fix(backend): set multer's fieldArrayIndexLimit to actually close CVE-2026-82333

The advisory is explicit that the 2.3.0 version bump alone doesn't remediate the array-index DoS — an app must also set limits.fieldArrayIndexLimit. Set it on every multer instance, sized to what each route's form actually needs.
fix(backend): bump sharp, nodemailer, multer, js-yaml, joi for security fixes
2026-09-10 23:37:03 +02:00 · 2026-09-10 17:44:21 +02:00 · 2026-09-10 11:54:50 +00:00 · 2026-09-10 13:48:48 +02:00 · 2026-09-09 20:35:16 +00:00 · 2026-09-09 22:27:18 +02:00
191 changed files with 10591 additions and 9070 deletions
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ DB_NAME=picpeak_prod
 # address is refused by the SSRF check otherwise. Running n8n beside PicPeak is
 # normal, so set EMAIL_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=true for that.
 #
+# Webhook and email-webhook deliveries connect to the DNS answer they just
+# validated and ignore HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY. Behind a mandatory egress
+# proxy set the *_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS flag, which sends through the proxy
+# without pinning.
+#
 # A mail account with its own SMTP host (Settings -> Mail accounts) keeps
 # sending through it; this replaces the global transport only.
 #
@@ -353,3 +358,9 @@ LOGS=./logs
 # Backend signing-key encryption (32+ characters); defaults to JWT_SECRET.
 # Keep this value stable until participation has been deleted.
 # USAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
+
+# Graceful shutdown budget in milliseconds. On SIGTERM the server stops
+# accepting requests, drains workers and closes the pool; whatever is still
+# running after this long is abandoned so the process exits before Docker's
+# 10 s stop grace period (raise stop_grace_period together with this value).
+#SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS=8000
@@ -24,17 +24,20 @@ A clear and concise description of what you expected to happen.
 If applicable, add screenshots to help explain your problem.

 **Environment (please complete the following information):**
- - OS: [e.g. Ubuntu 22.04]
- - Browser: [e.g. Chrome 120, Safari 17]
- - PicPeak Version: [e.g. 1.0.22]
- - Deployment Method: [e.g. Docker Compose, Manual]
- - Database: [e.g. PostgreSQL 15, SQLite]
+ - OS and version:
+ - Browser and version:
+ - PicPeak version and Docker image tag (if applicable):
+ - Deployment method: [Docker Compose, all-in-one container, manual]
+ - Database and version: [PostgreSQL, SQLite]

 **Logs**
 Please include relevant logs:
 ```
-# Backend logs
-docker-compose logs backend | tail -50
+# Backend logs (Docker Compose)
+docker compose logs --tail=50 backend
+
+# Or all-in-one container logs (replace picpeak if your container has another name)
+docker logs --tail=50 picpeak

 # Frontend console errors
 [paste any browser console errors]
@@ -44,4 +47,4 @@ docker-compose logs backend | tail -50
 Add any other context about the problem here.

 **Possible Solution**
-If you have an idea how to fix the issue, please describe it here.
+If you have an idea how to fix the issue, please describe it here.
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 blank_issues_enabled: false
 contact_links:
  - name: 📚 Documentation
-    url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/blob/main/DEPLOYMENT.md
-    about: Please read the documentation before opening an issue
+    url: https://docs.picpeak.app
+    about: Installation, configuration and feature guides
  - name: 💬 Discussions
    url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions
    about: Ask questions and discuss with the community
  - name: 🔒 Security Issues
    url: https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/blob/main/SECURITY.md
-    about: Please review our security policy for reporting vulnerabilities
+    about: Please review our security policy for reporting vulnerabilities
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ assignees: ''

 **What documentation needs improvement?**
 Please specify which document or section needs attention:
+- [ ] Documentation website (https://docs.picpeak.app)
 - [ ] README.md
 - [ ] DEPLOYMENT.md
 - [ ] CONTRIBUTING.md
@@ -16,6 +17,8 @@ Please specify which document or section needs attention:
 - [ ] Code Comments
 - [ ] Other: ___________

+Link to the affected page or file:
+
 **Describe the issue**
 What's wrong or missing in the documentation?

@@ -30,4 +33,4 @@ Who is this documentation for?
 - [ ] End users (photographers/clients)

 **Additional context**
-Add any other context, examples, or references here.
+Add any other context, examples, or references here.
@@ -6,11 +6,6 @@ name: Tests
 # calendar) plus the photo / settings / OG / auth surface — wiring them
 # into CI makes regressions visible at PR time instead of post-merge.
 #
-# Six backend suites are excluded via --testPathIgnorePatterns. They
-# fail on `upstream/beta` too (pre-existing mock/infra issues, NOT CRM
-# regressions). Excluding them here keeps CI green from day 1; revisit
-# each individually as its own fix.
-#
 # Triggers on any change that could affect either suite. The backend
 # job intentionally omits frontend paths and vice versa so unrelated
 # PRs don't pay both build costs.
@@ -89,18 +84,7 @@ jobs:
          # Un-gates the real-Postgres cases in the .picpeak restore suites
          # (see the `services:` note above). Absent it they silently skip.
          PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL: 'postgres://picpeak:testpass@127.0.0.1:5432/picpeak_test'
-        run: |
-          # Excluded suites — fail on upstream/beta too, tracked
-          # separately as test-infra debt:
-          #   adminSettings.logo                  — supertest fixture
-          #   integration/adminPhotos.reference   — supertest fixture
-          #   integration/webhookDelivery         — supertest fixture
-          #   services/backupService.enhanced     — knex mock chain
-          #   routes/__tests__/adminAuth          — supertest fixture
-          # (adminNotifications was excluded; #597 fix re-enables it.)
