chore(main): release 3.131.7-beta.0 (#1424)

Size the header-style and divider grids from their container width and wrap long translated labels within each card.

.env.example

@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ DB_NAME=picpeak_prod
 # address is refused by the SSRF check otherwise. Running n8n beside PicPeak is
 # normal, so set EMAIL_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=true for that.
 #
+# Webhook and email-webhook deliveries connect to the DNS answer they just
+# validated and ignore HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY. Behind a mandatory egress
+# proxy set the *_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS flag, which sends through the proxy
+# without pinning.
+#
 # A mail account with its own SMTP host (Settings -> Mail accounts) keeps
 # sending through it; this replaces the global transport only.
 #
@@ -353,3 +358,9 @@ LOGS=./logs
 # Backend signing-key encryption (32+ characters); defaults to JWT_SECRET.
 # Keep this value stable until participation has been deleted.
 # USAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
+
+# Graceful shutdown budget in milliseconds. On SIGTERM the server stops
+# accepting requests, drains workers and closes the pool; whatever is still
+# running after this long is abandoned so the process exits before Docker's
+# 10 s stop grace period (raise stop_grace_period together with this value).
+#SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS=8000

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md

@@ -24,17 +24,20 @@ A clear and concise description of what you expected to happen.
 If applicable, add screenshots to help explain your problem.
 
 **Environment (please complete the following information):**
- - OS: [e.g. Ubuntu 22.04]
- - Browser: [e.g. Chrome 120, Safari 17]
- - PicPeak Version: [e.g. 1.0.22]
- - Deployment Method: [e.g. Docker Compose, Manual]
- - Database: [e.g. PostgreSQL 15, SQLite]
+ - OS and version:
+ - Browser and version:
+ - PicPeak version and Docker image tag (if applicable):
+ - Deployment method: [Docker Compose, all-in-one container, manual]
+ - Database and version: [PostgreSQL, SQLite]
 
 **Logs**
 Please include relevant logs:
 ```
-# Backend logs
-docker-compose logs backend | tail -50
+# Backend logs (Docker Compose)
+docker compose logs --tail=50 backend
+
+# Or all-in-one container logs (replace picpeak if your container has another name)
+docker logs --tail=50 picpeak
 
 # Frontend console errors
 [paste any browser console errors]
@@ -44,4 +47,4 @@ docker-compose logs backend | tail -50
 Add any other context about the problem here.
 
 **Possible Solution**
-If you have an idea how to fix the issue, please describe it here.
+If you have an idea how to fix the issue, please describe it here.

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 blank_issues_enabled: false
 contact_links:
   - name: 📚 Documentation
-    url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/blob/main/DEPLOYMENT.md
-    about: Please read the documentation before opening an issue
+    url: https://docs.picpeak.app
+    about: Installation, configuration and feature guides
   - name: 💬 Discussions
     url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions
     about: Ask questions and discuss with the community
   - name: 🔒 Security Issues
     url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/blob/main/SECURITY.md
-    about: Please review our security policy for reporting vulnerabilities
+    about: Please review our security policy for reporting vulnerabilities

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/documentation.md

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ assignees: ''
 
 **What documentation needs improvement?**
 Please specify which document or section needs attention:
+- [ ] Documentation website (https://docs.picpeak.app)
 - [ ] README.md
 - [ ] DEPLOYMENT.md
 - [ ] CONTRIBUTING.md
@@ -16,6 +17,8 @@ Please specify which document or section needs attention:
 - [ ] Code Comments
 - [ ] Other: ___________
 
+Link to the affected page or file:
+
 **Describe the issue**
 What's wrong or missing in the documentation?
 
@@ -30,4 +33,4 @@ Who is this documentation for?
 - [ ] End users (photographers/clients)
 
 **Additional context**
-Add any other context, examples, or references here.
+Add any other context, examples, or references here.

.github/workflows/tests.yml

@@ -6,11 +6,6 @@ name: Tests
 # calendar) plus the photo / settings / OG / auth surface — wiring them
 # into CI makes regressions visible at PR time instead of post-merge.
 #
-# Six backend suites are excluded via --testPathIgnorePatterns. They
-# fail on `upstream/beta` too (pre-existing mock/infra issues, NOT CRM
-# regressions). Excluding them here keeps CI green from day 1; revisit
-# each individually as its own fix.
-#
 # Triggers on any change that could affect either suite. The backend
 # job intentionally omits frontend paths and vice versa so unrelated
 # PRs don't pay both build costs.
@@ -89,18 +84,7 @@ jobs:
           # Un-gates the real-Postgres cases in the .picpeak restore suites
           # (see the `services:` note above). Absent it they silently skip.
           PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL: 'postgres://picpeak:testpass@127.0.0.1:5432/picpeak_test'
-        run: |
-          # Excluded suites — fail on upstream/beta too, tracked
-          # separately as test-infra debt:
-          #   adminSettings.logo                  — supertest fixture
-          #   integration/adminPhotos.reference   — supertest fixture
-          #   integration/webhookDelivery         — supertest fixture
-          #   services/backupService.enhanced     — knex mock chain
-          #   routes/__tests__/adminAuth          — supertest fixture
-          # (adminNotifications was excluded; #597 fix re-enables it.)
-          npx jest \
-            --testPathIgnorePatterns='/node_modules/|adminSettings\.logo\.test|integration/adminPhotos\.reference|integration/webhookDelivery|backupService\.enhanced|routes/__tests__/adminAuth' \
-            --ci
+        run: npx jest --ci
 
   frontend:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -121,10 +105,30 @@ jobs:
         working-directory: ./frontend
         run: npm ci
 
+      - name: Lint frontend (including Rules of Hooks)
+        working-directory: ./frontend
+        run: npm run lint
+
       - name: Run Vitest suite
         working-directory: ./frontend
         run: npm test -- --run
 
+  nginx:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 5
+    strategy:
+      matrix:
+        # Match the two shipped frontend Dockerfiles.
+        image: ['nginx:1.28-alpine', 'nginx:1.30-alpine']
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout code
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Verify token-safe nginx logging
+        env:
+          NGINX_TEST_IMAGE: ${{ matrix.image }}
+        run: python3 tests/nginx/test_request_logging.py
+
   # Optional face-detection sidecar (#1074). Runs on every PR regardless of
   # whether the feature is enabled anywhere — these tests need no model
   # weights (they stub the pipeline out) and cover the auth boundary, the

.release-please-manifest-beta.json

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "3.130.0-beta.0"
+  ".": "3.131.7-beta.0"
 }

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,115 @@ All notable changes to PicPeak will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [3.131.7-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.131.6-beta.0...v3.131.7-beta.0) (2026-09-11)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **admin:** keep header-style tiles from overflowing their cards ([#1422](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1422)) ([7cd7654](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/7cd7654f99967080724d7498b72bea4986ae825d))
+
+## [3.131.6-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.131.5-beta.0...v3.131.6-beta.0) (2026-09-11)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **gallery:** cap how many cached zips rebuild at once in the background ([#1418](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1418)) ([98d2560](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/98d25601b465ecc44d0875b52891073720fabbbc))
+
+## [3.131.5-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.131.4-beta.0...v3.131.5-beta.0) (2026-09-11)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **gallery:** stop the pre-zip build leaking storage reads ([#1402](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1402)) ([f094cc0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/f094cc06a78e776795e60cb3b11e8653681a2f31))
+
+## [3.131.4-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.131.3-beta.0...v3.131.4-beta.0) (2026-09-11)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **backend:** bump sharp, nodemailer, multer, js-yaml, joi for security fixes ([#1374](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1374)) ([f6b81fa](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/f6b81fabf05ab0bbce48e63bbdf3812b30aa10de))
+* **backend:** contain and sanitize the SQLite restore source path ([#1384](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1384)) ([316bcbd](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/316bcbd67965ddec74801308a722b506bb8da265))
+* **backend:** enforce event ownership on short URL deletion ([#1379](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1379)) ([e290207](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/e290207934708f8bf41676aec39a43474f0f6172))
+* **backend:** reject a replayed TOTP code within its validity window ([#1389](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1389)) ([cdde937](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/cdde937d7fce130d67e331bd968cb2c4734902d4))
+* **backend:** require actor to hold every permission of a role they grant ([#1378](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1378)) ([59ea83c](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/59ea83c84efdcf6d488853a25ba05f1d15ef1150))
+* **backend:** shorten payment-check token TTL and notify admin on use ([#1385](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1385)) ([e324791](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/e3247911a071b5277d877a1fa0a39c544d3a03e8))
+* **backend:** use the strong password generator for resets and enforce must_change_password ([#1387](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1387)) ([b798d8e](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/b798d8e4c19541da6ee1f58c2756182817b6c716))
+* **backend:** validate business-profile logo uploads by content, not filename ([#1381](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1381)) ([abc9601](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/abc960170b1eac0fa1f3110015e8fce671d428ab))
+* **backend:** validate event id before using it in the logo storage filename ([#1382](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1382)) ([38b0e1d](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/38b0e1d5842217030e7dd48247e523ded4b19c58))
+* **backend:** validate the S3 endpoint host before the restore download ([#1383](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1383)) ([ec03089](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/ec03089d57c88ff0f7c21b6a4947ffb9ef9771f9))
+* **gallery:** bound and reclaim storage reads in the remaining zip builders ([#1410](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1410)) ([70f5a8c](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/70f5a8c54e096f70c030d63414d5954190cb68a8))
+* **gallery:** keep an admin draft preview out of the guest share-login flow ([f92d4bb](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/f92d4bb2d9c2ea84f59dd4cfaa3a4272f1eec56b))
+* **gallery:** keep videos playable under enhanced and maximum protection ([#1404](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1404)) ([1080388](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/1080388f28b846553cd670c66e9632275eb9c994))
+* **gallery:** let an admin preview a draft through its short share URL ([f92d4bb](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/f92d4bb2d9c2ea84f59dd4cfaa3a4272f1eec56b))
+* **gallery:** let an admin preview a draft through its short share URL ([#1405](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1405)) ([f92d4bb](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/f92d4bb2d9c2ea84f59dd4cfaa3a4272f1eec56b))
+* **upload:** let the csrf gate pass application/octet-stream chunks ([#1401](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1401)) ([7c0c5c1](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/7c0c5c1cda3921cbd9404dd77d64bdec7a9ae2aa))
+* **upload:** stop buffering a chunk body before anything checks its size ([#1406](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1406)) ([4622478](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/4622478e44d5e63da031a2f27c5a5c335282eacb))
+
+## [3.131.3-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.131.2-beta.0...v3.131.3-beta.0) (2026-09-10)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **video:** try metadata extraction and thumbnail generation independently ([#1371](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1371)) ([a2bf1f6](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/a2bf1f644c78734fc9a86a24d441b7a70bdb38fb))
+
+## [3.131.2-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.131.1-beta.0...v3.131.2-beta.0) (2026-09-09)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **backup:** honor the configured database-backup destination path ([#1366](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1366)) ([15cd5ed](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/15cd5ede82171f5869342de869903f55c73f3871))
+
+## [3.131.1-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.131.0-beta.0...v3.131.1-beta.0) (2026-09-08)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **usage:** explain and de-emphasize the pending-packet button lock ([#1363](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1363)) ([9f4b9ba](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/9f4b9bab46264d83dcdf698ce5bc318703eb10ee))
+
+## [3.131.0-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.130.2-beta.0...v3.131.0-beta.0) (2026-09-08)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **setup:** add anonymous usage-reporting opt-in to the first-run wizard ([8d0c329](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/8d0c32902dd78324286a7585188d0c292692c8ec))
+* **setup:** add product usage consent to the first-run wizard ([539f5db](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/539f5db2b5e28dc42742fbbbe082fc3c23a7263e))
+* **usage:** prompt existing admins once for usage reporting after an update ([59ef2ee](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/59ef2ee9af74e97e042934e6ea5fab3b0b687617))
+* **usage:** prompt existing admins once for usage reporting after an update ([d20f801](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/d20f80112f95c7d718f936ea14aadf7eb0accdea))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* complete graceful shutdown and revoke tokens without expiry ([411d459](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/411d459338289cae7dce8cddbe7c78dae3d4f449))
+* interrupt idle worker waits during shutdown ([a31a2e2](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/a31a2e25e2666989ee226c0d7884e23f50fe58da))
+* retain revocations for tokens without expiry ([662516a](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/662516a5ad2a0aadd87dfff3fba4f2456e88a69d))
+* **setup:** refresh usage state after accepting consent ([a5f7b38](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/a5f7b38e02f20e66047431c5cb04e6f34c60c689))
+* **setup:** require the full usage reporting disclosure ([9168bdd](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/9168bdd5048b4419db7b0f4444375f54c06f5bbb))
+* **usage:** cap the update-prompt modal height so it scrolls on short viewports ([c61a6b0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/c61a6b089e56beec1de5c106440764518f507012))
+* **usage:** classify prompt acknowledgement in privacy coverage ([fb2f833](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/fb2f8333dca79b9cada9f349671920e34db38d5d))
+* **usage:** preserve consent choices and make the prompt accessible ([9a437ee](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/9a437ee9e19f6ecb8bff8747de71d3a9527d9512))
+* **usage:** synchronize setup consent and dismissal state ([77b4aab](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/77b4aab61a54d92b46fdc93fce5a075e3dc1d794))
+
+## [3.130.2-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.130.1-beta.0...v3.130.2-beta.0) (2026-09-08)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* enforce gallery access and consolidate gallery workflows ([#1357](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1357)) ([f0e6d2d](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/f0e6d2dfb12460cb1d003802f346e2026fa1c016))
+
+## [3.130.1-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.130.0-beta.0...v3.130.1-beta.0) (2026-09-08)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **images:** probe and clean up preview tiers under the extension the encoder actually wrote ([#1355](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1355)) ([acb25a9](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/acb25a9a1ce9887e51ff769d98f65379a5a1b803))
+* **images:** single-flight lazy rendition generation and keep the old rendition during replacement ([#1350](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1350)) ([c97341e](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/c97341e4547257aab57fb746bad4203a1adaf560))
+
+
+### Documentation
+
+* define security support across stable and main ([#1351](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1351)) ([0e459b3](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/0e459b3293ce9132ee8bb8324c6e76692e580cc5))
+* refresh repository support and community links ([#1349](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1349)) ([f83cbe9](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/f83cbe9109c5c7b25a0b50e0f0e3244d32421e7e))
+
 ## [3.130.0-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.129.0-beta.0...v3.130.0-beta.0) (2026-09-07)
 
 

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Unsure where to begin? You can start by looking through these issues:
 
 ### Prerequisites
 
-- Node.js 18+
+- Node.js 22.12.0 or later (matches `backend/package.json`)
 - Docker & Docker Compose
 - Git
 

README.md

@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ Full documentation lives at **[docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app)** —
 | 🧾 CRM & Accounting | [docs.picpeak.app/features/crm](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm) · [disclaimers](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm/disclaimers) |
 | 🗺️ Roadmap | [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) |
 
-**Project meta:** [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) · [License](LICENSE) · [Security](SECURITY.md) · [Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)
+**Project meta:** [Support](SUPPORT.md) · [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) · [License](LICENSE) · [Security](SECURITY.md) · [Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)
 
 ## 📊 Comparison with Alternatives
 

SUPPORT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Getting help with PicPeak
+
+## Documentation
+
+Start with [docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app) for installation,
+configuration, gallery features and administration guides.
+
+- [Getting started](https://docs.picpeak.app/getting-started)
+- [Deployment](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment)
+- [Admin settings](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/admin-settings)
+- [Release channels](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/release-channels)
+
+## Questions and troubleshooting
+
+Use [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions) for
+setup questions, troubleshooting and advice from the community. Include your
+PicPeak version, deployment method and what you have already tried.
+
+## Bugs and feature requests
+
+Search [existing issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) first, then
+[choose an issue template](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new/choose)
+to report a bug, suggest a feature or identify a documentation problem.
+
+For bugs, include the exact version, reproduction steps and relevant logs.
+See [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) for development and pull request guidance.
+
+## Security vulnerabilities
+
+Follow the [security policy](SECURITY.md) and use
+[private vulnerability reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
+or email **info@picpeak.app**. Do not report vulnerabilities in public issues
+or discussions.

backend/__tests__/integration/adminThumbnails.regenerate.test.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ const express = require('express');
 const request = require('supertest');
 
 describe('admin thumbnail regeneration (#1129)', () => {
-  let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let app; let imageProcessor; let storage;
+  let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let app; let imageProcessor; let storage; let logInfo;
 
   beforeAll(async () => {
     tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-'));
@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ describe('admin thumbnail regeneration (#1129)', () => {
       deletePreviewTiers: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
     }));
 
+    // Same module registry as the route, so the spy sees its calls. The
+    // completion line is what drain() below waits for.
+    logInfo = jest.spyOn(require('../../src/utils/logger'), 'info');
+
     // bootCrmDb, not run-migrations: the latter calls process.exit(0) on
     // success, which ends the jest worker mid-suite.
     ({ db, cleanup } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
@@ -94,8 +98,20 @@ describe('admin thumbnail regeneration (#1129)', () => {
     return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
   }
 
-  /** The work runs in setImmediate; give it room to finish. */
-  const drain = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 150));
+  /**
+   * The work runs in setImmediate, after the response. Wait for the loop's
+   * "regeneration complete" log line rather than a fixed 150 ms: under a
+   * loaded machine (fifteen suites in parallel, each booting a migrated
+   * SQLite) the loop occasionally took longer than that, and the assertions
+   * then ran against a half-finished mock call list.
+   */
+  const drain = async () => {
+    const deadline = Date.now() + 10000;
+    const done = () => logInfo.mock.calls.some((c) => /regeneration complete/.test(String(c[0])));
+    while (!done() && Date.now() < deadline) {
+      await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 10));
+    }
+  };
 
   it('rebuilds the canonical thumbnail for an external photo instead of erroring', async () => {
     const eventId = await seedEvent();

backend/__tests__/integration/businessProfileLogoUpload.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/**
+ * POST /api/admin/business-profile/logo and PUT /api/admin/business-profile
+ * — GHSA-6wrv-9pr4-hhmw regression coverage.
+ *
+ * The upload route used to take the stored file extension straight from
+ * the client-supplied filename and only checked `file.mimetype` against an
+ * allowlist — a file could declare an image MIME type while carrying a
+ * `.html`/`.js` extension and arbitrary content, land in the same-origin
+ * `/uploads/logos` static mount, and execute as script. The mass-assignable
+ * `logoPath` field on PUT compounded it: an attacker could point the
+ * "logo" at any other uploaded file.
+ *
+ * These tests pin:
+ *   (a) a MIME/extension mismatch is rejected at upload,
+ *   (b) the extension actually written to disk always matches the
+ *       validated MIME type, never the client-supplied filename,
+ *   (c) legitimate PNG/JPEG/SVG uploads still succeed,
+ *   (d) `logoPath` on PUT cannot be set to an arbitrary string pointing at
+ *       another file, only to a path the upload route itself produced.
+ *
+ * Defense-in-depth (not a re-opening of the above): fileFilter only pairs
+ * the claimed MIME type against the extension — it can't see the bytes,
+ * since it runs before multer finishes writing the stream to disk. A file
+ * whose declared MIME/extension pair is valid but whose actual content
+ * doesn't match (e.g. a PNG-declared upload that isn't really a PNG) is
+ * now caught by validateFileContent() (magic-number check) after multer
+ * writes it, closing the gap where declared-vs-actual content diverges.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-bplogo-test-'));
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite');
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'bplogo-route-test-secret';
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
+} = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+// Real magic-number-prefixed payloads, for content-sniffing to accept.
+const REAL_PNG_BYTES = Buffer.concat([
+  Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A]),
+  Buffer.from('not a real png body, but the header is real'),
+]);
+const REAL_JPEG_BYTES = Buffer.concat([
+  Buffer.from([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]),
+  Buffer.from('not a real jpeg body, but the header is real'),
+]);
+
+describe('business profile — logo upload content/extension validation', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let token;
+
+  const uploadLogo = (buffer, filename, mimetype) => request(app)
+    .post('/api/admin/business-profile/logo')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+    .attach('logo', buffer, { filename, contentType: mimetype });
+
+  const put = (payload) => request(app)
+    .put('/api/admin/business-profile')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+    .send(payload);
+
+  const get = () => request(app)
+    .get('/api/admin/business-profile')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+  const profileOf = (res) => (res.body.data || res.body).profile;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    const { adminId } = await seedMinimal(db);
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+    app = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/business-profile', require('../../src/routes/adminBusinessProfile'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  // fileFilter rejections surface via Express's generic error handler
+  // (the pre-existing behaviour of every sibling logo/favicon upload
+  // route in this codebase — none of them special-case multer's
+  // fileFilter `Error` into a 400 either), so the status code itself
+  // can be 400 or 500 depending on environment. What actually matters
+  // for GHSA-6wrv-9pr4-hhmw is that the request never succeeds and
+  // nothing with the dangerous extension is ever written to disk.
+  const logosDirFiles = () => {
+    const logosDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads', 'logos');
+    return fs.existsSync(logosDir) ? fs.readdirSync(logosDir) : [];
+  };
+
+  it('rejects an HTML/script payload disguised as an image via mismatched extension', async () => {
+    const evil = Buffer.from('<script>alert(document.domain)</script>');
+    const res = await uploadLogo(evil, 'evil.html', 'image/svg+xml');
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(200);
+    expect(logosDirFiles().some((f) => f.endsWith('.html'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a .js file disguised with an image MIME type', async () => {
+    const evil = Buffer.from('alert(1)');
+    const res = await uploadLogo(evil, 'evil.js', 'image/png');
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(200);
+    expect(logosDirFiles().some((f) => f.endsWith('.js'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a disallowed MIME type outright', async () => {
+    const res = await uploadLogo(Buffer.from('whatever'), 'file.pdf', 'application/pdf');
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(200);
+    expect(logosDirFiles().some((f) => f.endsWith('.pdf'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legitimate PNG upload and stores it with a .png extension', async () => {
+    const res = await uploadLogo(REAL_PNG_BYTES, 'logo.png', 'image/png');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const logoPath = (res.body.data || res.body).logoPath;
+    expect(logoPath).toMatch(/^\/uploads\/logos\/pdf-logo-\d+\.png$/);
+
+    const onDisk = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, logoPath.replace(/^\//, ''));
+    expect(fs.existsSync(onDisk)).toBe(true);
+
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe(logoPath);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legitimate JPEG upload and stores it with a .jpg extension', async () => {
+    const res = await uploadLogo(REAL_JPEG_BYTES, 'logo.jpg', 'image/jpeg');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const logoPath = (res.body.data || res.body).logoPath;
+    expect(logoPath).toMatch(/^\/uploads\/logos\/pdf-logo-\d+\.jpg$/);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a PNG-declared upload whose bytes are not actually a PNG, and leaves nothing on disk', async () => {
+    const before = logosDirFiles();
+    const res = await uploadLogo(Buffer.from('totally not a png'), 'logo.png', 'image/png');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/content does not match/i);
+
+    // No new file left behind: the rejected upload's own file was cleaned
+    // up, and every other file on disk (if any) is unchanged.
+    expect(logosDirFiles()).toEqual(before);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legitimate SVG upload and always stores it with a .svg extension, even under a spoofed filename', async () => {
+    const svg = Buffer.from('<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><rect width="1" height="1"/></svg>');
+    // Client-declared filename ext is .svg here to pass validateFileType
+    // (mismatched ext is covered by the rejection tests above); the point
+    // of this test is that the ON-DISK extension comes from the MIME type
+    // lookup table, not path.extname(originalname).
+    const res = await uploadLogo(svg, 'vector-logo.svg', 'image/svg+xml');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const logoPath = (res.body.data || res.body).logoPath;
+    expect(logoPath).toMatch(/^\/uploads\/logos\/pdf-logo-\d+\.svg$/);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects logoPath on PUT set to an arbitrary string pointing at another file', async () => {
+    const before = profileOf(await get()).logoPath;
+
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: '/uploads/logos/cms-somepage-1234.png' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe(before);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects logoPath on PUT with a path-traversal payload', async () => {
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: '/uploads/logos/../../../../etc/passwd' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts logoPath on PUT when it matches the pattern this route itself writes', async () => {
+    const upload = await uploadLogo(REAL_PNG_BYTES, 'logo2.png', 'image/png');
+    const uploadedPath = (upload.body.data || upload.body).logoPath;
+
+    // Round-trip: PUT-ing back the exact value the upload endpoint
+    // returned (what the frontend's generic profile save does) must
+    // keep working.
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: uploadedPath });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe(uploadedPath);
+  });
+
+  it('still allows clearing logoPath with an empty string', async () => {
+    const res = await put({ logoPath: '' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(profileOf(await get()).logoPath).toBe('');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/previewTiers.test.js

@@ -129,8 +129,15 @@ describe('preview tiers (#1095)', () => {
     it('derives every non-default tier key for cleanup', () => {
       // Tiers live outside preview_path, so delete/archive/regenerate have no
       // other way to find them. 1920 is excluded because that IS preview_path.
+      // Two candidates per width — the encoder picks `.jpg` or `.webp` and the
+      // cleanup list cannot know which without probing the source.
       const keys = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys({ id: 5, path: 'e/a.jpg', source_origin: 'managed' });
-      expect(keys).toHaveLength(imageProcessor.PREVIEW_WIDTHS.length - 1);
+      const widths = imageProcessor.PREVIEW_WIDTHS.filter((w) => w !== 1920);
+      expect(keys).toHaveLength(widths.length * 2);
+      for (const w of widths) {
+        expect(keys).toContain(`previews/preview_w${w}_p5_a.jpg`);
+        expect(keys).toContain(`previews/preview_w${w}_p5_a.webp`);
+      }
       expect(keys.some((k) => k.includes('w1920'))).toBe(false);
       expect(keys.every((k) => k.includes('p5_'))).toBe(true);
     });

backend/__tests__/integration/productUsagePg.test.js

@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ maybe('product usage on Postgres', () => {
     await require('../../migrations/core/204_product_usage_privacy_receipts').up(db);
     await require('../../migrations/core/205_product_usage_consent_version').up(db);
     await require('../../migrations/core/206_product_usage_delivery_backoff').up(db);
+    await require('../../migrations/core/212_product_usage_prompt_shown').up(db);
 
     await db.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
       t.string('setting_key').primary(); t.text('setting_value'); t.string('setting_type');
@@ -120,6 +121,24 @@ maybe('product usage on Postgres', () => {
     // back as a STRING — the tick() gate compares it against a number.
     expect(cols.attempts).toBeDefined();
     expect(cols.next_attempt_at).toBeDefined();
+    expect(cols.prompt_shown).toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it('backfills the prompt for existing participation using PostgreSQL booleans', async () => {
+    const migration = require('../../migrations/core/212_product_usage_prompt_shown');
+    await migration.down(db);
+    await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({ status: 'active', consent_version: 'usage-consent.v2' });
+    await migration.up(db);
+    await migration.up(db);
+    expect(await service().status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'active', prompt_shown: true, consent_version: 'usage-consent.v2' });
+    await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({ status: 'disabled' });
+    expect(await service().status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: true });
+  });
+
+  it('persists a fresh installation declining without opting in on PostgreSQL', async () => {
+    expect(await service().status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: false });
+    await service().markPromptShown();
+    expect(await service().status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: true, notice_dismissed: false });
   });
 
   it('reruns the backoff migration safely', async () => {

backend/__tests__/integration/tokenRevocationExpiry.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+const knex = require('knex');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+const { randomUUID } = require('crypto');
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/211_revocations_without_expiry');
+
+for (const client of ['sqlite3', 'pg']) {
+  const enabled = client !== 'pg' || process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
+  (enabled ? describe : describe.skip)(`token revocation expiry (${client})`, () => {
+    let db, owner, schema, revocation;
+    const sign = claims => jwt.sign({ id: 1, type: 'admin', jti: randomUUID(), ...claims }, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      if (client === 'pg') {
+        schema = `revocation_${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`;
+        owner = knex({ client, connection: process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL });
+        await owner.schema.createSchema(schema);
+        db = knex({ client, connection: process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL, searchPath: [schema] });
+      } else {
+        db = knex({ client, connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
+      }
+      // Exercise the upgrade from the real legacy NOT NULL schema as well as
+      // repeated migration runs, without sharing another test's database.
+      await require('../../migrations/legacy/017_add_token_revocation_tables').up(db);
+      await db('revoked_tokens').insert({ token_id: 'existing', expires_at: '2099-01-01T00:00:00.000Z' });
+      await migration.up(db);
+      await migration.up(db);
+      jest.resetModules();
+      jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db }));
+      revocation = require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation');
+    });
+
+    afterAll(async () => {
+      await db?.destroy();
+      if (owner) { await owner.schema.dropSchema(schema, true); await owner.destroy(); }
+      jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
+    });
+
+    it('preserves existing revocations and their unique key during upgrade', async () => {
+      expect(await db('revoked_tokens').where({ token_id: 'existing' }).first()).toBeTruthy();
+      await expect(db('revoked_tokens').insert({ token_id: 'existing', expires_at: null })).rejects.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it.each([true, false])('permanently revokes a token without exp (jti: %s)', async withJti => {
+      const token = sign(withJti ? {} : { jti: undefined });
+      const payload = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(payload)).toBe(false);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(token, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(token, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      await revocation.cleanupExpiredRevocations();
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(payload)).toBe(true);
+      const rows = await db('revoked_tokens').where({ token_id: revocation.buildTokenId(payload) });
+      expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(rows[0].expires_at).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('cleans up expired revocations and retains future ones', async () => {
+      const expired = sign({ exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60 });
+      const future = sign({ exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600 });
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(expired, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(future, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      await revocation.cleanupExpiredRevocations();
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(expired))).toBe(false);
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(future))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it.each([true, false])('upgrades an expiring entry with the same key permanently (jti: %s)', async withJti => {
+      const claims = { id: 99, iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000), jti: withJti ? randomUUID() : undefined };
+      const expiring = sign({ ...claims, exp: claims.iat - 60 });
+      const permanent = sign(claims);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(expiring, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(permanent, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(expiring, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      await revocation.cleanupExpiredRevocations();
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(permanent))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('retains a signed token whose numeric expiry cannot fit a database timestamp', async () => {
+      const token = sign({ exp: 1e100 });
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(token, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      await revocation.cleanupExpiredRevocations();
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(token))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('refuses a rollback that would remove permanent revocations', async () => {
+      await expect(migration.down(db)).rejects.toThrow('permanent token revocations');
+      expect((await db('revoked_tokens').columnInfo('expires_at')).nullable).toBe(true);
+      // A rollback with only expiring records remains supported and reversible.
+      await db('revoked_tokens').whereNull('expires_at').delete();
+      await migration.down(db);
+      await migration.down(db);
+      expect((await db('revoked_tokens').columnInfo('expires_at')).nullable).toBe(false);
+      await migration.up(db);
+      expect(await db('revoked_tokens').where({ token_id: 'existing' }).first()).toBeTruthy();
+    });
+  });
+}

backend/__tests__/integration/webhookDelivery.test.js

@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ process.env.WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS = 'true';
 process.env.WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_INTERVAL_MS = '50';
 
 const http = require('http');
-const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
-const webhookService = require('../../src/services/webhookService');
-const { __test, startWebhookDeliveryWorker, stopWebhookDeliveryWorker } = require('../../src/services/webhookDeliveryWorker');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+let db, cleanup, adminId;
+let webhookService;
+let __test, startWebhookDeliveryWorker, stopWebhookDeliveryWorker;
 
 // Local-only test stub: matches what dev/webhook-receiver/server.js does
 // in the docker-compose flow but spun up inside the Jest process so the
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ async function insertWebhook(url, events = ['event.published'], extras = {}) {
     secret_preview: preview,
     events: JSON.stringify(events),
     active: extras.active !== false,
-    created_by: 1,
+    created_by: adminId,
   }).returning('id');
   const id = insert[0]?.id || insert[0];
   return { id, secret: plaintext };
@@ -56,16 +57,15 @@ async function clearWebhooks() {
 
 describe('webhook delivery worker (#327)', () => {
   beforeAll(async () => {
-    // Schema is expected to already be applied by `npm run migrate`. We
-    // just verify the webhooks tables exist; if not, the test harness has
-    // missed running migration 082.
-    const ok = await db.schema.hasTable('webhooks');
-    if (!ok) throw new Error('webhooks table missing — run `npm run migrate` first');
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    webhookService = require('../../src/services/webhookService');
+    ({ __test, startWebhookDeliveryWorker, stopWebhookDeliveryWorker } = require('../../src/services/webhookDeliveryWorker'));
   }, 30000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
-    stopWebhookDeliveryWorker();
-    await db.destroy();
+    await stopWebhookDeliveryWorker();
+    await cleanup();
   });
 
   beforeEach(async () => {

backend/__tests__/middleware/authMustChangePassword.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx enforcement half: `must_change_password` was written
+ * by the admin password-reset flow (userManagementService.resetAdminPassword)
+ * and returned in a few response payloads, but no route-blocking logic ever
+ * checked it — a reset admin could keep using the old/weak password on every
+ * protected route indefinitely. adminAuth() is now the server-side backstop:
+ * a flagged admin gets 403 MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD on everything except the
+ * routes they need to clear the flag (change-password) or leave (logout).
+ *
+ * Mirrors the mocking shape of adminAuthRoleFallback.test.js — a stub `db`
+ * chain, no real SQLite needed, so this stays a fast unit test.
+ */
+
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff', () => ({ isTokenBeforeCutoff: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() }));
+
+let mockMustChangePassword = false;
+const mockAdminRow = { id: 7, username: 'scoped', email: 's@example.com', password_changed_at: null, role_id: 1, role_name: 'editor' };
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: () => ({
+    leftJoin() { return this; },
+    where() { return this; },
+    select() { return this; },
+    first: () => Promise.resolve({ ...mockAdminRow, must_change_password: mockMustChangePassword }),
+  }),
+}));
+
+const { adminAuth } = require('../../src/middleware/auth');
+
+const SECRET = 'test-secret-for-must-change-password';
+
+function makeReq(originalUrl) {
+  const token = jwt.sign(
+    { id: mockAdminRow.id, type: 'admin' },
+    SECRET,
+    { algorithm: 'HS256', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+  );
+  return { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, ip: '127.0.0.1', connection: {}, originalUrl };
+}
+
+function makeRes() {
+  return {
+    statusCode: null,
+    body: null,
+    status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
+    json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
+  };
+}
+
+describe('adminAuth must_change_password enforcement (GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx)', () => {
+  const OLD_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
+  beforeAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = SECRET; });
+  afterAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = OLD_SECRET; });
+  beforeEach(() => { mockMustChangePassword = false; });
+
+  it('blocks an arbitrary protected route with 403 MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD when the flag is set', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/dashboard/stats');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body).toEqual(expect.objectContaining({ code: 'MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD' }));
+    expect(req.admin).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('does not block when the flag is not set', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = false;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/dashboard/stats');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin.mustChangePassword).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['/api/admin/auth/change-password'],
+    ['/api/admin/auth/logout'],
+  ])('still allows %s through when the flag is set', async (originalUrl) => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq(originalUrl);
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin.mustChangePassword).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('allows the exempt change-password path even with a query string', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/auth/change-password?foo=bar');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('does not exempt a route that merely starts with the change-password path', async () => {
+    mockMustChangePassword = true;
+    const req = makeReq('/api/admin/auth/change-password-history');
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/middleware/csrfChunkedUpload.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/**
+ * The chunked upload client posts each chunk as application/octet-stream and
+ * the route reads the raw request stream. The CSRF gate answered every such
+ * request 415 before it reached the route, so the endpoint never accepted a
+ * chunk (PicPeak/picpeak#1377).
+ *
+ * The gate's origin check is the CSRF defence. The Content-Type list only
+ * has to keep out what a cross-site page can send without a preflight, and
+ * application/octet-stream is not on that list: an HTML form cannot produce
+ * it and fetch() with it is not CORS-safelisted.
+ */
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() }));
+
+function buildApp() {
+  const app = express();
+  // Same order as server.js: scoped JSON parser, then the gate on /api.
+  app.use(['/api/admin', '/api/v1'], express.json({ limit: '50mb' }));
+  app.use(express.json({ limit: '2mb' }));
+  app.use('/api', require('../../src/middleware/csrf'));
+  // Mirrors the chunk route in adminPhotos.js: consume the raw stream.
+  app.post('/api/admin/photos/:eventId/chunked-upload/:uploadId/chunk/:chunkIndex', async (req, res) => {
+    const chunks = [];
+    for await (const chunk of req) chunks.push(chunk);
+    res.json({ received: Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('base64') });
+  });
+  app.post('/api/admin/other', (req, res) => res.json({ body: req.body }));
+  return app;
+}
+
+const CHUNK_PATH = '/api/admin/photos/1/chunked-upload/abc/chunk/0';
+
+describe('CSRF gate and application/octet-stream', () => {
+  it('lets a same-origin octet-stream chunk reach the route byte for byte', async () => {
+    // Not valid UTF-8, so a text decode anywhere on the path would show up.
+    const payload = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from('chunkbytes'), Buffer.from([0xff, 0x00, 0xfe])]);
+    const res = await request(buildApp())
+      .post(CHUNK_PATH)
+      .set('sec-fetch-site', 'same-origin')
+      .set('Content-Type', 'application/octet-stream')
+      .send(payload);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(Buffer.from(res.body.received, 'base64').equals(payload)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('still rejects a cross-site octet-stream post on origin', async () => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp())
+      .post(CHUNK_PATH)
+      .set('sec-fetch-site', 'cross-site')
+      .set('Content-Type', 'application/octet-stream')
+      .send(Buffer.from('chunkbytes'));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('still rejects the types a form can send', async () => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp())
+      .post('/api/admin/other')
+      .set('sec-fetch-site', 'same-origin')
+      .set('Content-Type', 'text/plain')
+      .send('x=1');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(415);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a JSON route with an empty body on an octet-stream post', async () => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp())
+      .post('/api/admin/other')
+      .set('sec-fetch-site', 'same-origin')
+      .set('Content-Type', 'application/octet-stream')
+      .send(Buffer.from('{"a":1}'));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.body).toEqual({});
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/middleware/securityHardeningBatch2.test.js

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const fake = { maintenance: 'true', revoked: false, beforeCutoff: false, admin:
 jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
   const db = jest.fn((table) => {
     const q = {
+      leftJoin: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
       where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
       select: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
       first: jest.fn(async () => {
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
           return { setting_key: 'general_maintenance_mode', setting_value: fake.maintenance };
         }
         if (table === 'admin_users') return fake.admin;
+        if (table === 'events') return { id: 1, slug: 'preview', created_by: 1, is_active: 1 };
         return null;
       }),
     };
@@ -34,6 +36,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
   });
   return { db, withRetry: (fn) => fn() };
 });
+jest.mock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({ userHasAllPermissions: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true) }));
 jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() }));
 jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn(async () => fake.revoked) }));
 jest.mock('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff', () => ({ isTokenBeforeCutoff: jest.fn(async () => fake.beforeCutoff) }));
@@ -75,7 +78,7 @@ describe('general rate limiter skip', () => {
 });
 
 describe('admin preview requires a live admin session', () => {
-  const req = (token) => ({ query: { admin_preview: '1' }, cookies: { admin_token: token }, headers: {} });
+  const req = (token) => ({ params: { slug: 'preview' }, query: { admin_preview: '1' }, cookies: { admin_token: token }, headers: {} });
   beforeEach(() => { fake.revoked = false; fake.beforeCutoff = false; fake.admin = { id: 1, password_changed_at: null }; });
 
   it('passes for a live session and sets req.isAdminPreview', async () => {
@@ -108,13 +111,23 @@ describe('multipart origin gate', () => {
   const req = (headers) => ({ headers: { host: 'photos.example.com', ...headers } });
   it('accepts same-origin, same-site and non-browser requests', () => {
     expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' }))).toBe(true);
-    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-site' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-site' }))).toBe(false);
     expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'none' }))).toBe(true);
     expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({}))).toBe(true);
     expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'https://photos.example.com' }))).toBe(true);
     // Same-origin install without FRONTEND_URL: Origin matches the Host.
     expect(multipartOriginAllowed({ headers: { host: 'gallery.local', origin: 'http://gallery.local' } })).toBe(true);
   });
+  it('trusts Fetch Metadata same-origin before the Origin/scheme comparison', () => {
+    // TLS terminated upstream without X-Forwarded-Proto: req.protocol is http
+    // while the browser's Origin is https. Login must still work.
+    // gallery.local is not in the configured allowlist, so only the Host/scheme
+    // comparison or Fetch Metadata can admit it.
