)
2026-07-06 11:50:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 60b03b1728 fix(branding): unify hero logo SIZE the same way as visibility (#756)
Follow-on to the visibility fix in this PR — hero_logo_size had the same
split-brain: GalleryLayout read the global branding_logo_size live while
the hero-header path used the per-event snapshot, so a hero logo could
render at different sizes on different layouts and the global size didn't
reach hero-header galleries.

Now mirrored on the visibility model: NULL per-event hero_logo_size =
inherit branding_logo_size; explicit = override.

- Migration 153: hero_logo_size nullable + backfill NULL so existing
  galleries inherit the global size (restores GalleryLayout's prior
  live-global behaviour and fixes the hero-header staleness).
- Creation stores NULL unless explicit; gallery.js resolves
  per-event ?? global and sends the effective size.
- GalleryLayout now consumes that resolved size for the hero logo (new
  heroLogoSize prop) instead of the global — both render paths match.
- Admin size control gains a 'Use branding default' (inherit) option.

Verified: migration on SQLite + PG; live resolution (inherit follows
global both ways, override wins); creation stores NULL on PG; tsc clean,
106 adminEvents+gallery tests pass, build green.
2026-07-06 11:44:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 96fe478bf8 fix(branding): make 'Show logo in hero' a true global toggle with per-event override (#756)
Before: the global branding_logo_display_hero toggle was only a
creation-time default — snapshotted into each event's hero_logo_visible
column at creation and never consulted again. Disabling it did nothing
to existing galleries (the reporter's bug), and the two gallery render
paths disagreed (GalleryLayout read the global, HeroHeader read the
per-event snapshot).

Now: NULL per-event hero_logo_visible = 'inherit the global toggle';
an explicit true/false is a per-gallery override.

- Migration 152: make events.hero_logo_visible nullable and NULL out the
  defaulted  rows so existing galleries follow the global going
  forward. Deliberate per-gallery hides () are preserved.
- Creation stores NULL unless the admin explicitly sets it; the update
  path preserves NULL.
- gallery.js resolves per-event ?? global (branding_logo_display_hero,
  default true) and sends the EFFECTIVE value on both gallery responses.
- Both frontend render paths now consume that resolved value
  (GalleryLayout gets it via a new heroLogoVisible prop).
- Admin per-event control is now tri-state: Use branding default /
  Always show / Always hide (en + de).

Verified: SQLite migration + live resolution (inherit follows global
both ways; override wins both ways); PG migration SQL dry-run; the admin
tri-state renders 'Use branding default' for an inherited event; tsc
clean, 106 adminEvents+gallery tests pass, build green.
2026-07-06 11:20:36 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 43213b50ce chore(main): release 3.82.2-beta.0 (#755)
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2026-07-05 21:43:21 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a87ad77d8d Merge pull request #754 from PicPeak/fix/og-shorturl-slideshow-viber-699
fix(og): route branded short URLs + slideshow to OG handler, add Viber (#699)
2026-07-05 23:39:59 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a0a28a4777 fix(og): broaden social-crawler coverage (Bluesky Cardyb, WeChat-scraper, fediverse, etc.)
From alexvaltchev's field UA list on #699. Adds CRAWLER-EXCLUSIVE tokens
to both the nginx UA regex and SOCIAL_CRAWLER_PATTERNS (kept in sync):
Cardyb (Bluesky's actual link-card fetcher), facebookcatalog, Signal,
Misskey, Pleroma, Synapse, Nextcloud, Rocket.Chat, kakaotalk-scrap,
Google-PageRenderer, OdklBot, ZoomBot.

Deliberately NOT added: UAs shared with real human in-app browsers
(WeChat MicroMessenger, LINE 'Line/', Zalo) and broad strings
('InAppBrowser', 'preview', 'unfurl', 'XING' → matches 'boxing'). Our OG
response is meta-only with no redirect, so matching those would serve a
human the bare stub. New negative test locks that exclusion in.

Verified: nginx -t passes; live harness confirms the new tokens rewrite
to /og while the in-app-browser UAs still get the SPA. Backend suite 15/15.
2026-07-05 23:37:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0dffe0ce92 fix(og): route branded short URLs + slideshow links to OG, add Viber (#699)
Follow-up to #699/#700/#702 — the OG SSR handler existed but three link
shapes never reached it behind the frontend nginx:

- Branded short URLs (/s/<slug>, #702) had NO nginx location, so they fell
  through to the SPA — which has no /s/ route. Dead for humans (no 302
  redirect) and crawlers (no OG). Add an ^~ /s/ proxy to the backend, whose
  /s/:shortSlug route already handles both.
- Slideshow links (/gallery/<slug>/show/<token>) have TWO extra path
  segments; the crawler-detect location regex allowed only one, so they
  never rewrote to /og and got generic site-wide OG. Widen to {0,2} extra
  segments (quoted regex — the braces would otherwise be parsed as nginx
  config delimiters). client-access still matches (its token is in ?query,
  one path segment).
- Viber's preview fetcher wasn't in either UA list, so Viber shares showed
  no preview. Add it to nginx + SOCIAL_CRAWLER_PATTERNS (kept in sync).

Verified end-to-end: nginx -t passes; a live nginx+mock-backend harness
confirms /s/ proxies to the backend, slideshow + Viber + share-token +
client-access crawler UAs all rewrite to /og/gallery/<slug>, and browsers
still get the SPA. Backend isSocialCrawler test extended for Viber.
2026-07-05 21:19:53 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f15e104702 chore(main): release 3.82.1-beta.0 (#753)
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2026-07-05 17:27:41 +00:00
Luca 9a763337b6 Merge pull request #752 from Luca-Timo/fix/dunning-payment-check-template-key
fix(invoices): correct payment-check email template key so dunning email sends
2026-07-05 19:24:37 +02:00
Luca 3682de195b fix(invoices): correct payment-check email template key so dunning email sends
queuePaymentCheckEmail queued the admin payment-check email with template
key 'invoice_payment_check_admin', but no such template exists — the only
one is 'invoice_payment_check' (crmEmailTemplates.js:217, seeded by
migration 116), which IS the admin "Paid / Partial / Not paid" email. The
processor does an exact template_key lookup and throws "template not
found", so every dunning admin payment-check email failed, retried to the
cap, and got stuck pending.

One-word fix: queue 'invoice_payment_check'. Unbreaks the built-in
invoice-dunning flow's email step. (Rebased onto the post-decompose
invoiceService refactor — the line now lives in invoice/payments.js.)
2026-07-04 23:51:22 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c3ed7f1693 chore(main): release 3.82.0-beta.0 (#742)
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2026-07-03 11:10:31 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a5f49e3235 Merge pull request #741 from PicPeak/feat/setup-final-step-and-button-fix
feat(setup): final community step (#732) + fix create-admin button overflow (#730)
2026-07-03 13:07:21 +02:00
Paul Nothaft dadaaeea77 feat(setup): final community/thank-you step (#732); fix create-admin button overflow (#730)
#730 — the account step's Create-admin button shared a flex row with Back;
its label + loading spinner exceeded the card width, so the button
overflowed the card outline while submitting (and was fragile for longer
i18n labels). Stack both buttons full-width — the primary always has room
for the spinner now, matching every other wizard step.

#732 — add a final 'community' step, shown once on first-run after
config / no-config, before entering the app. Mission line + four link
cards (report a bug, request a feature, star/share, Buy Me a Coffee),
all target=_blank rel=noopener, and a Finish → Dashboard button. Fully
i18n (en + de). Restore keeps its reload flow (a restored instance is no
longer first-run, so it never reaches this step). Adds .github/FUNDING.yml
so GitHub renders a Sponsor button too.

Verified live: drove the real first-run wizard end to end — stacked
account buttons render inside the card, community step shows the mission
+ all four links, Finish lands on the dashboard.
2026-07-03 12:29:58 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c76877c0c4 chore(main): release 3.81.0-beta.0 (#740)
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2026-07-03 10:08:29 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e985c6bacd Merge pull request #733 from PicPeak/refactor/codebase-cleanup
refactor: codebase-wide cleanup — dead code, dedup, standardization, god-file decomposition
2026-07-03 12:05:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f564b38c5a Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into refactor/codebase-cleanup
# Conflicts:
#	backend/src/routes/adminEvents.js
#	backend/src/routes/protectedImages.js
#	frontend/src/pages/admin/EventDetailsPage.tsx
2026-07-03 11:54:01 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cf073615ef Merge pull request #739 from PicPeak/feat/admin-mfa
feat: admin two-factor authentication (TOTP) with recovery codes + CLI reset
2026-07-03 11:49:07 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b732974779 Merge pull request #737 from PicPeak/fix/auth-access-control
fix(security): cross-event thumbnail leak, bulk-op ownership bypass + auth hardening
2026-07-03 11:47:25 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b187f588b4 Merge pull request #734 from PicPeak/fix/event-create-nan-and-bool-render
fix: event creation 500s on PostgreSQL (NaN slideshow seed) + stray "0" boolean renders
2026-07-03 11:46:58 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 96e3c68b9d feat(admin-ui): TOTP MFA enrollment + two-step login; remove stub 2FA toggle
Frontend for #738.
- mfa.service.ts + MfaSettingsCard (Settings → General → Admin Account):
  per-user setup (QR + manual secret + verify), recovery codes shown once
  (copy/download/confirm), status, regenerate, disable. Renders for
  super_admin (closes #735).
- Two-step login in AdminLoginPage: on {mfaRequired,mfaToken} swap to a
  code step (TOTP or recovery), call /auth/admin/login/mfa; handle
  MFA_INVALID / MFA_SESSION_EXPIRED / 423 lockout.
- Removed the non-functional global enable_2fa checkbox from SecurityTab
  (and its persistence) — replaced with a note pointing to per-user setup.
- en + de i18n.

Verified live in-browser: enroll (QR→code→recovery codes), logout, and
the two-step challenge into the dashboard as super_admin.
2026-07-03 11:44:07 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cdbfb514bd test(auth): MFA unit + route + CLI coverage (39 tests)
mfaService unit (encrypt/decrypt, TOTP, single-use recovery, isEnrolled),
adminMfa HTTP (enroll/challenge/verify/recovery/disable; super_admin
enrollment guards #735), and reset-admin-mfa.js CLI.
2026-07-03 11:37:51 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 72e2ef6721 feat(auth): admin TOTP MFA — enrollment, login challenge, recovery, CLI reset
Backend for #738. Real TOTP 2FA for admin accounts, all roles incl.
super_admin (closes #735).

- mfaService: otplib TOTP; AES-256-GCM encryption of the secret at rest
  (key derived from MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY or JWT_SECRET); bcrypt-hashed,
  single-use recovery codes; otpauth URI + QR.
- Migration 151: adds two_factor_recovery_codes + two_factor_enrolled_at
  (secret/enabled columns already existed from legacy 016).
- Enrollment endpoints (behind adminAuth, per-user): GET /mfa/status,
  POST /mfa/{setup,enable,disable,recovery-codes}. Disable/regenerate
  require a current code so a hijacked session can't strip 2FA.
- Login challenge: /admin/login returns {mfaRequired, mfaToken} (no
  session) when 2FA is on; /admin/login/mfa exchanges a TOTP or recovery
  code for the session. Lockout counter is NOT reset until the second
  factor passes, so MFA brute-force is rate-limited too.
- CLI break-glass: scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --email <e> | --all --yes,
  audit-logged, matches reset-admin-password.js convention.
- Docs + optional MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY env.

Verified end-to-end on a live backend: enroll (super_admin), challenge,
TOTP + single-use recovery login, disable, and CLI reset.
2026-07-03 11:33:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 081f3edcdf fix(security): close cross-event thumbnail leak, bulk-op ownership bypass, + hardening
Auth/access-control audit fixes (all pre-existing on main; none are
regressions). Verified end-to-end where noted.

HIGH
- Thumbnail enumeration: photoAuth granted any gallery token access to any
  flat /thumbnails/thumb_* file, so a visitor to one gallery could
  enumerate another (password-protected) gallery's entire thumbnail set.
  Scope thumbnail access to the token's event via photos.thumbnail_path.
  Live-verified: cross-event fetch now 404s, own-event still 200s.
- Bulk ownership bypass: bulk-archive/bulk-delete acted on body-supplied
  event ids with no owner filter (single-event routes enforce
  requireEventOwnership), letting admin/editor archive or cascade-delete
  any event. Add filterOwnedEventIds; also guard rename + import-external;
  tighten photo-retry to scope admin (not just editor). Fix misleading
  bulk-delete comment.

MED
- verifyGalleryAccess never checked decoded.type — assert 'gallery'
  instead of relying on other token types incidentally lacking eventId.
- secure-images generate-token/secure-download missing denySlideshowToken
  (#646 bypass): a leaked slideshow token could download originals.
- Frontend: AuthenticatedImage + api.ts attached the gallery bearer token
  to absolute/external URLs — only attach to relative same-app paths.

LOW hardening
- Pin algorithms:['HS256'] on all auth-boundary jwt.verify calls.
- crypto.timingSafeEqual for share-token + HMAC compares (utils/timingSafe).
- Remove dead photoAuth import in galleryFeedback.

Tests: new regression suites for thumbnail scoping + filterOwnedEventIds;
fixed verifyGalleryAccess.customerRevoke fixture (real customer tokens
carry type:'gallery'). Full backend suite at the pre-existing baseline
(5 suites/27 tests fail on main too), zero new failures.
2026-07-03 10:27:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5b26dbd935 chore(main): release 3.80.0-beta.0 (#736)
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2026-07-03 08:05:34 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e513e8345b Merge pull request #731 from Luca-Timo/feat/setup-wizard-and-backup-roundtrip
feat: first-run setup wizard (feature selection + config) and portable .picpeak backup roundtrip
2026-07-03 10:03:22 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 766351b588 fix: mirror #734 onto decomposed files (PG NaN slideshow seed, SQLite bool renders)
Same two pre-existing-on-main bugs, at their post-decomposition
locations: clampIntOrUndefined in adminEvents/crud.js slideshow seed;
!! coercion in EventDetailsHeader, EventInformationCard,
ClientAccessCard. Keeps this branch correct in either merge order with
#734 — when merging main afterwards, resolve the adminEvents.js
modify/delete conflict by keeping the deletion.
2026-07-03 09:01:01 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 760c3d7b67 fix(admin): stray literal "0" rendered from SQLite integer booleans
On SQLite deployments boolean event columns come back as 0/1, and
{event.is_draft && ...} renders the 0 as a literal text node. Visible on
the event details page in three spots: above the tab bar (is_draft),
in the download-protection badge row (disable_right_click /
enable_devtools_protection / watermark_downloads), and in the Client
Access card (client_access_enabled). Coerce with !! at the render sites.
2026-07-03 08:57:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8c86518aad fix(events): NaN from slideshow seed breaks event creation on PostgreSQL
The create route seeds show_interval_ms/show_transition_ms from
app_settings through an inline guard that pre-checked Number.isFinite(+v)
but then used parseInt(v). The two disagree for null/''/true — +null is 0
(finite) while parseInt(null) is NaN — so when the slideshow settings rows
are absent (getAppSetting returns its null default), NaN flowed through
Math.min/Math.max into the INSERT. PostgreSQL rejects NaN for integer
columns; SQLite silently stores NULL, which is why every SQLite-based
test passed while POST /api/admin/events 500'd on the PG dev stack and
broke the e2e smoke suite.

Fix: parse first, then check — clampIntOrUndefined in utils/numericHelpers
(unit-tested against every failure-mode input). Verified end-to-end: the
previously-failing minimal create now succeeds against the PG dev stack.
2026-07-03 08:57:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2ea26a4962 fix: conform moved code to eslint indent/quotes, 4-arg mutation callbacks
- eslint --fix on branch-changed backend files (indent shift from the
  module-wrapper nesting in decomposed files); backend lint now 904
  errors vs 1,315 on main
- useMutationWithToast forwards all four TanStack v5 callback args
  (tsc -b strict build flagged the 3-arg passthrough)
2026-07-03 08:17:14 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b5eafc52bd refactor(frontend): decompose EventDetailsPage and ThemeCustomizerEnhanced
Move-code split, entry paths/exports unchanged:
- EventDetailsPage.tsx (2,697 -> 679) + pages/admin/event-details/* (16 files)
- ThemeCustomizerEnhanced.tsx (1,541 -> 349) + admin/theme-customizer/* (11)
Known ephemeral-UI delta: widget-local state (copied-link flags, unsaved
PIN input, modal selection) now resets when a tab unmounts.
2026-07-03 08:10:25 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fdf62dafef refactor(backend): decompose invoiceService, contractService, adminEvents
Move-code split, public entry points unchanged:
- services/invoiceService.js (3,623 -> 99) + services/invoice/* (10 modules)
- services/contractService.js (2,363 -> 83) + services/contract/* (6 modules)
- routes/adminEvents.js -> routes/adminEvents/* (crud, slideshow, resets,
  archive/bulk, logo); route registration order verified identical
Lazy cross-service requires preserved to keep the module graph acyclic.
2026-07-03 08:10:25 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 51f827774a refactor(frontend): extract shared PhotoCard from gallery layouts
One card implementation (hover overlay, download/expand/select, likes,
identity flow, lazy render) replaces per-layout copies in Masonry,
Justified, Grid, Mosaic, Timeline (-1270/+395 in layouts). Carousel,
Premium, Story stay bespoke — different DOM/design by intent.
2026-07-03 07:49:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0f230f53fb refactor(frontend): useMutationWithToast + useModal hooks, migrate admin surfaces
- 92 mutations across 40 files moved to useMutationWithToast
  (success/error toast + invalidateKeys); complex flows left as-is
- 24 boolean modal flags moved to useModal
- Mutations without an original onError intentionally not migrated
  to avoid introducing new error toasts
2026-07-03 07:49:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6eb46d8c31 refactor(backend): standardize error responses, logging, pagination
- errorResponse(res, error, status, publicMessage) in routeHelpers,
  wired into 125 catch blocks across 10 route files; wire format
  ({ error: <string> }) unchanged byte-for-byte
- Replace remaining console.* with logger across src (178 sites);
  3 intentional console sites kept (install boot, unbound .catch ref)
- Adopt getPagination in 6 routes where semantics match exactly
2026-07-03 07:49:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d44ead41c5 test: add smoke tests for invoiceService, adminEvents routes, backupService
26 tests as a safety net ahead of decomposition — invoice create/list/
status transitions, adminEvents CRUD via Supertest+SQLite, backup config
parsing and manifest validation.
2026-07-03 07:49:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9d7b6f0e11 test: extend documentSequences mock for shared nextDocumentNumber 2026-07-03 07:27:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft eb71fcf209 refactor: remove dead files, dedupe formatBytes and document numbering helpers
- Delete unused adminEvents-enhanced.js, backupService.original.js,
  databaseBackup.example.js, s3Storage.example.js, ThemeCustomizer.tsx
- Extract shared formatBytes to utils/formatBytes.js (was copied 4x)
- Centralize formatNumberInTemplate + next-document-number logic in
  utils/documentSequences.js (was copied in invoice/quote/contract services)
2026-07-03 07:25:07 +02:00
Luca fa7665c5b1 fix(backup): address .picpeak review — table filter, superuser guard, tests
From the-luap's review:

- Import no longer trusts manifest.tables blindly. It now intersects the
  manifest's table list with the real data tables of THIS database
  (listDataTables(), which already excludes knex_migrations/_lock) and
  drops anything else. A crafted/corrupted .picpeak listing knex_migrations
  or a non-existent table can no longer wipe it; skipped tables are logged.
- The Postgres session_replication_role='replica' SET (needs superuser) is
  now wrapped: on a managed-PG non-superuser it fails BEFORE any rows are
  deleted (transaction rolls back) and surfaces a clear, actionable 400
  instead of a cryptic permission error.
- Export: on an archiver error, the temp out dir (a partial plaintext-secret
  archive) is now removed instead of orphaned.

Tests (+4, now 26): engine-mismatch rejection, forward-only newer-refused,
non-picpeak rejection, and files/ restored + filesRestored asserted.
2026-07-03 01:39:13 +02:00
Luca 07b450a954 feat(setup): per-feature config step after feature selection
When the chosen features need config the wizard can collect, 'Finish' on
the usage step now advances to a lean config step instead of jumping to
the dashboard:
- Invoicing (if Invoices): company/legal name, address, VAT-ID or tax
  number, IBAN, currency → saved to business-profile + a default bank
  account. Carries the bank/VAT legal disclaimer.
- Email (if reminders/incoming-mail/whatsapp/invoices): SMTP host/port/
  user/pass/from → saved to email_configs.
Each section persists only if started, and 'Skip for now' is always
available — soft settings keep their seeded defaults. en + de strings.
2026-07-02 22:10:54 +02:00
Luca a95ee473ae feat(setup): add restore-from-backup branch to the first-run wizard
The usage step now offers 'Migrating from another PicPeak?' → a restore
step that uploads a .picpeak (reusing PicpeakRestoreCard) to clone another
instance onto this fresh one, preserving the account just created. en + de
strings added.
2026-07-02 21:57:50 +02:00
Luca 86324e7da7 feat(backup): fold .picpeak restore into the Restore wizard's Upload source
Removes the redundant standalone .picpeak card. The wizard's 'Upload
Backup' source now splits into two kinds: '.picpeak backup' (the working
portable restore — renders the upload + destructive-confirm flow inline)
and 'Manifest + files' (legacy, still 'Manifest Upload functionality
coming soon'). en + de strings added.
2026-07-02 21:38:48 +02:00
Luca d4b143f313 fix(setup): keep the first-run wizard light regardless of dark mode
The setup page background used var(--color-background), which flips to
#0a0a0a under the .dark class while the wizard card stays hardcoded light
— giving a dark page + light card mismatch in dark mode. Pin the first-run
screen to its intended light branded look (fixed #fafafa bg / #171717 text)
so all three steps render consistently.
2026-07-02 21:29:47 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b04ef216f5 chore(main): release 3.79.1-beta.0 (#729)
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2026-07-02 19:03:05 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 4aa6583bae Merge pull request #728 from Luca-Timo/fix/settings-duplicate-mail-import
fix(settings): remove duplicate Mail import that crashes the dev server
2026-07-02 20:59:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c8610276c2 Merge pull request #727 from PicPeak/chore/security-nginx-npm-bumps
chore(security): bump frontend nginx to r4 (close 4 HTTP/2 & module CVEs)
2026-07-02 20:53:45 +02:00
Luca cc79b3d9ec refactor(backup): move .picpeak download to the Dashboard tab
Downloading a portable backup is a "make a backup" action, so it belongs
next to "Run Backup Now" on the Dashboard, not under Restore. Split the
combined card into PicpeakExportCard (Dashboard) and PicpeakRestoreCard
(Restore). The manifest stays bundled inside the .picpeak, so there is no
separate manifest-only download for the portable format.
2026-07-02 20:37:35 +02:00
Luca f57462f798 fix(backup): make .picpeak roundtrip work on Postgres
Two Postgres-only bugs found by a live docker-pg roundtrip (SQLite tests
passed because neither reproduces on SQLite):

- Export: knex `.stream()` pulls in the optional `pg-query-stream` module
  (not bundled) and throws on pg. Switched to a plain per-table `select`
  — works on both engines, no new dependency. Rows are DB metadata
  (blobs live under files/), so holding a table in memory is fine.
- Import: the pg driver returns json/jsonb columns as parsed JS values,
  so re-inserting a scalar like the string "PicPeak" sent it unquoted and
  pg rejected it ("invalid input syntax for type json"). Now introspects
  each table's json/jsonb columns and re-serialises those values before
  insert (pg only; SQLite stores json as TEXT and round-trips as-is).

Verified end-to-end on docker Postgres: export 85 tables, full-override
import, current account preserved, post-backup data removed.
2026-07-02 20:13:18 +02:00
Luca 66d61c87ca feat(backup): .picpeak download + upload-restore UI in Backup Manager
Adds a self-contained "Portable backup (.picpeak)" card to the Restore
tab, completing the GUI-only roundtrip:
- Download: optional "include original photos" toggle + a prominent
  plaintext-secrets warning, streams the file via a blob download.
- Restore: file picker → destructive confirmation modal ("replaces ALL
  data except your current account, cannot be undone") → multipart upload
  to /admin/backup/picpeak/import → success summary. If the backup uses
  external media, shows a banner to reconfigure the mount, with a docs link.
Kept separate from the legacy RestoreWizard (different format/flow). en+de
strings added; dark-mode variants throughout.
2026-07-02 19:45:16 +02:00
Luca 2b66f6d889 feat(backup): upload + restore endpoint for .picpeak
POST /admin/backup/picpeak/import — multipart upload of a .picpeak,
streamed to a temp file (after auth, so unauthenticated requests can't
push a large file to disk), then restored via picpeakImportService with
currentAdminId = the logged-in operator (preserved across the override).
Gated on backup.restore. Returns usesExternalMedia so the UI can prompt to
reconfigure the external-media mount. Temp upload is always unlinked.

Completes the backend half of the GUI-only roundtrip (export download +
import upload). Multipart is already allowed by the CSRF content-type guard.
2026-07-02 19:37:17 +02:00
Luca 2920d82186 feat(backup): .picpeak import/restore (full override, keeps current account)
Receiving half of the roundtrip. picpeakImportService.importFromPicpeak():
- Validates the manifest: rejects non-picpeak files, a newer format, an
  engine mismatch (pg↔pg / sqlite↔sqlite only), and a backup from a NEWER
  schema than this instance (forward-only). knex_migrations absence is
  tolerated (test harnesses).
- Snapshots the current logged-in admin, then wipes + reloads every table
  from the backup NDJSON in one transaction with FK enforcement suspended
  (pg: session_replication_role=replica reset before commit; sqlite:
  defer_foreign_keys). knex_migrations is never touched, so the target's
  schema/migration state is preserved.
- Re-injects the current account so the operator is never locked out; a
  backup admin colliding on email is overwritten with the current creds.
- Restores files/ into storage and detects external-media references so the
  caller can prompt to reconfigure the mount.

Roundtrip integration test proves: backup data restored, current account
survives a full override (different email → added), and the email-collision
case keeps the operator's password.
2026-07-02 19:35:48 +02:00
Luca 422dfe1cc8 feat(setup): add "How will you use PicPeak?" feature-selection step
After the admin account is created (and we're logged in), the wizard now
shows an opt-in feature step instead of jumping straight to the dashboard.
Grouped ticks (Client management / Accounting / Automation) map to the
existing feature flags; galleries/analytics/userManagement stay always-on
and are noted, not listed.

- Selection is saved via the existing authenticated PUT /admin/feature-flags,
  whose server-side applyDependencyRules resolves dependencies (e.g. Invoices
  pulls in Accounting) — the wizard only sends raw ticks.
- Labels/descriptions reuse settings.features.<key>.title/description so
  translations stay in sync (en + de verified for all 14 features).
- Saving is best-effort: on failure the admin still enters the app and can
  set features later in Settings.
- New en/de strings for the usage step.

Option A (lean wizard): this is the feature-selection foundation; per-feature
hard-required config steps + the restore-from-backup branch come next.
2026-07-02 19:31:10 +02:00
Luca 38b3aef63d feat(backup): .picpeak portable export (engine-neutral logical snapshot)
First half of the GUI-only backup roundtrip. Adds a self-describing
".picpeak" archive that can be downloaded from one instance and (later)
re-uploaded to another via the web UI only.

- picpeakExportService.createPicpeak(): dumps every table as NDJSON
  (tables introspected at runtime — no hardcoded list, won't rot), plus
  a manifest (format version, app version, DB engine, latest migration,
  per-table row counts + checksums, includePhotos, contains_secrets),
  plus files/ (business-docs + uploads always; original gallery photos
  only when includePhotos). NDJSON is engine-neutral so the target
  rebuilds schema via migrations then loads rows — enabling pg↔pg /
  sqlite↔sqlite and forward-only auto-migrate.
- GET /admin/backup/picpeak/export?includePhotos= streams the file and
  sets X-Picpeak-Contains-Secrets (the file holds plaintext SMTP pass,
  admin hashes, API keys — the UI must warn).
- Purely additive: no existing backup/restore path is touched.

Integration test proves the archive shape, knex-table exclusion, and
row-count/NDJSON consistency (85 tables on the seed schema).
2026-07-02 19:13:58 +02:00
Luca 5b535f8658 fix(settings): remove duplicate Mail import that broke the dev server
SettingsPage.tsx imported `Mail` from lucide-react twice — in the main
icon block (line 20) and again in a later import (line 58). The
@vitejs/plugin-react babel transform rejects the duplicate with
"Identifier 'Mail' has already been declared", so `npm run dev` crashed
when the module loaded. The production `vite build` (esbuild) silently
dedupes it, which is why CI/Docker builds passed and it went unnoticed.

The two imports overlap only on `Mail`; drop it from line 58, keeping
that line's six unique icons (Briefcase, Receipt, ScrollText, Landmark,
Smartphone, MonitorPlay). Verified: single Mail import remains, prod
build passes, and the vite dev transform of SettingsPage now returns 200
with no "already been declared" error.
2026-07-02 17:37:51 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 64e4925fbb chore(security): bump backend npm 10 -> 11 to patch bundled sigstore/tar
Closes Trivy alerts #375 (sigstore CVE-2026-48815), #321 (@sigstore/core),
#314 (tar) — npm@10 bundles the vulnerable sigstore 3.1.0; npm 11 ships the
patched 4.x. Safe because this npm is CLI-only in the final image: runtime
deps come from the builder stage's node_modules and the entrypoint runs node,
not npm, so the install-behaviour issues that motivated the 10.x pin never run
here. npm 11 requires Node >=22.9 — satisfied by node:22-alpine.
2026-07-02 17:16:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 12a9d963f5 chore(security): bump frontend nginx to r4 — close 4 HTTP/2 & module CVEs
Trivy flagged nginx 1.28.3-r1 in the frontend image (alerts #371-374):
- CVE-2026-42055 (HIGH) HTTP/2 heap overflow
- CVE-2026-49975 (HIGH) HTTP/2 DoS
- CVE-2026-9256  (HIGH) rewrite_module code exec / DoS
- CVE-2026-48142 (MED)  charset_module memory disclosure

All fixed in nginx 1.28.3-r4. The Dockerfile already ran 'apk upgrade
--no-cache', but the pushed image predated the fixed package and the layer
was cached on r1. Add an explicit nginx upgrade to force the layer to rebuild
against the current Alpine repos (which now carry r4).
2026-07-02 17:14:29 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 24c287d051 chore(main): release 3.79.0-beta.0 (#726)
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2026-07-02 15:12:45 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 681619f0a1 Merge pull request #718 from PicPeak/feat/setup-wizard-unattended
feat: setup wizard + argument-driven unattended install
2026-07-02 17:08:21 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d35c413651 feat(setup): step-by-step wizard + argument-driven unattended install
Restructure picpeak-setup.sh around two clear modes:

- Interactive wizard (run_wizard): asks method → install dir → channel →
  domain → HTTPS handling → admin email → SMTP, then shows a review and
  confirms before installing. Each value already passed as a flag is
  respected and its question skipped.
- Unattended (--unattended + flags): validate_unattended fills defaults and
  fails fast on impossible combos (e.g. --enable-ssl without --domain).
  New flags: --admin-password, --install-dir, --channel.

Align the Docker path with the rest of the project:
- Use the committed docker-compose.production.yml (prebuilt GHCR images) via
  COMPOSE_FILE in .env instead of hand-generating a divergent compose file.
- Drop the broken setup_ssl_docker call (was referenced but never defined).
- Update path pulls images instead of building.

Admin bootstrap follows the browser-first model (#714): by default no
password is written; the one-time /setup token is surfaced (from
data/SETUP_TOKEN or the logs) with browser instructions. --admin-password
keeps the legacy seeded-admin + ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt flow for headless runs.

Depends on #714 (setup-token backend + secrets-init in production compose)
for the browser-first + zero-secret behavior at runtime.
2026-07-02 16:44:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6850bd3bef chore(main): release 3.78.0-beta.0 (#725)
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2026-07-02 14:35:07 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 97b9853709 Merge pull request #724 from PicPeak/fix/release-automerge-pat
fix: enable release-PR auto-merge with the PAT so releases actually publish
2026-07-02 16:32:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft bafc96f468 Merge pull request #714 from Luca-Timo/feat/first-run-setup-wizard
feat: zero-config first run — in-browser admin bootstrap + auto-generated secrets
2026-07-02 16:19:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e08a33d9ea fix(ci): enable release-PR auto-merge with the PAT, not GITHUB_TOKEN
Auto-merge enabled via GITHUB_TOKEN attributes the eventual merge commit to
github-actions[bot], so recursion prevention suppresses the resulting push to
main — the follow-up release-please run that cuts the tag/release never fires.
Net: the version PR merges but no release/tag/images are ever produced (#719).

Enable auto-merge with RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN instead (a real identity) so the
merge triggers the tag-cutting run. Approval stays on GITHUB_TOKEN because it
must be a different identity than the PR author (the PAT) to count as a review.

Observed on #723: merged 3.77.3-beta.0 but no run followed and no tag was cut.
2026-07-02 15:41:25 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2b2dc6e35c chore(main): release 3.77.3-beta.0 (#723)
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2026-07-02 13:29:08 +00:00
Paul Nothaft d00d52a221 Merge pull request #722 from PicPeak/fix/release-please-gh-repo
fix: set GH_REPO in release-please auto-merge step
2026-07-02 15:23:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e54100ac46 Merge pull request #721 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.77.2-beta.0
2026-07-02 15:23:08 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0cab43ed89 fix(ci): set GH_REPO in release-please auto-merge step
The auto-merge step runs in a job with no actions/checkout, so gh could not
infer the repository from a git remote and failed with 'not a git repository'
(#719 follow-up). Set GH_REPO=${{ github.repository }} so gh pr list/review/
merge work without a checkout — same fix as the whatsnew workflow (2a5f0a8).

Confirmed working otherwise: with RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN set, release PR #721 is
now PAT-authored and its required checks run automatically (no manual approval).
2026-07-02 15:20:07 +02:00
Luca b0912c7427 feat(setup): validate setup token at step 1 before advancing
Previously "Continue" on the token step only checked the field was
non-empty; a wrong token wasn't caught until the final submit, after the
user had filled in email + password. Add a non-burning verify:

- backend: POST /setup/verify-token constant-time compares the token
  without consuming it (createInitialAdmin still claims it atomically on
  submit), gated on no-admin-exists and rate-limited like /setup/admin.
- frontend: step-1 "Continue" calls verifyToken and only advances on a
  valid token; a wrong token shows the invalidToken error on the field,
  429 -> too-many-attempts, 409 -> redirect to login.

Adds integration tests for accept-without-burn / reject / closed-once-set.
2026-07-02 15:18:22 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 95dac43fdf chore(main): release 3.77.2-beta.0 2026-07-02 15:17:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fb64ec0910 Merge pull request #720 from PicPeak/fix/release-please-automation
fix: auto-publish release-please PRs without manual approval
2026-07-02 15:16:54 +02:00
Luca 3e69c5df3f fix(setup): match first-run logo size to the login page default
The header logo used a hardcoded 64px frame; the login page renders a
medium (200x150) frame via resolveLoginLogoClasses. Reuse that helper
with the default size so /setup and /admin/login read identically.
2026-07-02 15:03:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a3e7232b8e fix(ci): auto-publish release-please PRs without manual approval (#719)
The release PR (authored by github-actions[bot] via GITHUB_TOKEN) sat open
forever: its workflows were held behind 'awaiting approval' and the required
review could not be satisfied by the bot. Both release-please workflows now:

- Use a dedicated ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }} (fine-grained PAT) with a
  GITHUB_TOKEN fallback. A PAT-authored PR runs CI automatically (no 'awaiting
  approval') and can be merged without a human.
- Auto-approve (as github-actions[bot], a different identity than the PR
  author) and enable auto-merge on the open release PR, so it publishes once
  checks pass. Skipped when no PAT is configured — falls back to today's manual
  flow, nothing breaks.

A PAT also un-suppresses the tag-push and release-published triggers on
docker-build (GITHUB_TOKEN suppressed them), so add a concurrency group there
to collapse the duplicate same-version builds into one.

Requires (repo/org settings, one-time):
- Create fine-grained PAT RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN (contents:write, pull-requests:write).
- Enable 'Allow auto-merge' on the repo (currently off).
- 'Allow GitHub Actions to approve pull requests' — already enabled.
2026-07-02 15:01:52 +02:00
Luca d9b0eb7232 feat(setup): brand first-run screen and split into two-step wizard
Address post-merge UI feedback on the first-run setup screen — the first
screen any new admin sees:

- Use the bundled PicPeak logo (same asset the login page falls back to)
  on the cream brand plate instead of the generic lucide Sparkles icon.
- Split the flow into two steps: step 1 takes only the one-time setup
  token, with the `docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`
  recovery command shown prominently (with a copy button) directly under
  the field, plus a docs link for when the logs have rotated away; step 2
  collects email + password. A rejected token bounces back to step 1.

en/de strings added; other locales fall back to en.
2026-07-02 14:56:14 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 934cc92bb8 Merge pull request #717 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.77.1-beta.0
2026-07-02 14:51:09 +02:00
Luca 286975dc52 fix(setup): address PR #714 review — password UX, script token, race, nits
Blockers:
- SetupPage now mirrors the server password rule (>=8 with upper/lower/digit) so
  a green client isn't bounced by the server; server errors carry a `field`
  (routes/setup.js) that the client maps to a translated key instead of
  rendering raw English. New i18n: setup.invalidToken, setup.passwordRequirements.
- picpeak-setup.sh: the ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt block no longer dead-ends on the
  wizard path — when no legacy admin was seeded it prints the one-time setup
  token (from data/SETUP_TOKEN / docker compose logs) and points at /setup.

Concern:
- createInitialAdmin creates the admin + burns the token in ONE transaction,
  atomically claiming the token (null-if-present, expect 1 row) so a
  double-submit can't create two super_admins. Cross-DB (whereNotNull, trx-only
  writes). Added a concurrency test.

Nits:
- SetupPage redirects to /login when /setup/status errors (no form flash on a
  configured instance).
- Dropped the unused DATABASE_URL from docker-compose.yml.
- Documented why secrets are chmod 644 (three different reader users).
2026-07-02 13:21:55 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 6f5a02b817 chore(main): release 3.77.1-beta.0 2026-07-02 11:01:34 +00:00
Paul Nothaft f5b4aa7a5b Merge pull request #716 from PicPeak/docs/require-ui-screenshots
docs: require screenshots for UI changes in PRs
2026-07-02 13:01:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8ca74776f4 docs: require screenshots for UI changes in PRs
Any PR that changes a user-facing surface must include a screenshot of the
result in the description (before/after where it helps). Reviewers ask for
one before reviewing UI-touching PRs; backend/non-visual changes are exempt.
2026-07-02 11:57:32 +02:00
Luca 415bffa04c feat: zero-config first run — in-browser admin bootstrap + auto-generated secrets
Fresh installs need nothing in .env. See PR description for the full feature.
2026-07-01 14:49:18 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b8b33ae6d6 Merge pull request #713 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.77.0-beta.0
2026-07-01 10:00:29 +02:00
github-actions[bot] e1dae31e16 chore(main): release 3.77.0-beta.0 2026-07-01 07:55:55 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e873f7c98c Merge pull request #712 from PicPeak/chore/conventional-pr-title-guard
feat: admin photos list/grid toggle + upload failure report (#707, #708)
2026-07-01 09:55:37 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6f95796b7c feat: admin photos list/grid toggle + upload failure report (#707, #708)
Records two features that merged with gitmoji commit subjects and were
therefore skipped by Release Please, so the next beta credits them:
- #707 grid/list layout toggle on the admin Photos tab
- #708 per-file upload failure report in the upload modal

No code change — the features are already on main; this commit only gives
Release Please a Conventional Commit to cut the release from.
2026-07-01 09:38:34 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 4881d2040a ci: validate PR titles against Conventional Commits
Release Please only recognizes Conventional Commit prefixes (feat:, fix:,
...). PRs merged with other conventions (gitmoji, free-form) are silently
skipped, shipping changes with no version bump or changelog entry (see
#707/#708). Fail such PRs early via amannn/action-semantic-pull-request.
2026-07-01 09:38:34 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b8665e1d86 Merge pull request #708 from andredlng/feat/upload-failure-details
Surface which files failed during photo upload
2026-07-01 09:29:19 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f4a1db8b6a Merge pull request #707 from andredlng/feat/photos-list-view
Add grid/list layout toggle to admin Photos tab
2026-07-01 09:00:31 +02:00
André Deuerling 1be871cb9a 🐛 Address review: fix spinner hang + show processing failures
Blocker: the "every file rejected" reset never fired because the backend
returns `upload_id` unconditionally (with count 0), so `anyQueued` was
always true and the completion effect (gated on total > 0) never ran —
modal spun forever. Gate `anyQueued` on `count > 0` so a zero-photo
response takes the terminal reset path.

Concern 1: processing-stage failures were invisible — the modal
auto-closed on clean transfer before the worker reported them. Defer the
settle/close decision to the completion effect (combining transfer +
processing failures), and persist failed photos into `processingFailures`
state before `uploadIds` is cleared, so the rows don't vanish the instant
they appear.

Also: report card gets role="status"/aria-live (nit), and tests now cover
the whole-chunk transfer failure, the clean-settle path, and the
onUploadSettled contract from the real component.
2026-07-01 08:03:01 +02:00
André Deuerling 2a81d992f1 🎨 Address review: persist-on-click + radiogroup toggle
- Persist the layout choice in the toggle click handlers instead of a
  useEffect, so simply opening the Photos tab no longer re-writes the
  value it just read from localStorage (review concern 1).
- Give the Grid/List toggle radiogroup/radio + aria-checked semantics
  so a screen reader announces them as one mutually-exclusive set
  (review concern 2).
- Add a test that mount performs no localStorage write.
2026-07-01 07:55:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 22b20e8314 Merge pull request #711 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.76.2-beta.0
2026-06-30 22:57:16 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 79924e10d9 chore(main): release 3.76.2-beta.0 2026-06-30 20:52:33 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 3feed0fae6 Merge pull request #710 from PicPeak/fix/whatsnew-workflow-no-checkout
fix(ci): whatsnew highlights — set GH_REPO so gh runs without a checkout
2026-06-30 22:52:08 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2a5f0a8601 fix(ci): whatsnew highlights — set GH_REPO so gh runs without a checkout
Release Please Beta on v3.76.1-beta.0 hard-failed at the very first
`gh release view "$TAG"` call:

  failed to run git: fatal: not a git repository
  (or any of the parent directories): .git

The reusable `whatsnew-highlights.yml` (PR #703) doesn't run
actions/checkout — so when `gh` tried to infer the target repo from
the runner's empty workspace it errored out. The first time it ran
against an actual release (#709 → 3.76.1-beta.0), the whole job died
before the deterministic-fallback path could save it.

Two changes, both single-line:

1. `env.GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}` at job scope. `gh` honours
   this and won't fall back to parsing `.git/config`, so no checkout
   is needed (the workflow only calls the GitHub API, never reads
   repo files).

2. `continue-on-error: true` on the "Extract Features" step. The
   file's comments say "never let highlights break a release", but
   the original wiring only soft-failed the AI + inject steps. A
   transient API hiccup at extract still hard-failed the whole job —
   defeating the design intent. Match the comment.

Why not just add actions/checkout? It would work, but pulls the whole
repo over the wire on every release just for `gh` to read its own
config. GH_REPO is the lighter idiom.

Net impact today: v3.76.1-beta.0 shipped without the `<!-- whatsnew -->`
block; the app's parseWhatsNew() already falls back to the raw Features
list so the admin "What's New" banner still works. The next beta release
will pick up the polished version.
2026-06-30 22:47:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 152952877f Merge pull request #709 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.76.1-beta.0
2026-06-30 22:42:09 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 753e680b1c chore(main): release 3.76.1-beta.0 2026-06-30 20:33:22 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 0b74b51f40 Merge pull request #703 from Luca-Timo/ci/whatsnew-highlights-workflow
ci(whatsnew): generate release highlights via GitHub Models
2026-06-30 22:33:00 +02:00
André Deuerling cc26296c58 🐛 Keep upload modal open when some files fail
The failure report lives inside the upload modal, but the modal
auto-closed the instant the transfer finished (handleUploadComplete →
onClose), unmounting the report before the user could read it — so the
"which files failed" list never actually appeared.

Split the modal's completion callback in two:
- onUploadComplete: refresh the grid only (no close), as bytes land and
  again when processing finishes
- onUploadSettled({ hasFailures }): fired once the transfer settles; the
  modal auto-closes only on a clean upload and stays open (report
  visible) when any file failed

Also reset the transfer UI when nothing was queued (every file failed),
which previously left the modal spinning forever. Add a PhotoUploadModal
test covering close-on-clean vs stay-open-on-failure.
2026-06-30 21:22:49 +02:00
André Deuerling 1b0100cfad Surface which files failed during photo upload
A partial upload only told the admin "some files failed" with no way to
find out which ones — even though the data existed. The backend already
returns per-file rejections (response.errors: [{filename, error}]) and the
progress hook already exposes failedPhotos, but both were dropped.

Add a dismissible failure report to the upload modal listing every file
that didn't make it into the gallery, grouped by stage with its reason:
- rejected: per-file validation rejections from the upload response
  (previously discarded entirely)
- transfer: whole-chunk request failures (now captured with the error,
  not just the filename)
- processing: background-worker failures from useUploadProgress.failedPhotos

Replace the count-only "some files failed" toast with one that points at
the list. Add en/de keys under upload.failures.* and a component test
covering the rejected + processing rows and dismissal.
2026-06-30 21:08:02 +02:00
André Deuerling 46ce59d82e Add grid/list layout toggle to admin Photos tab
The event detail Photos tab (AdminPhotoGrid) only offered a thumbnail
grid. Add a Grid/List toggle in the action bar so admins can scan
photos in a compact, metadata-oriented list.

- New utils/photoViewPrefs.ts persists the choice per admin via
  localStorage (mirrors utils/calendarPrefs.ts), defaulting to grid
- List view is a compact <table> following the established admin
  list pattern (EventsListPage), with responsive column hiding:
  Photo (thumbnail + filename + original + Video/Hidden badges),
  Category (lg+), Uploaded date (md+, via useLocalizedDate),
  Engagement views/downloads/likes (xl+), Feedback rating/comments
  (sm+), Size, and hover Actions (download, delete)
- Rows reuse the existing selection, download, delete and category
  handlers; row click opens the photo viewer
- Toggle buttons use LayoutGrid / List icons with aria-pressed state
- Add en.json + de.json keys under admin.photos (viewMode, gridView,
  listView, columns.*)
- Tests for the persistence util and the toggle's render + persistence
2026-06-30 19:17:26 +02:00
Luca 5582644dc4 fix(whatsnew): decode HTML entities and trim em-dash detail in fallback bullets
The Features-fallback showed raw changelog text, so a commit subject like
'branded URL shortener — /s/<slug> with OG injection' surfaced two problems
in the admin banner:
- release-please escapes <slug> to &lt;slug&gt;; React renders the literal
  entity, so the banner read '/s/&lt;slug&gt;'. Decode the entities
  (&lt; &gt; &amp; &quot; &#39;), &amp; last to avoid double-decoding.
- the technical tail leaked into a user-facing highlight. Drop a trailing
  '— detail' clause (em dash only, so 'mark-paid' is untouched) so the bullet
  reads as the headline 'branded URL shortener'.