-          npx jest \
-            --testPathIgnorePatterns='/node_modules/|adminSettings\.logo\.test|integration/adminPhotos\.reference|integration/webhookDelivery|backupService\.enhanced|routes/__tests__/adminAuth' \
-            --ci
+        run: npx jest --ci

  frontend:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -121,10 +105,30 @@ jobs:
        working-directory: ./frontend
        run: npm ci

+      - name: Lint frontend (including Rules of Hooks)
+        working-directory: ./frontend
+        run: npm run lint
+
      - name: Run Vitest suite
        working-directory: ./frontend
        run: npm test -- --run

+  nginx:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 5
+    strategy:
+      matrix:
+        # Match the two shipped frontend Dockerfiles.
+        image: ['nginx:1.28-alpine', 'nginx:1.30-alpine']
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout code
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Verify token-safe nginx logging
+        env:
+          NGINX_TEST_IMAGE: ${{ matrix.image }}
+        run: python3 tests/nginx/test_request_logging.py
+
  # Optional face-detection sidecar (#1074). Runs on every PR regardless of
  # whether the feature is enabled anywhere — these tests need no model
  # weights (they stub the pipeline out) and cover the auth boundary, the
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "3.130.0-beta.0"
+  ".": "3.131.3-beta.0"
 }
@@ -5,6 +5,71 @@ All notable changes to PicPeak will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).

+## [3.131.3-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.131.2-beta.0...v3.131.3-beta.0) (2026-09-10)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **video:** try metadata extraction and thumbnail generation independently ([#1371](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1371)) ([a2bf1f6](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/a2bf1f644c78734fc9a86a24d441b7a70bdb38fb))
+
+## [3.131.2-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.131.1-beta.0...v3.131.2-beta.0) (2026-09-09)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **backup:** honor the configured database-backup destination path ([#1366](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1366)) ([15cd5ed](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/15cd5ede82171f5869342de869903f55c73f3871))
+
+## [3.131.1-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.131.0-beta.0...v3.131.1-beta.0) (2026-09-08)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **usage:** explain and de-emphasize the pending-packet button lock ([#1363](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1363)) ([9f4b9ba](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/9f4b9bab46264d83dcdf698ce5bc318703eb10ee))
+
+## [3.131.0-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.130.2-beta.0...v3.131.0-beta.0) (2026-09-08)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **setup:** add anonymous usage-reporting opt-in to the first-run wizard ([8d0c329](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/8d0c32902dd78324286a7585188d0c292692c8ec))
+* **setup:** add product usage consent to the first-run wizard ([539f5db](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/539f5db2b5e28dc42742fbbbe082fc3c23a7263e))
+* **usage:** prompt existing admins once for usage reporting after an update ([59ef2ee](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/59ef2ee9af74e97e042934e6ea5fab3b0b687617))
+* **usage:** prompt existing admins once for usage reporting after an update ([d20f801](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/d20f80112f95c7d718f936ea14aadf7eb0accdea))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* complete graceful shutdown and revoke tokens without expiry ([411d459](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/411d459338289cae7dce8cddbe7c78dae3d4f449))
+* interrupt idle worker waits during shutdown ([a31a2e2](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/a31a2e25e2666989ee226c0d7884e23f50fe58da))
+* retain revocations for tokens without expiry ([662516a](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/662516a5ad2a0aadd87dfff3fba4f2456e88a69d))
+* **setup:** refresh usage state after accepting consent ([a5f7b38](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/a5f7b38e02f20e66047431c5cb04e6f34c60c689))
+* **setup:** require the full usage reporting disclosure ([9168bdd](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/9168bdd5048b4419db7b0f4444375f54c06f5bbb))
+* **usage:** cap the update-prompt modal height so it scrolls on short viewports ([c61a6b0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/c61a6b089e56beec1de5c106440764518f507012))
+* **usage:** classify prompt acknowledgement in privacy coverage ([fb2f833](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/fb2f8333dca79b9cada9f349671920e34db38d5d))
+* **usage:** preserve consent choices and make the prompt accessible ([9a437ee](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/9a437ee9e19f6ecb8bff8747de71d3a9527d9512))
+* **usage:** synchronize setup consent and dismissal state ([77b4aab](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/77b4aab61a54d92b46fdc93fce5a075e3dc1d794))
+
+## [3.130.2-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.130.1-beta.0...v3.130.2-beta.0) (2026-09-08)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* enforce gallery access and consolidate gallery workflows ([#1357](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1357)) ([f0e6d2d](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/f0e6d2dfb12460cb1d003802f346e2026fa1c016))
+
+## [3.130.1-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.130.0-beta.0...v3.130.1-beta.0) (2026-09-08)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **images:** probe and clean up preview tiers under the extension the encoder actually wrote ([#1355](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1355)) ([acb25a9](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/acb25a9a1ce9887e51ff769d98f65379a5a1b803))
+* **images:** single-flight lazy rendition generation and keep the old rendition during replacement ([#1350](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1350)) ([c97341e](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/c97341e4547257aab57fb746bad4203a1adaf560))
+
+
+### Documentation
+
+* define security support across stable and main ([#1351](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1351)) ([0e459b3](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/0e459b3293ce9132ee8bb8324c6e76692e580cc5))
+* refresh repository support and community links ([#1349](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1349)) ([f83cbe9](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/f83cbe9109c5c7b25a0b50e0f0e3244d32421e7e))
+
 ## [3.130.0-beta.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.129.0-beta.0...v3.130.0-beta.0) (2026-09-07)


@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Unsure where to begin? You can start by looking through these issues:

 ### Prerequisites

- Node.js 18+
+- Node.js 22.12.0 or later (matches `backend/package.json`)
 - Docker & Docker Compose
 - Git

@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ Full documentation lives at **[docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app)** —
 | 🧾 CRM & Accounting | [docs.picpeak.app/features/crm](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm) · [disclaimers](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm/disclaimers) |
 | 🗺️ Roadmap | [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) |

-**Project meta:** [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) · [License](LICENSE) · [Security](SECURITY.md) · [Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)
+**Project meta:** [Support](SUPPORT.md) · [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) · [License](LICENSE) · [Security](SECURITY.md) · [Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)

 ## 📊 Comparison with Alternatives

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Getting help with PicPeak
+
+## Documentation
+
+Start with [docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app) for installation,
+configuration, gallery features and administration guides.