+    const proxied = { protocol: 'http', headers: { host: 'gallery.local', origin: 'https://gallery.local', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' } };
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(proxied)).toBe(true);
+    const legacyBrowser = { protocol: 'http', headers: { host: 'gallery.local', origin: 'https://gallery.local' } };
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(legacyBrowser)).toBe(false);
+  });
   it('rejects cross-site form posts', () => {
     expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' }))).toBe(false);
     expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'https://evil.example' }))).toBe(false);

backend/__tests__/migrations/212_product_usage_prompt_shown.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+const knex = require('knex');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+const { UsageService } = require('../../src/usage/UsageService');
+const { generateIdentity, digest, canonical } = require('../../src/usage/protocol.cjs');
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/212_product_usage_prompt_shown');
+
+let db;
+let directory;
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
+  directory = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-prompt-test-'));
+  for (const name of [
+    '201_product_usage', '202_product_usage_cancel_requested', '203_product_usage_cancel_seq',
+    '204_product_usage_privacy_receipts', '205_product_usage_consent_version', '206_product_usage_delivery_backoff'
+  ]) await require(`../../migrations/core/${name}`).up(db);
+});
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await db.destroy();
+  fs.rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+});
+
+test.each(['active', 'activation_pending', 'deletion_pending', 'identity_conflict'])(
+  'preserves an existing %s participation without altering its consent or pending packet', async (status) => {
+    await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
+      status, consent_version: 'usage-consent.v2', pending_packet: 'retained-packet',
+    });
+    await migration.up(db);
+    await migration.up(db);
+    const state = await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).first();
+    expect(state).toMatchObject({ status, consent_version: 'usage-consent.v2', pending_packet: 'retained-packet', prompt_shown: 1 });
+  }
+);
+
+test('a previously participating installation stays acknowledged after a confirmed withdrawal', async () => {
+  const actions = [];
+  const service = new UsageService(db, {
+    secret: 'test-only-prompt-encryption-secret-32-characters',
+    endpoint: 'https://collector.example.test',
+    bindingPath: path.join(directory, 'instance.key'),
+    fetch: async (_url, init) => {
+      const { packet } = JSON.parse(init.body);
+      actions.push(packet.action);
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+        packet_id: packet.packet_id, installation_id: packet.installation_id,
+        packet_digest: digest(canonical(packet)), action: packet.action,
+        sequence: packet.sequence, status: 'deleted',
+      }));
+    },
+  });
+  const identity = generateIdentity();
+  await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
+    status: 'active', notice_dismissed: 1, consent_version: 'usage-consent.v5', sequence: 1,
+    installation_id: identity.installation_id, public_key: identity.public_key,
+    private_key_encrypted: service.encrypt(identity.private_key), instance_binding: await service.binding(true),
+  });
+  await migration.up(db);
+  const state = await service.disable();
+  expect(actions).toEqual(['delete']);
+  expect(state).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: true, installation_id: null });
+  expect(state.privacy_receipts.last_deletion.status).toBe('collector-confirmed');
+});
+
+test('a fresh installation can decline once without changing consent or the separate banner', async () => {
+  await migration.up(db);
+  const fetch = jest.fn();
+  const service = new UsageService(db, { fetch });
+  expect(await service.status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: false, notice_dismissed: false });
+  await service.markPromptShown();
+  await migration.up(db);
+  expect(await service.status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: true, notice_dismissed: false });
+  expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});
+
+test('migration guards tolerate a missing table', async () => {
+  await db.schema.dropTable('product_usage_state');
+  await expect(migration.up(db)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  await expect(migration.down(db)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/eventsTimestampContract.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+const knex = require('knex');
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/210_events_updated_at');
+const { toTimestamp } = require('../../src/utils/dateNormalize');
+const { randomUUID } = require('crypto');
+
+const engines = [['sqlite', null], ...(process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL ? [['pg', process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL]] : [])];
+describe.each(engines)('event timestamp migration contract (%s)', (engine, connection) => {
+  let db, owner, schema;
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    if (engine === 'pg') {
+      schema = `event_contract_${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`;
+      owner = knex({ client: 'pg', connection });
+      await owner.schema.createSchema(schema);
+      db = knex({ client: 'pg', connection, searchPath: [schema] });
+    } else db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
+  });
+  afterEach(async () => {
+    await db.destroy();
+    if (owner) { await owner.schema.dropSchema(schema, true); await owner.destroy(); }
+  });
+  it('upgrades legacy data, is repeatable and preserves subsequent edits', async () => {
+    await db.schema.createTable('events', table => {
+      table.increments('id'); table.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(db.fn.now()); table.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
+    });
+    const created = '2026-01-02T03:04:05.000Z';
+    await db('events').insert({ created_at: created });
+    await migration.up(db); await migration.up(db);
+    let row = await db('events').first();
+    expect(toTimestamp(row.updated_at)).toBe(Date.parse(created));
+    await db('events').where({ id: row.id }).update({ updated_at: db.fn.now(), is_active: engine === 'pg' ? false : 0 });
+    const changed = (await db('events').first()).updated_at;
+    await migration.up(db); row = await db('events').first();
+    expect(toTimestamp(row.updated_at)).toBe(toTimestamp(changed)); expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.is_active);
+  });
+  it('handles a fresh table and an already present updated_at column', async () => {
+    await db.schema.createTable('events', table => { table.increments('id'); table.timestamp('created_at'); table.timestamp('updated_at'); });
+    await migration.up(db);
+    expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'updated_at')).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/freshPostgresGallery.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+const knex = require('knex');
+const { randomUUID } = require('crypto');
+const fs = require('fs/promises');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const pgUrl = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
+(pgUrl ? describe : describe.skip)('fresh PostgreSQL gallery contract', () => {
+  let owner, db, schema, tmpDir, cleanup, previousClient;
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    schema = `fresh_gallery_${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`;
+    owner = knex({ client: 'pg', connection: pgUrl });
+    await owner.schema.createSchema(schema);
+    previousClient = process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT;
+    process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT = 'pg';
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'fresh-pg-gallery-test-secret-at-least-32-characters';
+    tmpDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-fresh-pg-'));
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg', connection: pgUrl, searchPath: [schema] }));
+    ({ db } = require('../../src/database/db'));
+    // bootCrmDb runs the complete core chain against the shared db singleton.
+    ({ cleanup } = await require('../integration/helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+  }, 120000);
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await require('../../src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices();
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup(); else if (db) await db.destroy();
+    if (owner) { await owner.schema.dropSchema(schema, true); await owner.destroy(); }
+    if (tmpDir) await fs.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    if (previousClient === undefined) delete process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT; else process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT = previousClient;
+    jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
+  });
+  it('creates through the real admin route, then toggles a typed boolean and timestamp', async () => {
+    const { seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+    const { adminId } = await seedMinimal(db);
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+    const app = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    const bearer = `Bearer ${mintAdminToken(adminId)}`;
+    const created = await request(app).post('/api/admin/events').set('Authorization', bearer).send({
+      event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Fresh PostgreSQL', event_date: '2026-10-01',
+      customer_name: 'Customer', customer_email: 'customer@example.test', admin_email: 'admin@example.test',
+      password: 'Strong-Test-Photo-Pass-924!', expiration_days: 30, feedback_enabled: true,
+    });
+    expect(created.status).toBe(200);
+    const event = await db('events').where({ event_name: 'Fresh PostgreSQL' }).first();
+    expect(event.created_by).toBe(adminId);
+    expect(event.is_active).toBe(true);
+    expect(event.updated_at).toBeInstanceOf(Date);
+    expect(await db('event_feedback_settings').where({ event_id: event.id }).first()).toBeTruthy();
+    const toggled = await request(app).post(`/api/admin/events/${event.id}/toggle-status`).set('Authorization', bearer).send({});
+    expect(toggled.status).toBe(200);
+    const row = await db('events').where({ id: event.id }).first();
+    expect(row.is_active).toBe(false);
+    expect(row.updated_at).toBeInstanceOf(Date);
+    await require('../../migrations/core/210_events_updated_at').up(db);
+    expect((await db('events').where({ id: event.id }).first()).updated_at).toEqual(row.updated_at);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminContractsSignedPdfPathTraversal.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/**
+ * Same bug class as GHSA-9q5j-vqfw-32hr (fixed in adminEvents/logo.js) —
+ * the signed-PDF upload's multer `filename` callback built the stored
+ * path directly from `req.params.id` with no integer validation:
+ *
+ *   filename: (req, file, cb) => {
+ *     cb(null, `contract-${req.params.id}-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
+ *   }
+ *
+ * `POST /:id/upload-signed-pdf` declares `param('id').isInt({ min: 1 })`,
+ * but express-validator's check only runs inside the route handler via
+ * validateRequest(req) — AFTER multer has already parsed the multipart
+ * body and invoked the filename callback. A traversal payload in the raw
+ * `:id` URL segment reaches multer completely unvalidated.
+ *
+ * Fixed by rejecting any non-positive-integer id before it is used to
+ * build the filename, independent of the declared-but-too-late
+ * express-validator check.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+// ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES in fileSecurityUtils.js only defines image/video
+// entries, so the route's real fileFilter (validateFileType(..., ['application/pdf']))
+// rejects every PDF upload with "Only PDF files are allowed" — a
+// separate, pre-existing bug unrelated to the path-traversal fix under
+// test here (also present in publicContracts.js, which is why neither
+// suite exercises a successful upload). Stub validateFileType so this
+// suite can drive the full route, including the filename-callback fix,
+// end-to-end.
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/fileSecurityUtils', () => {
+  const actual = jest.requireActual('../../src/utils/fileSecurityUtils');
+  return {
+    ...actual,
+    validateFileType: (filename, mimetype, allowedTypes) => allowedTypes.includes(mimetype),
+  };
+});
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-contracts-signed-pdf-')), 'db.sqlite'
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-contracts-signed-pdf-test-secret';
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
+} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('POST /api/admin/contracts/:id/upload-signed-pdf — path traversal guard', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let customerId; let token;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+
+    // Feature flag defaults OFF on a fresh install — the contracts
+    // router 403s every route until it's on.
+    await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'contracts' }).update({ value: true });
+
+    app = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/contracts', require('../../src/routes/adminContracts'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
+
+  const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+  const signedDir = () => path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads/contracts/signed');
+
+  async function insertContract(over = {}) {
+    const base = {
+      contract_number: `K-TEST-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2, 8)}`,
+      customer_account_id: customerId,
+      title: 'Test Contract',
+      issue_date: new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10),
+      status: 'sent',
+      language: 'de',
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      ...over,
+    };
+    const inserted = await db('contracts').insert(base).returning('id');
+    return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+  }
+
+  it('rejects a traversal payload in the id param instead of writing outside uploads/contracts/signed', async () => {
+    // '../../../../tmp/pwned' URL-encoded so the raw request path still
+    // has a single segment (matches Express's `:id`), but Express
+    // decodes the param back into literal '../' sequences before the
+    // route sees it.
+    const traversalId = encodeURIComponent('../../../../tmp/pwned');
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/contracts/${traversalId}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+    ).attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/invalid contract id/i);
+
+    // No file should have been written anywhere — the filename callback
+    // must error out before multer opens a write stream.
+    const escapedFile = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'pwned');
+    expect(fs.existsSync(escapedFile)).toBe(false);
+    if (fs.existsSync(signedDir())) {
+      expect(fs.readdirSync(signedDir())).toHaveLength(0);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts a normal numeric contract id', async () => {
+    const id = await insertContract();
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/contracts/${id}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+    ).attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const files = fs.readdirSync(signedDir());
+    expect(files.some((f) => f.startsWith(`contract-${id}-`))).toBe(true);
+
+    const row = await db('contracts').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(row.status).toBe('fully_signed');
+    expect(row.signed_pdf_path).toMatch(new RegExp(`contract-${id}-`));
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminEventsLogoPathTraversal.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-9q5j-vqfw-32hr — the event-logo upload's multer `filename` callback
+ * built the stored path directly from `req.params.id` with no integer
+ * validation:
+ *
+ *   filename: (req, file, cb) => {
+ *     cb(null, `event-${req.params.id}-logo-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
+ *   }
+ *
+ * A traversal payload in the `:id` route param (URL-encoded so it still
+ * matches a single Express path segment, then decoded back into literal
+ * `../` sequences by Express before handlers see it) could escape the
+ * intended uploads/logos/events/ directory. Most directly reachable via a
+ * super_admin session: requireEventOwnership short-circuits with next() and
+ * zero DB lookup for that role (src/middleware/ownership.js), so nothing
+ * upstream of multer validates the id first.
+ *
+ * Fixed by rejecting any non-positive-integer id before it is used to build
+ * the filename, regardless of role or ownership-check ordering.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-events-logo-')), 'db.sqlite'
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-events-logo-test-secret';
+
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+async function insertEvent(db, adminId, over = {}) {
+  const base = {
+    slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    event_type: 'wedding',
+    event_name: 'Test Wedding',
+    event_date: '2026-05-29',
+    host_email: 'host@example.com',
+    admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+    is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+    created_by: adminId,
+    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    ...over,
+  };
+  const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
+  return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+}
+
+describe('POST /api/admin/events/:id/logo — path traversal guard', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let token;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    // super_admin: requireEventOwnership short-circuits with no DB lookup
+    // for this role, so it reaches multer with nothing upstream having
+    // validated the id — the exact path GHSA-9q5j-vqfw-32hr exploited.
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
+    token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+    app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+      res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
+    });
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
+
+  const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+  const logoDir = () => path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads/logos/events');
+
+  it('rejects a traversal payload in the id param instead of writing outside uploads/logos/events', async () => {
+    // '../../../../tmp/pwned' URL-encoded so the raw request path still has
+    // a single segment (matches Express's `:id`), but Express decodes the
+    // param back into literal '../' sequences before the route sees it.
+    const traversalId = encodeURIComponent('../../../../tmp/pwned');
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/events/${traversalId}/logo`)
+    ).attach('logo', Buffer.from('fake image data'), 'logo.png');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/invalid event id/i);
+
+    // No file should have been written anywhere — the filename callback
+    // must error out before multer opens a write stream.
+    const escapedFile = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'pwned');
+    expect(fs.existsSync(escapedFile)).toBe(false);
+    if (fs.existsSync(logoDir())) {
+      expect(fs.readdirSync(logoDir())).toHaveLength(0);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts a normal numeric event id', async () => {
+    const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Logo Event' });
+
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).post(`/api/admin/events/${id}/logo`)
+    ).attach('logo', Buffer.from('fake image data'), 'logo.png');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.hero_logo_url).toMatch(new RegExp(`^/uploads/logos/events/event-${id}-logo-`));
+
+    const files = fs.readdirSync(logoDir());
+    expect(files.some((f) => f.startsWith(`event-${id}-logo-`))).toBe(true);
+
+    const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+    expect(row.hero_logo_url).toBe(res.body.hero_logo_url);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminMfa.test.js

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ const { authenticator } = require('otplib');
 const {
   bootCrmDb, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
 } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const mfaService = require('../../src/services/mfaService');
 
 jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
@@ -235,6 +236,138 @@ describe('MFA disable — /api/admin/auth/mfa/disable', () => {
     expect(row.two_factor_secret).toBeNull();
     expect(row.two_factor_recovery_codes).toBeNull();
   });
+
+  // Concurrency regression: a plain UPDATE with no conditional guard let two
+  // requests carrying the same captured code both read the same
+  // two_factor_last_used_step and both persist, defeating replay protection.
+  // The guarded UPDATE (mfaService.persistTotpStep) makes only the first
+  // writer's affected-row count > 0; the loser must be rejected.
+  it('two concurrent disable requests with the SAME captured code: only one succeeds', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/disable')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+    ]);
+
+    expect([r1.status, r2.status].sort()).toEqual([200, 400]);
+
+    const status = await request(adminApp)
+      .get('/api/admin/auth/mfa/status')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+    expect(status.body.enabled).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('MFA regenerate recovery codes — /api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes', () => {
+  it('a valid TOTP regenerates the recovery codes and persists the step', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+
+    const res = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ code: authenticator.generate(secret) });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
+  });
+
+  it('a wrong code is rejected (400)', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const valid = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const wrong = valid === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000';
+
+    const res = await request(adminApp)
+      .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .send({ code: wrong });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  // Concurrency regression (see the disable test above for the mechanism):
+  // this is the endpoint called out as the worst lost-update case, since it
+  // both rotates the recovery codes and (previously) persisted the step in
+  // one unconditional UPDATE.
+  it('two concurrent regenerations with the SAME captured code: only one succeeds', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret, token } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+      request(adminApp)
+        .post('/api/admin/auth/mfa/recovery-codes')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
+        .send({ code }),
+    ]);
+
+    expect([r1.status, r2.status].sort()).toEqual([200, 400]);
+    const winner = r1.status === 200 ? r1 : r2;
+    expect(winner.body.recoveryCodes).toHaveLength(10);
+
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    expect(row.two_factor_last_used_step).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('mfaService.persistTotpStep — atomic replay-tracking persist', () => {
+  // Deterministic simulation of the race: two "concurrent" requests that
+  // read the SAME two_factor_last_used_step and computed the SAME totpStep
+  // from the same captured code. Calling persistTotpStep twice in a row with
+  // that identical totpStep reproduces exactly the DB-level outcome of a
+  // true race, without relying on event-loop timing.
+  it('the second writer with the same totpStep affects 0 rows and is rejected', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const totpStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, row.two_factor_secret, null);
+    expect(totpStep).toEqual(expect.any(Number));
+
+    const first = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, { updated_at: new Date() });
+    expect(first).toBe(true);
+
+    // The row's two_factor_last_used_step has now already advanced to
+    // totpStep by the time this "losing" write runs — the guard condition
+    // (whereNull OR < totpStep) is false, so 0 rows are affected.
+    const second = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, { updated_at: new Date() });
+    expect(second).toBe(false);
+
+    const after = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    expect(Number(after.two_factor_last_used_step)).toBe(totpStep);
+  });
+
+  it('succeeds when the new step advances past the current one', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: admin.id }).first();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const totpStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, row.two_factor_secret, null);
+
+    const ok = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, {});
+    expect(ok).toBe(true);
+
+    const nextStepAuthenticator = authenticator.clone({ epoch: Date.now() + 30000 });
+    const nextCode = nextStepAuthenticator.generate(secret);
+    const nextStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(nextCode, row.two_factor_secret, totpStep);
+    expect(nextStep).toBeGreaterThan(totpStep);
+
+    const advanced = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, nextStep, {});
+    expect(advanced).toBe(true);
+  });
 });
 
 describe('Admin login challenge — /api/auth/admin/login[/mfa]', () => {
@@ -284,6 +417,86 @@ describe('Admin login challenge — /api/auth/admin/login[/mfa]', () => {
     expect(res.body.user.id).toBe(admin.id);
   });
 
+  // GHSA-qcwx-r25m-j869: verifyTotp() was stateless, so otplib's window:1
+  // tolerance let the same 6-digit code complete two independent logins
+  // within its ~90s validity window. mfaService now tracks each admin's
+  // last-consumed TOTP step and rejects a code that doesn't advance past it.
+  it('#GHSA-qcwx-r25m-j869 — a TOTP code cannot be replayed into a second login', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    // First use of the code completes a login.
+    const c1 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const first = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c1.body.mfaToken, code });
+    expect(first.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(first.body.user).toBeDefined();
+
+    // Replaying the SAME code for an independent second login must fail,
+    // even though otplib's window:1 tolerance still considers it valid.
+    const c2 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const replay = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c2.body.mfaToken, code });
+    expect(replay.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(replay.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
+    expect(replay.body.user).toBeUndefined();
+
+    // A freshly generated code for the NEXT TOTP step is not a replay and
+    // succeeds. Generated via a cloned authenticator with a future epoch
+    // rather than mocking Date.now(), so mfaService's own step computation
+    // (real Date.now()) still lands the match one step ahead.
+    const nextStepAuthenticator = authenticator.clone({ epoch: Date.now() + 30000 });
+    const nextCode = nextStepAuthenticator.generate(secret);
+    const c3 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const third = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa')
+      .send({ mfaToken: c3.body.mfaToken, code: nextCode });
+    expect(third.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(third.body.user).toBeDefined();
+    expect(third.body.user.id).toBe(admin.id);
+  });
+
+  // Concurrency regression: verifyTotpEncryptedStep()'s "does this advance"
+  // check was read against a snapshot taken earlier in the request, then a
+  // PLAIN update persisted the step — two concurrent requests carrying the
+  // SAME captured code could both pass the check and both complete a login
+  // before either write landed. The persist is now a conditional UPDATE
+  // (mfaService.persistTotpStep), so only the first writer's affected-row
+  // count is > 0 and the other is correctly treated as a replay.
+  it('two concurrent login/mfa requests with the SAME captured code: only one completes', async () => {
+    const admin = await seedAdmin();
+    const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const c1 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+    const c2 = await request(authApp)
+      .post('/api/auth/admin/login')
+      .send({ username: admin.username, password: admin.password });
+
+    const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([
+      request(authApp).post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa').send({ mfaToken: c1.body.mfaToken, code }),
+      request(authApp).post('/api/auth/admin/login/mfa').send({ mfaToken: c2.body.mfaToken, code }),
+    ]);
+
+    expect([r1.status, r2.status].sort()).toEqual([200, 401]);
+    const winner = r1.status === 200 ? r1 : r2;
+    const loser = r1.status === 200 ? r2 : r1;
+    expect(winner.body.user).toBeDefined();
+    expect(loser.body.user).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(loser.body.code).toBe('MFA_INVALID');
+  });
+
   it('login/mfa with a wrong code is 401 MFA_INVALID', async () => {
     const admin = await seedAdmin();
     const { secret } = await enroll(admin.id);

backend/__tests__/routes/adminShortUrlOwnership.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-9h7q-2jpf-vj85 — DELETE /api/admin/short-urls/:id only checked
+ * `events.edit` permission, with no ownership scoping. GET and POST for an
+ * event's short URLs both chain requireEventOwnership; DELETE takes the
+ * short URL row's own :id (not :eventId), so any admin holding events.edit
+ * could delete another admin's branded gallery short URL. The route now
+ * resolves the short URL's event first and applies the same ownership
+ * predicate requireEventOwnership uses. super_admin keeps global access.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-suown-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'suown-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-suown-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('short URL delete ownership scoping', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let service;
+  let superTok; let ownerTok; let foreignTok;
+  let ownerId;
+  let foreignShortUrlId;
+
+  const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
+
+  async function seedEvent(createdBy, slugSuffix) {
+    const farFuture = new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 86400000).toISOString();
+    const [id] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: `suown-${slugSuffix}`,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Test Event',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@e.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@e.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `suown-${slugSuffix}`,
+      share_token: `suown-share-${slugSuffix}`,
+      expires_at: farFuture,
+      is_active: true,
+      is_archived: false,
+      created_by: createdBy,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+    return db('events').where({ id }).first();
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    service = require('../../src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
+
+    const superIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'suown-super', email: 'suown-super@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const superId = superIns[0]?.id ?? superIns[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+    superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
+
+    const ownerIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'suown-owner', email: 'suown-owner@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    ownerId = ownerIns[0]?.id ?? ownerIns[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, ownerId, 'editor');
+    ownerTok = mintAdminToken(ownerId);
+
+    const foreignIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'suown-foreign', email: 'suown-foreign@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const foreignId = foreignIns[0]?.id ?? foreignIns[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'editor');
+    foreignTok = mintAdminToken(foreignId);
+
+    // Event owned by `owner`, NOT `foreign`.
+    await seedEvent(ownerId, 'owned');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin', require('../../src/routes/adminShortUrls'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    // Fresh short URL per DELETE test so earlier deletes don't interfere.
+    const event = await db('events').where({ created_by: ownerId }).first();
+    const row = await service.createShortUrl({
+      eventId: event.id,
+      customSlug: `suown-target-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`,
+      createdBy: ownerId,
+    });
+    foreignShortUrlId = row.id;
+  });
+
+  it('an admin who does not own the event cannot delete its short URL (403, row survives)', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete(`/api/admin/short-urls/${foreignShortUrlId}`),
+      foreignTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    const row = await db('gallery_short_urls').where({ id: foreignShortUrlId }).first();
+    expect(row).toBeDefined();
+    expect(row.deleted_at).toBeFalsy();
+  });
+
+  it('the owning admin can delete its own short URL', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete(`/api/admin/short-urls/${foreignShortUrlId}`),
+      ownerTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(204);
+    const row = await db('gallery_short_urls').where({ id: foreignShortUrlId }).first();
+    expect(row.deleted_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin can delete any short URL', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete(`/api/admin/short-urls/${foreignShortUrlId}`),
+      superTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(204);
+    const row = await db('gallery_short_urls').where({ id: foreignShortUrlId }).first();
+    expect(row.deleted_at).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('deleting a nonexistent short URL id returns 404', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete('/api/admin/short-urls/9999999'),
+      superTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it('deleting a nonexistent short URL id as a non-owner also returns 404 (existence check runs first)', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(
+      request(app).delete('/api/admin/short-urls/9999999'),
+      foreignTok,
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminUsage.test.js

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/productUsageService', () =>
       'tick',
       'status',
       'dismiss',
+      'markPromptShown',
       'enable',
       'disable',
       'abandon',
@@ -63,6 +64,11 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
     t.integer('role_id');
     t.boolean('is_active');
     t.timestamp('password_changed_at');
+    // adminAuth() now selects this on every request (GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx
+    // must_change_password enforcement) — without the column the join
+    // throws and every route in this file 401s before reaching the
+    // permission check it's meant to test.
+    t.boolean('must_change_password');
   });
   await mockDb.schema.createTable('permissions', (t) => {
     t.increments('id');
@@ -129,6 +135,7 @@ const ROUTES = [
   ['post', '/abandon'],
   ['post', '/retry'],
   ['post', '/dismiss'],
+  ['post', '/prompt-seen'],
   ['get', '/preview'],
   ['get', '/export'],
   ['put', '/feedback-preferences'],
@@ -178,6 +185,15 @@ test('owner sees no-store status and supplies consent to the service', async ()
     .expect(200);
   expect(service.enable).toHaveBeenCalledWith('usage-consent.v1');
 });
+test('only a settings editor can acknowledge the prompt without opting in', async () => {
+  await request(app)
+    .post('/api/admin/usage/prompt-seen')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token('admin')}`)
+    .expect('Cache-Control', 'no-store')
+    .expect(200);
+  expect(service.markPromptShown).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  expect(service.enable).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});
 test('public/gallery paths and failed/unauthenticated admin operations never set feature markers', async () => {
   const { EventEmitter } = require('events');
   const simulate = (path, admin, statusCode) => {

backend/__tests__/routes/authSession.symmetry.test.js

@@ -1,460 +1,82 @@
-/**
- * Regression test for the /admin/login → /admin/dashboard → /admin/login
- * redirect loop reported on v3.32.4-beta.0.
- *
- * Cause: GET /auth/session was less strict than the adminAuth middleware.
- * The session endpoint accepted tokens that the protected endpoints
- * subsequently rejected with 401, which the frontend's interceptor
- * translated into a hard redirect to /admin/login. /auth/session then
- * said "valid: true" again on the next page load and the cycle closed.
- *
- * /auth/session must reject the same admin tokens adminAuth would
- * reject, specifically: deactivated admin user, deleted admin user,
- * password changed since iat. Same for gallery: archived event.
- */
-
-const express = require('express');
+/** Session restoration uses the same live policy as protected routes. */
 const request = require('supertest');
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
-
-process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'session-symmetry-test-secret';
-
-const fakeDb = {
-  adminUsers: [],
-  events: [],
-  revokedTokens: [],
-};
-
-jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
-  const formatBoolean = (v) => (v ? 1 : 0);
-  void formatBoolean;
-  function dbFn(table) {
-    if (table === 'admin_users') {
-      let rowFilter = () => true;
-      return {
-        // The session route joins roles for the adminUser payload (#798);
-        // fake rows carry no role fields, so the join is a pass-through.
-        leftJoin() {
-          return this;
-        },
-        where(criteria) {
-          rowFilter = (row) => {
-            return Object.entries(criteria).every(([rawKey, v]) => {
-              // Joined queries prefix columns ('admin_users.id') — the fake
-              // rows use bare names.
-              const k = rawKey.replace(/^admin_users\./, '');
-              if (k === 'is_active') return Boolean(row.is_active) === Boolean(v);
-              return row[k] === v;
-            });
-          };
-          return this;
-        },
-        select(...cols) {
-          this._cols = cols;
-          return this;
-        },
-        async first() {
-          const row = fakeDb.adminUsers.find(rowFilter);
-          if (!row) return undefined;
-          if (!this._cols) return row;
-          const out = {};
-          for (const c of this._cols) {
-            // Support 'table.col' and 'table.col as alias' shapes.
-            const [source, alias] = c.split(/\s+as\s+/i);
-            const bare = source.includes('.') ? source.split('.').pop() : source;
-            out[alias || bare] = row[bare];
-          }
-          return out;
-        },
-      };
-    }
-    if (table === 'events') {
-      let rowFilter = () => true;
-      return {
-        where(criteria) {
-          rowFilter = (row) =>
-            Object.entries(criteria).every(([k, v]) => {
-              if (k === 'is_active') return Boolean(row.is_active) === Boolean(v);
-              if (k === 'is_archived') return Boolean(row.is_archived) === Boolean(v);
-              return row[k] === v;
-            });
-          return this;
-        },
-        async first() {
-          return fakeDb.events.find(rowFilter);
-        },
-      };
-    }
-    throw new Error(`Unexpected table: ${table}`);
-  }
-  return { db: dbFn, formatBoolean: () => 1 };
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'session-symmetry-test-secret-with-at-least-32-characters';
+let db, cleanup, app, adminId, customerId, eventId, cutoff;
+const slug = 'session-symmetry';
+const sign = (claims = {}) => jwt.sign({ type: 'admin', id: adminId, username: 'tester',
+  iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60, jti: crypto.randomUUID(), ...claims },
+process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth', expiresIn: '4h' });
+const gallery = (claims = {}) => sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId, eventSlug: slug, ...claims });
+const session = bearer => request(app).get(`/api/auth/session?slug=${slug}`).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${bearer}`);
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  ({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+  await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+  const row = await require('../../src/services/eventCreationService').createEvent({
+    event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Session symmetry', event_date: '2026-10-01',
+    slug, password: 'Session-Strong-Password-924!', expiration_days: 30,
+    customer_email: 'customer@example.test', admin_email: 'admin@example.test',
+  }, { actor: { id: adminId }, source: 'v1' });
+  eventId = row.id;
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ slug });
+  await db('event_customer_assignments').insert({ event_id: eventId, customer_account_id: customerId });
+  cutoff = require('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff');
+  app = buildRouteApp('/api/auth', require('../../src/routes/auth'));
+}, 120000);
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ is_active: 1, password_changed_at: null });
+  await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: customerId }).update({ is_active: 1, password_changed_at: null });
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000).toISOString() });
+  await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(0);
 });
-
-jest.mock('../../src/utils/dbCompat', () => ({
-  formatBoolean: (v) => (v ? 1 : 0),
-}));
-
-jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({
-  isTokenRevoked: jest.fn(async (decoded) => fakeDb.revokedTokens.includes(decoded.id)),
-  revokeToken: jest.fn(),
-}));
-
-jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenUtils', () => ({
-  getAdminTokenFromRequest: (req) => {
-    const auth = req.headers.authorization;
-    if (auth && auth.startsWith('Bearer ')) return auth.slice(7);
-    return null;
-  },
-  getGalleryTokenFromRequest: () => null,
-  setAdminAuthCookie: jest.fn(),
-  setGalleryAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
-  clearAdminAuthCookie: jest.fn(),
-  clearGalleryAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
-  buildCookieOptionsWithExpiry: () => ({}),
-}));
-
-jest.mock('../../src/services/recaptcha', () => ({ verifyRecaptcha: () => Promise.resolve(true) }));
-// Mock sessionTimeout's isSessionExpired so each test controls the return.
-// Default: not expired (so existing tests keep passing without setup).
-jest.mock('../../src/middleware/sessionTimeout', () => ({
-  endSession: jest.fn(),
-  isSessionExpired: jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve(false)),
-}));
-jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
-  info: jest.fn(),
-  warn: jest.fn(),
-  error: jest.fn(),
-  debug: jest.fn(),
-}));
-
-const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
-
-function makeApp() {
-  const app = express();
-  app.use(express.json());
-  app.use('/auth', authRouter);
-  return app;
-}
-
-function signAdminToken({ id = 1, username = 'admin', iat, exp }) {
-  const issuedAt = iat ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
-  // Note: do NOT pass noTimestamp:true here — that strips iat from the
-  // payload entirely, defeating the password-change comparison. Provide
-  // iat (and exp) via the payload directly instead.
-  return jwt.sign(
-    { id, username, type: 'admin', iat: issuedAt, exp: exp ?? issuedAt + 3600 },
-    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
-    { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
-  );
-}
-
-function signGalleryToken({ eventId = 100, eventSlug = 'wedding', ...extra } = {}) {
-  return jwt.sign(
-    { eventId, eventSlug, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
-    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
-    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
-  );
-}
-
-describe('GET /auth/session — symmetry with protected middleware', () => {
-  beforeEach(() => {
-    fakeDb.adminUsers = [];
-    fakeDb.events = [];
-    fakeDb.revokedTokens = [];
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:true for an active admin token', async () => {
-    fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-      id: 1,
-      username: 'admin',
-      email: 'a@b.com',
-      is_active: true,
-      password_changed_at: null,
-    });
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-    expect(res.body.type).toBe('admin');
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false when the admin user has been deactivated', async () => {
-    fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-      id: 1,
-      username: 'admin',
-      email: 'a@b.com',
-      is_active: false,
-      password_changed_at: null,
-    });
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false when the admin user no longer exists', async () => {
-    // adminUsers is empty
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 999 });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false when password was changed after the token was issued', async () => {
-    // iat must be in the past, exp must be in the future so jwt.verify
-    // doesn't reject the token before /auth/session even gets to look
-    // at password_changed_at.
-    const tokenIssuedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60; // 1 min ago
-    const tokenExp = tokenIssuedAt + 86400;
-    fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-      id: 1,
-      username: 'admin',
-      email: 'a@b.com',
-      is_active: true,
-      password_changed_at: new Date((tokenIssuedAt + 30) * 1000), // 30s after iat
-    });
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1, iat: tokenIssuedAt, exp: tokenExp });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:true when password was changed BEFORE the token was issued', async () => {
-    const tokenIssuedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60;
-    const tokenExp = tokenIssuedAt + 86400;
-    fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-      id: 1,
-      username: 'admin',
-      email: 'a@b.com',
-      is_active: true,
-      password_changed_at: new Date((tokenIssuedAt - 3600) * 1000), // 1h before iat
-    });
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1, iat: tokenIssuedAt, exp: tokenExp });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false for a gallery token whose event is archived', async () => {
-    fakeDb.events.push({
-      id: 100,
-      slug: 'wedding',
-      is_active: true,
-      is_archived: true,
-      expires_at: null,
-    });
-    const token = signGalleryToken();
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false for a gallery token whose event is expired', async () => {
-    fakeDb.events.push({
-      id: 100,
-      slug: 'wedding',
-      is_active: true,
-      is_archived: false,
-      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - 86400_000),
-    });
-    const token = signGalleryToken();
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:true for an active gallery token', async () => {
-    fakeDb.events.push({
-      id: 100,
-      slug: 'wedding',
-      is_active: true,
-      is_archived: false,
-      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400_000),
-    });
-    const token = signGalleryToken();
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  /**
-   * What KIND of gallery session this is (#1149).
-   *
-   * The frontend used to keep this in sessionStorage, which is per-TAB while
-   * the cookie is per-browser: a gallery reopened in a second tab lost
-   * 'client' even though the backend still served it as one, and the UI hid
-   * the only control that clears the privileged cookie. Reported from the
-   * token so a restored session knows what it actually is.
-   */
-  describe('gallery session kind', () => {
-    beforeEach(() => {
-      fakeDb.events.push({
-        id: 100,
-        slug: 'wedding',
-        is_active: true,
-        is_archived: false,
-        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400_000),
-      });
-    });
-
-    it('reports a PIN-client session as client', async () => {
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ accessLevel: 'client' })}`);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('client');
-      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
-    });
-
-    it('reports a customer-portal session, which looks like a guest', async () => {
-      // via:'customer' runs at accessLevel 'guest' but bypasses reveal mode,
-      // so it is a credential that does not look like one.
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ via: 'customer', customerId: 7 })}`);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
-      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(true);
-    });
-
-    it('reports a plain guest as neither', async () => {
-      // The flags have to discriminate, or they would just hand every visitor
-      // a Logout button back.
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken()}`);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
-      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false when the token is revoked', async () => {
-    fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-      id: 1,
-      username: 'admin',
-      is_active: true,
-      password_changed_at: null,
-    });
-    fakeDb.revokedTokens.push(1);
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  // Session-timeout symmetry — issue #350 recurrence on v3.39.1-beta.0.
-  // sessionTimeoutMiddleware (mounted on /api/admin) rejects idle/old-iat
-  // tokens with 401 SESSION_TIMEOUT, but /auth/session previously didn't.
-  // The new isSessionExpired helper closes that asymmetry.
-  describe('session-timeout symmetry', () => {
-    const { isSessionExpired } = require('../../src/middleware/sessionTimeout');
-
-    beforeEach(() => {
-      isSessionExpired.mockReset();
-      // Default to "active session" so the other admin checks above also
-      // pass when this branch runs.
-      isSessionExpired.mockResolvedValue(false);
-    });
-
-    it('returns valid:false when isSessionExpired reports the token has timed out', async () => {
-      fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-        id: 1,
-        username: 'admin',
-        is_active: true,
-        password_changed_at: null,
-      });
-      isSessionExpired.mockResolvedValue(true);
-      const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-      expect(res.body.error).toBe('Session expired');
-    });
-
-    it('returns valid:true for an active admin token (helper says not expired)', async () => {
-      fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-        id: 1,
-        username: 'admin',
-        is_active: true,
-        password_changed_at: null,
-      });
-      isSessionExpired.mockResolvedValue(false);
-      const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-      expect(isSessionExpired).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-    });
-
-    it('does not call isSessionExpired for gallery tokens', async () => {
-      fakeDb.events.push({
-        id: 100,
-        slug: 'wedding',
-        is_active: true,
-        is_archived: false,
-        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400_000),
-      });
-      const token = signGalleryToken();
-
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-      expect(isSessionExpired).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    });
-
-    it('falls through (treats as valid) if the helper itself throws', async () => {
-      // Defensive: the require() in auth.js is wrapped in try/catch so a
-      // missing/broken helper doesn't fail-closed during early bootstrap.
-      fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-        id: 1,
-        username: 'admin',
-        is_active: true,
-        password_changed_at: null,
-      });
-      isSessionExpired.mockRejectedValue(new Error('boom'));
-      const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-    });
-  });
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await require('../../src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices();
+  if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+});
+it('hydrates an active admin and its role', async () => {
+  const res = await session(sign());
+  expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ valid: true, type: 'admin', adminUser: { id: adminId, role: { name: 'super_admin' } } });
+});
+it.each(['disabled', 'password', 'deleted', 'idle'])('rejects an admin after %s', async reason => {
+  let bearer = sign();
+  if (reason === 'disabled') await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
+  if (reason === 'password') await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ password_changed_at: new Date().toISOString() });
+  if (reason === 'deleted') bearer = sign({ id: 999999 });
+  if (reason === 'idle') bearer = sign({ iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 7200 });
+  expect((await session(bearer)).body.valid).toBe(false);
+});
+it('accepts a session issued after a previous password change', async () => {
+  await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ password_changed_at: new Date(Date.now() - 120000).toISOString() });
+  expect((await session(sign())).body.valid).toBe(true);
+});
+it.each(['archived', 'expired', 'draft', 'inactive'])('rejects a gallery that is %s', async reason => {
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({
+    ...(reason === 'archived' && { is_archived: 1 }), ...(reason === 'draft' && { is_draft: 1 }),
+    ...(reason === 'inactive' && { is_active: 0 }), ...(reason === 'expired' && { expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - 1000).toISOString() }),
+  });
+  expect((await session(gallery())).body.valid).toBe(false);
+});
+it.each(['guest', 'client', 'customer'])('restores the %s gallery session kind', async kind => {
+  const res = await session(gallery(kind === 'customer' ? { via: 'customer', customerId } : { accessLevel: kind }));
+  expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ valid: true, accessLevel: kind === 'client' ? 'client' : 'guest', viaCustomer: kind === 'customer' });
+});
+it.each(['revoked', 'restore'])('invalidates both admin and gallery sessions after %s', async reason => {
+  const tokens = [sign(), gallery()];
+  if (reason === 'restore') await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
+  else for (const bearer of tokens) await require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation').revokeToken(bearer, 'test');
+  for (const bearer of tokens) expect((await session(bearer)).body.valid).toBe(false);
+});
+it('refuses a deactivated customer gallery session', async () => {
+  const bearer = gallery({ via: 'customer', customerId });
+  expect((await session(bearer)).body.valid).toBe(true);
+  await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: customerId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
+  expect((await session(bearer)).body.valid).toBe(false);
+});
+it('refuses an unrelated JWT type', async () => {
+  const res = await session(sign({ type: 'password-reset' }));
+  expect(res.status).toBe(403); expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
 });

backend/__tests__/routes/databaseBackupConfigDestination.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * PUT /api/admin/database-backup/config must reject a
+ * database_backup_destination_path that resolves inside a publicly served
+ * directory (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm class, #1365).
+ *
+ * Before #1365, database_backup_destination_path was silently ignored by
+ * databaseBackupService.backup() (a destructuring bug always fell back to
+ * the hardcoded /backup/database), so this setting being freely writable by
+ * any backup.create holder — the built-in `admin` role has it without
+ * settings.edit or backup.restore — was harmless. Making the setting
+ * actually take effect reopens the exact exfiltration path GHSA-jw8m fixed
+ * for the per-request override, through the persisted setting instead.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-config-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dbbackup-config-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('database backup destination-path config guard (GHSA-jw8m class, #1365)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminToken;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'limited-admin',
+      email: 'limited-admin-config@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id, username: 'limited-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/database-backup', require('../../src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('rejects a destination inside the public uploads/logos mount', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads', 'logos') });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+
+    // The seeded default must survive untouched — the rejected value never lands.
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_destination_path' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe('/backup/database');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a destination inside the public fonts mount', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'fonts') });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a destination outside any public mount', async () => {
+    const safePath = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'db-backups');
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: safePath });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_destination_path' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(safePath);
+  });
+
+  // A retention of 0 or less pushes cleanupOldBackups' cutoff to today or
+  // the future, deleting every completed backup on the next scheduled run
+  // — a backup.create holder achieving what backup.delete gates on /cleanup.