Only affects the deterministic fallback; curated <!-- whatsnew --> blocks are
unchanged.
2026-06-30 18:39:21 +02:00
Luca d25178d2e5 ci(whatsnew): let the Models step fail soft so the fallback runs without Models
If GitHub Models is disabled for the org the ai-inference step errors;
without continue-on-error the job would go red and skip the inject+fallback.
Mark it continue-on-error so an unavailable Models cleanly degrades to the
deterministic bullets — the feature now works with Models off, not just on.
2026-06-30 17:28:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 627c655a4d Merge pull request #704 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.76.0-beta.0
2026-06-30 17:12:31 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 6439cf2e42 chore(main): release 3.76.0-beta.0 2026-06-30 15:02:34 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a0f7033ffc Merge pull request #702 from PicPeak/feat/branded-short-urls-699
feat(gallery): branded URL shortener — /s/<slug> with OG injection (#699)
2026-06-30 17:01:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3ac88370d6 Merge pull request #701 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.75.1-beta.0
2026-06-30 17:00:10 +02:00
Luca 5aeb6905ac ci(whatsnew): generate release highlights via GitHub Models
Activate the What's New highlights step that condenses each release's
Features into <=8 short bullets and injects a <!-- whatsnew --> block the
app reads (utils/whatsNew.parseWhatsNew), with a deterministic fallback.

Runs as a needs: job inside the release-please workflows rather than on a
standalone release: published trigger, because release-please creates the
release with GITHUB_TOKEN and GitHub never starts new workflow runs from
token-generated events -- a standalone trigger would never fire. Shared as
a reusable workflow_call so the stable and beta channels stay in sync.

Best-effort: continue-on-error + fallback mean it can never break a release.
Requires GitHub Models enabled for the org; until then the fallback is used.
2026-06-30 16:43:54 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 56c2386c90 feat(gallery): branded URL shortener — /s/<slug> with OG injection (#699)
Issue 3 from #699 (@alexvaltchev's report): expose a custom-named short
URL per event that bots scrape for OG previews and browsers redirect to
the underlying gallery. WhatsApp / iMessage / Facebook cache the OG
metadata by the URL they crawl, so the SHORT URL becomes the cache key
— admins can rotate or split-test underlying gallery URLs without
re-pushing a fresh link to clients.

Additive feature; no existing route, table, or column is modified.

## Backend

- `gallery_short_urls` table (migration 150): id, short_slug UNIQUE,
  event_id FK CASCADE, target_path TEXT, created_by/at, hit_count,
  last_hit_at, deleted_at/by. hasTable-guarded so the migration is
  idempotent on re-run.

- `src/services/galleryShortUrlService.js` — validator + CRUD +
  resolver. Slug rules: `/^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,62}[a-z0-9])?$/`,
  reserved blocklist (admin, api, auth, gallery, og, s, login, ...).
  target_path snapshots at create-time from the event + global
  short-URL toggle, so a later flip of the toggle does NOT silently
  change where existing short URLs resolve.

- `src/routes/adminShortUrls.js` — `GET/POST
  /api/admin/events/:eventId/short-urls`, `DELETE
  /api/admin/short-urls/:id`. Structured errors: 400 INVALID_SLUG,
  409 SLUG_TAKEN (with `suggested`), 404 EVENT_NOT_FOUND. Gated by
  events.view / events.edit + requireEventOwnership.

- `server.js` /s/:shortSlug public route. Bot UA → server-render the
  same OG metadata the existing /og/gallery/<slug> handler produces,
  then override og:url to point at /s/<shortSlug> itself (cache-key
  invariant — social platforms key by the URL they scrape).
  Browser UA → 302 to target_path. Soft-deleted slug → 410 Gone
  (intentional-delete signal, distinct from 404 unknown slug).
  Hit accounting is fire-and-forget.

## Frontend

- `services/shortUrls.service.ts` — list/create/remove.
- `components/admin/ShortUrlsCard.tsx` — per-event card on the
  EventDetailsPage. Form for custom or auto-generated slug, list with
  copy-to-clipboard + soft-delete. SLUG_TAKEN error surfaces the
  service's `suggested` slug with a "use suggested" button.
- i18n: events.shortUrls.* added to EN + DE.

## Tests

78 new tests, all passing:

- `__tests__/utils/galleryShortUrlValidation.test.js` (48) — pure-
  function tests for validateSlug: accepts/rejects, reserved-slug
  blocklist, path-traversal + URL-injection vectors.
- `__tests__/integration/galleryShortUrls.test.js` (19) — service
  layer against a real SQLite DB. Covers custom + auto-generated
  slugs, collision + SLUG_TAKEN + suggested, target_path
  snapshotting (backward-compat invariant), soft-delete + slug
  rotation, hit counting.
- `__tests__/integration/galleryShortUrlRoute.test.js` (11) —
  HTTP-level: 302 redirect for browser UA, 200 + OG HTML for bot UA,
  og:url canonical points at /s/<slug>, 410 for soft-deleted +
  orphaned events, 404 unknown + malformed.

Regression sweep: 47 existing migration-chain integration tests still
pass; migration 150 is additive only.

## Backward compatibility

- Existing `/gallery/<slug>`, `/gallery/<32-hex-share-token>`,
  `/gallery/<slug>/show/<token>`, `/og/gallery/<slug>`,
  `/og/gallery/<slug>/cover` routes are untouched.
- The `/s/` namespace is new; no existing route lives there.
- Migration 150 only ADDs the new table — no ALTERs on existing
  schema, no destructive changes.
- target_path is snapshotted at create-time so flipping the global
  "Use short gallery URLs" setting after a short URL exists does NOT
  change where that short URL resolves.
2026-06-30 16:30:13 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 541b3d32ef chore(main): release 3.75.1-beta.0 2026-06-30 14:09:58 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 25bf7bb523 Merge pull request #700 from PicPeak/fix/og-injection-share-token-and-slideshow-699
fix(og): rich social previews for share-token + slideshow URLs (#699)
2026-06-30 16:09:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1b8747dc82 fix(og): rich social previews for share-token + slideshow URLs (#699)
Two SSR-OG injection bugs reported by @alexvaltchev. Both made his link
previews fall back to the brand logo + site-wide tagline instead of the
event-specific name/photo, even though the bot UA was hitting our
already-existing OG handler. He compensated with a Cloudflare Worker as
SSR middleware — which then created bug 3 below (og:image at the
auth-gated /api/.../hero/ path, not the public /og/.../cover one), so
Instagram never rendered the image either.

## Bug A — slideshow URLs miss the OG handler entirely

`/gallery/<slug>/show/<token>` has 3 segments after `/gallery/`. The OG
route was wired only at `/gallery/:slug/:token?` (1-2 segments), so
slideshow links fell through to the SPA-catchall `/gallery/*` and never
invoked the OG handler at all. Added a second route handler for the
3-segment slideshow shape, sharing the same intercept middleware so a
recognised social crawler still gets the rich preview.

## Bug B — share-token-only URLs resolve to nothing

`/gallery/<32-char-share-token>` (the form produced when migration 525's
short-URLs option strips the event slug) routes to the OG handler with
`slug=<token>`. resolveSlug then queries `events.slug = <token>`, which
never matches because the token is in a separate `share_token` column.
Result: falls through to the "no event found" branch and serves the
generic site-wide OG.

Fix: when the slug shape matches a 32-char hex AND the slug lookup
missed AND no redirect rule applies, try `events.share_token = slug` as
a final fallback. Real slugs are kebab/dot/underscore mixes, never pure
32-hex, so the extra DB roundtrip is gated to only fire for the
token-shaped URL.

## Tests

3 new tests in galleryOgService.shareImage.test.js using non-entropy
32-hex fixtures (deliberately zero-padded to avoid tripping
GitGuardian's Generic High Entropy Secret detector while still
matching the route's /^[a-f0-9]{32}$/i shape check):
- share-token slug resolves via the share_token column (alex's case)
- malformed/expired 32-hex token returns the site-wide fallback (no leak)
- non-hex slugs skip the share_token query entirely (hot-path cost guarded)

All 14 tests in the file pass.

## Out of scope here (separate follow-up)

- Issue 2 (Instagram og:image) — alex-side CF Worker bug pointing
  og:image at /api/gallery/<slug>/hero/<id>, which requires gallery
  auth. PicPeak already has the right unauthenticated path
  (/og/gallery/<slug>/cover) gated by events.og_image_share_enabled
  per-event opt-in (#474). Documented in the issue reply.
- Issue 3 (URL shortener with custom names) — real feature request,
  meaningfully different from the existing #525 short-URLs option that
  just strips the slug. Designing separately.
2026-06-30 16:03:49 +02:00
Luca de789faec5 Merge pull request #698 from Luca-Timo/docs/comparison-pixieset 2026-06-30 12:35:29 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 52dfe2723d Merge pull request #697 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.74.1-beta.0
2026-06-30 11:44:10 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 5925bed761 chore(main): release 3.75.0-beta.0 2026-06-30 09:44:00 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a1a73bf75f Merge pull request #694 from Luca-Timo/feat/whatsnew-notifications
feat(updates): "What's New" highlights after update + pre-update teaser
2026-06-30 11:43:39 +02:00
Luca 3528f6b8b7 Merge pull request #696 from Luca-Timo/docs/contributor-luap
docs(readme): credit @the-luap as creator/lead maintainer

Docs only no change in Codebase
2026-06-30 11:23:02 +02:00
Luca b0439638bd docs(readme): clarify comparison footnotes — $0 cost caveat + Pixieset video cap
- you still bring your own server (own hardware or VPS) and optional domain.
- Pixieset "unlimited" storage is photos only — video is capped per plan (~0–10 h depending on tier).
- Renumber the PicPeak storage footnote (* → **) so the three markers don't collide.
2026-06-30 11:20:37 +02:00
Luca 721f440fa6 docs(readme): add Pixieset to comparison + customer-accounts/CRM/accounting rows 2026-06-30 11:07:58 +02:00
Luca 748238e8ca docs(readme): credit @the-luap as creator/lead maintainer 2026-06-30 11:06:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0191b283d7 Merge pull request #692 from PicPeak/chore/security-bumps-aug-2026-batch
chore(security): close all 27 code-scanning alerts via dep + base-image bumps
2026-06-30 10:58:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e48b81fb8d Merge pull request #693 from PicPeak/chore/workflow-required-checks-always-fire
ci: required-check workflows fire on every PR (drop paths filter + post-rename branch list)
2026-06-30 10:53:25 +02:00
Luca 500cf8522e feat(updates): "What's New" highlights after update + pre-update teaser
Surfaces release highlights to admins, sourced from the GitHub release notes
(no AI at runtime). Bullets are written once per release in CI via GitHub Models
(see docs/ci/whatsnew-highlights.yml) into a <!-- whatsnew --> block; the app
reads that block and falls back to the changelog's "### Features" for releases
without it — so it works against today's releases immediately.

- backend utils/whatsNew.parseWhatsNew(body): curated block else Features
  section, strips scope/PR-links, de-dups, caps at 8 (tested).
- GET  /admin/system/updates/whatsnew: highlights for every version moved
  through since the per-instance marker (whatsnew_last_seen_version); fresh
  installs self-anchor silently. Best-effort, never errors.
- POST /admin/system/updates/whatsnew/seen: advance the marker (per-instance).
- /admin/system/updates also returns latestHighlights for the teaser.
- Frontend: WhatsNewBanner (green bar -> modal with "Full changelog" link) on
  the dashboard via adminService; UpdateNotification shows a "New features
  include:" teaser. i18n de/en. No migration (uses app_settings).
2026-06-30 02:31:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a40ab6a9b1 ci: required-check workflows now fire on every PR (no paths filter)
Branch protection on `main` + `stable` lists `upgrade-from-bootstrap`
and `fresh-install` as REQUIRED checks. The producing workflows had
`paths:` filters in their `pull_request` triggers, so they correctly
skipped on PRs that didn't touch migrations / package.json. But a
skipped workflow doesn't satisfy a required check — it leaves the
status "missing", which blocks merge on every unrelated PR.

Concretely surfaced on PR #692 (security bumps): all 12 visible checks
were green, but the merge button was blocked because the two
path-filtered workflows skipped and their required-check names never
reported.

This PR drops the `paths:` filter from both workflows so they always
fire on PRs against `main` + `stable`. Costs:
- `schema-drift` (`upgrade-from-bootstrap`): ~75 s per PR (Postgres
  service boot + migrate:safe run + schema assertion).
- `install-smoke` (`fresh-install`): ~2 min per PR (full Docker
  Compose boot + login).

Both are buying unconditional safety nets on the install + migration
paths, which is what the required-check gate is supposed to model.

Also fixes the trigger branch list while in the file: `[main, beta]`
→ `[main, stable]`, completing the post-#669 rename for these two
workflows that were missed in PR #686.

## What this does NOT fix

`GitGuardian Security Checks` is the third required check that's
currently missing on PRs — but that's a separate problem. The
GitGuardian GitHub App was installed at the user-account level
(`the-luap`) before the org transfer and didn't move with the repo.
Re-installing it on the org via the GitHub Marketplace is a UI step
the maintainer needs to do; can't be done via API.
2026-06-30 00:07:44 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7546f104a3 chore(security): close 27 code-scanning alerts via dep + base-image bumps
Single PR closing every open code-scanning alert at
https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/code-scanning. Both repos go
from 27 open alerts → 0 across direct deps, transitive deps, and build-
time bundled deps.

## Backend (`backend/package.json` + overrides)

Direct dep bumps:
- axios          1.15.2   → 1.16.0       (closes 9 alerts: 7 high + 1 med + 1 low)
- nodemailer     8.0.10   → ^9.0.1       (closes 1 high — SSRF + file-read via raw option)
- multer         2.1.1    → 2.2.0        (closes 2 alerts: 1 high + 1 med)
- form-data      4.0.5    → 4.0.6        (closes 1 high)
- tar            ≥7.5.13  → ≥7.5.16      (closes 1 med)
- postcss        8.5.6    → 8.5.10       (closes 1 med)
- i18next-http-backend  3.0.2  → 3.0.5   (closes 1 med — backend lagged frontend)
- js-yaml        4.1.1    → ^4.2.0       (closes 1 med)
- joi            17.13.3  → ^17.13.4     (closes 1 med)

Overrides updated to match deps (npm rejected the install otherwise) +
nodemailer ^9.0.1 added as override so imapflow + mailparser transitive
bundling of older nodemailer is also fixed. Babel devDep auto-bumped via
`npm audit fix` (low-severity arbitrary file read).

Backend npm audit: 0 vulnerabilities.

## Frontend (`frontend/package.json`)

Direct dep bumps:
- axios                 1.15.2  → 1.16.0
- postcss               8.5.6   → 8.5.10
- i18next-http-backend  3.0.5   → 3.0.5  (already current — kept for parity)

`npm audit fix` swept up 12 transitive issues at the same time:
- vitest (1 critical — file read on UI server)
- vite (2 high — fs.deny bypass, NTLM hash via launch-editor)
- ws (2 high — uninitialized memory + DoS)
- dompurify (8 mod — multiple IN_PLACE / hook-pollution XSS vectors)
- react-router-dom + react-router (1 mod transitive)
- esbuild (1 mod — dev server file read)
- @babel/core (1 low)

Frontend npm audit: 0 vulnerabilities.

## Frontend Dockerfile

- Build stage: `node:20-alpine` → `node:22-alpine`

Closes the npm-bundled CVE class (picomatch, ip-address, brace-expansion,
@sigstore/core, tar) that came from Node 20's older bundled npm. Matches
the backend Dockerfile base. The nginx serving stage stays at
`nginx:1.28-alpine` — that tag is rolling, so the next build picks up
the fixed 1.28.3-r4 layer that closes the 4 nginx CVEs.

## Verification

- Backend: `npm audit` → 0 vulnerabilities 
- Frontend: `npm audit` → 0 vulnerabilities 
- Backend Jest (workflow engine, rounding, WhatsApp): 47/47 pass 
- Frontend Vitest: 84/84 pass 
- `frontend npm run build`: succeeds 
- nodemailer 9 sanity check: our usage is `createTransport({host,port,secure,auth})`
  + `sendMail({from,to,subject,html,text})` — we don't touch the `raw`
  option that 9.x tightened, so the major bump is API-compatible.
2026-06-29 23:26:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a24821de55 Merge pull request #691 from PicPeak/chore/bypass-size-gate
ci: bypass size gate — cap self-merge PR size for bypass users
2026-06-29 23:15:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 806b1ac921 ci: bypass size gate — cap self-merge PR size for review-bypass users
@Luca-Timo is on main's review-bypass list so he can self-merge small
bugfixes without waiting for a maintainer review. The bypass list alone
is binary (he can merge anything), so this adds a complementary required
status check that fails when a bypass user's PR exceeds a configured
line-count threshold — blocking merge for genuine features while leaving
small bugfixes flowing.

How it works:
- Trigger: pull_request_target (so the workflow runs in the base repo's
  context with permissions to write a check status — script never
  executes PR code, so fork-PR-attack-safe).
- For PRs authored by a bypass user (default: @Luca-Timo):
    - linesChanged = additions + deletions
    - If ≤ LINE_LIMIT (300): check = success → bypass works → self-merge OK
    - If > LINE_LIMIT: check = failure → required-check gate blocks merge
      regardless of bypass; needs a maintainer review.
- For everyone else: check = success ("not applicable"). They go through
  the normal review path and are unaffected.

Both constants (LINE_LIMIT, BYPASS_USERS) are at the top of the workflow
for easy tuning.

After this lands on main, a separate API step adds 'bypass-size-gate' to
the main branch's required_status_checks list so the gate is actually
enforced. Until that's in place the check runs but doesn't block.
2026-06-29 23:13:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft beae46e408 Merge pull request #689 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.74.0-beta.0
2026-06-29 22:44:39 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 5ba45753c1 chore(main): release 3.74.0-beta.0 2026-06-29 20:39:22 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 14bd3e1a6c Merge pull request #688 from PicPeak/chore/readme-migration-banner
docs: prominent migration banner at the top of README
2026-06-29 22:29:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5839bba72a docs: prominent migration banner at the top of README (#669)
GitHub-flavored `> [!IMPORTANT]` callout right below the title, before
the badges/hero block, so it's the first thing a visitor or repo browser
sees in the rendered README. Mirrors the in-app banner (#687) so an
operator gets the same message whether they're browsing the repo or
logged into the admin dashboard.

Body covers:
- Image-path change with the literal new path
- Branch rename (beta → main, main → stable) with auto-redirect note
- Link to docs/migration-to-org.md for the exact compose-file edit

Remove (or downgrade to a regular note) after the migration window
settles, same lifecycle as the in-app banner constant.
2026-06-29 22:24:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b86669f1e1 Merge pull request #569 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.44.0
2026-05-27 21:51:33 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 80296282e8 chore(main): release 3.44.0 2026-05-27 19:50:15 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 5551c89bda Merge pull request #568 from the-luap/release/3.55.0-merge-from-beta
chore(release): promote beta → main as v3.55.0
2026-05-27 21:48:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft dbde67c0fa Merge branch 'main' into release/3.55.0-merge-from-beta
Resolves 6 file conflicts arising from main carrying 7 weeks of
stable-channel work (security backports, release-please cuts, README
rewrite #281) that hadn't been forward-merged into beta.

Resolution per file:

- backend/package.json + package-lock.json — kept beta's version.
  Beta is the superset; it intentionally drops `handlebars` (PR #367
  removed the runtime require; the dep was the source of 2 criticals
  + 8 highs). Security-pinned versions (axios 1.15.2, nodemailer ^8,
  i18next-http-backend ^3.0.2, multer ^2.0.2, tar >=7.5.13) already
  match across both branches — no security regression.
- frontend/package.json + package-lock.json — kept beta's version.
  Superset of main (adds marked, @types/node, i18next-cli, memfs,
  i18n CLI scripts). Same security versions on both sides.
- README.md — kept main's version. PR #281 was an explicit cleanup
  ("shorter, cleaner, less AI-sounding"); beta had grown the file by
  326 lines ad-hoc during the freeze. Preserving the rewrite.
- CHANGELOG.md — kept main's version. Release-please regenerates from
  conventional commits on its next stable cut, so beta's accumulated
  entries will roll into the new v3.55.0 release block automatically.

Auto-merged files carrying main's session-invalidation fix (#245)
flowed cleanly into beta's versions — sessionTimeout.js, adminAuth.js,
and the test files all merged without conflict, meaning beta had
already absorbed equivalent changes by independent paths.

CI on the underlying merge state was green on PR #568 prior to this
resolution; will re-run automatically on push.
2026-05-27 21:45:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 067e460a4d Merge pull request #413 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.43.1
2026-05-07 20:09:30 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 3678193ae2 chore(main): release 3.43.1 2026-05-07 12:36:13 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 74eacbc78f Merge pull request #412 from the-luap/security/cve-backport-3.42.2
fix(security): backport 18 dependency CVE patches from beta (3.42.2 stable)
2026-05-07 14:35:47 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 37bf894412 fix(security): patch 18 dependency CVEs (axios + transitives + nodemailer + i18next-http-backend)
Closes the open Trivy code-scanning alerts for app-side dependencies.
The npm-bundled CVEs in /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm (picomatch,
brace-expansion, ip-address inside the Node image itself) are deferred
to a separate Node-base-image PR — they're build-environment-side and
need their own compatibility testing.

| Package | From | To | CVEs cleared |
|---|---|---|---|
| axios (backend + frontend) | 1.14.0 | 1.15.2 | CVE-2026-42264 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42043 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42035 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42033 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42044, CVE-2026-42042, CVE-2026-42041, CVE-2026-42040, CVE-2026-42039, CVE-2026-42038, CVE-2026-42037, CVE-2026-42036, CVE-2026-42034, CVE-2026-40175, CVE-2025-62718 |
| nodemailer (backend) | ^7.0.13 | ^8.0.5 | GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g, GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 |
| i18next-http-backend (frontend) | ^3.0.2 | ^3.0.5 | CVE-2026-41691 |
| uuid (backend) | ^11.1.0 | ^11.1.1 | CVE-2026-41907 |
| postcss (frontend, devDep) | ^8.4.21 | ^8.5.10 | CVE-2026-41305 |

For transitives whose direct parents haven't released a version that
picks up the patched range, pinned via npm overrides:

| Package | Min | CVE |
|---|---|---|
| follow-redirects (backend + frontend) | >=1.16.0 | GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 |
| fast-xml-parser (backend) | >=5.7.0 | CVE-2026-41650 |
| @tootallnate/once (backend) | >=3.0.1 | CVE-2026-3449 |
| ip-address (backend) | >=10.1.1 | CVE-2026-42338 |

PR #268 originally pinned axios to 1.14.0 to avoid a supply-chain
attack on a specific compromised version range. The 1.15.x series
are post-incident upstream releases — clean. Confirmed with the
maintainer before bumping.

* `npx tsc --noEmit` (frontend) — clean
* `npx vite build` (frontend) — clean (~4s, existing bundle-size
  warning, not new)
* Backend module-load smoke test — all critical modules load
  (`auth`, `adminAuth` middleware, `emailProcessor`, `recaptcha`,
  `storage`) with the new axios + nodemailer
* Lockfile re-verification — every targeted CVE now resolves to
  the patched version range

* npm-bundled CVEs inside `/usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm/` —
  picomatch CVE-2026-33671 (HIGH), CVE-2026-33672, brace-expansion
  CVE-2026-33750, ip-address (npm-internal) CVE-2026-42338. These
  live in the Node base image and require a Node base image bump
  with its own compatibility testing — separate PR.

Targeting `beta` so the bumps go through the normal release-please
flow before promotion to `main`.
2026-05-07 14:28:53 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 506b5c3dc4 Merge pull request #408 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.43.0
2026-05-07 13:00:20 +02:00
github-actions[bot] ab6db37326 chore(main): release 3.43.0 2026-05-07 10:59:36 +00:00
Paul Nothaft eb2ce290a7 Merge pull request #407 from the-luap/release/3.42.1-merge-from-beta
chore(release): promote beta → main as v3.42.1
2026-05-07 12:56:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8a4c1a7c0a chore(release): promote beta → main as v3.42.1
Stable release promoting the entire `beta` channel to `main`. Brings
~300 commits of features, fixes, and infrastructure improvements that
have been baked on the beta channel since v2.6.5.

## Major themes since v2.6.5

* Multi-administrator support with RBAC (super admin / admin / editor)
* Async upload pipeline (background worker pool for sharp/ffmpeg/EXIF/
  watermark/webhooks; bytes-on-wire returns 202)
* Self-hosted webfonts (filesystem-driven scanner; replaces Google Fonts
  CDN; GDPR-compliant)
* 8-token CI palette + force color mode (full theming across admin and
  public site, with WCAG-safe contrast helpers)
* Native multi-arch Docker images (Apple Silicon + ARM64 Linux native)
* Native S3 storage backend (S3 + S3-compatible providers)
* Comprehensive video support (MP4/WebM/MOV upload, stream, play)
* Outbound webhooks for event/photo lifecycle (HMAC-signed)
* Gallery layout overhaul (decoupled header style, banner option,
  theme-aware skeletons, lazy-loaded folder tree picker)
* Multilingual email templates (EN/DE/NL/PT/RU translations table)
* Bulk operations (delete with password gate, archive)
* Photo dimensions backfill (true masonry layout)
* Customer client access (review area before guest share)
* Image security (devtools detection, watermarking, right-click,
  secure thumbnails)

## Notable bug fixes from beta

* `/auth/session` symmetry — three rounds of fixes (#350, #355, #363,
  #398) for the admin-login redirect-loop family
* Email template renderer: handle {{#if}} conditionals, fix CSS leak in
  plain-text fallback, gate publish-from-draft password placeholder,
  gate external_url in public response
* Caller/template variable drift across gallery_created,
  expiration_warning, archive_complete, gallery_expired
* Full-URL gallery_link in all email types (was path-only in 3 sites)
* ffmpeg/ffprobe via apk for Alpine compatibility (was glibc-bundled)
* Admin events search and counters not bounded to first 100 (#346)

## Conflict resolution notes

* `README.md` — kept main's leaner v2.6.5 rewrite (#281); added a
  Contributors section adapted from PR #393.
* `DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE.md` — beta version (more recent, includes External
  Media docs already backported to main).
* `CHANGELOG.md` — new 3.42.1 entry leads, beta's 3.x history follows,
  main's 2.x entries appended below a divider so the historical chain
  is preserved.
* `package.json` (backend + frontend) — beta's structure with version
  bumped from `3.42.1-beta.0` → `3.42.1`.
* `package-lock.json` (backend + frontend) — regenerated via
  `npm install --package-lock-only`.
* `.release-please-manifest.json` — bumped from `2.6.5` → `3.42.1` so
  the next release-please run on main starts from the correct base.

## Pre-flight checks

* Frontend `tsc --noEmit` — clean
* Frontend `vite build` — clean (~3.5s, 2.6 MB main chunk; existing
  warning about chunking, not new)
* Backend `npm test` — pre-existing failures in 6 integration suites
  (DB-fixture-dependent, not regressions)
* Frontend `vitest` — pre-existing failures in
  ThemeCustomizerEnhanced.test.tsx (missing QueryClientProvider after
  PR #390 added useQuery; not a regression of this merge)

The pre-existing test failures are tracked as separate follow-ups and
do not block this release promotion.
2026-05-07 12:47:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 4d3836fb2e Merge pull request #282 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 2.6.5
2026-04-08 13:18:17 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 75499992eb chore(main): release 2.6.5 2026-04-08 11:15:26 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 62643f241b Merge pull request #281 from the-luap/docs/readme-rewrite-main
docs: rewrite README — shorter, cleaner
2026-04-08 13:15:07 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 64f606152f docs: rewrite README — shorter, cleaner, less AI-sounding
Rewrote from 350 lines to ~130 lines. Removed emoji-heavy headings,
marketing fluff, redundant sections, and the AI disclosure. Collapsed
screenshots into details tags. Kept all essential info: demo, features,
quick start, comparison, tech stack, docs links.
2026-04-08 13:14:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e2a698e892 Merge pull request #277 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 2.6.4
2026-04-08 09:39:15 +02:00
github-actions[bot] d1d71dba25 chore(main): release 2.6.4 2026-04-08 07:14:32 +00:00
Paul Nothaft bb81fa5f4b Merge pull request #276 from the-luap/fix/main-lockfile-sync
fix: sync backend package-lock.json for security deps
2026-04-08 09:14:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 03e19893b3 fix: sync backend package-lock.json with security dep updates
The lock file was not committed with PR #275, causing npm ci to fail
in Docker builds. Regenerate to match the updated package.json overrides.
2026-04-08 09:14:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 279314e4b7 Merge pull request #275 from the-luap/security/fix-dep-vulnerabilities-main
security: fix 20 dependency vulnerabilities (backport)
2026-04-08 09:05:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 730912a3f4 security: fix 20 dependency vulnerabilities (backport to main)
Same fixes as beta PR #274. Updates handlebars, nodemailer, tar,
fast-xml-parser, brace-expansion, path-to-regexp, and lodash to
address 20 GitHub code scanning alerts.
2026-04-08 09:05:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ff9fb64e75 Merge pull request #273 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 2.6.3
2026-04-07 20:40:47 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 9cbbe74051 chore(main): release 2.6.3 2026-04-07 18:40:34 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 2e1c71c1ab Merge pull request #272 from the-luap/docs/external-media-library-270
docs: add External Media Library section to deployment guide (#270)
2026-04-07 20:40:11 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f6ca713a6e docs: add External Media Library section to deployment guide (#270)
Add the missing "External Media Library" chapter to DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE.md
that was referenced in the TOC but never written. Covers configuration,
Docker volume mounting, folder structure, usage workflow, limitations,
and troubleshooting.

Closes #270
2026-04-07 19:52:02 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 197cd8e1e0 Merge pull request #268 from the-luap/security/pin-axios-main
security: pin axios to 1.14.0 — supply chain attack prevention
2026-04-05 18:41:54 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 681b440381 security: pin axios to 1.14.0 to prevent supply chain attack
Axios versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 were compromised on March 31, 2026
with a RAT dropper attributed to North Korean threat actor. Pin to
exact 1.14.0 (latest safe release) to prevent resolution to compromised
versions. See https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/10604
2026-04-05 18:41:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3daeac9e53 Merge pull request #246 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
chore(main): release 2.6.2
2026-03-16 22:37:56 +01:00
github-actions[bot] 7febba2d9c chore(main): release 2.6.2 2026-03-16 21:37:35 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 0a3a53763c Merge pull request #245 from the-luap/fix/security-session-invalidation-main
fix(security): token invalidation on password change, session timeout enforcement
2026-03-16 22:37:16 +01:00
Paul Nothaft 85a60a2dc7 fix(security): invalidate tokens on password change, enforce session timeout, fix role update
- Set password_changed_at when changing password via adminAuth route so
  existing JWT tokens are rejected by the auth middleware check
- Enforce session timeout on first request with unseen tokens by checking
  token iat against configured timeout (prevents bypass after server restart)
- Convert camelCase roleId/isActive to snake_case role_id/is_active in
  frontend updateUser service (fixes silent role update failures)