+
+- [Getting started](https://docs.picpeak.app/getting-started)
+- [Deployment](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment)
+- [Admin settings](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/admin-settings)
+- [Release channels](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/release-channels)
+
+## Questions and troubleshooting
+
+Use [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/discussions) for
+setup questions, troubleshooting and advice from the community. Include your
+PicPeak version, deployment method and what you have already tried.
+
+## Bugs and feature requests
+
+Search [existing issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) first, then
+[choose an issue template](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new/choose)
+to report a bug, suggest a feature or identify a documentation problem.
+
+For bugs, include the exact version, reproduction steps and relevant logs.
+See [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) for development and pull request guidance.
+
+## Security vulnerabilities
+
+Follow the [security policy](SECURITY.md) and use
+[private vulnerability reporting](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/security/advisories/new)
+or email **info@picpeak.app**. Do not report vulnerabilities in public issues
+or discussions.
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ const express = require('express');
 const request = require('supertest');

 describe('admin thumbnail regeneration (#1129)', () => {
-  let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let app; let imageProcessor; let storage;
+  let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let app; let imageProcessor; let storage; let logInfo;

  beforeAll(async () => {
    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-'));
@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ describe('admin thumbnail regeneration (#1129)', () => {
      deletePreviewTiers: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
    }));

+    // Same module registry as the route, so the spy sees its calls. The
+    // completion line is what drain() below waits for.
+    logInfo = jest.spyOn(require('../../src/utils/logger'), 'info');
+
    // bootCrmDb, not run-migrations: the latter calls process.exit(0) on
    // success, which ends the jest worker mid-suite.
    ({ db, cleanup } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
@@ -94,8 +98,20 @@ describe('admin thumbnail regeneration (#1129)', () => {
    return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
  }

-  /** The work runs in setImmediate; give it room to finish. */
-  const drain = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 150));
+  /**
+   * The work runs in setImmediate, after the response. Wait for the loop's
+   * "regeneration complete" log line rather than a fixed 150 ms: under a
+   * loaded machine (fifteen suites in parallel, each booting a migrated
+   * SQLite) the loop occasionally took longer than that, and the assertions
+   * then ran against a half-finished mock call list.
+   */
+  const drain = async () => {
+    const deadline = Date.now() + 10000;
+    const done = () => logInfo.mock.calls.some((c) => /regeneration complete/.test(String(c[0])));
+    while (!done() && Date.now() < deadline) {
+      await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 10));
+    }
+  };

  it('rebuilds the canonical thumbnail for an external photo instead of erroring', async () => {
    const eventId = await seedEvent();
@@ -129,8 +129,15 @@ describe('preview tiers (#1095)', () => {
    it('derives every non-default tier key for cleanup', () => {
      // Tiers live outside preview_path, so delete/archive/regenerate have no
      // other way to find them. 1920 is excluded because that IS preview_path.
+      // Two candidates per width — the encoder picks `.jpg` or `.webp` and the
+      // cleanup list cannot know which without probing the source.
      const keys = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys({ id: 5, path: 'e/a.jpg', source_origin: 'managed' });
-      expect(keys).toHaveLength(imageProcessor.PREVIEW_WIDTHS.length - 1);
+      const widths = imageProcessor.PREVIEW_WIDTHS.filter((w) => w !== 1920);
+      expect(keys).toHaveLength(widths.length * 2);
+      for (const w of widths) {
+        expect(keys).toContain(`previews/preview_w${w}_p5_a.jpg`);
+        expect(keys).toContain(`previews/preview_w${w}_p5_a.webp`);
+      }
      expect(keys.some((k) => k.includes('w1920'))).toBe(false);
      expect(keys.every((k) => k.includes('p5_'))).toBe(true);
    });
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ maybe('product usage on Postgres', () => {
    await require('../../migrations/core/204_product_usage_privacy_receipts').up(db);
    await require('../../migrations/core/205_product_usage_consent_version').up(db);
    await require('../../migrations/core/206_product_usage_delivery_backoff').up(db);
+    await require('../../migrations/core/212_product_usage_prompt_shown').up(db);

    await db.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
      t.string('setting_key').primary(); t.text('setting_value'); t.string('setting_type');
@@ -120,6 +121,24 @@ maybe('product usage on Postgres', () => {
    // back as a STRING — the tick() gate compares it against a number.