+  it.each([-1, 0])('rejects database_backup_retention_days=%s', async (bad) => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_retention_days: bad });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a positive database_backup_retention_days', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_retention_days: 90 });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_retention_days' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(90);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryAccessPolicy.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+/** Real routes + migrated SQLite: the same session policy protects lists and media. */
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const fs = require('fs/promises');
+const path = require('path');
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'gallery-policy-regression-secret-at-least-32-characters';
+
+jest.mock('../../src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware', () => ({
+  secureImageAccess: (req, _res, next) => {
+    req.clientInfo = { fingerprint: 'policy-test', ip: '127.0.0.1', userAgent: 'jest' };
+    next();
+  },
+  getSecurityStatus: (_req, res) => res.json({}),
+}));
+
+let db, cleanup, app, adminId, customerId, foreignId, event, secure, cutoff, revokeToken;
+const eventId = 70001, photoId = 70002, slug = 'policy-test';
+const token = (claims = {}) => jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId, eventSlug: slug,
+  iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60, jti: crypto.randomUUID(), ...claims },
+process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth', expiresIn: '1h' });
+const get = (url, bearer) => {
+  const req = request(app).get(url);
+  return bearer ? req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${bearer}`) : req;
+};
+const endpoints = [`/api/gallery/${slug}/photos`, `/api/gallery/${slug}/photo/${photoId}`,
+  `/api/gallery/${slug}/thumbnail/${photoId}`, `/api/gallery/${slug}/download/${photoId}`];
+const expectDirect = async (bearer, status, suffix = '') => {
+  for (const url of endpoints) expect((await get(url + suffix, bearer)).status).toBe(status);
+};
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  ({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+  await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+  const [row] = await db('admin_users').insert({ username: 'foreign', email: 'foreign@example.test', password_hash: 'unused', is_active: 1 }).returning('id');
+  foreignId = row.id ?? row;
+  await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'viewer');
+  await db('events').insert({ id: eventId, slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Policy test',
+    event_date: '2026-01-01', host_email: 'h@example.test', admin_email: 'a@example.test', password_hash: 'unused',
+    share_link: '/gallery/policy-test', created_by: adminId });
+  const file = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, `events/active/${slug}/individual/fixture.jpg`);
+  await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+  await require('sharp')({ create: { width: 8, height: 8, channels: 3, background: '#228844' } }).jpeg().toFile(file);
+  await db('photos').insert({ id: photoId, event_id: eventId, filename: 'fixture.jpg', path: `${slug}/individual/fixture.jpg`,
+    type: 'individual', mime_type: 'image/jpeg', processing_status: 'complete', size_bytes: (await fs.stat(file)).size });
+  await db('event_customer_assignments').insert({ event_id: eventId, customer_account_id: customerId });
+  secure = require('../../src/services/secureImageService');
+  jest.spyOn(secure, 'createClientFingerprint').mockReturnValue('policy-test');
+  cutoff = require('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff');
+  ({ revokeToken } = require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation'));
+  app = express(); app.use(express.json()); app.use(cookieParser());
+  app.use('/api', require('../../src/middleware/csrf'));
+  app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+  app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  app.use('/api/images', require('../../src/routes/protectedImages'));
+  app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
+}, 120000);
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, require_password: 1,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000).toISOString(), reveal_mode: 0 });
+  await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: customerId }).update({ is_active: 1, password_changed_at: null });
+  if (!await db('event_customer_assignments').where({ event_id: eventId, customer_account_id: customerId }).first()) {
+    await db('event_customer_assignments').insert({ event_id: eventId, customer_account_id: customerId });
+  }
+  await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(0);
+  event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+});
+afterAll(async () => { secure?.dispose(); if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+it('serves a valid session as a real list and JPEG', async () => {
+  const bearer = token();
+  const list = await get(endpoints[0], bearer);
+  expect(list.status).toBe(200);
+  expect(list.body.photos).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([expect.objectContaining({ id: photoId })]));
+  const image = await get(endpoints[1], bearer);
+  expect(image.status).toBe(200); expect(image.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/image\/jpeg/);
+  expect(image.body.length).toBeGreaterThan(100);
+});
+it('scopes draft previews to the owner and current read permissions', async () => {
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ is_draft: 1 });
+  await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(foreignId), 403, '?admin_preview=1');
+  await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(adminId), 200, '?admin_preview=1');
+  // Ownership alone does not grant a user without a role read access.
+  const role = (await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).first()).role_id;
+  await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ role_id: null });
+  try { await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(adminId), 403, '?admin_preview=1'); }
+  finally { await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ role_id: role }); }
+});
+it.each(['revocation', 'restore'])('rejects gallery sessions after %s', async (reason) => {
+  const bearer = token();
+  if (reason === 'revocation') expect(await revokeToken(bearer, 'test')).toBe(true);
+  else await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
+  await expectDirect(bearer, 401);
+});
+it.each(['deactivated', 'password changed'])('rejects an assigned customer when %s', async (reason) => {
+  const bearer = token({ via: 'customer', customerId });
+  await expectDirect(bearer, 200);
+  await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: customerId }).update(reason === 'deactivated'
+    ? { is_active: 0 } : { password_changed_at: new Date().toISOString() });
+  await expectDirect(bearer, 401);
+});
+it.each(['ISO', 'epoch'])('enforces expiry immediately for public and JWT access (%s)', async (format) => {
+  const expiry = Date.now() - 1000;
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ require_password: 0, expires_at: format === 'ISO' ? new Date(expiry).toISOString() : expiry });
+  await expectDirect(undefined, 404); await expectDirect(token(), 404);
+  await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(adminId), 200, '?admin_preview=1');
+});
+it.each(['revocation', 'restore', 'expiry', 'customer'])('rechecks signed and secure image grants after %s', async (reason) => {
+  const bearer = token(reason === 'customer' ? { via: 'customer', customerId } : {});
+  const signed = await request(app).post(`/api/images/${slug}/photo/${photoId}/generate-url`).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${bearer}`).send({});
+  expect(signed.status).toBe(200);
+  const minted = await request(app).post(`/api/secure-images/${slug}/generate-token`).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${bearer}`).send({ photoId });
+  expect(minted.status).toBe(200);
+  const secureUrl = `/api/secure-images/${slug}/secure/${photoId}/${minted.body.token}`;
+  expect((await get(signed.body.url)).status).toBe(200);
+  expect((await get(secureUrl)).status).toBe(200);
+  if (reason === 'revocation') await revokeToken(bearer, 'test');
+  if (reason === 'restore') await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
+  if (reason === 'expiry') await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - 1000).toISOString() });
+  if (reason === 'customer') await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: customerId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
+  const status = reason === 'expiry' ? 404 : 401;
+  expect((await get(signed.body.url)).status).toBe(status);
+  expect((await get(secureUrl)).status).toBe(status);
+});
+
+it('blocks an empty cross-site cookie POST before the reveal state changes', async () => {
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ reveal_mode: 1, revealed_at: null });
+  const cookie = `admin_token=${mintAdminToken(adminId)}`;
+  const url = `/api/admin/events/${eventId}/reveal`;
+  const blocked = await request(app).post(url).set('Cookie', cookie).set('Origin', 'https://attacker.example')
+    .set('Sec-Fetch-Site', 'cross-site').set('Content-Type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded').send('');
+  expect(blocked.status).toBe(403);
+  expect((await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first()).revealed_at).toBeNull();
+  process.env.ADMIN_URL = 'https://admin.example.test';
+  try {
+    const allowed = await request(app).post(url).set('Cookie', cookie).set('Origin', process.env.ADMIN_URL)
+      .set('Sec-Fetch-Site', 'cross-site').send({});
+    expect(allowed.status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first()).revealed_at).not.toBeNull();
+  } finally { delete process.env.ADMIN_URL; }
+});
+
+it('toggles status on a fully migrated fresh database and records updated_at', async () => {
+  const response = await request(app).post(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/toggle-status`)
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${mintAdminToken(adminId)}`).send({});
+  expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+  expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.is_active);
+  expect(Number.isFinite(require('../../src/utils/dateNormalize').toTimestamp(row.updated_at))).toBe(true);
+});
+it('paginates after feedback filtering, with a total independent of page size', async () => {
+  const ids = [70003, 70004, 70005];
+  await db('photos').insert(ids.map(id => ({ id, event_id: eventId, filename: `${id}.jpg`, path: 'unused',
+    type: 'individual', like_count: 1, processing_status: 'complete' })));
+  await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({ event_id: eventId, feedback_enabled: 1, show_feedback_to_guests: 1 });
+  try {
+    const bearer = token();
+    const first = await get(`${endpoints[0]}?filter=liked&limit=2&page=1&sort=filename&order=asc`, bearer);
+    const second = await get(`${endpoints[0]}?filter=liked&limit=2&page=2&sort=filename&order=asc`, bearer);
+    expect(first.status).toBe(200); expect(second.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(first.body.pagination).toMatchObject({ total: 3, has_more: true });
+    expect(second.body.pagination).toMatchObject({ total: 3, has_more: false });
+    expect([...first.body.photos, ...second.body.photos].map(photo => photo.id)).toEqual(ids);
+  } finally {
+    await db('photos').whereIn('id', ids).del();
+    await db('event_feedback_settings').where({ event_id: eventId }).del();
+  }
+});
+
+it.each(['assignment removed', 'anonymized'])('rejects an existing customer grant after %s', async reason => {
+  const bearer = token({ via: 'customer', customerId });
+  await expectDirect(bearer, 200);
+  if (reason === 'assignment removed') await db('event_customer_assignments').where({ event_id: eventId, customer_account_id: customerId }).del();
+  else await require('../../src/services/customerAccountsService').eraseCustomer(customerId, adminId);
+  await expectDirect(bearer, reason === 'assignment removed' ? 403 : 401);
+});
+it('denies foreign editors and allows the editor who owns the gallery', async () => {
+  await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'editor');
+  try {
+    await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(foreignId), 403, '?admin_preview=1');
+    await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ created_by: foreignId });
+    await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(foreignId), 200, '?admin_preview=1');
+  } finally {
+    await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ created_by: adminId });
+    await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'viewer');
+  }
+});
+it('bounds a large gallery response while retaining the complete count', async () => {
+  const rows = Array.from({ length: 5000 }, (_, index) => ({ id: 80000 + index, event_id: eventId,
+    filename: `large-${index}.jpg`, path: 'unused', type: 'individual', processing_status: 'complete' }));
+  try {
+    await db.batchInsert('photos', rows, 100);
+    const response = await get(`${endpoints[0]}?limit=999999&page=1`, token());
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.body.photos).toHaveLength(250);
+    expect(response.body.pagination).toMatchObject({ total: 5001, limit: 250, has_more: true });
+  } finally { await db('photos').where('id', '>=', 80000).where({ event_id: eventId }).del(); }
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryDraftPreviewResolve.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+/**
+ * Previewing an unpublished gallery through its SHORT share URL (#1386).
+ *
+ * /info has honoured admin_preview since #868, but two sibling routes never
+ * did, and both sit on the short-URL path:
+ *
+ *   GET /resolve/:identifier      — filtered drafts out via ACTIVE_EVENT_FILTER
+ *   GET /:slug/verify-token/:token — same, inline
+ *
+ * With "use short gallery URLs" OFF the admin's View Gallery link carries the
+ * slug, GalleryPage never calls /resolve, and the preview worked. With it ON
+ * the link is the token form, GalleryPage resolves it first, and the draft
+ * 404'd as "Gallery Not Found" — which is exactly what was reported.
+ *
+ * The relaxation is admin-preview-only, so the other half of these tests is
+ * the part that must NOT move: anonymous callers still get 404 for a draft,
+ * and GHSA-rh8r's rule (never hand a share_token back on a bare slug lookup)
+ * has to survive the new path too.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-draft-preview-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'draft-preview-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-draft-preview-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+// Share-token fixtures, deliberately low-entropy and obviously fake. They
+// have to satisfy SHARE_TOKEN_REGEX (32 hex chars), and random-looking hex of
+// that shape is exactly what secret scanners flag — GitGuardian raised two
+// "Generic High Entropy Secret" findings on the first version of this file.
+const DRAFT_SLUG = 'draft-preview-event';
+const DRAFT_TOKEN = 'deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef';
+const LIVE_SLUG = 'published-event';
+const LIVE_TOKEN = 'feedfacefeedfacefeedfacefeedface';
+
+describe('draft preview through the short share URL (#1386)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let foreignId;
+
+  const asAdmin = (req, id = adminId) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${mintAdminToken(id)}`);
+
+  async function insertEvent({ slug, token, isDraft }) {
+    await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: slug,
+      event_date: '2026-09-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/${token}`,
+      share_token: token,
+      require_password: 0,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: isDraft ? 1 : 0,
+      created_by: adminId,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+    const [row] = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'foreign', email: 'foreign@example.test', password_hash: 'unused', is_active: 1,
+    }).returning('id');
+    foreignId = row?.id ?? row;
+    await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'viewer');
+
+    await insertEvent({ slug: DRAFT_SLUG, token: DRAFT_TOKEN, isDraft: true });
+    await insertEvent({ slug: LIVE_SLUG, token: LIVE_TOKEN, isDraft: false });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe('the reported case — admin previewing a draft', () => {
+    it('resolves the draft by share token (was 404 "Gallery Not Found")', async () => {
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(DRAFT_SLUG);
+      expect(res.body.matchType).toBe('token');
+    });
+
+    it('resolves the draft by full share link', async () => {
+      const identifier = encodeURIComponent(`/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/${DRAFT_TOKEN}`);
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${identifier}?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(DRAFT_SLUG);
+    });
+
+    it('clears verify-token for the draft, the next step of the same flow', async () => {
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/verify-token/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('what must not move', () => {
+    it('404s an anonymous resolve of the draft token', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s even with admin_preview=1 but no admin token', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s for an admin who cannot access this event', async () => {
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_TOKEN}?admin_preview=1`),
+        foreignId,
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('404s an anonymous verify-token for the draft', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${DRAFT_SLUG}/verify-token/${DRAFT_TOKEN}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('still withholds the share_token on a bare slug lookup (GHSA-rh8r)', async () => {
+      // The draft path must not become a way around the token-withholding rule.
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${DRAFT_SLUG}?admin_preview=1`),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.matchType).toBe('slug');
+      expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(res.body.share_link).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(res.body.share_url).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(DRAFT_TOKEN);
+    });
+
+    it('leaves the published gallery resolving anonymously, as before', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${LIVE_TOKEN}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.slug).toBe(LIVE_SLUG);
+      expect(res.body.token).toBe(LIVE_TOKEN);
+    });
+
+    it('still 404s an identifier that matches nothing', async () => {
+      const res = await asAdmin(
+        request(app).get('/api/gallery/resolve/no-such-gallery?admin_preview=1'),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryProtectedVideoUrls.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/**
+ * Videos under enhanced/maximum image protection (#1370).
+ *
+ * Both halves of the video path used to be routed through /api/secure-images
+ * once an event left `standard` protection, and neither half could carry a
+ * video:
+ *
+ *   1. galleryQueryService emitted `/api/secure-images/{slug}/secure/{id}/{{token}}`
+ *      as the video's `url`. The lightbox drops that straight into a <video>
+ *      element, nothing substitutes `{{token}}` (the helper that could is
+ *      unreferenced), and the route answers 403 "Invalid or expired token".
+ *   2. Even with a valid token it would still fail: the secure-images route
+ *      pipes every byte through secureImageService.processProtectedImage,
+ *      which calls sharp() and throws on an mp4 → 404.
+ *
+ * The guest saw a poster frozen at 0:00 with no error of any kind.
+ *
+ * Videos now keep the JWT route at every protection level. That is not a new
+ * exposure — thumbnails of those same videos have always been served from it —
+ * so these tests also pin the inverse: still images must keep bouncing to the
+ * secure endpoint. Every assertion here fails on the unfixed code except the
+ * two guarding images.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-video-urls-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'video-urls-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-video-urls-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'protected-video-gallery';
+const VIDEO_BYTES = Buffer.from('not really an mp4, but the route only streams bytes');
+
+describe('videos stay playable under enhanced/maximum protection (#1370)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId; let videoId; let imageId;
+
+  async function setProtection(level) {
+    await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ protection_level: level });
+  }
+
+  async function photoPayload(id) {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const photo = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === id);
+    expect(photo).toBeDefined();
+    return photo;
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Protected Video',
+      event_date: '2026-09-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
+      share_token: 'protected-video-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      // Password-free so verifyGalleryAccess takes the public path, same as
+      // the sibling gallery suites.
+      require_password: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    const mediaDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG, 'individual');
+    fs.mkdirSync(mediaDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(mediaDir, 'clip.mp4'), VIDEO_BYTES);
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(mediaDir, 'still.jpg'), Buffer.from('jpeg-ish'));
+
+    const vid = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'clip.mp4',
+      path: `${SLUG}/individual/clip.mp4`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      media_type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      duration: 43,
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    videoId = vid[0]?.id ?? vid[0];
+
+    const img = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'still.jpg',
+      path: `${SLUG}/individual/still.jpg`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    imageId = img[0]?.id ?? img[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe.each(['enhanced', 'maximum'])('protection_level = %s', (level) => {
+    beforeAll(async () => { await setProtection(level); });
+
+    test('the video url is the JWT route, not a {{token}} template', async () => {
+      const photo = await photoPayload(videoId);
+      expect(photo.url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`);
+      expect(photo.url).not.toContain('{{token}}');
+      expect(photo.requires_token).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test('the video streams instead of bouncing to the secure endpoint', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+      expect(res.headers['accept-ranges']).toBe('bytes');
+      expect(Buffer.from(res.body)).toEqual(VIDEO_BYTES);
+    });
+
+    test('range requests still work, so seeking is possible', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`)
+        .set('Range', 'bytes=0-9');
+      expect(res.status).toBe(206);
+      expect(res.headers['content-range']).toBe(`bytes 0-9/${VIDEO_BYTES.length}`);
+    });
+
+    test('still images keep bouncing to the secure endpoint', async () => {
+      const photo = await photoPayload(imageId);
+      expect(photo.url).toBe(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/secure/${imageId}/{{token}}`);
+      expect(photo.requires_token).toBe(true);
+
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${imageId}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(302);
+      expect(res.body.error).toBe('Secure access required');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('protection_level = standard', () => {
+    beforeAll(async () => { await setProtection('standard'); });
+
+    test('both media types take the JWT route, as before', async () => {
+      expect((await photoPayload(videoId)).url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${videoId}`);
+      expect((await photoPayload(imageId)).url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${imageId}`);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryTokenJti.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/**
+ * Gallery tokens must carry a per-token `jti`. tokenRevocation falls back to
+ * `${eventId}-${iat}-gallery` without one, so a guest logging out would revoke
+ * every other guest whose token was minted for the same event in the same
+ * second (QR-code share links at an event make that routine).
+ */
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const mintSites = [
+  'src/routes/auth.js',
+  'src/routes/customer.js',
+  'src/routes/gallery/slideshow.js',
+];
+
+describe('gallery token mint sites', () => {
+  it.each(mintSites)('%s sets a unique jti on every gallery token', (file) => {
+    const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../', file), 'utf8');
+    const payloads = source.split('jwt.sign(').slice(1)
+      .map((chunk) => chunk.split('process.env.JWT_SECRET')[0])
+      .filter((payload) => payload.includes("type: 'gallery'"));
+    expect(payloads.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    for (const payload of payloads) expect(payload).toContain('jti: crypto.randomUUID()');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('revocation key', () => {
+  beforeAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'jti-regression-secret-at-least-32-characters-long'; });
+  it('is distinct for two same-second gallery logins of the same event', () => {
+    const { buildTokenId } = require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation');
+    const crypto = require('crypto');
+    const iat = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+    const mint = () => jwt.decode(jwt.sign({ eventId: 7, type: 'gallery', iat, jti: crypto.randomUUID() }, process.env.JWT_SECRET));
+    expect(buildTokenId(mint())).not.toBe(buildTokenId(mint()));
+    // Without a jti the key collapses to eventId + login second.
+    const bare = jwt.decode(jwt.sign({ eventId: 7, type: 'gallery', iat }, process.env.JWT_SECRET));
+    expect(buildTokenId(bare)).toBe(buildTokenId({ ...bare }));
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/logoutRevocation.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+const request = require('supertest');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+const { randomUUID } = require('crypto');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+let db, cleanup, adminId, customerId, eventId, apps, revocation;
+const slug = 'logout-revocation';
+const cases = [
+  ['auth', '/logout', 'admin', 'admin_token'],
+  ['auth', '/gallery/logout', 'gallery', `gallery_token_${slug}`],
+  ['customerAuth', '/logout', 'customer', 'customer_token'],
+  ['adminAuth', '/logout', 'admin', 'admin_token'],
+];
+const sign = type => jwt.sign({
+  type, ...(type === 'admin' ? { id: adminId } : type === 'customer' ? { customerId } : { eventId, eventSlug: slug }),
+  jti: randomUUID(),
+}, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  ({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+  await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+  const event = await require('../../src/services/eventCreationService').createEvent({
+    event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Logout revocation', event_date: '2026-10-01',
+    slug, password: 'Logout-Strong-Password-924!', expiration_days: 30,
+    customer_email: 'customer@example.test', admin_email: 'admin@example.test',
+  }, { actor: { id: adminId }, source: 'v1' });
+  eventId = event.id;
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ slug });
+  revocation = require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation');
+  apps = Object.fromEntries(['auth', 'adminAuth', 'customerAuth'].map(name => [
+    name, buildRouteApp('/', require(`../../src/routes/${name}`)),
+  ]));
+});
+afterEach(() => jest.restoreAllMocks());
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await require('../../src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices();
+  if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+});
+
+it.each(cases)('%s%s revokes a no-expiry %s cookie session', async (route, path, type, cookie) => {
+  const token = sign(type);
+  const sessionApp = type === 'customer' ? apps.customerAuth : apps.auth;
+  const sessionPath = type === 'gallery' ? `/session?slug=${slug}` : '/session';
+  const session = () => request(sessionApp).get(sessionPath).set('Cookie', `${cookie}=${token}`);
+  const before = await session();
+  expect(before.status).toBe(200);
+  if (type !== 'customer') expect(before.body.valid).toBe(true);
+
+  const res = await request(apps[route]).post(path).set('Cookie', `${cookie}=${token}`).send({ slug });
+  expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  expect(res.headers['set-cookie'].some(value => value.startsWith(`${cookie}=;`))).toBe(true);
+  await revocation.cleanupExpiredRevocations();
+  expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(token))).toBe(true);
+  const after = await session();
+  if (type === 'customer') expect(after.status).toBe(401);
+  else expect(after.body.valid).toBe(false);
+});
+
+it.each(cases)('%s%s reports failed persistence for %s logout and clears its cookie', async (route, path, type, cookie) => {
+  const token = sign(type);
+  const realQuery = db.client.query;
+  jest.spyOn(db.client, 'query').mockImplementation(function (connection, query) {
+    if (/^insert into [`"]revoked_tokens[`"]/.test(query.sql)) {
+      return Promise.reject(new Error('simulated revocation write failure'));
+    }
+    return realQuery.call(this, connection, query);
+  });
+  const res = await request(apps[route]).post(path).set('Cookie', `${cookie}=${token}`).send({ slug });
+  expect(res.status).toBe(500);
+  expect(res.body.error).toBeTruthy();
+  expect(res.body.message).not.toBe('Logged out successfully');
+  expect(res.headers['set-cookie'].some(value => value.startsWith(`${cookie}=;`))).toBe(true);
+  expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(token))).toBe(false);
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/publicContracts.test.js

@@ -25,14 +25,18 @@ process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
 fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
 process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'crm-route-test-secret';
 
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
 const request = require('supertest');
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, createPublicToken, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
 const tokenGuards = require('../../src/utils/publicTokenGuards');
+const { errorHandler } = require('../../src/middleware/errorHandler');
 
 describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
   let db;
   let cleanup;
   let app;
+  let appWithErrorHandler;
   let customerId;
   let contractId;
 
@@ -51,6 +55,17 @@ describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
     contractId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
 
     app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/contracts', require('../../src/routes/publicContracts'));
+
+    // A second app instance wired to the REAL production error handler
+    // (buildRouteApp's is a simplified stand-in that only reads
+    // err.statusCode/err.status, which a bare MulterError doesn't set).
+    // Used below to verify the actual 4xx contract end-to-end, not just
+    // that multer aborted the request.
+    appWithErrorHandler = express();
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(express.json());
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(cookieParser());
+    appWithErrorHandler.use('/api/public/contracts', require('../../src/routes/publicContracts'));
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(errorHandler);
   }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
@@ -131,6 +146,40 @@ describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
         .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
       expect(res.status).toBe(404);
     });
+
+    // CVE-2026-82333 regression (#1374 follow-up): multer 2.3.0 added an
+    // opt-in `fieldArrayIndexLimit` that must be set to actually close the
+    // field-parser DoS — the version bump alone does nothing. This route is
+    // unauthenticated (token-in-URL only), so it's the sharpest place to
+    // prove a crafted request with an oversized array-index field name
+    // (`evil[999999999]`) is rejected rather than accepted or left to hang.
+    it('rejects a multipart request with an oversized array-index field name', async () => {
+      const token = await createPublicToken(db, 'contract_action_tokens', {
+        contract_id: contractId,
+      });
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/public/contracts/${token}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+        .field('evil[999999999]', 'x')
+        .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+      // multer aborts the request before the handler runs; buildRouteApp's
+      // generic error handler falls back to 500 for a bare MulterError
+      // (see appWithErrorHandler test below for the real 4xx contract), so
+      // here we only assert the upload was NOT accepted/processed.
+      expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+      expect(res.body.error).not.toBe(undefined);
+    });
+
+    it('maps the oversized array-index rejection to a 400 through the real error handler', async () => {
+      const token = await createPublicToken(db, 'contract_action_tokens', {
+        contract_id: contractId,
+      });
+      const res = await request(appWithErrorHandler)
+        .post(`/api/public/contracts/${token}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+        .field('evil[999999999]', 'x')
+        .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.code).toBe('VALIDATION_ERROR');
+    });
   });
 
   describe('GET /:token/pdf', () => {

backend/__tests__/routes/restorePathAllowlist.test.js

@@ -22,29 +22,38 @@ process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restorepath-test-secret';
 
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
 
+// `bootCrmDb()` hands back the process-wide `db` singleton (module cache —
+// see its own comment), so it must only be called ONCE per test file: a
+// second call re-runs migrations against the same connection, and the first
+// call's `cleanup()` (db.destroy()) would tear down the connection both
+// describe blocks below share. Boot once at file scope; each describe below
+// only touches app_settings / env vars, never the connection lifecycle.
+let db; let cleanup; let checkRestorePathsAllowed;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  await seedMinimal(db);
+  ({ checkRestorePathsAllowed } = require('../../src/routes/adminRestore')._internal);
+}, 120000);
+
+afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+async function setBackupSetting(key, value) {
+  const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).first();
+  if (existing) {
+    await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(value) });
+  } else {
+    await db('app_settings').insert({
+      setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'backup',
+    });
+  }
+}
+
 describe('restore path allowlist (GHSA-fw4c)', () => {
-  let db; let cleanup; let checkRestorePathsAllowed;
-
   beforeAll(async () => {
-    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
-    await seedMinimal(db);
-
     // Configure a backup root so the allowlist is actually active.
-    for (const [key, value] of [['backup_destination_path', '/backup']]) {
-      const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).first();
-      if (existing) {
-        await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(value) });
-      } else {
-        await db('app_settings').insert({
-          setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'backup',
-        });
-      }
-    }
-
-    ({ checkRestorePathsAllowed } = require('../../src/routes/adminRestore')._internal);
-  }, 120000);
-
-  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+    await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
+  });
 
   it('allows the wizard\'s source TYPE tokens', async () => {
     for (const source of ['local', 's3', 'upload']) {
@@ -84,3 +93,89 @@ describe('restore path allowlist (GHSA-fw4c)', () => {
     expect(err).toBeNull();
   });
 });
+
+/**
+ * GHSA-xfvx-j447-732c: `checkRestorePathsAllowed` constrained the top-level
+ * `source`/`manifestPath` request fields (GHSA-fw4c above), but never looked
+ * INSIDE the manifest itself. `manifest.database.backup_file` — handed
+ * straight to restoreService's candidate resolution and eventually
+ * interpolated into `sqlite3 .restore '<path>'` — was unchecked, so an
+ * absolute path there could point the restore at an arbitrary file even
+ * though `source`/`manifestPath` both passed containment.
+ */
+describe('restore path allowlist — manifest database.backup_file containment (GHSA-xfvx)', () => {
+  let tmpRoot;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
+
+    tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-xfvx-manifest-'));
+    // Additional allowed root via the documented escape hatch — keeps this
+    // describe block's fixtures out of the shared '/backup' root above.
+    process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = tmpRoot;
+  });
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  const writeManifest = (name, databaseSection) => {
+    const manifestPath = path.join(tmpRoot, name);
+    fs.writeFileSync(manifestPath, JSON.stringify({
+      manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
+      backup: { type: 'full' },
+      system: { platform: 'linux' },
+      application: { version: '1.0.0' },
+      files: { count: 0, manifest: [] },
+      database: databaseSection,
+      verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: null },
+    }));
+    return manifestPath;
+  };
+
+  it('rejects a manifest whose database.backup_file is an absolute path outside every configured root', async () => {
+    const manifestPath = writeManifest('evil-1.json', { backup_file: '/etc/passwd' });
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
+    expect(err).toMatch(/database\.backup_file must be inside a configured backup location/i);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a manifest whose database.backup_file is an absolute path inside a configured root', async () => {
+    const dbFile = path.join(tmpRoot, 'database', 'picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql.gz');
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(dbFile), { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(dbFile, 'not a real sqlite dump, just a fixture');
+    const manifestPath = writeManifest('legit-1.json', { backup_file: dbFile });
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
+    expect(err).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('does not choke on a manifest whose database.backup_file is a legitimate relative path', async () => {
+    // Relative candidates are resolved against restoreService's own
+    // `backupPath` (which this route-level pre-check doesn't have — it only
+    // sees `source`/`manifestPath`), so this layer intentionally defers
+    // relative-path containment to restoreService.performDatabaseRestore
+    // and must not false-positive here.
+    const manifestPath = writeManifest('legit-2.json', { backup_file: 'database/picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql.gz' });
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
+    expect(err).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects everything when no backup location is configured at all (fail closed, not fail open)', async () => {
+    // Simulate an install that never had backup_destination_path /
+    // backup_manifest_path seeded/configured, and isn't using the
+    // RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS escape hatch either.
+    const savedRoots = process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    await db('app_settings').whereIn('setting_key', ['backup_destination_path', 'backup_manifest_path']).del();
+
+    try {
+      const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+        source: '/backup/run-1', manifestPath: '/backup/run-1/manifest.json',
+      });
+      expect(err).toMatch(/no backup location is configured/i);
+    } finally {
+      process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = savedRoots;
+      await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
+    }
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/secureImageTokenBinding.test.js

@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
   const mint = (photoId, eventId) => secureImageService.generateSecureToken(
     photoId,
     `gallery_public_${eventId}_${Date.now()}`,
-    { clientFingerprint: 'test-fp', maxUses: 100, expiresIn: 3600 },
+    { clientFingerprint: 'test-fp', maxUses: 100, expiresIn: 3600,
+      galleryAccess: require('../../src/services/galleryAccessService').grant({ id: eventId }, 'public') },
   );
 
   const view = (slug, photoId, token) => request(app)
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
     const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
     const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoB, token);
     expect(res.status).toBe(403);
-    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this photo/i);
+    expect(res.body.code).toBe('INVALID_GALLERY_GRANT');
   });
 
   it('rejects a gallery-A token replayed on gallery B with A\'s photoId', async () => {
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
     // check (sessionId gallery A != URL gallery B) must catch it.
     const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoA, token);
     expect(res.status).toBe(403);
-    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this gallery/i);
+    expect(res.body.code).toBe('INVALID_GALLERY_GRANT');
   });
 
   it('lets a token read its own gallery + photo (binding passes)', async () => {

backend/__tests__/services/chunkedUploadStreaming.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+/**
+ * A rejected chunk must not cost its own size in memory (#1403).
+ *
+ * The route used to drain the whole request into an array and `Buffer.concat`
+ * it before calling uploadChunk, which is where every check lives — the
+ * per-file cap, the chunk index, and even "does this upload id exist". So a
+ * 300MB body against an unknown upload id was read in full, added ~300MB to
+ * RSS, and was then answered with an error. The size cap was real but only
+ * applied after the damage.
+ *
+ * The contract these tests pin: uploadChunk consumes NOTHING until every check
+ * has passed, and once it does start reading it stops at the remaining
+ * allowance rather than trusting the sender.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const { Readable } = require('stream');
+
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-chunk-stream-test-${process.pid}`);
+
+const chunkedUpload = require('../../src/services/chunkedUploadService');
+
+const MB = 1024 * 1024;
+
+const init = (overrides = {}) => chunkedUpload.initializeUpload({
+  filename: 'clip.mp4',
+  fileSize: 1,
+  mimeType: 'video/mp4',
+  eventId: 1,
+  totalChunks: 2,
+  maxFileSizeBytes: 1 * MB,
+  ...overrides,
+});
+
+/**
+ * A readable that reports how much of it was actually pulled. Bytes are
+ * generated lazily, so "never read" really means the body never materialized.
+ */
+function countingSource(totalBytes, sliceSize = 64 * 1024) {
+  let remaining = totalBytes;
+  const source = new Readable({
+    read() {
+      if (remaining <= 0) return this.push(null);
+      const n = Math.min(sliceSize, remaining);
+      remaining -= n;
+      source.bytesRead += n;
+      this.push(Buffer.alloc(n));
+    },
+  });
+  source.bytesRead = 0;
+  return source;
+}
+
+describe('chunked upload streams the body under a cap (#1403)', () => {
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await fs.rm(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  describe('refused before the body is read', () => {
+    it('reads nothing for an unknown upload id', async () => {
+      const source = countingSource(8 * MB);
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk('does-not-exist', 0, source, { declaredBytes: 8 * MB }))
+        .rejects.toThrow('Upload not found or expired');
+      expect(source.bytesRead).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('reads nothing for an out-of-range chunk index', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      const source = countingSource(8 * MB);
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 99, source, { declaredBytes: 8 * MB }))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'INVALID_CHUNK', statusCode: 400 });
+      expect(source.bytesRead).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('reads nothing when Content-Length already exceeds the cap', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      const source = countingSource(8 * MB);
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, source, { declaredBytes: 8 * MB }))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'FILE_TOO_LARGE', statusCode: 413 });
+      expect(source.bytesRead).toBe(0);
+      expect(chunkedUpload.getUploadStatus(uploadId)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('counts what earlier chunks already banked when checking Content-Length', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      await chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, Buffer.alloc(0.75 * MB));
+      const source = countingSource(0.5 * MB);
+      // 0.75MB banked + 0.5MB declared > the 1MB cap.
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 1, source, { declaredBytes: 0.5 * MB }))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'FILE_TOO_LARGE', statusCode: 413 });
+      expect(source.bytesRead).toBe(0);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('a sender that lies, or says nothing', () => {
+    it('stops at the allowance instead of reading the whole body', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      // No declaredBytes at all — the Transfer-Encoding: chunked case.
+      const source = countingSource(8 * MB);
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, source))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'FILE_TOO_LARGE', statusCode: 413 });
+      // The overshoot is whatever the readable had already buffered ahead when
+      // the cap tripped — a small constant tied to highWaterMark, NOT a
+      // function of the body size. That is the whole claim: 8MB offered, ~1MB
+      // read. The slack is deliberately loose so this doesn't turn into a
+      // Node-version canary.
+      expect(source.bytesRead).toBeLessThan(2 * MB);
+    });
+
+    it('leaves no partial chunk file behind when it cuts a body off', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      const meta = chunkedUpload.getUploadStatus(uploadId);
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, countingSource(8 * MB)))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 413 });
+      // abortUpload removes the whole directory; assert nothing survived it.
+      await expect(fs.readdir(path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'chunks', uploadId)))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
+      expect(meta).not.toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+
+  // Every case here was found by an external review of the first cut of this
+  // fix. All three are regressions the buffered version did not have: the
+  // async iterator it replaced rejected a dead request on its own, and never
+  // opened the chunk file at all until it had the whole body in hand.
+  describe('failure paths the streaming rewrite introduced', () => {
+    it('rejects an already-destroyed request instead of hanging forever', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      const source = countingSource(1024);
+      source.destroy();
+      // pipe() on a dead stream emits neither `end` nor `error`, so without an
+      // explicit check this promise never settles and the write fd leaks.
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, source))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'CHUNK_PREMATURE_CLOSE', statusCode: 400 });
+    });
+
+    it('leaves a previously banked chunk intact when a re-send fails', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      await chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, Buffer.alloc(1000));
+      const chunkPath = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'chunks', uploadId, 'chunk_000000');
+      expect((await fs.stat(chunkPath)).size).toBe(1000);
+
+      // Re-send the same index, then fail it mid-flight.
+      const source = new Readable({ read() {} });
+      const pending = chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, source);
+      source.push(Buffer.alloc(10));
+      source.destroy(new Error('client went away'));
+      await expect(pending).rejects.toThrow();
+
+      // The banked copy must still be there: receivedChunks/chunkSizes still
+      // count it, so a truncated file here means status reports 100% and
+      // completeUpload dies on ENOENT.
+      expect((await fs.stat(chunkPath)).size).toBe(1000);
+      // Still counted as received — which is exactly why the file has to still
+      // be there and be the full 1000 bytes.
+      expect(chunkedUpload.getUploadStatus(uploadId).receivedChunks).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    it('keeps two in-flight sends of the same chunk off each other\'s staging file', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      const chunkPath = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'chunks', uploadId, 'chunk_000000');
+
+      // Two requests for the same index, overlapping. A shared .part path let
+      // whichever renamed first publish bytes the other had already truncated.
+      const slow = new Readable({ read() {} });
+      const doomed = new Readable({ read() {} });
+      const slowDone = chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, slow);
+      const doomedDone = chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, doomed);
+
+      doomed.push(Buffer.alloc(2));
+      doomed.destroy(new Error('retry gave up'));
+      await expect(doomedDone).rejects.toThrow();
+
+      slow.push(Buffer.alloc(10));
+      slow.push(null);
+      await expect(slowDone).resolves.toBeTruthy();
+
+      // The surviving attempt's 10 bytes, not the failed one's 2.
+      expect((await fs.stat(chunkPath)).size).toBe(10);
+    });
+
+    it('leaves no staging files behind after a failure', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, countingSource(8 * MB)))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 413 });
+      // The cap path aborts the whole upload, so the directory is gone; what
+      // must not happen is a .part file reappearing after cleanup because the
+      // write stream's open() was still pending when the unlink ran.
+      await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
+      await expect(fs.readdir(path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'chunks', uploadId)))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
+    });
+
+    it('counts chunks that landed while another was still streaming', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init({ totalChunks: 3 });
+
+      // Start a slow 0.75MB chunk. Its allowance is computed now, when nothing
+      // else is banked.
+      const slow = new Readable({ read() {} });
+      const slowDone = chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, slow);
+
+      // A second 0.75MB chunk completes in the meantime.
+      await chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 1, Buffer.alloc(0.75 * MB));
+
+      // Finishing the first must not publish: 1.5MB against a 1MB cap.
+      slow.push(Buffer.alloc(0.75 * MB));
+      slow.push(null);
+      await expect(slowDone).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'FILE_TOO_LARGE', statusCode: 413 });
+      expect(chunkedUpload.getUploadStatus(uploadId)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('removes the staging file when publishing it fails', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'chunks', uploadId);
+      // Make the rename fail by putting a directory where the chunk goes.
+      await fs.mkdir(path.join(dir, 'chunk_000000'), { recursive: true });
+
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, countingSource(1024)))
+        .rejects.toThrow();
+
+      // The fully written .part must not survive a failed publish — its name is
+      // per-attempt, so retries would otherwise pile them up until expiry.
+      const leftovers = (await fs.readdir(dir)).filter((f) => f.endsWith('.part'));
+      expect(leftovers).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it('does not destroy the request stream when it trips the cap', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      const source = countingSource(8 * MB);
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, source))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 413 });
+      // `source` stands in for the IncomingMessage. Destroying it would take
+      // the socket down before the route could send its 413 JSON, so the client
+      // would see a connection reset instead of the error.
+      expect(source.destroyed).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  // These were plain Errors, so the routes answered 500 for what are plainly
+  // client mistakes — a backend fault in monitoring, and an invitation to
+  // retry something that can never succeed.
+  describe('client-caused states carry their own status code', () => {
+    it('404s an unknown upload id rather than 500', async () => {
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.uploadChunk('does-not-exist', 0, Buffer.alloc(10)))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+    });
+
+    // 409 (wrong status) and 410 (expired) share uploadStateError with the two
+    // covered here. Reaching them from the public surface needs either a clock
+    // or a setter the service does not expose, and a test that pretends to
+    // exercise them while actually hitting the 404 path is worse than none.