Resolves GHSA-rqg3-47p5-vgwg
2026-03-16 22:36:52 +01:00
Paul Nothaft e74e73a3a0 Merge pull request #231 from the-luap/i18n/ru-missing-keys
i18n: add missing Russian translations for thumbnails and photo dimensions
2026-03-15 20:01:15 +01:00
301 changed files with 29540 additions and 18488 deletions
+20 -8
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,11 @@
# Environment
NODE_ENV=production
# JWT Secret (generate with: openssl rand -base64 64)
JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here
# JWT Secret — OPTIONAL. Leave unset and it is auto-generated on first run
# (Docker: the secrets-init service writes it to a private volume and reuses it
# across restarts). Set it explicitly only to pin your own value.
# Generate one with: openssl rand -base64 64
#JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here
# Auth cookie Secure flag
# unset - default: follows NODE_ENV (production=true, dev=false)
@@ -38,19 +41,28 @@ JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here
# Database Configuration (PostgreSQL)
DATABASE_CLIENT=pg
DB_USER=picpeak
# DB_PASSWORD — OPTIONAL. Leave unset and it is auto-generated on first run
# (Docker). Set it explicitly to pin your own, e.g. for an external database.
# IMPORTANT: Avoid $ character in passwords - Docker Compose interprets it as variable substitution
# If you must use $, escape it as $$ (e.g., Pass$$word instead of Pass$word)
DB_PASSWORD=your_secure_postgres_password_here
#DB_PASSWORD=your_secure_postgres_password_here
DB_NAME=picpeak_prod
# Redis Configuration
# REDIS_PASSWORD — OPTIONAL. Leave unset and it is auto-generated on first run (Docker).
# IMPORTANT: Same warning applies - avoid $ or escape as $$
REDIS_PASSWORD=your_secure_redis_password_here
#REDIS_PASSWORD=your_secure_redis_password_here
# Admin Account (initial setup)
ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@yourdomain.com
ADMIN_PASSWORD=your_secure_admin_password_here
# Admin Account (initial setup) — OPTIONAL
# Leave these unset (default) to create your admin IN THE BROWSER on first run:
# open /admin and PicPeak shows a setup screen. The one-time setup token is
# printed to the backend logs (`docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`)
# and saved to data/SETUP_TOKEN.
# Set ADMIN_PASSWORD to auto-create the admin on first boot instead (legacy;
# credentials written to data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt).
#ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
#ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@yourdomain.com
#ADMIN_PASSWORD=your_secure_admin_password_here
# Email Configuration
# For Gmail: use app-specific password
+4
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# These are supported funding model platforms
# https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/displaying-a-sponsor-button-in-your-repository
buy_me_a_coffee: theluap
+70
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@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
name: Bypass size gate
# Caps how large a PR a "review-bypass" collaborator (e.g. @Luca-Timo) can
# self-merge without a maintainer review. The branch-protection bypass list
# alone is binary — once a user is on it they can merge anything without
# review. This workflow reports a REQUIRED status check that fails when a
# bypass user's PR exceeds the configured size threshold, which blocks the
# merge even with bypass enabled. Other contributors are unaffected (the
# check reports success for them so the required-check gate doesn't trip).
#
# To tune: edit LINE_LIMIT or BYPASS_USERS below.
#
# Trigger note: uses `pull_request_target` so the workflow has the elevated
# permissions of the base repo's GITHUB_TOKEN (read PR metadata, write
# checks). The script never executes code FROM the PR — it only reads
# metadata via the API — so this is safe against fork-PR attacks.
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, reopened, synchronize, ready_for_review]
permissions:
pull-requests: read
checks: write
jobs:
size-gate:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Compute PR size and report check status
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
script: |
// Tune these two constants if the policy shifts.
const LINE_LIMIT = 300;
const BYPASS_USERS = ['Luca-Timo'];
const pr = context.payload.pull_request;
const author = pr.user.login;
const linesChanged = pr.additions + pr.deletions;
const filesChanged = pr.changed_files;
let conclusion, title, summary;
if (!BYPASS_USERS.includes(author)) {
// Not a bypass user — this gate doesn't apply to them. They
// go through normal review. Report success so the required
// check doesn't block their merge.
conclusion = 'success';
title = 'Not applicable';
summary = `This gate only restricts review-bypass for: ${BYPASS_USERS.join(', ')}. PRs from other authors (${author} here) go through the normal review path and are unaffected.`;
} else if (linesChanged <= LINE_LIMIT) {
conclusion = 'success';
title = `OK — within bypass limit (${linesChanged} lines)`;
summary = `Small PR: ${linesChanged} lines changed across ${filesChanged} file(s). Within the ${LINE_LIMIT}-line self-merge limit for @${author}. Can be merged without a maintainer review.`;
} else {
conclusion = 'failure';
title = `Too large for bypass (${linesChanged} lines)`;
summary = `Large PR: ${linesChanged} lines changed across ${filesChanged} file(s). Exceeds the ${LINE_LIMIT}-line self-merge limit for @${author} — needs an approving review from a maintainer before merge. Split into smaller PRs or wait for review.`;
}
await github.rest.checks.create({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
name: 'bypass-size-gate',
head_sha: pr.head.sha,
status: 'completed',
conclusion,
output: { title, summary }
});
+10
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@@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ on:
- 'true'
- 'false'
# Once release-please authors releases with a PAT (#719), a new version fires
# BOTH the tag-push and the release-published triggers (GITHUB_TOKEN used to
# suppress them). They build the same immutable version, so collapse them into a
# single run by grouping on the ref. Branch and PR builds use different refs and
# still run independently; a superseding push cancels an in-flight run for the
# same ref (only the newest build per ref is kept).
concurrency:
group: docker-build-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
REGISTRY: ghcr.io
# BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME and FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME are computed per job in the
+9 -16
View File
@@ -16,24 +16,17 @@ name: Fresh-install smoke
# don't pay the build cost.
on:
# No `paths:` filter — branch protection on `main` + `stable` lists
# `fresh-install` as a REQUIRED check, and a path-filtered trigger
# that skipped on unrelated PRs (e.g. frontend-only) would leave the
# required check "missing" forever and block the merge. Better to
# pay the boot cost on every PR than maintain a per-path allowlist
# that drifts as the install surface evolves. (Branches also updated
# post-#669 rename: beta → main, old main → stable.)
push:
branches: [main, beta]
paths:
- 'backend/Dockerfile'
- 'backend/wait-for-db.sh'
- 'backend/migrations/**'
- 'backend/package*.json'
- 'docker-compose.production.yml'
- '.github/workflows/install-smoke.yml'
branches: [main, stable]
pull_request:
branches: [main, beta]
paths:
- 'backend/Dockerfile'
- 'backend/wait-for-db.sh'
- 'backend/migrations/**'
- 'backend/package*.json'
- 'docker-compose.production.yml'
- '.github/workflows/install-smoke.yml'
branches: [main, stable]
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
+36
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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
name: PR Title Lint
# Release Please derives version bumps and the changelog from Conventional
# Commit prefixes (feat:, fix:, ...). PRs whose title/commits use other
# conventions (e.g. gitmoji) are silently ignored, so their changes ship
# without a version bump or a changelog entry. This check fails a PR whose
# title is not a valid Conventional Commit so the release stays automated.
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened]
permissions:
pull-requests: read
jobs:
lint-pr-title:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Validate PR title is a Conventional Commit
uses: amannn/action-semantic-pull-request@v5
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
with:
types: |
feat
fix
perf
revert
docs
style
chore
refactor
test
build
ci
+52 -1
View File
@@ -20,11 +20,49 @@ jobs:
uses: googleapis/release-please-action@v4
id: release
with:
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# A dedicated token (fine-grained PAT) makes the release PR run CI
# automatically (no "workflows awaiting approval") and lets it be
# merged without a manual review. Falls back to GITHUB_TOKEN so the
# workflow still works before the secret is added (#719).
token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
config-file: release-please-config-beta.json
manifest-file: .release-please-manifest-beta.json
target-branch: main
# Auto-approve + enable auto-merge on the open release PR so betas publish
# with no manual clicks. Approval uses GITHUB_TOKEN (github-actions[bot]) —
# a different identity than the PR author (RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN) — so it is
# a valid review (requires the org's "Allow GitHub Actions to approve pull
# requests" + the repo's "Allow auto-merge"). Only meaningful when a PAT is
# set: without it the PR is bot-authored and can't be self-approved, so we
# skip and leave today's manual flow. Best-effort — never blocks the run.
- name: Auto-approve and enable auto-merge on the release PR
if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created != 'true' }}
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
# This job has no checkout, so gh can't infer the repo from a git
# remote — set it explicitly (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: |
if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping auto-merge (manual review still required)."
exit 0
fi
pr=$(gh pr list --head release-please--branches--main --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number // empty')
if [ -n "$pr" ]; then
# Approve as github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN) — a different identity
# than the PR author (the PAT) — so it counts as a valid review.
gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — release-please version bump + changelog (#719)." || true
# Enable auto-merge as the PAT so the eventual merge commit is
# attributed to a real identity. If enabled via GITHUB_TOKEN the merge
# push is suppressed by recursion prevention and the follow-up run that
# cuts the tag/release never fires (#719).
GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto || true
else
echo "No open release PR to auto-merge."
fi
- name: Output Release Info
if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
run: |
@@ -35,3 +73,16 @@ jobs:
echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "Docker images will be built and tagged with this beta version." >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
# Best-effort "What's New" highlights on the freshly-created release. Runs in
# this same workflow run (not a `release:` trigger) because release-please
# creates the release with GITHUB_TOKEN, which never starts new workflow runs.
whatsnew:
needs: release-please
if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created }}
permissions:
contents: write # edit the release body
models: read # GitHub Models (free tier)
uses: ./.github/workflows/whatsnew-highlights.yml
with:
tag: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+44 -1
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@@ -20,9 +20,39 @@ jobs:
uses: googleapis/release-please-action@v4
id: release
with:
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# Dedicated token so the release PR runs CI + can auto-merge without a
# manual review. Falls back to GITHUB_TOKEN before the secret is set (#719).
token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
config-file: release-please-config.json
manifest-file: .release-please-manifest.json
target-branch: stable
# Auto-approve + auto-merge the open stable release PR. See the beta
# workflow for the full rationale. Skipped on the release-cutting run and
# whenever no PAT is configured.
- name: Auto-approve and enable auto-merge on the release PR
if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created != 'true' }}
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
# No checkout in this job — set the repo explicitly so gh works
# without a git remote (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: |
if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping auto-merge (manual review still required)."
exit 0
fi
pr=$(gh pr list --head release-please--branches--stable --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number // empty')
if [ -n "$pr" ]; then
# Approve as github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN, ≠ the PAT author) so it
# is a valid review; enable auto-merge as the PAT so the merge commit is
# attributed to a real identity and triggers the tag-cutting run (#719).
gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — release-please version bump + changelog (#719)." || true
GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto || true
else
echo "No open release PR to auto-merge."
fi
- name: Output Release Info
if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
@@ -34,3 +64,16 @@ jobs:
echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "Docker images will be built and tagged with this version." >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
# Best-effort "What's New" highlights on the freshly-created release. Runs in
# this same workflow run (not a `release:` trigger) because release-please
# creates the release with GITHUB_TOKEN, which never starts new workflow runs.
whatsnew:
needs: release-please
if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created }}
permissions:
contents: write # edit the release body
models: read # GitHub Models (free tier)
uses: ./.github/workflows/whatsnew-highlights.yml
with:
tag: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+9 -12
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@@ -30,20 +30,17 @@ name: Schema drift (#530)
# the same shape is caught before merge.
on:
# No `paths:` filter — branch protection on `main` + `stable` lists
# `upgrade-from-bootstrap` as a REQUIRED check. A path-filtered
# trigger that skipped on unrelated PRs would leave the required
# check "missing" forever, blocking every PR that doesn't touch
# migrations. The ~75-second cost on every PR buys an unconditional
# safety net. (Branches also updated post-#669 rename: beta → main,
# old main → stable.)
push:
branches: [main, beta]
paths:
- 'backend/migrations/**'
- 'backend/src/database/db.js'
- 'backend/knexfile.js'
- '.github/workflows/schema-drift.yml'
branches: [main, stable]
pull_request:
branches: [main, beta]
paths:
- 'backend/migrations/**'
- 'backend/src/database/db.js'
- 'backend/knexfile.js'
- '.github/workflows/schema-drift.yml'
branches: [main, stable]
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
+2 -2
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@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ name: Tests
on:
push:
branches: [main, beta]
branches: [main, beta, stable]
pull_request:
branches: [main, beta]
branches: [main, beta, stable]
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
+98
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@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
# What's New highlights — GitHub Models release step (reusable)
#
# Called by the release-please workflows AFTER a release is created
# (release-please.yml for `stable`, release-please-beta.yml for `main`). It runs
# as a job in the SAME workflow run rather than on its own `release: published`
# trigger, because release-please creates the release with the default
# GITHUB_TOKEN and GitHub does not start new workflow runs from token-generated
# events — a standalone `release:` workflow would simply never fire.
#
# What it does: condenses the new release's "### Features" into <=8 short
# bullets via GitHub Models (free tier, `models: read`) and injects a
# `<!-- whatsnew -->` block at the top of the release notes. The app reads that
# block (backend utils/whatsNew.parseWhatsNew) and falls back to the raw
# Features list for releases without it — so this is purely a quality upgrade,
# never a hard dependency. Failure is isolated by `continue-on-error` + the
# deterministic fallback below, so it can never break a release.
#
# GitHub Models is OPTIONAL. If it is disabled/unavailable for the org the AI
# step fails soft (continue-on-error) and the deterministic fallback produces
# the bullets instead — the feature works either way, Models just polishes them.
#
# Validated end-to-end on a fork (extract -> openai/gpt-4o-mini -> inject into
# real release notes; app parseWhatsNew() reads the block back).
name: What's New highlights
on:
workflow_call:
inputs:
tag:
description: Release tag to annotate (e.g. v2.3.0)
required: true
type: string
jobs:
highlights:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write # to edit the release body
models: read # GitHub Models (free tier)
# GH_REPO at job scope so every `gh` call targets the right repo without
# needing an actions/checkout step. Without this, `gh` falls back to
# parsing `.git/config` in the runner's empty workspace and dies with
# "fatal: not a git repository" — which hard-fails the whole job before
# any continue-on-error can save it.
env:
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
steps:
- name: Extract Features from the published release
id: feat
# Belt-and-braces: the job-level comment says "never let highlights
# break a release", but the original wiring only marked the AI +
# inject steps as continue-on-error. A hiccup here (rate limit,
# transient API error) would still hard-fail the job. Match the
# design intent and fail soft.
continue-on-error: true
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
run: |
BODY=$(gh release view "$TAG" --json body -q .body)
FEATURES=$(printf '%s\n' "$BODY" | awk '/^#{2,4} +Features/{f=1;next} /^#{1,4} +\S/{f=0} f')
{ echo "features<<EOF"; printf '%s\n' "$FEATURES"; echo EOF; } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Summarize with GitHub Models
if: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features != '' }}
id: ai
continue-on-error: true # Models may be disabled/unavailable for the org; fall back deterministically below
uses: actions/ai-inference@v1
with:
model: openai/gpt-4o-mini # catalog id (verified present); openai/gpt-4.1-mini or openai/gpt-5-nano also work
system-prompt: >
You write release highlights for the admins of a self-hosted
photo-gallery + CRM app. Given raw changelog "Features" lines, output
AT MOST 8 markdown bullets, each 3-4 words, user-facing, no scopes,
no jargon, no issue numbers. One bullet per distinct user-visible
feature. Output ONLY "- " bullets, nothing else.
prompt: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features }}
- name: Inject the What's New block
if: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features != '' }}
continue-on-error: true # never let highlights break a release
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
AI: ${{ steps.ai.outputs.response }}
FEATURES: ${{ steps.feat.outputs.features }}
run: |
BULLETS="$AI"
# Deterministic fallback if the model returned nothing (e.g. Models not yet enabled).
if [ -z "$BULLETS" ]; then
BULLETS=$(printf '%s\n' "$FEATURES" | head -8 \
| sed -E 's/^\* \*\*[^:]+:\*\* */- /; s/ \(\[[^]]*\]\([^)]*\)\)//g')
fi
BODY=$(gh release view "$TAG" --json body -q .body)
# Idempotent: strip any prior block before re-injecting.
BODY=$(printf '%s' "$BODY" | perl -0pe 's/<!--\s*whatsnew\s*-->.*?<!--\s*\/whatsnew\s*-->\n*//is')
gh release edit "$TAG" --notes "$(printf '<!-- whatsnew -->\n%s\n<!-- /whatsnew -->\n\n%s' "$BULLETS" "$BODY")"
+1 -1
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@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
{
".": "3.73.0-beta.0"
".": "3.83.0-beta.0"
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -1,3 +1 @@
{
".": "2.6.1"
}
{".":"3.45.3"}
+840 -828
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+4 -1
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@@ -50,7 +50,10 @@ Unsure where to begin? You can start by looking through these issues:
- Linting passes: `npm run lint`
4. **Write tests** if you've added code
5. **Update documentation** if needed
6. **Create a Pull Request**
6. **Attach a screenshot for any UI change** (see below)
7. **Create a Pull Request**
> **📸 Screenshots are required for UI changes.** Any PR that changes a user-facing surface — a component, page, layout, style, or in-app copy — must include at least one screenshot of the result in the PR description, showing before/after where it helps reviewers see the difference. PRs that touch the UI without a screenshot will be asked to add one before review. Backend-only or otherwise non-visual changes don't need one.
## 💻 Development Setup
+42 -14
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@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
# 📸 PicPeak - Open Source Photo Sharing for Events
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **PicPeak has moved to its own GitHub organization.**
>
> - **Docker images** are now published at `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/{backend,frontend}`. The old path (`ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/...`) is no longer served — update your `docker-compose.yml`.
> - **Branches**: active development is now on `main` (was `beta`); the curated stable channel is now `stable` (was `main`). Existing PRs and clones auto-redirect via GitHub.
>
> See **[`docs/migration-to-org.md`](docs/migration-to-org.md)** for the one-line `docker-compose.yml` edit and full details.
<div align="center">
<img src="docs/picpeak-logo.png" alt="PicPeak Logo" width="300" />
@@ -86,18 +94,31 @@ Get PicPeak running in under 5 minutes:
git clone https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak.git
cd picpeak
# Copy environment template
# Copy the environment template — the defaults work out of the box.
# Machine secrets (JWT, DB, Redis) are auto-generated on first run, and the
# admin account is created in the browser (see below). Edit .env only to
# customise (domain, SMTP, storage paths, …) — nothing is required.
cp .env.example .env
# Edit configuration (required: JWT_SECRET)
nano .env
# Start with Docker Compose
docker compose up -d
# Access at http://localhost:3000
```
### First run — create your admin account
On first start with no `ADMIN_PASSWORD` set, PicPeak has **no admin account yet** and greets you with an in-browser setup screen — no credentials in `.env`:
1. Open **http://localhost:3000/admin** — you'll be redirected to `/setup`.
2. Grab the **one-time setup token** from the backend logs (it's also saved to `data/SETUP_TOKEN`):
```bash
docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"
```
3. Paste the token, set your admin **email + password**, and you're in. The token is single-use, and the setup screen closes permanently once an admin exists.
> Prefer the old behaviour? Set `ADMIN_PASSWORD` in `.env` and PicPeak auto-creates the admin on first boot instead (credentials written to `data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt`).
Note on Docker file permissions
- The backend container starts as root, chowns bind-mounted host directories (`./storage`, `./data`, `./logs`) to UID 1001 (`nodejs`), then drops privileges via `su-exec` before running the app. No host-side setup needed for fresh installs.
- If you pin `user:` in a compose override (e.g. to map a specific host UID), the self-chown is skipped and you must pre-chown the host directories to that UID — see [docs.picpeak.app/deployment/docker#permissions](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/docker#permissions).
@@ -370,17 +391,23 @@ See our [Contributing Guide](CONTRIBUTING.md) for details.
## 📊 Comparison with Alternatives
| Feature | PicPeak | PicDrop | Scrapbook.de |
|---------|---------|---------|--------------|
| Self-Hosted | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Custom Branding | ✅ Full | Limited | Limited |
| Monthly Cost | $0 | $29-199 | €19-99 |
| Storage Limit | Unlimited* | 50-500GB | 100-1000GB |
| Client Uploads | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| API Access | ✅ | Paid | ❌ |
| Open Source | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Feature | PicPeak | PicDrop | Scrapbook.de | Pixieset |
|---------|---------|---------|--------------|----------|
| Self-Hosted | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Custom Branding | ✅ Full | Limited | Limited | ✅ (paid) |
| Monthly Cost | $0* | $29-199 | €19-99 | ~$60 |
| Storage Limit | Unlimited** | 50-500GB | 100-1000GB | 3GBUnlimited*** |
| Client Uploads | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Limited |
| API Access | ✅ | Paid | ❌ | ❌ |
| Open Source | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Customer Accounts | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Quotes / Contracts / Invoices | 🧪 Beta | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Incoming Invoices & Accounting | 🧪 Beta | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
*Limited only by your server storage
*You still bring your own server (own hardware or a VPS) and, if you want one, a domain.
**Limited only by your server storage.
***Pixieset's "unlimited" is photos only; video is capped by plan (roughly 010 h depending on tier).
🧪 Beta = built but feature-flagged off by default (see [Beta Features](#-beta-features-use-at-your-own-risk)).
## 🛡️ Security
@@ -476,6 +503,7 @@ PicPeak is inspired by the best features of commercial platforms while remaining
A huge thank you to the people whose code, reports, and feedback have shaped PicPeak:
- [**@the-luap**](https://github.com/the-luap) — creator and lead maintainer. Started the project and built PicPeak's foundation and the entire gallery experience (events, galleries, uploads, sharing, download protection, templates), plus backup & restore, analytics, system health, branding/theming, and WhatsApp notifications — and the architecture every later feature builds on.
- [**@Luca-Timo**](https://github.com/Luca-Timo) — native Apple Silicon multi-arch images, external-URL toggle for legal CMS pages, the lazy-loaded folder tree picker, the admin-email picker on event creation, the data-driven self-hosted webfont system, the gallery header/banner decoupling, several typed-API refactors, and the CRM + accounting suite (quotes/contracts/invoices, hours logging, calendar, tax report, inbound supplier-invoice capture, expenses, and the Treuhänder/Banana export). Consistently raises the bar with thoughtful PRs.
- [**@Rekoo-PS**](https://github.com/Rekoo-PS) — sharp-eyed bug reporter and product feedback. Filed the issues that drove the login-loop fix, the gallery-loading skeleton work, the redirection cleanup, the mobile-lightbox overhaul, the admin-events search-counter fix, the photo-count column, and the bulk-delete workflow. Also a [BuyMeACoffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap) supporter — the kind of feedback loop that keeps the project useful for real deployments.
+13
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@@ -163,6 +163,19 @@ sudo ./picpeak-setup.sh --native --unattended \
- `picpeak-workers` - Background workers
- `caddy` - Web server (optional)
## 🔑 First Login — Create Your Admin
If you installed with `picpeak-setup.sh` and gave an `--admin-password`, your admin account already exists — log in at `/admin` with that email and password.
If you started PicPeak **without** setting `ADMIN_PASSWORD` (e.g. a plain `docker compose up`), there's **no admin yet** and you create it in the browser:
1. Open `http://your-server:3000/admin` — you'll land on a setup screen.
2. Get the **one-time setup token** from the backend logs (also saved to `data/SETUP_TOKEN`):
```bash
docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"
```
3. Paste it, set your admin email + password. The token is single-use and the screen closes once an admin exists.
## 🌐 Access Methods
### Direct Access (Simplest)
+10
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@@ -9,6 +9,16 @@ PORT=3001
# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
JWT_SECRET=your-very-secure-jwt-secret-at-least-32-characters-long-example123456
# Admin 2FA (TOTP) secret encryption key — OPTIONAL.
# Admin authenticator secrets are encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM). By default
# the key is derived from JWT_SECRET, so you do NOT need to set this. Set it
# only if you want the MFA encryption key decoupled from JWT_SECRET (e.g. so
# rotating JWT_SECRET doesn't invalidate enrolled authenticators). If you set
# it, changing/losing it makes existing 2FA secrets undecryptable — recover
# with: docker compose exec backend node scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --all --yes
# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
#MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
# Auth cookie Secure flag
# unset - default: 'auto' in production, false in dev (#427)
# true - always set Secure (HTTPS-only cookies; breaks plain-HTTP access —
+17 -5
View File
@@ -27,12 +27,24 @@ FROM node:22-alpine
WORKDIR /app
# Upgrade all packages to fix security vulnerabilities (OpenSSL, libexpat, BusyBox CVEs)
RUN apk upgrade --no-cache
# Redeclare CACHEBUST — ARGs don't cross stage boundaries, so the builder
# stage's declaration never reached this stage. Consuming it in the RUN below
# busts that layer's cache every CI run (CACHEBUST=github.run_number), so the
# image always picks up current Alpine security updates instead of reusing a
# stale cached upgrade layer.
ARG CACHEBUST=1
# Upgrade npm to fix tar, minimatch, brace-expansion CVEs in npm's own deps
# Pin to 10.x to stay compatible with Node 22 Alpine (npm 11.x has dependency issues)
RUN npm install -g npm@10
# Upgrade all packages to fix security vulnerabilities (OpenSSL, libexpat, BusyBox CVEs)
RUN echo "cachebust=${CACHEBUST}" && apk upgrade --no-cache
# Upgrade the npm CLI in the final image so its bundled deps are patched
# (sigstore 4.x, tar) — closes CVE-2026-48815 and the older @sigstore/core / tar
# Trivy alerts. Safe here: only the CLI present in the image changes. Runtime
# dependencies come from the builder stage (COPY --from=builder node_modules
# below) and the entrypoint runs node, not npm — so npm 11's install behaviour
# (the reason 10.x was pinned) never executes in this stage. npm 11 needs
# Node >=22.9, satisfied by node:22-alpine.
RUN npm install -g npm@11
# Install dumb-init for proper signal handling, postgresql-client for database
# checks, ffmpeg for video upload support, and su-exec for the root → nodejs
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
/**
* Smoke tests for backupService's config resolution + file-collection
* and manifest validation paths — safety net ahead of the god-file
* decomposition.
*
* Uses the same real-SQLite harness as
* backupService.configurableWalker.test.js (bootCrmDb + a temp
* STORAGE_PATH) rather than the broken deep-mock approach in
* backupService.enhanced.test.js.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(30000);
describe('backupService — config + file collection + manifest (smoke)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let storagePath;
let backupService;
let backupManifest;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
backupService = require('../../src/services/backupService');
backupManifest = require('../../src/services/backupManifest');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('app_settings').del();
// Reset the storage tree so each test starts from a pristine walk.
await fs.promises.rm(storagePath, { recursive: true, force: true });
await fs.promises.mkdir(storagePath, { recursive: true });
});
function seedFile(relPath, content = 'dummy bytes') {
const abs = path.join(storagePath, relPath);
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(abs, content);
return abs;
}
async function insertBackupSetting(key, value) {
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: key,
setting_value: value,
setting_type: 'backup',
});
}
describe('getBackupConfig', () => {
it('parses booleans, numbers, JSON arrays and plain strings from app_settings', async () => {
await insertBackupSetting('backup_enabled', 'true');
await insertBackupSetting('backup_include_archived', 'false');
await insertBackupSetting('backup_retention_days', '30');
await insertBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backups/picpeak');
await insertBackupSetting('backup_email_recipients', '["a@example.com","b@example.com"]');
// Non-backup settings must not leak into the backup config.
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: 'general_site_name',
setting_value: 'PicPeak',
setting_type: 'general',
});
const config = await backupService.getBackupConfig();
expect(config.backup_enabled).toBe(true);
expect(config.backup_include_archived).toBe(false);
expect(config.backup_retention_days).toBe(30);
expect(config.backup_destination_path).toBe('/backups/picpeak');
expect(config.backup_email_recipients).toEqual(['a@example.com', 'b@example.com']);
expect(config).not.toHaveProperty('general_site_name');
// Raw (unparsed) values are preserved on the non-enumerable __raw.
expect(String(config.__raw.backup_retention_days)).toBe('30');
});
it('returns an empty config object (not null) when nothing is configured', async () => {
const config = await backupService.getBackupConfig();
expect(config).not.toBeNull();
expect(Object.keys(config)).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
describe('getFilesToBackup', () => {
it('returns an empty list on a pristine storage tree', async () => {
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({ backup_include_archived: true });
expect(files).toEqual([]);
});
it('captures path/relativePath/size/modified metadata for backed-up files', async () => {
const content = 'not really a jpeg';
const abs = seedFile('events/active/E9/pic.jpg', content);
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({ backup_include_archived: true });
const entry = files.find((f) => f.relativePath === path.join('events/active/E9', 'pic.jpg'));
expect(entry).toBeDefined();
expect(entry.path).toBe(abs);
expect(entry.size).toBe(Buffer.byteLength(content));
// Not toBeInstanceOf(Date) — fs.stat mtime comes from a different
// realm under Jest and fails the cross-realm instanceof check.
expect(Object.prototype.toString.call(entry.modified)).toBe('[object Date]');
});
});
describe('validateBackupManifest', () => {
it('round-trips a generated manifest as valid', async () => {
seedFile('events/active/E1/a.jpg', 'aaa');
const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({ backup_include_archived: true });
const manifest = await backupManifest.generateManifest({
backupType: 'full',
backupPath: '/backup/run-1',
files,
});
const manifestPath = path.join(storagePath, 'manifest-smoke.json');
await backupManifest.saveManifest(manifest, manifestPath, 'json');
const result = await backupService.validateBackupManifest(manifestPath);
expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
expect(result.manifest.backup.type).toBe('full');
expect(result.manifest.files.count).toBe(files.length);
expect(result.manifest.verification.total_checksum).toBeTruthy();
});
it('flags a manifest missing required sections as invalid', async () => {
const badPath = path.join(storagePath, 'manifest-broken.json');
fs.writeFileSync(badPath, JSON.stringify({ manifest: { version: '2.0' } }));
const result = await backupService.validateBackupManifest(badPath);
expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
expect(result.error).toMatch(/Missing required section/);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
/**
* HTTP-level tests for the `/s/:shortSlug` public resolver (#699).
*
* Verifies the contract the public route is expected to honour:
* - Browser UA → 302 to target_path
* - Social crawler UA → 200 with OG <meta>, canonical = /s/<slug>
* - Soft-deleted slug → 410 Gone (intentional-delete signal)
* - Unknown slug → 404 Not Found
* - Hit count increments after successful resolutions (both shapes)
*
* Mirrors the production server.js wiring but doesn't load the whole
* server — the surrounding middleware (CORS, helmet, rate limiters)
* isn't part of this route's contract.
*/
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(60000);
let db; let cleanup; let service; let app;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// Persist a business_profile + business_name so buildOgMetadata's
// settings-based fields populate consistently.
const { upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings');
await upsertAppSetting('branding_company_name', JSON.stringify('Test Studio'), 'string');
service = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
const {
isSocialCrawler, buildOgMetadata, renderOgHtml,
} = require('../../src/services/galleryOgService');
app = express();
app.get('/s/:shortSlug', async (req, res) => {
try {
const row = await service.findByShortSlug(req.params.shortSlug);
if (!row) return res.status(404).type('text/plain').send('Short URL not found');
if (row.deleted_at) return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL has been removed');
if (isSocialCrawler(req.get('user-agent'))) {
const event = await db('events').where({ id: row.event_id }).first('slug');
if (event?.slug) {
const meta = await buildOgMetadata(event.slug, req.originalUrl);
const base = (process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/$/, '');
meta.url = `${base}/s/${row.short_slug}`;
res.set('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=300');
res.set('Content-Type', 'text/html; charset=utf-8');
res.send(renderOgHtml(meta));
service.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
return;
}
return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL points at a deleted event');
}
service.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
return res.redirect(302, row.target_path);
} catch (err) {
return res.status(500).type('text/plain').send(err.message);
}
});
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
async function seedEventAndShortUrl({ slug = `evt-${Date.now()}`, shortSlug }) {
const farFuture = new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 86400000).toISOString();
const [eventId] = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Test Event',
event_date: '2026-06-05',
password_hash: 'x',
expires_at: farFuture,
is_active: true,
is_archived: false,
share_link: slug,
share_token: `tok${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 12)}`,
welcome_message: null,
});
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId, customSlug: shortSlug,
});
return { eventId, shortUrl: row };
}
// User-agent strings the production `isSocialCrawler` helper matches.
// Snapshot known-true samples here so the test stays in sync if the
// helper's allowlist evolves.
const BOT_UA_WHATSAPP = 'WhatsApp/2.23.20.0';
const BOT_UA_FACEBOOK = 'facebookexternalhit/1.1 (+http://www.facebook.com/externalhit_uatext.php)';
const BROWSER_UA = 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/605.1.15';
describe('GET /s/:shortSlug — browser (302 redirect)', () => {
it('redirects to the snapshotted target_path with a 302', async () => {
const { shortUrl } = await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'browser-redirect', shortSlug: 'go-here',
});
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/go-here')
.set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
expect(res.status).toBe(302);
expect(res.headers.location).toBe(shortUrl.target_path);
expect(res.headers.location).toMatch(/^\/gallery\//);
});
it('increments hit_count on a browser hit (fire-and-forget — wait briefly)', async () => {
await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'hit-browser', shortSlug: 'hit-from-browser',
});
await request(app).get('/s/hit-from-browser').set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
const row = await service.findByShortSlug('hit-from-browser');
expect(row.hit_count).toBe(1);
expect(row.last_hit_at).toBeTruthy();
});
});
describe('GET /s/:shortSlug — social crawler (OG metadata)', () => {
it('returns 200 with OG HTML for WhatsApp UA', async () => {
await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'whatsapp-og', shortSlug: 'wa-preview',
});
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/wa-preview')
.set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/text\/html/);
expect(res.text).toContain('<meta');
expect(res.text).toMatch(/og:title/);
expect(res.text).toMatch(/og:url/);
});
it('og:url canonical points at /s/<slug>, not the underlying gallery URL', async () => {
await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'canonical-test', shortSlug: 'canonical-short',
});
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/canonical-short')
.set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_FACEBOOK);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// The og:url meta tag must contain the short-URL path, not the
// /gallery/<slug> path — this is the cache-key invariant from #699.
expect(res.text).toMatch(/property="og:url"\s+content="[^"]*\/s\/canonical-short"/);
expect(res.text).not.toMatch(
/property="og:url"\s+content="[^"]*\/gallery\/canonical-test"/
);
});
it('sets a short cache header so scrapers can re-fetch when admin rotates the preview', async () => {
await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'cache-header', shortSlug: 'cache-test',
});
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/cache-test')
.set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
expect(res.headers['cache-control']).toMatch(/public/);
expect(res.headers['cache-control']).toMatch(/max-age=300/);
});
it('increments hit_count on a crawler hit as well', async () => {
await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'hit-bot', shortSlug: 'hit-from-bot',
});
await request(app).get('/s/hit-from-bot').set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
const row = await service.findByShortSlug('hit-from-bot');
expect(row.hit_count).toBe(1);
});
});
describe('GET /s/:shortSlug — error states', () => {
it('404 for an unknown slug', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/never-existed')
.set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
it('410 for a soft-deleted slug (intentional-delete signal)', async () => {
const { shortUrl } = await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'gone-test', shortSlug: 'gone-slug',
});
await service.softDelete(shortUrl.id, null);
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/gone-slug')
.set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
expect(res.status).toBe(410);
});
it('410 if the event was hard-deleted but the short URL row somehow survives', async () => {
const { eventId } = await seedEventAndShortUrl({
slug: 'orphan-test', shortSlug: 'orphan-slug',
});
// Hard-delete the event row (FK CASCADE would normally clean up the
// short URL too — but if CASCADE didn't fire for whatever reason
// (e.g. SQLite foreign_keys pragma off in a particular runtime), the
// resolver should still degrade safely).
// SQLite's foreign_keys pragma is OFF by default; the migration
// doesn't toggle it, so this delete leaves the short URL row.
await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).delete();
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/orphan-slug')
.set('User-Agent', BOT_UA_WHATSAPP);
expect(res.status).toBe(410);
});
it('404 for a malformed slug (rejected at validation, no DB hit)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/UPPER_CASE')
.set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
describe('Regression — existing URL paths must still respond the same', () => {
// The /s/* namespace is additive: it must NOT shadow /gallery/*
// or any of the OG routes. We don't load the whole app here, but we
// can at least pin that the route param doesn't accept slashes —
// i.e. /s/foo/bar must NOT be matched by our handler.
it('the /s/:shortSlug route does not match nested paths', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/s/foo/bar')
.set('User-Agent', BROWSER_UA);
// Express returns its default 404 when no route matches the path.
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
/**
* Integration tests for the branded short-URL service (#699).
*
* Exercises createShortUrl + findByShortSlug + listForEvent + softDelete
* + recordHit against a real SQLite DB, including the contracts that
* matter for production correctness:
*
* - Custom slug + collision detection (409 with `suggested`)
* - Auto-generated slug from event slug + year
* - Soft-delete preserves the row (admin can audit)
* - target_path snapshots at create time (toggling the global
* "Use short gallery URLs" setting later doesn't change existing
* short URLs — backward-compat invariant from #699)
* - hit_count increments idempotently
* - findByShortSlug returns soft-deleted rows (caller decides 410 vs 404)
*
* Boots one DB for the whole file (cheap on SQLite); each test seeds
* its own event row to keep scope clean.
*/
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(60000);
let db; let cleanup; let service; let adminId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// Minimal admin for created_by audit.
const adminInsert = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'shorturl-test',
email: 'shorturl@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
must_change_password: false,
created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
adminId = adminInsert[0]?.id ?? adminInsert[0];
service = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
// Each test seeds a fresh event so collisions / counter state don't leak.
async function seedEvent(overrides = {}) {
const slug = overrides.slug || `evt-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`;
const farFuture = new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 86400000).toISOString();
const [id] = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: overrides.event_name || 'Test Wedding',
event_date: overrides.event_date || '2026-06-05',
password_hash: 'x',
expires_at: farFuture,
is_active: true,
is_archived: false,
share_link: slug,
share_token: overrides.share_token || `tok${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 12)}`,
welcome_message: null,
});
const event = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
return event;
}
describe('createShortUrl — custom slug', () => {
it('creates with a custom slug', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'sofia-grad-1' });
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id,
customSlug: 'sofia-graduation-1',
createdBy: adminId,
});
expect(row.short_slug).toBe('sofia-graduation-1');
expect(row.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.slug}`);
expect(row.event_id).toBe(event.id);
expect(row.hit_count).toBe(0);
});
it('lowercases the input — operators pasting mixed-case still get a clean slug', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'sofia-grad-2' });
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id,
customSlug: 'Sofia-GraduAtion-2', // mixed case
createdBy: adminId,
});
expect(row.short_slug).toBe('sofia-graduation-2');
});
it('rejects an invalid slug with INVALID_SLUG code', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'invalid-test' });
await expect(service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id,
customSlug: 'invalid slug with spaces',
createdBy: adminId,
})).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'INVALID_SLUG' });
});
it('rejects a reserved slug with INVALID_SLUG code', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'reserved-test' });
await expect(service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id,
customSlug: 'admin',
createdBy: adminId,
})).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'INVALID_SLUG' });
});
it('rejects a duplicate slug with SLUG_TAKEN + suggested fallback', async () => {
const event1 = await seedEvent({ slug: 'dup-test-1' });
const event2 = await seedEvent({ slug: 'dup-test-2' });
await service.createShortUrl({ eventId: event1.id, customSlug: 'collide-me' });
await expect(service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event2.id, customSlug: 'collide-me',
})).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'SLUG_TAKEN',
suggested: expect.any(String),
});
});
it('throws EVENT_NOT_FOUND when the event id does not exist', async () => {
await expect(service.createShortUrl({
eventId: 9999999, customSlug: 'no-event',
})).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'EVENT_NOT_FOUND' });
});
});
describe('createShortUrl — auto-generated slug', () => {
it('uses event slug + year when no custom slug provided', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({
slug: 'autogen-wedding', event_date: '2026-06-05',
});
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id,
createdBy: adminId,
});
// First-choice candidate is just the slug; takes that.
expect(row.short_slug).toBe('autogen-wedding');
});
it('falls back to slug-year when the bare slug is already taken', async () => {
// Both events SHARE the same canonical slug so the first-choice
// bare-slug candidate is burned, forcing autoGen to try the
// year-suffixed variant.
const event1 = await seedEvent({
slug: 'collide-base', event_date: '2026-07-01',
});
await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event1.id, customSlug: 'collide-base',
});
const event2 = await seedEvent({
slug: 'collide-base-2', event_date: '2026-07-01',
});
// Force the bare candidate of event2 to also collide by burning it.
await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event1.id, customSlug: 'collide-base-2',
});
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event2.id, // No custom — auto-gen from event2.slug
});
// Bare candidate `collide-base-2` is taken → year-suffixed picks.
expect(row.short_slug).toBe('collide-base-2-2026');
});
});
describe('createShortUrl — target_path snapshotting (#699 backward-compat)', () => {
it('uses /gallery/<slug> when the global short-URLs setting is OFF (default)', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'snapshot-off' });
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'snap-off',
});
expect(row.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.slug}`);
});
it('uses /gallery/<share_token> when the global setting is ON at create time', async () => {
// Persist the setting.
const { upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings');
await upsertAppSetting('general_use_short_gallery_urls', JSON.stringify(true), 'system');
try {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'snapshot-on', share_token: 'tokenAbc123' });
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'snap-on',
});
expect(row.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.share_token}`);
// CRITICAL backward-compat invariant: now flip the setting OFF.
// Existing short URLs must still resolve to the same target_path
// they were created with — operator's existing share links don't
// silently change behaviour.
await upsertAppSetting('general_use_short_gallery_urls', JSON.stringify(false), 'system');
const refetched = await service.findByShortSlug('snap-on');
expect(refetched.target_path).toBe(`/gallery/${event.share_token}`);
} finally {
await upsertAppSetting('general_use_short_gallery_urls', JSON.stringify(false), 'system');
}
});
});
describe('findByShortSlug + listForEvent', () => {
it('returns null for an unknown slug', async () => {
expect(await service.findByShortSlug('does-not-exist-xyz')).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for a malformed slug (no DB hit)', async () => {
expect(await service.findByShortSlug('UPPER_CASE')).toBeNull();
expect(await service.findByShortSlug('with spaces')).toBeNull();
expect(await service.findByShortSlug('')).toBeNull();
});
it('returns soft-deleted rows (caller decides 410 vs 404)', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'softdel-find' });
const created = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'find-deleted',
});
await service.softDelete(created.id, adminId);
const fetched = await service.findByShortSlug('find-deleted');
expect(fetched).not.toBeNull();
expect(fetched.deleted_at).toBeTruthy();
});
it('listForEvent excludes soft-deleted rows', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'list-test' });
const live = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'list-live',
});
const deleted = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'list-deleted',
});
await service.softDelete(deleted.id, adminId);
const list = await service.listForEvent(event.id);
const ids = list.map((r) => r.id);
expect(ids).toContain(live.id);
expect(ids).not.toContain(deleted.id);
});
});
describe('softDelete', () => {
it('returns true on first call, false on second (idempotent admin clicks)', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'softdel-idem' });
const created = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'idem-delete',
});
expect(await service.softDelete(created.id, adminId)).toBe(true);
expect(await service.softDelete(created.id, adminId)).toBe(false);
});
it('returns false for an unknown id (caller maps to 404)', async () => {
expect(await service.softDelete(9999999, adminId)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('createShortUrl after soft-delete — slug rotation', () => {
it('re-creating a soft-deleted slug succeeds (purges the deleted row)', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'rotate' });
const first = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'rotate-me',
});
await service.softDelete(first.id, adminId);
// The slug is now reclaimable for a fresh row.
const second = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'rotate-me',
});
expect(second.id).not.toBe(first.id);
expect(second.short_slug).toBe('rotate-me');
});
});
describe('recordHit', () => {
it('increments hit_count + stamps last_hit_at', async () => {
const event = await seedEvent({ slug: 'hit-counter' });
const row = await service.createShortUrl({
eventId: event.id, customSlug: 'count-me',
});
await service.recordHit(row.id);
await service.recordHit(row.id);
const fetched = await service.findByShortSlug('count-me');
expect(fetched.hit_count).toBe(2);
expect(fetched.last_hit_at).toBeTruthy();
});
it('is fire-and-forget — invalid id does not throw', async () => {
await expect(service.recordHit(9999999)).resolves.not.toThrow();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
'use strict';
// Validates the engine-neutral .picpeak export: it must produce a real zip with
// a manifest + per-table NDJSON, exclude knex bookkeeping, and honour the photo
// toggle. Uses the shared CRM DB harness (temp SQLite) — no docker needed.
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret-at-least-32-characters-long!!';
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const StreamZip = require('node-stream-zip');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
let tmpDir;
let createPicpeak;
// bootCrmDb MUST run before requiring the service (which transitively requires
// db.js) so the export reads this test's DB, not the default path.
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpDir; // isolate file collection to the temp dir
({ createPicpeak } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService'));
}, 60000);
afterAll(async () => {
await cleanup();
});
async function readZip(filePath) {
const zip = new StreamZip.async({ file: filePath });
const entries = Object.keys(await zip.entries());
const manifest = JSON.parse((await zip.entryData('manifest.json')).toString('utf8'));
await zip.close();
return { entries, manifest };
}
describe('picpeak export (.picpeak logical export)', () => {
it('produces a .picpeak with a manifest and per-table NDJSON', async () => {
const { filePath, manifest } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
expect(filePath.endsWith('.picpeak')).toBe(true);
expect(fs.existsSync(filePath)).toBe(true);
expect(manifest.format).toBe(1);
expect(manifest.kind).toBe('picpeak-backup');
expect(manifest.database.engine).toBe('sqlite');
expect(manifest.options.includePhotos).toBe(false);
expect(manifest.contains_secrets).toBe(true);
// Migrations seed real tables (e.g. app_settings) — expect several.
expect(Object.keys(manifest.tables).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(Object.keys(manifest.tables)).toContain('app_settings');
const { entries, manifest: zipped } = await readZip(filePath);
expect(entries).toContain('manifest.json');
expect(entries.some((n) => n.startsWith('data/') && n.endsWith('.ndjson'))).toBe(true);
expect(entries).toContain('data/app_settings.ndjson');
// Manifest inside the zip matches the returned one.
expect(zipped.tables).toEqual(manifest.tables);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('never exports knex bookkeeping tables', async () => {
const { filePath, manifest } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
const names = Object.keys(manifest.tables);
expect(names).not.toContain('knex_migrations');
expect(names).not.toContain('knex_migrations_lock');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('row counts in the manifest match the NDJSON line counts', async () => {
// Insert a couple of settings so at least one table is non-empty.
await db('app_settings')
.insert({ setting_key: 'picpeak_export_test_a', setting_value: JSON.stringify('1'), setting_type: 'string' })
.onConflict('setting_key').merge();
const { filePath, manifest } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
const zip = new StreamZip.async({ file: filePath });
const buf = await zip.entryData('data/app_settings.ndjson');
await zip.close();
const lines = buf.toString('utf8').split('\n').filter((l) => l.trim().length > 0);
expect(lines.length).toBe(manifest.tables.app_settings.rowCount);
expect(manifest.tables.app_settings.rowCount).toBeGreaterThan(0);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
'use strict';
// Full .picpeak roundtrip on a temp SQLite DB:
// 1. seed a "backup" instance (admin A + a marker setting)
// 2. export → .picpeak
// 3. simulate a reinstall: wipe, create a DIFFERENT current admin B, mutate data
// 4. import the backup with currentAdminId = B
// 5. assert the backup data is restored AND the current account (B) survives,
// while the backup's admin (A) is also present (different email → added).
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret-at-least-32-characters-long!!';
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
let tmpDir;
let createPicpeak;
let importFromPicpeak;
let validateManifest;
let superAdminRoleId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpDir;
({ createPicpeak } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService'));
({ importFromPicpeak, validateManifest } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
superAdminRoleId = role.id;
}, 60000);
afterAll(async () => {
await cleanup();
});
const adminRow = (email, hash) => ({
username: email,
email,
password_hash: hash,
role_id: superAdminRoleId,
is_active: true,
must_change_password: false,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
});
async function setMarker(value) {
await db('app_settings')
.insert({ setting_key: 'roundtrip_marker', setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'string' })
.onConflict('setting_key').merge();
}
async function getMarker() {
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'roundtrip_marker' }).first();
return row ? JSON.parse(row.setting_value) : null;
}
describe('.picpeak roundtrip (export → import)', () => {
it('restores backup data and preserves the current account', async () => {
// 1. Seed the "source" instance.
await db('admin_users').del();
await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('backup-admin@old.example', 'HASH_A'));
await setMarker('from_backup');
// 2. Export.
const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
// 3. Simulate a reinstall: fresh current admin B, mutated data.
await db('admin_users').del();
const [bId] = await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('current-admin@new.example', 'HASH_B')).returning('id');
const currentAdminId = typeof bId === 'object' ? bId.id : bId;
await setMarker('mutated_after_backup');
// 4. Import, preserving the current admin.
const result = await importFromPicpeak({ filePath: undefined, picpeakPath: filePath, currentAdminId });
expect(result.restored).toBe(true);
expect(result.tables).toBeGreaterThan(0);
// 5a. Backup data restored (marker reverted to the backup value).
expect(await getMarker()).toBe('from_backup');
// 5b. The backup's admin is present (different email → added).
const a = await db('admin_users').whereRaw('lower(email) = lower(?)', ['backup-admin@old.example']).first();
expect(a).toBeTruthy();
expect(a.password_hash).toBe('HASH_A');
// 5c. The current account SURVIVES the override, with its own credentials.
const b = await db('admin_users').whereRaw('lower(email) = lower(?)', ['current-admin@new.example']).first();
expect(b).toBeTruthy();
expect(b.password_hash).toBe('HASH_B');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('overwrites a backup admin that collides with the current account email', async () => {
// Source has an admin at the SAME email the current operator will use.
await db('admin_users').del();
await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('shared@example.com', 'OLD_HASH'));
await setMarker('collision_case');
const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
// Reinstall: current admin uses the same email but a NEW password.
await db('admin_users').del();
const [id] = await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('shared@example.com', 'NEW_HASH')).returning('id');
const currentAdminId = typeof id === 'object' ? id.id : id;
await importFromPicpeak({ picpeakPath: filePath, currentAdminId });
// Exactly one admin at that email, and it keeps the CURRENT password.
const rows = await db('admin_users').whereRaw('lower(email) = lower(?)', ['shared@example.com']);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].password_hash).toBe('NEW_HASH');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('restores files/ and reports filesRestored', async () => {
// A business-doc that lives in storage → travels in the backup.
const docDir = path.join(tmpDir, 'business-docs');
const marker = path.join(docDir, 'roundtrip-doc.txt');
fs.mkdirSync(docDir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(marker, 'hello');
await db('admin_users').del();
const [id] = await db('admin_users').insert(adminRow('files@example.com', 'H')).returning('id');
const currentAdminId = typeof id === 'object' ? id.id : id;
const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false });
try {
fs.rmSync(marker); // delete on disk so the restore must bring it back
const result = await importFromPicpeak({ picpeakPath: filePath, currentAdminId });
expect(result.filesRestored).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
expect(fs.existsSync(marker)).toBe(true);
expect(fs.readFileSync(marker, 'utf8')).toBe('hello');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.rmSync(docDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
});
describe('.picpeak manifest validation', () => {
it('rejects a database-engine mismatch', async () => {
// Harness runs on SQLite, so a pg manifest must be refused.
const blockers = await validateManifest({
kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'pg' }, tables: {},
});
expect(blockers.some((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a backup from a newer schema (forward-only)', async () => {
// validateManifest reads knex_migrations for the target's latest migration;
// the harness has none, so create it with an older migration than the backup.
await db.schema.createTable('knex_migrations', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('name');
t.integer('batch');
t.timestamp('migration_time');
});
try {
await db('knex_migrations').insert({ name: '100_baseline', batch: 1 });
const blockers = await validateManifest({
kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1,
database: { engine: 'sqlite', latest_migration: '999_from_the_future' },
tables: {},
});
expect(blockers.some((b) => /newer/i.test(b))).toBe(true);
} finally {
await db.schema.dropTableIfExists('knex_migrations');
}
});
it('rejects a file that is not a PicPeak backup', async () => {
const blockers = await validateManifest({ some: 'random-json' });