    expect(cols.attempts).toBeDefined();
    expect(cols.next_attempt_at).toBeDefined();
+    expect(cols.prompt_shown).toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it('backfills the prompt for existing participation using PostgreSQL booleans', async () => {
+    const migration = require('../../migrations/core/212_product_usage_prompt_shown');
+    await migration.down(db);
+    await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({ status: 'active', consent_version: 'usage-consent.v2' });
+    await migration.up(db);
+    await migration.up(db);
+    expect(await service().status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'active', prompt_shown: true, consent_version: 'usage-consent.v2' });
+    await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({ status: 'disabled' });
+    expect(await service().status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: true });
+  });
+
+  it('persists a fresh installation declining without opting in on PostgreSQL', async () => {
+    expect(await service().status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: false });
+    await service().markPromptShown();
+    expect(await service().status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: true, notice_dismissed: false });
  });

  it('reruns the backoff migration safely', async () => {
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+const knex = require('knex');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+const { randomUUID } = require('crypto');
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/211_revocations_without_expiry');
+
+for (const client of ['sqlite3', 'pg']) {
+  const enabled = client !== 'pg' || process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
+  (enabled ? describe : describe.skip)(`token revocation expiry (${client})`, () => {
+    let db, owner, schema, revocation;
+    const sign = claims => jwt.sign({ id: 1, type: 'admin', jti: randomUUID(), ...claims }, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      if (client === 'pg') {
+        schema = `revocation_${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`;
+        owner = knex({ client, connection: process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL });
+        await owner.schema.createSchema(schema);
+        db = knex({ client, connection: process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL, searchPath: [schema] });
+      } else {
+        db = knex({ client, connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
+      }
+      // Exercise the upgrade from the real legacy NOT NULL schema as well as
+      // repeated migration runs, without sharing another test's database.
+      await require('../../migrations/legacy/017_add_token_revocation_tables').up(db);
+      await db('revoked_tokens').insert({ token_id: 'existing', expires_at: '2099-01-01T00:00:00.000Z' });
+      await migration.up(db);
+      await migration.up(db);
+      jest.resetModules();
+      jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db }));
+      revocation = require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation');
+    });
+
+    afterAll(async () => {
+      await db?.destroy();
+      if (owner) { await owner.schema.dropSchema(schema, true); await owner.destroy(); }
+      jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
+    });
+
+    it('preserves existing revocations and their unique key during upgrade', async () => {
+      expect(await db('revoked_tokens').where({ token_id: 'existing' }).first()).toBeTruthy();
+      await expect(db('revoked_tokens').insert({ token_id: 'existing', expires_at: null })).rejects.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it.each([true, false])('permanently revokes a token without exp (jti: %s)', async withJti => {
+      const token = sign(withJti ? {} : { jti: undefined });
+      const payload = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(payload)).toBe(false);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(token, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(token, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      await revocation.cleanupExpiredRevocations();
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(payload)).toBe(true);
+      const rows = await db('revoked_tokens').where({ token_id: revocation.buildTokenId(payload) });
+      expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(rows[0].expires_at).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('cleans up expired revocations and retains future ones', async () => {
+      const expired = sign({ exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60 });
+      const future = sign({ exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600 });
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(expired, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(future, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      await revocation.cleanupExpiredRevocations();
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(expired))).toBe(false);
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(future))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it.each([true, false])('upgrades an expiring entry with the same key permanently (jti: %s)', async withJti => {
+      const claims = { id: 99, iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000), jti: withJti ? randomUUID() : undefined };
+      const expiring = sign({ ...claims, exp: claims.iat - 60 });
+      const permanent = sign(claims);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(expiring, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(permanent, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(expiring, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      await revocation.cleanupExpiredRevocations();
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(permanent))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('retains a signed token whose numeric expiry cannot fit a database timestamp', async () => {
+      const token = sign({ exp: 1e100 });
+      expect(await revocation.revokeToken(token, 'logout')).toBe(true);
+      await revocation.cleanupExpiredRevocations();
+      expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(token))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('refuses a rollback that would remove permanent revocations', async () => {
+      await expect(migration.down(db)).rejects.toThrow('permanent token revocations');
+      expect((await db('revoked_tokens').columnInfo('expires_at')).nullable).toBe(true);
+      // A rollback with only expiring records remains supported and reversible.