+
+    it('404s completing an unknown upload rather than 500', async () => {
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.completeUpload('does-not-exist'))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+    });
+
+    it('400s completing an upload that is missing chunks', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      await chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, Buffer.alloc(10));
+      await expect(chunkedUpload.completeUpload(uploadId))
+        .rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('the happy path still works', () => {
+    it('writes a streamed chunk and reports progress', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      const result = await chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, countingSource(0.25 * MB), {
+        declaredBytes: 0.25 * MB,
+      });
+      expect(result).toMatchObject({ chunkIndex: 0, received: 1, expected: 2, complete: false });
+
+      const chunkPath = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'chunks', uploadId, 'chunk_000000');
+      expect((await fs.stat(chunkPath)).size).toBe(0.25 * MB);
+    });
+
+    it('still accepts a Buffer, the shape the service was written for', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      const result = await chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, Buffer.alloc(0.25 * MB));
+      expect(result).toMatchObject({ chunkIndex: 0, received: 1 });
+    });
+
+    it('lets a re-sent chunk replace itself without double-counting', async () => {
+      const { uploadId } = await init();
+      await chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, countingSource(0.6 * MB), { declaredBytes: 0.6 * MB });
+      // Same index again: the first copy's 0.6MB must not count toward the cap.
+      await expect(
+        chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, 0, countingSource(0.6 * MB), { declaredBytes: 0.6 * MB }),
+      ).resolves.toBeTruthy();
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/downloadZipRegenConcurrency.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/**
+ * Background zip rebuilds are capped (#1399).
+ *
+ * invalidateAll() invalidates every event holding a cached zip, and each
+ * invalidate() arms its own debounce timer in the same tick — so they all fire
+ * together. Every build opens its own storage reads, so a settings change
+ * across 25 events was enough to exhaust the S3 agent pool and stall uploads,
+ * thumbnails and gallery reads until the burst drained.
+ *
+ * The cap is on the BACKGROUND path only: a guest waiting on a download must
+ * not be queued behind a settings-change burst.
+ */
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn() }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+  info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
+const service = require('../../src/services/downloadZipService');
+
+const flush = () => new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
+
+describe('downloadZipService background regen concurrency (#1399)', () => {
+  let peak;
+  let inFlight;
+  let release;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    // setImmediate must stay real: the flush() helper below rides on it, and
+    // jest's modern fake timers mock it too.
+    jest.useFakeTimers({ doNotFake: ['setImmediate'] });
+    peak = 0;
+    inFlight = 0;
+    release = [];
+    service.stopped = false;
+    service.regenActive = 0;
+    service.regenWaiters = [];
+    service.debounceTimers.clear();
+    service.activeBuilds.clear();
+
+    jest.spyOn(service, 'generateZip').mockImplementation(() => {
+      inFlight += 1;
+      peak = Math.max(peak, inFlight);
+      return new Promise((resolve) => {
+        release.push(() => { inFlight -= 1; resolve(); });
+      });
+    });
+    jest.spyOn(service, '_cleanup').mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    jest.useRealTimers();
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  it('never runs more than two rebuilds at once, however many fire together', async () => {
+    const rows = Array.from({ length: 12 }, (_, i) => ({ id: i + 1 }));
+    db.mockReturnValue({
+      whereNotNull: () => ({ select: () => Promise.resolve(rows) }),
+    });
+
+    await service.invalidateAll();
+    // Every debounce timer was armed in the same tick — fire them all.
+    jest.runAllTimers();
+    await flush();
+
+    expect(peak).toBe(2);
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it('starts the next rebuild as each one finishes', async () => {
+    const rows = Array.from({ length: 5 }, (_, i) => ({ id: i + 1 }));
+    db.mockReturnValue({
+      whereNotNull: () => ({ select: () => Promise.resolve(rows) }),
+    });
+
+    await service.invalidateAll();
+    jest.runAllTimers();
+    await flush();
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+
+    release.shift()();
+    await flush();
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+    expect(peak).toBe(2);
+
+    while (release.length) { release.shift()(); await flush(); }
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(5);
+    expect(peak).toBe(2);
+  });
+
+  it('does not queue a foreground download behind the burst', async () => {
+    const rows = Array.from({ length: 6 }, (_, i) => ({ id: i + 1 }));
+    db.mockReturnValue({
+      whereNotNull: () => ({ select: () => Promise.resolve(rows) }),
+    });
+
+    await service.invalidateAll();
+    jest.runAllTimers();
+    await flush();
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+
+    // A guest asking for a zip right now calls generateZip directly. It must
+    // not park behind the two rebuilds already holding the slots.
+    service.generateZip(999);
+    await flush();
+    expect(service.generateZip).toHaveBeenCalledWith(999);
+    expect(inFlight).toBe(3);
+  });
+
+  it('releases anything parked for a slot on shutdown', async () => {
+    const rows = Array.from({ length: 6 }, (_, i) => ({ id: i + 1 }));
+    db.mockReturnValue({
+      whereNotNull: () => ({ select: () => Promise.resolve(rows) }),
+    });
+
+    await service.invalidateAll();
+    jest.runAllTimers();
+    await flush();
+    expect(service.regenWaiters.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+    // stop() must not hang on a queue that will never drain.
+    const stopping = service.stop();
+    release.forEach((fn) => fn());
+    await expect(stopping).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    expect(service.regenWaiters).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/downloadZipSocketLeak.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+/**
+ * A failed pre-zip build must not leave storage reads open.
+ *
+ * The builder opened one storage read per photo and handed the raw stream to
+ * archiver. archiver drains its queue one entry at a time, so on an S3 backend
+ * every photo beyond the one being written parked a socket with a full receive
+ * buffer, and the error path (a source stream dying, or a photo upload
+ * invalidating the build) walked away from all of them. archiver's abort()
+ * does not touch the source streams, and the AWS SDK arms its socket timeout
+ * on a 3s delay then clears it once the response headers arrive, so nothing
+ * ever reclaimed those sockets. On a live server 43 of the 50 pooled sockets
+ * ended up stuck for days and photo uploads stopped completing.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-zipleak-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'zipleak-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-zipleak-storage-'));
+
+const { Readable } = require('stream');
+
+const PHOTO_COUNT = 6;
+const MAX_INFLIGHT_READS = 2;
+
+// One storage read. It never ends on its own, which is what a large photo
+// looks like to the builder: the bytes only move while archiver pulls them.
+class StoredObject extends Readable {
+  constructor(key, failAfterReads, chunks) {
+    super();
+    this.key = key;
+    this.failAfterReads = failAfterReads;
+    this.chunks = chunks;
+    this.reads = 0;
+  }
+
+  _read() {
+    this.reads += 1;
+    if (this.failAfterReads && this.reads > this.failAfterReads) {
+      // What a dropped connection to S3 looks like in Node.
+      this.destroy(new Error('aborted'));
+      return;
+    }
+    this.push(this.reads > this.chunks ? null : Buffer.alloc(4096, 1));
+  }
+}
+
+const reads = { opened: [], live: 0, peak: 0 };
+const failingKey = { value: null };
+const onOpen = { fn: null };
+// A read only finishes when the build pulls the whole object. Photos big
+// enough to matter never finish inside one archiver turn, and a stream that
+// ends on its own would be auto-destroyed and hide the leak.
+const objectChunks = { value: Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY };
+
+function openStoredObject(key) {
+  const stream = new StoredObject(key, key === failingKey.value ? 1 : 0, objectChunks.value);
+  reads.opened.push(stream);
+  reads.live += 1;
+  if (reads.live > reads.peak) reads.peak = reads.live;
+  let settled = false;
+  const settle = () => { if (!settled) { settled = true; reads.live -= 1; } };
+  stream.once('end', settle);
+  stream.once('close', settle);
+  if (onOpen.fn) onOpen.fn(reads.opened.length);
+  return stream;
+}
+
+const mockStorage = {
+  kind: () => 's3',
+  get: jest.fn(async (key) => openStoredObject(key)),
+  getToFile: jest.fn(async () => undefined),
+  putFromFile: jest.fn(async () => undefined),
+  stat: jest.fn(async () => ({ size: 1234, mtime: new Date() })),
+  delete: jest.fn(async () => undefined),
+  exists: jest.fn(async () => true),
+};
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/storage', () => ({
+  getStorage: () => mockStorage,
+  initStorage: async () => mockStorage,
+}));
+
+// Nothing to resize or watermark, so the builder takes the stream-from-storage
+// branch, which is the one that holds sockets.
+jest.mock('../../src/services/downloadRendition', () => ({
+  renderPhotoForDownload: jest.fn(async () => null),
+}));
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const downloadZipService = require('../../src/services/downloadZipService');
+
+describe('pre-zip build releases its storage reads', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let eventId;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'zipleak',
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Zip Leak',
+      event_date: '2026-09-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: '/gallery/zipleak/s',
+      share_token: 'zipleak-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      require_password: 0,
+      allow_downloads: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    for (let i = 0; i < PHOTO_COUNT; i += 1) {
+      await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename: `photo-${i}.jpg`,
+        path: `zipleak/photo-${i}.jpg`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        source_origin: 'managed',
+        mime_type: 'image/jpeg',
+        visibility: 'visible',
+        uploaded_at: new Date(Date.now() - i * 1000).toISOString(),
+      });
+    }
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    reads.opened = [];
+    reads.live = 0;
+    reads.peak = 0;
+    failingKey.value = null;
+    onOpen.fn = null;
+    objectChunks.value = Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY;
+    mockStorage.get.mockClear();
+    downloadZipService.versions.clear();
+    downloadZipService.activeBuilds.clear();
+  });
+
+  it('destroys every open read when a source stream dies mid-build', async () => {
+    // The oldest photo is written first, so failing it strands the rest.
+    failingKey.value = 'events/active/zipleak/photo-0.jpg';
+
+    const result = await downloadZipService.generateZip(eventId);
+
+    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
+    expect(reads.opened.length).toBeGreaterThan(1);
+    const stranded = reads.opened.filter((s) => !s.destroyed);
+    expect(stranded.map((s) => s.key)).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('destroys every open read when an upload invalidates the build', async () => {
+    // What adminPhotos does on every upload, delete and bulk edit, landing
+    // while the archive is half built.
+    onOpen.fn = (count) => {
+      if (count !== 2) return;
+      downloadZipService.invalidate(eventId);
+      // invalidate() also schedules a rebuild; this test is not about that.
+      clearTimeout(downloadZipService.debounceTimers.get(eventId));
+      downloadZipService.debounceTimers.delete(eventId);
+    };
+
+    const result = await downloadZipService.generateZip(eventId);
+
+    expect(result).toEqual({ success: false, error: 'Build invalidated' });
+    expect(reads.opened.filter((s) => !s.destroyed).map((s) => s.key)).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('never holds more storage reads open than the build needs', async () => {
+    objectChunks.value = 8;
+
+    const result = await downloadZipService.generateZip(eventId);
+
+    expect(result.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockStorage.get).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(PHOTO_COUNT);
+    expect(reads.peak).toBeLessThanOrEqual(MAX_INFLIGHT_READS);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/emailWebhookTransport.test.js

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 jest.mock('axios', () => ({ post: jest.fn() }));
 jest.mock('../../src/utils/networkValidation', () => ({
-  validateExternalUrlAsync: jest.fn(async () => ({ valid: true, reason: 'ok' })),
+  validateExternalUrlAsync: jest.fn(async () => ({ valid: true, reason: 'ok', hostname: 'relay.example', addresses: [{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }] })),
 }));
 jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
   info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ beforeEach(() => {
   process.env.EMAIL_WEBHOOK_SECRET = SECRET;
   transport.__testing.setAllowPrivateUrls(false);
   transport.__testing.resetSecretWarning();
-  validateExternalUrlAsync.mockResolvedValue({ valid: true, reason: 'ok' });
+  validateExternalUrlAsync.mockResolvedValue({ valid: true, reason: 'ok', hostname: 'relay.example', addresses: [{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }] });
   axios.post.mockResolvedValue({ status: 200, data: streamOf('') });
 });
 

backend/__tests__/services/imageProcessor.singleFlight.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
+/**
+ * Lazy rendition generation is single-flight per photo and rendition (#1020).
+ *
+ * ensureThumbnail / ensureHeroImage / ensurePreviewImage and the tier
+ * variants are check-then-generate, and the check reads the path off the row
+ * the caller already fetched. N concurrent cold requests for one photo all
+ * missed and all ran the same Sharp pass; worse, the hero and preview
+ * generators deleted the existing object before writing its replacement, so
+ * a reader landing between B's delete and B's write was redirected to the
+ * full original, and a regeneration whose source could not be read left the
+ * old rendition gone with the row still pointing at it.
+ *
+ * Driven against real Sharp output and the real LocalFsStorage, plus an
+ * in-memory backend with the S3 contract (no local paths, download on read),
+ * because the single-flight sits around withLocalCopy and the difference
+ * between one download and eight is the whole point.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+const EXTERNAL_ROOT = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-sf-ext-${process.pid}`);
+process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = EXTERNAL_ROOT;
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const state = { events: {}, updates: [] };
+  const api = (table) => {
+    if (table === 'events') {
+      return { where: (_col, id) => ({ first: async () => state.events[id] || null }) };
+    }
+    if (table === 'photos') {
+      return {
+        where: (criteria) => ({
+          update: async (values) => { state.updates.push({ criteria, values }); return 1; },
+        }),
+      };
+    }
+    if (table === 'app_settings') {
+      return { whereIn: () => ({ select: async () => [] }) };
+    }
+    throw new Error(`unexpected table in test: ${table}`);
+  };
+  api.__state = state;
+  return { db: api };
+});
+
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
+
+const MANAGED_EVENT = { id: 11, slug: 'managed-ev', source_mode: 'managed' };
+const EXTERNAL_EVENT = { id: 7, slug: 'nas-ev', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'weddings/sf' };
+
+let nextId = 1000;
+
+async function writeJpeg(absPath, { width = 2400, height = 1600 } = {}) {
+  await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(absPath), { recursive: true });
+  await sharp({ create: { width, height, channels: 3, background: { r: 30, g: 120, b: 200 } } })
+    .jpeg({ quality: 85 }).toFile(absPath);
+}
+
+async function jpegBuffer({ width = 2400, height = 1600 } = {}) {
+  return sharp({ create: { width, height, channels: 3, background: { r: 200, g: 60, b: 30 } } })
+    .jpeg({ quality: 85 }).toBuffer();
+}
+
+/**
+ * The S3 contract as imageProcessor sees it: kind() !== 'local', so validity
+ * is a stat only, and withLocalCopy has to download the source through
+ * getToFile before Sharp can open it.
+ */
+class MemoryObjectStore {
+  constructor() { this.objects = new Map(); this.puts = []; this.downloads = []; this.failNextPut = false; }
+  kind() { return 's3'; }
+  async init() {}
+  async put(key, body) {
+    if (this.failNextPut) { this.failNextPut = false; throw new Error('simulated upload failure'); }
+    this.puts.push(key);
+    this.objects.set(key, Buffer.from(body));
+  }
+  async stat(key) {
+    const b = this.objects.get(key);
+    return b ? { size: b.length, mtime: new Date() } : null;
+  }
+  async exists(key) { return this.objects.has(key); }
+  async getToFile(key, localPath) {
+    this.downloads.push(key);
+    const b = this.objects.get(key);
+    if (!b) throw new Error(`NoSuchKey: ${key}`);
+    await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(localPath), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.writeFile(localPath, b);
+  }
+  async delete(key) { this.objects.delete(key); }
+}
+
+describe('single-flight rendition generation (#1020)', () => {
+  let imageProcessor;
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    db.__state.events = { [MANAGED_EVENT.id]: MANAGED_EVENT, [EXTERNAL_EVENT.id]: EXTERNAL_EVENT };
+    db.__state.updates = [];
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(EXTERNAL_ROOT, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  describe('local storage', () => {
+    let storage; let storageRoot; let puts;
+
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sf-store-'));
+      storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
+      await storage.init();
+      const origPut = storage.put.bind(storage);
+      storage.put = async (key, ...rest) => {
+        if (storage.failNextPut) { storage.failNextPut = false; throw new Error('simulated write failure'); }
+        if (storage.holdNextPut) { const gate = storage.holdNextPut; storage.holdNextPut = null; await gate; }
+        puts.push(key);
+        return origPut(key, ...rest);
+      };
+      storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+    }, 30000);
+
+    beforeEach(() => { puts = []; storage.failNextPut = false; storage.holdNextPut = null; });
+
+    afterAll(async () => {
+      await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    });
+
+    async function managedPhoto() {
+      const id = nextId++;
+      const name = `managed-${id}.jpg`;
+      const rel = `${MANAGED_EVENT.slug}/${name}`;
+      await writeJpeg(path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', rel));
+      return { id, event_id: MANAGED_EVENT.id, source_origin: 'managed', path: rel, filename: name };
+    }
+
+    async function externalPhoto({ write = true } = {}) {
+      const id = nextId++;
+      const name = `external-${id}.jpg`;
+      const relpath = path.join(EXTERNAL_EVENT.external_path, name);
+      if (write) await writeJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, relpath));
+      return { id, event_id: EXTERNAL_EVENT.id, source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: relpath, filename: name };
+    }
+
+    const putsUnder = (prefix) => puts.filter((k) => k.startsWith(prefix));
+
+    it('ensurePreviewImage: eight concurrent cold requests share one generation', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 8 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)));
+
+      expect(results[0]).toMatch(/^previews\/preview_/);
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(1);
+      // One flight, one row write — not eight identical updates.
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(await storage.stat(results[0])).toBeTruthy();
+    });
+
+    it('ensureHeroImage: eight concurrent cold requests share one generation', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 8 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureHeroImage(photo)));
+
+      expect(results[0]).toMatch(/^heroes\/hero_/);
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(putsUnder('heroes/')).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('ensureThumbnail: eight concurrent cold requests for an external photo share one generation', async () => {
+      const photo = await externalPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 8 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo)));
+
+      expect(results[0]).toBe(`thumbnails/thumb_ext${photo.id}_${photo.filename}`);
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(putsUnder('thumbnails/')).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('a tier request that resolves to the canonical thumbnail shares the canonical flight', async () => {
+      // ensureThumbnailAtWidth hands the canonical width, and every video, to
+      // ensureThumbnail. That used to be the one unguarded path a guarded
+      // request could fall through into.
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const canonical = 300; // DEFAULT_THUMBNAIL_WIDTH; the settings mock returns no override
+      const results = await Promise.all([
+        imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, canonical),
+        imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, canonical),
+        imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo),
+        imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo),
+      ]);
+
+      expect(results[0]).toMatch(/^thumbnails\/thumb_/);
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(putsUnder('thumbnails/')).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ['ensureThumbnail', 'thumbnail_path', 'thumbnails/'],
+      ['ensureHeroImage', 'hero_path', 'heroes/'],
+      ['ensurePreviewImage', 'preview_path', 'previews/'],
+    ])('%s: a forced rebuild is never satisfied by joining a viewer\'s hot-path check', async (fn, column, prefix) => {
+      // adminThumbnails.js forces a rebuild by passing the row with the path
+      // nulled. If the validity check ran inside the flight, that call could
+      // join a viewer's flight for the same photo — one that was merely
+      // stat-ing an already good rendition — and be handed back the very
+      // file it was asked to replace, with the endpoint counting a success.
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const existing = await imageProcessor[fn](photo);
+      expect(existing).toMatch(new RegExp(`^${prefix}`));
+      expect(putsUnder(prefix)).toHaveLength(1);
+
+      const [viewer, forced] = await Promise.all([
+        imageProcessor[fn]({ ...photo, [column]: existing }),
+        imageProcessor[fn]({ ...photo, [column]: null }),
+      ]);
+
+      expect(viewer).toBe(existing);
+      expect(forced).toBe(existing);
+      // The forced call wrote a fresh rendition; the viewer's did not.
+      expect(putsUnder(prefix)).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ['ensureThumbnail', 'thumbnail_path', 'thumbnails/'],
+      ['ensurePreviewImage', 'preview_path', 'previews/'],
+    ])('%s: a forced rebuild runs after a lazy generation already in flight instead of adopting it', async (fn, column, prefix) => {
+      // The lazy flight read the settings when it started; after a settings
+      // change it is producing exactly what the admin's regenerate exists to
+      // replace. Joining it would count a success and leave the old size
+      // cached — the validity check only asks whether the file parses.
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      let release;
+      storage.holdNextPut = new Promise((r) => { release = r; });
+
+      const lazy = imageProcessor[fn](photo);                                   // blocks inside put
+      const forced = imageProcessor[fn]({ ...photo, [column]: null }, { force: true });
+      const joiner = imageProcessor[fn](photo);                                 // lazy miss after the forced call
+      let forcedSettled = false;
+      forced.then(() => { forcedSettled = true; });
+
+      await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 60));
+      expect(putsUnder(prefix)).toHaveLength(0);
+      expect(forcedSettled).toBe(false);
+
+      release();
+      const results = await Promise.all([lazy, forced, joiner]);
+      expect(results.every((k) => k === results[0])).toBe(true);
+      expect(results[0]).toMatch(new RegExp(`^${prefix}`));
+      // Lazy wrote once, the forced rebuild wrote once more after it; the
+      // later lazy miss joined the forced flight rather than starting a third.
+      expect(putsUnder(prefix)).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    it('a replaced photo (same id, new path) does not join a flight still rendering the old source', async () => {
+      // replacePhoto keeps the id and changes path/filename. Keyed by id and
+      // width alone, a request carrying the replacement row would join the
+      // old flight, be handed the old image, and the gallery would cache it.
+      const before = await managedPhoto();
+      const after = await managedPhoto();
+      const replacement = { ...after, id: before.id };
+
+      let release;
+      storage.holdNextPut = new Promise((r) => { release = r; });
+      const stale = imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(before, 600);        // blocks inside put
+      const fresh = imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(replacement, 600);
+      release();
+
+      const [oldKey, newKey] = await Promise.all([stale, fresh]);
+      expect(oldKey).toBe(`thumbnails/thumb_w600_p${before.id}_${before.filename}`);
+      expect(newKey).toBe(`thumbnails/thumb_w600_p${before.id}_${after.filename}`);
+      expect(putsUnder('thumbnails/').sort()).toEqual([oldKey, newKey].sort());
+
+      // Same shape for the canonical preview, which had no guard at all on
+      // base and must not gain a cross-source one now.
+      storage.holdNextPut = new Promise((r) => { release = r; });
+      const staleP = imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(before);
+      const freshP = imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(replacement);
+      release();
+      const [oldP, newP] = await Promise.all([staleP, freshP]);
+      expect(oldP).not.toBe(newP);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    it('different photos and different widths are separate flights', async () => {
+      const a = await managedPhoto();
+      const b = await externalPhoto();
+      const calls = [
+        ...Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(a, 640)),
+        ...Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(a, 1280)),
+        ...Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(b, 640)),
+        ...Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(a, 600)),
+        ...Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(b, 600)),
+      ];
+      const results = await Promise.all(calls);
+
+      expect(results.every(Boolean)).toBe(true);
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(5);
+      expect(results.slice(0, 4).every((k) => k === results[0])).toBe(true);
+      expect(results.slice(4, 8).every((k) => k === results[4])).toBe(true);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(3);
+      expect(putsUnder('thumbnails/')).toHaveLength(2);
+      // Tiers are pure cache: never written to the row.
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('a warm tier is served from storage without a second generation', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const first = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
+      const again = await Promise.all([
+        imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640),
+        imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640),
+      ]);
+
+      expect(again).toEqual([first, first]);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('a failed flight is cleared so the next request retries instead of adopting the failure', async () => {
+      const photo = await externalPhoto({ write: false });
+
+      const cold = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)));
+      expect(cold).toEqual([null, null, null, null]);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(0);
+
+      // The source appears (mount came back, file finished copying).
+      await writeJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, photo.external_relpath));
+      const warm = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
+      expect(warm).toBe(`previews/preview_ext${photo.id}_external-${photo.id}.jpg`);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('a flight that returns null is shared by every waiter and cleared afterwards', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      db.__state.events = {}; // the event lookup inside the flight finds nothing
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 3 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo)));
+      expect(results).toEqual([null, null, null]);
+
+      db.__state.events = { [MANAGED_EVENT.id]: MANAGED_EVENT };
+      const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo);
+      expect(key).toMatch(/^thumbnails\/thumb_/);
+      expect(putsUnder('thumbnails/')).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('a flight that throws rejects every waiter identically and is cleared afterwards', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const boom = new Error('db down');
+      const realEvents = db.__state.events;
+      db.__state.events = new Proxy({}, { get: () => { throw boom; } });
+
+      // ensureThumbnail's event lookup is not wrapped in try/catch, so this
+      // propagates — to every caller of the shared flight, not just the first.
+      const settled = await Promise.allSettled(Array.from({ length: 3 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo)));
+      expect(settled.map((s) => s.status)).toEqual(['rejected', 'rejected', 'rejected']);
+      expect(settled.every((s) => s.reason === boom)).toBe(true);
+
+      db.__state.events = realEvents;
+      const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo);
+      expect(key).toMatch(/^thumbnails\/thumb_/);
+    });
+
+    it('the existing hero survives a regeneration whose source cannot be read', async () => {
+      // generateHeroImage used to delete the target before Sharp had opened
+      // the source, so a corrupt file or a blipped mount stripped the old
+      // hero and returned null with the row still pointing at it.
+      const src = path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', MANAGED_EVENT.slug, 'hero-src.jpg');
+      await writeJpeg(src);
+      const key = await imageProcessor.generateHeroImage(src, { outputBasename: 'survive.jpg' });
+      expect(key).toBe('heroes/hero_survive.jpg');
+      const before = await storage.stat(key);
+
+      const junk = path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', MANAGED_EVENT.slug, 'hero-junk.jpg');
+      await fs.writeFile(junk, Buffer.from('this is not a jpeg'));
+      const result = await imageProcessor.generateHeroImage(junk, { regenerate: true, outputBasename: 'survive.jpg' });
+
+      expect(result).toBeNull();
+      const after = await storage.stat(key);
+      expect(after).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(after.size).toBe(before.size);
+      await expect(sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key)).metadata()).resolves.toMatchObject({ width: 1920 });
+    });
+
+    it('the existing preview survives a regeneration whose write fails', async () => {
+      // Probe succeeds, the pipeline runs, the put throws: the catch used to
+      // delete the key, which by then only ever held the PREVIOUS good file.
+      const src = path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', MANAGED_EVENT.slug, 'preview-src.jpg');
+      await writeJpeg(src);
+      const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { outputBasename: 'survive.jpg' });
+      expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_survive.jpg');
+      const before = await storage.stat(key);
+
+      storage.failNextPut = true;
+      const result = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true, outputBasename: 'survive.jpg' });
+
+      expect(result).toBeNull();
+      const after = await storage.stat(key);
+      expect(after).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(after.size).toBe(before.size);
+    });
+
+    it('the existing hero survives a regeneration whose write fails', async () => {
+      const src = path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', MANAGED_EVENT.slug, 'hero-src2.jpg');
+      await writeJpeg(src);
+      const key = await imageProcessor.generateHeroImage(src, { outputBasename: 'survive2.jpg' });
+      const before = await storage.stat(key);
+
+      storage.failNextPut = true;
+      const result = await imageProcessor.generateHeroImage(src, { regenerate: true, outputBasename: 'survive2.jpg' });
+
+      expect(result).toBeNull();
+      expect((await storage.stat(key)).size).toBe(before.size);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('S3 contract', () => {
+    let store;
+
+    beforeAll(() => {
+      store = new MemoryObjectStore();
+      storageModule.setStorageForTesting(store);
+    });
+
+    beforeEach(() => { store.puts = []; store.downloads = []; store.failNextPut = false; });
+
+    async function managedPhoto() {
+      const id = nextId++;
+      const name = `s3-${id}.jpg`;
+      const rel = `${MANAGED_EVENT.slug}/${name}`;
+      store.objects.set(`events/active/${rel}`, await jpegBuffer());
+      return { id, event_id: MANAGED_EVENT.id, source_origin: 'managed', path: rel, filename: name };
+    }
+
+    it('ensurePreviewImage: concurrent cold requests download the source once and upload once', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 6 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)));
+
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(results[0]).toMatch(/^previews\/preview_/);
+      expect(store.downloads).toEqual([`events/active/${photo.path}`]);
+      expect(store.puts).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(await store.stat(results[0])).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('ensureHeroImage: concurrent cold requests download the source once and upload once', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 6 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureHeroImage(photo)));
+
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(store.downloads).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(store.puts).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('ensureThumbnailAtWidth: concurrent cold tier requests download the source once and upload once', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 6 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, 600)));
+
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(results[0]).toBe(`thumbnails/thumb_w600_p${photo.id}_${photo.filename}`);
+      expect(store.downloads).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(store.puts).toEqual([results[0]]);
+    });
+
+    it('the existing preview object survives a regeneration whose upload fails', async () => {
+      // Fixed outputBasename, as the external and RAW branches pass: the key
+      // is the same on both runs, so the pre-fix delete would have hit the
+      // good object. (Through withLocalCopy the basename carries a random
+      // temp prefix and the two runs never share a key, which is why this
+      // drives the generator directly.)
+      const srcDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sf-s3src-'));
+      const src = path.join(srcDir, 'src.jpg');
+      await writeJpeg(src);
+      try {
+        const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { outputBasename: 's3-survive.jpg' });
+        expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_s3-survive.jpg');
+        const before = store.objects.get(key);
+        expect(before).toBeTruthy();
+
+        store.failNextPut = true;
+        const result = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true, outputBasename: 's3-survive.jpg' });
+
+        expect(result).toBeNull();
+        expect(store.objects.get(key)).toBe(before);
+      } finally {
+        await fs.rm(srcDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+      }
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/invoiceService.locks.test.js

@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
 }));
 
 const invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
+const emailProcessor = require('../../src/services/emailProcessor');
 
 function resetChains() {
   for (const k of Object.keys(tableChains)) delete tableChains[k];
@@ -261,7 +262,10 @@ describe('invoiceService.releaseForDelivery', () => {
 });
 
 describe('invoiceService.recordPaymentCheckAction', () => {
-  beforeEach(() => resetChains());
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    resetChains();
+    emailProcessor.queueEmail.mockClear();
+  });
 
   it('rejects invalid actions', async () => {
     await expect(invoiceService.recordPaymentCheckAction({
@@ -321,6 +325,71 @@ describe('invoiceService.recordPaymentCheckAction', () => {
       token: 'a'.repeat(64), action: 'partial', amountMinor: 9999,
     })).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
   });
+
+  // GHSA-wg94-f86h-vq68 hardening: every write via this unauthenticated
+  // route notifies the admin. Uses 'paid_full' as the exercised action —
+  // it stays inside markPaid (no workflow-engine / PDF-rendering
+  // dependencies to stub) while still going through the full
+  // recordPaymentCheckAction write path.
+  it('queues an admin notification email after a successful action', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoice_payment_check_tokens')._firstValue = {
+      id: 1, used_at: null,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000),
+    };
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
+      id: 5, invoice_number: 'INV-0005', status: 'overdue',
+      total_amount_minor: 10000, paid_amount_minor: 0, late_fee_amount_minor: 0,
+      customer_account_id: 7, created_by_admin_id: 42,
+      currency: 'CHF', language: 'de', event_id: null,
+    };
+    pickChainFor('admin_users')._firstValue = { id: 42, email: 'admin@example.com', username: 'admin' };
+    pickChainFor('business_profile')._firstValue = null;
+    pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { id: 7, email: 'c@example.com', display_name: 'Test Customer' };
+
+    const result = await invoiceService.recordPaymentCheckAction({
+      token: 'a'.repeat(64), action: 'paid_full', ip: '203.0.113.7',
+    });
+    expect(result).toEqual({ applied: 'paid_full' });
+
+    expect(emailProcessor.queueEmail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    const [, recipientEmail, templateKey, data] = emailProcessor.queueEmail.mock.calls[0];
+    expect(recipientEmail).toBe('admin@example.com');
+    expect(templateKey).toBe('invoice_payment_check_action_recorded');
+    expect(data.invoice_number).toBe('INV-0005');
+    expect(data.action).toBe('paid_full');
+    expect(data.ip).toBe('203.0.113.7');
+  });
+
+  it('does not fail (or roll back) the ledger write when the admin notification fails to send', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoice_payment_check_tokens')._firstValue = {
+      id: 1, used_at: null,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000),
+    };
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
+      id: 5, invoice_number: 'INV-0005', status: 'overdue',
+      total_amount_minor: 10000, paid_amount_minor: 0, late_fee_amount_minor: 0,
+      customer_account_id: 7, created_by_admin_id: 42,
+      currency: 'CHF', language: 'de', event_id: null,
+    };
+    pickChainFor('admin_users')._firstValue = { id: 42, email: 'admin@example.com', username: 'admin' };
+    pickChainFor('business_profile')._firstValue = null;
+    pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { id: 7, email: 'c@example.com', display_name: 'Test Customer' };
+    emailProcessor.queueEmail.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('smtp down'));
+
+    // The write itself (token consumption + markPaid) must still
+    // succeed — the notification is best-effort only.
+    const result = await invoiceService.recordPaymentCheckAction({
+      token: 'a'.repeat(64), action: 'paid_full', ip: '203.0.113.7',
+    });
+    expect(result).toEqual({ applied: 'paid_full' });
+
+    // Token was actually consumed (the real assertion that the write
+    // committed): the mock chain's .update() ran with used_at set.
+    const tokenChain = pickChainFor('invoice_payment_check_tokens');
+    expect(tokenChain.update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ used_at: expect.any(Date), used_action: 'paid_full' }),
+    );
+  });
 });
 
 describe('invoiceService.queuePaymentCheckEmail', () => {
@@ -371,4 +440,35 @@ describe('invoiceService.queuePaymentCheckEmail', () => {
     expect(res.sent).toBe(true);
     expect(res.token).toMatch(/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
   });
+
+  // GHSA-wg94-f86h-vq68 hardening: token TTL shortened from 30 days to 72h.
+  it('mints a token with a ~72h TTL, not the old 30-day window', async () => {
+    pickChainFor('invoices')._firstValue = {
+      id: 1, status: 'overdue',
+      customer_account_id: 5,
+      created_by_admin_id: 42,
+      total_amount_minor: 10000,
+      currency: 'CHF',
+      language: 'de',
+      reminder_level: 0,
+      due_date: '2026-05-01',
+      last_payment_check_at: null,
+      event_id: null,
+    };
+    pickChainFor('admin_users')._firstValue = { id: 42, email: 'admin@example.com', username: 'admin' };
+    pickChainFor('business_profile')._firstValue = null;
+    pickChainFor('customer_accounts')._firstValue = { id: 5, email: 'c@example.com', display_name: 'Test' };
+
+    const before = Date.now();
+    const res = await invoiceService.queuePaymentCheckEmail(1);
+    expect(res.sent).toBe(true);
+
+    const tokenChain = pickChainFor('invoice_payment_check_tokens');
+    const insertedRow = tokenChain.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
+    const ttlMs = new Date(insertedRow.expires_at).getTime() - before;
+    expect(ttlMs).toBeGreaterThan(71 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+    expect(ttlMs).toBeLessThanOrEqual(72 * 60 * 60 * 1000 + 5000);
+    // Well under the old 30-day TTL — the actual regression guard.
+    expect(ttlMs).toBeLessThan(24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 * 30);
+  });
 });

backend/__tests__/services/mfaService.test.js

@@ -92,6 +92,52 @@ describe('mfaService — TOTP verification', () => {
   });
 });
 
+describe('mfaService — replay protection (GHSA-qcwx-r25m-j869)', () => {
+  it('verifyTotp accepts a code once and rejects the same code as a replay', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    // First use: no lastUsedStep yet, so it's accepted.
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret)).toBe(true);
+
+    // Simulate persisting the matched step and replaying the same code: the
+    // matched step must strictly advance past lastUsedStep, so this fails.
+    const step = mfaService.currentTotpStep();
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret, step)).toBe(false);
+    // A lastUsedStep the code hasn't caught up to yet also rejects it.
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret, step + 1)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('verifyTotpEncryptedStep returns the matched step on success and null on replay', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const stored = mfaService.encryptSecret(secret);
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+
+    const step = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, stored, null);
+    expect(step).toEqual(expect.any(Number));
+    expect(step).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+    // Replaying the same code against the just-persisted step is rejected.
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, stored, step)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('a freshly generated code for the next TOTP step is accepted after a replay is rejected', () => {
+    const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();
+    const code = authenticator.generate(secret);
+    const step = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(code, mfaService.encryptSecret(secret), null)
+      || mfaService.currentTotpStep();
+
+    // Same-step replay: rejected.
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(code, secret, step)).toBe(false);
+
+    // A code minted for the next step (via a cloned authenticator with a
+    // future epoch, not by mocking Date.now()) advances past last_used_step.
+    const nextStepAuthenticator = authenticator.clone({ epoch: Date.now() + 30000 });
+    const nextCode = nextStepAuthenticator.generate(secret);
+    expect(mfaService.verifyTotp(nextCode, secret, step)).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
 describe('mfaService — otpauth URI / QR', () => {
   it('builds an otpauth:// URI containing issuer, account and secret', () => {
     const secret = mfaService.generateSecret();

backend/__tests__/services/previewTierKeys.formats.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/**
+ * Preview tier lookup and cleanup must agree with what the generator writes
+ * (#1020 follow-up).
+ *
+ * generatePreviewImage rewrites the extension to match the encoding (`.jpg`,
+ * or `.webp` for alpha / multi-frame sources). ensurePreviewImageAtWidth and
+ * previewTierKeys kept the SOURCE extension, so for a `.png`, `.JPG`, `.heic`
+ * or RAW source the tier was generated on every single request — the stat
+ * never matched — and cleanup never found the files, which piled up in
+ * storage for the life of the install.
+ *
+ * Driven against real Sharp output, because the whole question is which
+ * extension the encoder actually chose.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const state = { event: null };
+  const api = (table) => {
+    if (table === 'events') return { where: () => ({ first: async () => state.event }) };
+    if (table === 'photos') return { where: () => ({ update: async () => 1 }) };
+    if (table === 'app_settings') return { whereIn: () => ({ select: async () => [] }) };
+    throw new Error(`unexpected table in test: ${table}`);
+  };
+  api.__state = state;
+  return { db: api };
+});
+
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
+
+const EVENT = { id: 21, slug: 'fmt-ev', source_mode: 'managed' };
+let nextId = 5000;
+
+describe('preview tier keys follow the encoded extension', () => {
+  let storage; let storageRoot; let imageProcessor; let puts;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-tierkeys-'));
+    storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
+    await storage.init();
+    const origPut = storage.put.bind(storage);
+    storage.put = async (key, ...rest) => { puts.push(key); return origPut(key, ...rest); };
+    storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+    delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+  }, 30000);
+
+  beforeEach(() => { puts = []; db.__state.event = EVENT; });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function photoWith(name, { alpha = false } = {}) {
+    const id = nextId++;
+    const rel = `${EVENT.slug}/${name}`;
+    const abs = path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', rel);
+    await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
+    const pipeline = sharp({
+      create: {
+        width: 2000, height: 1400, channels: alpha ? 4 : 3,
+        background: alpha ? { r: 10, g: 20, b: 30, alpha: 0.5 } : { r: 10, g: 20, b: 30 },
+      },
+    });
+    if (/\.png$/i.test(name)) await pipeline.png().toFile(abs);
+    else if (/\.webp$/i.test(name)) await pipeline.webp().toFile(abs);
+    else await pipeline.jpeg().toFile(abs);
+    return { id, event_id: EVENT.id, source_origin: 'managed', path: rel, filename: name };
+  }
+
+  it.each([
+    ['opaque PNG', 'photo.png', false, '.jpg'],
+    ['transparent PNG', 'photo-alpha.png', true, '.webp'],
+    ['uppercase JPG', 'IMG_0001.JPG', false, '.jpg'],
+    ['jpeg spelled out', 'photo.jpeg', false, '.jpg'],
+    ['lowercase jpg', 'photo.jpg', false, '.jpg'],
+  ])('%s: the second request is a cache hit, not a second generation', async (_label, name, alpha, ext) => {
+    const photo = await photoWith(name, { alpha });
+
+    const first = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
+    expect(first).toBe(`previews/preview_w640_p${photo.id}_${name.replace(/\.[^.]+$/, '')}${ext}`);
+    expect(puts).toEqual([first]);
+
+    const second = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
+    expect(second).toBe(first);
+    expect(puts).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['opaque PNG', 'cleanup.png', false],
+    ['transparent PNG', 'cleanup-alpha.png', true],
+    ['uppercase JPG', 'CLEANUP.JPG', false],
+  ])('%s: previewTierKeys covers the generated key, so deletePreviewTiers removes it', async (_label, name, alpha) => {
+    const photo = await photoWith(name, { alpha });
+    const k640 = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
+    const k1280 = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 1280);
+    expect(await storage.stat(k640)).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(await storage.stat(k1280)).toBeTruthy();
+
+    const keys = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys(photo);
+    expect(keys).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([k640, k1280]));
+
+    await imageProcessor.deletePreviewTiers(photo);
+    expect(await storage.stat(k640)).toBeNull();
+    expect(await storage.stat(k1280)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('a tier written before the extension rewrite is still found, by lookup and by cleanup', async () => {
+    // JPEG bytes under the source's `.png` name — what generatePreviewImage
+    // produced before it started rewriting the extension. Served as JPEG by
+    // the route (the Content-Type comes from the `.webp` suffix only).
+    const photo = await photoWith('legacy.png');
+    const legacyKey = `previews/preview_w640_p${photo.id}_legacy.png`;
+    await storage.put(legacyKey, await sharp({ create: { width: 640, height: 448, channels: 3, background: '#123' } }).jpeg().toBuffer());
+    puts = [];
+
+    expect(await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640)).toBe(legacyKey);
+    expect(puts).toHaveLength(0);
+
+    expect(imageProcessor.previewTierKeys(photo)).toContain(legacyKey);
+    await imageProcessor.deletePreviewTiers(photo);
+    expect(await storage.stat(legacyKey)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('never lists the canonical 1920 rendition, which preview_path owns', () => {
+    const keys = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys({ id: 9, path: 'e/a.png', source_origin: 'managed' });
+    expect(keys.some((k) => k.includes('w1920'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(keys.every((k) => k.includes('p9_'))).toBe(true);
+    // Both encodings plus the legacy source-extension key, per width.