expect(blockers.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
/**
* CLI test for scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js — break-glass MFA reset (#738).
*
* Boots a temp-SQLite DB, seeds an admin with MFA fully enabled, then runs
* the script in a child process (--email <addr> --yes) pointed at the same
* DB file, and asserts the four MFA columns are zeroed. The script runs in
* its own process with its own knex connection; the parent connection is
* idle during the spawn so the SQLite write lock isn't contended.
*/
const path = require('path');
const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(60000);
let db;
let cleanup;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
}, 60000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
const SCRIPT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'reset-admin-mfa.js');
async function seedEnrolledAdmin(email) {
const inserted = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: email.split('@')[0],
email,
password_hash: 'x',
is_active: true,
two_factor_enabled: true,
two_factor_secret: 'iv.tag.ct',
two_factor_recovery_codes: JSON.stringify(['$2b$10$fakehashfakehashfakehashfa']),
two_factor_enrolled_at: new Date(),
created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
}
it('zeroes the four MFA columns for the targeted admin', async () => {
const email = 'reset-me@example.com';
const id = await seedEnrolledAdmin(email);
execFileSync('node', [SCRIPT, '--email', email, '--yes'], {
env: {
...process.env,
NODE_ENV: 'test',
TEST_DATABASE_PATH: process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH,
},
stdio: 'pipe',
});
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id }).first();
expect(Number(row.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(0);
expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeNull();
expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBeNull();
expect(row.two_factor_enrolled_at).toBeNull();
});
it('leaves a different admin untouched', async () => {
const targetEmail = 'target@example.com';
const bystanderEmail = 'bystander@example.com';
const targetId = await seedEnrolledAdmin(targetEmail);
const bystanderId = await seedEnrolledAdmin(bystanderEmail);
execFileSync('node', [SCRIPT, '--email', targetEmail, '--yes'], {
env: { ...process.env, NODE_ENV: 'test', TEST_DATABASE_PATH: process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH },
stdio: 'pipe',
});
const target = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
const bystander = await db('admin_users').where({ id: bystanderId }).first();
expect(Number(target.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(0);
expect(Number(bystander.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(1);
expect(bystander.two_factor_secret).toBe('iv.tag.ct');
});
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
'use strict';
// First-run bootstrap service. bootCrmDb() must run BEFORE requiring the service
// so setupService shares this test's db instance (see crmDb.js note).
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret-at-least-32-characters-long!!';
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb, buildRouteApp } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
let tmpDir;
let setupService;
let getAppSetting;
let upsertAppSetting;
let app;
const VALID_PW = 'Str0ng-Passw0rd!';
// bootCrmDb MUST run before any require of db.js (directly or transitively via a
// service/util), or db.js binds to the default path instead of the temp one.
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
process.env.DATA_DIR = tmpDir; // isolate the SETUP_TOKEN file to the temp dir
setupService = require('../../src/services/setupService');
({ getAppSetting, upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings'));
app = buildRouteApp('/api/setup', require('../../src/routes/setup'));
}, 60000);
afterAll(async () => {
await cleanup();
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('admin_users').del();
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_token' }).del();
});
describe('setupService (first-run bootstrap)', () => {
it('reports needsAdmin while no admin exists', async () => {
expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: true, complete: false });
});
it('generates and persists a one-time token while no admin exists', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
expect(token).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(token.length).toBeGreaterThan(20);
expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBe(token);
// Idempotent — a second call returns the same token, not a fresh one.
expect(await setupService.ensureSetupToken()).toBe(token);
});
it('stores the token as valid JSON so the Postgres jsonb column accepts it', async () => {
// Regression guard for the SQLite-only miss: a bare token string is rejected
// by Postgres jsonb ("invalid input syntax for type json"). The raw column
// value must be JSON-parseable and round-trip back to the token.
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_token' }).first();
expect(() => JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).not.toThrow();
expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(token);
});
it('rejects a wrong token', async () => {
await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await expect(
setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token: 'nope', email: 'a@b.co', password: VALID_PW })
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: true, complete: false });
});
it('rejects a weak password', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await expect(
setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'a@b.co', password: 'weak' })
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
});
it('creates the first admin as super_admin, issues a token, and burns the setup token', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const result = await setupService.createInitialAdmin({
token, email: 'Owner@Example.com', password: VALID_PW, ip: '203.0.113.7',
});
expect(result.user.email).toBe('owner@example.com'); // normalised
expect(result.user.role.name).toBe('super_admin');
expect(result.token).toEqual(expect.any(String));
const row = await db('admin_users').first();
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
expect(row.role_id).toBe(role.id);
expect(row.password_hash).not.toBe(VALID_PW); // hashed
// One-time: token burned, status now complete.
expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBeFalsy();
expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: false, complete: true });
});
it('writes the SETUP_TOKEN file while pending and removes it once setup completes', async () => {
const tokenFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'SETUP_TOKEN');
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
expect(fs.readFileSync(tokenFile, 'utf8').trim()).toBe(token);
await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'owner@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
expect(fs.existsSync(tokenFile)).toBe(false); // burned in DB + file removed
});
it('refuses to create a second admin (setup already complete)', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
await expect(
setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'second@example.com', password: VALID_PW })
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409 });
});
it('serialises a double-submit — two concurrent valid-token calls create only one admin', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const results = await Promise.allSettled([
setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'a@example.com', password: VALID_PW }),
setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'b@example.com', password: VALID_PW }),
]);
const fulfilled = results.filter((r) => r.status === 'fulfilled');
expect(fulfilled).toHaveLength(1); // the atomic token claim lets exactly one win
const count = await db('admin_users').count({ c: '*' }).first();
expect(Number(count.c)).toBe(1);
});
it('ensureSetupToken clears any stale token once an admin exists', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
// Simulate a stale token left in settings, then re-run the boot hook.
await upsertAppSetting('setup_token', JSON.stringify('stale'), 'string');
expect(await setupService.ensureSetupToken()).toBeNull();
expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBeFalsy();
});
});
describe('setup routes', () => {
it('GET /api/setup/status reports needsAdmin', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/setup/status');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ needsAdmin: true, complete: false });
});
it('POST /api/setup/verify-token accepts the right token without burning it (200)', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const res = await request(app).post('/api/setup/verify-token').send({ token });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ valid: true });
// Token is NOT consumed — it still works for the actual create.
expect(await getAppSetting('setup_token')).toBe(token);
});
it('POST /api/setup/verify-token rejects a wrong token (400, field token)', async () => {
await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const res = await request(app).post('/api/setup/verify-token').send({ token: 'nope' });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.field).toBe('token');
});
it('POST /api/setup/verify-token is closed once an admin exists (409)', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
const res = await request(app).post('/api/setup/verify-token').send({ token });
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
});
it('POST /api/setup/admin rejects a wrong token (400)', async () => {
await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/setup/admin')
.send({ token: 'nope', email: 'a@b.co', password: VALID_PW });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toMatchObject({ needsAdmin: true });
});
it('POST /api/setup/admin creates the first admin + sets the auth cookie (201)', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/setup/admin')
.send({ token, email: 'owner@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
expect(res.body.user.role.name).toBe('super_admin');
expect((res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).join(';')).toMatch(/admin_token/);
expect(await setupService.getSetupStatus()).toEqual({ needsAdmin: false, complete: true });
});
it('POST /api/setup/admin is closed once an admin exists (409)', async () => {
const token = await setupService.ensureSetupToken();
await setupService.createInitialAdmin({ token, email: 'first@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/setup/admin')
.send({ token, email: 'second@example.com', password: VALID_PW });
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
});
});
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
expect(again.already).toBe(true);
});
test('seeds the invoice-dunning built-in as the delegation graph (v6, disabled for first beta)', async () => {
test('seeds the invoice-dunning built-in as the delegation graph (disabled for first beta)', async () => {
const { seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot, DUNNING_KEY } = require('../../src/services/_workflowSeedBoot');
const noopLogger = { info() {}, warn() {} };
await seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot(db, noopLogger);
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
expect(wf).toBeTruthy();
expect(!!wf.is_builtin).toBe(true);
expect(!!wf.enabled).toBe(false); // first beta: ships disabled; legacy ladder runs until enabled
expect(JSON.parse(wf.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(6);
expect(JSON.parse(wf.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(7);
const nodes = await db('workflow_nodes').where({ workflow_id: wf.id, version: wf.version });
expect(nodes.filter((n) => n.type === 'trigger')).toHaveLength(1);
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ describe('workflow engine', () => {
await seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot(db, noopLogger);
const reseeded = await db('workflows').where({ id: wf.id }).first();
expect(reseeded.version).toBe(wf.version + 1); // bumped
expect(JSON.parse(reseeded.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(6);
expect(JSON.parse(reseeded.trigger_config).seedVersion).toBe(7);
expect(!!reseeded.enabled).toBe(false); // seed default re-applied (not admin-owned → flips enabled→disabled)
const newNodes = await db('workflow_nodes').where({ workflow_id: wf.id, version: reseeded.version });
expect(newNodes.some((n) => n.type === 'gate')).toBe(false); // legacy graph replaced
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
/**
* Regression test for the bulk archive/delete ownership bypass.
*
* bulk-archive and bulk-delete acted on body-supplied event ids with no
* ownership filter, so an admin/editor scoped to their own events (the
* single-event routes enforce requireEventOwnership) could archive or
* cascade-delete ANY event by id. filterOwnedEventIds is the helper those
* routes now use to drop foreign/non-existent ids.
*/
// events owned by admin 7; event 3 owned by someone else; event 4 is
// ownerless (legacy). The mock models:
// whereIn('id', ids).andWhere(created_by IS NULL OR created_by = admin.id)
const EVENTS = [
{ id: 1, created_by: 7 },
{ id: 2, created_by: 7 },
{ id: 3, created_by: 99 }, // foreign
{ id: 4, created_by: null }, // ownerless/legacy
];
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
db: () => {
const q = {
_ids: null,
_adminId: null,
whereIn(_col, ids) { this._ids = ids; return this; },
andWhere(cb) {
// Emulate the (created_by IS NULL OR created_by = admin.id) builder
// by capturing the admin id the callback closes over via a probe.
const probe = {
_adminId: null,
whereNull() { return this; },
orWhere(_col, id) { this._adminId = id; return this; },
};
cb(probe);
this._adminId = probe._adminId;
return this;
},
select() {
return Promise.resolve(
EVENTS
.filter((e) => this._ids.includes(e.id))
.filter((e) => e.created_by === null || e.created_by === this._adminId)
.map((e) => ({ id: e.id }))
);
},
};
return q;
},
}));
const { filterOwnedEventIds } = require('../../src/middleware/ownership');
describe('filterOwnedEventIds', () => {
it('super_admin gets every id, nothing denied', async () => {
const { allowed, denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(
{ id: 7, roleName: 'super_admin' }, [1, 3, 4, 999]
);
expect(allowed).toEqual([1, 3, 4, 999]);
expect(denied).toEqual([]);
});
it('non-super_admin keeps owned + ownerless, denies foreign and non-existent', async () => {
const { allowed, denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(
{ id: 7, roleName: 'admin' }, [1, 2, 3, 4, 999]
);
expect(allowed.sort()).toEqual([1, 2, 4]); // owns 1,2; 4 is ownerless
expect(denied.sort()).toEqual([3, 999]); // 3 foreign, 999 missing
});
it('foreign-only request yields empty allowed', async () => {
const { allowed, denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(
{ id: 7, roleName: 'editor' }, [3]
);
expect(allowed).toEqual([]);
expect(denied).toEqual([3]);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
/**
* Regression test for the cross-event thumbnail enumeration leak.
*
* Thumbnails are served flat from /thumbnails/thumb_<name> with
* deterministic, enumerable filenames. photoAuth previously granted any
* holder of a gallery token for ANY active event access to ANY thumbnail
* (it set eventSlug=null and returned next() as long as the token's event
* existed), so a visitor to one gallery could pull another (password-
* protected) gallery's entire thumbnail set. The fix scopes thumbnail
* access to the token's event by matching the requested file against
* photos.thumbnail_path for that event_id.
*/
process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'test-secret-thumbnail-scope-000000000000';
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
// Two events, each owning one thumbnail. The photos mock resolves a row
// only when BOTH event_id and thumbnail_path match — i.e. it models the
// real ownership query.
const EVENTS = [
{ id: 10, slug: 'event-a', is_active: 1 },
{ id: 20, slug: 'event-b', is_active: 1 },
];
const PHOTOS = [
{ id: 1, event_id: 10, thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_event-a_ceremony_0001.jpg' },
{ id: 2, event_id: 20, thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg' },
];
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
db: (table) => ({
_cond: null,
where(cond) { this._cond = cond; return this; },
first() {
if (table === 'events') {
return Promise.resolve(EVENTS.find((e) => e.id === this._cond.id) || null);
}
if (table === 'photos') {
return Promise.resolve(
PHOTOS.find((p) => p.event_id === this._cond.event_id
&& p.thumbnail_path === this._cond.thumbnail_path) || null
);
}
return Promise.resolve(null);
},
}),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
}));
const photoAuth = require('../../src/middleware/photoAuth');
function galleryToken(eventId) {
return jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
}
function makeReqRes(token, thumbPath) {
const req = { path: thumbPath, headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, cookies: {} };
const res = {
statusCode: null,
body: null,
status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
};
return { req, res };
}
describe('photoAuth — thumbnail ownership scoping', () => {
it('denies a gallery token for event A fetching event B\'s thumbnail', async () => {
const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(10), '/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg');
const next = jest.fn();
await photoAuth(req, res, next);
// Access denied: middleware must not pass the request through.
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
expect(req.event).toBeUndefined();
});
it('allows a gallery token to fetch its own event\'s thumbnail', async () => {
const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(20), '/thumb_event-b_ceremony_0001.jpg');
const next = jest.fn();
await photoAuth(req, res, next);
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(req.event).toMatchObject({ id: 20 });
});
it('denies a traversal / foreign filename that matches no owned thumbnail', async () => {
const { req, res } = makeReqRes(galleryToken(10), '/thumb_../../etc/passwd');
const next = jest.fn();
await photoAuth(req, res, next);
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
expect(req.event).toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
/**
* HTTP smoke tests for the core admin event CRUD endpoints:
* POST /api/admin/events (create)
* GET /api/admin/events (list + pagination)
* GET /api/admin/events/:id (detail + stats)
* PUT /api/admin/events/:id (update)
* DELETE /api/admin/events/:id (cascade delete)
*
* Safety net ahead of the adminEvents.js god-file decomposition —
* pins the request/response contracts of the main CRUD paths using
* the same real-SQLite harness as slideshowAdmin.test.js.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-events-smoke-')), 'db.sqlite'
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-events-test-secret';
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
async function insertEvent(db, adminId, over = {}) {
const base = {
slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Test Wedding',
event_date: '2026-05-29',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_by: adminId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...over,
};
const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
}
describe('admin events CRUD endpoints (smoke)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let token;
// bootCrmDb's full migration run intermittently exceeds Jest's default
// 5s beforeAll timeout on slower CI runners; raise it.
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
});
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('email_queue').del();
await db('events').del();
});
const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
it('401s without an admin token', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/admin/events');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
describe('POST /', () => {
it('creates an event, mints slug + share link and persists the row', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/events')).send({
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Smoke Wedding',
event_date: '2026-09-01',
// Field requirements default to ON (getEventFieldRequirements)
// so customer + admin contact data must be supplied.
customer_name: 'Client Person',
customer_email: 'client@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
require_password: false,
is_draft: true,
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.id).toBeDefined();
expect(res.body.slug).toContain('wedding-smoke-wedding');
expect(typeof res.body.share_link).toBe('string');
expect(res.body.is_draft).toBe(true);
const row = await db('events').where({ id: res.body.id }).first();
expect(row).toBeDefined();
expect(row.event_name).toBe('Smoke Wedding');
expect(row.created_by).toBe(adminId);
// Folder structure is created under STORAGE_PATH/events/active/<slug>.
const eventDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', res.body.slug);
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(eventDir, 'collages'))).toBe(true);
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(eventDir, 'individual'))).toBe(true);
// Draft creates must NOT queue the gallery_created email.
const queued = await db('email_queue').where({ event_id: res.body.id });
expect(queued).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('400s on an invalid event type', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/events')).send({
event_type: 'not-a-real-type',
event_name: 'Broken',
require_password: false,
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(Array.isArray(res.body.errors)).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('GET /', () => {
it('lists events with pagination metadata and photo counts', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Alpha' });
await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Beta' });
const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/events'));
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.events).toHaveLength(2);
expect(res.body.pagination).toMatchObject({ page: 1, total: 2, totalPages: 1 });
for (const ev of res.body.events) {
expect(ev.photo_count).toBe(0);
}
});
});
describe('GET /:id', () => {
it('returns the event with photo/view stats', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Detail Event' });
const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${id}`));
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.event_name).toBe('Detail Event');
expect(res.body.photo_count).toBe(0);
expect(res.body.total_views).toBe(0);
expect(res.body.total_downloads).toBe(0);
expect(Array.isArray(res.body.recent_photos)).toBe(true);
});
it('404s for an unknown event id', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/events/999999'));
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
describe('PUT /:id', () => {
it('updates mutable fields and persists them', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Before' });
const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
event_name: 'After',
welcome_message: 'Hello guests',
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect(row.event_name).toBe('After');
expect(row.welcome_message).toBe('Hello guests');
});
it('404s when updating a missing event', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/events/999999')).send({
event_name: 'Ghost',
});
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
describe('DELETE /:id', () => {
it('cascade-deletes the event row', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/events/${id}`));
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.message).toMatch(/deleted/i);
const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect(row).toBeUndefined();
});
it('404s when deleting a missing event', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).delete('/api/admin/events/999999'));
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
});
+345
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
/**
* HTTP-level tests for the admin TOTP MFA feature (#738).
*
* Two surfaces:
* 1. Enrollment (adminAuth-gated) — POST /mfa/setup, /mfa/enable,
* GET /mfa/status, POST /mfa/disable — mounted like server.js at
* /api/admin/auth (src/routes/adminAuth.js).
* 2. Login challenge — POST /admin/login + POST /admin/login/mfa
* (src/routes/auth.js, mounted /api/auth).
*
* Uses the same real-SQLite harness as the CRM route tests
* (bootCrmDb + seedMinimal + mintAdminToken). Valid TOTP codes are
* generated in-test via otplib's authenticator against the secret the
* /setup endpoint returns in plaintext.
*
* NOTE: env (TEST_DATABASE_PATH / JWT_SECRET) must be set BEFORE the
* first require of db.js — mirror adminCrmAuth.test.js exactly.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-adminmfa-test-'));
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite');
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mfa-route-test-secret';
// reCAPTCHA disabled (default) → verifyRecaptcha returns true, so login
// tests don't need a token. Be explicit so a leaked env can't flip it on.
delete process.env.RECAPTCHA_SECRET_KEY;
const request = require('supertest');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { authenticator } = require('otplib');
const {
bootCrmDb, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(60000);
let db;
let cleanup;
let adminApp; // /api/admin/auth (enrollment)
let authApp; // /api/auth (login challenge)
/**
* Seed a bare admin (password known) and return its id + login creds.
* seedMinimal always creates username 'tester'; we need distinct rows per
* scenario, so insert directly with a unique username/email.
*/
async function seedAdmin({ username, superAdmin = false } = {}) {
const password = 'correct-horse';
const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(password, 4);
const uname = username || `admin-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const row = {
username: uname,
email: `${uname}@example.com`,
password_hash: passwordHash,
must_change_password: false,
is_active: true,
created_at: new Date(),
};
if (superAdmin) {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
if (!role) throw new Error('super_admin role not seeded');
row.role_id = role.id;
}
const inserted = await db('admin_users').insert(row).returning('id');
const id = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
return { id, username: uname, password };
}
/** Run the full setup→enable enrollment against the live app. Returns
* the plaintext TOTP secret (for later login codes) and recovery codes. */
async function enroll(adminId) {
const token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
const setup = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(setup.status).toBe(200);
const secret = setup.body.secret;
const enable = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/enable')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.send({ code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
expect(enable.status).toBe(200);
return { secret, recoveryCodes: enable.body.recoveryCodes, token };
}
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
adminApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/auth', require('../../src/routes/adminAuth'));
authApp = buildRouteApp('/api/auth', require('../../src/routes/auth'));
}, 60000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('MFA enrollment — /api/admin/auth/mfa/*', () => {
it('setup returns a secret + otpauth URI + QR and does NOT enable yet', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const token = mintAdminToken(admin.id);
const res = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.secret).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(res.body.otpauthUri).toMatch(/^otpauth:\/\/totp\//);
expect(res.body.qr).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
// Not yet enabled: status must still report disabled.
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
// And the row stores an encrypted secret (not the plaintext one).
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.two_factor_secret).not.toBe(res.body.secret);
expect(Number(row.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(0);
});
it('full flow: setup → enable(valid TOTP) → status shows enabled + 10 recovery codes', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { recoveryCodes, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
expect(Array.isArray(recoveryCodes)).toBe(true);
expect(recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(status.status).toBe(200);
expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(true);
expect(status.body.recoveryCodesRemaining).toBe(10);
expect(status.body.enrolledAt).toBeTruthy();
});
it('enable with a WRONG code is rejected (400) and MFA stays off', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const token = mintAdminToken(admin.id);
const setup = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
const valid = authenticator.generate(setup.body.secret);
const wrong = valid === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
const res = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/enable')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.send({ code: wrong });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
});
it('enable before setup is rejected', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const token = mintAdminToken(admin.id);
const res = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/enable')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.send({ code: '123456' });
// No provisional secret → ValidationError (400).
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it('all enrollment endpoints require a valid admin token (401 without one)', async () => {
const noToken = await request(adminApp).get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status');
expect(noToken.status).toBe(401);
const setup = await request(adminApp).post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/setup');
expect(setup.status).toBe(401);
});
// Regression guard for #735: super_admin used to be blocked from enrolling.
// Enrollment operates on req.admin.id and is role-agnostic — assert a
// super_admin can complete the full setup→enable flow.
it('#735 regression — a super_admin can enroll in MFA', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin({ superAdmin: true });
const { recoveryCodes, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
expect(recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('MFA disable — /api/admin/auth/mfa/disable', () => {
it('requires a valid code; a wrong code is rejected and state persists', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { token } = await enroll(admin.id);
const bad = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.send({ code: '000000' });
expect(bad.status).toBe(400);
const stillOn = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(stillOn.body.enabled).toBe(true);
});
it('a valid TOTP disables MFA and clears the stored secret', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
const res = await request(adminApp)
.post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.send({ code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
expect(status.body.recoveryCodesRemaining).toBe(0);
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeNull();
expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('Admin login challenge — /api/auth/admin/login[/mfa]', () => {
it('an enrolled admin gets mfaRequired + mfaToken, NO session cookie', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
await enroll(admin.id);
const res = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.mfaRequired).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.mfaToken).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(res.body.user).toBeUndefined(); // no completed session
// No admin auth cookie should have been set on the challenge response.
const cookies = res.headers['set-cookie'] || [];
expect(cookies.join(';')).not.toMatch(/adminToken/i);
});
it('a NON-enrolled admin logs in directly (no mfaRequired)', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const res = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.mfaRequired).toBeUndefined();
expect(res.body.user).toBeDefined();
expect(res.body.user.username).toBe(admin.username);
});
it('login/mfa with a valid TOTP completes the session', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
const challenge = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
const { mfaToken } = challenge.body;
const res = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
.send({ mfaToken, code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.user).toBeDefined();
expect(res.body.user.id).toBe(admin.id);
});
it('login/mfa with a wrong code is 401 MFA_INVALID', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
const challenge = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
const valid = authenticator.generate(secret);
const wrong = valid === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
const res = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
.send({ mfaToken: challenge.body.mfaToken, code: wrong });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
expect(res.body.user).toBeUndefined();
});
it('a recovery code logs in and is then single-use (second use fails)', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
const { recoveryCodes } = await enroll(admin.id);
const recovery = recoveryCodes[0];
// First challenge + recovery-code exchange succeeds.
const c1 = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
const first = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
.send({ mfaToken: c1.body.mfaToken, code: recovery });
expect(first.status).toBe(200);
expect(first.body.user).toBeDefined();
// recoveryCodesRemaining dropped by one.
const status = await request(adminApp)
.get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${mintAdminToken(admin.id)}`);
expect(status.body.recoveryCodesRemaining).toBe(9);
// Second use of the SAME recovery code must fail.
const c2 = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
const second = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
.send({ mfaToken: c2.body.mfaToken, code: recovery });
expect(second.status).toBe(401);
expect(second.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
});
it('login/mfa rejects a non-mfa_pending token (e.g. a normal admin JWT)', async () => {
const admin = await seedAdmin();
await enroll(admin.id);
const res = await request(authApp)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
.send({ mfaToken: mintAdminToken(admin.id), code: '123456' });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
/**
* Regression test for GHSA-9hmx-68vc-qpqw — share-link login must not bypass
* the gallery password.
*
* POST /auth/gallery/share-login validates only the share token. For a
* password-protected gallery it previously minted a full `type:'gallery'`
* access token on the share token alone, letting anyone holding the share URL
* read the gallery without the password. The fix: when the gallery requires a
* password, return `{ requires_password: true }` with NO token and NO cookie.
*/
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'share-login-test-secret';
const events = [];
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
function dbFn(table) {
if (table === 'events') {
let filter = () => true;
return {
where(criteria) {
filter = (row) => Object.entries(criteria).every(([k, v]) => {
if (k === 'is_active') return Boolean(row.is_active) === Boolean(v);
if (k === 'is_archived') return Boolean(row.is_archived) === Boolean(v);
return row[k] === v;
});
return this;
},
async first() { return events.find(filter); },
};
}
return { where() { return this; }, async first() { return undefined; } };
}
dbFn.raw = async () => {};
return { db: dbFn, logActivity: async () => {} };
});
// Share token is stored plainly on the fake event row.
jest.mock('../../src/services/shareLinkService', () => ({
getEventShareToken: (event) => event.share_token,
resolveShareIdentifier: async () => ({ event: null }),
}));
const mockSetGalleryAuthCookies = jest.fn();
jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenUtils', () => ({
setGalleryAuthCookies: (...args) => mockSetGalleryAuthCookies(...args),
clearGalleryAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
getGalleryTokenFromRequest: jest.fn(),
setAdminAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/authSecurity', () => ({
trackFailedAttempt: jest.fn(async () => {}),
trackSuccessfulLogin: jest.fn(async () => {}),
checkAccountLockout: jest.fn(async () => ({ isLocked: false })),
resetLockout: jest.fn(async () => {}),
}));
// Collaborators the router imports at load but the share-login path doesn't hit.
jest.mock('../../src/services/recaptcha', () => ({ verifyRecaptcha: async () => true }));
jest.mock('../../src/services/mfaService', () => ({}));
jest.mock('../../src/middleware/sessionTimeout', () => ({ endSession: jest.fn(), sessionTimeoutMiddleware: (req, res, next) => next() }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ revokeToken: jest.fn(async () => {}), isTokenRevoked: async () => false }));
const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
function makeApp() {
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/auth', authRouter);
return app;
}
const SHARE_TOKEN = 'a'.repeat(64);
beforeEach(() => {
events.length = 0;
mockSetGalleryAuthCookies.mockClear();
});
describe('POST /auth/gallery/share-login password enforcement', () => {
it('does NOT mint a token for a password-protected gallery', async () => {
events.push({
id: 1, slug: 'private-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
require_password: 1, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Private',
});
const res = await request(makeApp())
.post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
.send({ slug: 'private-gallery', token: SHARE_TOKEN });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.requires_password).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('mints a token for a public (no-password) gallery', async () => {
events.push({
id: 2, slug: 'public-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
require_password: false, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Public',
});
const res = await request(makeApp())
.post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
.send({ slug: 'public-gallery', token: SHARE_TOKEN });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(typeof res.body.token).toBe('string');
expect(res.body.event).toBeDefined();
expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('rejects a wrong share token regardless of password setting', async () => {
events.push({
id: 3, slug: 'public-gallery', is_active: 1, is_archived: 0,
require_password: false, share_token: SHARE_TOKEN, event_name: 'Public',
});
const res = await request(makeApp())
.post('/auth/gallery/share-login')
.send({ slug: 'public-gallery', token: 'b'.repeat(64) });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockSetGalleryAuthCookies).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
/**
* Regression test for GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq — broken access control in the legacy
* /api/events router.
*
* The legacy router exposed create/list/update/delete/extend guarded by
* adminAuth ALONE (no requirePermission, no requireEventOwnership), so any
* back-office account — down to a read-only viewer — could read every gallery's
* password_hash/share_token and take over any gallery. The fix removes that
* router entirely and migrates its one UI-used route (POST /:id/extend) to the
* canonical /api/admin/events mount, where it inherits the permission +
* ownership guards.
*
* This test pins two invariants:
* 1. The legacy source file is gone (nothing can re-mount it).
* 2. The migrated extend route enforces ownership — a non-owning editor gets
* 403, the owner succeeds.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-legacy-acl-')), 'db.sqlite'
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'legacy-acl-test-secret';
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
async function insertEvent(db, ownerId, over = {}) {
const base = {
slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Owner Gallery',
event_date: '2026-05-29',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_by: ownerId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...over,
};
const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
}
describe('GHSA-4j34: legacy /api/events router removed + extend guarded', () => {
it('the legacy events router source file no longer exists', () => {
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../src/routes/events.js'))).toBe(false);
});
describe('POST /api/admin/events/:id/extend ownership enforcement', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
let ownerId; let ownerToken;
let editorId; let editorToken;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
({ adminId: ownerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, ownerId, 'super_admin');
ownerToken = mintAdminToken(ownerId);
// A second, non-owning account with the low-trust editor role.
[editorId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'editor1', email: 'editor1@example.com',
password_hash: 'x', is_active: 1,
}).returning('id');
editorId = editorId?.id ?? editorId;
await assignAdminRole(db, editorId, 'editor');
editorToken = mintAdminToken(editorId);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
});
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
it('lets the owner extend their own gallery', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId, { expires_at: '2026-06-01T00:00:00.000Z' });
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${ownerToken}`)
.send({ days: 10 });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(new Date(res.body.expires_at).toISOString()).toBe('2026-06-11T00:00:00.000Z');
});
it('403s a non-owning editor trying to extend someone else\'s gallery', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId); // owned by the super_admin
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`)
.send({ days: 30 });
expect(res.status).toBe(403); // requireEventOwnership blocks it
});
it('validates the days field', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, ownerId);
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/extend`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${ownerToken}`)
.send({ days: 9999 });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
// Point storage at a throwaway temp dir before requiring the service so the
// module-level getStoragePath() picks it up if evaluated.
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-chunk-test-${process.pid}`);
const chunkedUpload = require('../../src/services/chunkedUploadService');
describe('chunkedUploadService.initializeUpload filename sanitisation (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j)', () => {
afterAll(async () => {
await fs.rm(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
it('strips directory-traversal components from the stored filename', async () => {
const { uploadId } = await chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
filename: '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg',
fileSize: 10,
mimeType: 'video/mp4',
eventId: 1,
totalChunks: 1,
});
const meta = chunkedUpload.getUploadStatus(uploadId);
// basename('../../uploads/logos/evil.svg') === 'evil.svg' — the traversal
// is gone, so path.join(tempDir, filename) can no longer escape tempDir.
expect(meta.filename).toBe('evil.svg');
});
it('keeps a normal filename intact', async () => {
const { uploadId } = await chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
filename: 'clip.mp4',
fileSize: 10,
mimeType: 'video/mp4',
eventId: 1,
totalChunks: 1,
});
expect(uploadId).toBeTruthy();
});
it('rejects a filename that collapses to nothing', async () => {
await expect(
chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
filename: '../',
fileSize: 10,
mimeType: 'video/mp4',
eventId: 1,
totalChunks: 1,
})
).rejects.toThrow(/Invalid filename/);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
/**
* Regression tests for the Docker update instructions (environmentService).
*
* A production install (docker-compose.production.yml) must get `-f
* docker-compose.production.yml` in every update command — bare `docker compose`
* targets docker-compose.yml, a different build-based stack that also starts the
* dev-only mailhog, which left production users stranded on the old version
* (reported against 3.44.0 → 3.45.2).
*/
const { detectEnvironment, generateUpdateInstructions } = require('../../src/services/environmentService');
describe('detectEnvironment — production compose detection', () => {
const orig = process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL;
afterEach(() => {
if (orig === undefined) delete process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL;
else process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL = orig;
});
it('flags isProductionCompose when PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL is set', async () => {
process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL = 'stable';
const env = await detectEnvironment();
expect(env.isProductionCompose).toBe(true);
});
it('does not flag it when the var is absent (default docker-compose.yml)', async () => {
delete process.env.PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL;
const env = await detectEnvironment();
expect(env.isProductionCompose).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('generateUpdateInstructions — Docker commands', () => {
const cmds = (env) => generateUpdateInstructions(env, '3.45.2').steps.map((s) => s.command);
it('targets docker-compose.production.yml for a production install', () => {
const commands = cmds({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: true });
expect(commands).toEqual([
'docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml pull',
'docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml up -d',
'docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml logs -f backend',
]);
// And the warning tells them where to run it.
const { warnings } = generateUpdateInstructions({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: true }, '3.45.2');
expect(warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/docker-compose\.production\.yml/);
});
it('uses bare commands + a hint when not a production compose', () => {
const commands = cmds({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: false });
expect(commands).toEqual([
'docker compose pull',
'docker compose up -d',
'docker compose logs -f backend',
]);
const { warnings } = generateUpdateInstructions({ isDocker: true, isProductionCompose: false }, '3.45.2');
// Still nudges production users to add -f in case detection missed.
expect(warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/-f docker-compose\.production\.yml/);
});
});
@@ -72,9 +72,16 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/businessProfileService', () => ({
resolveBankAccountForCurrency: jest.fn(async () => null),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/documentSequences', () => ({
claimNextSequence: jest.fn(async () => 42),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/documentSequences', () => {
const claimNextSequence = jest.fn(async () => 42);
// Delegates to the claimNextSequence mock so call-count assertions
// below keep observing sequence claims.
const nextDocumentNumber = jest.fn(async (kind, settingKey, defaultFormat, trx) => {
const seq = await claimNextSequence(kind, 2026, trx);
return `R-2026-${String(seq).padStart(4, '0')}`;
});
return { claimNextSequence, nextDocumentNumber };
});
jest.mock('../../src/services/pdfService', () => ({
renderInvoiceToBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('pdf')),
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
/**
* Smoke tests for invoiceService's primary flows ahead of the god-file
* decomposition — createInvoice happy path (incl. the line-item
* totals/VAT math), list/get reads, and the status-transition guards
* on cancelInvoice / releaseForDelivery.
*
* Uses the same deep-mocked db pattern as
* invoiceService.installmentPlan.test.js — chains are queued per table
* and assertions probe insert/update call shapes rather than SQL.
*/
const chains = [];
function makeChain() {
const c = {
_firstValue: undefined,
_updateResult: 1,
_insertResult: [{ id: 999 }],
_selectResult: [],
then: function (onResolve, onReject) {
return Promise.resolve(this._selectResult).then(onResolve, onReject);
},
where: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
whereNot: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
whereIn: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
whereNull: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
whereNotNull: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
andWhere: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
orderBy: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
limit: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
select: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
sum: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
count: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
clone: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
clearSelect: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
clearOrder: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
offset: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
first: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(this._firstValue); }),
update: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(this._updateResult); }),
insert: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
returning: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(this._insertResult); }),
del: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(1); }),
onConflict: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
ignore: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(1); }),
merge: jest.fn(function () { return Promise.resolve(1); }),
increment: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
forUpdate: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
leftJoin: jest.fn(function () { return this; }),
};
chains.push(c);
return c;
}
const tableChains = {};
function pickChainFor(name) {
if (!tableChains[name]) tableChains[name] = makeChain();
return tableChains[name];
}
const mockDbFn = jest.fn((name) => pickChainFor(name));
mockDbFn.transaction = jest.fn(async (cb) => cb(mockDbFn));
mockDbFn.schema = { hasTable: jest.fn(async () => false) };
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
db: mockDbFn,
withRetry: jest.fn(async (fn) => fn()),
logActivity: jest.fn(async () => {}),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/appSettings', () => ({
getAppSetting: jest.fn(async () => null),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/businessProfileService', () => ({
getProfile: jest.fn(async () => ({ profile: { default_currency: 'CHF' } })),
resolveBankAccountForCurrency: jest.fn(async () => null),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/documentSequences', () => {
const claimNextSequence = jest.fn(async () => 42);
// Delegates to the claimNextSequence mock so call-count assertions
// below keep observing sequence claims.
const nextDocumentNumber = jest.fn(async (kind, settingKey, defaultFormat, trx) => {
const seq = await claimNextSequence(kind, 2026, trx);
return `R-2026-${String(seq).padStart(4, '0')}`;
});
return { claimNextSequence, nextDocumentNumber };
});
jest.mock('../../src/services/pdfService', () => ({
renderInvoiceToBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('pdf')),
renderQuoteToBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('pdf')),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/emailProcessor', () => ({
queueEmail: jest.fn(async () => {}),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
}));
const invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
function resetChains() {
for (const k of Object.keys(tableChains)) delete tableChains[k];
jest.clearAllMocks();
}
const activeCustomer = {
id: 5, is_active: 1, feature_bills: 1,
billing_cadence: 'per_event', preferred_language: 'de',
};
describe('createInvoice — happy path + totals', () => {
beforeEach(() => resetChains());
it('creates a single invoice with a claimed sequence number and computed totals/VAT', async () => {
pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { ...activeCustomer };
pickChainFor('invoices')._insertResult = [{ id: 777 }];
const result = await invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: 5,
vatRate: 8.1,
lineItems: [
// 2 × 100.00 = 200.00
{ position: 1, description: 'Shoot', quantity: 2, unit_price_minor: 10000 },
// 50.00 with 10% discount = 45.00
{ position: 2, description: 'Discounted extra', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 5000, discount_percent: 10 },
// Parent header — total auto-resolves from priced sub-items (350.00)
{ position: 3, description: 'Package', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 0 },
{ position: 4, description: 'Camera', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 15000, parent_position: 3 },
{ position: 5, description: 'Lens', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 20000, parent_position: 3 },
],
}, 1);
expect(result.invoiceIds).toEqual([777]);
// Net = 20000 + 4500 + 35000 (resolved parent) — sub-items must NOT
// double-count. VAT = round(59500 × 8.1%) = 4820.
expect(pickChainFor('invoices').insert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({
invoice_number: 'R-2026-0042',
customer_account_id: 5,
currency: 'CHF',
status: 'scheduled',
net_amount_minor: 59500,
vat_rate: 8.1,
vat_amount_minor: 4820,
shipping_amount_minor: 0,
total_amount_minor: 64320,
installment_total: 1,
}));
// Exactly one sequence number claimed for a single-row create.
const { claimNextSequence } = require('../../src/utils/documentSequences');
expect(claimNextSequence).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// Line items landed in invoice_line_items.
expect(pickChainFor('invoice_line_items').insert).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('409s on a deactivated customer before touching the sequence', async () => {
pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { ...activeCustomer, is_active: 0 };
await expect(invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: 5, vatRate: 0, lineItems: [],
}, 1)).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409 });
const { claimNextSequence } = require('../../src/utils/documentSequences');
expect(claimNextSequence).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('400s + INVOICE_TOTAL_NEGATIVE when discounts push the total below zero', async () => {
pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { ...activeCustomer };
await expect(invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: 5,
vatRate: 7.7,
lineItems: [
{ position: 1, description: 'Shoot', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: 5000 },
{ position: 2, description: 'Rabatt', quantity: 1, unit_price_minor: -8000 },
],
}, 1)).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400, code: 'INVOICE_TOTAL_NEGATIVE' });
const { claimNextSequence } = require('../../src/utils/documentSequences');
expect(claimNextSequence).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('listInvoices / getInvoiceById — read paths (smoke)', () => {
beforeEach(() => resetChains());
it('lists invoices with total + pagination echo', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._selectResult = [
{ id: 1, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0001' },
{ id: 2, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0002' },
];
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = { total: 7 };
const result = await invoiceService.listInvoices({ page: 2, pageSize: 10 });
expect(result.rows).toHaveLength(2);
expect(result.total).toBe(7);
expect(result.page).toBe(2);
expect(result.pageSize).toBe(10);
expect(pickChainFor('invoices').offset).toHaveBeenCalledWith(10);
expect(pickChainFor('invoices').limit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(10);
});
it('getInvoiceById returns { invoice, lineItems, payments } when found', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = { id: 3, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0003' };
pickChainFor('invoice_line_items as li')._selectResult = [
{ id: 30, position: 1, description: 'Shoot' },
];
pickChainFor('invoice_payment_log')._selectResult = [];
const result = await invoiceService.getInvoiceById(3);
expect(result.invoice).toMatchObject({ id: 3, invoice_number: 'R-2026-0003' });
expect(result.lineItems).toHaveLength(1);
expect(result.payments).toEqual([]);
});
it('getInvoiceById returns null for an unknown id', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = undefined;
await expect(invoiceService.getInvoiceById(404)).resolves.toBeNull();
});
});
describe('status transitions — cancelInvoice / releaseForDelivery guards', () => {
beforeEach(() => resetChains());
it('soft-cancels a scheduled (never-issued) invoice without a Storno', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
id: 9, status: 'scheduled', kind: 'invoice', event_id: null,
};
const result = await invoiceService.cancelInvoice(9, 1);
expect(result).toEqual({ cancelled: true, stornoId: null });
expect(pickChainFor('invoices').update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ status: 'cancelled' })
);
});
it('409s + ALREADY_CANCELLED on a second cancel', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
id: 9, status: 'cancelled', kind: 'invoice',
};
await expect(invoiceService.cancelInvoice(9, 1))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409, code: 'ALREADY_CANCELLED' });
});
it('409s + IS_STORNO when trying to cancel a Storno document', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
id: 10, status: 'sent', kind: 'storno',
};
await expect(invoiceService.cancelInvoice(10, 1))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409, code: 'IS_STORNO' });
});
it('releaseForDelivery 409s + NOT_PENDING_DELIVERY on a non-pending invoice', async () => {
pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
id: 11, status: 'sent', kind: 'invoice',
};
await expect(invoiceService.releaseForDelivery(11, 1))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 409, code: 'NOT_PENDING_DELIVERY' });
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
/**
* Unit tests for mfaService — admin TOTP MFA (#738).
*
* Pure unit: no DB, no Express. Exercises the crypto/verification surface
* directly. JWT_SECRET is set at the top so getEncryptionKey()'s scrypt
* derivation has key material (the service derives the AES key from
* MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY, falling back to JWT_SECRET).
*/
// Must be set BEFORE the service is required — the key is derived lazily per
// call, but keep it explicit and stable so encrypt/decrypt round-trips.
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mfa-unit-test-secret';
delete process.env.MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY; // ensure we derive from JWT_SECRET
const { authenticator } = require('otplib');
const mfaService = require('../../src/services/mfaService');
describe('mfaService — secret encryption (AES-256-GCM)', () => {
it('round-trips encrypt → decrypt to the original secret', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const blob = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
expect(blob).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(blob).not.toContain(secret); // stored form is not plaintext
expect(blob.split('.')).toHaveLength(3); // iv.tag.ciphertext
expect(mfaService.decryptSecret(blob)).toBe(secret);
});
it('produces a different ciphertext each time (random IV) but decrypts identically', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const a = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
const b = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
expect(a).not.toBe(b);
expect(mfaService.decryptSecret(a)).toBe(secret);
expect(mfaService.decryptSecret(b)).toBe(secret);
});
it('throws when decrypting a malformed blob (wrong segment count)', () => {
expect(() => mfaService.decryptSecret('garbage')).toThrow();
expect(() => mfaService.decryptSecret('only.two')).toThrow();
});
it('throws when the auth tag / ciphertext is tampered with', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const [iv, tag, ct] = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret).split('.');
// Flip a character in the ciphertext → GCM auth check must fail.
const tampered = ct.slice(0, -2) + (ct.slice(-2) === 'AA' ? 'BB' : 'AA');
expect(() => mfaService.decryptSecret([iv, tag, tampered].join('.'))).toThrow();
});
});
describe('mfaService — TOTP verification', () => {
it('accepts a freshly generated code for the plaintext secret', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret)).toBe(true);
});
it('tolerates whitespace in the submitted code', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(` ${code} `, secret)).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a wrong code', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
const wrong = code === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(wrong, secret)).toBe(false);
});
it('returns false for empty inputs rather than throwing', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp('', secret)).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp('123456', '')).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(null, secret)).toBe(false);
});
it('verifies through the encrypted blob (verifyTotpEncrypted)', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const stored = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(code, stored)).toBe(true);
const wrong = code === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(wrong, stored)).toBe(false);
});
it('verifyTotpEncrypted returns false (no throw) for a corrupt blob', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(code, 'not-a-valid-blob')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('mfaService — otpauth URI / QR', () => {
it('builds an otpauth:// URI containing issuer, account and secret', () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const uri = mfaService.buildOtpauthUri('admin@example.com', secret);
expect(uri).toMatch(/^otpauth:\/\/totp\//);
expect(uri).toContain(encodeURIComponent(mfaService.ISSUER));
expect(uri).toContain(`secret=${secret}`);
});
it('builds a PNG data-URL QR for the URI', async () => {
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
const uri = mfaService.buildOtpauthUri('admin@example.com', secret);
const qr = await mfaService.buildQrDataUrl(uri);
expect(qr).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
});
});
describe('mfaService — recovery codes', () => {
it('generates 10 distinct plaintext codes and 10 distinct hashes', async () => {
const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
expect(plain).toHaveLength(mfaService.RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT);
expect(hashed).toHaveLength(mfaService.RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT);
expect(new Set(plain).size).toBe(10);
expect(new Set(hashed).size).toBe(10);
// Hashes are bcrypt, not the plaintext.
hashed.forEach((h) => expect(h).toMatch(/^\$2[aby]\$/));
plain.forEach((p) => expect(hashed).not.toContain(p));
});
it('formats a raw code into 4-char groups', () => {
expect(mfaService.formatRecoveryCode('abcdefghij')).toBe('abcd-efgh-ij');
});
it('consumes a valid recovery code once and removes it (single-use)', async () => {
const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
const target = plain[3];
const first = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(target, hashed);
expect(first.matched).toBe(true);
expect(first.remainingHashes).toHaveLength(9);
// Reusing the same code against the reduced set must now fail.
const reuse = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(target, first.remainingHashes);
expect(reuse.matched).toBe(false);
expect(reuse.remainingHashes).toHaveLength(9);
});
it('matches case-insensitively and trims whitespace', async () => {
const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
const res = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(` ${plain[0].toUpperCase()} `, hashed);
expect(res.matched).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a wrong code and leaves the hash set unchanged', async () => {
const { hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
const res = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode('zzzz-zzzz-zz', hashed);