+      await db('revoked_tokens').whereNull('expires_at').delete();
+      await migration.down(db);
+      await migration.down(db);
+      expect((await db('revoked_tokens').columnInfo('expires_at')).nullable).toBe(false);
+      await migration.up(db);
+      expect(await db('revoked_tokens').where({ token_id: 'existing' }).first()).toBeTruthy();
+    });
+  });
+}
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ process.env.WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS = 'true';
 process.env.WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_INTERVAL_MS = '50';

 const http = require('http');
-const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
-const webhookService = require('../../src/services/webhookService');
-const { __test, startWebhookDeliveryWorker, stopWebhookDeliveryWorker } = require('../../src/services/webhookDeliveryWorker');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+let db, cleanup, adminId;
+let webhookService;
+let __test, startWebhookDeliveryWorker, stopWebhookDeliveryWorker;

 // Local-only test stub: matches what dev/webhook-receiver/server.js does
 // in the docker-compose flow but spun up inside the Jest process so the
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ async function insertWebhook(url, events = ['event.published'], extras = {}) {
    secret_preview: preview,
    events: JSON.stringify(events),
    active: extras.active !== false,
-    created_by: 1,
+    created_by: adminId,
  }).returning('id');
  const id = insert[0]?.id || insert[0];
  return { id, secret: plaintext };
@@ -56,16 +57,15 @@ async function clearWebhooks() {

 describe('webhook delivery worker (#327)', () => {
  beforeAll(async () => {
-    // Schema is expected to already be applied by `npm run migrate`. We
-    // just verify the webhooks tables exist; if not, the test harness has
-    // missed running migration 082.
-    const ok = await db.schema.hasTable('webhooks');
-    if (!ok) throw new Error('webhooks table missing — run `npm run migrate` first');
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    webhookService = require('../../src/services/webhookService');
+    ({ __test, startWebhookDeliveryWorker, stopWebhookDeliveryWorker } = require('../../src/services/webhookDeliveryWorker'));
  }, 30000);

  afterAll(async () => {
-    stopWebhookDeliveryWorker();
-    await db.destroy();
+    await stopWebhookDeliveryWorker();
+    await cleanup();
  });

  beforeEach(async () => {
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const fake = { maintenance: 'true', revoked: false, beforeCutoff: false, admin:
 jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
  const db = jest.fn((table) => {
    const q = {
+      leftJoin: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
      where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
      select: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
      first: jest.fn(async () => {
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
          return { setting_key: 'general_maintenance_mode', setting_value: fake.maintenance };
        }
        if (table === 'admin_users') return fake.admin;
+        if (table === 'events') return { id: 1, slug: 'preview', created_by: 1, is_active: 1 };
        return null;
      }),
    };
@@ -34,6 +36,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
  });
  return { db, withRetry: (fn) => fn() };
 });
+jest.mock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({ userHasAllPermissions: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true) }));
 jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() }));
 jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn(async () => fake.revoked) }));
 jest.mock('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff', () => ({ isTokenBeforeCutoff: jest.fn(async () => fake.beforeCutoff) }));
@@ -75,7 +78,7 @@ describe('general rate limiter skip', () => {
 });

 describe('admin preview requires a live admin session', () => {
-  const req = (token) => ({ query: { admin_preview: '1' }, cookies: { admin_token: token }, headers: {} });
+  const req = (token) => ({ params: { slug: 'preview' }, query: { admin_preview: '1' }, cookies: { admin_token: token }, headers: {} });
  beforeEach(() => { fake.revoked = false; fake.beforeCutoff = false; fake.admin = { id: 1, password_changed_at: null }; });

  it('passes for a live session and sets req.isAdminPreview', async () => {
@@ -108,13 +111,23 @@ describe('multipart origin gate', () => {
  const req = (headers) => ({ headers: { host: 'photos.example.com', ...headers } });
  it('accepts same-origin, same-site and non-browser requests', () => {
    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' }))).toBe(true);
-    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-site' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-site' }))).toBe(false);
    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'none' }))).toBe(true);
    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({}))).toBe(true);
    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'https://photos.example.com' }))).toBe(true);
    // Same-origin install without FRONTEND_URL: Origin matches the Host.
    expect(multipartOriginAllowed({ headers: { host: 'gallery.local', origin: 'http://gallery.local' } })).toBe(true);
  });
+  it('trusts Fetch Metadata same-origin before the Origin/scheme comparison', () => {
+    // TLS terminated upstream without X-Forwarded-Proto: req.protocol is http
+    // while the browser's Origin is https. Login must still work.
+    // gallery.local is not in the configured allowlist, so only the Host/scheme
+    // comparison or Fetch Metadata can admit it.