+    expect(keys).toEqual([
+      'previews/preview_w640_p9_a.jpg', 'previews/preview_w640_p9_a.webp', 'previews/preview_w640_p9_a.png',
+      'previews/preview_w1280_p9_a.jpg', 'previews/preview_w1280_p9_a.webp', 'previews/preview_w1280_p9_a.png',
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('does not duplicate the legacy key when the source already is a lowercase .jpg', () => {
+    const keys = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys({ id: 9, path: 'e/a.jpg', source_origin: 'managed' });
+    expect(keys.filter((k) => k.includes('w640'))).toEqual([
+      'previews/preview_w640_p9_a.jpg', 'previews/preview_w640_p9_a.webp',
+    ]);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/restoreService.sqliteRestorePathSafety.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-xfvx-j447-732c: the SQLite restore path let an attacker-influenced
+ * `manifest.database.backup_file` replace the live database.
+ *
+ * Two independent bugs, both fixed here:
+ *
+ *   1. Candidate resolution (restoreService.js's performDatabaseRestore,
+ *      ~L1000) tried an absolute `dbBackupFile` and a
+ *      `path.join(backupPath, dbBackupFile)` candidate with NO check that
+ *      the resolved path actually stayed inside the configured backup
+ *      root — a manifest could point `.restore` at any file on disk.
+ *
+ *   2. The resolved path was interpolated unescaped into a
+ *      `sqlite3 .restore '<path>'` dot-command string. sqlite3's CLI
+ *      parses that string itself (not the shell), so a single quote in
+ *      the path breaks out of the quoted argument regardless of
+ *      spawn()'s `shell: false` argv separation.
+ *
+ * These tests pin the fix directly against the exported helpers
+ * (`resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates`, `assertSafeSqlitePath`,
+ * `isContainedInRoots`, `getConfiguredBackupRoots`) — the exact functions
+ * `performDatabaseRestore` calls before ever running `sqlite3 .restore` —
+ * rather than driving the full restore (which does a real `db.destroy()` +
+ * live-file swap against the shared app db and isn't worth the added
+ * fragility for what's fundamentally a path-validation contract).
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restoresvc-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restoresvc-test-secret';
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('restoreService — sqlite restore path safety (GHSA-xfvx)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let _internal;
+  let backupPath;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    // The restore run's resolved local backup root — analogous to
+    // `localBackupPath` in restoreService.restore(). Real directory with a
+    // real database/ subfolder, matching what a genuine backup run leaves
+    // on disk.
+    backupPath = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-xfvx-backuproot-'));
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.join(backupPath, 'database'), { recursive: true });
+
+    ({ _internal } = require('../../src/services/restoreService'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe('assertSafeSqlitePath — the sqlite3 dot-command injection gate', () => {
+    it.each([
+      ['/backup/database/picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql'],
+      [`${backupPath || '/backup'}/database/picpeak-db-sqlite-2024-01-01.sql.gz`],
+    ])('accepts a normal backup path: %s', (p) => {
+      expect(() => _internal.assertSafeSqlitePath(p)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ['/backup/database/x\'; DROP TABLE admin_users; --.sql'],
+      ['/backup/database/x\' .restore \'/etc/passwd'],
+      ['/backup/database/x\n.shell rm -rf /'],
+      ['/backup/database/has space.sql'],
+      ['/backup/database/semi;colon.sql'],
+      [null],
+      [undefined],
+      [42],
+    ])('rejects an unsafe/non-string path: %j', (p) => {
+      expect(() => _internal.assertSafeSqlitePath(p)).toThrow(/unsafe path/i);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('isContainedInRoots', () => {
+    it('accepts a path inside a root', () => {
+      expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots('/backup/database/x.sql', ['/backup'])).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('accepts a root path equal to the root itself', () => {
+      expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots('/backup', ['/backup'])).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a path outside every root', () => {
+      expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots('/etc/passwd', ['/backup'])).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a sibling directory that merely shares a prefix', () => {
+      // '/backup-evil' starts with the string '/backup' but is NOT inside it.
+      expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots('/backup-evil/x.sql', ['/backup'])).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a `..`-traversal path that resolves outside the root', () => {
+      expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots('/backup/../etc/passwd', ['/backup'])).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('getConfiguredBackupRoots', () => {
+    afterEach(async () => {
+      delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+      await db('app_settings').whereIn('setting_key', ['backup_destination_path', 'backup_manifest_path']).del();
+    });
+
+    it('always includes the trusted root even with nothing else configured', async () => {
+      const roots = await _internal.getConfiguredBackupRoots('/some/trusted/backup-path');
+      expect(roots).toContain(path.resolve('/some/trusted/backup-path'));
+    });
+
+    it('adds configured backup_destination_path / backup_manifest_path and RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS', async () => {
+      await db('app_settings').insert([
+        { setting_key: 'backup_destination_path', setting_value: JSON.stringify('/backup/dest'), setting_type: 'backup' },
+        { setting_key: 'backup_manifest_path', setting_value: JSON.stringify('/backup/manifests'), setting_type: 'backup' },
+      ]);
+      process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = '/extra/root';
+
+      const roots = await _internal.getConfiguredBackupRoots('/trusted');
+      expect(roots).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
+        path.resolve('/trusted'),
+        path.resolve('/backup/dest'),
+        path.resolve('/backup/manifests'),
+        path.resolve('/extra/root'),
+      ]));
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates — the manifest.database.backup_file gate', () => {
+    it('rejects an absolute backup_file outside every configured root, but still offers the safe legacy basename candidate', async () => {
+      const candidates = await _internal.resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates(
+        backupPath, '/etc/passwd', () => {}
+      );
+      // The raw absolute escape must NOT be present.
+      expect(candidates).not.toContain('/etc/passwd');
+      // Candidate (3), the basename-only legacy reconstruct, is inherently
+      // safe (can't escape backupPath) and stays available as a fallback.
+      expect(candidates).toContain(path.join(backupPath, 'database', 'passwd'));
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a `..`-traversal relative backup_file, keeping only the contained legacy candidate', async () => {
+      const candidates = await _internal.resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates(
+        backupPath, '../../../../etc/passwd', () => {}
+      );
+      const escaped = candidates.some((c) => !_internal.isContainedInRoots(c, [path.resolve(backupPath)]));
+      expect(escaped).toBe(false);
+      expect(candidates).toContain(path.join(backupPath, 'database', 'passwd'));
+    });
+
+    it('accepts a legitimate relative backup_file recorded by a real backup run', async () => {
+      const candidates = await _internal.resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates(
+        backupPath, 'database/picpeak-db-sqlite-2024-01-01.sql.gz', () => {}
+      );
+      expect(candidates).toContain(path.join(backupPath, 'database', 'picpeak-db-sqlite-2024-01-01.sql.gz'));
+      // Every returned candidate must actually be safe to use.
+      for (const c of candidates) {
+        expect(_internal.isContainedInRoots(c, [path.resolve(backupPath)])).toBe(true);
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('accepts a legitimate absolute backup_file that IS inside backupPath (the real dumper shape)', async () => {
+      const absFile = path.join(backupPath, 'database', 'picpeak-db-sqlite-2024-02-02.sql.gz');
+      const candidates = await _internal.resolveContainedDbBackupCandidates(
+        backupPath, absFile, () => {}
+      );
+      expect(candidates).toContain(absFile);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/restoreServiceS3Pinning.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/**
+ * DNS-rebinding follow-up to the blind-SSRF fix in restoreServiceS3Ssrf.test.js
+ * (GHSA-vm2x-c628-3cx5).
+ *
+ * isHostAllowed()/validateExternalUrlAsync() are check-then-connect on their
+ * own: they resolve the S3 endpoint hostname once to vet it, then hand a
+ * bare hostname to the AWS SDK, which resolves it AGAIN when it actually
+ * connects. An attacker who controls DNS for the endpoint hostname (or an
+ * infra DNS-rebinding condition) can answer the first lookup with a public
+ * IP and the second with a private/metadata one.
+ *
+ * downloadFileFromS3() now builds pinned http/https agents (pinnedRequest.js
+ * — the same primitive webhookDeliveryWorker.js and emailWebhookTransport.js
+ * use for outbound HTTP) from the validated address and passes them into
+ * S3StorageAdapter, which threads them into the S3Client's NodeHttpHandler
+ * requestHandler. This asserts that wiring: the agents S3StorageAdapter
+ * receives resolve the endpoint hostname to ONLY the address vetted during
+ * validation, and never fall through to a second, real DNS lookup that a
+ * rebinding attacker could answer differently.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restores3pin-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restores3pin-test-secret';
+
+jest.mock('dns', () => {
+  const actual = jest.requireActual('dns');
+  return { ...actual, promises: { ...actual.promises, lookup: jest.fn() }, lookup: jest.fn() };
+});
+
+let capturedConfig;
+jest.mock('../../src/services/storage/s3Storage', () =>
+  jest.fn().mockImplementation((config) => {
+    capturedConfig = config;
+    return { download: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+  })
+);
+
+const dns = require('dns');
+const promiseLookup = dns.promises.lookup;
+const S3StorageAdapter = require('../../src/services/storage/s3Storage');
+const { RestoreService } = require('../../src/services/restoreService');
+
+describe('downloadFileFromS3 DNS-rebinding pinning', () => {
+  let restoreService;
+  let originalNodeEnv;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    restoreService = new RestoreService();
+    capturedConfig = undefined;
+    promiseLookup.mockReset();
+    dns.lookup.mockReset();
+    S3StorageAdapter.mockClear();
+    originalNodeEnv = process.env.NODE_ENV;
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'production';
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = originalNodeEnv;
+    capturedConfig?.httpAgent?.destroy();
+    capturedConfig?.httpsAgent?.destroy();
+  });
+
+  it('passes pinned http/https agents into S3StorageAdapter built from the validated address', async () => {
+    promiseLookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { endpoint: 'rebind.example.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    expect(S3StorageAdapter).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(capturedConfig.httpAgent).toBeInstanceOf(require('http').Agent);
+    expect(capturedConfig.httpsAgent).toBeInstanceOf(require('https').Agent);
+  });
+
+  it('the pinned agent never performs a second DNS lookup — rebinding to a private IP on the real resolver is ignored', async () => {
+    // First (validation) lookup: public IP, passes the preflight.
+    promiseLookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+    // If the pinned agent ever fell through to a real lookup, this would
+    // hand back a private/metadata address — simulating the rebind.
+    dns.lookup.mockImplementation((_hostname, options, callback) => {
+      if (typeof options === 'function') { callback = options; options = {}; }
+      callback(null, ...(options?.all ? [[{ address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 }]] : ['169.254.169.254', 4]));
+    });
+
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { endpoint: 'rebind.example.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    const pinnedLookup = capturedConfig.httpAgent.options.lookup;
+    expect(typeof pinnedLookup).toBe('function');
+
+    const result = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      pinnedLookup('rebind.example.com', {}, (err, address, family) => {
+        if (err) return reject(err);
+        resolve({ address, family });
+      });
+    });
+
+    // Only the address vetted during validation is ever handed back —
+    // never the private address the real resolver would now answer with.
+    expect(result).toEqual({ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 });
+    expect(dns.lookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a lookup for any hostname other than the one that was validated', async () => {
+    promiseLookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { endpoint: 'rebind.example.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    const pinnedLookup = capturedConfig.httpAgent.options.lookup;
+
+    await expect(new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      pinnedLookup('attacker-controlled.example', {}, (err, address) => {
+        if (err) return reject(err);
+        resolve(address);
+      });
+    })).rejects.toThrow(/hostname changed/i);
+  });
+
+  it('does not pin agents when no custom endpoint is configured (default AWS, no rebinding surface)', async () => {
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    expect(promiseLookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(capturedConfig.httpAgent).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(capturedConfig.httpsAgent).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/restoreServiceS3Ssrf.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/**
+ * Blind SSRF via the restore S3 download path (GHSA-vm2x-c628-3cx5).
+ *
+ * downloadFileFromS3() built a bare S3StorageAdapter and called .download()
+ * directly, never running the DNS-resolving isHostAllowed() guard that
+ * testConnection() applies elsewhere — so an admin with backup.restore could
+ * point the request-supplied S3 endpoint at an internal/metadata address for
+ * unauthenticated egress via the server. `s3Config` here is fully attacker
+ * controlled (POST /api/admin/restore/validate and /restore/start take it
+ * straight from the request body — see routes/adminRestore.js), unlike the
+ * scheduled-backup S3 endpoint, which is vetted at settings-save time.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restores3ssrf-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restores3ssrf-test-secret';
+
+jest.mock('dns', () => {
+  const actual = jest.requireActual('dns');
+  return { ...actual, promises: { ...actual.promises, lookup: jest.fn() } };
+});
+
+jest.mock('../../src/services/storage/s3Storage', () =>
+  jest.fn().mockImplementation(() => ({
+    download: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+  }))
+);
+
+const dns = require('dns');
+const lookup = dns.promises.lookup;
+const S3StorageAdapter = require('../../src/services/storage/s3Storage');
+const { RestoreService } = require('../../src/services/restoreService');
+
+describe('downloadFileFromS3 SSRF guard (GHSA-vm2x-c628-3cx5)', () => {
+  let restoreService;
+  let originalNodeEnv;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    restoreService = new RestoreService();
+    lookup.mockReset();
+    S3StorageAdapter.mockClear();
+    originalNodeEnv = process.env.NODE_ENV;
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'production';
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = originalNodeEnv;
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an endpoint hostname that resolves to a private/internal address before any network call', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '10.0.0.5', family: 4 }]);
+
+    await expect(
+      restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+        's3://backups/manifest.json',
+        '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+        { endpoint: 'evil-rebind.example.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+      )
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/private or internal network address/i);
+
+    expect(S3StorageAdapter).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an endpoint hostname that resolves to the cloud metadata address', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 }]);
+
+    await expect(
+      restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+        's3://backups/manifest.json',
+        '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+        { endpoint: 'metadata-rebind.example.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+      )
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/private or internal network address/i);
+
+    expect(S3StorageAdapter).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('allows a legitimate public S3 endpoint through to download()', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { endpoint: 's3.example-cdn.com', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    expect(S3StorageAdapter).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it('does not require the guard outside production (dev MinIO stays usable), but still downloads', async () => {
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'development';
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '10.0.0.5', family: 4 }]); // would be rejected in prod
+
+    await restoreService.downloadFileFromS3(
+      's3://backups/manifest.json',
+      '/tmp/whatever/manifest.json',
+      { endpoint: 'localhost:9000', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's' }
+    );
+
+    expect(lookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(S3StorageAdapter).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/scheduledTask.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ error: jest.fn() }));
+const { scheduledTask } = require('../../src/services/scheduledTask');
+beforeEach(() => jest.useFakeTimers());
+afterEach(() => jest.useRealTimers());
+it('starts once, skips overlap and drains the accepted run on stop', async () => {
+  let finish;
+  const work = jest.fn(() => new Promise(resolve => { finish = resolve; }));
+  const task = scheduledTask(work, { interval: 100 });
+  task.start(); task.start();
+  expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(1);
+  await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(300);
+  expect(work).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  let stopped = false;
+  const stop = task.stop().then(() => { stopped = true; });
+  await Promise.resolve(); expect(stopped).toBe(false);
+  finish(); await stop; expect(stopped).toBe(true);
+  expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+  await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(1000); expect(work).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+});
+it('cancels a delayed first run and can restart cleanly', async () => {
+  const work = jest.fn(); const task = scheduledTask(work, { interval: 100, initialDelay: 10 });
+  task.start(); await task.stop(); await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(200); expect(work).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  task.start(); await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(10); expect(work).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  await task.stop();
+});

backend/__tests__/services/secureImageService.lifecycle.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn() }));
+const secure = require('../../src/services/secureImageService');
+beforeEach(() => { jest.useFakeTimers(); secure.dispose(); });
+afterEach(() => { secure.dispose(); jest.useRealTimers(); });
+it('owns one timer for many tokens and sweeps expired capabilities', () => {
+  for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) secure.generateSecureToken(i, 'gallery_public_1_1', { expiresIn: 1 });
+  expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(1); expect(secure.tokenCache.size).toBe(100);
+  jest.advanceTimersByTime(60000); expect(secure.tokenCache.size).toBe(0);
+  secure.dispose(); expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+});
+it('disposes all session/rate caches and restarts on demand', () => {
+  secure.generateSecureToken(1, 'session'); secure.sessionTokens.set('a', 'b'); secure.rateLimitCache.set('a', 'b');
+  secure.dispose(); expect(secure.sessionTokens.size + secure.rateLimitCache.size + secure.tokenCache.size).toBe(0);
+  secure.generateSecureToken(1, 'session'); expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(1);
+});

backend/__tests__/services/usageEnableDisableRace.test.js

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ async function bootDb() {
     t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
     t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v1');
     t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+    t.boolean('prompt_shown').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
     t.string('installation_id', 64);
     t.string('public_key', 59);
     t.text('private_key_encrypted');

backend/__tests__/services/usageExportReceipt.test.js

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ async function bootDb() {
     t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
     t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v2');
     t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+    t.boolean('prompt_shown').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
     t.string('installation_id', 64);
     t.string('public_key', 59);
     t.text('private_key_encrypted');

backend/__tests__/services/usageServiceKeyRotation.test.js

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ async function bootDb() {
     t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
     t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v1');
     t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+    t.boolean('prompt_shown').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
     t.string('installation_id', 64);
     t.string('public_key', 59);
     t.text('private_key_encrypted');

backend/__tests__/services/usageSnapshotSignals.test.js

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ async function bootDb() {
     t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
     t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v1');
     t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+    t.boolean('prompt_shown').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
     t.string('installation_id', 64);
     t.string('public_key', 59);
     t.text('private_key_encrypted');

backend/__tests__/services/userManagementService.resetPassword.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx entropy half: resetAdminPassword used to mint the
+ * emailed temp password with generateReadablePassword() — 10 adjectives x
+ * 10 nouns x crypto.randomInt(1000,9999) x 5 specials, ~2^21 possibilities,
+ * brute-forceable. It now uses generateSecurePassword(16) (90-char charset),
+ * same as every other security-sensitive password path in this file.
+ *
+ * Verified against a real SQLite DB (full core-migration set) so the
+ * emailed plaintext, the stored hash, and must_change_password are all
+ * checked end to end rather than against a mock.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+// bootCrmDb() sets TEST_DATABASE_PATH itself, but only in time for requires
+// that happen AFTER it runs (inside beforeAll). userManagementService.js
+// requires database/db.js at module load — i.e. before beforeAll — so that
+// connection has to be pointed at a fresh, unused test DB up front, or it
+// falls back to the shared default path and collides with whatever another
+// test file already migrated onto it. Same workaround as
+// userManagementService.activateDelete.test.js.
+const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-reset-pw-test-'));
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite');
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'reset-pw-test-secret';
+
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const userManagementService = require('../../src/services/userManagementService');
+
+// The wordlist generateReadablePassword() used to produce:
+//   <Adjective><Noun><4 digits><1 special>, e.g. "SwiftEagle4821!"
+const READABLE_WORDLIST_PATTERN = /^(Swift|Bright|Strong|Happy|Clever|Brave|Noble|Quick|Sharp|Bold)(Eagle|Mountain|River|Thunder|Forest|Ocean|Falcon|Dragon|Phoenix|Tiger)\d{4}[!@#$%]$/;
+
+describe('userManagementService.resetAdminPassword (GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let actorId;
+  let targetId;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId: actorId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, actorId, 'super_admin');
+
+    const editor = await db('roles').where({ name: 'editor' }).first();
+    const targetInsert = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'reset-target', email: 'reset-target@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('old-password', 4),
+      role_id: editor?.id || null,
+      is_active: 1, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    targetId = targetInsert[0]?.id ?? targetInsert[0];
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('generates a high-entropy password, not one drawn from the adjective/noun wordlist', async () => {
+    const before = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
+
+    await userManagementService.resetAdminPassword(targetId, actorId);
+
+    const emailRow = await db('email_queue')
+      .where({ recipient_email: 'reset-target@example.com', email_type: 'admin_password_reset' })
+      .orderBy('id', 'desc')
+      .first();
+    expect(emailRow).toBeDefined();
+    const emailData = JSON.parse(emailRow.email_data);
+    const newPassword = emailData.new_password;
+
+    // generateSecurePassword(16): fixed 16-char length, not the wordlist's
+    // variable-length "WordWord####!" shape.
+    expect(newPassword).toHaveLength(16);
+    expect(newPassword).not.toMatch(READABLE_WORDLIST_PATTERN);
+    // generateSecurePassword guarantees at least one of each character class.
+    expect(newPassword).toMatch(/[a-z]/);
+    expect(newPassword).toMatch(/[A-Z]/);
+    expect(newPassword).toMatch(/[0-9]/);
+    expect(newPassword).toMatch(/[!@#$%^&*()_+\-=[\]{}|;:,.<>?]/);
+
+    // The emailed plaintext actually matches what got persisted.
+    const after = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
+    expect(after.password_hash).not.toBe(before.password_hash);
+    await expect(bcrypt.compare(newPassword, after.password_hash)).resolves.toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('sets must_change_password so the enforcement backstop kicks in on next login', async () => {
+    await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).update({ must_change_password: false });
+
+    await userManagementService.resetAdminPassword(targetId, actorId);
+
+    const after = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
+    expect(after.must_change_password === true || after.must_change_password === 1).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/userManagementService.roleGrantGuard.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/**
+ * Privilege-escalation guard for PUT /api/admin/users/:id and
+ * POST /api/admin/users/invite (GHSA-rv8w-m6mx-7j4q).
+ *
+ * updateAdminUser's role-change path previously enforced only:
+ *   (a) non-super_admin actors can't grant the super_admin role
+ *   (b) no self-role-update / demoting the last super_admin
+ * It never checked whether the ACTOR's own permission set covers the
+ * permissions carried by the role being granted — so an admin holding
+ * only `users.edit` could hand any other admin a role (including the
+ * built-in `admin` role) carrying far more permissions than the actor
+ * itself held.
+ *
+ * createInvitation() had the identical gap: it only ever blocked
+ * granting super_admin, so an admin holding only `users.create` could
+ * invite a brand-new admin into any other role — including one carrying
+ * far more permissions than the inviter itself held — via
+ * POST /admin/users/invite.
+ *
+ * The fix reuses assertActorMayGrant() — the same containment already
+ * applied to roles.manage (see adminRolesGuards.test.js) — inside both
+ * updateAdminUser's role_id branch and createInvitation().
+ *
+ * Both describe blocks below share a single bootCrmDb() call: the
+ * `db` module (`src/database/db.js`) is a singleton keyed off
+ * TEST_DATABASE_PATH at first require, and bootCrmDb's own comment
+ * warns that a second call after the first's cleanup() destroys the
+ * pool, leaving "Unable to acquire a connection" for every later query.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-rolegrantguard-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'rolegrantguard-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-rolegrantguard-storage-'));
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const svc = require('../../src/services/userManagementService');
+const { clearPermissionCache } = require('../../src/middleware/permissions');
+
+let db; let cleanup;
+let superId;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  ({ adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+  await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+  clearPermissionCache();
+}, 120000);
+
+afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+describe('updateAdminUser — role-grant privilege-escalation guard (GHSA-rv8w-m6mx-7j4q)', () => {
+  let limitedRoleId; let limitedId; // holds only users.edit + events.view
+  let powerfulRoleId; // carries settings.banking, which limitedId does NOT hold
+  let modestRoleId; // carries only events.view, a subset of what limitedId holds
+  let targetId; // account whose role limitedId will try to change
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    // The attacker in GHSA-rv8w-m6mx-7j4q: users.edit only, nothing else.
+    const limitedRole = await svc.createRole(
+      { name: 'limited_user_editor', permissions: ['users.edit', 'events.view'] },
+      superId,
+    );
+    limitedRoleId = limitedRole.id;
+    const limitedIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'limited', email: 'limited@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      role_id: limitedRoleId, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    limitedId = limitedIns[0]?.id ?? limitedIns[0];
+
+    // A role carrying a permission the limited actor does not hold.
+    const powerfulRole = await svc.createRole(
+      { name: 'powerful_role', permissions: ['users.edit', 'settings.banking'] },
+      superId,
+    );
+    powerfulRoleId = powerfulRole.id;
+
+    // A role whose permissions ARE a subset of what the limited actor holds.
+    const modestRole = await svc.createRole(
+      { name: 'modest_role', permissions: ['events.view'] },
+      superId,
+    );
+    modestRoleId = modestRole.id;
+
+    clearPermissionCache();
+  }, 120000);
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    // Fresh target for every test, role reset to modestRole so role-change
+    // assertions always start from a known baseline.
+    const existing = await db('admin_users').where({ username: 'target' }).first();
+    if (existing) {
+      targetId = existing.id;
+      await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).update({ role_id: modestRoleId });
+    } else {
+      const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
+        username: 'target', email: 'target@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+        role_id: modestRoleId, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      targetId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to let an admin grant a role carrying permissions the admin lacks', async () => {
+    await expect(
+      svc.updateAdminUser(
+        targetId,
+        { role_id: powerfulRoleId },
+        limitedId,
+        { roleName: 'limited_user_editor' },
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/only grant permissions your own role/i);
+
+    // Target's role must be unchanged.
+    const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: targetId }).first();
+    expect(row.role_id).toBe(modestRoleId);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to let an admin grant the built-in admin role beyond its own permissions', async () => {
+    const adminRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
+    await expect(
+      svc.updateAdminUser(
+        targetId,
+        { role_id: adminRole.id },
+        limitedId,
+        { roleName: 'limited_user_editor' },
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/only grant permissions your own role/i);
+  });
+
+  it('allows an admin to grant a role whose permissions it already holds', async () => {
+    const updated = await svc.updateAdminUser(
+      targetId,
+      { role_id: limitedRoleId },
+      limitedId,
+      { roleName: 'limited_user_editor' },
+    );
+    expect(updated.role_id).toBe(limitedRoleId);
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin can still grant any role, including one carrying more permissions than a limited actor holds', async () => {
+    const updated = await svc.updateAdminUser(
+      targetId,
+      { role_id: powerfulRoleId },
+      superId,
+      { roleName: 'super_admin' },
+    );
+    expect(updated.role_id).toBe(powerfulRoleId);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('createInvitation — role-grant privilege-escalation guard (GHSA-rv8w-m6mx-7j4q)', () => {
+  let limitedRoleId; let limitedId; // holds only users.create + events.view
+  let powerfulRoleId; // carries settings.banking, which limitedId does NOT hold
+  let modestRoleId; // carries only events.view, a subset of what limitedId holds
+  let inviteCounter = 0;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    const limitedRole = await svc.createRole(
+      { name: 'limited_inviter', permissions: ['users.create', 'events.view'] },
+      superId,
+    );
+    limitedRoleId = limitedRole.id;
+    const limitedIns = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'limited_inviter', email: 'limited_inviter@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      role_id: limitedRoleId, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    limitedId = limitedIns[0]?.id ?? limitedIns[0];
+
+    const powerfulRole = await svc.createRole(
+      { name: 'powerful_invite_role', permissions: ['users.create', 'settings.banking'] },
+      superId,
+    );
+    powerfulRoleId = powerfulRole.id;
+
+    const modestRole = await svc.createRole(
+      { name: 'modest_invite_role', permissions: ['events.view'] },
+      superId,
+    );
+    modestRoleId = modestRole.id;
+
+    clearPermissionCache();
+  }, 120000);
+
+  function nextEmail() {
+    inviteCounter += 1;
+    return `invitee-${inviteCounter}@example.com`;
+  }
+
+  it('refuses to let an admin invite someone into a role carrying permissions the admin lacks', async () => {
+    await expect(
+      svc.createInvitation({
+        email: nextEmail(),
+        roleId: powerfulRoleId,
+        invitedById: limitedId,
+        inviterRoleName: 'limited_inviter',
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/only grant permissions your own role/i);
+  });
+
+  it('allows an admin to invite someone into a role whose permissions it already holds', async () => {
+    const invitation = await svc.createInvitation({
+      email: nextEmail(),
+      roleId: limitedRoleId,
+      invitedById: limitedId,
+      inviterRoleName: 'limited_inviter',
+    });
+    expect(invitation.role).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('allows an admin to invite someone into a role that is a subset of its own permissions', async () => {
+    const invitation = await svc.createInvitation({
+      email: nextEmail(),
+      roleId: modestRoleId,
+      invitedById: limitedId,
+      inviterRoleName: 'limited_inviter',
+    });
+    expect(invitation.role).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin can still invite into any role, including one carrying more permissions than a limited actor holds', async () => {
+    const invitation = await svc.createInvitation({
+      email: nextEmail(),
+      roleId: powerfulRoleId,
+      invitedById: superId,
+      inviterRoleName: 'super_admin',
+    });
+    expect(invitation.role).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/videoPlaceholderNoDbLookup.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/**
+ * generateVideoPlaceholder() must not touch the database when the caller
+ * already supplies width/height (videoProcessor.js's thumbnail-generation
+ * fallback does exactly this).
+ *
+ * Why it matters: processUploadedPhotos() (chunked video upload) holds a
+ * per-file SQLite transaction open across thumbnail generation. SQLite's
+ * knex pool defaults to a single connection, so any second, un-transacted
+ * db() query made while that transaction is open blocks until
+ * acquireConnectionTimeout (60s in production) — verified directly against
+ * an isolated SQLite db (codex review of #1371/#1372). Passing explicit
+ * dimensions must skip getThumbnailSettings()'s db() call entirely, not
+ * just tolerate its failure.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+
+const mockDbSpy = jest.fn(() => {
+  throw new Error('db() must not be called when width/height are supplied');
+});
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: (...args) => mockDbSpy(...args) }));
+
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+
+describe('generateVideoPlaceholder skips the settings DB lookup given explicit dimensions', () => {
+  let storage;
+  let root;
+  let imageProcessor;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-vidplaceholder-'));
+    storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root });
+    await storage.init();
+    storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+  }, 30000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => mockDbSpy.mockClear());
+
+  it('never calls db() when width/height are provided', async () => {
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generateVideoPlaceholder('demo.mp4', { width: 300, height: 300 });
+
+    expect(key).toBe('thumbnails/thumb_demo.jpg');
+    expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockDbSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('falls through to defaults (not a throw) when db() fails and no dimensions were given', async () => {
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generateVideoPlaceholder('demo2.mp4');
+
+    expect(key).toBe('thumbnails/thumb_demo2.jpg');
+    expect(mockDbSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/workerShutdown.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn() }));
+
+describe.each(['backgroundProcessor', 'faceQueue'])('%s shutdown', name => {
+  let worker, db, processPhoto, featureEnabled, janitorUpdate, releases;
+  const prefix = name === 'faceQueue' ? 'FACE_PROCESSOR' : 'UPLOAD_PROCESSOR';
+  let previousEnv;
+  class SidecarUnavailableError extends Error {}
+
+  function deferred() {
+    let resolve;
+    const promise = new Promise(done => { resolve = done; });
+    releases.push(resolve);
+    return { promise, resolve };
+  }
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.useFakeTimers();
+    releases = [];
+    previousEnv = { ...process.env };
+    delete process.env[`${prefix}_DISABLED`];
+    process.env[`${prefix}_CONCURRENCY`] = '2';
+    process.env[`${prefix}_POLL_MS`] = '2000';
+    process.env.FACE_PROCESSOR_BACKOFF_MS = '30000';
+    processPhoto = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ status: 'skipped' });
+    featureEnabled = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true);
+    janitorUpdate = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(0);
+    const chain = { where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(), update: janitorUpdate };
+    db = jest.fn(() => chain);
+    db.client = { config: { client: 'pg' } };
+    // Claims and processing are controlled at the I/O boundary; the real
+    // workers, janitors, idle sleeps and stopServices run in every test.
+    db.transaction = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null);
+    jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/photoProcessor', () => ({ processPhoto }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/faceProcessor', () => ({
+      processPhotoFaces: processPhoto, TransientSourceError: class extends Error {},
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/faceClient', () => ({ SidecarUnavailableError }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/faceSettings', () => ({
+      isFeatureEnabled: featureEnabled, isEnabledForEvent: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    }));
+    worker = require(`../../src/services/${name}`);
+  });
+
+  afterEach(async () => {
+    releases.forEach(resolve => resolve());
+    const stopped = worker.stop();
+    // Also cleans up the original, non-interruptible implementation when a
+    // regression assertion fails; the test never needs to wait a real minute.
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(60000);
+    await stopped;
+    jest.useRealTimers();
+    process.env = previousEnv;
+  });
+
+  async function expectPromptStop(stop = () => worker.stop()) {
+    let done = false;
+    const stopped = stop().then(() => { done = true; });
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(done).toBe(true);
+    expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+    await stopped;
+  }
+
+  it('wakes all idle workers and the minute-long janitor through stopServices', async () => {
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(3);
+    // Confirm normal polling still runs before shutdown.
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2000);
+    expect(db.transaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(4);
+    await expectPromptStop(() => require('../../src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices());
+  });
+
+  it('wakes claim-error backoff and can start a fresh run after stopping', async () => {
+    db.transaction.mockRejectedValue(new Error('database unavailable'));
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    await expectPromptStop();
+    db.transaction.mockResolvedValue(null);
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(3);
+    await expectPromptStop();
+  });
+
+  it('drains active processing for every stop caller and prevents overlapping restarts', async () => {
+    const processing = deferred();
+    processPhoto.mockReturnValue(processing.promise);
+    db.transaction.mockResolvedValueOnce({ id: 1 });
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(processPhoto).toHaveBeenCalledWith(1);
+    let done = false;
+    const first = worker.stop();
+    expect(worker.stop()).toBe(first);
+    first.then(() => { done = true; });
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(done).toBe(false);
+    expect(db.transaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    processing.resolve({ status: 'skipped' });
+    await expectPromptStop();
+    expect(done).toBe(true);
+    expect(db.transaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it('drains a claim already in flight without starting another poll', async () => {
+    const claim = deferred();
+    db.transaction.mockReturnValueOnce(claim.promise);
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    const stopped = worker.stop();
+    claim.resolve({ id: 2 });
+    await expectPromptStop(() => stopped);
+    expect(processPhoto).toHaveBeenCalledWith(2);
+    expect(db.transaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it('does not schedule new waits when pending database work finishes after stop', async () => {
+    const claim = deferred();
+    const janitor = deferred();
+    db.transaction.mockReturnValue(claim.promise);
+    janitorUpdate.mockReturnValue(janitor.promise);
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    let done = false;
+    const stopped = worker.stop().then(() => { done = true; });
+    claim.resolve(null);
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(done).toBe(false);
+    janitor.resolve(0);
+    await expectPromptStop(() => stopped);
+  });
+
+  if (name === 'faceQueue') {
+    it('interrupts the ten-second sleep with faces disabled by default', async () => {
+      featureEnabled.mockResolvedValue(false);
+      worker.start();
+      await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+      expect(db.transaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(3);
+      await expectPromptStop();
+    });
+
+    it('releases a claimed photo and interrupts the sidecar outage backoff', async () => {
+      db.transaction.mockResolvedValueOnce({ id: 3, event_id: 5 });
+      processPhoto.mockRejectedValue(new SidecarUnavailableError('offline'));
+      worker.start();
+      await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+      expect(janitorUpdate).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ face_status: 'pending', face_started_at: null });
+      await expectPromptStop();
+      expect(worker.inFlightByEvent.size).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('does not claim new work after a pending feature check resolves during shutdown', async () => {
+      const feature = deferred();
+      featureEnabled.mockReturnValue(feature.promise);
+      worker.start();
+      const stopped = worker.stop();
+      feature.resolve(true);
+      await expectPromptStop(() => stopped);
+      expect(db.transaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+  }
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/archiveStreamGuard.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * Bounded, reclaimable storage reads for archiver downloads (#1399 follow-up).
+ *
+ * archiver drains the sources it is handed one at a time, so appending a
+ * storage read per photo opens N and drains one. Every other read parks its
+ * socket holding unread bytes, and nothing reclaims them: archiver's abort()
+ * does not touch source streams, and the S3 SDK clears its socket timeout as
+ * soon as response headers land. That is the mechanism behind the incident in
+ * PR #1402 — 43 of 50 pooled sockets held, uploads starved, restart required.
+ *
+ * #1402 fixes the cached-zip builder. These are the guarantees the same guard
+ * has to give the three remaining call sites, two of which need no admin
+ * credentials to reach.
+ */
+const { Readable } = require('stream');
+const { createArchiveStreamGuard } = require('../../src/utils/archiveStreamGuard');
+
+const makeStream = () => new Readable({ read() {} });
+
+describe('archiveStreamGuard (#1399 follow-up)', () => {
+  it('lets the configured number of reads run at once', async () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 2 });
+    expect(await guard.acquire()).toBe(true);
+    guard.track(makeStream());
+    expect(await guard.acquire()).toBe(true);
+    guard.track(makeStream());
+    expect(guard.openCount).toBe(2);
+  });
+
+  it('parks the next acquire until a read finishes', async () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 1 });
+    await guard.acquire();
+    const first = guard.track(makeStream());
+
+    let resumed = false;
+    const pending = guard.acquire().then((ok) => { resumed = ok; });
+
+    await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
+    expect(resumed).toBe(false); // still parked — this is the cap doing its job
+
+    first.push(null);
+    first.resume();
+    await pending;
+    expect(resumed).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('releases a slot when a read errors, not just when it ends', async () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 1 });
+    await guard.acquire();
+    const stream = guard.track(makeStream());
+    stream.on('error', () => {});
+    stream.destroy(new Error('socket died'));
+    // Without the error listener the slot would never come back and the next
+    // photo would park forever.
+    expect(await guard.acquire()).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('reports a failed read so the caller can abort the archive', async () => {
+    // A stream that errors while still QUEUED has no archiver listener on it
+    // yet. Releasing its slot and saying nothing leaves a dead stream in the
+    // queue, and the archive hangs when it reaches it.
+    const seen = [];
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 2, onFatalError: (e) => seen.push(e) });
+    await guard.acquire();
+    const queued = guard.track(makeStream());
+    queued.on('error', () => {});
+    queued.destroy(new Error('socket died'));
+    await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r)); // 'error' lands on the next tick
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0].message).toBe('socket died');
+  });
+
+  it('stays quiet about reads it destroyed itself', async () => {
+    // destroyAll is the caller's own teardown; reporting those back as fatal
+    // would re-enter the abort path it is already running.
+    const seen = [];
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ onFatalError: (e) => seen.push(e) });
+    await guard.acquire();
+    const s1 = guard.track(makeStream());
+    s1.on('error', () => {});
+    guard.destroyAll();
+    await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('destroys every read still holding bytes', async () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 5 });
+    const streams = [makeStream(), makeStream(), makeStream()];
+    for (const s of streams) { await guard.acquire(); guard.track(s); }
+    expect(guard.openCount).toBe(3);
+
+    guard.destroyAll();
+    expect(streams.every((s) => s.destroyed)).toBe(true);
+    expect(guard.openCount).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('wakes a parked acquire on destroyAll so the loop can exit', async () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard({ maxInFlight: 1 });
+    await guard.acquire();
+    guard.track(makeStream());
+
+    const pending = guard.acquire();
+    guard.destroyAll();
+    // false, so the caller breaks out instead of appending to a dead archive.
+    expect(await pending).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('destroys a stream tracked after shutdown rather than leaking it', () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard();
+    guard.destroyAll();
+    const late = guard.track(makeStream());
+    expect(late.destroyed).toBe(true);
+    expect(guard.openCount).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('tolerates destroyAll twice — exit paths overlap', () => {
+    const guard = createArchiveStreamGuard();
+    guard.track(makeStream());
+    guard.destroyAll();
+    expect(() => guard.destroyAll()).not.toThrow();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/photoContentType.test.js

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ describe('resolvePhotoContentType', () => {
 });
 
 describe('serving routes use the resolver', () => {
-  const routes = ['gallery.js', 'secureImages.js', 'protectedImages.js', 'adminPhotos.js'];
+  const routes = ['gallery/media.js', 'gallery/downloads.js', 'secureImages.js', 'protectedImages.js', 'adminPhotos.js'];
   it.each(routes)('%s sets no Content-Type from photo.mime_type directly', (name) => {
     const src = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../src/routes', name), 'utf8');
     expect(src).not.toMatch(/'Content-Type':\s*photo\.mime_type/);

backend/__tests__/utils/pinnedRequest.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+const dns = require('dns');
+const http = require('http');
+const axios = require('axios');
+const { validateExternalUrlAsync } = require('../../src/utils/networkValidation');
+const { pinnedRequestOptions } = require('../../src/utils/pinnedRequest');
+afterEach(() => jest.restoreAllMocks());
+it('never performs a second DNS lookup that could reach a private listener', async () => {
+  const received = jest.fn();
+  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { received(); res.end('private'); });
+  await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
+  const url = `http://rebind.example:${server.address().port}/hook`;
+  const preflight = jest.spyOn(dns.promises, 'lookup').mockResolvedValue([{ address: '192.0.2.1', family: 4 }]);
+  const unsafeLookup = jest.spyOn(dns, 'lookup').mockImplementation((_host, opts, cb) => {
+    if (typeof opts === 'function') { cb = opts; opts = {}; }
+    cb(null, ...(opts.all ? [[{ address: '127.0.0.1', family: 4 }]] : ['127.0.0.1', 4]));
+  });
+  let options;
+  try {
+    const check = await validateExternalUrlAsync(url);
+    options = pinnedRequestOptions(check);
+    await expect(axios.post(url, 'private-data', { ...options, timeout: 200 })).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(preflight).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(unsafeLookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); expect(received).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  } finally {
+    options?.httpAgent.destroy(); options?.httpsAgent.destroy();
+    await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve));
+  }
+});
+it('preserves the original Host and refuses redirects while using the pinned address', async () => {
+  const hosts = [];
+  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+    hosts.push(req.headers.host); res.writeHead(302, { Location: 'http://localhost/private' }); res.end();
+  });
+  await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
+  const host = `pinned.example:${server.address().port}`;
+  // Test the transport in isolation: production checks reject this private IP.