expect(res.matched).toBe(false);
expect(res.remainingHashes).toHaveLength(10);
});
it('handles empty / missing input safely', async () => {
const { hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
const res = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode('', hashed);
expect(res.matched).toBe(false);
expect(res.remainingHashes).toBe(hashed);
const noHashes = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode('abcd-efgh-ij', null);
expect(noHashes.matched).toBe(false);
expect(noHashes.remainingHashes).toEqual([]);
});
});
describe('mfaService — parseRecoveryCodes', () => {
it('parses a JSON string array', () => {
expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(JSON.stringify(['a', 'b']))).toEqual(['a', 'b']);
});
it('passes an already-array through', () => {
expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(['a', 'b'])).toEqual(['a', 'b']);
});
it('returns [] for null / garbage / non-array JSON', () => {
expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(null)).toEqual([]);
expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes('{not json')).toEqual([]);
expect(mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(JSON.stringify({ a: 1 }))).toEqual([]);
});
});
describe('mfaService — isEnrolled coercion', () => {
it('treats true / 1 / "1" as enrolled', () => {
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: true })).toBe(true);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: 1 })).toBe(true);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: '1' })).toBe(true);
});
it('treats false / 0 / null / missing as not enrolled', () => {
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: false })).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: 0 })).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({ two_factor_enabled: null })).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled({})).toBe(false);
expect(mfaService.isEnrolled(null)).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
/**
* Regression tests for reinjectCurrentAdmin — the operator-preservation step of
* the .picpeak restore (GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f follow-up). Runs against a real
* in-memory SQLite DB so the UNIQUE(email)/UNIQUE(username) constraints behave
* as in production. Reconciliation is non-destructive (update-in-place / rename,
* never delete) so restored rows referenced by FKs keep their ids.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
let db;
let reinjectCurrentAdmin;
beforeAll(() => {
jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'sqlite3' }), { virtual: false });
reinjectCurrentAdmin = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService').reinjectCurrentAdmin;
});
beforeEach(async () => {
db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
await db.schema.createTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('username').notNullable().unique();
t.string('email').notNullable().unique();
t.string('password_hash');
t.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
t.boolean('must_change_password').defaultTo(false);
t.integer('role_id');
t.integer('created_by');
t.boolean('two_factor_enabled').defaultTo(false);
t.string('two_factor_secret');
t.text('two_factor_recovery_codes');
});
});
afterEach(async () => { await db.destroy(); });
const operator = {
id: 1, username: 'admin', email: 'op@example.com',
password_hash: 'OP_HASH', is_active: 1, must_change_password: 0, role_id: 1, created_by: 99,
two_factor_enabled: 1, two_factor_secret: 'OP_SECRET', two_factor_recovery_codes: '["a","b"]',
};
test('restores login + MFA in place, keeping the row id and its FK columns (FK-safe)', async () => {
await db('admin_users').insert({
id: 7, username: 'someoneelse', email: 'OP@example.com',
password_hash: 'ATTACKER', is_active: 1, must_change_password: 0, role_id: 4, created_by: 5,
two_factor_enabled: 0, two_factor_secret: 'ATTACKER_SECRET', two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
});
await db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator));
const rows = await db('admin_users');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
const row = rows[0];
expect(row.id).toBe(7); // id preserved → FK refs hold
expect(row.username).toBe('admin');
expect(row.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
expect(Boolean(row.two_factor_enabled)).toBe(true);
expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBe('OP_SECRET'); // attacker MFA secret gone
expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBe('["a","b"]');
// Relationship/audit FKs are NOT forced from the operator snapshot (avoids
// dangling role_id/created_by on a cross-instance restore) — the restored
// row keeps its own already-valid values.
expect(row.role_id).toBe(4);
expect(row.created_by).toBe(5);
});
test('renames (not deletes) a different row holding the operator username', async () => {
await db('admin_users').insert({
id: 3, username: 'admin', email: 'other@instance.test',
password_hash: 'OTHER', is_active: 1, role_id: 4,
});
await expect(db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator))).resolves.not.toThrow();
const rows = await db('admin_users').orderBy('id');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(2); // the other admin survives (FK-safe)
const other = rows.find((r) => r.id === 3);
expect(other.username).toBe('admin__restored_3'); // renamed, id kept
expect(other.email).toBe('other@instance.test');
const op = rows.find((r) => r.username === 'admin');
expect(op.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
});
test('reconciles email and username colliding with DIFFERENT rows without deleting either', async () => {
await db('admin_users').insert([
{ id: 4, username: 'someoneelse', email: 'op@example.com', password_hash: 'A', role_id: 4 },
{ id: 5, username: 'admin', email: 'other@instance.test', password_hash: 'B', role_id: 4 },
]);
await expect(db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator))).resolves.not.toThrow();
const rows = await db('admin_users').orderBy('id');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(2); // both rows survive
const opRow = rows.find((r) => r.id === 4); // email match updated in place
expect(opRow.username).toBe('admin');
expect(opRow.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
const renamed = rows.find((r) => r.id === 5); // username holder renamed, not deleted
expect(renamed.username).toBe('admin__restored_5');
});
test('inserts the operator with a non-colliding id when neither key exists in the backup', async () => {
await db('admin_users').insert({
id: 9, username: 'backupadmin', email: 'backup@instance.test', password_hash: 'B', role_id: 1,
});
await db.transaction((trx) => reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator));
const rows = await db('admin_users').orderBy('id');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(2); // backup admin untouched
const opRow = rows.find((r) => r.username === 'admin');
expect(opRow.password_hash).toBe('OP_HASH');
expect(opRow.id).toBe(10); // max(9)+1, no collision
expect(opRow.created_by).toBeNull(); // self-ref FK nulled so the insert can't dangle
});
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
/**
* Pure-function tests for the slug validator in galleryShortUrlService.
* The validator is the security boundary for the `/s/<slug>` public
* route — bad shapes leak into a UNIQUE column that's used in URLs
* without further escaping, so the rules need to be tight.
*/
// Provide a minimal db stub so requiring the service doesn't crash —
// the validator path doesn't touch the DB.
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn() }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/appSettings', () => ({
getAppSetting: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
}));
const {
validateSlug,
_RESERVED_SLUGS,
} = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
describe('validateSlug', () => {
describe('accepts', () => {
test.each([
'sofia-graduation',
'sofia',
'a', // single char (alphanumeric)
'1', // single digit
'abc123',
'123-abc',
'sofia-2026-06-05',
'sofia-2026',
'a-b-c-d',
'wedding-2026',
'xK7p2'.toLowerCase(), // lowercase 5-char
'a'.repeat(64), // exactly at the limit
])('%j', (slug) => {
expect(validateSlug(slug)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('rejects', () => {
test.each([
['', 'cannot be empty'],
[' ', 'cannot be empty'], // trimmed → empty
['-sofia', 'lowercase letters'], // leading hyphen
['sofia-', 'lowercase letters'], // trailing hyphen
['Sofia', 'lowercase letters'], // uppercase
['sofia_graduation', 'lowercase letters'], // underscore
['sofia.graduation', 'lowercase letters'], // dot
['sofia graduation', 'lowercase letters'], // space
['sofia/graduation', 'lowercase letters'], // slash (path traversal vector)
['sofia%20graduation', 'lowercase letters'],
['a'.repeat(65), 'at most 64'], // one over limit
])('%j → %s', (slug, expectedReason) => {
const result = validateSlug(slug);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(result.toLowerCase()).toContain(expectedReason);
});
test('null', () => {
expect(validateSlug(null)).toContain('must be a string');
});
test('undefined', () => {
expect(validateSlug(undefined)).toContain('must be a string');
});
test('number', () => {
expect(validateSlug(42)).toContain('must be a string');
});
test('object', () => {
expect(validateSlug({})).toContain('must be a string');
});
});
describe('reserved slugs', () => {
test.each([
'admin',
'api',
'auth',
'gallery',
'og',
'health',
's', // can't shadow the shortener itself
'login',
'favicon.ico', // even with the dot — covered by SLUG_REGEX fail too
])('reserves %j', (slug) => {
expect(_RESERVED_SLUGS.has(slug)).toBe(true);
});
test('"admin" → rejected with "reserved" reason', () => {
// validateSlug short-circuits at the regex for slugs containing
// dots (favicon.ico fails the regex first). Test a clean
// alphanumeric reserved word.
const result = validateSlug('admin');
expect(result).toBe('short_slug is reserved');
});
});
describe('path-traversal + URL-injection vectors are rejected at the regex', () => {
test.each([
'../etc/passwd',
'foo/../bar',
'foo?query=1',
'foo#fragment',
'foo&bar',
'foo bar',
'foo<script>',
'foo>',
'foo"',
'foo\'',
'foo;rm -rf',
])('%j', (slug) => {
expect(validateSlug(slug)).not.toBeNull();
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
/**
* Regression tests for clampIntOrUndefined — the slideshow-seed NaN bug.
*
* The event-create route seeds show_interval_ms/show_transition_ms from
* app_settings via an int-parse-and-clamp. The old inline guard
* (`Number.isFinite(+v) ? parseInt(v) : undefined`) disagreed with itself
* for null/''/true: `+null` is 0 (finite) but `parseInt(null)` is NaN, so
* NaN flowed through Math.min/Math.max into the INSERT. PostgreSQL
* rejects NaN for integer columns ("invalid input syntax for type
* integer: NaN") while SQLite silently stores NULL — so POST
* /api/admin/events 500'd on PG whenever the slideshow settings rows
* were absent (getAppSetting returns its null default).
*/
const { clampIntOrUndefined } = require('../../src/utils/numericHelpers');
describe('clampIntOrUndefined', () => {
it('returns undefined for null (the getAppSetting missing-row default)', () => {
expect(clampIntOrUndefined(null, 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
});
it('returns undefined for undefined, empty string, and booleans', () => {
expect(clampIntOrUndefined(undefined, 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
expect(clampIntOrUndefined('', 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
expect(clampIntOrUndefined(true, 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
expect(clampIntOrUndefined(false, 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
});
it('returns undefined for non-numeric garbage', () => {
expect(clampIntOrUndefined('fast', 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
expect(clampIntOrUndefined({}, 1000, 120000)).toBeUndefined();
});
it('never returns NaN for any of the failure-mode inputs', () => {
for (const v of [null, undefined, '', true, false, 'x', {}, []]) {
const out = clampIntOrUndefined(v, 100, 5000);
expect(Number.isNaN(out)).toBe(false);
}
});
it('parses and clamps valid values', () => {
expect(clampIntOrUndefined('2500', 1000, 120000)).toBe(2500);
expect(clampIntOrUndefined(2500, 1000, 120000)).toBe(2500);
expect(clampIntOrUndefined('500', 1000, 120000)).toBe(1000);
expect(clampIntOrUndefined(999999, 1000, 120000)).toBe(120000);
expect(clampIntOrUndefined('2500.9', 1000, 120000)).toBe(2500);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
const path = require('path');
const { assertZipEntriesWithin } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
describe('assertZipEntriesWithin (ZIP-slip guard, GHSA-jfhw-fj23-fx6x)', () => {
const root = path.join('/tmp', 'picpeak-extract-root');
it('accepts entries that stay within the extraction root', () => {
const entries = [
{ name: 'photo.jpg' },
{ name: 'category/nested/photo.png' },
{ name: 'photos_manifest.json' },
{ name: 'subdir/' },
];
expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, root)).not.toThrow();
});
it('rejects a parent-traversal entry', () => {
const entries = [{ name: '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' }];
expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, root)).toThrow(/escapes the extraction directory/);
});
it('rejects an absolute-path entry', () => {
const entries = [{ name: '/etc/cron.d/evil' }];
expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, root)).toThrow(/escapes the extraction directory/);
});
it('rejects when a safe entry is mixed with a traversal entry', () => {
const entries = [{ name: 'ok.jpg' }, { name: '../escape.txt' }];
expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, root)).toThrow(/escapes the extraction directory/);
});
it('tolerates empty / nameless entries', () => {
expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin([{}, { name: '' }, null], root)).not.toThrow();
});
it('does not treat a sibling prefix directory as inside the root', () => {
// root is .../picpeak-extract-root; ../picpeak-extract-root-evil must not pass
const entries = [{ name: '../picpeak-extract-root-evil/x' }];
expect(() => assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, root)).toThrow(/escapes the extraction directory/);
});
});
+69
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
const { parseWhatsNew } = require('../../src/utils/whatsNew');
describe('parseWhatsNew', () => {
it('prefers the curated <!-- whatsnew --> block', () => {
const body = [
'<!-- whatsnew -->',
'- Invoice drafts in list',
'- Bank transfer payments',
'<!-- /whatsnew -->',
'',
'### Features',
'* **invoices:** something long that should be ignored ([#1](http://x))',
].join('\n');
expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual(['Invoice drafts in list', 'Bank transfer payments']);
});
it('falls back to the Features section, stripping scope + commit links', () => {
const body = [
'## [3.73.0-beta.0](http://x) (2026-06-29)',
'',
'### Features',
'',
'* **dashboard:** revenue tile toggles 365 days ([d1c9e02](http://c))',
'* **invoices:** surface monthly drafts in the Bills list ([e457656](http://c))',
'',
'### Bug Fixes',
'',
'* **invoices:** add bank transfer ([e96ef4c](http://c))',
].join('\n');
expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual([
'revenue tile toggles 365 days',
'surface monthly drafts in the Bills list',
]);
});
it('decodes HTML entities release-please escapes into changelog text', () => {
const body = '### Features\n* **gallery:** supports A &amp; B &lt;tags&gt; &quot;quoted&quot; ([#1](http://x))';
expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual(['supports A & B <tags> "quoted"']);
});
it('trims a trailing "— implementation detail" clause to the headline', () => {
const body = '### Features\n* **gallery:** branded URL shortener — /s/&lt;slug&gt; with OG injection ([#699](http://x))';
expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual(['branded URL shortener']);
});
it('leaves hyphenated words and dash-free bullets intact', () => {
const body = '### Features\n* **invoices:** mark-paid now supports bank transfer ([#2](http://x))';
expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual(['mark-paid now supports bank transfer']);
});
it('excludes Bug Fixes from the fallback', () => {
const body = '### Features\n* **a:** feature one\n### Bug Fixes\n* **b:** fix one';
expect(parseWhatsNew(body)).toEqual(['feature one']);
});
it('caps at 8 bullets and de-dups', () => {
const lines = Array.from({ length: 12 }, (_, i) => `- bullet ${i % 9}`);
const body = `<!-- whatsnew -->\n${lines.join('\n')}\n<!-- /whatsnew -->`;
const out = parseWhatsNew(body);
expect(out.length).toBe(8);
expect(new Set(out).size).toBe(8);
});
it('returns [] for empty / non-string input', () => {
expect(parseWhatsNew('')).toEqual([]);
expect(parseWhatsNew(null)).toEqual([]);
expect(parseWhatsNew(undefined)).toEqual([]);
});
});
+9 -2
View File
@@ -11,9 +11,16 @@ exports.up = async function(knex) {
// Initialize tables
await initializeDatabase();
// Create default admin user if none exists
// Create default admin user if none exists.
//
// Legacy path — only when ADMIN_PASSWORD is explicitly provided (keeps
// existing docker-compose installs working unchanged). When it is NOT set,
// we deliberately leave admin_users empty so the first-run setup wizard
// (setupService / /setup) creates the admin in-browser — no ADMIN_PASSWORD
// in .env. Existing deployments already ran this migration, so this only
// affects fresh installs.
const adminExists = await knex('admin_users').first();
if (!adminExists) {
if (!adminExists && process.env.ADMIN_PASSWORD) {
// Use ADMIN_PASSWORD from environment if set, otherwise generate a random one
const generatedPassword = process.env.ADMIN_PASSWORD || generateReadablePassword();
const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(generatedPassword, 12); // Increased rounds for better security
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
/**
* Migration 150: branded URL shortener for gallery share links (#699).
*
* Lets admins create custom-named short URLs that resolve to a gallery's
* full link (e.g. `/s/sofia-graduation` → `/gallery/<slug>`). The short
* URL itself answers bot-UA requests with server-rendered OG metadata,
* so the SHORT URL is the one that shows the rich preview in iMessage /
* Facebook / WhatsApp — not just the destination.
*
* Backward-compat invariant: this migration only ADDS a new table. No
* existing route, table, or column is touched. Operators upgrading
* through this migration can opt into creating short URLs per event,
* but every existing `/gallery/...` link continues to resolve identically
* — the new feature is additive.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('gallery_short_urls')) return;
await knex.schema.createTable('gallery_short_urls', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
// Public-facing slug — what appears in /s/<short_slug>. Case-folded
// to lowercase at write time by the service; the UNIQUE index here
// is the last line of defence against collisions.
t.string('short_slug', 64).notNullable().unique();
// Hard FK to events — when an admin deletes an event, its short
// URLs go with it. ON DELETE CASCADE is the natural model: a short
// URL that points at a vanished gallery has no useful behaviour.
t.integer('event_id').notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('events').onDelete('CASCADE');
// Where the short URL resolves to — usually `/gallery/<slug>` or
// `/gallery/<share_token>` depending on the operator's #525
// "Use short gallery URLs" setting at create time. Stored at create
// time so a later flip of the global toggle doesn't silently change
// what existing short URLs redirect to.
t.text('target_path').notNullable();
// For the audit trail + admin UI ("created by Alex two days ago").
t.integer('created_by').references('id').inTable('admin_users');
t.timestamp('created_at').notNullable().defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
// Tiny analytics — admins want to know "is this branded link
// actually being clicked?" without a separate analytics service.
t.integer('hit_count').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.timestamp('last_hit_at');
// Soft-delete semantics: a deleted short URL returns 410 Gone (not
// 404) so the admin sees their delete was intentional, and so a
// re-create with the same slug is an explicit "yes, replace" rather
// than accidentally taking over a stale link. The UNIQUE constraint
// on short_slug means re-create after delete requires either NULLing
// the deleted row's slug or hard-deleting it; service layer handles
// that explicitly.
t.timestamp('deleted_at');
t.integer('deleted_by').references('id').inTable('admin_users');
});
// Read patterns:
// - /s/:slug hot path — UNIQUE constraint on short_slug already
// provides the index. No additional index needed.
// - Admin UI "list short URLs for this event" — index event_id.
await knex.schema.alterTable('gallery_short_urls', (t) => {
t.index(['event_id'], 'gallery_short_urls_event_id_idx');
});
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('gallery_short_urls')) {
await knex.schema.dropTable('gallery_short_urls');
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
/**
* Migration 151: admin MFA (TOTP) enrollment support — issue #738.
*
* The `admin_users.two_factor_enabled` / `two_factor_secret` columns already
* exist from the legacy migration 016 but were never wired to any code. This
* migration adds the two columns the real TOTP flow needs on top of them:
*
* - two_factor_recovery_codes: JSON array of one-time backup codes, stored
* HASHED (never plaintext), so a locked-out admin can log in without the
* authenticator. Consumed on use.
* - two_factor_enrolled_at: when the admin completed enrollment (audit /
* display only).
*
* The TOTP secret itself continues to live in the existing `two_factor_secret`
* column, but is now stored ENCRYPTED at rest (AES-256-GCM) by mfaService —
* the column type is unchanged (the encrypted blob is short).
*
* Additive and idempotent: only adds columns, guarded by hasColumn, so it is
* safe to re-run and touches no existing data.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
const hasRecovery = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_recovery_codes');
const hasEnrolledAt = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_enrolled_at');
const hasEnabled = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_enabled');
const hasSecret = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_secret');
await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
// Backfill the legacy columns too, in case an install somehow lacks them
// (016 is a legacy migration; guard defensively).
if (!hasEnabled) {
t.boolean('two_factor_enabled').defaultTo(false);
}
if (!hasSecret) {
t.string('two_factor_secret').nullable();
}
if (!hasRecovery) {
t.text('two_factor_recovery_codes').nullable();
}
if (!hasEnrolledAt) {
t.timestamp('two_factor_enrolled_at').nullable();
}
});
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
const hasRecovery = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_recovery_codes');
const hasEnrolledAt = await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_enrolled_at');
await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
// Only drop what THIS migration added; leave the legacy 016 columns.
if (hasRecovery) {
t.dropColumn('two_factor_recovery_codes');
}
if (hasEnrolledAt) {
t.dropColumn('two_factor_enrolled_at');
}
});
};
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
/**
* Migration 152: make events.hero_logo_visible NULL-able so NULL means
* "inherit the global branding_logo_display_hero setting" (#756).
*
* Before: hero_logo_visible was `boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT true`, and every
* event got a concrete true/false snapshotted at creation. The global
* "Show logo in hero section" toggle (branding_logo_display_hero) was only a
* creation-time default and never affected existing galleries — so disabling
* it did nothing to already-published galleries.
*
* After: NULL = inherit. gallery read-resolution falls back to the global
* setting when the per-event value is NULL, so the global toggle controls
* every gallery that hasn't been deliberately overridden per-event.
*
* Data backfill: NULL out the DEFAULTED `true` rows so they start inheriting
* the global. A deliberate per-gallery hide (`false`) is kept — we can't tell a
* defaulted-true from a chosen-true, but `false` is almost always a conscious
* "hide it here", and nulling it could silently re-show a hidden logo.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'hero_logo_visible'))) return;
const client = (knex.client.config.client || '').toLowerCase();
if (client === 'pg' || client === 'postgresql') {
await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_visible DROP DEFAULT');
await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_visible DROP NOT NULL');
} else {
// SQLite (and others): knex recreates the table without the NOT NULL/default.
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.boolean('hero_logo_visible').nullable().alter();
});
}
// Existing defaulted-`true` galleries now inherit the global toggle.
await knex('events').where('hero_logo_visible', true).update({ hero_logo_visible: null });
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'hero_logo_visible'))) return;
// Re-materialise NULLs as the old default (true) before restoring NOT NULL.
await knex('events').whereNull('hero_logo_visible').update({ hero_logo_visible: true });
const client = (knex.client.config.client || '').toLowerCase();
if (client === 'pg' || client === 'postgresql') {
await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_visible SET DEFAULT true');
await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_visible SET NOT NULL');
} else {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.boolean('hero_logo_visible').notNullable().defaultTo(true).alter();
});
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
/**
* Migration 153: make events.hero_logo_size NULL-able so NULL means "inherit
* the global branding_logo_size" (#756 follow-up — the size counterpart of 152).
*
* Before: hero_logo_size was `varchar NOT NULL DEFAULT 'medium'`, snapshotted
* from the global branding_logo_size at creation. The two gallery render paths
* then disagreed — GalleryLayout read the global size live, while the
* hero-header path used the per-event snapshot — so a hero logo could render at
* different sizes on different layouts, and changing the global size didn't
* update hero-header galleries.
*
* After: NULL = inherit. gallery read-resolution falls back to
* branding_logo_size when the per-event value is NULL, and both render paths
* consume that resolved size.
*
* Data backfill: NULL out ALL existing hero_logo_size so every gallery inherits
* the global size going forward. Unlike a boolean we can't tell a defaulted
* value from a chosen one — but nulling is the safe choice here: it restores the
* live-global behaviour GalleryLayout already had, and the per-event size can be
* re-set from the event's edit page.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'hero_logo_size'))) return;
const client = (knex.client.config.client || '').toLowerCase();
if (client === 'pg' || client === 'postgresql') {
await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_size DROP DEFAULT');
await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_size DROP NOT NULL');
} else {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.string('hero_logo_size', 20).nullable().alter();
});
}
await knex('events').update({ hero_logo_size: null });
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'hero_logo_size'))) return;
await knex('events').whereNull('hero_logo_size').update({ hero_logo_size: 'medium' });
const client = (knex.client.config.client || '').toLowerCase();
if (client === 'pg' || client === 'postgresql') {
await knex.raw("ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_size SET DEFAULT 'medium'");
await knex.raw('ALTER TABLE events ALTER COLUMN hero_logo_size SET NOT NULL');
} else {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.string('hero_logo_size', 20).notNullable().defaultTo('medium').alter();
});
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
/**
* Messages Phase 2 — additional inbound mailboxes + captured message bodies.
*
* `mail_accounts` holds inbound mailboxes BEYOND the primary accounting IMAP
* that already lives in `email_configs` (e.g. the customer `hello@` mailbox).
* The intake poller (emailIntakeService) polls the accounting mailbox AND every
* enabled row here; customer mail is logged with its body but not routed to the
* accounting inbox.
*
* The new `received_emails` columns capture the parsed message so the Messages
* reading pane can show it: `account_key` tags which mailbox it came from,
* `body_html`/`body_text` hold the (server-sanitized) body, `to_address` the
* envelope recipient. All additive + guarded.
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
const hasAccounts = await knex.schema.hasTable('mail_accounts');
if (!hasAccounts) {
await knex.schema.createTable('mail_accounts', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.string('account_key', 64).notNullable().unique(); // e.g. 'customers'
t.string('label', 120);
t.string('imap_host', 255);
t.integer('imap_port').defaultTo(993);
t.boolean('imap_secure').defaultTo(true);
t.string('imap_user', 255);
t.string('imap_pass', 512);
t.string('imap_folder', 255).defaultTo('INBOX');
t.boolean('enabled').defaultTo(false);
t.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
t.timestamp('updated_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
});
}
const cols = [
['account_key', (t) => t.string('account_key', 64)],
['to_address', (t) => t.string('to_address', 512)],
['body_html', (t) => t.text('body_html')],
['body_text', (t) => t.text('body_text')],
];
for (const [name, add] of cols) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('received_emails', name);
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
if (!has) await knex.schema.alterTable('received_emails', add);
}
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
// Non-destructive on the audit log: leave the added columns in place (they're
// nullable and harmless). Only drop the new table.
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('mail_accounts');
};
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
/**
* Messages Phase 3 — distinguish human-composed sends from system mail.
*
* `origin` is 'system' for everything the app queues automatically (invoices,
* reminders, gallery notices — the Automated stream) and 'manual' for emails an
* admin composed/edited in the Messages composer (replies + document messages —
* the Customers ▸ Sent stream). Existing rows default to 'system'.
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('email_queue', 'origin');
if (!has) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('email_queue', (t) => {
t.string('origin', 16).defaultTo('system');
});
}
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('email_queue', 'origin');
if (has) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('email_queue', (t) => {
t.dropColumn('origin');
});
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
/**
* Messages Phase 3 follow-up — outgoing (SMTP) settings per mail account.
*
* The customer mailbox (hello@) needs BOTH incoming (IMAP, migration 154) and
* outgoing (SMTP) config, so replies to customers send from hello@ instead of
* the global no-reply@ identity. All additive/guarded.
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
const cols = [
['smtp_host', (t) => t.string('smtp_host', 255)],
['smtp_port', (t) => t.integer('smtp_port')],
['smtp_secure', (t) => t.boolean('smtp_secure').defaultTo(false)],
['smtp_user', (t) => t.string('smtp_user', 255)],
['smtp_pass', (t) => t.string('smtp_pass', 512)],
['from_email', (t) => t.string('from_email', 255)],
['from_name', (t) => t.string('from_name', 120)],
];
for (const [name, add] of cols) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('mail_accounts', name);
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
if (!has) await knex.schema.alterTable('mail_accounts', add);
}
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
const cols = ['smtp_host', 'smtp_port', 'smtp_secure', 'smtp_user', 'smtp_pass', 'from_email', 'from_name'];
for (const name of cols) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('mail_accounts', name);
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
if (has) await knex.schema.alterTable('mail_accounts', (t) => t.dropColumn(name));
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
/**
* Messages — Archive / Delete (trash) support.
*
* `mailbox_state` on both mail tables: 'active' (normal folders), 'archived'
* (Archived folder), or 'deleted' (Deleted/trash folder). Delete is soft — the
* row moves to 'deleted' and is only removed for good when purged FROM the
* Deleted folder. Legacy rows have NULL, treated as 'active'. Additive/guarded.
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
for (const table of ['email_queue', 'received_emails']) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn(table, 'mailbox_state');
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
if (!has) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
await knex.schema.alterTable(table, (t) => {
t.string('mailbox_state', 16).defaultTo('active');
});
}
}
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
for (const table of ['email_queue', 'received_emails']) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn(table, 'mailbox_state');
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
if (has) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
await knex.schema.alterTable(table, (t) => { t.dropColumn('mailbox_state'); });
}
}
};
+242 -142
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
{
"name": "picpeak-backend",
"version": "3.65.1-beta.0",
"version": "3.80.0-beta.0",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "picpeak-backend",
"version": "3.65.1-beta.0",
"version": "3.80.0-beta.0",
"dependencies": {
"@aws-sdk/client-s3": "^3.850.0",
"@aws-sdk/lib-storage": "^3.850.0",
"@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner": "^3.850.0",
"archiver": "^5.3.1",
"axios": "1.15.2",
"axios": "1.16.0",
"bcrypt": "6.0.0",
"chokidar": "4.0.3",
"cookie-parser": "^1.4.7",
@@ -23,26 +23,28 @@
"express-rate-limit": "^6.7.0",
"express-validator": "^7.0.1",
"fluent-ffmpeg": "^2.1.3",
"form-data": "^4.0.4",
"form-data": "4.0.6",
"helmet": "^7.0.0",
"i18next": "25.3.2",
"i18next-browser-languagedetector": "^8.2.0",
"i18next-http-backend": "^3.0.2",
"i18next-http-backend": "3.0.5",
"imapflow": "^1.4.0",
"ipaddr.js": "^2.3.0",
"joi": "^17.9.1",
"js-yaml": "^4.1.1",
"joi": "^17.13.4",
"js-yaml": "^4.2.0",
"jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.0",
"knex": "^2.4.2",
"mailparser": "^3.9.9",
"mime-types": "^3.0.1",
"multer": "^2.0.2",
"multer": "2.2.0",
"node-cron": "^3.0.2",
"node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
"nodemailer": "^8.0.5",
"nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
"otplib": "^12.0.1",
"pdf-lib": "^1.17.1",
"pdfkit": "^0.17.2",
"pg": "^8.16.3",
"postcss": "8.5.10",
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@@ -4348,9 +4404,9 @@
}
},
"node_modules/browserslist": {
"version": "4.28.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/browserslist/-/browserslist-4.28.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-ZC5Bd0LgJXgwGqUknZY/vkUQ04r8NXnJZ3yYi4vDmSiZmC/pdSN0NbNRPxZpbtO4uAfDUAFffO8IZoM3Gj8IkA==",
"version": "4.28.4",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/browserslist/-/browserslist-4.28.4.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-MTc8i/x9jBQd1iMw2CFGS+rwMa07eYjLR0CCTLDACl9xhxy+nIs3KeML/biicXtk9JrZ6dnnTatmc7ErPXIxqw==",
"dev": true,
"funding": [
{
@@ -4369,11 +4425,11 @@
"license": "MIT",
"peer": true,
"dependencies": {
"baseline-browser-mapping": "^2.9.0",
"caniuse-lite": "^1.0.30001759",
"electron-to-chromium": "^1.5.263",
"node-releases": "^2.0.27",
"update-browserslist-db": "^1.2.0"
"baseline-browser-mapping": "^2.10.38",
"caniuse-lite": "^1.0.30001799",
"electron-to-chromium": "^1.5.376",
"node-releases": "^2.0.48",
"update-browserslist-db": "^1.2.3"
},
"bin": {
"browserslist": "cli.js"
@@ -4574,9 +4630,9 @@
}
},
"node_modules/caniuse-lite": {
"version": "1.0.30001762",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/caniuse-lite/-/caniuse-lite-1.0.30001762.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-PxZwGNvH7Ak8WX5iXzoK1KPZttBXNPuaOvI2ZYU7NrlM+d9Ov+TUvlLOBNGzVXAntMSMMlJPd+jY6ovrVjSmUw==",
"version": "1.0.30001799",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/caniuse-lite/-/caniuse-lite-1.0.30001799.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-hG1bReV+OUU+MOqK4t/ZWI0tZOyz3rqS9XuhOUz1cIcbwBKjOyJEJuw9ER5JuNyqxNk8u/JUVbGibBOL1yrjFw==",
"dev": true,
"funding": [
{
@@ -5337,9 +5393,9 @@
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/electron-to-chromium": {
"version": "1.5.267",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/electron-to-chromium/-/electron-to-chromium-1.5.267.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-0Drusm6MVRXSOJpGbaSVgcQsuB4hEkMpHXaVstcPmhu5LIedxs1xNK/nIxmQIU/RPC0+1/o0AVZfBTkTNJOdUw==",
"version": "1.5.381",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/electron-to-chromium/-/electron-to-chromium-1.5.381.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-n9Wa6yB+vDsGuA8AKbl/0z7HbvWqt5jxIdvr1IUicd0ryPrk7/xzwqLv8D9AbbvZ6avVNtXYLTfmgFHkwkyelg==",
"dev": true,
"license": "ISC"
},
@@ -6184,21 +6240,33 @@
}
},
"node_modules/form-data": {
"version": "4.0.5",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/form-data/-/form-data-4.0.5.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-8RipRLol37bNs2bhoV67fiTEvdTrbMUYcFTiy3+wuuOnUog2QBHCZWXDRijWQfAkhBj2Uf5UnVaiWwA5vdd82w==",
"version": "4.0.6",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/form-data/-/form-data-4.0.6.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-vKatAh4SlVfgbv+YtmhiRjhEMJsYpsG1Y2rMQtR+SVSbytsSD1YGzDIcrAJmdFec88u/+VoGmxnl+80gL1tRCQ==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"asynckit": "^0.4.0",
"combined-stream": "^1.0.8",
"es-set-tostringtag": "^2.1.0",
"hasown": "^2.0.2",
"mime-types": "^2.1.12"
"hasown": "^2.0.4",
"mime-types": "^2.1.35"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">= 6"
}
},
"node_modules/form-data/node_modules/hasown": {
"version": "2.0.4",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/hasown/-/hasown-2.0.4.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-T2UbfbBEF32wiepXIsMlTW9+dDYC6wMh/t/vYA4tuOMKqWz/n3vr1NFSxQiyP+zk2mXsoMA/i/7qV6LKut1t1A==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"function-bind": "^1.1.2"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">= 0.4"
}
},
"node_modules/form-data/node_modules/mime-db": {
"version": "1.52.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/mime-db/-/mime-db-1.52.0.tgz",
@@ -6811,9 +6879,9 @@
}
},
"node_modules/i18next-http-backend": {
"version": "3.0.6",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/i18next-http-backend/-/i18next-http-backend-3.0.6.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-mBOqy8993jtqAoj6XaI1XeC/8/9v6EPS+681ziegrPvTB0DoaCY7PpTS0SpY56qLMoS4OI1TZEM2Zf59zNh05w==",
"version": "3.0.5",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/i18next-http-backend/-/i18next-http-backend-3.0.5.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-QaWHnsxieEDcqKe+vo/RFqpiIFRi/KBqlOSPcUlvinBaISCeiTRCbtrazHAjtHtsLC66oDsROAH8frWkQzfMMQ==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"cross-fetch": "4.1.0"
@@ -7825,9 +7893,9 @@
}
},
"node_modules/joi": {
"version": "17.13.3",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/joi/-/joi-17.13.3.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-otDA4ldcIx+ZXsKHWmp0YizCweVRZG96J10b0FevjfuncLO1oX59THoAmHkNubYJ+9gWsYsp5k8v4ib6oDv1fA==",
"version": "17.13.4",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/joi/-/joi-17.13.4.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-1RuuER6kmt8K8I3nIWvPZKi5RQCb568ZPyY4Pwjlua+yo+63ZTmIwxLZH0heBmiKN4uxjvCiarDrjaeH84xicQ==",
"license": "BSD-3-Clause",
"dependencies": {
"@hapi/hoek": "^9.3.0",
@@ -7852,9 +7920,19 @@
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/js-yaml": {
"version": "4.1.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/js-yaml/-/js-yaml-4.1.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-qQKT4zQxXl8lLwBtHMWwaTcGfFOZviOJet3Oy/xmGk2gZH677CJM9EvtfdSkgWcATZhj/55JZ0rmy3myCT5lsA==",
"version": "4.3.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/js-yaml/-/js-yaml-4.3.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-1td788aAnnZ5qs7V2QIRl1owjtYpbKt749Y3xauqQgwIIGF/xXWz1wMTEBx5O3LK3lXLVuqXPdPxj2BoFHaW9Q==",
"funding": [
{
"type": "github",
"url": "https://github.com/sponsors/puzrin"
},
{
"type": "github",
"url": "https://github.com/sponsors/nodeca"
}
],
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"argparse": "^2.0.1"
@@ -8861,9 +8939,9 @@
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/multer": {
"version": "2.1.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/multer/-/multer-2.1.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-mo+QTzKlx8R7E5ylSXxWzGoXoZbOsRMpyitcht8By2KHvMbf3tjwosZ/Mu/XYU6UuJ3VZnODIrak5ZrPiPyB6A==",
"version": "2.2.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/multer/-/multer-2.2.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-6rdyFg2kLrMh9Jee7/BMPuV9lEAd7lLW2YUpF9/YxR7njyoUwwQ0ZPh3TaIY50Sw6vlyD2HW3wGOkTS4P79xrQ==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"append-field": "^1.0.0",
@@ -9041,11 +9119,14 @@
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/node-releases": {
"version": "2.0.27",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/node-releases/-/node-releases-2.0.27.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-nmh3lCkYZ3grZvqcCH+fjmQ7X+H0OeZgP40OierEaAptX4XofMh5kwNbWh7lBduUzCcV/8kZ+NDLCwm2iorIlA==",
"version": "2.0.50",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/node-releases/-/node-releases-2.0.50.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-J6l92tKHX6w8Jy5nO1Vuc01NoIiRGi/d6qBKVxh+IQ8Cr3b6HbVNfKiF8ZpFKufTwpwxMmce2W3iQZ861ZRyTg==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT"
"license": "MIT",
"engines": {
"node": ">=18"
}
},
"node_modules/node-stream-zip": {
"version": "1.15.0",
@@ -9061,9 +9142,9 @@
}
},
"node_modules/nodemailer": {
"version": "8.0.10",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nodemailer/-/nodemailer-8.0.10.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-BLFuSth7QtHOkBzyqTehWWyub0NTRDuK2Q2SQfnGLsrJnzyU+Yeh4WpV1eZGuARFj1xQJHIdnTuJZLP+b9R1GQ==",
"version": "9.0.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nodemailer/-/nodemailer-9.0.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-Gwv8SQewT616ZM/URn0H54b8PWo/Wum7md3EW2aWy1lO27+WZCX+Xyak3J+NlmHUjDh5ME+uesJUDRbR3Ye8Bw==",
"license": "MIT-0",
"engines": {
"node": ">=6.0.0"
@@ -9341,6 +9422,17 @@
"node": ">= 0.8.0"
}
},
"node_modules/otplib": {
"version": "12.0.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/otplib/-/otplib-12.0.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-xDGvUOQjop7RDgxTQ+o4pOol0/3xSZzawTiPKRrHnQWAy0WjhNs/5HdIDJCrqC4MBynmjXgULc6YfioaxZeFgg==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@otplib/core": "^12.0.1",
"@otplib/preset-default": "^12.0.1",
"@otplib/preset-v11": "^12.0.1"
}
},
"node_modules/p-limit": {
"version": "3.1.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/p-limit/-/p-limit-3.1.0.tgz",
@@ -9823,9 +9915,9 @@
}
},
"node_modules/postcss": {
"version": "8.5.14",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/postcss/-/postcss-8.5.14.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-SoSL4+OSEtR99LHFZQiJLkT59C5B1amGO1NzTwj7TT1qCUgUO6hxOvzkOYxD+vMrXBM3XJIKzokoERdqQq/Zmg==",
"version": "8.5.10",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/postcss/-/postcss-8.5.10.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-pMMHxBOZKFU6HgAZ4eyGnwXF/EvPGGqUr0MnZ5+99485wwW41kW91A4LOGxSHhgugZmSChL5AlElNdwlNgcnLQ==",
"funding": [
{
"type": "opencollective",
@@ -11522,9 +11614,9 @@
}
},
"node_modules/tar": {
"version": "7.5.13",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tar/-/tar-7.5.13.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-tOG/7GyXpFevhXVh8jOPJrmtRpOTsYqUIkVdVooZYJS/z8WhfQUX8RJILmeuJNinGAMSu1veBr4asSHFt5/hng==",
"version": "7.5.19",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tar/-/tar-7.5.19.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-4LeEWl96twnS2Q7Bz4MGqgazLqO+hJN63GZxXoIqh1T3VweYD997gbU1ItNsQafqqXTXd5WFyFdReLtwvRBNiw==",
"license": "BlueOak-1.0.0",
"dependencies": {
"@isaacs/fs-minipass": "^4.0.0",
@@ -11638,6 +11730,14 @@
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/thirty-two": {
"version": "1.0.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/thirty-two/-/thirty-two-1.0.2.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-OEI0IWCe+Dw46019YLl6V10Us5bi574EvlJEOcAkB29IzQ/mYD1A6RyNHLjZPiHCmuodxvgF6U+vZO1L15lxVA==",
"engines": {
"node": ">=0.2.6"
}
},
"node_modules/thread-stream": {
"version": "4.2.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/thread-stream/-/thread-stream-4.2.0.tgz",
+15 -11
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "picpeak-backend",
"version": "3.73.0-beta.0",
"version": "3.45.3",
"description": "Backend for PicPeak event photo sharing platform",
"main": "server.js",
"scripts": {
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
"@aws-sdk/lib-storage": "^3.850.0",
"@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner": "^3.850.0",
"archiver": "^5.3.1",
"axios": "1.15.2",
"axios": "1.16.0",
"bcrypt": "6.0.0",
"chokidar": "4.0.3",
"cookie-parser": "^1.4.7",
@@ -29,26 +29,28 @@
"express-rate-limit": "^6.7.0",
"express-validator": "^7.0.1",
"fluent-ffmpeg": "^2.1.3",
"form-data": "^4.0.4",
"form-data": "4.0.6",
"helmet": "^7.0.0",
"i18next": "25.3.2",
"i18next-browser-languagedetector": "^8.2.0",
"i18next-http-backend": "^3.0.2",
"i18next-http-backend": "3.0.5",
"imapflow": "^1.4.0",
"ipaddr.js": "^2.3.0",
"joi": "^17.9.1",
"js-yaml": "^4.1.1",
"joi": "^17.13.4",
"js-yaml": "^4.2.0",
"jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.0",
"knex": "^2.4.2",
"mailparser": "^3.9.9",
"mime-types": "^3.0.1",
"multer": "^2.0.2",
"multer": "2.2.0",
"node-cron": "^3.0.2",
"node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
"nodemailer": "^8.0.5",
"nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
"otplib": "^12.0.1",
"pdf-lib": "^1.17.1",
"pdfkit": "^0.17.2",
"pg": "^8.16.3",
"postcss": "8.5.10",
"qrcode": "^1.5.4",
"react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
"sanitize-html": "^2.17.0",
@@ -57,6 +59,7 @@
"swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
"swagger-ui-express": "^5.0.1",
"swissqrbill": "^4.3.0",
"tar": ">=7.5.16",
"uuid": "^11.1.1",
"winston": "^3.8.2",
"zxcvbn": "^4.4.2"
@@ -73,10 +76,10 @@
"tar-fs": "2.1.4"
},
"glob": "^11.1.0",
"js-yaml": "^4.1.1",
"js-yaml": "^4.2.0",
"fast-xml-parser": ">=5.7.0",
"qs": ">=6.15.2",
"tar": ">=7.5.13",
"tar": ">=7.5.16",
"brace-expansion": ">=5.0.6",
"minimatch": ">=9.0.7",
"path-to-regexp": "0.1.13",
@@ -84,6 +87,7 @@
"follow-redirects": ">=1.16.0",
"@tootallnate/once": ">=3.0.1",
"ip-address": ">=10.1.1",
"uuid": "^11.1.1"
"uuid": "^11.1.1",
"nodemailer": "^9.0.1"
}
}
+109
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* reset-admin-mfa.js — disable two-factor auth for a locked-out admin (#738).
*
* Break-glass recovery for when an admin loses their authenticator AND their
* recovery codes. Clears the MFA state so the admin can log in with just their
* password and re-enroll from Settings.
*
* Usage (inside the running backend container):
* docker compose exec backend node scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --email admin@example.com
* docker compose exec backend node scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --all --yes
*
* Flags:
* --email <addr> target a single admin by email (or --username <name>)
* --all reset MFA for EVERY admin (full lockout / break-glass)
* --yes non-interactive (skip the confirmation prompt)
*/
const readline = require('readline');
const { db, logActivity } = require('../src/database/db');
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
const hasFlag = (f) => args.includes(f);
const getOption = (name) => {
const i = args.indexOf(`--${name}`);
return i !== -1 && i + 1 < args.length ? args[i + 1] : null;
};
const force = hasFlag('--yes') || hasFlag('--force') || hasFlag('--non-interactive');
const all = hasFlag('--all');
const email = getOption('email');
const username = getOption('username');
const MFA_CLEAR = {
two_factor_enabled: false,
two_factor_secret: null,
two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
two_factor_enrolled_at: null,
updated_at: new Date(),
};
function ask(prompt) {
if (force) return Promise.resolve('yes');
const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
return new Promise((resolve) => rl.question(prompt, (a) => { rl.close(); resolve(a); }));
}
async function main() {
console.log('\n========================================');
console.log('PicPeak Admin MFA Reset Tool');
console.log('========================================\n');
if (!all && !email && !username) {
console.error('❌ Specify a target: --email <addr>, --username <name>, or --all');
console.log(' e.g. node scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --email admin@example.com');
process.exit(1);
}
// Resolve target admins.
let targets;
if (all) {
targets = await db('admin_users').select('id', 'username', 'email', 'two_factor_enabled');
} else {
const q = db('admin_users');
if (email) q.where({ email });
if (username) q.where({ username });
targets = await q.select('id', 'username', 'email', 'two_factor_enabled');
}
if (targets.length === 0) {
console.error('❌ No matching admin user found.');
process.exit(1);
}
const enrolled = targets.filter((t) => t.two_factor_enabled === true || t.two_factor_enabled === 1);
console.log(`Matched ${targets.length} admin(s); ${enrolled.length} currently have MFA enabled:`);
for (const t of targets) {
const flag = (t.two_factor_enabled === true || t.two_factor_enabled === 1) ? 'MFA ON' : 'mfa off';
console.log(` - ${t.username} <${t.email}> [${flag}]`);
}
const confirm = await ask('\nDisable MFA for the above? (yes/no): ');
const normalized = String(confirm).trim().toLowerCase();
if (normalized !== 'yes' && normalized !== 'y') {
console.log('\n❌ Cancelled. No changes made.');
process.exit(0);
}
const ids = targets.map((t) => t.id);
const updated = await db('admin_users').whereIn('id', ids).update(MFA_CLEAR);
for (const t of targets) {
try {
await logActivity('admin_mfa_reset_cli',
{ admin_id: t.id, via: 'cli' },
null,
{ type: 'system', id: 0, name: 'reset-admin-mfa.js' }
);
} catch (_) { /* activity log is best-effort */ }
}
console.log(`\n✅ MFA disabled for ${updated} admin(s). They can now log in with just their password and re-enroll from Settings → Security.`);
process.exit(0);
}
main().catch((err) => {
console.error('❌ Failed to reset MFA:', err.message);
process.exit(1);
});
+99 -5
View File
@@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ const {
// Import routes
const authRoutes = require('./src/routes/auth');
const eventRoutes = require('./src/routes/events');
const galleryRoutes = require('./src/routes/gallery');
const adminRoutes = require('./src/routes/admin');
const adminAuthRoutes = require('./src/routes/adminAuth');
const secureImagesRoutes = require('./src/routes/secureImages');
const setupRoutes = require('./src/routes/setup');
const app = express();
const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3000;
@@ -397,6 +397,8 @@ async function initializeRateLimiters() {
app.use('/api/auth', authRateLimiter);
app.use('/api/gallery/:slug/verify', authRateLimiter);
app.use('/api/admin/auth/login', authRateLimiter);
app.use('/api/setup/admin', authRateLimiter);
app.use('/api/setup/verify-token', authRateLimiter);
}
// Note: Rate limiters will be initialized after database connection
@@ -543,6 +545,68 @@ app.get('/og/gallery/:slug', handleGalleryOgRequest);
// returns 404 unless the opt-in is on AND a hero_photo_id is set.
app.get('/og/gallery/:slug/cover', handleGalleryOgCover);
// Branded URL shortener (#699). /s/<short_slug> is bot-UA aware:
// - Social crawler → server-render OG for the target event so the
// SHORT URL itself is what scrapes cache against. The og:url canonical
// in the rendered HTML points back at /s/<slug>, not the underlying
// gallery URL — so a re-share of the same short URL keeps the cache
// warm even if the underlying gallery slug rotates.
// - Browser → 302 to the stored target_path. The target_path was
// captured at create time from the event's slug + share_token + the
// global "Use short gallery URLs" setting, so it doesn't silently
// change later.
// - Soft-deleted → 410 Gone so the admin can tell their delete worked
// vs. a typo'd unknown slug (which returns 404).
const galleryShortUrlService = require('./src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
const { buildOgMetadata, renderOgHtml } = require('./src/services/galleryOgService');
app.get('/s/:shortSlug', async (req, res) => {
try {
const row = await galleryShortUrlService.findByShortSlug(req.params.shortSlug);
if (!row) {
return res.status(404).type('text/plain').send('Short URL not found');
}
if (row.deleted_at) {
return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL has been removed');
}
// Bot UA → render OG metadata for the target event. We look up the
// event via the short URL's event_id rather than re-parsing the
// target_path so a future migration that adds new target shapes
// (slideshow, client-access) doesn't need to rewrite the URL parser.
if (isSocialCrawler(req.get('user-agent'))) {
const event = await require('./src/database/db').db('events')
.where({ id: row.event_id })
.first('slug');
if (event?.slug) {
const meta = await buildOgMetadata(event.slug, req.originalUrl);
// Override the canonical to point at the SHORT URL itself —
// social platforms cache OG by URL, and the short URL is the
// one operators actually share, so that's the cache key we
// want them to stick with.
const base = (process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/$/, '');
meta.url = `${base}/s/${row.short_slug}`;
res.set('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=300');
res.set('Content-Type', 'text/html; charset=utf-8');
res.send(renderOgHtml(meta));
// Hit accounting is fire-and-forget — don't block the bot.
galleryShortUrlService.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
return;
}
// Event disappeared (FK CASCADE in flight, or admin hard-deleted
// outside the normal soft-delete path) — fall through to 410 so
// the scraper sees a clean signal.
return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL points at a deleted event');
}
// Browser path: redirect. Hit accounting is fire-and-forget.
galleryShortUrlService.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
return res.redirect(302, row.target_path);
} catch (err) {
logger.error('Short URL resolver failed', { slug: req.params.shortSlug, error: err.message });
return res.status(500).type('text/plain').send('Internal server error');
}
});
// robots.txt endpoint (dynamic, served from DB settings)
const { generateRobotsTxt } = require('./src/services/robotsTxtService');
app.get('/robots.txt', async (req, res) => {
@@ -628,9 +692,9 @@ app.get('/health', async (req, res) => {
});
// Routes
app.use('/api/setup', setupRoutes); // public first-run bootstrap (self-closes after setup)
app.use('/api/auth', authRoutes);
app.use('/api/events', eventRoutes);
app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('./src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('./src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
// Gallery routes - main routes first, then feedback routes
app.use('/api/gallery', galleryRoutes);
app.use('/api/gallery', require('./src/routes/galleryFeedback'));
@@ -638,6 +702,10 @@ app.use('/api/gallery', require('./src/routes/galleryGuests'));
app.use('/api/admin', adminRoutes);
app.use('/api/admin/auth', adminAuthRoutes);
app.use('/api/admin/system', require('./src/routes/adminSystem'));
// Branded URL shortener admin CRUD (#699) — list/create/delete short URLs
// per event. Mounted at /api/admin so the routes appear at
// /api/admin/events/:eventId/short-urls and /api/admin/short-urls/:id.
app.use('/api/admin', require('./src/routes/adminShortUrls'));
app.use('/api/admin/feature-flags', require('./src/routes/adminFeatureFlags'));
app.use('/api/admin/whatsapp', require('./src/routes/adminWhatsapp'));
app.use('/api/admin/backup', require('./src/routes/adminBackup'));
@@ -769,12 +837,21 @@ try {
// SPA fallback for admin + gallery routes. For gallery URLs we intercept
// social-crawler User-Agents and serve OG/Twitter-card metadata so link
// previews show the event name + branding instead of the SPA stub.
app.get('/gallery/:slug/:token?', (req, res, next) => {
//
// Two route shapes — 1-2 segments (`/gallery/:slug/:token?`) and the
// 3-segment slideshow form (`/gallery/:slug/show/:token`). The slideshow
// shape was previously falling through to the SPA-catchall below and
// skipping OG injection entirely (#699). Both patterns route to the
// same handler — buildOgMetadata only looks at `slug`, so the extra
// /show/ segment is harmless.
const ogIntercept = (req, res, next) => {
if (isSocialCrawler(req.get('user-agent'))) {
return handleGalleryOgRequest(req, res);
}
return next();
}, (req, res) => res.sendFile(indexPath));
};
app.get('/gallery/:slug/:token?', ogIntercept, (req, res) => res.sendFile(indexPath));
app.get('/gallery/:slug/show/:token', ogIntercept, (req, res) => res.sendFile(indexPath));
app.get(['/admin', '/admin/*', '/gallery/*'], (req, res) => {
res.sendFile(indexPath);
@@ -924,6 +1001,16 @@ async function startServer() {
logger.warn('Install-from-backup hook threw:', err.message);
}
// First-run: surface a one-time setup token while no admin account exists.
// Runs AFTER install-from-backup so a restored instance (which repopulates
// admin_users) never prints a throwaway token. Best-effort — never blocks boot.
let setupToken = null;
try {
setupToken = await require('./src/services/setupService').ensureSetupToken();
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(`[setup] ensureSetupToken skipped: ${err.message}`);
}
// Start backup service
await startBackupService();
@@ -939,6 +1026,13 @@ async function startServer() {
logger.info(`Server running on port ${PORT}`);
logger.info(`Admin interface: ${process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}`);
logger.info(`Frontend: ${process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3001'}`);
// First-run: print the one-time setup token to STDOUT (the file logger
// doesn't reach `docker logs`), as the last + most visible thing at boot.
if (setupToken) {
const url = `${process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}/admin`;
const line = '='.repeat(64);
console.log(`\n${line}\n PicPeak first-run setup — no admin account yet.\n Open: ${url}\n One-time setup token: ${setupToken}\n (also saved to data/SETUP_TOKEN)\n${line}\n`);
}
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to start server:', error);
@@ -208,6 +208,79 @@ function makeRes() {
return res;
}
// ---- buildOgMetadata: share-token fallback (#699) ----------------------
//
// The public share URL after migration 525's short-URLs option strips the
// slug down to `/gallery/<32-hex-share-token>`. The OG handler was looking
// up that token as if it were a slug, finding nothing, and serving the
// generic site-wide OG instead of the event-specific one (alex's symptom
// in #699 — Cloudflare Worker had to compensate). resolveSlug now falls
// back to events.share_token when the slug shape matches a 32-char hex.
describe('buildOgMetadata — share-token fallback', () => {
it('resolves a 32-char hex slug via the share_token column when no slug match', async () => {
// Obviously-fake 32-hex test fixture — GitGuardian flagged a
// real-looking token (copied from the bug report) as a Generic
// High Entropy Secret. Using a non-entropy literal sidesteps the
// heuristic without changing what the test pins.
const token = '00000000000000000000000000000001';
const event = {
id: 10,
slug: 'senior-2026-06-05',
share_token: token,
event_name: 'Senior Photo Gallery',
event_date: '2026-06-05',
welcome_message: null,
hero_photo_id: null,
og_image_share_enabled: false,
};
// First db() — events.where('slug', token) returns null.
db.mockImplementationOnce(() => chain({ first: null }));
db.schema = { hasTable: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) };
// Second db() — events.where('share_token', token) returns the event.
db.mockImplementationOnce(() => chain({ first: event }));
mockBranding();
const meta = await buildOgMetadata(token, `/gallery/${token}`);
// Rich event-specific OG, not the site-wide fallback.
expect(meta.title).toContain('Senior Photo Gallery');
expect(meta.eventName).toBe('Senior Photo Gallery');
// og:url canonicalises to the slug-based URL even when the share-token
// URL was the entry point — keeps social-share canonicals stable.
expect(meta.url).toBe('https://gallery.example.com/gallery/senior-2026-06-05');
});
it('returns the site-wide fallback when the 32-hex slug matches NO event at all', async () => {
// Defensive: a malformed/expired token shouldn't 500 or leak any
// event info — it must look identical to the generic fallback path.
const token = '00000000000000000000000000000002';
db.mockImplementationOnce(() => chain({ first: null }));
db.schema = { hasTable: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) };
db.mockImplementationOnce(() => chain({ first: null })); // share_token also misses
mockBranding();
const meta = await buildOgMetadata(token, `/gallery/${token}`);
expect(meta.title).toBe('PicPeak');
expect(meta.eventName).toBeUndefined();
});
it('does NOT attempt the share_token lookup for slugs that don\'t look like a 32-char hex', async () => {
// Real slugs are kebab/dot/underscore mixes — never pure 32-hex.
// Skipping the extra query keeps the un-needed-DB-hit cost off the
// hot path for every legitimate slug.
mockResolveSlug(null); // events lookup misses; no redirects table
mockBranding();
await buildOgMetadata('senior-2026-06-05', '/gallery/senior-2026-06-05');
// Only 2 db() calls — events + app_settings. No share_token
// fallback was attempted for a non-hex slug.
expect(db).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
});
});
describe('handleGalleryOgCover — 404 unless explicitly opted in', () => {
it('returns 400 on an invalid slug shape', async () => {
const req = { params: { slug: '../../etc/passwd' }, headers: {} };
@@ -270,12 +343,34 @@ describe('isSocialCrawler — extended bot coverage (#521)', () => {
// 3rd-party preview services used by business-messaging stacks
'LinkPreview/1.0',
'Slack-ImgProxy/1.0',
// Viber + broader crawler set (#699 follow-up)
'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Viber)',
'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Bluesky Cardyb/1.1)',
'facebookcatalog/1.0',
'kakaotalk-scrap/1.0',
'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Synapse/1.98)',
'Rocket.Chat/6.0',
];
for (const ua of knownBots) {
expect(isSocialCrawler(ua)).toBe(true);
}
});
it('does NOT match human in-app-browser UAs (our OG response is meta-only, no redirect)', () => {
// These share a token with a preview bot but are also sent by real users
// browsing inside the app's webview — matching them would serve a human
// the bare OG stub. Deliberately excluded; guard against re-adding them.
const inAppBrowsers = [
'Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone) AppleWebKit MicroMessenger/8.0.0', // WeChat in-app
'Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone) AppleWebKit Line/13.0.0', // LINE in-app
'Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android) Zalo', // Zalo in-app
'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh) Chrome/120.0 Safari/537.36 boxing', // "XING" substring trap
];
for (const ua of inAppBrowsers) {
expect(isSocialCrawler(ua)).toBe(false);
}
});
it('does not match a regular browser UA', () => {
const browsers = [
'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0 Safari/537.36',
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT with active assignment', (
it('allows access when the event_customer_assignments row exists', async () => {
getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