+    const proxied = { protocol: 'http', headers: { host: 'gallery.local', origin: 'https://gallery.local', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' } };
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(proxied)).toBe(true);
+    const legacyBrowser = { protocol: 'http', headers: { host: 'gallery.local', origin: 'https://gallery.local' } };
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(legacyBrowser)).toBe(false);
+  });
  it('rejects cross-site form posts', () => {
    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' }))).toBe(false);
    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'https://evil.example' }))).toBe(false);
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+const knex = require('knex');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+const { UsageService } = require('../../src/usage/UsageService');
+const { generateIdentity, digest, canonical } = require('../../src/usage/protocol.cjs');
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/212_product_usage_prompt_shown');
+
+let db;
+let directory;
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
+  directory = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-prompt-test-'));
+  for (const name of [
+    '201_product_usage', '202_product_usage_cancel_requested', '203_product_usage_cancel_seq',
+    '204_product_usage_privacy_receipts', '205_product_usage_consent_version', '206_product_usage_delivery_backoff'
+  ]) await require(`../../migrations/core/${name}`).up(db);
+});
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await db.destroy();
+  fs.rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+});
+
+test.each(['active', 'activation_pending', 'deletion_pending', 'identity_conflict'])(
+  'preserves an existing %s participation without altering its consent or pending packet', async (status) => {
+    await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
+      status, consent_version: 'usage-consent.v2', pending_packet: 'retained-packet',
+    });
+    await migration.up(db);
+    await migration.up(db);
+    const state = await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).first();
+    expect(state).toMatchObject({ status, consent_version: 'usage-consent.v2', pending_packet: 'retained-packet', prompt_shown: 1 });
+  }
+);
+
+test('a previously participating installation stays acknowledged after a confirmed withdrawal', async () => {
+  const actions = [];
+  const service = new UsageService(db, {
+    secret: 'test-only-prompt-encryption-secret-32-characters',
+    endpoint: 'https://collector.example.test',
+    bindingPath: path.join(directory, 'instance.key'),
+    fetch: async (_url, init) => {
+      const { packet } = JSON.parse(init.body);
+      actions.push(packet.action);
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+        packet_id: packet.packet_id, installation_id: packet.installation_id,
+        packet_digest: digest(canonical(packet)), action: packet.action,
+        sequence: packet.sequence, status: 'deleted',
+      }));
+    },
+  });
+  const identity = generateIdentity();
+  await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
+    status: 'active', notice_dismissed: 1, consent_version: 'usage-consent.v5', sequence: 1,
+    installation_id: identity.installation_id, public_key: identity.public_key,
+    private_key_encrypted: service.encrypt(identity.private_key), instance_binding: await service.binding(true),
+  });
+  await migration.up(db);
+  const state = await service.disable();
+  expect(actions).toEqual(['delete']);
+  expect(state).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: true, installation_id: null });
+  expect(state.privacy_receipts.last_deletion.status).toBe('collector-confirmed');
+});
+
+test('a fresh installation can decline once without changing consent or the separate banner', async () => {
+  await migration.up(db);
+  const fetch = jest.fn();
+  const service = new UsageService(db, { fetch });
+  expect(await service.status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: false, notice_dismissed: false });
+  await service.markPromptShown();
+  await migration.up(db);
+  expect(await service.status()).toMatchObject({ status: 'disabled', prompt_shown: true, notice_dismissed: false });
+  expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});
+
+test('migration guards tolerate a missing table', async () => {
+  await db.schema.dropTable('product_usage_state');
+  await expect(migration.up(db)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  await expect(migration.down(db)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+const knex = require('knex');
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/210_events_updated_at');
+const { toTimestamp } = require('../../src/utils/dateNormalize');
+const { randomUUID } = require('crypto');
+
+const engines = [['sqlite', null], ...(process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL ? [['pg', process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL]] : [])];
+describe.each(engines)('event timestamp migration contract (%s)', (engine, connection) => {
+  let db, owner, schema;
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    if (engine === 'pg') {
+      schema = `event_contract_${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`;
+      owner = knex({ client: 'pg', connection });
+      await owner.schema.createSchema(schema);
+      db = knex({ client: 'pg', connection, searchPath: [schema] });
+    } else db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
+  });
+  afterEach(async () => {
+    await db.destroy();
+    if (owner) { await owner.schema.dropSchema(schema, true); await owner.destroy(); }
+  });
+  it('upgrades legacy data, is repeatable and preserves subsequent edits', async () => {
+    await db.schema.createTable('events', table => {
+      table.increments('id'); table.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(db.fn.now()); table.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
+    });
+    const created = '2026-01-02T03:04:05.000Z';
+    await db('events').insert({ created_at: created });
+    await migration.up(db); await migration.up(db);
+    let row = await db('events').first();
+    expect(toTimestamp(row.updated_at)).toBe(Date.parse(created));
+    await db('events').where({ id: row.id }).update({ updated_at: db.fn.now(), is_active: engine === 'pg' ? false : 0 });
+    const changed = (await db('events').first()).updated_at;
+    await migration.up(db); row = await db('events').first();
+    expect(toTimestamp(row.updated_at)).toBe(toTimestamp(changed)); expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.is_active);
+  });
+  it('handles a fresh table and an already present updated_at column', async () => {
+    await db.schema.createTable('events', table => { table.increments('id'); table.timestamp('created_at'); table.timestamp('updated_at'); });
+    await migration.up(db);
+    expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'updated_at')).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+const knex = require('knex');
+const { randomUUID } = require('crypto');
+const fs = require('fs/promises');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const pgUrl = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
+(pgUrl ? describe : describe.skip)('fresh PostgreSQL gallery contract', () => {
+  let owner, db, schema, tmpDir, cleanup, previousClient;
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    schema = `fresh_gallery_${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`;
+    owner = knex({ client: 'pg', connection: pgUrl });
+    await owner.schema.createSchema(schema);
+    previousClient = process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT;
+    process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT = 'pg';
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'fresh-pg-gallery-test-secret-at-least-32-characters';
+    tmpDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-fresh-pg-'));
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg', connection: pgUrl, searchPath: [schema] }));
+    ({ db } = require('../../src/database/db'));
+    // bootCrmDb runs the complete core chain against the shared db singleton.