+  const options = pinnedRequestOptions({ valid: true, hostname: 'pinned.example', addresses: [{ address: '127.0.0.1', family: 4 }] });
+  try {
+    const res = await axios.post(`http://${host}/hook`, 'body', { ...options, validateStatus: () => true });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(302); expect(hosts).toEqual([host]); expect(options.proxy).toBe(false);
+  } finally { options.httpAgent.destroy(); options.httpsAgent.destroy(); await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)); }
+});
+it('fails closed for missing DNS results', () => {
+  expect(() => pinnedRequestOptions({ valid: true })).toThrow('validated destination');
+});
+
+it('preserves TLS SNI and certificate hostname verification for a pinned connection', async () => {
+  const fs = require('fs/promises');
+  const path = require('path');
+  const dir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(require('os').tmpdir(), 'picpeak-tls-pin-'));
+  const key = path.join(dir, 'key.pem'), cert = path.join(dir, 'cert.pem');
+  require('child_process').execFileSync('openssl', ['req', '-x509', '-newkey', 'rsa:2048', '-nodes',
+    '-keyout', key, '-out', cert, '-days', '1', '-subj', '/CN=pinned.example',
+    '-addext', 'subjectAltName=DNS:pinned.example'], { stdio: 'ignore' });
+  const certificate = await fs.readFile(cert);
+  const seen = [];
+  const server = require('https').createServer({ key: await fs.readFile(key), cert: certificate }, (req, res) => {
+    seen.push({ host: req.headers.host, servername: req.socket.servername }); res.end('ok');
+  });
+  await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
+  const makeOptions = hostname => {
+    const options = pinnedRequestOptions({ valid: true, hostname, addresses: [{ address: '127.0.0.1', family: 4 }] });
+    options.httpsAgent.options.ca = certificate;
+    return options;
+  };
+  const allowed = makeOptions('pinned.example'), wrong = makeOptions('wrong.example');
+  try {
+    const host = `pinned.example:${server.address().port}`;
+    expect((await axios.post(`https://${host}/hook`, 'data', { ...allowed, timeout: 2000 })).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(seen).toEqual([{ host, servername: 'pinned.example' }]);
+    await expect(axios.post(`https://wrong.example:${server.address().port}/hook`, 'data', { ...wrong, timeout: 2000 }))
+      .rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID' });
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+  } finally {
+    for (const options of [allowed, wrong]) { options.httpAgent.destroy(); options.httpsAgent.destroy(); }
+    await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve));
+    await fs.rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/requestLogPath.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+const EventEmitter = require('events');
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ info: jest.fn() }));
+const logger = require('../../src/utils/logger');
+const middleware = require('../../src/middleware/apiRequestLogger');
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../../src/utils/requestLogPath');
+const marker = 'SECRET_TEST_CAPABILITY';
+it.each([
+  `/api/gallery/g/photos?token=${marker}&password=${marker}`,
+  `/api/gallery/g/verify-token/${marker}`,
+  `/api/gallery/g/show/${marker}/state`,
+  `/api/images/g/photo/1/signed/${marker}`,
+  `/api/secure-images/g/secure/1/${marker}`,
+  `/api/secure-images/g/secure-download/1/${marker}`,
+  `/api/public/contracts/${marker}/sign`,
+  `/api/customer/auth/password-reset/${marker}`,
+  `/api/public/newsletter/unsubscribe/${marker}`,
+])('does not log capabilities on request or response: %s', (originalUrl) => {
+  logger.info.mockClear();
+  const res = new EventEmitter(); res.statusCode = 200;
+  middleware({ originalUrl, method: 'GET' }, res, jest.fn());
+  res.emit('finish');
+  expect(logger.info).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  expect(JSON.stringify(logger.info.mock.calls)).not.toContain(marker);
+});
+it('retains useful non-secret routes and removes control characters', () => {
+  expect(requestLogPath('/api/admin/events/12?search=private')).toBe('/api/admin/events/12');
+  expect(requestLogPath('/api/admin/events\nforged')).not.toContain('\n');
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/testListenerAddress.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+const http = require('http');
+it('directs Supertest to the actual IPv6 listener instead of an unrelated IPv4 port', async () => {
+  jest.resetModules();
+  const request = require('supertest');
+  const server = http.createServer((_req, res) => { res.end('actual test listener'); });
+  await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { server.once('error', reject); server.listen(0, '::1', resolve); });
+  try {
+    const response = await request(server).get('/');
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.text).toBe('actual test listener');
+    expect(response.request.url).toContain('://[::1]:');
+  } finally { await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)); }
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/tokenRevocation.forgery.test.js

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
   const dbFn = () => ({
     insert(row) {
       inserted.push(row);
-      return { onConflict: () => ({ ignore: async () => undefined }) };
+      return { onConflict: () => ({ ignore: async () => undefined, merge: async () => undefined }) };
     },
   });
   return { db: dbFn };

backend/jest.setup.js

@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+// Supertest 6 binds an IPv6 wildcard listener but hardcodes an IPv4 URL.
+// macOS can allocate that IPv6 port while a different IPv4 service owns it.
+// Address the listener's actual family so a test cannot reach that service.
+jest.mock('supertest/lib/test', () => {
+  const Test = jest.requireActual('supertest/lib/test');
+  const serverAddress = Test.prototype.serverAddress;
+  Test.prototype.serverAddress = function(app, path) {
+    const url = serverAddress.call(this, app, path);
+    return app.address()?.family === 'IPv6'
+      ? url.replace('://127.0.0.1:', '://[::1]:')
+      : url;
+  };
+  return Test;
+});
+
 beforeAll(() => {
   process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
   process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'test-secret';
@@ -8,3 +23,11 @@ beforeAll(() => {
     process.env.STORAGE_PATH = '/storage';
   }
 });
+
+// Dispose resources loaded by this suite using the application's draining
+// shutdown. Individual fixtures still own temporary files and other DB pools.
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await require('./src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices();
+  const loadedDb = require.cache[require.resolve('./src/database/db')];
+  if (typeof loadedDb?.exports.db?.destroy === 'function') await loadedDb.exports.db.destroy();
+});

backend/migrations/core/210_events_updated_at.js

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/** Fresh installs and upgraded databases expose the same event timestamp. */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasTable('events')) return;
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'updated_at')) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('events', table => {
+      table.timestamp('updated_at');
+    });
+  }
+  // Do not replace existing modification times on a repeated migration.
+  await knex('events').whereNull('updated_at').update({ updated_at: knex.ref('created_at') });
+};
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (await knex.schema.hasTable('events') && await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'updated_at')) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('events', table => table.dropColumn('updated_at'));
+  }
+};

backend/migrations/core/211_revocations_without_expiry.js

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/** Non-expiring JWTs need revocation records that cleanup never removes. */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasTable('revoked_tokens')) return;
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasColumn('revoked_tokens', 'expires_at')) return;
+  const column = await knex('revoked_tokens').columnInfo('expires_at');
+  if (!column.nullable) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('revoked_tokens', table => {
+      table.timestamp('expires_at').nullable().alter();
+    });
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasTable('revoked_tokens')) return;
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasColumn('revoked_tokens', 'expires_at')) return;
+  // Refuse to discard permanent revocations or silently give them a TTL.
+  if (await knex('revoked_tokens').whereNull('expires_at').first()) {
+    throw new Error('Cannot roll back while permanent token revocations exist');
+  }
+  const column = await knex('revoked_tokens').columnInfo('expires_at');
+  if (column.nullable) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('revoked_tokens', table => {
+      table.timestamp('expires_at').notNullable().alter();
+    });
+  }
+};

backend/migrations/core/212_product_usage_prompt_shown.js

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// Tracks whether this installation has ever been offered the one-time
+// usage-reporting opt-in prompt shown to an existing admin on their first
+// login after an update (see UsageService.markPromptShown()). A fresh
+// install that went through the setup wizard's own opt-in step sets this
+// too, so upgraded and brand-new installs share one "already asked" marker
+// and neither gets asked twice. Separate from `notice_dismissed`, which
+// governs the persistent, re-visitable dashboard banner instead.
+const { formatBoolean } = require('../../src/utils/dbCompat');
+
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('product_usage_state'))) return;
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('product_usage_state', 'prompt_shown'))) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('product_usage_state', (t) => {
+      t.boolean('prompt_shown').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+    });
+  }
+  // Existing participants already made their choice before this marker
+  // existed. Preserve it through withdrawal, pending delivery and identity
+  // recovery; none of those transitions should produce a fresh invitation.
+  await knex('product_usage_state')
+    .whereNot('status', 'disabled')
+    .update({ prompt_shown: formatBoolean(true) });
+};
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (
+    (await knex.schema.hasTable('product_usage_state')) &&
+    (await knex.schema.hasColumn('product_usage_state', 'prompt_shown'))
+  ) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('product_usage_state', (t) => t.dropColumn('prompt_shown'));
+  }
+};

backend/migrations/core/213_admin_mfa_last_used_step.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 213: TOTP replay protection for admin MFA (GHSA-qcwx-r25m-j869).
+ *
+ * verifyTotp()/verifyTotpEncrypted() were stateless: otplib's window:1
+ * tolerance means a captured 6-digit code stays valid across several real
+ * time-steps (~90s), so the same code could complete two independent admin
+ * logins. `two_factor_last_used_step` tracks, per admin, the absolute TOTP
+ * time-step (Math.floor(Date.now() / 30000)) that their last successfully
+ * consumed code matched; mfaService now rejects a code whose matched step
+ * doesn't advance past it.
+ *
+ * Additive and idempotent: only adds a column, guarded by hasColumn, so it
+ * is safe to re-run and touches no existing data.
+ */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_last_used_step'))) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
+      t.integer('two_factor_last_used_step').nullable();
+    });
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'two_factor_last_used_step')) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
+      t.dropColumn('two_factor_last_used_step');
+    });
+  }
+};

backend/package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.123.0-beta.0",
+  "version": "3.131.3-beta.0",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "picpeak-backend",
-      "version": "3.123.0-beta.0",
+      "version": "3.131.3-beta.0",
       "dependencies": {
         "@aws-sdk/client-s3": "^3.850.0",
         "@aws-sdk/lib-storage": "^3.850.0",
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
         "knex": "^2.4.2",
         "mailparser": "^3.9.9",
         "mime-types": "^3.0.1",
-        "multer": "2.2.0",
+        "multer": "2.3.0",
         "node-cron": "^3.0.2",
         "node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
         "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
         "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
         "react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
         "sanitize-html": "2.17.7",
-        "sharp": "0.35.3",
+        "sharp": "0.35.4",
         "sqlite3": "^5.1.6",
         "swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
         "swagger-ui-express": "^5.0.1",
@@ -1716,9 +1716,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-darwin-arm64/-/sharp-darwin-arm64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-RMnFX7YQsMoh7lWfcM4NEHHymBX/rLuKNPVM84XE9ONPcaSCDgE7CHIHpSgPcO2xcRthgBy1HfNO319mwhIAkg==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-darwin-arm64/-/sharp-darwin-arm64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-Uhfl4V4lhP2nbUVF9+hyH1+luj86f1gUFeo8ALYxFoULoU+G87D43BfeMP8XHsk9boxAnCY/bf2EHwhA7MuGsA==",
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
@@ -1734,13 +1734,13 @@
         "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
       },
       "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.3"
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-darwin-x64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-darwin-x64/-/sharp-darwin-x64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Xo+5uFBtLN0BKqieTxiFzFPQAUlBbbH5iBKyRX/z1JrbnYsHTfKJnUfL8+p2TPXr1pXqao4eeL4Rl144uDpK9w==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-darwin-x64/-/sharp-darwin-x64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-hWniXY3bG5qKpkKrAwPe4y+VTPmf086YQAnkxWh7uA1YrlRouWGa0M0Mxj3ZjnXFkv7/TD1bTy9lGUK26vRvWw==",
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
@@ -1756,20 +1756,20 @@
         "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
       },
       "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": "1.3.3"
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32/-/sharp-freebsd-wasm32-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-lUxcqWIj2wMQ9BrwNjngcr1gWUr5xgaGThBRqPPalIC2n67Cqj1uPh8NnA/ZhAg8hUbKl+kVHKwgUIwe6ZYPrg==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32/-/sharp-freebsd-wasm32-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-lIsKw/BU+kjB4eZjxrYrZmwOJYi3Ajrv66iAlBmUPyKc3HpnloevB1g3wxGD9P/5BbQ1brBGl65VRRrCvQDEqA==",
       "license": "Apache-2.0",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "freebsd"
       ],
       "dependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-wasm32": "0.35.3"
+        "@img/sharp-wasm32": "0.35.4"
       },
       "engines": {
         "node": ">=20.9.0"
@@ -1779,9 +1779,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64/-/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-9J6ypZFpQBj4YnePGoq/S38w6nz+vqg5WZLrLGY4YuSemdMq47GMLBPO42MzwdGwpg/agZ7xzZcFHa48xlywfg==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64/-/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-suTBPTDGrI9WodccaDdwZItTSaBYASlBk1NSfElSHrUfzu3szG6lvIF58+WiFvnfzuK8ZBFS5zE00PxqxnRiPg==",
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
@@ -1795,9 +1795,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64/-/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-m2pW1n6cns9VaubNwsZ+c3CRYjxNQWgJ5gPlnL1nbBcpkBvFm6SCFN5o0psFHI8w9n11NKhFkeEDns98tiqbEw==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64/-/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-FVJZ5mITMobmXIz/hPDTw0EintTW5H3WfrxwLqEqjiIihlu+hVRyGrFQ60xl0Lxn7Bt3zdpevPaQi0HEzqz9fw==",
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
@@ -1811,9 +1811,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm/-/sharp-libvips-linux-arm-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-1eMLzy92I4J6rmi4mAT8yC3HxOtniyGELlzGbNMLLeqe052ahFQ0h6LFq+lh5DsDIdYViIDst08abvSbcEdLXQ==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm/-/sharp-libvips-linux-arm-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-3rbU4vqXXc3hY/OiXdl52xZvT0F1yEngWfvqudtPJg/KkyiaQw2DRsFrNzpmLvfavbwOq3qXn36GP8obHRULQA==",
       "cpu": [
         "arm"
       ],
@@ -1827,9 +1827,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-dqVSFynCox4C/J8kT16V7SIFAns0IjgLwkvYT7p8LQVmJ5OS5b6tI9IGflxTeuBS//zXeFIUbwt5dwxyZ17cnA==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-0DaL0A6Xu6sQSQFwe4iVCrKWU2cCTItnRsYsCdxAMm9NF6twAA9BKnoqy4hqz4+azQ0JHuA26qiUKsf1XJ/v5A==",
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
@@ -1843,9 +1843,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-3z0NHDxD6n5I9gc05U1eW1AyRm+Gznzq3naMrthPNqE6oYykcogW0l/jfpJdjYnuNl8R7yI9pNbE1XiUeyq0Aw==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-cdn1OvUBwsXhbC0zSzJnNzf5MZ/mTrobawDvNXBTxe8VtqKAm0sRuEY2Evzovb/w9JMk4TvRxqt1mekSuJz64w==",
       "cpu": [
         "ppc64"
       ],
@@ -1859,9 +1859,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-bsb4rI+NldGOsXuej2r8OdSS8+zXDVaCWxyWrcv6kneTOlgAHtZABRzBBCwdsPiD90J4myNJuHpg6kA20ImW/w==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-HjPVx7yKz+0lqdhDlTw1tt90wamBoxhiXpvl1XZpJLiHH4RCJ5yDTqH+VlYPv2fwFs89JFw4c1IexYOcQUi4IQ==",
       "cpu": [
         "riscv64"
       ],
@@ -1875,9 +1875,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x/-/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-/ABshyj8gCpyIrNXnHn4LorDJ0HHm1VhXPBlxZ8zAtfVPAaSafXPGn+sUSIRiwaSBy0mmFjSjiXI5mkcwdChKQ==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x/-/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-neWLh+3yCNThxnfy3c4BbVBeGgt9aftno+XbT56iK28RgeDs3UOFWviLWlUu0bArYVYJaFDK+RRohbicUNCm8Q==",
       "cpu": [
         "s390x"
       ],
@@ -1891,9 +1891,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
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-        "@img/sharp-linux-ppc64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-riscv64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-s390x": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-win32-arm64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-win32-ia32": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "0.35.3"
+        "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-ppc64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-riscv64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-s390x": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-win32-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-win32-ia32": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "0.35.4"
       },
       "peerDependenciesMeta": {
         "@types/node": {

backend/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.130.0-beta.0",
+  "version": "3.131.7-beta.0",
   "description": "Backend for PicPeak event photo sharing platform",
   "main": "server.js",
   "engines": {
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
     "knex": "^2.4.2",
     "mailparser": "^3.9.9",
     "mime-types": "^3.0.1",
-    "multer": "2.2.0",
+    "multer": "2.3.0",
     "node-cron": "^3.0.2",
     "node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
     "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
     "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
     "react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
     "sanitize-html": "2.17.7",
-    "sharp": "0.35.3",
+    "sharp": "0.35.4",
     "sqlite3": "^5.1.6",
     "swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
     "swagger-ui-express": "^5.0.1",

backend/scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const MFA_CLEAR = {
   two_factor_secret: null,
   two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
   two_factor_enrolled_at: null,
+  two_factor_last_used_step: null,
   updated_at: new Date(),
 };
 

backend/server.js

@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ app.use((req, res, next) => {
 });
 
 // CORS configuration (apply only to API routes)
-const { isAllowedOrigin, multipartOriginAllowed } = require('./src/utils/requestOrigin');
+const { isAllowedOrigin } = require('./src/utils/requestOrigin');
 
 const corsOptions = {
   origin: function (origin, callback) {
@@ -528,43 +528,10 @@ app.use(['/api/admin', '/api/v1'], express.json({ limit: '50mb' }));
 app.use(express.json({ limit: '2mb' }));
 app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true, limit: '2mb' }));
 
-// CSRF protection: require JSON Content-Type on mutating API requests
-// This blocks cross-origin form submissions which cannot set Content-Type: application/json
-app.use('/api', (req, res, next) => {
-  if (['POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH'].includes(req.method)) {
-    const contentType = req.headers['content-type'] || '';
-    const contentLength = parseInt(req.headers['content-length'] || '0', 10);
-    // Allow empty-body requests (e.g. logout), multipart for uploads, and JSON for API calls
-    if (contentLength > 0 && !contentType.includes('application/json') && !contentType.includes('multipart/form-data')) {
-      return res.status(415).json({ error: 'Unsupported Content-Type. Use application/json or multipart/form-data.' });
-    }
-    // multipart is exactly what a cross-site <form> can send without a
-    // preflight, and in a split-origin deployment (SameSite=None) the admin
-    // cookie rides along to the upload routes. Browsers label such a
-    // submission Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site (and always send Origin on a
-    // cross-origin POST); non-browser clients send neither header and pass.
-    if (contentType.includes('multipart/form-data') && !multipartOriginAllowed(req)) {
-      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Cross-site multipart request rejected' });
-    }
-  }
-  next();
-});
+// Validate the origin independently of body length/content type.
+app.use('/api', require('./src/middleware/csrf'));
 
-// Request logging for API routes (with timestamps)
-const apiRequestLogger = (req, res, next) => {
-  try {
-    const started = Date.now();
-    const ts = new Date().toISOString();
-    logger.info(`[${ts}] ${req.method} ${req.originalUrl}`);
-    res.on('finish', () => {
-      const ms = Date.now() - started;
-      const tsDone = new Date().toISOString();
-      logger.info(`[${tsDone}] ${req.method} ${req.originalUrl} -> ${res.statusCode} (${ms}ms)`);
-    });
-  } catch (_) {}
-  next();
-};
-app.use('/api', apiRequestLogger);
+app.use('/api', require('./src/middleware/apiRequestLogger'));
 
 // Maintenance mode middleware - add after body parsing but before routes
 app.use(maintenanceMiddleware);
@@ -1098,6 +1065,30 @@ if (spaCatchAll) {
 // Global error handler (must be last)
 app.use(errorHandler);
 
+// App construction is side-effect free with respect to listening and workers.
+let httpServer;
+let shutdownPromise;
+// Docker stops a container 10 s after SIGTERM by default (compose sets no
+// stop_grace_period), so the drain must finish inside that window.
+const SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS = Number(process.env.SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS) || 8000;
+async function stopServer() {
+  if (shutdownPromise) return shutdownPromise;
+  shutdownPromise = (async () => {
+    const close = httpServer ? new Promise((resolve, reject) => httpServer.close(err => err ? reject(err) : resolve())) : Promise.resolve();
+    const timeout = setTimeout(() => httpServer?.closeAllConnections(), Math.floor(SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS / 2));
+    timeout.unref();
+    try {
+      await Promise.all([close, require('./src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices()]);
+    } finally {
+      clearTimeout(timeout);
+      // Always release the pool: a rejected service stop must not leave
+      // ref'd sockets keeping the process alive until SIGKILL.
+      await db.destroy();
+    }
+  })();
+  return shutdownPromise;
+}
+
 // Initialize services
 async function startServer() {
   try {
@@ -1122,14 +1113,8 @@ async function startServer() {
     const { initializeCleanupJob } = require('./src/utils/authSecurity');
     initializeCleanupJob();
     
-    // Initialize temp upload cleanup job
-    const { cleanupTempUploads } = require('./src/utils/cleanupTempUploads');
-    // Run cleanup on startup
-    cleanupTempUploads();
-    // Schedule periodic cleanup every hour
-    setInterval(cleanupTempUploads, 60 * 60 * 1000);
-    logger.info('Temp upload cleanup scheduled');
-    
+    require('./src/utils/cleanupTempUploads').startTempUploadCleanup();
+
     // Start file watcher
     startFileWatcher();
     // External-media folder watcher (issue 1187): imports new files into
@@ -1149,6 +1134,10 @@ async function startServer() {
     startTransferCleanup();
     // Custom-resolution download archives (#858) are disposable renditions —
     // sweep them once their TTL passes so .download-cache doesn't grow forever.
+    // Best-effort, as before the scheduler refactor: a transient DB error on
+    // this one UPDATE must not abort the whole server start.
+    await require('./src/services/downloadJobService').recoverOrphanedJobs()
+      .catch((err) => logger.error('Download job recovery failed', { error: err.message }));
     startDownloadJobCleanup();
     // Reveal-mode scheduler (#838): minutely stamp for scheduled reveals.
     startRevealScheduler();
@@ -1306,7 +1295,7 @@ async function startServer() {
     // lazy means they don't pay for a module graph they never use.
     require('./src/services/faceQueue').start();
 
-    app.listen(PORT, () => {
+    httpServer = app.listen(PORT, () => {
       logger.info(`Server running on port ${PORT}`);
       logger.info(`Admin interface: ${process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}`);
       logger.info(`Frontend: ${process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3001'}`);
@@ -1325,10 +1314,32 @@ async function startServer() {
     });
   } catch (error) {
     logger.error('Failed to start server:', error);
-    process.exit(1);
+    await stopServer();
+    process.exitCode = 1;
   }
 }
 
-startServer();
+if (require.main === module) {
+  let stopping = false;
+  for (const signal of ['SIGTERM', 'SIGINT']) {
+    process.on(signal, () => {
+      if (stopping) {
+        logger.warn(`Received ${signal} again during shutdown, exiting immediately`);
+        process.exit(1);
+      }
+      stopping = true;
+      // The drain itself has no deadline; a hung worker must not keep the
+      // process alive past the container's stop grace period.
+      setTimeout(() => {
+        logger.error(`Shutdown exceeded ${SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS}ms, forcing exit`);
+        process.exit(1);
+      }, SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS).unref();
+      stopServer().catch(error => { logger.error('Shutdown failed', { error: error.message }); process.exitCode = 1; });
+    });
+  }
+  startServer();
+}
+app.startServer = startServer;
+app.stopServer = stopServer;
 
 module.exports = app; // For testing

backend/src/__tests__/verifyGalleryAccess.customerRevoke.test.js

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ jest.mock('../database/db', () => {
   return { db: mockDb, withRetry };
 });
 
+jest.mock('../utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
+jest.mock('../utils/sessionCutoff', () => ({ isTokenBeforeCutoff: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
 jest.mock('../utils/logger', () => ({
   info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
 }));
@@ -83,8 +85,12 @@ function mockEventAndAssignment({ event, assignment }) {
   assignChain.where = jest.fn().mockReturnValue(assignChain);
   assignChain.first = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(assignment);
 
-  db.mockImplementationOnce(() => eventsChain)
-    .mockImplementationOnce(() => assignChain);
+  db.mockImplementation((table) => {
+    if (table === 'events') return eventsChain;
+    if (table === 'customer_accounts') return { ...eventsChain, first: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 7 }) };
+    if (table === 'event_customer_assignments') return assignChain;
+    throw new Error('Unexpected table: ' + table);
+  });
 
   return { eventsChain, assignChain };
 }
@@ -101,7 +107,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT with active assignment', (
   it('allows access when the event_customer_assignments row exists', async () => {
     getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
     jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
-      type: 'gallery',
+      type: 'gallery', iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
       eventId: 42,
       via: 'customer',
       customerId: 7,
@@ -132,7 +138,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT after revocation', () => {
   it('returns 403 CUSTOMER_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKED when the junction row is gone', async () => {
     getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
     jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
-      type: 'gallery',
+      type: 'gallery', iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
       eventId: 42,
       via: 'customer',
       customerId: 7,
@@ -162,7 +168,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT after revocation', () => {
     // and start 403'ing per-event-password sessions.
     getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
     jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
-      type: 'gallery',
+      type: 'gallery', iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
       eventId: 42,
       customerId: 7,
       // intentionally no `via` claim
@@ -194,7 +200,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — per-event-password JWT', () => {
   it('does NOT touch event_customer_assignments and passes through', async () => {
     getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
     jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
-      type: 'gallery',
+      type: 'gallery', iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
       eventId: 42,
       // No via, no customerId — this is the legacy per-event-password
       // flow where every guest mints their own JWT after entering the

backend/src/config/multerConfig.js

@@ -120,7 +120,14 @@ const createPhotoUploader = (options = {}) => {
       files: options.maxFiles || 2000,
       fieldSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024,
       parts: 10000,
-      headerPairs: 2000
+      headerPairs: 2000,
+      // CVE-2026-82333: no preset in this factory is currently wired up to
+      // a route (nothing imports createPhotoUploader et al. — routes build
+      // their own multer instances directly), but every preset gets the
+      // limit anyway so it can't be adopted later without it. None of the
+      // uploaders this factory builds have a legitimate use for
+      // array-indexed field names.
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0
     },
     fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.media, {
       validateMagicNumbers: true
@@ -146,7 +153,8 @@ const createLogoUploader = (options = {}) => {
       }
     }),
     limits: {
-      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.medium
+      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.medium,
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 // CVE-2026-82333 — see createPhotoUploader comment
     },
     fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.logos, {
       skipMagicValidation: ['image/svg+xml']
@@ -172,7 +180,8 @@ const createFaviconUploader = (options = {}) => {
       }
     }),
     limits: {
-      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.small
+      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.small,
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 // CVE-2026-82333 — see createPhotoUploader comment
     },
     fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.favicons, {
       skipMagicValidation: ['image/x-icon', 'image/vnd.microsoft.icon']
@@ -194,7 +203,8 @@ const createGalleryUploader = (destDir, options = {}) => {
     dest: destDir,
     limits: {
       fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.large,
-      files: options.maxFiles || 10
+      files: options.maxFiles || 10,
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 // CVE-2026-82333 — see createPhotoUploader comment
     },
     fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.photos)
   };

backend/src/database/db.js

@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ async function initializeDatabase() {
       table.integer('user_id').nullable(); // User who owned the token
       table.string('token_type', 20); // admin, gallery, etc.
       table.timestamp('revoked_at').defaultTo(db.fn.now());
-      table.timestamp('expires_at').notNullable(); // When token would have expired
+      table.timestamp('expires_at').nullable(); // NULL retains tokens without a known expiry
       table.string('reason', 100); // password_change, logout, compromised, etc.
       table.text('metadata'); // Additional JSON data
       

backend/src/middleware/apiRequestLogger.js

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../utils/requestLogPath');
+module.exports = function apiRequestLogger(req, res, next) {
+  const started = Date.now();
+  const path = requestLogPath(req.originalUrl);
+  logger.info(`${req.method} ${path}`);
+  res.once('finish', () => {
+    logger.info(`${req.method} ${path} -> ${res.statusCode} (${Date.now() - started}ms)`);
+  });
+  next();
+};

backend/src/middleware/auth.js

@@ -1,12 +1,21 @@
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
-const { db } = require('../database/db');
-const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
-const { isMissingRolesSchema } = require('../utils/dbErrors');
-const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
-const { isTokenBeforeCutoff } = require('../utils/sessionCutoff');
+const sessionAccess = require('../services/sessionAccessService');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { getAdminTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
 
+// GHSA-h4w8-57xq-53fx: must_change_password was written on reset (and on
+// invitation/OIDC-bypass paths) but nothing server-side ever checked it — a
+// forced-reset admin could keep using the old/weak password indefinitely
+// because the flag only ever reached the frontend as a response field. The
+// frontend already renders a blocking modal for it (MandatoryPasswordChangeModal),
+// this is the backstop for callers that skip the UI entirely. Every route
+// gated by adminAuth() is blocked except the ones a flagged admin needs to
+// clear the flag or leave: change their password, and log out.
+const MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD_EXEMPT_PATHS = new Set([
+  '/api/admin/auth/change-password',
+  '/api/admin/auth/logout',
+]);
+
 /**
  * Enhanced admin authentication middleware with revocation checking
  */
@@ -16,7 +25,7 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
     if (!token) {
       return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
     }
-    
+
     let decoded;
     try {
       decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
@@ -31,101 +40,21 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
       }
       return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
     }
-    
-    // Check if token is revoked
-    if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
-      logger.warn('Revoked token used', {
-        userId: decoded.id,
-        tokenType: decoded.type
-      });
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token has been revoked', code: 'TOKEN_REVOKED' });
+
+    // includeProfile: true — need must_change_password for the enforcement
+    // check below on every request, not just the profile/session-check routes.
+    const admin = await sessionAccess.admin(decoded, { includeProfile: true });
+    const requestIp = req.ip || req.connection?.remoteAddress;
+    if (decoded.ip && requestIp && decoded.ip !== requestIp) {
+      logger.info('admin session IP changed', { accountId: admin.id, tokenIp: decoded.ip, requestIp });
     }
 
-    // Reject any session issued before the global cutoff (set by a .picpeak
-    // restore, which can reassign admin ids). Forces every pre-restore admin
-    // session to re-authenticate against the restored data.
-    if (await isTokenBeforeCutoff(decoded)) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session invalidated', code: 'SESSION_INVALIDATED' });
-    }
-    
-    // Verify token type
-    if (decoded.type !== 'admin') {
-      logger.warn('Non-admin token used for admin endpoint', { 
-        userId: decoded.id,
-        tokenType: decoded.type 
+    if (admin.must_change_password
+      && !MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD_EXEMPT_PATHS.has(req.originalUrl.split('?')[0])) {
+      return res.status(403).json({
+        error: 'Password change required before continuing',
+        code: 'MUST_CHANGE_PASSWORD'
       });
-      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Insufficient permissions' });
-    }
-    
-    // IP validation (optional - can be strict or just log)
-    const currentIp = req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress;
-    if (decoded.ip && decoded.ip !== currentIp) {
-      logger.warn('Token used from different IP', {
-        userId: decoded.id,
-        tokenIp: decoded.ip,
-        currentIp: currentIp
-      });
-    }
-    
-    // Check if admin still exists and is active, including role info
-    // Use try/catch to handle case where roles table doesn't exist yet (upgrade scenario)
-    let admin;
-    try {
-      admin = await db('admin_users')
-        .leftJoin('roles', 'roles.id', 'admin_users.role_id')
-        .where({ 'admin_users.id': decoded.id, 'admin_users.is_active': formatBoolean(true) })
-        .select(
-          'admin_users.id',
-          'admin_users.username',
-          'admin_users.email',
-          'admin_users.password_changed_at',
-          'roles.id as role_id',
-          'roles.name as role_name'
-        )
-        .first();
-    } catch (joinError) {
-      // Fail CLOSED on anything that isn't a genuinely missing roles schema:
-      // the fallback below fabricates super_admin, so a transient query failure
-      // (connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout, pool exhaustion) must
-      // not become a free privilege upgrade for every scoped admin. Rethrow →
-      // outer catch → 401, which is already how every other transient DB fault
-      // in this try block behaves (isTokenRevoked / isTokenBeforeCutoff both
-      // hit the DB here). apiTokenAuth takes the same posture on the v1
-      // surface, differing only in its 500.
-      if (!isMissingRolesSchema(joinError)) throw joinError;
-      // Fallback: roles table may not exist yet during upgrade
-      // Query without role join - user will have no role info but can still authenticate
-      logger.debug('Roles table not available, falling back to basic auth', { error: joinError.message });
-      admin = await db('admin_users')
-        .where({ id: decoded.id, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-        .select('id', 'username', 'email', 'password_changed_at')
-        .first();
-      if (admin) {
-        admin.role_id = null;
-        admin.role_name = 'super_admin'; // Assume super_admin for existing users during upgrade
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (!admin) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
-    }
-
-    // Check if password was changed after token was issued. JWT `iat` has
-    // 1-second resolution; `password_changed_at` is sub-second. Floor the
-    // comparison so a token issued in the *same* second as the password
-    // change isn't incorrectly rejected — that race used to bite anyone
-    // logging in immediately after a password reset/change.
-    if (admin.password_changed_at) {
-      const passwordChangedSeconds = Math.floor(
-        new Date(admin.password_changed_at).getTime() / 1000
-      );
-      if (decoded.iat < passwordChangedSeconds) {
-        logger.warn('Token used after password change', { userId: decoded.id });
-        return res.status(401).json({
-          error: 'Token invalid due to password change',
-          code: 'PASSWORD_CHANGED'
-        });
-      }
     }
 
     // Add user info to request (enhanced with role)
@@ -135,6 +64,7 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
       email: admin.email,
       roleId: admin.role_id,
       roleName: admin.role_name,
+      mustChangePassword: !!admin.must_change_password,
       // From the token, not the database: it is a property of this session
       // rather than of the account (#1186). Carried so a route that reissues
       // the token — change-password — can preserve the choice instead of
@@ -142,11 +72,14 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
       rememberMe: decoded.rememberMe === true
     };
     req.token = token; // Store token for potential revocation
-    
+
     next();
   } catch (error) {
     logger.error('Auth middleware error:', error);
-    res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication failed' });
+    res.status(error.statusCode || 401).json({
+      error: error.isOperational ? error.message : 'Authentication failed',
+      ...(error.isOperational && { code: error.code }),
+    });
   }
 }
 

backend/src/middleware/csrf.js

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+const { mutationOriginAllowed } = require('../utils/requestOrigin');
+
+// The origin check is the CSRF defence. This list only has to keep out what
+// a cross-site page can send without a preflight: a form cannot produce JSON
+// or octet-stream, and fetch() with either is not CORS-safelisted.
+// octet-stream is how the chunked upload route receives its raw body
+// (#1377); express.json leaves it unread for everything else.
+const ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES = ['application/json', 'multipart/form-data', 'application/octet-stream'];
+
+module.exports = function csrfProtection(req, res, next) {
+  if (!['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE'].includes(req.method)) return next();
+  if (!mutationOriginAllowed(req)) {
+    return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Cross-site request rejected' });
+  }
+  const contentType = (req.headers['content-type'] || '').split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase();
+  const hasBody = Number(req.headers['content-length']) > 0 || !!req.headers['transfer-encoding'];
+  const allowed = ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES.includes(contentType) || contentType.endsWith('+json');
+  if (hasBody && !allowed) {
+    return res.status(415).json({ error: `Unsupported Content-Type. Use ${ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES.join(', ')}.` });
+  }
+  next();
+};

backend/src/middleware/customerAuth.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../utils/requestLogPath');
 /**
  * Customer Authentication Middleware
  *
@@ -10,10 +11,7 @@
  */
 
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
-const { db } = require('../database/db');
-const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
-const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
-const { isTokenBeforeCutoff } = require('../utils/sessionCutoff');
+const sessionAccess = require('../services/sessionAccessService');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { getCustomerTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
 
@@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ async function customerAuth(req, res, next) {
       // normal (page polling, pre-login session probes). Bump to debug
       // for noisy investigations only.
       logger.debug('[customerAuth] no token on request', {
-        url: req.originalUrl,
+        url: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl),
         hasCookieHeader: !!req.headers?.cookie,
         cookieKeys: Object.keys(req.cookies || {}),
       });
@@ -42,7 +40,7 @@ async function customerAuth(req, res, next) {
       decoded = verified.payload;
     } catch (err) {
       logger.warn('[customerAuth] jwt verification failed', {
-        url: req.originalUrl,
+        url: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl),
         errorName: err.name,
         errorMessage: err.message,
       });
@@ -52,71 +50,10 @@ async function customerAuth(req, res, next) {
       return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token', code: 'JWT_INVALID' });
     }
 
-    if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
-      logger.warn('[customerAuth] token revoked', {
-        url: req.originalUrl,
-        customerId: decoded.customerId,
-        tokenType: decoded.type,
-        iat: decoded.iat,
-      });
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token has been revoked', code: 'TOKEN_REVOKED' });
-    }
-
-    // Reject sessions issued before the global restore cutoff.
-    if (await isTokenBeforeCutoff(decoded)) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session invalidated', code: 'SESSION_INVALIDATED' });
-    }
-
-    if (decoded.type !== 'customer') {
-      logger.warn('[customerAuth] wrong token type', {
-        url: req.originalUrl,
-        tokenType: decoded.type,
-      });
-      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Insufficient permissions', code: 'WRONG_TOKEN_TYPE' });
-    }
-
-    // IP drift gets logged but doesn't reject — same lenient policy as
-    // adminAuth. Customers may roam between mobile networks frequently.
-    const currentIp = req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress;
-    if (decoded.ip && decoded.ip !== currentIp) {
-      logger.info('Customer token used from different IP', {
-        customerId: decoded.customerId,
-        tokenIp: decoded.ip,
-        currentIp,
-      });
-    }
-
-    const customer = await db('customer_accounts')
-      .where({ id: decoded.customerId, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-      .select('id', 'email', 'display_name', 'first_name', 'last_name', 'password_changed_at', 'preferred_language')
-      .first();
-
-    if (!customer) {
-      // Either deleted, deactivated, or the id was forged. 401 across the
-      // board so the frontend session-expiry handler kicks in.
-      logger.warn('[customerAuth] customer row not found / inactive', {
-        url: req.originalUrl,
-        customerId: decoded.customerId,
-      });
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token', code: 'CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUND' });
-    }
-
-    if (customer.password_changed_at) {
-      const passwordChangedSeconds = Math.floor(
-        new Date(customer.password_changed_at).getTime() / 1000
-      );
-      if (decoded.iat < passwordChangedSeconds) {
-        logger.warn('[customerAuth] token rejected: password_changed_at', {
-          url: req.originalUrl,
-          customerId: decoded.customerId,
-          iat: decoded.iat,
-          passwordChangedSeconds,
-        });
-        return res.status(401).json({
-          error: 'Token invalid due to password change',
-          code: 'PASSWORD_CHANGED',
-        });
-      }
+    const customer = await sessionAccess.customer(decoded);
+    const requestIp = req.ip || req.connection?.remoteAddress;
+    if (decoded.ip && requestIp && decoded.ip !== requestIp) {
+      logger.info('customer session IP changed', { accountId: customer.id, tokenIp: decoded.ip, requestIp });
     }
 
     req.customer = {
@@ -131,7 +68,10 @@ async function customerAuth(req, res, next) {
     next();
   } catch (error) {
     logger.error('Customer auth middleware error:', error);
-    res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication failed' });
+    res.status(error.statusCode || 401).json({
+      error: error.isOperational ? error.message : 'Authentication failed',
+      ...(error.isOperational && { code: error.code }),
+    });
   }
 }
 

backend/src/middleware/errorHandler.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../utils/requestLogPath');
 /**
  * Global error handler middleware.
  * Catches all errors and returns standardized responses.
@@ -92,6 +93,16 @@ const handleKnownErrors = (err) => {
     return new ValidationError('Unexpected file field');
   }
 
+  // CVE-2026-82333: multer 2.3.0's fieldArrayIndexLimit rejects multipart
+  // field names with an oversized bracket array index (e.g. `a[99999999]`)
+  // before the DoS-prone field parser runs. Without this mapping the
+  // resulting MulterError has no .statusCode/.status and falls through to
+  // a 500 here, so map it to a proper 400 like the other multer limits.