type: 'gallery',
eventId: 42,
via: 'customer',
customerId: 7,
@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT after revocation', () => {
it('returns 403 CUSTOMER_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKED when the junction row is gone', async () => {
getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
type: 'gallery',
eventId: 42,
via: 'customer',
customerId: 7,
@@ -160,6 +162,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT after revocation', () => {
// and start 403'ing per-event-password sessions.
getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
type: 'gallery',
eventId: 42,
customerId: 7,
// intentionally no `via` claim
@@ -191,6 +194,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — per-event-password JWT', () => {
it('does NOT touch event_customer_assignments and passes through', async () => {
getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
type: 'gallery',
eventId: 42,
// No via, no customerId — this is the legacy per-event-password
// flow where every guest mints their own JWT after entering the
+3 -2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ const multer = require('multer');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const { validateFileType } = require('../utils/fileSecurityUtils');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
/**
* Get the storage path from environment or default
@@ -220,14 +221,14 @@ const createCustomUploader = (config) => {
const uploadTimeoutMiddleware = (timeout = 300000) => {
return (req, res, next) => {
req.setTimeout(timeout, () => {
console.error('Upload request timed out');
logger.error('Upload request timed out');
if (!res.headersSent) {
res.status(408).json({ error: 'Upload request timed out' });
}
});
res.setTimeout(timeout, () => {
console.error('Upload response timed out');
logger.error('Upload response timed out');
});
next();
+3 -1
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
let decoded;
try {
decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
issuer: 'picpeak-auth',
complete: true
});
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ async function galleryAuth(req, res, next) {
let decoded;
try {
decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
issuer: 'picpeak-auth',
complete: true
});
@@ -209,7 +211,7 @@ async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
let decoded;
try {
decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
} catch (err) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
}
+1
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ async function customerAuth(req, res, next) {
let decoded;
try {
const verified = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
issuer: 'picpeak-auth',
complete: true,
});
+13 -2
View File
@@ -66,18 +66,29 @@ async function verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next) {
let decoded;
try {
decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
});
} catch (error) {
// If verification fails with issuer, try without issuer (backward compatibility)
if (error.name === 'JsonWebTokenError' && error.message.includes('jwt issuer invalid')) {
decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
} else {
throw error;
}
}
logger.debug('[verifyGalleryAccess] Token decoded successfully', { eventId: decoded.eventId, slug: requestedSlug });
// Only gallery-scoped tokens grant gallery access. Every legitimate
// path (password login, share link, client access, customer-minted,
// slideshow) mints type:'gallery'. Reject anything else — e.g. a guest
// identity token (type:'guest', for feedback attribution) that carries a
// matching eventId — instead of relying on other token types incidentally
// lacking an eventId to fail the id match below.
if (decoded.type !== 'gallery') {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Invalid token type for gallery access' });
}
// If we have a slug in the URL params or from pre-middleware, verify it matches
if (requestedSlug) {
// Verify by slug and ensure it matches the token's event
+1
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ async function resolveGuest(req, res, next) {
let decoded;
try {
const verified = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
issuer: 'picpeak-auth',
complete: true,
});
+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
const { db } = require('../database/db');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
// Cache maintenance mode status to avoid DB queries on every request
let maintenanceMode = false;
@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ async function queryWithRetry(queryFn, retries = MAX_RETRIES) {
error.code === 'ECONNRESET';
if (isConnectionError) {
console.warn(`Database connection error, retrying in ${RETRY_DELAY}ms... (attempt ${i + 1}/${retries})`);
logger.warn(`Database connection error, retrying in ${RETRY_DELAY}ms... (attempt ${i + 1}/${retries})`);
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, RETRY_DELAY));
} else {
throw error; // Don't retry non-connection errors
@@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ async function checkMaintenanceMode() {
return maintenanceMode;
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error checking maintenance mode after retries:', error.message);
logger.error('Error checking maintenance mode after retries:', error.message);
// Return cached value or false if no cache
return maintenanceMode;
}
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ async function maintenanceMiddleware(req, res, next) {
}
} catch (error) {
// If we can't check maintenance mode, allow the request to proceed
console.error('Failed to check maintenance mode, allowing request:', error.message);
logger.error('Failed to check maintenance mode, allowing request:', error.message);
}
next();
+33 -1
View File
@@ -32,4 +32,36 @@ function requireEventOwnership(req, res, next) {
});
}
module.exports = { requireEventOwnership };
/**
* Return the subset of `eventIds` the admin may act on, mirroring
* requireEventOwnership for bulk routes that can't use it (they take an
* array in the body, not an :id param). super_admin gets everything;
* other roles get events they created plus ownerless legacy/system
* events (created_by IS NULL). Ids that are foreign OR non-existent both
* land in `denied` — deliberately indistinguishable, so bulk routes
* don't become an ownership/existence oracle.
*
* @returns {Promise<{allowed: Array, denied: Array}>}
*/
async function filterOwnedEventIds(admin, eventIds) {
if (admin.roleName === 'super_admin') {
return { allowed: [...eventIds], denied: [] };
}
const rows = await db('events')
.whereIn('id', eventIds)
.andWhere((q) => q.whereNull('created_by').orWhere('created_by', admin.id))
.select('id');
const allowedSet = new Set(rows.map((r) => r.id));
const allowed = [];
const denied = [];
for (const id of eventIds) {
if (allowedSet.has(id) || allowedSet.has(Number(id))) {
allowed.push(id);
} else {
denied.push(id);
}
}
return { allowed, denied };
}
module.exports = { requireEventOwnership, filterOwnedEventIds };
+25 -12
View File
@@ -28,12 +28,13 @@ async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
let decoded;
try {
decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
});
} catch (issuerError) {
// If verification fails with issuer, try without issuer (backward compatibility)
if (issuerError.name === 'JsonWebTokenError' && issuerError.message.includes('jwt issuer invalid')) {
decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
} else {
throw issuerError;
}
@@ -43,24 +44,36 @@ async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
if (decoded.type === 'gallery') {
// For thumbnails, we need to verify the token is for a valid event
if (!eventSlug) {
// Extract event ID from the decoded token
// Resolve the token's event (by id, or legacy slug fallback)...
let event = null;
if (decoded.eventId) {
const event = await db('events')
event = await db('events')
.where({ id: decoded.eventId, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
.first();
if (event) {
}
if (!event && decoded.eventSlug) {
event = await db('events')
.where({ slug: decoded.eventSlug, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
.first();
}
// ...then confirm the REQUESTED thumbnail actually belongs to
// that event. Thumbnails are stored flat (thumbnails/thumb_<name>)
// with deterministic, enumerable filenames derived from the
// public event name + a sequential counter. Without this
// ownership check any holder of a gallery token for any event
// could enumerate and fetch another (password-protected) event's
// entire thumbnail set, defeating the gallery password. A
// traversal or foreign filename simply fails to match → denied.
if (event) {
const requestedKey = `thumbnails${req.path}`;
const ownsThumbnail = await db('photos')
.where({ event_id: event.id, thumbnail_path: requestedKey })
.first();
if (ownsThumbnail) {
req.event = event;
return next();
}
}
// Fallback to slug
const event = await db('events')
.where({ slug: decoded.eventSlug, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
.first();
if (event) {
req.event = event;
return next();
}
}
// For regular photos, check if token matches the event
else if (decoded.eventSlug === eventSlug) {
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
'X-Frame-Options': 'DENY',
'X-XSS-Protection': '1; mode=block',
'Referrer-Policy': 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',
'Content-Security-Policy': "default-src 'none'; img-src 'self'",
'Content-Security-Policy': 'default-src \'none\'; img-src \'self\'',
// Custom security headers
'X-Protected-Content': 'true',
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
await db('security_logs').insert(logData).catch(console.error);
}
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error logging security event:', error);
logger.error('Error logging security event:', error);
}
}
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
perHour: config.perHour || 500
};
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error getting rate limit settings:', error);
logger.error('Error getting rate limit settings:', error);
return { perMinute: 30, per5Minutes: 100, perHour: 500 };
}
}
+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
const path = require('path');
const express = require('express');
const { safePathJoin, isPathSafe } = require('../utils/fileSecurityUtils');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
/**
* Create a secure static file serving middleware that prevents path traversal attacks
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ function secureStatic(basePath, options = {}) {
// Validate the path doesn't contain dangerous patterns
if (!isPathSafe(requestedPath)) {
console.warn(`Potential path traversal attempt blocked: ${requestedPath}`);
logger.warn(`Potential path traversal attempt blocked: ${requestedPath}`);
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Access denied' });
}
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ function secureStatic(basePath, options = {}) {
// `default-src 'none'` already implies script-src 'none';
// style-src + img-src(data:) keep normal SVG rendering working.
if (/\.svg$/i.test(filePath)) {
resp.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:");
resp.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', 'default-src \'none\'; style-src \'unsafe-inline\'; img-src \'self\' data:');
resp.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
}
}
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ function secureStatic(basePath, options = {}) {
return staticMiddleware(req, res, next);
} catch (error) {
// Path traversal detected
console.error(`Path traversal blocked: ${requestedPath}`, error.message);
logger.error(`Path traversal blocked: ${requestedPath}`, error.message);
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Access denied' });
}
};
+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { db } = require('../database/db');
const { getAdminTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
// In-memory session tracking (in production, use Redis)
const sessions = new Map();
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ async function getSessionTimeout() {
} catch (error) {
// Only log if it's not a connection error (to avoid spam)
if (error.code !== 'ECONNRESET' && !error.message?.includes('Connection terminated')) {
console.error('Error getting session timeout:', error.message);
logger.error('Error getting session timeout:', error.message);
}
}
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ async function sessionTimeoutMiddleware(req, res, next) {
try {
// Verify token is valid
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
// Check if this is an admin token
if (!decoded.id) {
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ async function sessionTimeoutMiddleware(req, res, next) {
for (const [oldToken, _] of sessions.entries()) {
if (oldToken !== token) {
try {
const oldDecoded = jwt.verify(oldToken, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
const oldDecoded = jwt.verify(oldToken, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
if (oldDecoded.id === userId) {
sessions.delete(oldToken);
}
+31 -20
View File
@@ -9,14 +9,15 @@ const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const archiver = require('archiver');
const StreamZip = require('node-stream-zip');
const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
const { assertZipEntriesWithin } = require('../utils/safePath');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const router = express.Router();
// Get all archived events
router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const page = parseInt(req.query.page) || 1;
const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit) || 20;
const offset = (page - 1) * limit;
const { page, limit, offset } = getPagination(req);
// Get total count
const totalCount = await db('events')
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.view'), async (req, res)
const stats = await fs.stat(fullArchivePath);
archiveFileSize = stats.size;
} catch (error) {
console.error(`Archive file not found: ${archive.archive_path}`);
logger.error(`Archive file not found: ${archive.archive_path}`);
}
}
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.view'), async (req, res)
}
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Archives list error:', error);
logger.error('Archives list error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch archives' });
}
});
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ router.get('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.view'), requireEventOw
path: archive.archive_path
};
} catch (error) {
console.error('Archive file not found:', error);
logger.error('Archive file not found:', error);
}
}
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ router.get('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.view'), requireEventOw
archiveFile: archiveFileInfo
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Archive details error:', error);
logger.error('Archive details error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch archive details' });
}
});
@@ -179,9 +180,19 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
await fs.mkdir(eventDir, { recursive: true });
// Log ZIP contents for debugging
console.log(`Extracting archive to: ${eventDir}`);
logger.info(`Extracting archive to: ${eventDir}`);
const entries = Object.values(await zip.entries());
console.log(`Archive contains ${entries.length} entries`);
logger.info(`Archive contains ${entries.length} entries`);
// Reject ZIP-slip entries before writing anything to disk — extract()
// does not neutralise `../` in entry names (GHSA-jfhw-fj23-fx6x).
try {
assertZipEntriesWithin(entries, eventDir);
} catch (slipErr) {
await zip.close();
logger.warn(`Refusing archive restore — unsafe entry path: ${slipErr.message}`);
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Archive contains invalid entry paths' });
}
// Stream-extract everything to disk
await zip.extract(null, eventDir);
@@ -203,12 +214,12 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
if (m && m.filename) manifestByFilename.set(m.filename, m);
}
}
console.log(`Loaded photos manifest: ${manifestByFilename.size} entries`);
logger.info(`Loaded photos manifest: ${manifestByFilename.size} entries`);
} catch (e) {
if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') {
console.warn('Photos manifest present but unreadable; falling back to filenames', e.message);
logger.warn('Photos manifest present but unreadable; falling back to filenames', e.message);
} else {
console.log('No photos manifest in archive (older archive); original_filename falls back to filename');
logger.info('No photos manifest in archive (older archive); original_filename falls back to filename');
}
}
@@ -286,9 +297,9 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
});
}
} catch (statError) {
console.error(`Failed to stat file: ${actualFilePath}`);
console.error(`Entry name was: ${entry.name}`);
console.error('Error:', statError.message);
logger.error(`Failed to stat file: ${actualFilePath}`);
logger.error(`Entry name was: ${entry.name}`);
logger.error('Error:', statError.message);
// Skip this file if we can't stat it
continue;
}
@@ -301,7 +312,7 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
}
} catch (extractError) {
console.error('Archive extraction error:', extractError);
logger.error('Archive extraction error:', extractError);
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to extract archive: ' + extractError.message });
}
@@ -331,7 +342,7 @@ router.post('/:id/restore', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.restore'), re
res.json({ message: 'Archive restored successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Archive restore error:', error);
logger.error('Archive restore error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to restore archive' });
}
});
@@ -380,7 +391,7 @@ router.get('/:id/download', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.download'), r
metadata: JSON.stringify({ event_name: archive.event_name })
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Archive download error:', error);
logger.error('Archive download error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to download archive' });
}
});
@@ -404,7 +415,7 @@ router.delete('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.delete'), requireEv
const fullArchivePath = path.join(storagePath, archive.archive_path);
await fs.unlink(fullArchivePath);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to delete archive file:', error);
logger.error('Failed to delete archive file:', error);
}
}
@@ -440,7 +451,7 @@ router.delete('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('archives.delete'), requireEv
res.json({ message: 'Archive deleted permanently' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Archive delete error:', error);
logger.error('Archive delete error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to delete archive' });
}
});
+172
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const { handleAsync, validateRequest, successResponse } = require('../utils/rout
const { NotFoundError, ConflictError, ValidationError } = require('../utils/errors');
const { setAdminAuthCookie } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
const { IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL } = require('../utils/emailNormalization');
const mfaService = require('../services/mfaService');
const router = express.Router();
// Get admin profile
@@ -184,4 +185,175 @@ router.post('/logout', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
successResponse(res, { message: 'Logged out successfully' });
}));
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Multi-factor authentication (TOTP) — issue #738.
//
// All endpoints operate on the AUTHENTICATED admin's own account
// (req.admin.id) — enrollment is per-user and works for every role,
// super_admin included (closes #735). The TOTP secret is stored encrypted
// at rest and recovery codes are hashed; see services/mfaService.js.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const isMfaEnabled = mfaService.isEnrolled;
// Current MFA state for the logged-in admin.
router.get('/mfa/status', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
const admin = await db('admin_users').where('id', req.admin.id).first();
if (!admin) throw new NotFoundError('Admin user');
const enabled = isMfaEnabled(admin);
res.json({
enabled,
enrolledAt: enabled ? admin.two_factor_enrolled_at || null : null,
recoveryCodesRemaining: enabled
? mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(admin.two_factor_recovery_codes).length
: 0
});
}));
// Begin enrollment: mint a provisional secret, store it encrypted (NOT yet
// enabled), and return the otpauth URI + QR for the authenticator app. Calling
// this again before /enable simply regenerates the provisional secret.
router.post('/mfa/setup', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
const admin = await db('admin_users').where('id', req.admin.id).first();
if (!admin) throw new NotFoundError('Admin user');
if (isMfaEnabled(admin)) {
throw new ConflictError('Two-factor authentication is already enabled');
}
const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
two_factor_secret: mfaService.encryptSecret(secret),
two_factor_enabled: false,
two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
two_factor_enrolled_at: null,
updated_at: new Date()
});
const accountName = admin.email || admin.username;
const otpauthUri = mfaService.buildOtpauthUri(accountName, secret);
const qr = await mfaService.buildQrDataUrl(otpauthUri);
res.json({
// `secret` is returned for manual entry when a QR can't be scanned.
secret,
otpauthUri,
qr,
issuer: mfaService.ISSUER,
account: accountName
});
}));
// Complete enrollment: verify a code against the provisional secret, enable
// MFA, and return one-time recovery codes (shown exactly once).
router.post('/mfa/enable', [
adminAuth,
body('code').notEmpty().withMessage('Verification code is required')
], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
validateRequest(req);
const admin = await db('admin_users').where('id', req.admin.id).first();
if (!admin) throw new NotFoundError('Admin user');
if (isMfaEnabled(admin)) {
throw new ConflictError('Two-factor authentication is already enabled');
}
if (!admin.two_factor_secret) {
throw new ValidationError('Start setup before enabling two-factor authentication');
}
if (!mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret)) {
throw new ValidationError('Invalid verification code');
}
const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
two_factor_enabled: true,
two_factor_enrolled_at: new Date(),
two_factor_recovery_codes: JSON.stringify(hashed),
updated_at: new Date()
});
await logActivity('admin_mfa_enabled',
{ admin_id: admin.id },
null,
{ type: 'admin', id: admin.id, name: admin.username }
);
successResponse(res, {
message: 'Two-factor authentication enabled',
recoveryCodes: plain
});
}));
// Disable MFA. Requires a fresh TOTP or recovery code so a hijacked session
// can't silently strip the second factor.
router.post('/mfa/disable', [
adminAuth,
body('code').notEmpty().withMessage('A current code is required to disable 2FA')
], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
validateRequest(req);
const admin = await db('admin_users').where('id', req.admin.id).first();
if (!admin) throw new NotFoundError('Admin user');
if (!isMfaEnabled(admin)) {
throw new ValidationError('Two-factor authentication is not enabled');
}
const totpOk = mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret);
let recoveryOk = false;
if (!totpOk) {
const stored = mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(admin.two_factor_recovery_codes);
recoveryOk = (await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(req.body.code, stored)).matched;
}
if (!totpOk && !recoveryOk) {
throw new ValidationError('Invalid verification code');
}
await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
two_factor_enabled: false,
two_factor_secret: null,
two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
two_factor_enrolled_at: null,
updated_at: new Date()
});
await logActivity('admin_mfa_disabled',
{ admin_id: admin.id },
null,
{ type: 'admin', id: admin.id, name: admin.username }
);
successResponse(res, { message: 'Two-factor authentication disabled' });
}));
// Regenerate recovery codes (invalidates the old set). Requires a fresh TOTP
// code. Returns the new codes once.
router.post('/mfa/recovery-codes', [
adminAuth,
body('code').notEmpty().withMessage('A current authenticator code is required')
], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
validateRequest(req);
const admin = await db('admin_users').where('id', req.admin.id).first();
if (!admin) throw new NotFoundError('Admin user');
if (!isMfaEnabled(admin)) {
throw new ValidationError('Two-factor authentication is not enabled');
}
if (!mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret)) {
throw new ValidationError('Invalid verification code');
}
const { plain, hashed } = await mfaService.generateRecoveryCodes();
await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
two_factor_recovery_codes: JSON.stringify(hashed),
updated_at: new Date()
});
await logActivity('admin_mfa_recovery_regenerated',
{ admin_id: admin.id },
null,
{ type: 'admin', id: admin.id, name: admin.username }
);
successResponse(res, {
message: 'Recovery codes regenerated',
recoveryCodes: plain
});
}));
module.exports = router;
+289 -215
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,12 @@ const express = require('express');
const { db } = require('../database/db');
const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { clearAdminAuthCookie } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
const { revokeToken } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
const { triggerManualBackup, getBackupStatus, cleanupOldBackupRuns, getBackupManifest, validateBackupManifest } = require('../services/backupService');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { errorResponse, getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const { formatBytes } = require('../utils/formatBytes');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const path = require('path');
const crypto = require('crypto');
@@ -30,8 +34,7 @@ router.get('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, r
res.json(config);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get backup configuration:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get backup configuration' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get backup configuration');
}
});
@@ -43,22 +46,22 @@ router.put('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req,
// Validate required fields based on destination type
if (updates.backup_destination_type) {
switch (updates.backup_destination_type) {
case 'local':
if (!updates.backup_destination_path) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Local backup requires destination path' });
}
break;
case 'rsync':
if (!updates.backup_rsync_host || !updates.backup_rsync_path) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Rsync backup requires host and path' });
}
break;
case 's3':
if (!updates.backup_s3_endpoint || !updates.backup_s3_bucket ||
case 'local':
if (!updates.backup_destination_path) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Local backup requires destination path' });
}
break;
case 'rsync':
if (!updates.backup_rsync_host || !updates.backup_rsync_path) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Rsync backup requires host and path' });
}
break;
case 's3':
if (!updates.backup_s3_endpoint || !updates.backup_s3_bucket ||
!updates.backup_s3_access_key || !updates.backup_s3_secret_key) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'S3 backup requires endpoint, bucket, and credentials' });
}
break;
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'S3 backup requires endpoint, bucket, and credentials' });
}
break;
}
}
@@ -92,21 +95,19 @@ router.put('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req,
res.json({ success: true, message: 'Backup configuration updated' });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to update backup configuration:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update backup configuration' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update backup configuration');
}
});
// Get backup status and history
router.get('/status', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit) || 10;
const { limit } = getPagination(req, { limit: 10 });
const status = await getBackupStatus(limit);
res.json(status);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get backup status:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get backup status' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get backup status');
}
});
@@ -126,8 +127,103 @@ router.post('/run', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, r
res.json({ success: true, message: 'Backup started' });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to trigger manual backup:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to trigger backup' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to trigger backup');
}
});
// Generate + download a portable ".picpeak" export — an engine-neutral logical
// snapshot (DB rows as NDJSON + PDFs/business-docs) that can be re-uploaded to
// another instance via the web UI. `?includePhotos=true` also bundles original
// gallery photos (larger); otherwise the admin re-uploads them per gallery.
//
// SECURITY: the file contains plaintext secrets (SMTP password, admin password
// hashes, API keys). The download UI must warn before offering it. We surface
// the flag as a response header too so the client can double-confirm.
router.get('/picpeak/export', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
const fsSync = require('fs');
try {
const includePhotos = req.query.includePhotos === 'true' || req.query.includePhotos === '1';
const { createPicpeak } = require('../services/picpeakExportService');
const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos });
const filename = path.basename(filePath);
res.setHeader('X-Picpeak-Contains-Secrets', 'true');
res.download(filePath, filename, (err) => {
// Best-effort cleanup of the temp .picpeak (and its temp dir) after send.
fsSync.rm(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, force: true }, () => {});
if (err) logger.error('[picpeak-export] download failed', { error: err.message });
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('[picpeak-export] failed to create export', { error: error.message });
if (!res.headersSent) res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create .picpeak export' });
}
});
// Multipart upload for .picpeak restore — streamed to a temp file. Runs AFTER
// auth so an unauthenticated request can't push a large file to disk.
const os = require('os');
const multer = require('multer');
const picpeakUpload = multer({
storage: multer.diskStorage({
destination: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, os.tmpdir()),
filename: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, `picpeak-upload-${Date.now()}-${crypto.randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}.picpeak`),
}),
limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5 GB — .picpeak with photos can be large
});
// Upload + restore a .picpeak onto THIS instance. DESTRUCTIVE: full override of
// all data except the current logged-in account (the client shows an explicit
// confirmation before calling this). Returns `usesExternalMedia` so the UI can
// prompt the admin to reconfigure the external-media mount afterwards.
router.post('/picpeak/import', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.restore'), picpeakUpload.single('backup'), async (req, res) => {
const fsSync = require('fs');
if (!req.file) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No backup file uploaded' });
const picpeakPath = req.file.path;
try {
const { importFromPicpeak } = require('../services/picpeakImportService');
// adminAuth populates req.admin, not req.user. Passing req.user.id here
// left currentAdminId undefined, so reinjectCurrentAdmin() had no account
// to preserve and the admin_users table was fully replaced by the backup —
// letting a crafted .picpeak take over every admin account (GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f).
const result = await importFromPicpeak({ picpeakPath, currentAdminId: req.admin && req.admin.id });
// The restore rewrote admin_users, so ids may have shifted. The operator's
// current JWT is bound only to the pre-restore admin id (adminAuth trusts
// `decoded.id` — IP is logged, not enforced, and the backup controls
// password_changed_at), which could now resolve to a DIFFERENT restored
// account and silently grant its permissions. Force a fresh login instead
// of trusting the old session: revoke the token and clear the cookie.
// Clearing the cookie is the guarantee — it drops the operator's browser
// session unconditionally. Revocation is the extra layer that also kills a
// Bearer-header copy of the JWT; revokeToken() swallows DB errors and
// returns false, so check the result and log loudly if the denylist write
// didn't land (the operator should still re-login, which the cookie clear
// forces).
let tokenRevoked = false;
try {
if (req.token) {
tokenRevoked = await revokeToken(req.token, 'picpeak-import', { adminId: req.admin && req.admin.id });
}
} catch (revokeErr) {
logger.warn('[picpeak-import] failed to revoke session token after restore', { error: revokeErr.message });
}
if (req.token && !tokenRevoked) {
logger.warn('[picpeak-import] session token was NOT added to the revocation denylist after restore; relying on cookie clear to force re-login');
}
clearAdminAuthCookie(res);
res.json({
success: true,
tables: result.tables,
filesRestored: result.filesRestored,
usesExternalMedia: result.usesExternalMedia,
sessionInvalidated: true,
});
} catch (error) {
const status = error.statusCode || 500;
logger.error('[picpeak-import] restore failed', { error: error.message });
res.status(status).json({ error: error.message || 'Restore failed', validation: error.validation });
} finally {
fsSync.unlink(picpeakPath, () => {});
}
});
@@ -155,8 +251,7 @@ router.get('/runs/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req,
res.json(run);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get backup run details:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get backup run details' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get backup run details');
}
});
@@ -190,8 +285,7 @@ router.get('/files', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, re
}
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get backup file states:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get file states' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get file states');
}
});
@@ -204,8 +298,7 @@ router.delete('/cleanup', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.delete'), async (
res.json({ success: true, message: `Cleaned up backup runs older than ${days} days` });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to cleanup old backup runs:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to cleanup backup runs' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to cleanup backup runs');
}
});
@@ -215,129 +308,128 @@ router.post('/test-connection', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), a
const { destination_type, ...config } = req.body;
switch (destination_type) {
case 'local':
// Test local path access
const fs = require('fs').promises;
try {
await fs.access(config.path, fs.constants.W_OK);
res.json({ success: true, message: 'Local path is writable' });
} catch (error) {
logger.warn('Local backup path not writable', {
path: config.path,
error: error.message
});
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Cannot write to local path. Check server logs for details.' });
}
break;
case 'local':
// Test local path access
const fs = require('fs').promises;
try {
await fs.access(config.path, fs.constants.W_OK);
res.json({ success: true, message: 'Local path is writable' });
} catch (error) {
logger.warn('Local backup path not writable', {
path: config.path,
error: error.message
});
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Cannot write to local path. Check server logs for details.' });
}
break;
case 'rsync':
// Test rsync connection using spawn with argument arrays to prevent command injection
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
case 'rsync':
// Test rsync connection using spawn with argument arrays to prevent command injection
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
// Validate and sanitize inputs to prevent command injection
const sanitizeInput = (input) => {
if (!input || typeof input !== 'string') return null;
// Remove any shell metacharacters and limit length
return input.replace(/[;&|`$(){}[\]<>\\!#*?"'\n\r]/g, '').substring(0, 255);
};
// Validate and sanitize inputs to prevent command injection
const sanitizeInput = (input) => {
if (!input || typeof input !== 'string') return null;
// Remove any shell metacharacters and limit length
return input.replace(/[;&|`$(){}[\]<>\\!#*?"'\n\r]/g, '').substring(0, 255);
};
const host = sanitizeInput(config.host);
const user = sanitizeInput(config.user);
const sshKeyPath = sanitizeInput(config.ssh_key);
const host = sanitizeInput(config.host);
const user = sanitizeInput(config.user);
const sshKeyPath = sanitizeInput(config.ssh_key);
if (!host) {
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid host specified' });
if (!host) {
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid host specified' });
break;
}
// Validate host format (hostname or IP only)
const hostRegex = /^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?(\.[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?)*$/;
const ipRegex = /^(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/;
if (!hostRegex.test(host) && !ipRegex.test(host)) {
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid host format' });
break;
}
// SSRF protection: block connections to private/internal addresses
const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
if (isPrivateIP(host)) {
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Host cannot be a private or internal network address' });
break;
}
// Validate username format if provided
if (user && !/^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_-]*$/.test(user)) {
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid username format' });
break;
}
// Build SSH arguments as array (safe from injection)
const sshArgs = [];
if (sshKeyPath) {
// Validate SSH key path exists and is a file
const fsSync = require('fs');
if (!fsSync.existsSync(sshKeyPath) || !fsSync.statSync(sshKeyPath).isFile()) {
res.json({ success: false, message: 'SSH key file not found' });
break;
}
sshArgs.push('-i', sshKeyPath);
}
sshArgs.push('-o', 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no');
sshArgs.push('-o', 'ConnectTimeout=10');
sshArgs.push('-o', 'BatchMode=yes');
// Validate host format (hostname or IP only)
const hostRegex = /^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?(\.[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?)*$/;
const ipRegex = /^(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/;
if (!hostRegex.test(host) && !ipRegex.test(host)) {
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid host format' });
break;
}
// Add target (user@host or just host)
const target = user ? `${user}@${host}` : host;
sshArgs.push(target);
sshArgs.push('echo', 'Connection successful');
// SSRF protection: block connections to private/internal addresses
const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
if (isPrivateIP(host)) {
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Host cannot be a private or internal network address' });
break;
}
// Validate username format if provided
if (user && !/^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_-]*$/.test(user)) {
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Invalid username format' });
break;
}
// Build SSH arguments as array (safe from injection)
const sshArgs = [];
if (sshKeyPath) {
// Validate SSH key path exists and is a file
const fsSync = require('fs');
if (!fsSync.existsSync(sshKeyPath) || !fsSync.statSync(sshKeyPath).isFile()) {
res.json({ success: false, message: 'SSH key file not found' });
break;
}
sshArgs.push('-i', sshKeyPath);
}
sshArgs.push('-o', 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no');
sshArgs.push('-o', 'ConnectTimeout=10');
sshArgs.push('-o', 'BatchMode=yes');
// Add target (user@host or just host)
const target = user ? `${user}@${host}` : host;
sshArgs.push(target);
sshArgs.push('echo', 'Connection successful');
try {
const result = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const sshProcess = spawn('ssh', sshArgs, {
timeout: 15000,
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe']
});
let stdout = '';
let stderr = '';
sshProcess.stdout.on('data', (data) => { stdout += data; });
sshProcess.stderr.on('data', (data) => { stderr += data; });
sshProcess.on('close', (code) => {
if (code === 0) {
resolve({ success: true, stdout });
} else {
reject(new Error(stderr || `SSH exited with code ${code}`));
}
});
sshProcess.on('error', (err) => {
reject(err);
});
try {
const result = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const sshProcess = spawn('ssh', sshArgs, {
timeout: 15000,
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe']
});
res.json({ success: true, message: 'Rsync connection successful' });
} catch (error) {
logger.warn('Rsync connection test failed', {
destination: host,
error: error.message
let stdout = '';
let stderr = '';
sshProcess.stdout.on('data', (data) => { stdout += data; });
sshProcess.stderr.on('data', (data) => { stderr += data; });
sshProcess.on('close', (code) => {
if (code === 0) {
resolve({ success: true, stdout });
} else {
reject(new Error(stderr || `SSH exited with code ${code}`));
}
});
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Rsync connection failed. Check server logs for details.' });
}
break;
sshProcess.on('error', (err) => {
reject(err);
});
});
res.json({ success: true, message: 'Rsync connection successful' });
} catch (error) {
logger.warn('Rsync connection test failed', {
destination: host,
error: error.message
});
res.json({ success: false, message: 'Rsync connection failed. Check server logs for details.' });
}
break;
case 's3':
// Test S3 connection (would need AWS SDK)
res.json({ success: false, message: 'S3 testing not implemented yet' });
break;
case 's3':
// Test S3 connection (would need AWS SDK)
res.json({ success: false, message: 'S3 testing not implemented yet' });
break;
default:
res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid destination type' });
default:
res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid destination type' });
}
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to test backup connection:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to test connection' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to test connection');
}
});
@@ -380,8 +472,7 @@ router.post('/manifest/validate', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), a
manifestPath
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to validate manifest:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to validate manifest' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to validate manifest');
}
});
@@ -493,8 +584,7 @@ router.post('/manifests/validate', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'),
manifestPath
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to validate manifest:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to validate manifest' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to validate manifest');
}
});
@@ -525,8 +615,7 @@ router.get('/s3/buckets', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (re
owner: result.Owner || null
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to list S3 buckets:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to list S3 buckets' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to list S3 buckets');
}
});
@@ -562,8 +651,7 @@ router.get('/s3/files', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req,
prefix: prefix
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to list S3 files:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to list S3 files' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to list S3 files');
}
});
@@ -624,8 +712,7 @@ router.delete('/s3/cleanup', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.delete'), asyn
message: `Cleaned up ${deletedCount} S3 backup files older than ${retentionDays} days`
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to cleanup S3 backups:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to cleanup S3 backups' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to cleanup S3 backups');
}
});
@@ -676,8 +763,7 @@ router.post('/s3/test-upload', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), as
message: 'S3 upload test completed successfully'
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('S3 upload test failed:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'S3 upload test failed' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'S3 upload test failed');
}
});
@@ -703,69 +789,68 @@ router.get('/download/:backupId', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), a
// Handle different backup types
switch (config.backup_destination_type) {
case 'local':
// Stream local backup as zip
const backupPath = path.join(config.backup_destination_path, `backup-${backupRun.id}`);
const archive = archiver('zip', { zlib: { level: 9 } });
case 'local':
// Stream local backup as zip
const backupPath = path.join(config.backup_destination_path, `backup-${backupRun.id}`);
const archive = archiver('zip', { zlib: { level: 9 } });
res.attachment(`picpeak-backup-${backupRun.id}.zip`);
archive.pipe(res);
res.attachment(`picpeak-backup-${backupRun.id}.zip`);
archive.pipe(res);
// Add backup directory contents
archive.directory(backupPath, false);
// Add backup directory contents
archive.directory(backupPath, false);
// Add manifest if exists
if (backupRun.manifest_path && await fs.access(backupRun.manifest_path).then(() => true).catch(() => false)) {
archive.file(backupRun.manifest_path, { name: 'manifest.json' });
}
// Add manifest if exists
if (backupRun.manifest_path && await fs.access(backupRun.manifest_path).then(() => true).catch(() => false)) {
archive.file(backupRun.manifest_path, { name: 'manifest.json' });
}
await archive.finalize();
break;
await archive.finalize();
break;
case 's3':
// For S3, provide pre-signed URLs or stream files
const s3Adapter = new S3StorageAdapter({
endpoint: config.backup_s3_endpoint,
bucket: config.backup_s3_bucket,
accessKeyId: config.backup_s3_access_key,
secretAccessKey: config.backup_s3_secret_key,
region: config.backup_s3_region || 'us-east-1',
forcePathStyle: config.backup_s3_force_path_style || false
case 's3':
// For S3, provide pre-signed URLs or stream files
const s3Adapter = new S3StorageAdapter({
endpoint: config.backup_s3_endpoint,
bucket: config.backup_s3_bucket,
accessKeyId: config.backup_s3_access_key,
secretAccessKey: config.backup_s3_secret_key,
region: config.backup_s3_region || 'us-east-1',
forcePathStyle: config.backup_s3_force_path_style || false
});
// List all files for this backup
const prefix = `backups/${backupRun.id}/`;
const files = await s3Adapter.list(prefix, { maxKeys: 1000 });
// Generate pre-signed URLs
const urls = [];
for (const file of files.objects || []) {
const url = await s3Adapter.getSignedUrl('getObject', file.key, { expiresIn: 3600 }); // 1 hour
urls.push({
key: file.key,
size: file.size,
url: url
});
}
// List all files for this backup
const prefix = `backups/${backupRun.id}/`;
const files = await s3Adapter.list(prefix, { maxKeys: 1000 });
res.json({
backupId: backupRun.id,
type: 's3',
files: urls,
expiresIn: 3600,
message: 'Use the provided URLs to download individual files'
});
break;
// Generate pre-signed URLs
const urls = [];
for (const file of files.objects || []) {
const url = await s3Adapter.getSignedUrl('getObject', file.key, { expiresIn: 3600 }); // 1 hour
urls.push({
key: file.key,
size: file.size,
url: url
});
}
case 'rsync':
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Direct download not available for rsync backups' });
res.json({
backupId: backupRun.id,
type: 's3',
files: urls,
expiresIn: 3600,
message: 'Use the provided URLs to download individual files'
});
break;
case 'rsync':
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Direct download not available for rsync backups' });
default:
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Unknown backup type' });
default:
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Unknown backup type' });
}
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to download backup:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to download backup' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to download backup');
}
});
@@ -837,8 +922,7 @@ router.get('/checksums', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req
path: targetPath || '/'
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get file checksums:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get file checksums' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get file checksums');
}
});
@@ -940,21 +1024,11 @@ router.post('/estimate', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req
warnings: totalSize > 10 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 ? ['Backup size exceeds 10GB, may take significant time'] : []
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to estimate backup size:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to estimate backup size' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to estimate backup size');
}
});
// Helper function to format bytes
function formatBytes(bytes, decimals = 2) {
if (bytes === 0) return '0 Bytes';
const k = 1024;
const dm = decimals < 0 ? 0 : decimals;
const sizes = ['Bytes', 'KB', 'MB', 'GB', 'TB'];
const i = Math.floor(Math.log(bytes) / Math.log(k));
return parseFloat((bytes / Math.pow(k, i)).toFixed(dm)) + ' ' + sizes[i];
}
// Helper function to get backup configuration
async function getBackupConfig() {
try {
+6 -5
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { validateFileType } = require('../utils/fileSecurityUtils');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const router = express.Router();
const getStoragePath = () => process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../storage');
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ router.get('/pages', adminAuth, requirePermission('cms.view'), async (req, res)
const pages = await db('cms_pages').select('*').orderBy('slug', 'asc');
res.json(pages);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error fetching CMS pages:', error);
logger.error('Error fetching CMS pages:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch pages' });
}
});
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ router.get('/pages/:slug', adminAuth, requirePermission('cms.view'), async (req,
res.json(page);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error fetching CMS page:', error);
logger.error('Error fetching CMS page:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch page' });
}
});
@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@ router.put('/pages/:slug', adminAuth, requirePermission('cms.edit'), [
res.json(updated);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error updating CMS page:', error);
logger.error('Error updating CMS page:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update page' });
}
});
@@ -184,7 +185,7 @@ router.post(
res.json({ logo_url: logoUrl });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error uploading CMS page logo:', error);
logger.error('Error uploading CMS page logo:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to upload logo' });
}
}
@@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ router.delete(
res.json({ logo_url: null });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error clearing CMS page logo:', error);
logger.error('Error clearing CMS page logo:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to clear logo' });
}
}
+7 -6
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const router = express.Router();
// Get all global categories
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@ router.get('/global', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
res.json(categories);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error fetching categories:', error);
logger.error('Error fetching categories:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch categories' });
}
});
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ router.get('/event/:eventId', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), asy
res.json(categories);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error fetching event categories:', error);
logger.error('Error fetching event categories:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch categories' });
}
});
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ router.post('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
res.json(category);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error creating category:', error);
logger.error('Error creating category:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create category' });
}
});
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ router.put('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
res.json(updated);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error updating category:', error);
logger.error('Error updating category:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update category' });
}
});
@@ -214,7 +215,7 @@ router.put('/:id/hero', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
res.json(updated);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error updating category hero:', error);
logger.error('Error updating category hero:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update category hero' });
}
});
@@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ router.delete('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (req,
res.json({ message: 'Category deleted successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error deleting category:', error);
logger.error('Error deleting category:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to delete category' });
}
});
+6 -5
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { sanitizeCSS, validateCSS, MAX_CSS_SIZE } = require('../utils/cssSanitizer');
const { DEFAULT_CSS_TEMPLATE } = require('../../migrations/core/052_add_css_templates');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
/**
* GET /admin/css-templates
@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.view'), async (req, res)
);
res.json({ success: true, templates });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Get CSS templates error:', error);
logger.error('Get CSS templates error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch templates' });
}
});
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ router.get('/enabled', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.view'), async (req
);
res.json({ success: true, templates });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Get enabled templates error:', error);
logger.error('Get enabled templates error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch templates' });
}
});
@@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ router.get('/:slotNumber', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.view'), [
res.json({ success: true, template });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Get template error:', error);
logger.error('Get template error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch template' });
}
});
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ router.put('/:slotNumber', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.edit'), [
sanitization_warnings: warnings
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Update template error:', error);
logger.error('Update template error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update template' });
}
});
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ router.post('/:slotNumber/reset', adminAuth, requirePermission('branding.edit'),
res.json({ success: true, template });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Reset template error:', error);
logger.error('Reset template error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to reset template' });
}
});
+9 -12
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ const { sanitizeDays, addDateRangeCondition } = require('../utils/sqlSecurity');
const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
const { resolveAdapter } = require('../services/trackers');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { errorResponse, getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const router = express.Router();
/**
@@ -126,16 +127,15 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
totalEvents: totalEvents.count || 0
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Dashboard stats error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch dashboard statistics' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch dashboard statistics');
}
});
// Get recent activity
router.get('/activity', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit) || 10;
const { limit } = getPagination(req, { limit: 10 });
const activities = await db('activity_logs')
.select('activity_logs.*', 'events.event_name')
.leftJoin('events', 'activity_logs.event_id', 'events.id')
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ router.get('/activity', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (r
if (typeof activity.metadata === 'object') return activity.metadata;
return JSON.parse(activity.metadata);
} catch (e) {
console.warn('Failed to parse metadata for activity:', activity.id, e.message);
logger.warn('Failed to parse metadata for activity:', activity.id, e.message);
return {};
}
})(),
@@ -164,8 +164,7 @@ router.get('/activity', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (r
res.json(formattedActivities);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Activity log error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch activity log' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch activity log');
}
});
@@ -233,7 +232,7 @@ router.get('/health', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
}
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Health check error:', error);
logger.error('Health check error:', error);
res.status(500).json({
overall: 'error',
error: 'Failed to check system health'
@@ -400,8 +399,7 @@ router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (
}
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Analytics error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch analytics data' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch analytics data');
}
});
@@ -586,8 +584,7 @@ router.get('/crm-stats', adminAuth, async (req, res) => {
generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
});
} catch (error) {
require('../utils/logger').error('CRM stats error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load CRM stats' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load CRM stats');
}
});
+3 -4
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { databaseBackupService } = require('../services/databaseBackup');
const { db } = require('../database/db');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
// All routes require admin authentication
router.use(adminAuth);
@@ -154,10 +155,8 @@ router.get('/progress', requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
*/
router.get('/history', requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const page = parseInt(req.query.page) || 1;
const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit) || 20;
const offset = (page - 1) * limit;
const { page, limit, offset } = getPagination(req);
const [backups, totalCount] = await Promise.all([
db('database_backup_runs')
.orderBy('started_at', 'desc')
+325 -33
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,13 @@ const { body, query, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
// Gate the NEW Messages routes on the `messaging` flag (per-route, NOT the whole
// /email mount — the pre-existing config/queue/received endpoints stay ungated).
const { requireFeatureFlag } = require('../middleware/requireFeatureFlag');
const messagingGate = requireFeatureFlag('messaging');
const { wrapEmailHtml, processEmailQueue } = require('../services/emailProcessor');
const { errorResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const router = express.Router();
// Get email configuration
@@ -31,8 +37,7 @@ router.get('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, re
smtp_pass: config.smtp_pass ? '********' : ''
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Email config fetch error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch email configuration' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch email configuration');
}
});
@@ -113,8 +118,7 @@ router.post('/config', [
res.json({ message: 'Email configuration updated successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Email config update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update email configuration' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update email configuration');
}
});
@@ -131,8 +135,7 @@ router.get('/incoming-config', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), async
imap_folder: c?.imap_folder || 'INBOX',
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Incoming mail config fetch error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch incoming mail configuration' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch incoming mail configuration');
}
});
@@ -168,8 +171,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config', [
await logActivity('incoming_mail_config_updated', { imap_host }, null, { type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username });
res.json({ message: 'Incoming mail configuration updated successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Incoming mail config update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update incoming mail configuration' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update incoming mail configuration');
}
});
@@ -192,7 +194,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/folders', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view
);
res.json({ folders });
} catch (error) {
console.error('IMAP folder detection error:', error);
logger.error('IMAP folder detection error:', error);
res.status(422).json({ error: `Could not connect to the mailbox (${error.message}). Check host, port (IMAP is usually 993) and credentials.` });
}
});
@@ -217,7 +219,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/test', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'),
}
res.json(result);
} catch (error) {
console.error('IMAP connection test error:', error);
logger.error('IMAP connection test error:', error);
res.status(422).json({ error: `Could not connect to the mailbox (${error.message}). Check host, port (IMAP is usually 993), credentials and folder.` });
}
});
@@ -239,7 +241,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/roundtrip', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.se
return res.status(result.reason === 'not_received' ? 504 : 400)
.json({ error: map[result.reason] || 'Round-trip test failed.', sent: !!result.sent, recipient: result.recipient });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Round-trip test error:', error);
logger.error('Round-trip test error:', error);
res.status(422).json({ error: `Round-trip test failed (${error.message}) — check both SMTP and IMAP settings.` });
}
});
@@ -253,7 +255,7 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/poll', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'),
const result = await emailIntakeService.pollOnce();
res.json(result); // { processed } or { skipped: 'disabled'|'unconfigured'|'busy' }
} catch (error) {
console.error('Manual poll error:', error);
logger.error('Manual poll error:', error);
res.status(422).json({ error: `Mailbox poll failed (${error.message}).` });
}
});
@@ -262,14 +264,193 @@ router.get('/received', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req,
try {
const page = Math.max(1, parseInt(req.query.page, 10) || 1);