+    ({ cleanup } = await require('../integration/helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+  }, 120000);
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await require('../../src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices();
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup(); else if (db) await db.destroy();
+    if (owner) { await owner.schema.dropSchema(schema, true); await owner.destroy(); }
+    if (tmpDir) await fs.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    if (previousClient === undefined) delete process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT; else process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT = previousClient;
+    jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
+  });
+  it('creates through the real admin route, then toggles a typed boolean and timestamp', async () => {
+    const { seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+    const { adminId } = await seedMinimal(db);
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+    const app = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    const bearer = `Bearer ${mintAdminToken(adminId)}`;
+    const created = await request(app).post('/api/admin/events').set('Authorization', bearer).send({
+      event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Fresh PostgreSQL', event_date: '2026-10-01',
+      customer_name: 'Customer', customer_email: 'customer@example.test', admin_email: 'admin@example.test',
+      password: 'Strong-Test-Photo-Pass-924!', expiration_days: 30, feedback_enabled: true,
+    });
+    expect(created.status).toBe(200);
+    const event = await db('events').where({ event_name: 'Fresh PostgreSQL' }).first();
+    expect(event.created_by).toBe(adminId);
+    expect(event.is_active).toBe(true);
+    expect(event.updated_at).toBeInstanceOf(Date);
+    expect(await db('event_feedback_settings').where({ event_id: event.id }).first()).toBeTruthy();
+    const toggled = await request(app).post(`/api/admin/events/${event.id}/toggle-status`).set('Authorization', bearer).send({});
+    expect(toggled.status).toBe(200);
+    const row = await db('events').where({ id: event.id }).first();
+    expect(row.is_active).toBe(false);
+    expect(row.updated_at).toBeInstanceOf(Date);
+    await require('../../migrations/core/210_events_updated_at').up(db);
+    expect((await db('events').where({ id: event.id }).first()).updated_at).toEqual(row.updated_at);
+  });
+});
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/productUsageService', () =>
      'tick',
      'status',
      'dismiss',
+      'markPromptShown',
      'enable',
      'disable',
      'abandon',
@@ -129,6 +130,7 @@ const ROUTES = [
  ['post', '/abandon'],
  ['post', '/retry'],
  ['post', '/dismiss'],
+  ['post', '/prompt-seen'],
  ['get', '/preview'],
  ['get', '/export'],
  ['put', '/feedback-preferences'],
@@ -178,6 +180,15 @@ test('owner sees no-store status and supplies consent to the service', async ()
    .expect(200);
  expect(service.enable).toHaveBeenCalledWith('usage-consent.v1');
 });
+test('only a settings editor can acknowledge the prompt without opting in', async () => {
+  await request(app)
+    .post('/api/admin/usage/prompt-seen')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token('admin')}`)
+    .expect('Cache-Control', 'no-store')
+    .expect(200);
+  expect(service.markPromptShown).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  expect(service.enable).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});
 test('public/gallery paths and failed/unauthenticated admin operations never set feature markers', async () => {
  const { EventEmitter } = require('events');
  const simulate = (path, admin, statusCode) => {
@@ -1,460 +1,82 @@
-/**
- * Regression test for the /admin/login → /admin/dashboard → /admin/login
- * redirect loop reported on v3.32.4-beta.0.
- *
- * Cause: GET /auth/session was less strict than the adminAuth middleware.
- * The session endpoint accepted tokens that the protected endpoints
- * subsequently rejected with 401, which the frontend's interceptor
- * translated into a hard redirect to /admin/login. /auth/session then
- * said "valid: true" again on the next page load and the cycle closed.
- *
- * /auth/session must reject the same admin tokens adminAuth would
- * reject, specifically: deactivated admin user, deleted admin user,
- * password changed since iat. Same for gallery: archived event.
- */
-
-const express = require('express');
+/** Session restoration uses the same live policy as protected routes. */
 const request = require('supertest');
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
-
-process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'session-symmetry-test-secret';
-
-const fakeDb = {
-  adminUsers: [],
-  events: [],
-  revokedTokens: [],
-};
-
-jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
-  const formatBoolean = (v) => (v ? 1 : 0);
-  void formatBoolean;
-  function dbFn(table) {
-    if (table === 'admin_users') {
-      let rowFilter = () => true;
-      return {
-        // The session route joins roles for the adminUser payload (#798);
-        // fake rows carry no role fields, so the join is a pass-through.
-        leftJoin() {
-          return this;
-        },
-        where(criteria) {
-          rowFilter = (row) => {
-            return Object.entries(criteria).every(([rawKey, v]) => {
-              // Joined queries prefix columns ('admin_users.id') — the fake
-              // rows use bare names.
-              const k = rawKey.replace(/^admin_users\./, '');
-              if (k === 'is_active') return Boolean(row.is_active) === Boolean(v);
-              return row[k] === v;
-            });
-          };
-          return this;
-        },
-        select(...cols) {
-          this._cols = cols;
-          return this;
-        },
-        async first() {
-          const row = fakeDb.adminUsers.find(rowFilter);
-          if (!row) return undefined;
-          if (!this._cols) return row;
-          const out = {};
-          for (const c of this._cols) {
-            // Support 'table.col' and 'table.col as alias' shapes.