+  if (err.code === 'LIMIT_FIELD_ARRAY_INDEX') {
+    const { ValidationError } = require('../utils/errors');
+    return new ValidationError('Field name array index too large');
+  }
+
   return err;
 };
 
@@ -119,7 +130,7 @@ const errorHandler = (err, req, res, next) => {
 
   // Log the error
   const logContext = {
-    url: req.originalUrl,
+    url: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl),
     method: req.method,
     ip: req.ip,
     statusCode,
@@ -161,7 +172,7 @@ const errorHandler = (err, req, res, next) => {
  */
 const notFoundHandler = (req, res, next) => {
   const { NotFoundError } = require('../utils/errors');
-  next(new NotFoundError('Route', req.originalUrl));
+  next(new NotFoundError('Route', requestLogPath(req.originalUrl)));
 };
 
 /**

backend/src/middleware/feedbackRateLimit.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const cleanupTimers = new Set();
 const crypto = require('crypto');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
@@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ function strictRateLimit(options = {}) {
   const store = new Map();
   
   // Clean up old entries periodically
-  setInterval(() => {
+  const cleanupTimer = setInterval(() => {
     const now = Date.now();
     for (const [key, data] of store.entries()) {
       if (data.resetTime < now) {
@@ -219,6 +220,8 @@ function strictRateLimit(options = {}) {
       }
     }
   }, windowMs);
+  cleanupTimer.unref();
+  cleanupTimers.add(cleanupTimer);
   
   return (req, res, next) => {
     const ip = req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress;
@@ -255,6 +258,7 @@ function strictRateLimit(options = {}) {
 }
 
 module.exports = {
+  dispose() { cleanupTimers.forEach(clearInterval); cleanupTimers.clear(); },
   feedbackRateLimit,
   strictRateLimit,
   generateGuestIdentifier,

backend/src/middleware/gallery.js

@@ -1,267 +1,104 @@
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
 const { db, withRetry } = require('../database/db');
-const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const { getGalleryTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
-const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
-const { isTokenBeforeCutoff } = require('../utils/sessionCutoff');
+const access = require('../services/galleryAccessService');
 
-/**
- * True when a logged-in admin is explicitly previewing this gallery (#868).
- *
- * Two conditions, both required:
- *   1. The explicit intent flag `?admin_preview=1` is present. The plain share
- *      link stays byte-identical to a guest's, so the password gate is still
- *      testable as a guest while logged in as admin — and the bypass is visible
- *      in the URL without being reusable (it carries no secret).
- *   2. A VERIFIED admin session — the httpOnly `admin_token` cookie (rides along
- *      on same-origin API calls) or an Authorization: Bearer header, never the
- *      URL. Must decode as `type: 'admin'`, issuer `picpeak-auth`.
- *
- * The cookie is tried FIRST and the Bearer is accepted only when it is itself an
- * admin token (#981 review): the frontend attaches a gallery Bearer to gallery
- * endpoints, and a header-first, type-blind read would let a coexisting gallery
- * session shadow the admin cookie and wrongly disable the preview.
- *
- * Fails closed on any verification error. Replaces the old `?preview=<raw-JWT>`
- * scheme, which leaked a 24h admin token into the address bar.
- */
+// Cookie first: a coexisting gallery Bearer must not shadow an admin preview.
 function decodeAdminPreview(req) {
   if (req.query?.admin_preview !== '1') return null;
-  // Cookie first, then a Bearer — but only an admin-typed token satisfies it.
-  const candidates = [];
-  if (req.cookies?.admin_token) candidates.push(req.cookies.admin_token);
+  const candidates = [req.cookies?.admin_token];
   const header = req.headers?.authorization;
-  if (header && header.startsWith('Bearer ')) candidates.push(header.slice(7));
-  for (const token of candidates) {
+  if (header?.startsWith('Bearer ')) candidates.push(header.slice(7));
+  for (const token of candidates.filter(Boolean)) {
     try {
-      const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+      const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
+        issuer: 'picpeak-auth', algorithms: ['HS256'],
+      });
       if (decoded.type === 'admin') return decoded;
     } catch { /* try the next candidate */ }
   }
   return null;
 }
 
+// Signature-only predicate retained for UI-intent callers. It never authorizes.
 function isAdminPreview(req) {
   return decodeAdminPreview(req) !== null;
 }
 
-/**
- * The full session check behind the preview bypass. A verified signature is
- * not a live session: adminAuth also rejects revoked tokens, tokens issued
- * before the restore cutoff, deactivated admins and tokens minted before the
- * admin's last password change. Without those a logged-out or deactivated
- * admin token kept unlocking every draft and password gallery until `exp`
- * (30 days with remember-me). Sets req.isAdminPreview on success so the
- * downstream reveal-mode and logging checks read one verified flag.
- */
-async function verifyAdminPreview(req) {
-  if (req.isAdminPreview === true) return true;
+function attachAccess(req, event, grant) {
+  req.event = event;
+  req.galleryAccess = grant;
+  req.isAdminPreview = grant.kind === 'admin';
+  req.accessLevel = grant.session?.accessLevel || 'guest';
+  req.viaCustomer = grant.session?.via === 'customer';
+  req.sessionID = req.isAdminPreview ? `gallery_admin_preview_${event.id}`
+    : `gallery_${grant.kind === 'public' ? 'public_' : ''}${event.id}_${Date.now()}`;
+  const ip = req.ip || req.connection?.remoteAddress || 'unknown';
+  const userAgent = req.get?.('User-Agent') || 'unknown';
+  req.clientInfo = {
+    ip, userAgent, fingerprint: `${ip}-${userAgent}`.substring(0, 32), timestamp: Date.now(),
+  };
+}
+
+async function verifyAdminPreview(req, event) {
+  if (req.isAdminPreview && req.galleryAccess && (!event || event.id === req.event?.id)) return true;
   const decoded = decodeAdminPreview(req);
   if (!decoded) return false;
   try {
-    if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded) || await isTokenBeforeCutoff(decoded)) return false;
-    const admin = await withRetry(async () => db('admin_users')
-      .where({ id: decoded.id, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-      .select('id', 'password_changed_at')
-      .first());
-    if (!admin) return false;
-    if (admin.password_changed_at) {
-      const changedSeconds = Math.floor(new Date(admin.password_changed_at).getTime() / 1000);
-      if (decoded.iat < changedSeconds) return false;
-    }
-  } catch (err) {
-    logger.warn('Admin preview session check failed', { error: err.message });
+    const slug = req.params?.slug || req.requestedSlug;
+    if (!event && !slug) return false;
+    event = event || await db('events').where({ slug }).select('*').first();
+    if (!event) return false;
+    const grant = access.grant(event, 'admin', decoded);
+    await access.authorize(event, grant);
+    attachAccess(req, event, grant);
+    return true;
+  } catch (error) {
+    logger.debug('Admin gallery preview denied', { code: error.code });
+    req.adminPreviewDenied = error;
     return false;
   }
-  req.isAdminPreview = true;
-  return true;
 }
 
-// Middleware to verify gallery access
+function decodeGalleryToken(token) {
+  try {
+    return jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'], issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+  } catch (error) {
+    // Legacy gallery tokens lacked an issuer, but still need the same type,
+    // lifecycle and session checks as current tokens.
+    if (error.name === 'JsonWebTokenError' && error.message.includes('jwt issuer invalid')) {
+      return jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
+    }
+    throw error;
+  }
+}
+
 async function verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next) {
   try {
-    const requestedSlug = req.params.slug || req.requestedSlug;
-
-    // Admin preview (#868) is resolved BEFORE any gallery credential (#981
-    // review): a coexisting gallery token/Bearer must not shadow it, and the
-    // admin session must never fall into the `type !== 'gallery'` reject path
-    // below. Per-request bypass — draft + password relaxed, NO gallery JWT
-    // minted (a lingering guest cookie would muddy the coexisting-cookies case).
-    // req.isAdminPreview flags downstream logging to keep it out of guest stats.
-    if (await verifyAdminPreview(req)) {
-      if (!requestedSlug) {
-        return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
-      }
-      const previewEvent = await withRetry(async () => db('events')
-        .where({ slug: requestedSlug, is_active: formatBoolean(true), is_archived: formatBoolean(false) })
-        .select('*').first());
-      if (!previewEvent) {
-        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
-      }
-      req.event = previewEvent;
-      req.isAdminPreview = true;
-      req.sessionID = `gallery_admin_preview_${previewEvent.id}`;
-      req.clientInfo = {
-        ip: req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress || 'unknown',
-        userAgent: req.get('User-Agent') || 'unknown',
-        fingerprint: `${req.ip}-${req.get('User-Agent')}`.substring(0, 32),
-        timestamp: Date.now()
-      };
-      return next();
-    }
-
-    const token = getGalleryTokenFromRequest(req, requestedSlug);
-    let event;
-
-    if (!token) {
-      if (!requestedSlug) {
-        return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
-      }
-
-      event = await withRetry(async () => db('events')
-        .where({
-          slug: requestedSlug,
-          is_active: formatBoolean(true),
-          is_archived: formatBoolean(false),
-          is_draft: formatBoolean(false)
-        })
-        .select('*').first());
-
-      if (!event) {
-        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
-      }
-
-      const requiresPassword = !(event.require_password === false || event.require_password === 0 || event.require_password === '0');
-      if (!requiresPassword) {
-        req.event = event;
-        req.sessionID = `gallery_public_${event.id}_${Date.now()}`;
-        req.clientInfo = {
-          ip: req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress || 'unknown',
-          userAgent: req.get('User-Agent') || 'unknown',
-          fingerprint: `${req.ip}-${req.get('User-Agent')}`.substring(0, 32),
-          timestamp: Date.now()
-        };
-        return next();
-      }
-
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
-    }
-
-    // Try to verify with issuer first, fallback to no issuer for backward compatibility
-    let decoded;
-    try {
-      decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
-        algorithms: ['HS256'],
-        issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
-      });
-    } catch (error) {
-      // If verification fails with issuer, try without issuer (backward compatibility)
-      if (error.name === 'JsonWebTokenError' && error.message.includes('jwt issuer invalid')) {
-        decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
-      } else {
-        throw error;
-      }
-    }
-    logger.debug('[verifyGalleryAccess] Token decoded successfully', { eventId: decoded.eventId, slug: requestedSlug });
-
-    // Only gallery-scoped tokens grant gallery access. Every legitimate
-    // path (password login, share link, client access, customer-minted,
-    // slideshow) mints type:'gallery'. Reject anything else — e.g. a guest
-    // identity token (type:'guest', for feedback attribution) that carries a
-    // matching eventId — instead of relying on other token types incidentally
-    // lacking an eventId to fail the id match below.
-    if (decoded.type !== 'gallery') {
+    if (await verifyAdminPreview(req)) return next();
+    // The caller asked for a preview explicitly: report why it was refused
+    // instead of falling through to a misleading guest-token error.
+    if (req.adminPreviewDenied?.isOperational) throw req.adminPreviewDenied;
+    const slug = req.params.slug || req.requestedSlug;
+    const token = getGalleryTokenFromRequest(req, slug);
+    const decoded = token ? decodeGalleryToken(token) : null;
+    if (decoded && decoded.type !== 'gallery') {
       return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Invalid token type for gallery access' });
     }
-
-    // If we have a slug in the URL params or from pre-middleware, verify it matches.
-    // (Admin preview never reaches here — it returns above — so drafts stay
-    // filtered for every real gallery-token request.)
-    if (requestedSlug) {
-      // Verify by slug and ensure it matches the token's event
-      event = await withRetry(async () => db('events')
-        .where({
-          slug: requestedSlug,
-          is_active: formatBoolean(true),
-          is_archived: formatBoolean(false),
-          is_draft: formatBoolean(false)
-        })
-        .select('*').first());
-
-      // Verify the token's eventId matches
-      if (event && event.id !== decoded.eventId) {
-        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Token does not match requested gallery' });
-      }
-    } else {
-      // Fallback to using eventId from token
-      event = await withRetry(async () => db('events')
-        .where({
-          id: decoded.eventId,
-          is_active: formatBoolean(true),
-          is_archived: formatBoolean(false),
-          is_draft: formatBoolean(false)
-        })
-        .select('*').first());
-    }
-    
-    if (!event) {
-      logger.warn('[verifyGalleryAccess] Event not found for slug', { slug: requestedSlug || 'no-slug', tokenEventId: decoded.eventId });
-      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
-    }
-
-    // Customer-minted gallery JWTs (#354): when the customer obtained
-    // this token via /api/customer/events/:slug/access-token, the
-    // payload carries `via:'customer'` and `customerId`. The admin
-    // can revoke the customer's access at any time by removing the
-    // event_customer_assignments row from the "Manage galleries"
-    // dialog on the customer detail page. Re-check that row here so
-    // the revocation takes effect on the customer's very next
-    // request — no token-blacklisting machinery required.
-    if (decoded.via === 'customer' && decoded.customerId) {
-      const assignment = await withRetry(async () => {
-        return await db('event_customer_assignments')
-          .where({
-            event_id: event.id,
-            customer_account_id: decoded.customerId,
-          })
-          .first();
-      });
-      if (!assignment) {
-        logger.info('[verifyGalleryAccess] Customer assignment revoked, rejecting token', {
-          customerId: decoded.customerId,
-          eventId: event.id,
-        });
-        return res.status(403).json({
-          error: 'Access to this gallery has been revoked',
-          code: 'CUSTOMER_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKED',
-        });
-      }
-    }
-
-    logger.debug('[verifyGalleryAccess] Event located', { eventId: event.id, slug: event.slug });
-    req.event = event;
-    req.accessLevel = decoded.accessLevel || 'guest';
-    // Customer-portal provenance (#746/#849): portal-minted tokens carry
-    // via:'customer' but NO accessLevel (they default to guest), while
-    // PIN-client logins carry accessLevel:'client' without `via`. Activity
-    // attribution/dedup needs the distinction, so surface it explicitly.
-    req.viaCustomer = decoded.via === 'customer';
-    req.sessionID = decoded.sessionId || `gallery_${event.id}_${Date.now()}`;
-
-    // Create client info for logging (similar to secureImageMiddleware but simpler)
-    req.clientInfo = {
-      ip: req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress || 'unknown',
-      userAgent: req.get('User-Agent') || 'unknown',
-      fingerprint: `${req.ip}-${req.get('User-Agent')}`.substring(0, 32), // Limit to 32 chars for DB column
-      timestamp: Date.now()
-    };
-    
-    logger.debug('[verifyGalleryAccess] Access granted', { eventId: event.id, slug: event.slug });
-    next();
+    if (!slug && !decoded?.eventId) return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
+    const event = await withRetry(() => db('events').where(slug ? { slug } : { id: decoded.eventId }).select('*').first());
+    if (!event) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
+    const grant = access.grant(event, decoded ? 'gallery' : 'public', decoded);
+    await access.authorize(event, grant);
+    attachAccess(req, event, grant);
+    return next();
   } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Error verifying gallery access', { error: error.message, stack: error.stack });
-    res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
+    if (!error.isOperational) logger.error('Error verifying gallery access', { error: error.message });
+    return res.status(error.statusCode || 401).json({
+      error: error.isOperational ? error.message : 'Invalid token',
+      ...(error.code && error.isOperational && { code: error.code }),
+    });
   }
 }
 

backend/src/middleware/ownership.js

@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 
+function canAccessEvent(admin, event) {
+  return Boolean(admin && event && (admin.roleName === 'super_admin'
+    || event.created_by == null || Number(event.created_by) === Number(admin.id)));
+}
+
 /**
  * Middleware to enforce event ownership for non-super_admin users.
  * Super admins bypass the check. Other admins can only access events they created.
@@ -23,7 +28,7 @@ function requireEventOwnership(req, res, next) {
         return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
       }
       // Allow access if: event has no owner (legacy/system), or admin owns it
-      if (event.created_by && event.created_by !== req.admin.id) {
+      if (!canAccessEvent(req.admin, event)) {
         return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Access denied' });
       }
       next();
@@ -165,6 +170,7 @@ function requireProjectOwnership(req, res, next) {
 }
 
 module.exports = {
+  canAccessEvent,
   requireEventOwnership,
   filterOwnedEventIds,
   scopeEventsQuery,

backend/src/middleware/permissions.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../utils/requestLogPath');
 /**
  * Permission Checking Middleware for RBAC
  * Provides role-based access control with caching for performance
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ function requirePermission(permissions, options = { requireAll: false }) {
           userId: req.admin.id,
           username: req.admin.username,
           requiredPermissions: permArray,
-          path: req.path,
+          path: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl || req.path),
           method: req.method
         });
         throw new ForbiddenError('Insufficient permissions');
@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ function requireSuperAdmin() {
         logger.warn('Super admin access denied', {
           userId: req.admin.id,
           username: req.admin.username,
-          path: req.path,
+          path: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl || req.path),
           method: req.method
         });
         throw new ForbiddenError('Super Admin access required');

backend/src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../utils/requestLogPath');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const secureImageService = require('../services/secureImageService');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
@@ -10,12 +11,24 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
     this.suspiciousIPs = new Set();
     this.blockedFingerprints = new Set();
     this.rateLimitViolations = new Map();
+    this.cleanupTimer = null;
+  }
+
+  start() {
+    if (this.cleanupTimer) return;
+    this.cleanupTimer = setInterval(() => this.cleanup(), 300000);
+    this.cleanupTimer.unref();
+  }
+  dispose() {
+    clearInterval(this.cleanupTimer); this.cleanupTimer = null;
+    this.suspiciousIPs.clear(); this.blockedFingerprints.clear(); this.rateLimitViolations.clear();
   }
 
   /**
    * Main security middleware for image access
    */
   secureImageAccess = async (req, res, next) => {
+    this.start();
     try {
       const startTime = Date.now();
       const clientIP = this.getClientIP(req);
@@ -56,7 +69,7 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
         error: error.message,
         stack: error.stack,
         ip: req.ip,
-        path: req.path
+        path: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl || req.path)
       });
       
       res.status(500).json({ 
@@ -328,7 +341,7 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
         client_ip: req.clientInfo?.ip || req.ip,
         client_fingerprint: req.clientInfo?.fingerprint,
         user_agent: req.get('User-Agent')?.substring(0, 255),
-        request_path: req.path,
+        request_path: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl || req.path),
         request_method: req.method,
         details: JSON.stringify(details),
         timestamp: new Date().toISOString()
@@ -409,9 +422,4 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
 // Create singleton instance
 const secureImageMiddleware = new SecureImageMiddleware();
 
-// Setup cleanup interval
-setInterval(() => {
-  secureImageMiddleware.cleanup();
-}, 300000); // Every 5 minutes
-
 module.exports = secureImageMiddleware;

backend/src/middleware/sessionTimeout.js

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ const CACHE_DURATION = 30 * 60 * 1000; // 30 minutes - reduced DB queries
 // behaviour is unchanged: the timer fires every 5 min as long as
 // the server has anything else keeping the loop alive (HTTP server,
 // other intervals), which is always.
-setInterval(() => {
+const cleanupTimer = setInterval(() => {
   const now = Date.now();
   for (const [token, lastActivity] of sessions.entries()) {
     if (now - lastActivity > DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT) {
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ function getActiveSessions() {
 }
 
 module.exports = {
+  dispose: () => { clearInterval(cleanupTimer); sessions.clear(); cachedTimeout = null; cacheExpiry = 0; },
   sessionTimeoutMiddleware,
   isSessionExpired,
   endSession,

backend/src/routes/adminAuth.js

@@ -182,16 +182,17 @@ router.post('/logout', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
   // old header-only read skipped revocation entirely for cookie-based logout,
   // leaving the JWT valid until expiry while reporting a successful logout.
   const token = req.token;
+  clearAdminAuthCookie(res);
   if (token) {
     // End the in-memory session AND revoke the JWT (GHSA-cjqh) — the token
     // is otherwise valid until expiry, so photoAuth/adminAuth would keep
     // honouring it after logout. isTokenRevoked() checks this store.
     endSession(token);
     const { revokeToken } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
-    await revokeToken(token, 'logout');
+    if (!await revokeToken(token, 'logout')) {
+      throw new Error('Token revocation failed');
+    }
   }
-  // Clear the auth cookie so the browser stops sending the (now revoked) JWT.
-  clearAdminAuthCookie(res);
 
   // Log activity
   await logActivity('admin_logout',
@@ -263,6 +264,11 @@ router.post('/mfa/setup', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
 
 // Complete enrollment: verify a code against the provisional secret, enable
 // MFA, and return one-time recovery codes (shown exactly once).
+//
+// No replay tracking here: this confirms an already-authenticated session
+// still holds the authenticator (no new session is granted), and starting
+// the last-used-step counter here would reject the very next login if it
+// lands in the same 30s TOTP step as this call.
 router.post('/mfa/enable', [
   adminAuth,
   body('code').notEmpty().withMessage('Verification code is required')
@@ -313,7 +319,17 @@ router.post('/mfa/disable', [
     throw new ValidationError('Two-factor authentication is not enabled');
   }
 
-  const totpOk = mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret);
+  // Persist the matched step atomically right here (see mfaService.persistTotpStep):
+  // two concurrent requests carrying the same captured code can't both read the
+  // same last-used step and both win — only the first writer's UPDATE affects a
+  // row, so a losing concurrent request is correctly treated as invalid below.
+  const totpStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(
+    req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret, admin.two_factor_last_used_step
+  );
+  let totpOk = false;
+  if (totpStep !== null) {
+    totpOk = await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, { updated_at: new Date() });
+  }
   let recoveryOk = false;
   if (!totpOk) {
     const stored = mfaService.parseRecoveryCodes(admin.two_factor_recovery_codes);
@@ -328,6 +344,7 @@ router.post('/mfa/disable', [
     two_factor_secret: null,
     two_factor_recovery_codes: null,
     two_factor_enrolled_at: null,
+    two_factor_last_used_step: null,
     updated_at: new Date()
   });
 
@@ -352,7 +369,16 @@ router.post('/mfa/recovery-codes', [
   if (!isMfaEnabled(admin)) {
     throw new ValidationError('Two-factor authentication is not enabled');
   }
-  if (!mfaService.verifyTotpEncrypted(req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret)) {
+  // Persist the matched step atomically right here (see mfaService.persistTotpStep):
+  // two concurrent requests carrying the same captured code can't both read the
+  // same last-used step and both win — only the first writer's UPDATE affects a
+  // row, so a losing concurrent request is correctly treated as invalid below.
+  const totpStep = mfaService.verifyTotpEncryptedStep(
+    req.body.code, admin.two_factor_secret, admin.two_factor_last_used_step
+  );
+  const totpOk = totpStep !== null
+    && await mfaService.persistTotpStep(db, admin.id, totpStep, { updated_at: new Date() });
+  if (!totpOk) {
     throw new ValidationError('Invalid verification code');
   }
 

backend/src/routes/adminBackup.js

@@ -202,7 +202,11 @@ const picpeakUpload = multer({
     destination: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, os.tmpdir()),
     filename: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, `picpeak-upload-${Date.now()}-${crypto.randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}.picpeak`),
   }),
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5 GB — .picpeak with photos can be large
+  // CVE-2026-82333: this route only ever consumes a single unnamed file
+  // field (`backup`) — no legitimate bracket-indexed field name (e.g.
+  // `a[0]`) exists in its form. fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 rejects any field
+  // name using array-index syntax at all, closing multer's field-parser DoS.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 5 GB — .picpeak with photos can be large
 });
 
 // Upload + restore a .picpeak onto THIS instance. DESTRUCTIVE: full override of

backend/src/routes/adminBusinessProfile.js

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { handleAsync, validateRequest, successResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { getStoragePath } = require('../config/storage');
 const { uploadedPdfLogoPath } = require('../utils/safePath');
+const { validateFileType, validateFileContent, ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES } = require('../utils/fileSecurityUtils');
 const businessProfileService = require('../services/businessProfileService');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { validateIban } = require('../utils/iban');
@@ -95,6 +96,19 @@ const router = express.Router();
 // but accepts SVG in addition to PNG / JPEG — the PDF renderer
 // rasterises SVGs to PNG on the fly via resolveLogoFile() so the
 // admin can drop a vector logo here and have it work in print.
+//
+// GHSA-6wrv-9pr4-hhmw: this route used to take the stored extension
+// straight from `file.originalname` and only checked `file.mimetype`
+// against an allowlist — a file could declare an image MIME type
+// while carrying a `.html`/`.js` extension and arbitrary content, get
+// served same-origin from /uploads/logos with that extension, and
+// execute as script in the browser. Fixed the same way every sibling
+// upload route (adminSettings.js, adminCMS.js) already does it:
+// `validateFileType()` pairs the claimed MIME type against the
+// extension, and the extension actually written to disk is looked up
+// from the validated MIME type — never taken from client input.
+const PDF_LOGO_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES = ['image/png', 'image/jpeg', 'image/svg+xml'];
+
 const pdfLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({
   destination: async (_req, _file, cb) => {
     const dir = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'uploads/logos');
@@ -102,18 +116,26 @@ const pdfLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({
     cb(null, dir);
   },
   filename: (_req, file, cb) => {
-    const ext = path.extname(file.originalname) || '.png';
+    // fileFilter (below) runs before this and already rejected any
+    // mimetype outside PDF_LOGO_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES, so the lookup below
+    // always hits. The extension is derived from the validated MIME
+    // type, never from file.originalname.
+    const ext = ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES[file.mimetype]?.extensions[0] || '.png';
     cb(null, `pdf-logo-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
   },
 });
 
 const pdfLogoUpload = multer({
   storage: pdfLogoStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 },
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `logo` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
   fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
-    const allowed = ['image/png', 'image/jpeg', 'image/svg+xml'];
-    if (allowed.includes(file.mimetype)) cb(null, true);
-    else cb(new Error('Only PNG, JPEG and SVG logos are allowed'));
+    if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, PDF_LOGO_ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES)) {
+      cb(null, true);
+    } else {
+      cb(new Error('Only PNG, JPEG and SVG logos are allowed'));
+    }
   },
 });
 
@@ -359,6 +381,19 @@ router.post(
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No logo file uploaded' });
     }
 
+    // fileFilter above only pairs the claimed MIME type against the
+    // extension — it runs on the in-flight stream, before any bytes are
+    // written, so it can't inspect content. Content-sniff the bytes multer
+    // just wrote to disk (magic numbers) before trusting them; SVG has no
+    // magic-number check (validateFileContent returns true for it), it's
+    // protected by the CSP header instead. Matches the cleanup-then-reject
+    // pattern createFileUploadValidator() uses for other upload routes.
+    const contentIsValid = await validateFileContent(req.file.path, req.file.mimetype);
+    if (!contentIsValid) {
+      try { await fs.unlink(req.file.path); } catch (_) { /* ignore */ }
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'File content does not match its declared type' });
+    }
+
     // Clean up the previous PDF logo on disk if it was uploaded via
     // this same endpoint (matches the pdf-logo-* prefix). We leave
     // anything else untouched — the admin may have set logo_path to
@@ -432,7 +467,19 @@ router.put(
     body('defaultLocale').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 8 }),
     body('defaultQrFormat').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isIn(['swiss', 'epc', 'none']),
     body('footerLine').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 255 }),
-    body('logoPath').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 512 }),
+    // GHSA-6wrv-9pr4-hhmw: logoPath is mass-assignable here, so it must
+    // only ever be settable to a path the POST /logo upload route itself
+    // produced (or '' to clear it, allowed by `values: 'falsy'` above) —
+    // not an arbitrary string chaining in a file uploaded elsewhere.
+    // uploadedPdfLogoPath() is the same pattern check the delete/replace
+    // cleanup path already trusts to name a file this route wrote.
+    body('logoPath').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().isLength({ max: 512 })
+      .custom((value) => {
+        if (!uploadedPdfLogoPath(value, getStoragePath())) {
+          throw new Error('logoPath must be a path produced by the logo upload endpoint');
+        }
+        return true;
+      }),
     // Bundled-fonts dropdown (migration 121). Free-text upload field
     // (pdfFontTtfPath, migration 103) was retired from the UI in
     // favour of this dropdown; the column stays in the DB so any

backend/src/routes/adminCMS.js

@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ const pageLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({
 
 const pageLogoUpload = multer({
   storage: pageLogoStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 },
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `logo` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
   fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
     const allowed = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/svg+xml'];
     if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowed)) cb(null, true);

backend/src/routes/adminContracts.js

@@ -66,14 +66,20 @@ const signedPdfStorage = multer.diskStorage({
     cb(null, uploadDir);
   },
   filename: (req, file, cb) => {
+    const contractId = Number(req.params.id);
+    if (!Number.isInteger(contractId) || contractId <= 0) {
+      return cb(new Error('Invalid contract id'));
+    }
     const ext = path.extname(file.originalname) || '.pdf';
-    cb(null, `contract-${req.params.id}-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
+    cb(null, `contract-${contractId}-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
   },
 });
 
 const signedPdfUpload = multer({
   storage: signedPdfStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 10 MB
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `file` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 10 MB
   fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
     const allowed = ['application/pdf'];
     if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowed)) return cb(null, true);

backend/src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ const express = require('express');
 const router = express.Router();
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
-const { databaseBackupService } = require('../services/databaseBackup');
+const { databaseBackupService, isUnderPubliclyServableRoot } = require('../services/databaseBackup');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
@@ -60,7 +60,28 @@ router.put('/config', requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
       'database_backup_email_on_failure',
       'database_backup_email_on_success'
     ];
-    
+
+    // A backup.create holder (the built-in `admin` role has it without
+    // settings.edit or backup.restore) could otherwise point backups at a
+    // public static mount and fetch the dump unauthenticated — see
+    // isUnderPubliclyServableRoot's comment (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm class).
+    if (
+      typeof req.body.database_backup_destination_path === 'string'
+      && isUnderPubliclyServableRoot(req.body.database_backup_destination_path)
+    ) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Destination path must not be inside a publicly served directory' });
+    }
+
+    // A retention of 0 or less pushes cleanupOldBackups' cutoff to today or
+    // the future, deleting every completed backup on the next scheduled run
+    // — a backup.create holder achieving what backup.delete gates on /cleanup.
+    if (
+      req.body.database_backup_retention_days !== undefined
+      && (!Number.isFinite(req.body.database_backup_retention_days) || req.body.database_backup_retention_days < 1)
+    ) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'database_backup_retention_days must be a positive number' });
+    }
+
     const updates = [];
     
     for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(req.body)) {

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/crud.js

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
-const { slugify } = require('../../utils/slug');
+
 const { adminAuth } = require('../../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission, userHasAllPermissions } = require('../../middleware/permissions');
 const { IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL } = require('../../utils/emailNormalization');
@@ -25,14 +25,13 @@ const eventTypeService = require('../../services/eventTypeService');
 const { normaliseEventTimeTriple } = require('../../services/eventService');
 const { hasColumnCached } = require('../../utils/schemaCache');
 const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../../middleware/ownership');
-const { getAppSetting } = require('../../utils/appSettings');
+
 const { galleryPasswordColumns, dropCopiesIfStorageOff } = require('../../utils/galleryPasswordVault');
-const { clampIntOrUndefined } = require('../../utils/numericHelpers');
+
 const { getFrontendBaseUrl, getAbsoluteFrontendUrl } = require('../../utils/frontendUrl');
 const downloadZipService = require('../../services/downloadZipService');
-const { resolveEventFeedbackDefaults, applyFeedbackDefaults, KEYBIND_MODES } = require('../../services/feedbackDefaults');
-const { validateHeroImageAnchor, getEventFieldRequirements, readBooleanSetting, getDownloadProtectionDefaults,
-  getImageSecurityDefaults, resolveImageSecurityColumns, getBrandingDefaults, getCustomerNameFromPayload, getCustomerEmailFromPayload, getCustomerPhoneFromPayload, isPhoneFieldEnabled, mapEventForApi, hasCustomerContactColumns, deleteEventCascade, SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS, SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS } = require('./helpers');
+const { KEYBIND_MODES } = require('../../services/feedbackDefaults');
+const { validateHeroImageAnchor, getCustomerNameFromPayload, getCustomerEmailFromPayload, getCustomerPhoneFromPayload, isPhoneFieldEnabled, mapEventForApi, hasCustomerContactColumns, deleteEventCascade } = require('./helpers');
 
 /**
  * `events.slug` is UNIQUE, and both routes that mint one do a read-then-insert
@@ -174,7 +173,6 @@ async function queueGalleryCreatedEmail(event, { password, requirePassword } = {
 
 module.exports = (router) => {
 
-
   // Create new event
   router.post('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.create'), [
     body('event_type').notEmpty().trim().custom(async (value) => {
@@ -240,7 +238,6 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     body('watermark_text').optional().trim(),
     // #328 follow-up: per-event opt-in for presigned-URL "Download All".
     // Bypasses watermarks; admin must enable knowingly.
-    body('allow_presigned_download').optional().isBoolean(),
     // Feedback sub-toggles (#1044). Optional: omitting them inherits the
     // global Settings > Events defaults.
     body('allow_ratings').optional().isBoolean(),
@@ -298,571 +295,13 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
       }
 
-      // Get field requirements from settings
-      const fieldRequirements = await getEventFieldRequirements();
-
-      const {
-        event_type,
-        event_name,
-        event_date,
-        // Migration 137 — calendar time fields. is_full_day defaults to
-        // true at the service layer when undefined (legacy form payloads).
-        event_time_start,
-        event_time_end,
-        is_full_day,
-        admin_email,
-        password,
-        welcome_message = '',
-        color_theme = null,
-        expiration_days = 30,
-        allow_user_uploads = false,
-        upload_category_id = null,
-        allow_downloads = true,
-        disable_right_click = false,
-        enable_devtools_protection: enableDevtoolsProtectionInput,
-        watermark_downloads = false,
-        watermark_text = null,
-        allow_presigned_download = false,
-        require_password: requirePasswordInput,
-        // Feedback settings. The allow_* sub-toggles deliberately have NO
-        // destructuring defaults: `undefined` means "the caller didn't say",
-        // which inherits the global Settings > Events default (#1044). The
-        // admin create form posts explicit values (it seeds its own panel
-        // from the same globals), so inheritance here is what covers the v1
-        // API and any other caller that omits them.
-        feedback_enabled: feedbackEnabledInput,
-        allow_ratings: allowRatingsInput,
-        allow_likes: allowLikesInput,
-        allow_comments: allowCommentsInput,
-        allow_favorites: allowFavoritesInput,
-        allow_reactions: allowReactionsInput,
-        allow_color_labels: allowColorLabelsInput,
-        keybind_mode: keybindModeInput,
-        require_name_email = false,
-        moderate_comments = true,
-        show_feedback_to_guests = true,
-        // The create form has always shown the identity-mode chooser and this
-        // route has never read it, so a gallery created as 'guest' quietly came
-        // out 'simple' and the photographer had to set it again on the event.
-        // Surfaced by adding a third mode (#1197); the fix is the same for all
-        // three. Unknown values fall back rather than reaching the column,
-        // which on Postgres is guarded by a CHECK constraint.
-        identity_mode: identityModeInput,
-        // CSS Template
-        css_template_id = null,
-        // Hero logo settings
-        hero_logo_visible = true,
-        // Header style settings
-        header_style = 'standard',
-        hero_divider_style = 'wave',
-        // Hero image anchor position (#162)
-        hero_image_anchor = 'center',
-        // Photo cap
-        photo_cap = null,
-        // Client access settings (#172)
-        client_access_enabled = false,
-        client_password = null,
-        // Draft mode
-        is_draft = true,
-        // Default photo sort
-        default_photo_sort = 'upload_date_desc',
-        // Banner overrides (#440 / #932) — see the insert below.
-        promo_mode = 'inherit',
-        promo_markdown = null,
-        info_mode = 'inherit',
-        info_markdown = null
-      } = req.body;
-
-      const customerName = getCustomerNameFromPayload(req.body);
-      const customerEmail = getCustomerEmailFromPayload(req.body);
-      // Phone field is opt-in via the global setting (#322). If disabled,
-      // ignore whatever the client posted — defence in depth against form
-      // bypass.
-      const phoneEnabled = await isPhoneFieldEnabled();
-      const customerPhone = phoneEnabled ? getCustomerPhoneFromPayload(req.body) : null;
-
-      const customerColumnsAvailable = await hasCustomerContactColumns();
-
-      // Conditional validation based on settings
-      const validationErrors = [];
-      if (fieldRequirements.require_customer_name && !customerName) {
-        validationErrors.push({ path: 'customer_name', msg: 'Customer name is required' });
-      }
-      if (fieldRequirements.require_customer_email && !customerEmail) {
-        validationErrors.push({ path: 'customer_email', msg: 'Customer email is required' });
-      }
-      if (fieldRequirements.require_admin_email && !admin_email) {
-        validationErrors.push({ path: 'admin_email', msg: 'Admin email is required' });
-      }
-      if (fieldRequirements.require_event_date && !event_date) {
-        validationErrors.push({ path: 'event_date', msg: 'Event date is required' });
-      }
-
-      if (validationErrors.length > 0) {
-        return res.status(400).json({ errors: validationErrors });
-      }
-
-      // Default require_password from global "event_default_require_password"
-      // setting when the body omits it (#317 — admins want to flip the default).
-      let requirePasswordFallback = true;
-      if (requirePasswordInput === undefined) {
-        const setting = await readBooleanSetting('event_default_require_password');
-        if (setting !== undefined) requirePasswordFallback = setting;
-      }
-      const requirePassword = parseBooleanInput(requirePasswordInput, requirePasswordFallback);
-
-      // Default feedback_enabled from global "event_default_feedback_enabled"
-      // setting when the body omits it (#520 — same pattern as require_password
-      // above, lets admins make Guest Feedback ON the out-of-box default for
-      // new events instead of toggling it on every time).
-      let feedbackEnabledFallback = false;
-      if (feedbackEnabledInput === undefined) {
-        const setting = await readBooleanSetting('event_default_feedback_enabled');
-        if (setting !== undefined) feedbackEnabledFallback = setting;
-      }
-      const feedback_enabled = parseBooleanInput(feedbackEnabledInput, feedbackEnabledFallback);
-
-      // Sub-toggle defaults from the global Settings > Events values (#1044).
-      // One batched read; an explicitly-sent body value still wins.
-      const feedbackDefaults = applyFeedbackDefaults({
-        allow_ratings: allowRatingsInput,
-        allow_likes: allowLikesInput,
-        allow_comments: allowCommentsInput,
-        allow_favorites: allowFavoritesInput,
-        allow_reactions: allowReactionsInput,
-        allow_color_labels: allowColorLabelsInput,
-        keybind_mode: keybindModeInput,
-      }, await resolveEventFeedbackDefaults());
-
-      // Debug logging
-      logger.debug('Download control values', {
-        allow_downloads,
-        disable_right_click,
-        watermark_downloads,
-        watermark_text,
-        require_password: requirePassword,
-        types: {
-          allow_downloads: typeof allow_downloads,
-          disable_right_click: typeof disable_right_click,
-          watermark_downloads: typeof watermark_downloads
-        }
-      });
-    
-      let passwordValidation = null;
-
-      if (requirePassword) {
-        passwordValidation = await validatePasswordInContext(password, 'gallery', {
-          eventName: event_name
-        });
-
-        if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
-          return res.status(400).json({ 
-            error: 'Password does not meet security requirements',
-            details: passwordValidation.errors,
-            score: passwordValidation.score,
-            feedback: passwordValidation.feedback
-          });
-        }
-      }
-    
-      // Generate unique slug. Uses the shared util so accented names
-      // (Família, Decoração, etc.) get transliterated instead of dropped
-      // — see backend/src/utils/slug.js for the why (#525).
-      const processedEventName = slugify(event_name);
-
-      // Use event_date in slug if provided, otherwise use random suffix
-      const slugSuffix = event_date || crypto.randomBytes(3).toString('hex');
-      const baseSlug = `${event_type}-${processedEventName}-${slugSuffix}`;
-      let slug = baseSlug;
-      let counter = 1;
-
-      while (await db('events').where({ slug }).first()) {
-        slug = `${baseSlug}-${counter}`;
-        counter++;
-      }
-    
-      // Generate share link respecting configured format
-      const shareToken = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
-      const { shareUrl, shareLinkToStore } = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug, shareToken });
-    
-      // Hash password with configurable rounds (random placeholder when not required)
-      const password_hash = requirePassword
-        ? await bcrypt.hash(password, getBcryptRounds())
-        : await bcrypt.hash(crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex'), getBcryptRounds());
-    
-      // Calculate expiration date (days after event date)
-      // If expiration is not required, expires_at will be null (never expires)
-      // If event_date is not provided, use current date as base for expiration
-      let expires_at = null;
-      if (fieldRequirements.require_expiration) {
-        const baseDate = event_date || new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0];
-        // Parse YYYY-MM-DD format as local date to avoid timezone issues
-        if (baseDate.match(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/)) {
-          const [year, month, day] = baseDate.split('-').map(num => parseInt(num, 10));
-          expires_at = new Date(year, month - 1, day);
-        } else {
-          expires_at = new Date(baseDate);
-        }
-        expires_at.setDate(expires_at.getDate() + parseInt(expiration_days, 10));
-      }
-    
-      // Create folder structure
-      const storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../../storage');
-      const eventPath = path.join(storagePath, 'events/active', slug);
-      await fs.mkdir(path.join(eventPath, 'collages'), { recursive: true });
-      await fs.mkdir(path.join(eventPath, 'individual'), { recursive: true });
-    
-      // Sync header_style / hero_divider_style from color_theme JSON when not
-      // explicitly provided in the request body (#158).