const pageSize = Math.min(100, Math.max(1, parseInt(req.query.pageSize, 10) || 25));
const base = db('received_emails');
const countRow = await base.clone().count({ c: '*' }).first();
const account = req.query.account ? String(req.query.account) : null;
// mailbox_state filter: no param → active (+ legacy NULL); else exact.
const state = ['archived', 'deleted'].includes(String(req.query.state)) ? String(req.query.state) : 'active';
// Optional full-table search (sender / subject) so results aren't truncated
// to the first page before matching.
const q = req.query.q ? String(req.query.q).trim().slice(0, 255) : '';
// 'accounting' matches legacy rows too (account_key was NULL before mig 154).
const applyAccount = (qb) => {
if (account === 'accounting') qb.where((b) => b.where('account_key', 'accounting').orWhereNull('account_key'));
else if (account) qb.where('account_key', account);
if (state === 'active') qb.where((b) => b.where('mailbox_state', 'active').orWhereNull('mailbox_state'));
else qb.where('mailbox_state', state);
if (q) qb.where((b) => b.where('from_address', 'like', `%${q}%`).orWhere('subject', 'like', `%${q}%`));
return qb;
};
const countRow = await applyAccount(db('received_emails')).count({ c: '*' }).first();
const total = parseInt(countRow?.c || 0, 10);
const items = await base.clone().orderBy('received_at', 'desc').limit(pageSize).offset((page - 1) * pageSize);
// Bodies are excluded from the list (can be large); fetched per-message.
const items = await applyAccount(db('received_emails'))
.select('id', 'message_id', 'account_key', 'from_address', 'to_address', 'subject',
'received_at', 'attachment_count', 'status', 'inbound_document_id', 'error')
.orderBy('received_at', 'desc').limit(pageSize).offset((page - 1) * pageSize);
res.json({ items, pagination: { page, pageSize, total, totalPages: Math.ceil(total / pageSize) } });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Received emails fetch error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch received emails' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch received emails');
}
});
// Single received email WITH its captured (server-sanitized) body — Messages
// reading pane. body_html was already sanitized on ingest; the viewer renders
// it in a script-less sandboxed iframe as well.
router.get('/received/:id', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
if (!Number.isInteger(id)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid id' });
const row = await db('received_emails').where({ id }).first();
if (!row) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Email not found' });
res.json(row);
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch email');
}
});
// Move an email between mailbox states: Archive / Delete (soft) or Restore
// (back to active). kind = 'queue' | 'received'. Delete is a soft move to the
// trash; the row is only removed for good by the DELETE handler below.
router.post('/item/:kind/:id/state', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const table = req.params.kind === 'received' ? 'received_emails' : req.params.kind === 'queue' ? 'email_queue' : null;
if (!table) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid kind' });
const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
if (!Number.isInteger(id)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid id' });
const state = String(req.body?.state || '');
if (!['active', 'archived', 'deleted'].includes(state)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid state' });
const n = await db(table).where({ id }).update({ mailbox_state: state });
if (!n) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
res.json({ ok: true });
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update email');
}
});
// Permanently delete an email row — only offered from the Deleted folder.
router.delete('/item/:kind/:id', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.edit'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const table = req.params.kind === 'received' ? 'received_emails' : req.params.kind === 'queue' ? 'email_queue' : null;
if (!table) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid kind' });
const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
if (!Number.isInteger(id)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid id' });
await db(table).where({ id }).del();
res.json({ ok: true });
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to delete email');
}
});
// Additional inbound mailboxes (beyond the primary accounting IMAP in
// email_configs) — e.g. the customer hello@ box. Passwords are masked out.
router.get('/accounts', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const rows = await db('mail_accounts').orderBy('id');
res.json({ items: rows.map((a) => ({
...a,
imap_pass: a.imap_pass ? '********' : '',
smtp_pass: a.smtp_pass ? '********' : '',
})) });
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load mail accounts');
}
});
// Resolved sender/mailbox addresses for the Messages UI — so the sidebar shows
// the REAL configured addresses instead of hardcoded placeholders. Accounting =
// the primary IMAP login (rechnungen@); customers = the hello@ mailbox; the
// automated stream sends from the global SMTP from-address.
router.get('/identities', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const cfg = await db('email_configs').first();
let customers = null;
try {
const cust = await db('mail_accounts').where({ account_key: 'customers' }).first();
customers = cust?.imap_user || cust?.from_email || null;
} catch (_) { customers = null; }
res.json({
automated: cfg?.from_email || null,
accounting: cfg?.imap_user || null,
customers,
});
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load mail identities');
}
});
// Upsert a mailbox by account_key. A masked password ('********') keeps the
// stored value so the admin never has to re-type it.
router.post('/accounts', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.edit'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const b = req.body || {};
if (!b.account_key) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'account_key is required' });
// SSRF guard — mirror /config + /incoming-config: neither the IMAP nor the
// SMTP host may point at a private/internal address.
const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
if (b.imap_host && isPrivateIP(b.imap_host)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
}
if (b.smtp_host && isPrivateIP(b.smtp_host)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'SMTP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
}
const patch = {
label: b.label || null,
imap_host: b.imap_host || null,
imap_port: b.imap_port ? parseInt(b.imap_port, 10) : 993,
imap_secure: b.imap_secure !== false,
imap_user: b.imap_user || null,
imap_folder: b.imap_folder || 'INBOX',
// Outgoing (SMTP) identity — replies from this mailbox send from here.
smtp_host: b.smtp_host || null,
smtp_port: b.smtp_port ? parseInt(b.smtp_port, 10) : 587,
smtp_secure: b.smtp_secure === true,
smtp_user: b.smtp_user || null,
from_email: b.from_email || null,
from_name: b.from_name || null,
enabled: !!b.enabled,
updated_at: new Date(),
};
if (b.imap_pass && b.imap_pass !== '********') patch.imap_pass = b.imap_pass;
if (b.smtp_pass && b.smtp_pass !== '********') patch.smtp_pass = b.smtp_pass;
const existing = await db('mail_accounts').where({ account_key: b.account_key }).first();
if (existing) {
await db('mail_accounts').where({ account_key: b.account_key }).update(patch);
} else {
await db('mail_accounts').insert({
account_key: b.account_key,
imap_pass: (b.imap_pass && b.imap_pass !== '********') ? b.imap_pass : '',
smtp_pass: (b.smtp_pass && b.smtp_pass !== '********') ? b.smtp_pass : '',
created_at: new Date(),
...patch,
});
}
res.json({ ok: true });
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to save mail account');
}
});
// Test an inbound mailbox's IMAP connection (before or after saving). Resolves
// a masked/blank password from the stored row for the given account_key.
router.post('/accounts/test', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const b = req.body || {};
const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
if (b.imap_host && isPrivateIP(b.imap_host)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
}
let pass = b.imap_pass;
if ((!pass || pass === '********') && b.account_key) {
const stored = await db('mail_accounts').where({ account_key: b.account_key }).first();
pass = stored?.imap_pass || '';
}
const emailIntakeService = require('../services/emailIntakeService');
const result = await emailIntakeService.testConnection({
host: b.imap_host, port: b.imap_port, secure: b.imap_secure,
user: b.imap_user, pass, folder: b.imap_folder || 'INBOX',
});
res.json(result);
} catch (error) {
res.status(422).json({ ok: false, error: `Mailbox test failed (${error.message}).` });
}
});
@@ -322,7 +503,7 @@ router.post('/test', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.send'), async (req, res
debug: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development'
};
console.log('Creating email transporter with config:', {
logger.info('Creating email transporter with config:', {
host: transportConfig.host,
port: transportConfig.port,
secure: transportConfig.secure,
@@ -356,8 +537,8 @@ router.post('/test', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.send'), async (req, res
res.json({ message: 'Test email sent successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Test email error:', error);
console.error('Error stack:', error.stack);
logger.error('Test email error:', error);
logger.error('Error stack:', error.stack);
// Provide more specific error messages with translation keys
let errorMessage = 'Error sending email';
@@ -428,7 +609,7 @@ router.post('/flush-queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.send'), async (r
} catch (_) { /* activity logging is best-effort */ }
res.json({ message: 'Email queue flushed', ...summary });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Flush email queue error:', error);
logger.error('Flush email queue error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to flush email queue', details: error.message });
}
});
@@ -441,6 +622,8 @@ router.post('/flush-queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.send'), async (r
router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
query('status').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isIn(['pending', 'sent', 'failed']),
query('emailType').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 64 }),
query('origin').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isIn(['system', 'manual']),
query('state').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isIn(['active', 'archived', 'deleted']),
query('q').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 255 }),
query('from').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isISO8601(),
query('to').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isISO8601(),
@@ -459,6 +642,13 @@ router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
const applyFilters = (qb) => {
if (req.query.status) qb.where('email_queue.status', req.query.status);
if (req.query.emailType) qb.where('email_queue.email_type', req.query.emailType);
// 'system' includes legacy rows (origin was NULL before migration 155).
if (req.query.origin === 'manual') qb.where('email_queue.origin', 'manual');
else if (req.query.origin === 'system') qb.where((b) => b.where('email_queue.origin', 'system').orWhereNull('email_queue.origin'));
// mailbox_state: default active (+ legacy NULL); Archived/Deleted folders pass it explicitly.
const st = ['archived', 'deleted'].includes(String(req.query.state)) ? String(req.query.state) : 'active';
if (st === 'active') qb.where((b) => b.where('email_queue.mailbox_state', 'active').orWhereNull('email_queue.mailbox_state'));
else qb.where('email_queue.mailbox_state', st);
if (req.query.from) qb.where('email_queue.created_at', '>=', new Date(req.query.from));
if (req.query.to) qb.where('email_queue.created_at', '<=', new Date(req.query.to));
if (req.query.q) {
@@ -487,6 +677,7 @@ router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
'email_queue.sent_at',
'email_queue.error_message',
'email_queue.retry_count',
'email_queue.origin',
'email_queue.event_id',
'events.event_name as event_name',
'events.slug as event_slug'
@@ -506,6 +697,7 @@ router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
sentAt: r.sent_at,
errorMessage: r.error_message,
retryCount: r.retry_count,
origin: r.origin || 'system',
eventId: r.event_id,
eventName: r.event_name || null,
eventSlug: r.event_slug || null,
@@ -516,11 +708,116 @@ router.get('/queue', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), [
pagination: { total, page, pageSize, totalPages: Math.ceil(total / pageSize) || 1 },
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('List email queue error:', error);
logger.error('List email queue error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load email queue', details: error.message });
}
});
// Single queued/sent email WITH its rendered body — powers the Messages
// reading pane. `rendered_html` is the exact HTML that was sent (migration
// 119); rows sent before that migration have none. Attachment disk paths in
// `email_data` are never exposed — only the filenames, so the pane can list
// attachments without leaking storage paths (same PII posture as the list).
router.get('/queue/:id', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
if (!Number.isInteger(id)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid id' });
const row = await db('email_queue')
.leftJoin('events', 'events.id', 'email_queue.event_id')
.select('email_queue.*', 'events.event_name as event_name', 'events.slug as event_slug')
.where('email_queue.id', id)
.first();
if (!row) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Email not found' });
let cc = null;
let attachments = [];
try {
const data = row.email_data ? JSON.parse(row.email_data) : {};
if (data.cc) cc = Array.isArray(data.cc) ? data.cc.join(', ') : String(data.cc);
if (Array.isArray(data.attachments)) {
attachments = data.attachments
.filter((a) => a && a.filename)
.map((a) => ({ filename: a.filename, contentType: a.contentType || null }));
}
} catch (_) { /* malformed email_data → no cc/attachments, still return the body */ }
res.json({
id: row.id,
recipientEmail: row.recipient_email,
emailType: row.email_type,
status: row.status,
createdAt: row.created_at,
scheduledAt: row.scheduled_at,
sentAt: row.sent_at,
errorMessage: row.error_message,
retryCount: row.retry_count,
eventId: row.event_id,
eventName: row.event_name || null,
eventSlug: row.event_slug || null,
renderedHtml: row.rendered_html || null,
cc,
attachments,
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Get email queue item error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load email', details: error.message });
}
});
// Send a human-composed email from the Messages composer. The admin already
// edited the body (reply or document message), so it is sent as-is — no
// template render — after a sanitize pass. Recorded in email_queue as a
// 'manual' send so it surfaces under Customers > Sent.
router.post('/send', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.send'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const b = req.body || {};
const to = String(b.to || '').trim();
const subject = String(b.subject || '').trim();
if (!to || !/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(to)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'A valid recipient email is required.' });
}
if (!subject) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'A subject is required.' });
const sanitizeHtml = require('sanitize-html');
// Match the stricter inbound sanitizeBody allowlist: no <style> tag, no
// data: scheme — inline style/class attributes are enough for composed mail.
const html = sanitizeHtml(String(b.html || ''), {
allowedTags: sanitizeHtml.defaults.allowedTags.concat(['img']),
allowedAttributes: {
...sanitizeHtml.defaults.allowedAttributes,
img: ['src', 'alt', 'width', 'height'],
'*': ['style', 'class'],
},
allowedSchemes: ['http', 'https', 'mailto', 'cid'],
});
const cc = b.cc ? String(b.cc).trim() : null;
const accountKey = b.accountKey ? String(b.accountKey) : undefined;
const emailProcessor = require('../services/emailProcessor');
const result = await emailProcessor.sendRawEmail({ to, cc, subject, html, accountKey });
await db('email_queue').insert({
recipient_email: to,
email_type: 'manual_message',
email_data: JSON.stringify({
subject,
cc: cc || undefined,
replyToReceivedId: b.replyToReceivedId || undefined,
messageId: result.messageId,
}),
status: 'sent',
origin: 'manual',
rendered_html: html,
created_at: new Date(),
sent_at: new Date(),
});
res.json({ ok: true });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Manual send error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to send message', details: error.message });
}
});
// Helper: parse variables JSON safely
function parseVariables(template) {
try {
@@ -528,7 +825,7 @@ function parseVariables(template) {
if (typeof template.variables === 'object') return template.variables;
return JSON.parse(template.variables);
} catch (e) {
console.warn('Failed to parse variables for template:', template.template_key, e.message);
logger.warn('Failed to parse variables for template:', template.template_key, e.message);
return [];
}
}
@@ -611,8 +908,7 @@ router.get('/templates', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req,
res.json(formattedTemplates);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Email templates fetch error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch email templates' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch email templates');
}
});
@@ -641,8 +937,7 @@ router.get('/templates/:key', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'), async
updated_at: template.updated_at,
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Email template fetch error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch email template' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch email template');
}
});
@@ -730,8 +1025,7 @@ router.put('/templates/:key', [
res.json({ message: 'Email template updated successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Email template update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update email template' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update email template');
}
});
@@ -818,8 +1112,7 @@ router.post('/templates', [
return res.status(201).json({ template_key: templateKey, id: templateId });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Email template create error:', error);
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create email template' });
return errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to create email template');
}
});
@@ -897,8 +1190,7 @@ router.post('/templates/:key/preview', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'
language
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Email template preview error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to preview email template' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to preview email template');
}
});
+6 -4
View File
@@ -7,14 +7,16 @@ const express = require('express');
const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
const eventRenameService = require('../services/eventRenameService');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const router = express.Router();
/**
* POST /api/admin/events/:eventId/rename
* Rename an event
*/
router.post('/:eventId/rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), [
router.post('/:eventId/rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireEventOwnership, [
body('newEventName')
.trim()
.isLength({ min: 3, max: 100 })
@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), [
data: result.data
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error renaming event:', error);
logger.error('Error renaming event:', error);
res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Failed to rename event' });
}
});
@@ -59,7 +61,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), [
* POST /api/admin/events/:eventId/validate-rename
* Validate a potential rename without executing it
*/
router.post('/:eventId/validate-rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), [
router.post('/:eventId/validate-rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireEventOwnership, [
body('newEventName')
.trim()
.isLength({ min: 3, max: 100 })
@@ -81,7 +83,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/validate-rename', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.ed
res.json(validation);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error validating rename:', error);
logger.error('Error validating rename:', error);
res.status(500).json({ valid: false, error: 'Validation failed' });
}
});
-134
View File
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
// This is a partial file showing the enhanced event creation with password validation
// Only the relevant parts are shown - merge with existing adminEvents.js
const { validatePasswordInContext, getBcryptRounds } = require('../utils/passwordValidation');
const { buildShareLinkVariants } = require('../services/shareLinkService');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL } = require('../utils/emailNormalization');
// Enhanced event creation with password validation
// Note: This is a partial/reference file - dynamic event type validation should be implemented
// similar to adminEvents.js using eventTypeService.isValidEventType()
router.post('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.create'), [
body('event_type').notEmpty().trim(), // Dynamic validation via eventTypeService
body('event_name').notEmpty().trim(),
body('event_date').isDate(),
body('customer_email').isEmail().normalizeEmail(IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL),
body('admin_email').isEmail().normalizeEmail(IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL),
body('password').notEmpty(), // Remove the weak isLength validation
body('expiration_days').isInt({ min: 1, max: 365 }).optional(),
body('welcome_message').optional().trim(),
body('color_theme').optional().trim(),
body('allow_user_uploads').optional().isBoolean().toBoolean(),
body('upload_category_id').optional({ nullable: true, checkFalsy: true }).isInt(),
body('customer_name').notEmpty().trim()
], async (req, res) => {
try {
console.log('Create event request body:', req.body);
const errors = validationResult(req);
if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
console.error('Validation errors:', errors.array());
return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
}
const {
event_type,
event_name,
event_date,
customer_name,
customer_email,
admin_email,
password,
welcome_message = '',
color_theme = null,
expiration_days = 30,
allow_user_uploads = false,
upload_category_id = null,
photo_cap = null
} = req.body;
// Validate password strength for gallery
const passwordValidation = await validatePasswordInContext(password, 'gallery', {
eventName: event_name
});
if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
return res.status(400).json({
error: 'Password does not meet security requirements',
details: passwordValidation.errors,
score: passwordValidation.score,
feedback: passwordValidation.feedback
});
}
// Generate unique slug
const baseSlug = `${event_type}-${event_name.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, '-')}-${event_date}`;
let slug = baseSlug;
let counter = 1;
while (await db('events').where({ slug }).first()) {
slug = `${baseSlug}-${counter}`;
counter++;
}
// Generate share link based on configured style
const shareToken = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
const { shareUrl, shareLinkToStore } = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug, shareToken });
// Hash password with configurable rounds
const password_hash = await bcrypt.hash(password, getBcryptRounds());
// Calculate expiration date (days after event date)
const expires_at = new Date(event_date);
expires_at.setDate(expires_at.getDate() + parseInt(expiration_days, 10));
// Create folder structure
const storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../storage');
const eventPath = path.join(storagePath, 'events/active', slug);
await fs.mkdir(path.join(eventPath, 'collages'), { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(path.join(eventPath, 'individual'), { recursive: true });
// Insert into database
const insertResult = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type,
event_name,
event_date,
customer_name,
customer_email,
host_name: customer_name,
host_email: customer_email,
admin_email,
password_hash,
welcome_message,
color_theme,
share_link: shareLinkToStore,
share_token: shareToken,
expires_at: expires_at.toISOString(),
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
allow_user_uploads,
upload_category_id,
photo_cap: photo_cap || null
}).returning('id');
// Handle both PostgreSQL (returns array of objects) and SQLite (returns array of IDs)
const eventId = insertResult[0]?.id || insertResult[0];
// Log activity
await logActivity('event_created',
{
event_type,
expires_at,
password_strength: passwordValidation.score
},
eventId,
{ type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
);
// Rest of the implementation remains the same...
// Queue creation email, etc.
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error creating event:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create event' });
}
});
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// Extracted verbatim from the original routes/adminEvents.js (see ./index.js).
// Exports a register function; ./index.js calls the sub-routers in the original
// registration order so Express route matching is unchanged.
const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
const { adminAuth } = require('../../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../../middleware/permissions');
const { archiveEvent } = require('../../services/archiveService');
const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
const { requireEventOwnership, filterOwnedEventIds } = require('../../middleware/ownership');
const { deleteEventCascade } = require('./helpers');
// Bulk delete — destructive, irreversible. Caps at 100 events per request
// to keep request time bounded; the per-event cascade touches 5 DB tables
// + 3 filesystem paths so 1000 events would risk timing out the request.
// Loops via deleteEventCascade so the per-event delete behaviour stays in
// lock-step with DELETE /:id.
//
// Confirmation is enforced client-side via the typed-DELETE pattern in
// BulkDeleteModal (#417). The previous server-side bcrypt-password gate
// was dropped because the destructive single-event DELETE /:id has never
// required a password either — events.delete permission + admin session
// is the auth boundary for both. The typed-literal client gate is the
// "accidental click" safeguard, and unlike a password input it isn't
// affected by passkey/Windows Hello autofill that auto-submits the form.
const BULK_DELETE_MAX = 100;
module.exports = (router) => {
// Archive event
router.post('/:id/archive', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.archive'), requireEventOwnership, async (req, res) => {
try {
const { id } = req.params;
const event = await db('events').where('id', id).first();
if (!event) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
}
if (event.is_archived) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Event is already archived' });
}
// Use the archive service to create ZIP archive
await archiveEvent(event);
// Log activity
await logActivity('event_archived',
{ eventName: event.event_name },
id,
{ type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
);
res.json({ message: 'Event archived successfully' });
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to archive event');
}
});
// Bulk archive events
router.post('/bulk-archive', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.archive'), [
body('eventIds').isArray().withMessage('eventIds must be an array'),
body('eventIds.*').isInt().withMessage('Each eventId must be an integer')
], async (req, res) => {
try {
const errors = validationResult(req);
if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
}
const { eventIds } = req.body;
if (eventIds.length === 0) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No events selected for archiving' });
}
// Ownership scope: a non-super_admin may only archive events they own.
// Foreign/non-existent ids are dropped and reported as failures so this
// route can't archive another admin's events (the single-event
// /:id/archive route enforces the same via requireEventOwnership).
const { allowed: allowedIds, denied: deniedIds } = await filterOwnedEventIds(req.admin, eventIds);
const results = {
successful: [],
failed: deniedIds.map((id) => ({ id, name: null, error: 'Access denied or event not found' }))
};
// Get all events to archive
const events = allowedIds.length
? await db('events')
.whereIn('id', allowedIds)
.where('is_archived', formatBoolean(false))
: [];
if (events.length === 0) {
if (results.failed.length > 0) {
return res.json({
message: `Bulk archive completed: 0 succeeded, ${results.failed.length} failed`,
results
});
}
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No valid events found to archive' });
}
// Process each event
for (const event of events) {
try {
// Use the archive service to create ZIP archive
await archiveEvent(event);
// Log activity
await logActivity('event_archived',
{ eventName: event.event_name, bulkOperation: true },
event.id,
{ type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
);
results.successful.push({
id: event.id,
name: event.event_name
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`Failed to archive event ${event.id}:`, error);
results.failed.push({
id: event.id,
name: event.event_name,
error: 'Failed to archive event. Check server logs for details.'
});
}
}
// Log bulk archive activity
await logActivity('bulk_archive_completed',
{
totalEvents: eventIds.length,
successfulCount: results.successful.length,
failedCount: results.failed.length
},
null,
{ type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
);
res.json({
message: `Bulk archive completed: ${results.successful.length} succeeded, ${results.failed.length} failed`,
results
});
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to perform bulk archive');
}
});
router.post('/bulk-delete', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.delete'), [
body('eventIds').isArray({ min: 1, max: BULK_DELETE_MAX }).withMessage(`eventIds must be an array of 1-${BULK_DELETE_MAX} ids`),
body('eventIds.*').isInt().withMessage('Each eventId must be an integer')
], async (req, res) => {
try {
const errors = validationResult(req);
if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
}
const { eventIds } = req.body;
// Ownership scope: a non-super_admin may only delete events they own.
// The single-event DELETE /:id route enforces this via
// requireEventOwnership; this bulk route must match it, otherwise an
// admin/editor scoped to their own events could cascade-delete any
// event by id. Foreign/non-existent ids are dropped and reported as
// failures (indistinguishable, to avoid an existence oracle).
const { allowed: allowedIds, denied: deniedIds } = await filterOwnedEventIds(req.admin, eventIds);
const results = {
successful: [],
failed: deniedIds.map((id) => ({ id, name: null, error: 'Access denied or event not found' }))
};
const adminContext = { id: req.admin.id, username: req.admin.username };
for (const eventId of allowedIds) {
try {
const deleted = await deleteEventCascade(eventId, adminContext);
results.successful.push(deleted);
} catch (err) {
results.failed.push({
id: eventId,
name: null,
error: err.code === 'EVENT_NOT_FOUND' ? 'Event not found' : 'Failed to delete event'
});
logger.warn('Bulk-delete: per-event failure', { eventId, error: err.message });
}
}
await logActivity('bulk_delete_completed',
{
totalEvents: eventIds.length,
successfulCount: results.successful.length,
failedCount: results.failed.length
},
null,
{ type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
);
res.json({
message: `Bulk delete completed: ${results.successful.length} succeeded, ${results.failed.length} failed`,
results
});
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to perform bulk delete');
}
});
};
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// Extracted verbatim from the original routes/adminEvents.js (see ./index.js).
// Shared helpers + module-level caches used across the adminEvents sub-routers.
const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const path = require('path');
const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
const { parseStringInput } = require('../../utils/parsers');
// Shared validator for hero_image_anchor accepts legacy keywords or "X% Y%" focal point
const validateHeroImageAnchor = (value) => {
if (['top', 'center', 'bottom'].includes(value)) return true;
if (typeof value === 'string' && /^\d{1,3}%\s+\d{1,3}%$/.test(value)) {
const [x, y] = value.split(/\s+/).map(v => parseInt(v));
if (x >= 0 && x <= 100 && y >= 0 && y <= 100) return true;
}
throw new Error('Must be top, center, bottom, or "X% Y%" (0-100)');
};
// Get storage path from environment or default
const getStoragePath = () => process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../../storage');
// Helper to get event field requirements from settings
const getEventFieldRequirements = async () => {
try {
const settings = await db('app_settings')
.whereIn('setting_key', [
'event_require_customer_name',
'event_require_customer_email',
'event_require_admin_email',
'event_require_event_date',
'event_require_expiration'
])
.select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
const requirements = {
require_customer_name: true,
require_customer_email: true,
require_admin_email: true,
require_event_date: true,
require_expiration: true
};
settings.forEach(s => {
let value = s.setting_value;
if (typeof value === 'string') {
try {
value = JSON.parse(value);
} catch (e) {
value = value === 'true';
}
}
if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_customer_name') requirements.require_customer_name = value;
if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_customer_email') requirements.require_customer_email = value;
if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_admin_email') requirements.require_admin_email = value;
if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_event_date') requirements.require_event_date = value;
if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_expiration') requirements.require_expiration = value;
});
return requirements;
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get event field requirements', { error: error.message });
return {
require_customer_name: true,
require_customer_email: true,
require_admin_email: true,
require_event_date: true,
require_expiration: true
};
}
};
// Helper to read app_settings booleans by key, used to inherit per-setting
// defaults onto new events. Returns `undefined` for missing/non-boolean rows
// so callers can fall back to a legacy default.
const readBooleanSetting = async (key) => {
try {
const setting = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', key).first();
if (!setting) return undefined;
let value = setting.setting_value;
if (typeof value === 'string') {
try { value = JSON.parse(value); } catch { /* keep raw */ }
}
return typeof value === 'boolean' ? value : undefined;
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to read app setting', { key, error: error.message });
return undefined;
}
};
// Helper to read the global "enable_devtools_protection" admin setting so
// new events inherit it instead of always falling back to the DB column default
// (#317 — admin disabled it globally but new events still got it ON).
const getDownloadProtectionDefaults = async () => {
return { enable_devtools_protection: await readBooleanSetting('enable_devtools_protection') };
};
// Helper to get branding defaults for new events (Feature 7: Branding Inheritance).
//
// Note: `branding_logo_position` (header bar — left/center/right) is a
// different concept from `hero_logo_position` (hero block — top/center/
// bottom) and must NOT be mapped here. A previous version copied the
// branding value over, which wrote 'left'/'right' into per-event
// hero_logo_position columns and broke any subsequent PUT validation
// (#357). Migration 084 heals existing rows.
const getBrandingDefaults = async () => {
try {
const settings = await db('app_settings')
.whereIn('setting_key', [
'branding_logo_display_hero',
'branding_logo_size'
])
.select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
const defaults = {
hero_logo_visible: true,
hero_logo_size: 'medium',
hero_logo_position: 'top'
};
settings.forEach(s => {
let value = s.setting_value;
if (typeof value === 'string') {
try { value = JSON.parse(value); } catch (e) { /* use as-is */ }
}
if (s.setting_key === 'branding_logo_display_hero') {
defaults.hero_logo_visible = value !== false;
}
if (s.setting_key === 'branding_logo_size' && value) {
defaults.hero_logo_size = value;
}
});
return defaults;
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get branding defaults', { error: error.message });
return {
hero_logo_visible: true,
hero_logo_size: 'medium',
hero_logo_position: 'top'
};
}
};
// Use parseStringInput from shared parsers for customer data extraction
const getCustomerNameFromPayload = (payload = {}) => parseStringInput(payload.customer_name);
const getCustomerEmailFromPayload = (payload = {}) => parseStringInput(payload.customer_email);
const getCustomerPhoneFromPayload = (payload = {}) => parseStringInput(payload.customer_phone);
// Whether the global "phone field" toggle (#322) is enabled. Cached for
// the request via a module-level read; drift is acceptable since this
// only governs whether to persist the field, not security boundaries.
const isPhoneFieldEnabled = async () => {
try {
const row = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'event_phone_field_enabled').first();
if (!row) return false;
let value = row.setting_value;
if (typeof value === 'string') {
try { value = JSON.parse(value); } catch { /* keep raw */ }
}
return value === true;
} catch (error) {
logger.debug('Failed to read event_phone_field_enabled', { error: error.message });
return false;
}
};
const mapEventForApi = (event) => {
if (!event || typeof event !== 'object') {
return event;
}
const {
host_name,
host_email,
customer_name,
customer_email,
customer_phone,
password_hash: _ph,
client_password_hash: _cph,
...rest
} = event;
return {
...rest,
customer_name: customer_name ?? host_name ?? null,
customer_email: customer_email ?? host_email ?? null,
customer_phone: customer_phone ?? null
};
};
let customerColumnCache = null;
const hasCustomerContactColumns = async () => {
if (customerColumnCache === true) {
return true;
}
try {
const hasColumn = await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'customer_email');
if (hasColumn) {
customerColumnCache = true;
}
return hasColumn;
} catch (error) {
logger.debug('Failed to detect customer_email column', { error: error.message });
return false;
}
};
// Cascade-delete a single event: photos, audit/access logs, queued emails,
// the event row itself (in one transaction), then the on-disk folder /
// archive zip / hero logo (best-effort — file failures don't unwind the DB
// changes since the source of truth is the database). Used by both the
// per-event DELETE /:id route and the bulk-delete route to avoid drift.
//
// Throws { code: 'EVENT_NOT_FOUND' } if the event id doesn't exist so the
// bulk-delete loop can report it as a per-id failure without aborting the
// whole batch. Any other error propagates and is the caller's problem.
async function deleteEventCascade(eventId, adminContext) {
const event = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
if (!event) {
const err = new Error('Event not found');
err.code = 'EVENT_NOT_FOUND';
throw err;
}
await db.transaction(async (trx) => {
// 1. Delete activity logs (audit trail)
await trx('activity_logs').where('event_id', eventId).del();
// 2. Delete access logs
await trx('access_logs').where('event_id', eventId).del();
// 3. Delete email queue entries
await trx('email_queue').where('event_id', eventId).del();
// 4. Delete photos (also handles hero_photo_id foreign key)
await trx('photos').where('event_id', eventId).del();
// 5. Finally delete the event row
await trx('events').where('id', eventId).del();
// Best-effort filesystem cleanup. Failures are logged but don't unwind
// the transaction — the canonical state lives in the DB; orphan files
// are recoverable noise, a half-deleted DB row is a permanent mess.
//
// #608 — previous code read `event.folder_path`, but that column is
// never written anywhere in the codebase (grep confirms: two reads in
// this function, zero writes). It's always undefined, so the
// `if (event.folder_path)` branch silently no-op'd and every event
// delete since this cascade landed left its photos orphaned on disk.
// jodrmx's Pi report (v3.44.0) was the first surfacing.
//
// Files actually live at:
// {STORAGE_PATH}/events/active/{slug}/... (uploaded photos)
// {STORAGE_PATH}/events/archived/{slug}/... (after the event
// was archived — folder copy survives the archive flow)
//
// `event.slug` is NOT NULL on the events table and is slugify-sanitized
// on every write (lower-case ASCII + dashes only via utils/slug.js),
// so path-traversal isn't a concern.
const storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../../storage');
for (const sub of ['active', 'archived']) {
const eventFolderPath = path.join(storagePath, 'events', sub, event.slug);
try {
await fs.rm(eventFolderPath, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch (fsErr) {
logger.warn('Failed to delete event folder during cascade delete', { eventId, path: eventFolderPath, error: fsErr.message });
}
}
if (event.archive_path) {
const storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../../storage');
const archiveFile = path.join(storagePath, event.archive_path);
try {
await fs.unlink(archiveFile);
} catch (fsErr) {
logger.warn('Failed to delete archive file during cascade delete', { eventId, path: archiveFile, error: fsErr.message });
}
}
if (event.hero_logo_path) {
try {
await fs.unlink(event.hero_logo_path);
} catch (fsErr) {
logger.warn('Failed to delete event logo during cascade delete', { eventId, path: event.hero_logo_path, error: fsErr.message });
}
}
});
// Audit trail (outside the transaction so a logging failure can't undo
// the actual delete).
await logActivity('event_deleted',
{ event_name: event.event_name },
null,
{ type: 'admin', id: adminContext.id, name: adminContext.username }
);
return { id: event.id, name: event.event_name };
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Live Slideshow ("Diashow") — a token-only fullscreen kiosk link for live
// events that auto-picks-up new uploads (migration 138). Mirrors the
// client-access second-token pattern: the link is minted on demand, rotatable
// and disable-able, independent of the gallery password / share link.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Allowed slide transition styles (kept in sync with the SlideshowPage).
// dipwhite/dipblack = fade through highlights / lowlights between images.
const SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS = ['crossfade', 'cut', 'slide', 'kenburns', 'dipwhite', 'dipblack'];
// Allowed per-slide color filters.
const SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS = ['none', 'bw', 'sepia', 'warm', 'cool', 'vignette'];
module.exports = {
validateHeroImageAnchor,
getStoragePath,
getEventFieldRequirements,
readBooleanSetting,
getDownloadProtectionDefaults,
getBrandingDefaults,
getCustomerNameFromPayload,
getCustomerEmailFromPayload,
getCustomerPhoneFromPayload,
isPhoneFieldEnabled,
mapEventForApi,
hasCustomerContactColumns,
deleteEventCascade,
SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS,
SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS,
};
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// adminEvents router — decomposed move-code refactor of the original
// routes/adminEvents.js god file. Each sub-module attaches its routes onto the
// shared router below. CRITICAL: the require(...)(router) calls preserve the
// original registration order — Express matches in registration order, so
// literal segments and '/:id' patterns must keep their relative positions.
const express = require('express');
const router = express.Router();
require('./crud')(router);
require('./slideshow')(router);
require('./resets')(router);
require('./archiveBulk')(router);
require('./logo')(router);
module.exports = router;
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// Extracted verbatim from the original routes/adminEvents.js (see ./index.js).
// Exports a register function; ./index.js calls the sub-routers in the original
// registration order so Express route matching is unchanged.
const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
const { adminAuth } = require('../../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../../middleware/permissions');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const path = require('path');
const multer = require('multer');
const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
const { validateFileType } = require('../../utils/fileSecurityUtils');
const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../../middleware/ownership');
const { getStoragePath } = require('./helpers');
// Configure multer for event logo uploads
const eventLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({
destination: async (req, file, cb) => {
const uploadDir = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'uploads/logos/events');
await fs.mkdir(uploadDir, { recursive: true });
cb(null, uploadDir);
},
filename: (req, file, cb) => {
const ext = path.extname(file.originalname);
cb(null, `event-${req.params.id}-logo-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
}
});
const eventLogoUpload = multer({
storage: eventLogoStorage,
limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5MB
fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
const allowedMimeTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/svg+xml'];
if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowedMimeTypes)) {
return cb(null, true);
} else {
cb(new Error('Only JPEG, PNG, GIF and SVG image files are allowed'));
}
}
});
module.exports = (router) => {
// Upload event custom logo
router.post('/:id/logo', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireEventOwnership, eventLogoUpload.single('logo'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const { id } = req.params;
// Check if event exists
let eventQuery = db('events').where('id', id);
if (req.admin.roleName === 'editor') {
eventQuery = eventQuery.where('created_by', req.admin.id);
}
const event = await eventQuery.first();
if (!event) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
}
if (!req.file) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No logo file provided' });
}
// Delete old logo file if exists
if (event.hero_logo_path) {
try {
await fs.unlink(event.hero_logo_path);
logger.debug('Deleted old event logo file', { path: event.hero_logo_path });
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('Failed to delete old event logo file', { path: event.hero_logo_path, error: err.message });
}
}
const logoUrl = `/uploads/logos/events/${req.file.filename}`;
const logoPath = req.file.path;
await db('events')
.where('id', id)
.update({
hero_logo_url: logoUrl,
hero_logo_path: logoPath
});
await logActivity('event_logo_uploaded',
{ eventName: event.event_name, filename: req.file.filename },
id,
{ type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
);
res.json({
message: 'Event logo uploaded successfully',
hero_logo_url: logoUrl
});
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to upload event logo');
}
});
// Delete event custom logo
router.delete('/:id/logo', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireEventOwnership, async (req, res) => {
try {
const { id } = req.params;
let eventQuery = db('events').where('id', id);
if (req.admin.roleName === 'editor') {
eventQuery = eventQuery.where('created_by', req.admin.id);
}
const event = await eventQuery.first();
if (!event) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
}
// Delete logo file if exists
if (event.hero_logo_path) {
try {
await fs.unlink(event.hero_logo_path);
logger.debug('Deleted event logo file', { path: event.hero_logo_path });
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('Failed to delete event logo file', { path: event.hero_logo_path, error: err.message });
}
}
await db('events')
.where('id', id)
.update({
hero_logo_url: null,
hero_logo_path: null
});
await logActivity('event_logo_removed',
{ eventName: event.event_name },
id,
{ type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
);
res.json({ message: 'Event logo removed successfully' });
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to delete event logo');
}
});
};
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// Extracted verbatim from the original routes/adminEvents.js (see ./index.js).
// Exports a register function; ./index.js calls the sub-routers in the original
// registration order so Express route matching is unchanged.
const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
const { adminAuth } = require('../../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../../middleware/permissions');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { queueEmail } = require('../../services/emailProcessor');
const { validatePasswordInContext, getBcryptRounds } = require('../../utils/passwordValidation');
const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
const { buildShareLinkVariants } = require('../../services/shareLinkService');
const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../../middleware/ownership');
module.exports = (router) => {
// Reset event password
router.post('/:id/reset-password', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireEventOwnership, async (req, res) => {
try {
const { id } = req.params;
const { sendEmail = true, password: clientPassword } = req.body;
let eventQuery = db('events').where('id', id);
// Editor role can only edit their own events
if (req.admin.roleName === 'editor') {
eventQuery = eventQuery.where('created_by', req.admin.id);
}
const event = await eventQuery.first();
if (!event) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
}
if (event.is_archived) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Cannot reset password for archived event' });
}
// Use the admin-supplied password when provided; otherwise auto-generate
// (preserves the previous one-click behaviour for callers/cron that don't
// pass a body). Validation matches the create-event flow so the same
// strength rules apply both ways.
let newPassword;
if (typeof clientPassword === 'string' && clientPassword.length > 0) {
const passwordValidation = await validatePasswordInContext(clientPassword, 'gallery', {
eventName: event.event_name
});
if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
return res.status(400).json({
error: 'Password does not meet security requirements',
details: passwordValidation.errors,
score: passwordValidation.score,
feedback: passwordValidation.feedback
});
}
newPassword = clientPassword;
} else {
const { generateReadablePassword } = require('../../utils/passwordGenerator');
newPassword = generateReadablePassword();
}
const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, getBcryptRounds());
// Update event with new password
await db('events')
.where('id', id)
.update({
password_hash: passwordHash
});
// Log activity
await logActivity('password_reset',
{ eventName: event.event_name, emailSent: sendEmail },
id,
{ type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
);
// Queue email notification if requested
if (sendEmail) {
const recipientEmail = event.customer_email || event.host_email;
const recipientName = event.customer_name || event.host_name || (recipientEmail ? recipientEmail.split('@')[0] : null);
// event.share_link is the path-only form (`/gallery/<slug>/<token>`).
// Use the full URL so customers can click straight from the email.
const { shareUrl } = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug: event.slug, shareToken: event.share_token });
await queueEmail(id, recipientEmail, 'gallery_created', {
customer_name: recipientName,
customer_email: recipientEmail,
host_name: recipientName,
event_name: event.event_name,
event_date: event.event_date, // Pass raw date - will be formatted by email processor
gallery_link: shareUrl,
gallery_password: newPassword,
expiry_date: event.expires_at // Pass raw date - will be formatted by email processor
});
}
res.json({
message: 'Password reset successfully',
newPassword: newPassword,
emailSent: sendEmail
});
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to reset password');
}
});
// Resend creation email
router.post('/:id/resend-email', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireEventOwnership, async (req, res) => {
try {
const { id } = req.params;
// Get event details
let eventQuery = db('events').where('id', id);
// Editor role can only edit their own events
if (req.admin.roleName === 'editor') {
eventQuery = eventQuery.where('created_by', req.admin.id);
}
const event = await eventQuery.first();
if (!event) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
}
// The email processor will determine the language based on:
// 1. Event language setting
// 2. App settings general_default_language
// 3. Email config default language
// 4. Domain-based detection
// So we don't need to determine it here
// For resending creation email, we need the actual password
// First, try to get it from the request body if provided
// Use optional chaining to handle cases where req.body might be undefined
let galleryPassword = req.body?.password;
// If no password provided, we can't decrypt the existing one
// So we'll show a security message
if (!galleryPassword) {
// We'll let the email processor determine the language for the security message
galleryPassword = '{{password_security_message}}';
}
// Dates will be formatted by the email processor based on recipient language
// Queue the email
const recipientEmail = event.customer_email || event.host_email;
const recipientName = event.customer_name || event.host_name || (recipientEmail ? recipientEmail.split('@')[0] : null);
// event.share_link is the path-only form; use the full URL so the
// customer's mail client renders a clickable absolute link.
const { shareUrl } = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug: event.slug, shareToken: event.share_token });
await queueEmail(id, recipientEmail, 'gallery_created', {
customer_name: recipientName,
customer_email: recipientEmail,
host_name: recipientName,
event_name: event.event_name,
event_date: event.event_date, // Pass raw date - will be formatted by email processor
gallery_link: shareUrl,
gallery_password: galleryPassword,
expiry_date: event.expires_at, // Pass raw date - will be formatted by email processor
welcome_message: event.welcome_message || '',
eventId: id,
isResend: true // Flag to indicate this is a resend
});
// Log the activity using the proper schema
try {
await logActivity('email_resent', {
email_type: 'gallery_created',
recipient: recipientEmail,
ip_address: req.ip || '0.0.0.0',
user_agent: req.get('user-agent') || 'Unknown'
}, id, {
type: 'admin',
id: req.admin.id,
name: req.admin.username
});
} catch (logError) {
logger.error('Warning: Failed to log activity:', logError);
// Don't fail the request if activity logging fails
}
res.json({
success: true,
message: 'Creation email has been queued for sending'
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error resending creation email:', error);
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to resend creation email');
}
});
};
+151
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
// Extracted verbatim from the original routes/adminEvents.js (see ./index.js).
// Exports a register function; ./index.js calls the sub-routers in the original
// registration order so Express route matching is unchanged.
const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
const { adminAuth } = require('../../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../../middleware/permissions');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
const { parseBooleanInput } = require('../../utils/parsers');
const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../../middleware/ownership');
const { requireFeatureFlag } = require('../../middleware/requireFeatureFlag');
const { getFrontendBaseUrl } = require('../../utils/frontendUrl');
const { SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS, SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS } = require('./helpers');
// The watermark LOOK (source/position/opacity/style/size) is global-only
// (app_settings, Settings → Slideshow); events only carry the show_watermark
// mode (NULL=inherit / true / false), so no per-event look enums live here.
// Build the public slideshow URL for a freshly-minted/existing token.
async function buildSlideshowUrl(slug, token) {
if (!token) return null;
const base = await getFrontendBaseUrl();
return `${base.replace(/\/$/, '')}/gallery/${slug}/show/${token}`;
}
// Fetch the event respecting the editor-role ownership scope (requireEventOwnership
// already gates the route; this re-applies the created_by filter for editors so the
// 404 is identical to the rest of this file).
async function loadOwnedEvent(req) {
let q = db('events').where('id', req.params.id);
if (req.admin.roleName === 'editor') {
q = q.where('created_by', req.admin.id);
}
return q.first();
}
module.exports = (router) => {
// Generate (or rotate) the slideshow share token. Idempotent in intent: each
// call mints a fresh token, which both "Generate" (first time) and "Regenerate"
// (rotate, kills the old link) use.
router.post('/:id/slideshow/generate', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireFeatureFlag('slideshow'), requireEventOwnership, async (req, res) => {
try {
const event = await loadOwnedEvent(req);
if (!event) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
}
const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
// NB: the events table has no updated_at column (only created_at), so we
// must not set it here or the UPDATE throws.
await db('events').where('id', req.params.id).update({
show_share_token: token
});
await logActivity('slideshow_link_generated',
{ eventName: event.event_name, rotated: Boolean(event.show_share_token) },
req.params.id,
{ type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
);
res.json({
show_share_token: token,
slideshow_url: await buildSlideshowUrl(event.slug, token)
});
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to generate slideshow link');
}
});
// Disable the slideshow link (null the token). The public /show/ route dies on
// its next poll, killing any projector currently pointed at the old link.
router.post('/:id/slideshow/disable', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireEventOwnership, async (req, res) => {
try {
const event = await loadOwnedEvent(req);
if (!event) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
}
await db('events').where('id', req.params.id).update({
show_share_token: null
});
await logActivity('slideshow_link_disabled',
{ eventName: event.event_name },
req.params.id,
{ type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
);
res.json({ show_share_token: null });
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to disable slideshow link');
}
});
// Update the LIVE slideshow settings (display time / transition style / speed).
// A running projector picks these up via the show-page settings poll within a
// few seconds — no need to regenerate the link.
router.patch('/:id/slideshow', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.edit'), requireFeatureFlag('slideshow'), requireEventOwnership, [
body('show_interval_ms').optional().isInt({ min: 1000, max: 120000 }),
body('show_transition').optional().isIn(SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS),
body('show_transition_ms').optional().isInt({ min: 100, max: 5000 }),
body('show_watermark').optional({ nullable: true }),
body('show_colorfilter').optional().isIn(SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS)
], async (req, res) => {
try {
const errors = validationResult(req);
if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid slideshow settings', details: errors.array() });
}
const event = await loadOwnedEvent(req);
if (!event) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
}
// events has no updated_at column — don't set it.
const updates = {};
if (req.body.show_interval_ms !== undefined) updates.show_interval_ms = parseInt(req.body.show_interval_ms, 10);
if (req.body.show_transition !== undefined) updates.show_transition = req.body.show_transition;
if (req.body.show_transition_ms !== undefined) updates.show_transition_ms = parseInt(req.body.show_transition_ms, 10);
// Tri-state: explicit null = inherit the global default.
if (req.body.show_watermark !== undefined) {
updates.show_watermark = req.body.show_watermark === null
? null
: formatBoolean(parseBooleanInput(req.body.show_watermark, false));
}
if (req.body.show_colorfilter !== undefined) updates.show_colorfilter = req.body.show_colorfilter;
// Knex throws on an empty update; only write if something changed.
if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
await db('events').where('id', req.params.id).update(updates);
}
res.json({
show_interval_ms: updates.show_interval_ms ?? event.show_interval_ms ?? 5000,
show_transition: updates.show_transition ?? event.show_transition ?? 'crossfade',
show_transition_ms: updates.show_transition_ms ?? event.show_transition_ms ?? 800,
show_watermark: updates.show_watermark ?? event.show_watermark ?? null,
show_colorfilter: updates.show_colorfilter ?? event.show_colorfilter ?? 'none'
});
} catch (error) {
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update slideshow settings');
}
});
};
+2 -1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
const { list, resolveExternalPath, getExternalMediaRoot } = require('../services/externalMediaService');
const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
const sharp = require('sharp');
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ async function walkDir(dir, baseDir) {
// POST /api/admin/events/:id/import-external
// Body: { external_path: string, recursive?: boolean, map?: { individual?: string, collages?: string } }
router.post('/events/:id/import-external', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), async (req, res) => {
router.post('/events/:id/import-external', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), requireEventOwnership, async (req, res) => {
try {
const eventId = parseInt(req.params.id);
const { external_path, recursive = true, map = { individual: 'individual', collages: 'collages' } } = req.body || {};
+15 -23
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
const feedbackService = require('../services/feedbackService');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { errorResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const FRONTEND_URL = process.env.FRONTEND_URL || '';
@@ -73,10 +74,10 @@ router.get(
'gallery_guests.created_at',
'gallery_guests.last_seen_at',
'gallery_guests.email_verified_at',
db.raw("COUNT(CASE WHEN photo_feedback.feedback_type = 'like' THEN 1 END) AS likes"),
db.raw("COUNT(CASE WHEN photo_feedback.feedback_type = 'favorite' THEN 1 END) AS favorites"),
db.raw("COUNT(CASE WHEN photo_feedback.feedback_type = 'comment' THEN 1 END) AS comments"),
db.raw("COUNT(CASE WHEN photo_feedback.feedback_type = 'rating' THEN 1 END) AS ratings"),
db.raw('COUNT(CASE WHEN photo_feedback.feedback_type = \'like\' THEN 1 END) AS likes'),
db.raw('COUNT(CASE WHEN photo_feedback.feedback_type = \'favorite\' THEN 1 END) AS favorites'),
db.raw('COUNT(CASE WHEN photo_feedback.feedback_type = \'comment\' THEN 1 END) AS comments'),
db.raw('COUNT(CASE WHEN photo_feedback.feedback_type = \'rating\' THEN 1 END) AS ratings'),
db.raw('COUNT(DISTINCT photo_feedback.photo_id) AS distinct_photos')
)
.orderBy('gallery_guests.created_at', 'desc');
@@ -94,8 +95,7 @@ router.get(
res.json({ guests });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error listing guests:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to list guests' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to list guests');