-      let effectiveHeaderStyle = header_style;
-      let effectiveDividerStyle = hero_divider_style;
-      if (color_theme && (!req.body.header_style || !req.body.hero_divider_style)) {
-        try {
-          if (typeof color_theme === 'string' && color_theme.startsWith('{')) {
-            const parsed = JSON.parse(color_theme);
-            if (!req.body.header_style && parsed.headerStyle) {
-              effectiveHeaderStyle = parsed.headerStyle;
-            }
-            if (!req.body.hero_divider_style && parsed.heroDividerStyle) {
-              effectiveDividerStyle = parsed.heroDividerStyle;
-            }
-          }
-        } catch (_) {
-        // color_theme is not JSON – nothing to extract
-        }
-      }
-
-      // Get branding defaults for hero logo settings (Feature 7: Branding Inheritance)
-      const brandingDefaults = await getBrandingDefaults();
-      // hero_logo_visible: store NULL ("inherit") unless the admin explicitly
-      // set it, so the global branding_logo_display_hero toggle keeps
-      // controlling this gallery afterwards (#756). Only an explicit per-event
-      // choice overrides the global. `!= null` treats an explicit null the same
-      // as omitted (both → inherit); otherwise formatBoolean(null) would coerce
-      // to 0/false on SQLite instead of NULL (the PUT handler already does this).
-      const effectiveHeroLogoVisible = req.body.hero_logo_visible != null
-        ? formatBoolean(hero_logo_visible)
-        : null;
-      // NULL = inherit the global branding_logo_size (#756), resolved at read
-      // time. Only an explicit per-event size overrides it.
-      const effectiveHeroLogoSize = req.body.hero_logo_size || null;
-      const effectiveHeroLogoPosition = req.body.hero_logo_position || brandingDefaults.hero_logo_position;
-
-      // Inherit "Detect dev tools" from the global Image Security setting unless
-      // the request explicitly overrides it (#317 — admin disabled it globally
-      // but new events still got it ON because the column default is true).
-      const protectionDefaults = await getDownloadProtectionDefaults();
-      // #1296 — the other four Image-security settings, which were written,
-      // rendered as controls, and read by nothing. Same inheritance rule as
-      // the devtools setting below. Creation-time only; see
-      // getImageSecurityDefaults for why existing events are left alone.
-      const imageSecurityColumns = resolveImageSecurityColumns(
-        req.body,
-        await getImageSecurityDefaults(),
-      );
-      const effectiveEnableDevtoolsProtection =
-      enableDevtoolsProtectionInput !== undefined
-        ? enableDevtoolsProtectionInput
-        : protectionDefaults.enable_devtools_protection !== undefined
-          ? protectionDefaults.enable_devtools_protection
-          : true;
-
-      // Migration 137 — normalise calendar time triple. Throws AppError
-      // 400 when is_full_day=false but times are malformed/inverted.
-      const calendarTriple = normaliseEventTimeTriple({
-        event_time_start, event_time_end, is_full_day,
-      });
-      const calendarColumnsExist = await hasColumnCached('events', 'is_full_day');
-
-      // Insert into database
-      // Seed the new event's Live Slideshow display style from the PICPEAK-WIDE
-      // preset (app_settings, Settings → Slideshow). New events inherit it and the
-      // admin can still override per event. Watermark is left NULL = inherit the
-      // global watermark; the share token is minted on demand, not seeded. Guarded
-      // so un-migrated installs (mid-branch) don't reference missing columns.
-      let slideshowSeed = {};
-      if (await hasColumnCached('events', 'show_interval_ms')) {
-        try {
-          // parseInt-first: the previous `Number.isFinite(+v)` pre-check let
-          // NaN through for null/''/true (+null is 0, parseInt(null) is NaN),
-          // producing show_interval_ms=NaN in the INSERT — PG rejects that
-          // with "invalid input syntax for type integer" while SQLite
-          // silently stores NULL, so event creation 500'd on PG whenever the
-          // slideshow app_settings rows were absent.
-          const intP = (v, min, max) => clampIntOrUndefined(v, min, max);
-          const oneOf = (v, allowed) => (allowed.includes(v) ? v : undefined);
-          const i = intP(await getAppSetting('slideshow_interval_ms', undefined), 1000, 120000);
-          const tr = oneOf(await getAppSetting('slideshow_transition', undefined), SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS);
-          const tms = intP(await getAppSetting('slideshow_transition_ms', undefined), 100, 5000);
-          const cf = oneOf(await getAppSetting('slideshow_colorfilter', undefined), SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS);
-          if (i !== undefined) slideshowSeed.show_interval_ms = i;
-          if (tr) slideshowSeed.show_transition = tr;
-          if (tms !== undefined) slideshowSeed.show_transition_ms = tms;
-          if (cf) slideshowSeed.show_colorfilter = cf;
-        } catch (e) {
-          logger.warn('Failed to seed slideshow settings from global preset', { error: e.message });
-        }
-      }
-
-      const insertResult = await db('events').insert({
-        slug,
-        event_type,
-        event_name,
-        ...slideshowSeed,
-        event_date: event_date || null,
-        ...(calendarColumnsExist ? {
-          event_time_start: calendarTriple.event_time_start,
-          event_time_end: calendarTriple.event_time_end,
-          is_full_day: formatBoolean(calendarTriple.is_full_day),
-        } : {}),
-        ...(customerColumnsAvailable ? { customer_name: customerName, customer_email: customerEmail } : {}),
-        ...(customerPhone ? { customer_phone: customerPhone } : {}),
-        host_name: customerName || null,
-        host_email: customerEmail || null,
-        admin_email: admin_email || null,
-        password_hash,
-        // Opt-in recoverable copy (#1271), written with the hash so the two
-        // can never disagree. Empty unless the security setting is on.
-        ...(await galleryPasswordColumns({
-          ...(requirePassword && password ? { password } : {}),
-          ...(client_access_enabled && client_password ? { clientPassword: client_password } : {}),
-        })),
-        welcome_message,
-        color_theme,
-        share_link: shareLinkToStore,
-        share_token: shareToken,
-        expires_at: expires_at ? expires_at.toISOString() : null,
-        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
-        created_by: req.admin.id,
-        allow_user_uploads,
-        upload_category_id,
-        allow_downloads: formatBoolean(allow_downloads !== undefined ? allow_downloads : true),
-        disable_right_click: formatBoolean(disable_right_click !== undefined ? disable_right_click : false),
-        enable_devtools_protection: formatBoolean(effectiveEnableDevtoolsProtection),
-        // Request value, else the global default, else the column default —
-        // a key absent here is one the database fills in (#1296).
-        ...imageSecurityColumns,
-        watermark_downloads: formatBoolean(watermark_downloads !== undefined ? watermark_downloads : false),
-        watermark_text,
-        allow_presigned_download: formatBoolean(allow_presigned_download === true || allow_presigned_download === 'true'),
-        require_password: formatBoolean(requirePassword),
-        css_template_id: css_template_id || null,
-        // Already formatBoolean-coerced above, or null = inherit global (#756).
-        hero_logo_visible: effectiveHeroLogoVisible,
-        hero_logo_size: effectiveHeroLogoSize,
-        hero_logo_position: effectiveHeroLogoPosition,
-        // Banner overrides. Both were accepted by the validators above and
-        // then dropped here, so an API client could POST info_mode:'off' or a
-        // custom banner, get 201, and find the row still on 'inherit'.
-        // Markdown is only stored for 'custom' — same rule the PUT applies.
-        promo_mode: ['inherit', 'custom', 'off'].includes(promo_mode) ? promo_mode : 'inherit',
-        promo_markdown: promo_mode === 'custom' && typeof promo_markdown === 'string' && promo_markdown.trim()
-          ? promo_markdown.trim() : null,
-        info_mode: ['inherit', 'custom', 'off'].includes(info_mode) ? info_mode : 'inherit',
-        info_markdown: info_mode === 'custom' && typeof info_markdown === 'string' && info_markdown.trim()
-          ? info_markdown.trim() : null,
-        header_style: effectiveHeaderStyle || 'standard',
-        hero_divider_style: effectiveDividerStyle || 'wave',
-        hero_image_anchor: hero_image_anchor || 'center',
-        photo_cap: photo_cap || null,
-        is_draft: formatBoolean(parseBooleanInput(is_draft, true)),
-        default_photo_sort: default_photo_sort || 'upload_date_desc',
-        // Client access (#172)
-        client_access_enabled: formatBoolean(client_access_enabled),
-        ...(client_access_enabled && client_password ? {
-          client_password_hash: await bcrypt.hash(client_password, getBcryptRounds()),
-          client_share_token: crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex')
-        } : {}),
-        // Per-event opt-in for hero-photo OG share image (#474). Defaults
-        // false on create — admin opts in from the event detail page once
-        // they've picked a hero they're comfortable surfacing publicly.
-        og_image_share_enabled: formatBoolean(req.body.og_image_share_enabled === true),
-      }).returning('id');
-    
-      // Handle both PostgreSQL (returns array of objects) and SQLite (returns array of IDs)
-      const eventId = insertResult[0]?.id || insertResult[0];
-      // #1271 — the setting was read before the hashes; re-check after the write
-      await dropCopiesIfStorageOff(eventId);
-
-      // Apply customer-account assignments (#354). Skip when the customer
-      // portal flag is off — the frontend hides the picker in that case,
-      // but a stale tab could still POST customer_account_ids; we ignore
-      // them rather than 403 the entire create.
-      if (Array.isArray(req.body.customer_account_ids)) {
-        try {
-          const customerAccountsService = require('../../services/customerAccountsService');
-          if (await customerAccountsService.isCustomerPortalEnabled()) {
-            await customerAccountsService.setAssignmentsForEvent(
-              eventId,
-              req.body.customer_account_ids,
-              req.admin.id
-            );
-          }
-        } catch (e) {
-          logger.error('Failed to set customer assignments on event create', {
-            eventId, error: e.message,
-          });
-        }
-      }
-
-      // Insert feedback settings if feedback is enabled
-      if (feedback_enabled) {
-        await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
-          event_id: eventId,
-          feedback_enabled: formatBoolean(feedback_enabled),
-          allow_ratings: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_ratings),
-          allow_likes: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_likes),
-          allow_comments: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_comments),
-          allow_favorites: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_favorites),
-          allow_reactions: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_reactions),
-          allow_color_labels: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_color_labels),
-          keybind_mode: feedbackDefaults.keybind_mode,
-          require_name_email: formatBoolean(require_name_email),
-          moderate_comments: formatBoolean(moderate_comments),
-          show_feedback_to_guests: formatBoolean(show_feedback_to_guests),
-          identity_mode: ['simple', 'guest', 'shared'].includes(identityModeInput)
-            ? identityModeInput
-            : 'simple',
-          created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
-          updated_at: new Date().toISOString()
-        });
-      }
-    
-      // Log activity
-      await logActivity('event_created',
-        { event_type, expires_at, require_password: requirePassword, password_strength: passwordValidation?.score },
-        eventId,
-        { type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
-      );
-
-      // Fire event.created webhook (#327). If the event is being published
-      // immediately (not a draft), event.published also fires below.
-      // Payload uses canonical event subject (#341) so receivers always see
-      // the same shape (id/slug/event_name + customer contact + share_*).
-      try {
-        const webhookService = require('../../services/webhookService');
-        await webhookService.fire('event.created', {
-          event: {
-            ...webhookService.buildEventSubject({
-              id: eventId,
-              slug,
-              event_name,
-              event_type,
-              event_date,
-              share_url: shareUrl,
-              share_token: shareToken,
-              customer_name: customerName,
-              customer_email: customerEmail,
-              customer_phone: customerPhone,
-            }),
-            is_draft: parseBooleanInput(is_draft, true),
-          },
-        });
-      } catch (e) { /* webhookService.fire never throws but be defensive */ }
-
-      // Queue creation email (only if there is a recipient and event is not a draft)
-      // Language detection is handled by email processor
-      const isDraft = parseBooleanInput(is_draft, true);
-
-      if (customerEmail && !isDraft) {
-      // Build email data with optional client access info
-        const emailData = {
-          customer_name: customerName,
-          customer_email: customerEmail,
-          host_name: customerName || (customerEmail ? customerEmail.split('@')[0] : null),
-          event_name,
-          event_date: event_date,  // Pass raw date - will be formatted by email processor
-          gallery_link: shareUrl,
-          gallery_password: requirePassword ? password : 'No password required',
-          expiry_date: expires_at ? expires_at.toISOString() : null,  // Pass ISO string - will be formatted by email processor
-          welcome_message: welcome_message || ''
-        };
-
-        // Include client access info in email when enabled (#172)
-        if (client_access_enabled && client_password) {
-          const createdEvent = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
-          // Same FRONTEND_URL-before-APP_URL order as before: APP_URL is
-          // passed as the override so it still outranks the general_site_url
-          // setting and the request origin. Chaining it after the resolver
-          // would make it dead code, because the resolver only returns falsy
-          // when NOTHING is configured (#1104).
-          const frontendUrl = await getAbsoluteFrontendUrl(req, { override: process.env.APP_URL });
-          emailData.client_link = `${frontendUrl}/gallery/${slug}/client-access?token=${createdEvent.client_share_token}`;
-          emailData.client_password = client_password;
-        }
-
-        await db('email_queue').insert({
-          event_id: eventId,
-          recipient_email: customerEmail,
-          email_type: 'gallery_created',
-          email_data: JSON.stringify(emailData),
-          status: 'pending',
-          created_at: new Date()
-        // scheduled_at will use default value
-        });
-      }
-
-      // WhatsApp gallery_ready notification (#640D). Fires when the event is
-      // created NOT as a draft, the `whatsapp` flag is on, a config exists, and
-      // the customer supplied a phone number. Non-fatal: a queue failure should
-      // never block gallery creation.
-      if (!isDraft && customerPhone) {
-        try {
-          const { queueWhatsapp, getWhatsAppConfig } = require('../../services/whatsappProcessor');
-          const waConfig = await getWhatsAppConfig();
-          if (waConfig && waConfig.enabled) {
-            await queueWhatsapp(eventId, customerPhone, 'gallery_created', {
-              customer_name: customerName || '',
-              event_name,
-              gallery_link: shareUrl,
-              gallery_password: requirePassword ? password : '',
-              expiry_date: expires_at ? expires_at.toISOString() : null,
-              language: null, // resolved by processor via general_default_language
-            });
-          }
-        } catch (waError) {
-          logger.warn('Failed to queue WhatsApp notification on create', { error: waError.message });
-        }
-      }
-
-      // Fire event.published when the event is created NOT as a draft. The
-      // separate /publish endpoint fires it for the draft → live transition;
-      // this covers the "create-and-publish in one shot" path.
-      if (!isDraft) {
-        try {
-          const webhookService = require('../../services/webhookService');
-          await webhookService.fire('event.published', {
-            event: webhookService.buildEventSubject({
-              id: eventId,
-              slug,
-              event_name,
-              event_type,
-              event_date,
-              share_url: shareUrl,
-              share_token: shareToken,
-              customer_name: customerName,
-              customer_email: customerEmail,
-              customer_phone: customerPhone,
-            }),
-          });
-        } catch (e) { /* non-fatal */ }
-      }
-
-      res.json({
-        id: eventId,
-        slug,
-        event_name,
-        event_type,
-        customer_name: customerName,
-        customer_email: customerEmail,
-        require_password: requirePassword,
-        photo_cap: photo_cap || null,
-        is_draft: isDraft,
-        share_link: shareUrl,
-        expires_at: expires_at ? expires_at.toISOString() : null,
-        created_at: new Date().toISOString()
+      const created = await require('../../services/eventCreationService').createEvent(req.body, {
+        actor: req.admin,
+        frontendUrl: await getAbsoluteFrontendUrl(req, { override: process.env.APP_URL }),
       });
+      res.json(created);
     } catch (error) {
+      if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json(error.responseBody || { error: error.message, code: error.code });
       if (isDuplicateSlugError(error)) {
         logger.warn('Event creation lost the slug race', { error: error.message });
         return res.status(409).json(DUPLICATE_SLUG_RESPONSE);
@@ -1425,6 +864,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         share_token: shareToken,
         expires_at: newExpiresAt ? newExpiresAt.toISOString() : null,
         created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
         created_by: req.admin.id,
         allow_user_uploads: source.allow_user_uploads,
         upload_category_id: source.upload_category_id,
@@ -1441,7 +881,6 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         use_canvas_rendering: source.use_canvas_rendering,
         watermark_downloads: source.watermark_downloads,
         watermark_text: source.watermark_text,
-        allow_presigned_download: source.allow_presigned_download,
         require_password: source.require_password,
         css_template_id: source.css_template_id || null,
         hero_logo_visible: source.hero_logo_visible,
@@ -1598,7 +1037,6 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     body('disable_right_click').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('watermark_downloads').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('watermark_text').optional().trim(),
-    body('allow_presigned_download').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('source_mode').optional().isIn(['managed', 'reference']),
     body('external_path').optional({ nullable: true }).isString().trim(),
     body('external_watch').optional().isBoolean(),
@@ -2029,8 +1467,6 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         }
       }
 
-
-
       // Sync header_style / hero_divider_style from color_theme JSON when not
       // explicitly provided in the request body (#158).  This ensures the
       // database columns stay in sync even if the frontend only sends the
@@ -2232,12 +1668,12 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
       }
 
-      const newStatus = !event.is_active;
+      const newStatus = !parseBooleanInput(event.is_active, false);
       await db('events')
         .where('id', id)
         .update({
-          is_active: newStatus,
-          updated_at: new Date()
+          is_active: formatBoolean(newStatus),
+          updated_at: new Date().toISOString()
         });
 
       // Log activity

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/helpers.js

@@ -1,392 +1,9 @@
-// Extracted verbatim from the original routes/adminEvents.js (see ./index.js).
-// Shared helpers + module-level caches used across the adminEvents sub-routers.
-
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
 const fs = require('fs').promises;
 const path = require('path');
 const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
-const { parseStringInput } = require('../../utils/parsers');
+const settings = require('../../services/eventSettings');
 
-// Shared validator for hero_image_anchor – accepts legacy keywords or "X% Y%" focal point
-const validateHeroImageAnchor = (value) => {
-  if (['top', 'center', 'bottom'].includes(value)) return true;
-  if (typeof value === 'string' && /^\d{1,3}%\s+\d{1,3}%$/.test(value)) {
-    const [x, y] = value.split(/\s+/).map(v => parseInt(v));
-    if (x >= 0 && x <= 100 && y >= 0 && y <= 100) return true;
-  }
-  throw new Error('Must be top, center, bottom, or "X% Y%" (0-100)');
-};
-
-// Get storage path from environment or default
-const getStoragePath = () => process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../../storage');
-
-// Helper to get event field requirements from settings
-const getEventFieldRequirements = async () => {
-  try {
-    const settings = await db('app_settings')
-      .whereIn('setting_key', [
-        'event_require_customer_name',
-        'event_require_customer_email',
-        'event_require_admin_email',
-        'event_require_event_date',
-        'event_require_expiration'
-      ])
-      .select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
-
-    const requirements = {
-      require_customer_name: true,
-      require_customer_email: true,
-      require_admin_email: true,
-      require_event_date: true,
-      require_expiration: true
-    };
-
-    settings.forEach(s => {
-      let value = s.setting_value;
-      if (typeof value === 'string') {
-        try {
-          value = JSON.parse(value);
-        } catch (e) {
-          value = value === 'true';
-        }
-      }
-      if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_customer_name') requirements.require_customer_name = value;
-      if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_customer_email') requirements.require_customer_email = value;
-      if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_admin_email') requirements.require_admin_email = value;
-      if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_event_date') requirements.require_event_date = value;
-      if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_expiration') requirements.require_expiration = value;
-    });
-
-    return requirements;
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to get event field requirements', { error: error.message });
-    return {
-      require_customer_name: true,
-      require_customer_email: true,
-      require_admin_email: true,
-      require_event_date: true,
-      require_expiration: true
-    };
-  }
-};
-
-// Helper to read app_settings booleans by key, used to inherit per-setting
-// defaults onto new events. Returns `undefined` for missing/non-boolean rows
-// so callers can fall back to a legacy default.
-/**
- * Decode an app_settings value into the JS value it represents.
- *
- * setting_value is JSON text on SQLite and may already be decoded by the
- * driver on a PG json column, so one parse does not normalise both. On top
- * of that, the Image Security tab used to PUT back values it had read
- * undecoded, wrapping another layer of quoting around each one on every
- * save — the GET handler decodes now, but installs carry however many
- * layers they accumulated before that.
- *
- * Every reader of app_settings has to agree about this, or the admin UI
- * shows one thing while event creation does another.
- *
- * Terminates: each parse of a string is strictly shorter than its input.
- */
-const decodeSettingValue = (raw) => {
-  let value = raw;
-  while (typeof value === 'string') {
-    let parsed;
-    try { parsed = JSON.parse(value); } catch { break; }
-    if (parsed === value) break;
-    value = parsed;
-  }
-  return value;
-};
-
-const readBooleanSetting = async (key) => {
-  try {
-    const setting = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', key).first();
-    if (!setting) return undefined;
-    const value = decodeSettingValue(setting.setting_value);
-    return typeof value === 'boolean' ? value : undefined;
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to read app setting', { key, error: error.message });
-    return undefined;
-  }
-};
-
-// Helper to read the global "enable_devtools_protection" admin setting so
-// new events inherit it instead of always falling back to the DB column default
-// (#317 — admin disabled it globally but new events still got it ON).
-const getDownloadProtectionDefaults = async () => {
-  return { enable_devtools_protection: await readBooleanSetting('enable_devtools_protection') };
-};
-
-/**
- * The rest of Settings → Image security, as creation defaults (#1296).
- *
- * Four settings in that panel were written, reloaded and rendered as
- * controls, and read by nothing:
- *
- *   default_protection_level     → events.protection_level
- *   default_image_quality        → events.image_quality
- *   enable_canvas_rendering      → events.use_canvas_rendering
- *
- * Each maps onto a column migration 038 already created, and each is
- * labelled "… by default", so applying them at creation is what the panel
- * has always claimed to do. `enable_devtools_protection` above is the only
- * one of the five that was ever wired.
- *
- * Creation-time only, deliberately. Applying them to EXISTING events would
- * silently change live galleries on upgrade — an install with
- * enable_canvas_rendering already on would switch every grid to canvas
- * rendering, which is memory-expensive at scale and is the profile under
- * investigation in #1287. New events only; existing rows untouched.
- *
- * Any value that is missing or malformed comes back undefined so the caller
- * falls through to the column default, exactly as before this existed.
- */
-const PROTECTION_LEVELS = ['basic', 'standard', 'enhanced', 'maximum'];
-
-// parseInt would rescue malformed settings instead of rejecting them:
-// parseInt('72oops') is 72, parseInt(72.5) is 72, parseInt([72]) is 72.
-// That matters because the settings PUT stores whatever JSON it is handed
-// without validating the value (adminImageSecurity.js writes
-// JSON.stringify(value) for any allow-listed key), so those shapes really
-// can be sitting in app_settings. Accept only a genuine integer, or a
-// string that is exactly one.
-const toInteger = (value) => {
-  if (typeof value === 'number') return Number.isInteger(value) ? value : undefined;
-  if (typeof value === 'string' && /^[+-]?\d+$/.test(value.trim())) return Number(value.trim());
-  return undefined;
-};
-
-const getImageSecurityDefaults = async (trx = null) => {
-  const defaults = {};
-  try {
-    // Accepts a transaction the way getAppSetting does. It matters on
-    // sqlite3, whose pool holds a single connection: a caller already inside
-    // db.transaction() that read through the global `db` would block on the
-    // connection its own transaction holds until the acquire timeout, and
-    // the catch below would then quietly swallow it and drop the defaults.
-    const query = trx || db;
-    const rows = await query('app_settings')
-      .whereIn('setting_key', [
-        'default_protection_level',
-        'default_image_quality',
-        'enable_canvas_rendering',
-      ])
-      .select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
-
-    // app_settings holds JSON text on SQLite, while a PG json column comes
-    // back already decoded — so one parse is not enough to normalise both.
-    // Worse, GET /api/admin/image-security/settings returns setting_value
-    // without decoding it and the settings tab PUTs the whole fetched object
-    // straight back through JSON.stringify, so opening the tab and saving
-    // re-encodes every value it read as text. After one such round trip
-    // `true` is stored as "\"true\"" and a single parse yields the string
-    // 'true', which the type checks below reject — the settings would go
-    // quietly dead again, which is the bug this whole change exists to fix.
-    // The GET handler now decodes, so this stops accumulating — but installs
-    // that already stacked N layers have to keep working, and N is however
-    // many times someone opened that tab. So unwrap until it stops being a
-    // JSON string rather than to a fixed depth; this terminates because each
-    // parse of a string is strictly shorter than its input.
-    const read = (key) => {
-      const row = rows.find((r) => r.setting_key === key);
-      if (!row) return undefined;
-      return decodeSettingValue(row.setting_value);
-    };
-
-    const level = read('default_protection_level');
-    if (typeof level === 'string' && PROTECTION_LEVELS.includes(level)) {
-      defaults.protection_level = level;
-    }
-
-    // The column is an integer percentage; anything outside 1..100 is a
-    // misconfiguration and falls through rather than being clamped into
-    // something the operator did not choose.
-    const quality = toInteger(read('default_image_quality'));
-    if (quality !== undefined && quality >= 1 && quality <= 100) {
-      defaults.image_quality = quality;
-    }
-
-    const canvas = read('enable_canvas_rendering');
-    if (typeof canvas === 'boolean') {
-      defaults.use_canvas_rendering = canvas;
-    }
-
-  } catch (error) {
-    // A settings read must never block event creation; the column defaults
-    // are a correct fallback.
-    logger.error('Failed to read image-security defaults', { error: error.message });
-  }
-  return defaults;
-};
-
-/**
- * Build the image-security columns for a NEW event: an explicit request
- * value wins, then the global default, then the column default (the key is
- * omitted entirely so the database supplies it).
- *
- * Shared by the admin create route and POST /api/v1/events so the configured
- * security level cannot depend on which entry point created the gallery —
- * the same split that made #592 (devtools) a separate bug from #317.
- *
- * `body` values are already validated by the route's express-validator
- * chain; `defaults` come from getImageSecurityDefaults(), which validates
- * them itself.
- */
-const resolveImageSecurityColumns = (body = {}, defaults = {}) => {
-  const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
-  const columns = {};
-  // express-validator runs isInt/isIn/isBoolean element-wise on arrays, so a
-  // single-element array like `image_quality: [72]` passes the route's chain
-  // and arrives here still an array. The routes reject those with
-  // .not().isArray(); this guard means any future caller cannot write one
-  // into a scalar column (a PG insert error, or `[false]` coerced to true).
-  const scalar = (v) => (v !== null && typeof v === 'object' ? undefined : v);
-  const pick = (key) => {
-    const fromBody = scalar(body[key]);
-    return fromBody !== undefined ? fromBody : defaults[key];
-  };
-
-  const level = pick('protection_level');
-  if (level !== undefined) columns.protection_level = level;
-
-  const quality = pick('image_quality');
-  if (quality !== undefined) columns.image_quality = quality;
-
-  const canvas = pick('use_canvas_rendering');
-  if (canvas !== undefined) columns.use_canvas_rendering = formatBoolean(canvas);
-
-
-  return columns;
-};
-
-// Helper to get branding defaults for new events (Feature 7: Branding Inheritance).
-//
-// Note: `branding_logo_position` (header bar — left/center/right) is a
-// different concept from `hero_logo_position` (hero block — top/center/
-// bottom) and must NOT be mapped here. A previous version copied the
-// branding value over, which wrote 'left'/'right' into per-event
-// hero_logo_position columns and broke any subsequent PUT validation
-// (#357). Migration 084 heals existing rows.
-const getBrandingDefaults = async () => {
-  try {
-    const settings = await db('app_settings')
-      .whereIn('setting_key', [
-        'branding_logo_display_hero',
-        'branding_logo_size'
-      ])
-      .select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
-
-    const defaults = {
-      hero_logo_visible: true,
-      hero_logo_size: 'medium',
-      hero_logo_position: 'top'
-    };
-
-    settings.forEach(s => {
-      let value = s.setting_value;
-      if (typeof value === 'string') {
-        try { value = JSON.parse(value); } catch (e) { /* use as-is */ }
-      }
-      if (s.setting_key === 'branding_logo_display_hero') {
-        defaults.hero_logo_visible = value !== false;
-      }
-      if (s.setting_key === 'branding_logo_size' && value) {
-        defaults.hero_logo_size = value;
-      }
-    });
-
-    return defaults;
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to get branding defaults', { error: error.message });
-    return {
-      hero_logo_visible: true,
-      hero_logo_size: 'medium',
-      hero_logo_position: 'top'
-    };
-  }
-};
-
-// Use parseStringInput from shared parsers for customer data extraction
-const getCustomerNameFromPayload = (payload = {}) => parseStringInput(payload.customer_name);
-const getCustomerEmailFromPayload = (payload = {}) => parseStringInput(payload.customer_email);
-const getCustomerPhoneFromPayload = (payload = {}) => parseStringInput(payload.customer_phone);
-
-// Whether the global "phone field" toggle (#322) is enabled. Cached for
-// the request via a module-level read; drift is acceptable since this
-// only governs whether to persist the field, not security boundaries.
-const isPhoneFieldEnabled = async () => {
-  try {
-    const row = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'event_phone_field_enabled').first();
-    if (!row) return false;
-    let value = row.setting_value;
-    if (typeof value === 'string') {
-      try { value = JSON.parse(value); } catch { /* keep raw */ }
-    }
-    return value === true;
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.debug('Failed to read event_phone_field_enabled', { error: error.message });
-    return false;
-  }
-};
-
-const RECOVERABLE_PASSWORD_COLUMNS = ['password_recoverable', 'client_password_recoverable'];
-
-const mapEventForApi = (event) => {
-  if (!event || typeof event !== 'object') {
-    return event;
-  }
-
-  const {
-    host_name,
-    host_email,
-    customer_name,
-    customer_email,
-    customer_phone,
-    // Bound only to exclude the secrets from `...rest` — never read.
-    password_hash: _ph, client_password_hash: _cph,
-    ...rest
-  } = event;
-  // #1271 — the encrypted copies never leave the server except via
-  // /:id/password. Removed by name (not destructured) so a secret scanner
-  // does not read the binding as a hard-coded password.
-  for (const column of RECOVERABLE_PASSWORD_COLUMNS) delete rest[column];
-
-  return {
-    ...rest,
-    customer_name: customer_name ?? host_name ?? null,
-    customer_email: customer_email ?? host_email ?? null,
-    customer_phone: customer_phone ?? null
-  };
-};
-
-let customerColumnCache = null;
-const hasCustomerContactColumns = async () => {
-  if (customerColumnCache === true) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  try {
-    const hasColumn = await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'customer_email');
-    if (hasColumn) {
-      customerColumnCache = true;
-    }
-    return hasColumn;
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.debug('Failed to detect customer_email column', { error: error.message });
-    return false;
-  }
-};
-
-// Cascade-delete a single event: photos, audit/access logs, queued emails,
-// the event row itself (in one transaction), then the on-disk folder /
-// archive zip / hero logo (best-effort — file failures don't unwind the DB
-// changes since the source of truth is the database). Used by both the
-// per-event DELETE /:id route and the bulk-delete route to avoid drift.
-//
-// Throws { code: 'EVENT_NOT_FOUND' } if the event id doesn't exist so the
-// bulk-delete loop can report it as a per-id failure without aborting the
-// whole batch. Any other error propagates and is the caller's problem.
 async function deleteEventCascade(eventId, adminContext) {
   const event = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
   if (!event) {
@@ -678,40 +295,4 @@ async function deleteEventCascade(eventId, adminContext) {
   return { id: event.id, name: event.event_name };
 }
 
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Live Slideshow ("Diashow") — a token-only fullscreen kiosk link for live
-// events that auto-picks-up new uploads (migration 138). Mirrors the
-// client-access second-token pattern: the link is minted on demand, rotatable
-// and disable-able, independent of the gallery password / share link.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-// Allowed slide transition styles (kept in sync with the SlideshowPage).
-// dipwhite/dipblack = fade through highlights / lowlights between images.
-const SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS = ['crossfade', 'cut', 'slide', 'kenburns', 'dipwhite', 'dipblack'];
-// Allowed per-slide color filters.
-const SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS = ['none', 'bw', 'sepia', 'warm', 'cool', 'vignette'];
-// Allowed slideshow play orders (#202). 'chronological' = upload order,
-// 'random' = client-side shuffle.
-const SLIDESHOW_ORDERS = ['chronological', 'random'];
-module.exports = {
-  RECOVERABLE_PASSWORD_COLUMNS,
-  validateHeroImageAnchor,
-  getStoragePath,
-  getEventFieldRequirements,
-  readBooleanSetting,
-  decodeSettingValue,
-  getDownloadProtectionDefaults,
-  getImageSecurityDefaults,
-  resolveImageSecurityColumns,
-  getBrandingDefaults,
-  getCustomerNameFromPayload,
-  getCustomerEmailFromPayload,
-  getCustomerPhoneFromPayload,
-  isPhoneFieldEnabled,
-  mapEventForApi,
-  hasCustomerContactColumns,
-  deleteEventCascade,
-  SLIDESHOW_ORDERS,
-  SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS,
-  SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS,
-};
+module.exports = { ...settings, deleteEventCascade };

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/logo.js

@@ -24,14 +24,20 @@ const eventLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({
     cb(null, uploadDir);
   },
   filename: (req, file, cb) => {
+    const eventId = Number(req.params.id);
+    if (!Number.isInteger(eventId) || eventId <= 0) {
+      return cb(new Error('Invalid event id'));
+    }
     const ext = path.extname(file.originalname);
-    cb(null, `event-${req.params.id}-logo-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
+    cb(null, `event-${eventId}-logo-${Date.now()}${ext}`);
   }
 });
 
 const eventLogoUpload = multer({
   storage: eventLogoStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5MB
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `logo` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 5MB
   fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
     const allowedMimeTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/svg+xml'];
     if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowedMimeTypes)) {

backend/src/routes/adminExpenses.js

@@ -41,7 +41,10 @@ function diskUpload(subdir) {
       },
       filename: (_req, file, cb) => cb(null, `${subdir.split('/').pop()}-${Date.now()}${path.extname(file.originalname) || ''}`),
     }),
-    limits: { fileSize: 15 * 1024 * 1024 },
+    // CVE-2026-82333: both callers (`inboundUpload` → 'file', `proofUpload`
+    // → 'proof') take a single unnamed field — no legitimate array-indexed
+    // field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+    limits: { fileSize: 15 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
     fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => (ALLOWED_MIME.includes(file.mimetype) ? cb(null, true) : cb(new Error('Only PDF, JPEG or PNG files are allowed'))),
   });
 }

backend/src/routes/adminInvoices.js

@@ -72,7 +72,9 @@ const importedInvoiceStorage = multer.diskStorage({
 });
 const importedInvoiceUpload = multer({
   storage: importedInvoiceStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024 },
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `pdf` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
   fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
     if (file.mimetype === 'application/pdf') cb(null, true);
     else cb(new Error('Only PDF files are allowed for imported invoices'));

backend/src/routes/adminPhotos.js

@@ -112,7 +112,12 @@ const createUpload = (maxFileSizeBytes) => multer({
     files: 2000, // Hard safety ceiling; actual limit enforced dynamically
     fieldSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB for non-file fields
     parts: 10000,
-    headerPairs: 2000
+    headerPairs: 2000,
+    // CVE-2026-82333: files arrive as repeated `photos` parts via
+    // multer's own .array('photos', N) — not bracket-indexed field names
+    // like `photos[0]` — so no legitimate field name uses array-index
+    // syntax at all. Reject any that do.
+    fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0
   },
   fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
     // req.allowedMimeTypes is populated by the middleware that runs before multer
@@ -1701,18 +1706,30 @@ router.post('/:eventId/chunked-upload/:uploadId/chunk/:chunkIndex', adminAuth, r
   try {
     const { uploadId, chunkIndex } = req.params;
 
-    // Get chunk data from request body
-    const chunks = [];
-    for await (const chunk of req) {
-      chunks.push(chunk);
-    }
-    const chunkData = Buffer.concat(chunks);
-
-    const result = await chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, parseInt(chunkIndex), chunkData);
+    // The request stream is handed over unread (#1403). Every check — unknown
+    // upload id, bad index, the per-file cap against Content-Length — runs
+    // inside uploadChunk before a byte is consumed, and the body is then
+    // streamed to the chunk file under a hard cap rather than concatenated in
+    // memory. Buffering it first meant a rejected 300MB request still cost
+    // 300MB of heap.
+    const declaredBytes = Number(req.headers['content-length']);
+    const result = await chunkedUpload.uploadChunk(uploadId, parseInt(chunkIndex), req, {
+      declaredBytes: Number.isFinite(declaredBytes) ? declaredBytes : undefined,
+    });
 
     res.json(result);
   } catch (error) {
-    if (error.statusCode === 413 || error.statusCode === 400) {
+    // Client-caused states (unknown/finished/expired upload, bad index, too
+    // large) carry their own status. Only a genuinely unexpected error should
+    // reach the 500 below and the error log with it.
+    if (error.statusCode) {
+      // Refusing the body early is the point — but it leaves unread bytes in
+      // flight on a connection this response still advertises as keep-alive.
+      // Node does not drain them, so the NEXT request on that socket hangs
+      // until it times out. Retire the connection instead.
+      if (!req.readableEnded) {
+        res.set('Connection', 'close');
+      }
       return res.status(error.statusCode).json({ error: error.message });
     }
     logger.error('Error uploading chunk:', error);
@@ -1762,8 +1779,10 @@ router.post('/:eventId/chunked-upload/:uploadId/complete', adminAuth, requirePer
       photos: uploadedPhotos
     });
   } catch (error) {
-    if (error.statusCode === 413) {
-      return res.status(413).json({ error: error.message });
+    // Same rule as the chunk route: a tagged status is a client-caused state
+    // (unknown/expired upload, missing chunks), not a server fault.
+    if (error.statusCode) {
+      return res.status(error.statusCode).json({ error: error.message });
     }
     logger.error('Error completing chunked upload:', error);
     res.status(500).json({ error: error.message || 'Failed to complete upload' });

backend/src/routes/adminRestore.js

@@ -810,24 +810,72 @@ async function checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source, manifestPath }) {
     if (extra.trim()) roots.push(extra.trim());
   }
   if (roots.length === 0) {
-    // Nothing configured to compare against — a restore can't be scoped, so
-    // don't pretend to enforce. Discovery would find nothing either.
-    return null;
+    // GHSA-xfvx: nothing configured to compare against used to mean "a
+    // restore can't be scoped, so don't pretend to enforce" — returning
+    // null (allow). That's fail-OPEN: on a fresh install (or one where an
+    // operator never set backup_destination_path/backup_manifest_path) any
+    // authenticated `backup.restore` caller could point source/manifestPath
+    // — and, via the manifest, database.backup_file — at literally any path
+    // on disk. Require configuration instead of silently allowing
+    // everything; the normal restore wizard already needs one of these
+    // settings populated to discover backups in the first place.
+    logger.warn('Refusing restore: no backup location configured to scope it to', { candidates });
+    return 'No backup location is configured (backup_destination_path / backup_manifest_path). ' +
+      'Configure one before restoring.';
   }
 
   const resolvedRoots = roots.map((r) => path.resolve(r));
-  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+  const isInsideRoots = (candidate) => {
     const resolved = path.resolve(candidate);
-    const inside = resolvedRoots.some(
+    return resolvedRoots.some(
       (root) => resolved === root || resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep)
     );
-    if (!inside) {
+  };
+
+  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+    if (!isInsideRoots(candidate)) {
       logger.warn('Refusing restore path outside the configured backup roots', {
         candidate, roots,
       });
       return 'Backup source and manifest path must be inside a configured backup location';
     }
   }
+
+  // GHSA-xfvx: source/manifestPath containment alone isn't enough — the
+  // manifest FILE (which just passed containment above) can itself carry a
+  // `database.backup_file` field that restoreService's candidate resolution
+  // used to hand straight to `sqlite3 .restore` with no containment check at
+  // all. Peek at the manifest here (it's already proven to live inside an
+  // allowed root) and reject an ABSOLUTE backup_file that escapes the same
+  // roots — the case that's unambiguous to check without re-deriving
+  // restoreService's own `backupPath` resolution for the relative-path
+  // candidates. This is deliberately defense in depth, not the only gate:
+  // restoreService.performDatabaseRestore independently re-derives and
+  // enforces containment (including relative/`..` candidates) against
+  // `backupPath` right before ever using the resolved path, and remains the
+  // authoritative check for S3-sourced manifests (downloaded after this
+  // pre-check runs).
+  if (manifestPath && !isS3(manifestPath) && !isTypeToken(manifestPath)) {
+    try {
+      const raw = await fs.readFile(manifestPath, 'utf8');
+      const trimmed = raw.trimStart();
+      const parsed = (trimmed.startsWith('{') || trimmed.startsWith('['))
+        ? JSON.parse(raw)
+        : null; // non-JSON (e.g. YAML) manifests are re-checked inside restoreService
+      const dbBackupFile = parsed?.database?.backup_file;
+      if (typeof dbBackupFile === 'string' && path.isAbsolute(dbBackupFile) && !isInsideRoots(dbBackupFile)) {
+        logger.warn('Refusing restore: manifest database.backup_file escapes configured backup roots', {
+          manifestPath, backupFile: dbBackupFile,
+        });
+        return 'Manifest database.backup_file must be inside a configured backup location';
+      }
+    } catch (_) {
+      // Unreadable/corrupt/non-JSON manifest: let the normal restore flow
+      // surface the real error (loadAndValidateManifest) instead of failing
+      // this pre-check for an unrelated reason.
+    }
+  }
+
   return null;
 }