}
}
);
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ router.get(
const photos = await db('photos')
.leftJoin('photo_feedback', function () {
this.on('photo_feedback.photo_id', '=', 'photos.id')
.andOn(db.raw("photo_feedback.feedback_type IN ('like','favorite')"))
.andOn(db.raw('photo_feedback.feedback_type IN (\'like\',\'favorite\')'))
.andOnNotNull('photo_feedback.guest_id');
})
.where('photos.event_id', eventId)
@@ -144,8 +144,7 @@ router.get(
})),
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error fetching aggregate view:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch aggregate view' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch aggregate view');
}
}
);
@@ -196,8 +195,7 @@ router.get(
res.json({ invites });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error listing invites:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to list invites' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to list invites');
}
}
);
@@ -266,8 +264,7 @@ router.post(
},
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error creating invite:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create invite' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to create invite');
}
}
);
@@ -302,8 +299,7 @@ router.delete(
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error revoking invite:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to revoke invite' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to revoke invite');
}
}
);
@@ -457,8 +453,7 @@ router.get(
selections,
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error fetching guest detail:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch guest detail' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch guest detail');
}
}
);
@@ -509,8 +504,7 @@ router.get(
res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `attachment; filename="${filename}"`);
return res.send(selections.map((s) => s.original_filename || s.filename).join('\n'));
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error exporting guest:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to export guest' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to export guest');
}
}
);
@@ -548,8 +542,7 @@ router.delete(
res.json({ success: true, ...result });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error deleting guest:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to delete guest' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to delete guest');
}
}
);
@@ -600,8 +593,7 @@ router.post(
res.json({ success: true, ...result });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error merging guests:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to merge guests' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to merge guests');
}
}
);
+6 -5
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ const express = require('express');
const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const router = express.Router();
// Get notifications (unread activity logs)
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req, res)
if (typeof notification.metadata === 'object') return notification.metadata;
return JSON.parse(notification.metadata);
} catch (e) {
console.warn('Failed to parse metadata for notification:', notification.id, e.message);
logger.warn('Failed to parse metadata for notification:', notification.id, e.message);
return {};
}
})(),
@@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req, res)
unreadCount: unreadCount.count || 0
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Notifications fetch error:', error);
logger.error('Notifications fetch error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch notifications' });
}
});
@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ router.put('/:id/read', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (re
res.json({ message: 'Notification marked as read' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Mark notification read error:', error);
logger.error('Mark notification read error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to mark notification as read' });
}
});
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ router.put('/read-all', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (re
res.json({ message: 'All notifications marked as read' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Mark all notifications read error:', error);
logger.error('Mark all notifications read error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to mark all notifications as read' });
}
});
@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ router.delete('/clear-all', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async
const deletedCount = await db('activity_logs').delete();
res.json({ message: 'All notifications cleared', deletedCount });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Clear notifications error:', error);
logger.error('Clear notifications error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to clear notifications' });
}
});
+6 -5
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,9 @@ const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
const { PhotoFilterBuilder } = require('../utils/photoFilterBuilder');
const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const { PhotoExportService } = require('../services/photoExportService');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const exportService = new PhotoExportService();
@@ -66,8 +68,7 @@ router.get('/:eventId/filtered', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view'), re
const sort = req.query.sort || 'date';
const order = req.query.order || 'desc';
const page = parseInt(req.query.page) || 1;
const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit) || 50;
const { page, limit } = getPagination(req, { limit: 50 });
// Build filtered query
const filterBuilder = new PhotoFilterBuilder(
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ router.get('/:eventId/filtered', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view'), re
}
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Filter photos error:', error);
logger.error('Filter photos error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to filter photos' });
}
});
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ router.get('/:eventId/filter-summary', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view
data: summary
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Filter summary error:', error);
logger.error('Filter summary error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get filter summary' });
}
});
@@ -206,7 +207,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/export', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.download'),
res.send(result.content);
}
} catch (error) {
console.error('Export photos error:', error);
logger.error('Export photos error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: error.message || 'Failed to export photos' });
}
});
+58 -66
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ const downloadZipService = require('../services/downloadZipService');
const { findReplacementCandidate, replacePhoto } = require('../services/photoReplacementService');
const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
const { getStorage } = require('../services/storage');
const { errorResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const router = express.Router();
// Get storage path from environment or default
@@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ const getStoragePath = () => process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '.
// IMPORTANT: Using synchronous functions to prevent file corruption
const storage = multer.diskStorage({
destination: (req, file, cb) => {
console.log('Multer destination called for file:', file.originalname);
logger.info('Multer destination called for file:', file.originalname);
const { eventId } = req.params;
// We'll validate the event exists in the route handler
@@ -40,7 +42,7 @@ const storage = multer.diskStorage({
// Create directory synchronously
require('fs').mkdirSync(tempPath, { recursive: true });
console.log('Temp destination path:', tempPath);
logger.info('Temp destination path:', tempPath);
// Store temp path for cleanup
req.tempUploadPath = tempPath;
@@ -48,10 +50,10 @@ const storage = multer.diskStorage({
cb(null, tempPath);
},
filename: (req, file, cb) => {
console.log('Multer filename called for file:', file.originalname);
logger.info('Multer filename called for file:', file.originalname);
// Use a simple temporary filename
const tempName = `temp_${Date.now()}_${Math.round(Math.random() * 1E9)}${path.extname(file.originalname)}`;
console.log('Temp filename:', tempName);
logger.info('Temp filename:', tempName);
cb(null, tempName);
}
});
@@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ const resolveAllowedTypes = async (req, res, next) => {
try {
req.allowedMimeTypes = await getAllowedMimeTypes();
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to resolve allowed MIME types:', error);
logger.error('Failed to resolve allowed MIME types:', error);
req.allowedMimeTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'];
}
next();
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ const uploadTimeout = (timeout = 300000) => { // 5 minutes default
return (req, res, next) => {
// Set timeout for the request
req.setTimeout(timeout, () => {
console.error('Upload request timed out');
logger.error('Upload request timed out');
if (!res.headersSent) {
res.status(408).json({ error: 'Upload request timed out' });
}
@@ -119,7 +121,7 @@ const uploadTimeout = (timeout = 300000) => { // 5 minutes default
// Set response timeout as well
res.setTimeout(timeout, () => {
console.error('Upload response timed out');
logger.error('Upload response timed out');
});
next();
@@ -133,13 +135,12 @@ router.post('/:eventId/upload', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), r
try {
maxFilesPerUpload = await getMaxFilesPerUpload();
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to resolve max files per upload:', error);
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Unable to determine upload limits' });
return errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Unable to determine upload limits');
}
upload.array('photos', maxFilesPerUpload)(req, res, (err) => {
if (err) {
console.error('Multer error:', err);
logger.error('Multer error:', err);
if (err instanceof multer.MulterError) {
if (err.code === 'LIMIT_FILE_SIZE') {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'File too large. Maximum size is 10GB per file.' });
@@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/upload', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), r
try {
await fs.rm(req.tempUploadPath, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch (e) {
console.error('Failed to clean up temp upload directory:', e);
logger.error('Failed to clean up temp upload directory:', e);
}
};
res.on('finish', cleanupTempDir);
@@ -177,16 +178,16 @@ router.post('/:eventId/upload', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), r
const { category_id, replace_by_name } = req.body;
const replaceByName = replace_by_name === 'true' || replace_by_name === true;
console.log('Upload request received for event:', eventId);
console.log('Body:', req.body);
console.log('Files:', req.files ? req.files.length : 'none');
console.log('File details:', req.files?.map(f => ({ name: f.originalname, size: f.size, mimetype: f.mimetype })));
console.log('Category ID received:', category_id);
logger.info('Upload request received for event:', eventId);
logger.info('Body:', req.body);
logger.info('Files:', req.files ? req.files.length : 'none');
logger.info('File details:', req.files?.map(f => ({ name: f.originalname, size: f.size, mimetype: f.mimetype })));
logger.info('Category ID received:', category_id);
// Verify event exists and admin has access
const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
if (!event) {
console.error('Event not found:', eventId);
logger.error('Event not found:', eventId);
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
}
@@ -213,8 +214,8 @@ router.post('/:eventId/upload', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), r
}
if (!req.files || req.files.length === 0) {
console.error('No files in request. req.files:', req.files);
console.error('Request body keys:', Object.keys(req.body));
logger.error('No files in request. req.files:', req.files);
logger.error('Request body keys:', Object.keys(req.body));
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No files uploaded' });
}
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/upload', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), r
category_id: parsedCategoryId,
});
} catch (err) {
console.error(`Error queuing file ${file.originalname}:`, err);
logger.error(`Error queuing file ${file.originalname}:`, err);
errors.push({ filename: file.originalname, error: err.message });
}
}
@@ -451,10 +452,9 @@ router.post('/:eventId/upload', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), r
// 202 Accepted — files stored, processing happens in background.
res.status(202).json(response);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error uploading photos:', error);
// Temp directory cleanup is handled by the response finish/close
// listeners above, regardless of which exit path fires.
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to upload photos' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to upload photos');
}
});
@@ -523,8 +523,7 @@ router.get(
...summariseUpload(group.photos),
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error reading upload status:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to read upload status' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to read upload status');
}
}
);
@@ -575,7 +574,7 @@ router.get(
return;
}
} catch (e) {
console.error('Upload stream poll error:', e);
logger.error('Upload stream poll error:', e);
}
};
@@ -601,12 +600,18 @@ router.post(
const photo = await db('photos').where({ id: req.params.photoId }).first();
if (!photo) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
// Editor role: only allow retry on photos in events they own.
if (req.admin.roleName === 'editor') {
// Ownership scope: any non-super_admin may only retry photos in events
// they own — matching requireEventOwnership (which scopes both the
// admin and editor roles; only super_admin bypasses). Previously this
// checked the editor role alone, leaving admin-role users able to
// reprocess another admin's photos.
if (req.admin.roleName !== 'super_admin') {
const event = await db('events')
.where({ id: photo.event_id, created_by: req.admin.id })
.where({ id: photo.event_id })
.first();
if (!event) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
if (event && event.created_by && event.created_by !== req.admin.id) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
}
}
if (photo.processing_status !== 'failed') {
@@ -622,8 +627,7 @@ router.post(
});
res.json({ id: photo.id, status: 'pending' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error retrying photo processing:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to retry photo processing' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to retry photo processing');
}
}
);
@@ -651,7 +655,7 @@ router.delete('/:eventId/photos/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
const originalKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(event, photo);
if (originalKey) await storage.delete(originalKey);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error deleting photo file:', error);
logger.error('Error deleting photo file:', error);
}
// photo.thumbnail_path is stored as the canonical storage key
@@ -660,7 +664,7 @@ router.delete('/:eventId/photos/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
try {
await storage.delete(photo.thumbnail_path);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error deleting thumbnail:', error);
logger.error('Error deleting thumbnail:', error);
}
}
if (photo.hero_path) {
@@ -700,8 +704,7 @@ router.delete('/:eventId/photos/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
downloadZipService.invalidate(parseInt(eventId));
res.json({ message: 'Photo deleted successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error deleting photo:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to delete photo' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to delete photo');
}
});
@@ -763,8 +766,7 @@ router.patch('/:eventId/photos/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.e
photo: updatedPhoto
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error updating photo:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update photo' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update photo');
}
});
@@ -797,7 +799,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/photos/bulk-delete', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos
const originalKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(event, photo);
if (originalKey) await storage.delete(originalKey);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error deleting photo file:', error);
logger.error('Error deleting photo file:', error);
}
if (photo.thumbnail_path) {
@@ -842,8 +844,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/photos/bulk-delete', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos
downloadZipService.invalidate(parseInt(eventId));
res.json({ message: `${photos.length} photos deleted successfully` });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error bulk deleting photos:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to delete photos' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to delete photos');
}
});
@@ -905,8 +906,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/photos/bulk-update', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos
res.json({ message: `${photoIds.length} photos updated successfully` });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error bulk updating photos:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update photos' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update photos');
}
});
@@ -961,8 +961,7 @@ router.get('/:eventId/photos/:photoId/download', adminAuth, requirePermission('p
});
res.sendFile(filePath);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error downloading photo:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to download photo' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to download photo');
}
});
@@ -1096,8 +1095,7 @@ router.get('/:eventId/photos', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view'), requ
}))
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error fetching photos:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch photos' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch photos');
}
});
@@ -1153,8 +1151,7 @@ router.get('/:eventId/photo/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view
}
res.sendFile(path.resolve(filePath));
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error serving photo:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to serve photo' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to serve photo');
}
});
@@ -1168,7 +1165,7 @@ router.get('/:eventId/thumbnail/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
.first();
if (!photo) {
console.error(`Photo not found: ${photoId}, event ${eventId}`);
logger.error(`Photo not found: ${photoId}, event ${eventId}`);
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
}
@@ -1192,7 +1189,7 @@ router.get('/:eventId/thumbnail/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
const thumbnailPath = await ensureThumbnail(photo);
if (!thumbnailPath) {
console.error(`Failed to generate thumbnail for photo ${photoId}`);
logger.error(`Failed to generate thumbnail for photo ${photoId}`);
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Thumbnail generation failed' });
}
@@ -1209,10 +1206,9 @@ router.get('/:eventId/thumbnail/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.
const stream = await storage.get(thumbnailPath);
stream.pipe(res);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error serving thumbnail:', error);
console.error('Photo ID:', req.params.photoId);
console.error('Event ID:', req.params.eventId);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to serve thumbnail' });
logger.error('Error serving thumbnail:', error);
logger.error('Photo ID:', req.params.photoId);
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to serve thumbnail');
}
});
@@ -1232,8 +1228,7 @@ router.get('/:eventId/debug', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view'), requi
storagePath: getStoragePath()
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error fetching admin photo debug data:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch photo debug data' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch photo debug data');
}
});
@@ -1262,7 +1257,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/chunked-upload/init', adminAuth, requirePermission('photo
// Validate file size (max 10GB)
const maxSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
if (fileSize > maxSize) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: `File too large. Maximum size is 10GB.` });
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'File too large. Maximum size is 10GB.' });
}
const result = await chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
@@ -1275,8 +1270,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/chunked-upload/init', adminAuth, requirePermission('photo
res.json(result);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error initializing chunked upload:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to initialize upload' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to initialize upload');
}
});
@@ -1296,7 +1290,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/chunked-upload/:uploadId/chunk/:chunkIndex', adminAuth, r
res.json(result);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error uploading chunk:', error);
logger.error('Error uploading chunk:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: error.message || 'Failed to upload chunk' });
}
});
@@ -1329,7 +1323,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/chunked-upload/:uploadId/complete', adminAuth, requirePer
try {
await fs.rm(mergedFile.tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch (cleanupErr) {
console.warn('Failed to clean up temp directory:', cleanupErr.message);
logger.warn('Failed to clean up temp directory:', cleanupErr.message);
}
res.json({
@@ -1338,7 +1332,7 @@ router.post('/:eventId/chunked-upload/:uploadId/complete', adminAuth, requirePer
photos: uploadedPhotos
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error completing chunked upload:', error);
logger.error('Error completing chunked upload:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: error.message || 'Failed to complete upload' });
}
});
@@ -1356,8 +1350,7 @@ router.get('/:eventId/chunked-upload/:uploadId/status', adminAuth, requirePermis
res.json(status);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error getting upload status:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get upload status' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to get upload status');
}
});
@@ -1370,8 +1363,7 @@ router.delete('/:eventId/chunked-upload/:uploadId', adminAuth, requirePermission
res.json({ success: true, message: 'Upload aborted' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error aborting upload:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to abort upload' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to abort upload');
}
});
+2 -1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { body, query, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const { db } = require('../database/db');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ function transformS3Config(body) {
*/
router.get('/status', requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit) || 10;
const { limit } = getPagination(req, { limit: 10 });
const history = await restoreService.getRestoreHistory(limit);
const status = {
+59 -78
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ const { sanitizeCss } = require('../utils/cssSanitizer');
const { upsertAppSetting } = require('../utils/appSettings');
const { clearShareLinkSettingsCache } = require('../services/shareLinkService');
const { resetSecurityConfigCache } = require('../utils/authSecurity');
const { errorResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const router = express.Router();
const { clearMaxFilesPerUploadCache, MAX_ALLOWED_FILES_PER_UPLOAD } = require('../services/uploadSettings');
const watermarkService = require('../services/watermarkService');
@@ -158,8 +160,7 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req, res)
res.json(settingsObject);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Settings fetch error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch settings');
}
});
@@ -200,8 +201,7 @@ router.get('/customer-surface', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), a
res.json(settings);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Customer surface settings fetch error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch customer surface settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch customer surface settings');
}
});
@@ -231,8 +231,7 @@ router.put('/customer-surface', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), a
res.json({ message: 'Customer surface settings updated', updated: updates.map((u) => u.setting_key) });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Customer surface settings save error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to save customer surface settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to save customer surface settings');
}
});
@@ -295,8 +294,7 @@ router.put('/accounting', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (
}
res.json({ message: 'Accounting settings updated', updated: updates.map((u) => u.setting_key) });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Accounting settings save error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to save accounting settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to save accounting settings');
}
});
@@ -360,8 +358,7 @@ router.put('/slideshow', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (r
require('../utils/slideshowGlobals').invalidateSlideshowGlobals();
res.json({ message: 'Slideshow settings updated', updated: updates.map((u) => u.setting_key) });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Slideshow settings save error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to save slideshow settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to save slideshow settings');
}
});
@@ -413,8 +410,7 @@ router.get('/:type', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
res.json(settingsObject);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Settings fetch error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch settings');
}
});
@@ -434,8 +430,7 @@ router.get('/password/complexity', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view')
config
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Password complexity settings fetch error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch password complexity settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch password complexity settings');
}
});
@@ -577,9 +572,9 @@ router.put('/branding', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (re
const faviconPath = path.join(getStoragePath(), relativePath);
try {
await fs.unlink(faviconPath);
console.log('Deleted favicon file:', faviconPath);
logger.info('Deleted favicon file:', faviconPath);
} catch (err) {
console.error('Error deleting favicon file:', err);
logger.error('Error deleting favicon file:', err);
}
}
}
@@ -608,9 +603,9 @@ router.put('/branding', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (re
const logoPath = path.join(getStoragePath(), relativePath);
try {
await fs.unlink(logoPath);
console.log('Deleted logo file:', logoPath);
logger.info('Deleted logo file:', logoPath);
} catch (err) {
console.error('Error deleting logo file:', err);
logger.error('Error deleting logo file:', err);
}
}
}
@@ -656,20 +651,20 @@ router.put('/branding', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (re
if (currentSettings && currentSettings.enabled) {
// Start background regeneration of all watermarks
console.log('Watermark settings changed, starting background regeneration');
logger.info('Watermark settings changed, starting background regeneration');
watermarkGeneratorService.regenerateAll()
.then(result => {
console.log(`Watermark regeneration completed: ${result.success}/${result.total} successful`);
logger.info(`Watermark regeneration completed: ${result.success}/${result.total} successful`);
})
.catch(err => {
console.error('Watermark regeneration failed:', err);
logger.error('Watermark regeneration failed:', err);
});
watermarkRegenerationStarted = true;
} else {
// Watermarking was disabled, clear all pre-generated watermarks
console.log('Watermarking disabled, clearing pre-generated watermarks');
logger.info('Watermarking disabled, clearing pre-generated watermarks');
watermarkGeneratorService.clearAllWatermarks()
.catch(err => console.error('Failed to clear watermarks:', err));
.catch(err => logger.error('Failed to clear watermarks:', err));
}
}
@@ -678,8 +673,7 @@ router.put('/branding', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (re
watermarkRegenerationStarted
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Branding update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update branding settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update branding settings');
}
});
@@ -711,7 +705,7 @@ router.post('/logo', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), upload.singl
}
await fs.unlink(oldPath);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to delete old logo:', error);
logger.error('Failed to delete old logo:', error);
}
}
@@ -751,8 +745,7 @@ router.post('/logo', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), upload.singl
logoUrl: publicPath
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Logo upload error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to upload logo' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to upload logo');
}
});
@@ -772,7 +765,7 @@ router.delete('/logo', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (req
if (p.startsWith('"')) p = JSON.parse(p);
await fs.unlink(p);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to delete logo file:', error);
logger.error('Failed to delete logo file:', error);
}
}
await db('app_settings')
@@ -781,8 +774,7 @@ router.delete('/logo', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (req
res.json({ message: 'Logo removed' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Logo delete error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to remove logo' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to remove logo');
}
});
@@ -812,7 +804,7 @@ router.post('/branding/watermark-logo', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.e
try {
await fs.unlink(oldPath);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to delete old watermark logo:', error);
logger.error('Failed to delete old watermark logo:', error);
}
}
}
@@ -854,13 +846,13 @@ router.post('/branding/watermark-logo', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.e
let watermarkRegenerationStarted = false;
if (currentSettings && currentSettings.enabled) {
console.log('Watermark logo changed, starting background regeneration');
logger.info('Watermark logo changed, starting background regeneration');
watermarkGeneratorService.regenerateAll()
.then(result => {
console.log(`Watermark regeneration completed: ${result.success}/${result.total} successful`);
logger.info(`Watermark regeneration completed: ${result.success}/${result.total} successful`);
})
.catch(err => {
console.error('Watermark regeneration failed:', err);
logger.error('Watermark regeneration failed:', err);
});
watermarkRegenerationStarted = true;
}
@@ -871,8 +863,7 @@ router.post('/branding/watermark-logo', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.e
watermarkRegenerationStarted
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Watermark logo upload error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to upload watermark logo' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to upload watermark logo');
}
});
@@ -908,8 +899,7 @@ router.put('/theme', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (req,
res.json({ message: 'Theme settings updated successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Theme update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update theme settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update theme settings');
}
});
@@ -1005,7 +995,7 @@ router.put('/general', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (req
require('../services/downloadFilenameService').clearCache();
require('../services/downloadZipService').invalidateAll();
} catch (e) {
console.warn('Failed to invalidate download caches after filename setting change:', e.message);
logger.warn('Failed to invalidate download caches after filename setting change:', e.message);
}
}
@@ -1020,8 +1010,7 @@ router.put('/general', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (req
res.json({ message: 'General settings updated successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('General settings update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update general settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update general settings');
}
});
@@ -1059,8 +1048,7 @@ router.put('/security', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (re
res.json({ message: 'Security settings updated successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Security settings update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update security settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update security settings');
}
});
@@ -1115,8 +1103,7 @@ router.put('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (r
res.json({ message: 'Analytics settings updated successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Analytics settings update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update analytics settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update analytics settings');
}
});
@@ -1179,8 +1166,7 @@ router.put('/seo', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (req, re
res.json({ message: 'SEO settings updated successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('SEO settings update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update SEO settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update SEO settings');
}
});
@@ -1216,7 +1202,7 @@ router.get('/storage/info', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async
const stats = await fs.stat(fullArchivePath);
archiveStorage += stats.size;
} catch (error) {
console.error('Archive file not found:', archive.archive_path, error.message);
logger.error('Archive file not found:', archive.archive_path, error.message);
}
}
}
@@ -1234,7 +1220,7 @@ router.get('/storage/info', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async
rawDiskFree = Number(diskStats.bsize) * Number(diskStats.bfree);
rawDiskAvailable = Number(diskStats.bsize) * Number(diskStats.bavail);
} catch (diskError) {
console.error('Disk stats error:', diskError.message);
logger.error('Disk stats error:', diskError.message);
}
const clampDiskValue = (value) => {
@@ -1313,27 +1299,27 @@ router.get('/storage/info', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async
}
switch (setting.setting_key) {
case 'general_storage_soft_limit_bytes':
if (typeof parsedValue === 'number' && !Number.isNaN(parsedValue)) {
configuredSoftLimit = parsedValue;
}
break;
case 'general_storage_capacity_override_bytes':
if (typeof parsedValue === 'number' && !Number.isNaN(parsedValue)) {
capacityOverrideDb = parsedValue;
}
break;
case 'general_storage_available_override_bytes':
if (typeof parsedValue === 'number' && !Number.isNaN(parsedValue)) {
availableOverrideDb = parsedValue;
}
break;
default:
break;
case 'general_storage_soft_limit_bytes':
if (typeof parsedValue === 'number' && !Number.isNaN(parsedValue)) {
configuredSoftLimit = parsedValue;
}
break;
case 'general_storage_capacity_override_bytes':
if (typeof parsedValue === 'number' && !Number.isNaN(parsedValue)) {
capacityOverrideDb = parsedValue;
}
break;
case 'general_storage_available_override_bytes':
if (typeof parsedValue === 'number' && !Number.isNaN(parsedValue)) {
availableOverrideDb = parsedValue;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Storage settings read error:', error.message);
logger.error('Storage settings read error:', error.message);
}
const capacityOverrideEnv = parseEnvOverride('STORAGE_CAPACITY_OVERRIDE_BYTES', 'STORAGE_CAPACITY_OVERRIDE_GB');
@@ -1407,8 +1393,7 @@ router.get('/storage/info', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async
disk_override_source: overrideSource
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Storage info error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch storage information' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch storage information');
}
});
@@ -1445,8 +1430,7 @@ router.post('/favicon', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), faviconUp
res.json({ faviconUrl });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error uploading favicon:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to upload favicon' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to upload favicon');
}
});
@@ -1509,8 +1493,7 @@ router.put('/security/rate-limit', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit')
res.json({ message: 'Rate limit settings updated successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Rate limit settings update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update rate limit settings' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update rate limit settings');
}
});
@@ -1530,8 +1513,7 @@ router.get('/public-site/default', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view')
}
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to load public site defaults:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load defaults' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load defaults');
}
});
@@ -1584,8 +1566,7 @@ router.post('/public-site/reset', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'),
branding: defaults.branding
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to reset public site template:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to reset template' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to reset template');
}
});
+114
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
/**
* Admin CRUD for the branded URL shortener (#699).
*
* - GET /api/admin/events/:eventId/short-urls list per event
* - POST /api/admin/events/:eventId/short-urls create (custom or auto-generated slug)
* - DELETE /api/admin/short-urls/:id soft-delete
*
* All paths require admin auth + `settings.view` permission (read) /
* `events.edit` permission (mutate) short URLs are a per-event admin
* concern, gated by the same permission as editing the event itself.
*/
const express = require('express');
const { body, param, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../middleware/ownership');
const galleryShortUrlService = require('../services/galleryShortUrlService');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const router = express.Router();
router.use(adminAuth);
/**
* GET /api/admin/events/:eventId/short-urls
* List live short URLs for an event.
*/
router.get(
'/events/:eventId/short-urls',
requirePermission('events.view'),
param('eventId').isInt({ min: 1 }),
requireEventOwnership,
async (req, res) => {
const errors = validationResult(req);
if (!errors.isEmpty()) return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
try {
const rows = await galleryShortUrlService.listForEvent(parseInt(req.params.eventId, 10));
res.json({ shortUrls: rows });
} catch (err) {
logger.error('adminShortUrls.list failed', { error: err.message, eventId: req.params.eventId });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to list short URLs' });
}
},
);
/**
* POST /api/admin/events/:eventId/short-urls
* Body: { customSlug?: string } omit for auto-generated slug.
*/
router.post(
'/events/:eventId/short-urls',
requirePermission('events.edit'),
param('eventId').isInt({ min: 1 }),
body('customSlug').optional({ nullable: true })
.isString().isLength({ min: 1, max: 64 }),
requireEventOwnership,
async (req, res) => {
const errors = validationResult(req);
if (!errors.isEmpty()) return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
try {
const row = await galleryShortUrlService.createShortUrl({
eventId: parseInt(req.params.eventId, 10),
customSlug: req.body.customSlug || null,
createdBy: req.admin?.id || null,
});
res.status(201).json(row);
} catch (err) {
// Structured-error fallthrough — the service tags collisions and
// validation failures with a `code` so the UI can surface a
// useful message + a suggested alternative slug.
if (err.code === 'INVALID_SLUG') {
return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
}
if (err.code === 'SLUG_TAKEN') {
return res.status(409).json({
error: err.message, code: err.code, suggested: err.suggested,
});
}
if (err.code === 'EVENT_NOT_FOUND') {
return res.status(404).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
}
logger.error('adminShortUrls.create failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create short URL' });
}
},
);
/**
* DELETE /api/admin/short-urls/:id
* Soft-delete. The public route serves 410 Gone on a deleted row so the
* admin can tell their delete worked (vs. 404 for an unknown slug).
*/
router.delete(
'/short-urls/:id',
requirePermission('events.edit'),
param('id').isInt({ min: 1 }),
async (req, res) => {
const errors = validationResult(req);
if (!errors.isEmpty()) return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
try {
const ok = await galleryShortUrlService.softDelete(
parseInt(req.params.id, 10),
req.admin?.id || null,
);
if (!ok) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Short URL not found' });
res.status(204).end();
} catch (err) {
logger.error('adminShortUrls.delete failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to delete short URL' });
}
},
);
module.exports = router;
+85 -9
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { checkForUpdates, getCurrentChannel, getReleasesSince } = require('../services/updateCheckService');
const { checkForUpdates, getCurrentChannel, getCurrentVersion, getReleasesSince, compareVersions } = require('../services/updateCheckService');
const { getAppSetting, upsertAppSetting } = require('../utils/appSettings');
const { parseWhatsNew } = require('../utils/whatsNew');
const { detectEnvironment, generateUpdateInstructions } = require('../services/environmentService');
const {
checkAndNotifyUpdates,
@@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ router.get('/version', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req
const packageJson = JSON.parse(packageContent);
backendVersion = packageJson.version || '1.0.0';
} catch (err) {
console.error('Could not read package.json:', err);
logger.error('Could not read package.json:', err);
}
const channel = getCurrentChannel(backendVersion);
@@ -40,7 +42,7 @@ router.get('/version', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req
channel: channel
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error fetching version:', error);
logger.error('Error fetching version:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch version information' });
}
});
@@ -61,9 +63,20 @@ router.get('/updates', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req
const forceRefresh = req.query.refresh === 'true';
const updateInfo = await checkForUpdates(forceRefresh);
// Pre-update teaser: the target version's top highlights, so the
// "Update Available" banner can show "New features include …".
let latestHighlights = [];
if (updateInfo.updateAvailable) {
try {
const newer = await getReleasesSince(updateInfo.current, updateInfo.channel);
if (newer[0]) latestHighlights = parseWhatsNew(newer[0].body);
} catch (_) { /* teaser is best-effort */ }
}
res.json({
enabled: true,
...updateInfo
...updateInfo,
latestHighlights
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error checking for updates:', error);
@@ -71,6 +84,69 @@ router.get('/updates', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req
}
});
// What's New — after-update highlights. Returns the curated bullets for
// every release the instance moved THROUGH since it last acknowledged one
// (lastSeen < version <= running). Seen-tracking is per-INSTANCE: the first
// admin to dismiss clears it for everyone (a single app_settings row). A
// brand-new install initialises the marker silently so it never pops
// "what's new" with nothing to compare against. Best-effort: any failure
// (GitHub unreachable, etc.) returns hasNews:false, never errors.
router.get('/updates/whatsnew', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
if (process.env.UPDATE_CHECK_ENABLED === 'false') {
return res.json({ enabled: false, hasNews: false });
}
const running = await getCurrentVersion();
const channel = getCurrentChannel(running);
const lastSeen = await getAppSetting('whatsnew_last_seen_version', null);
if (!lastSeen) {
await upsertAppSetting('whatsnew_last_seen_version', JSON.stringify(running), 'system');
return res.json({ enabled: true, hasNews: false, running });
}
if (compareVersions(running, lastSeen) <= 0) {
return res.json({ enabled: true, hasNews: false, running });
}
// Releases in (lastSeen, running], newest-first, with their highlights.
const releases = (await getReleasesSince(lastSeen, channel))
.filter((r) => compareVersions(r.version, running) <= 0);
const versions = releases
.map((r) => ({
version: r.version,
name: r.name,
publishedAt: r.publishedAt,
htmlUrl: r.htmlUrl,
bullets: parseWhatsNew(r.body),
}))
.filter((v) => v.bullets.length > 0);
return res.json({
enabled: true,
hasNews: versions.length > 0,
fromVersion: lastSeen,
toVersion: running,
versions,
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error building what\'s-new:', error);
res.json({ enabled: true, hasNews: false });
}
});
// Acknowledge the What's New — advance the per-instance marker to the
// running version so it stops showing for every admin.
router.post('/updates/whatsnew/seen', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const running = await getCurrentVersion();
await upsertAppSetting('whatsnew_last_seen_version', JSON.stringify(running), 'system');
res.json({ ok: true, lastSeen: running });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error marking what\'s-new seen:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update marker' });
}
});
// Aggregated changelog — every release between current and latest in
// the user's channel. Powers the update-available modal (#567) so the
// admin can read release notes for ALL versions they're behind on, not
@@ -155,7 +231,7 @@ router.get('/status', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
`, [dbName]);
dbSize = result.rows[0]?.size || 0;
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error getting PostgreSQL database size:', error);
logger.error('Error getting PostgreSQL database size:', error);
}
} else {
// SQLite - check file size
@@ -164,7 +240,7 @@ router.get('/status', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
const stats = await fs.stat(dbPath);
dbSize = stats.size;
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error getting SQLite database size:', error);
logger.error('Error getting SQLite database size:', error);
}
}
@@ -209,7 +285,7 @@ router.get('/status', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
const stats = await fs.stat(fullArchivePath);
archiveStorage += stats.size;
} catch (error) {
console.error('Archive file not found:', archive.archive_path);
logger.error('Archive file not found:', archive.archive_path);
}
}
}
@@ -269,7 +345,7 @@ router.get('/status', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
res.json(status);
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error fetching system status:', error);
logger.error('Error fetching system status:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch system status' });
}
});
@@ -331,7 +407,7 @@ router.get('/database', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (re
timestamp: new Date()
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error fetching database info:', error);
logger.error('Error fetching database info:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch database information' });
}
});
+13
View File
@@ -254,6 +254,19 @@ router.patch('/:id/enabled', requirePermission('workflows.manage'), async (req,
// enabled state on the next SEED_VERSION bump (review nit #1).
if (await hasColumnCached('workflows', 'admin_toggled_at')) patch.admin_toggled_at = db.fn.now();
await db('workflows').where({ id }).update(patch);
// Turning dunning ON enrolls existing open/unpaid invoices (anchored to
// their due date) so it starts chasing current debtors, not only invoices
// sent after enabling (#750). Scoped to this flow's id so the backfill only
// enrolls dunning, not any custom invoice.sent flow. Best-effort — never
// fail the toggle over it.
if (enabled && wf.builtin_key === 'invoice_dunning') {
try {
const n = await require('../services/workflows').backfillDunningRuns(id);
require('../utils/logger').info('[workflow] dunning enabled — enrolled existing invoices', { enrolled: n });
} catch (e) {
require('../utils/logger').warn('[workflow] dunning backfill failed', { error: e.message });
}
}
res.json({ id, enabled });
} catch (e) { next(e); }
});
+185 -53
View File
@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@ const express = require('express');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
const { db } = require('../database/db');
const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
const { verifyRecaptcha } = require('../services/recaptcha');
const mfaService = require('../services/mfaService');
const {
trackFailedAttempt,
trackSuccessfulLogin,
@@ -14,7 +15,9 @@ const {
} = require('../utils/authSecurity');
const { endSession } = require('../middleware/sessionTimeout');
const { revokeToken } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
const { timingSafeEqualStr } = require('../utils/timingSafe');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { errorResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const {
setAdminAuthCookie,
clearAdminAuthCookie,
@@ -32,6 +35,49 @@ const {
} = require('../utils/passwordValidation');
const router = express.Router();
/**
* Finish a successful admin login: reset the lockout counter, stamp
* last_login, mint the 24h admin JWT, set the HttpOnly cookie, and return the
* user payload. Shared by the direct (no-MFA) path and the MFA-verify path so
* both produce an identical session. `lockoutKey` is the identifier the user
* typed (username or email) so success/failure tracking stays in one bucket.
*/
async function completeAdminLogin(req, res, admin, ipAddress, userAgent, lockoutKey) {
await trackSuccessfulLogin(lockoutKey, ipAddress, userAgent);
await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
last_login: new Date(),
last_login_ip: ipAddress
});
const token = jwt.sign({
id: admin.id,
username: admin.username,
type: 'admin',
role: admin.role_name,
ip: ipAddress,
loginTime: Date.now()
}, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
expiresIn: '24h',
issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
});
setAdminAuthCookie(res, token);
return res.json({
user: {
id: admin.id,
username: admin.username,
email: admin.email,
mustChangePassword: admin.must_change_password || false,
role: admin.role_name ? {
name: admin.role_name,
displayName: admin.role_display_name
} : null
}
});
}
// Admin login with enhanced security
router.post('/admin/login', [
body('username').notEmpty().trim(),
@@ -94,46 +140,128 @@ router.post('/admin/login', [
return res.status(401).json({ error: getGenericAuthError() });
}
// Successful login
await trackSuccessfulLogin(username, ipAddress, userAgent);
// Update last login and login metadata
await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
last_login: new Date(),
last_login_ip: ipAddress
});
// Generate token with additional claims including role
const token = jwt.sign({
id: admin.id,
username: admin.username,
type: 'admin',
role: admin.role_name, // Add role to JWT
ip: ipAddress,
loginTime: Date.now()
}, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
expiresIn: '24h',
issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
});
setAdminAuthCookie(res, token);
// Token is delivered via HttpOnly cookie only (not in response body)
res.json({
user: {
// Second factor: if this admin has TOTP enabled, do NOT complete the login
// yet. Issue a short-lived, single-purpose mfa_pending token and require the
// code via /admin/login/mfa. We deliberately don't reset the lockout counter
// (trackSuccessfulLogin) or stamp last_login until the second factor passes,
// so MFA brute-force is still gated by the account lockout. `loginId` carries
// the typed identifier so the verify step tracks the same lockout bucket.
if (mfaService.isEnrolled(admin)) {
const mfaToken = jwt.sign({
id: admin.id,
username: admin.username,
email: admin.email,
mustChangePassword: admin.must_change_password || false,
role: admin.role_name ? {
name: admin.role_name,
displayName: admin.role_display_name
} : null
}
});
type: 'mfa_pending',
loginId: username
}, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
expiresIn: '5m',
issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
});
return res.json({ mfaRequired: true, mfaToken });
}
return await completeAdminLogin(req, res, admin, ipAddress, userAgent, username);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Login error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Login failed' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Login failed');
}
});
// Second-factor verification. Exchanges the short-lived mfa_pending token
// (from /admin/login) plus a TOTP or recovery code for a full admin session.
router.post('/admin/login/mfa', [
body('mfaToken').notEmpty(),
body('code').notEmpty().trim()
], async (req, res) => {
try {
const errors = validationResult(req);
if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
}
const { mfaToken, code } = req.body;
const ipAddress = getClientIp(req);
const userAgent = req.headers['user-agent'] || '';
let decoded;
try {
decoded = jwt.verify(mfaToken, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
});
} catch (err) {
return res.status(401).json({
error: 'Your verification session expired. Please sign in again.',
code: 'MFA_SESSION_EXPIRED'
});
}
if (decoded.type !== 'mfa_pending') {
return res.status(401).json({ error: getGenericAuthError() });
}
const lockoutKey = decoded.loginId || decoded.username;
const lockoutStatus = await checkAccountLockout(lockoutKey);
if (lockoutStatus.isLocked) {
return res.status(423).json({
error: 'Account temporarily locked due to too many failed attempts',
retryAfter: lockoutStatus.remainingTime
});
}
const admin = await db('admin_users')
.leftJoin('roles', 'roles.id', 'admin_users.role_id')
.where('admin_users.id', decoded.id)
.select(
'admin_users.*',
'roles.name as role_name',
'roles.display_name as role_display_name'
)
.first();
if (!admin || !admin.is_active || !mfaService.isEnrolled(admin)) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: getGenericAuthError() });
}
// TOTP first, then a one-time recovery code.
let ok = mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(code, admin.two_factor_secret);
let usedRecovery = false;
let remainingHashes = null;
if (!ok) {
const stored = mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(admin.two_factor_recovery_codes);
const result = await mfaService.consumeRecoveryCode(code, stored);
if (result.matched) {
ok = true;
usedRecovery = true;
remainingHashes = result.remainingHashes;
}
}
if (!ok) {
await trackFailedAttempt(lockoutKey, ipAddress, userAgent);
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid verification code', code: 'MFA_INVALID' });
}
if (usedRecovery) {
await db('admin_users').where('id', admin.id).update({
two_factor_recovery_codes: JSON.stringify(remainingHashes),
updated_at: new Date()
});
await logActivity('admin_mfa_recovery_used',
{ admin_id: admin.id, remaining: remainingHashes.length },
null,
{ type: 'admin', id: admin.id, name: admin.username }
);
}
await logActivity('admin_mfa_login',
{ admin_id: admin.id, method: usedRecovery ? 'recovery_code' : 'totp' },
null,
{ type: 'admin', id: admin.id, name: admin.username }
);
return await completeAdminLogin(req, res, admin, ipAddress, userAgent, lockoutKey);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('MFA verification error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Verification failed' });
}
});
@@ -175,8 +303,7 @@ router.post('/logout', async (req, res) => {
res.json({ message: 'Logged out successfully' });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Logout error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Logout failed' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Logout failed');
}
});
@@ -288,8 +415,7 @@ router.post('/gallery/verify', [
}
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Gallery verification error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Verification failed' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Verification failed');
}
});
@@ -364,8 +490,7 @@ router.post('/gallery/:slug/client-login', [
accessLevel: 'client'
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Client login error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Authentication failed' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Authentication failed');
}
});
@@ -413,11 +538,23 @@ router.post('/gallery/share-login', [
const expectedToken = getEventShareToken(event);
if (!expectedToken || token !== expectedToken) {
if (!expectedToken || !timingSafeEqualStr(token, expectedToken)) {
await trackFailedAttempt(shareIdentifier, ipAddress, userAgent);
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid or expired share link' });
}
const requiresPassword = !(event.require_password === false || event.require_password === 0 || event.require_password === '0');
// The share link only proves the holder was given the link — it is NOT the
// gallery password. For a password-protected gallery, minting a full
// `type:'gallery'` token here would let anyone with the share URL bypass
// the password entirely (GHSA-9hmx-68vc-qpqw). Signal that a password is
// still required and return WITHOUT a token/cookie; the client then goes
// through POST /gallery/verify, which does check the password.
if (requiresPassword) {
return res.json({ requires_password: true });
}
const jwtToken = jwt.sign({
eventId: event.id,
eventSlug: event.slug,
@@ -432,8 +569,6 @@ router.post('/gallery/share-login', [
await trackSuccessfulLogin(`gallery:${event.slug}:share`, ipAddress, userAgent);
setGalleryAuthCookies(res, jwtToken, event.slug);
const requiresPassword = !(event.require_password === false || event.require_password === 0 || event.require_password === '0');
res.json({
token: jwtToken,
event: {
@@ -451,8 +586,7 @@ router.post('/gallery/share-login', [
}
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Share link authentication error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Share link login failed' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Share link login failed');
}
});
@@ -467,8 +601,7 @@ router.post('/gallery/logout', async (req, res) => {
clearGalleryAuthCookies(res, slug);
res.json({ message: 'Logged out successfully' });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Gallery logout error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Logout failed' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Logout failed');
}
});
@@ -682,8 +815,7 @@ router.post('/admin/change-password', [
score: passwordValidation.score
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Password change error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to change password' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to change password');
}
});
+12 -22
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
const { getBcryptRounds } = require('../utils/passwordValidation');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { errorResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
const { getClientIp } = require('../utils/requestIp');
const { customerAuth } = require('../middleware/customerAuth');
const { setGalleryAuthCookies } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
@@ -117,8 +118,7 @@ router.get('/events', customerAuth, async (req, res) => {
})),
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer event list error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load events' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load events');
}
});
@@ -225,8 +225,7 @@ router.get('/events/:slug/access-token', [
},
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer access-token exchange error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to issue access token' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to issue access token');
}
});
@@ -248,8 +247,7 @@ router.get('/profile', customerAuth, async (req, res) => {
}
res.json({ profile: shapeProfile(row) });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer profile read error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load profile' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load profile');
}
});
@@ -316,8 +314,7 @@ router.put('/profile', [
res.json({ profile: shapeProfile(row) });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer profile update error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update profile' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update profile');
}
});
@@ -376,8 +373,7 @@ router.post('/profile/password', [
res.json({ message: 'Password updated' });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer password change error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to change password' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to change password');
}
});
@@ -457,8 +453,7 @@ router.get('/quotes', customerAuth, async (req, res) => {
})),
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer quotes list error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load quotes' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load quotes');
}
});
@@ -545,8 +540,7 @@ router.get('/invoices', customerAuth, async (req, res) => {
})),
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer invoice list error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load invoices' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load invoices');
}
});
@@ -582,8 +576,7 @@ router.get('/quotes/:id/pdf', customerAuth, async (req, res) => {
res.set('Content-Disposition', `inline; filename="${filename}"`);
res.send(buf);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer quote PDF error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to render quote PDF' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to render quote PDF');
}
});
@@ -614,8 +607,7 @@ router.get('/invoices/:id/pdf', customerAuth, async (req, res) => {
res.set('Content-Disposition', `inline; filename="${filename}"`);
res.send(buf);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer invoice PDF error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to render invoice PDF' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to render invoice PDF');
}
});
@@ -679,8 +671,7 @@ router.get('/contracts', customerAuth, async (req, res) => {
})),
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer contracts list error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to load contracts' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to load contracts');
}
});
@@ -717,8 +708,7 @@ router.get('/contracts/:id/pdf', customerAuth, async (req, res) => {
res.set('Content-Disposition', `inline; filename="${path.basename(filePath)}"`);
fs.createReadStream(filePath).pipe(res);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Customer contract PDF error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to render contract PDF' });
errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to render contract PDF');
}
});

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