-            const [source, alias] = c.split(/\s+as\s+/i);
-            const bare = source.includes('.') ? source.split('.').pop() : source;
-            out[alias || bare] = row[bare];
-          }
-          return out;
-        },
-      };
-    }
-    if (table === 'events') {
-      let rowFilter = () => true;
-      return {
-        where(criteria) {
-          rowFilter = (row) =>
-            Object.entries(criteria).every(([k, v]) => {
-              if (k === 'is_active') return Boolean(row.is_active) === Boolean(v);
-              if (k === 'is_archived') return Boolean(row.is_archived) === Boolean(v);
-              return row[k] === v;
-            });
-          return this;
-        },
-        async first() {
-          return fakeDb.events.find(rowFilter);
-        },
-      };
-    }
-    throw new Error(`Unexpected table: ${table}`);
-  }
-  return { db: dbFn, formatBoolean: () => 1 };
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'session-symmetry-test-secret-with-at-least-32-characters';
+let db, cleanup, app, adminId, customerId, eventId, cutoff;
+const slug = 'session-symmetry';
+const sign = (claims = {}) => jwt.sign({ type: 'admin', id: adminId, username: 'tester',
+  iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60, jti: crypto.randomUUID(), ...claims },
+process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth', expiresIn: '4h' });
+const gallery = (claims = {}) => sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId, eventSlug: slug, ...claims });
+const session = bearer => request(app).get(`/api/auth/session?slug=${slug}`).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${bearer}`);
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  ({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+  await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+  const row = await require('../../src/services/eventCreationService').createEvent({
+    event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Session symmetry', event_date: '2026-10-01',
+    slug, password: 'Session-Strong-Password-924!', expiration_days: 30,
+    customer_email: 'customer@example.test', admin_email: 'admin@example.test',
+  }, { actor: { id: adminId }, source: 'v1' });
+  eventId = row.id;
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ slug });
+  await db('event_customer_assignments').insert({ event_id: eventId, customer_account_id: customerId });
+  cutoff = require('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff');
+  app = buildRouteApp('/api/auth', require('../../src/routes/auth'));
+}, 120000);
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ is_active: 1, password_changed_at: null });
+  await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: customerId }).update({ is_active: 1, password_changed_at: null });
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000).toISOString() });
+  await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(0);
 });
-
-jest.mock('../../src/utils/dbCompat', () => ({
-  formatBoolean: (v) => (v ? 1 : 0),
-}));
-
-jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({
-  isTokenRevoked: jest.fn(async (decoded) => fakeDb.revokedTokens.includes(decoded.id)),
-  revokeToken: jest.fn(),
-}));
-
-jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenUtils', () => ({
-  getAdminTokenFromRequest: (req) => {
-    const auth = req.headers.authorization;
-    if (auth && auth.startsWith('Bearer ')) return auth.slice(7);
-    return null;
-  },
-  getGalleryTokenFromRequest: () => null,
-  setAdminAuthCookie: jest.fn(),
-  setGalleryAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
-  clearAdminAuthCookie: jest.fn(),
-  clearGalleryAuthCookies: jest.fn(),
-  buildCookieOptionsWithExpiry: () => ({}),
-}));
-
-jest.mock('../../src/services/recaptcha', () => ({ verifyRecaptcha: () => Promise.resolve(true) }));
-// Mock sessionTimeout's isSessionExpired so each test controls the return.
-// Default: not expired (so existing tests keep passing without setup).
-jest.mock('../../src/middleware/sessionTimeout', () => ({
-  endSession: jest.fn(),
-  isSessionExpired: jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve(false)),
-}));
-jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
-  info: jest.fn(),
-  warn: jest.fn(),
-  error: jest.fn(),
-  debug: jest.fn(),
-}));
-
-const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
-
-function makeApp() {
-  const app = express();
-  app.use(express.json());
-  app.use('/auth', authRouter);
-  return app;
-}
-
-function signAdminToken({ id = 1, username = 'admin', iat, exp }) {
-  const issuedAt = iat ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
-  // Note: do NOT pass noTimestamp:true here — that strips iat from the
-  // payload entirely, defeating the password-change comparison. Provide
-  // iat (and exp) via the payload directly instead.
-  return jwt.sign(
-    { id, username, type: 'admin', iat: issuedAt, exp: exp ?? issuedAt + 3600 },
-    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
-    { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
-  );
-}
-
-function signGalleryToken({ eventId = 100, eventSlug = 'wedding', ...extra } = {}) {
-  return jwt.sign(
-    { eventId, eventSlug, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
-    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
-    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
-  );
-}
-
-describe('GET /auth/session — symmetry with protected middleware', () => {
-  beforeEach(() => {
-    fakeDb.adminUsers = [];
-    fakeDb.events = [];
-    fakeDb.revokedTokens = [];
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:true for an active admin token', async () => {
-    fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-      id: 1,
-      username: 'admin',
-      email: 'a@b.com',
-      is_active: true,
-      password_changed_at: null,
-    });
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-    expect(res.body.type).toBe('admin');
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false when the admin user has been deactivated', async () => {
-    fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-      id: 1,
-      username: 'admin',
-      email: 'a@b.com',
-      is_active: false,
-      password_changed_at: null,
-    });
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false when the admin user no longer exists', async () => {
-    // adminUsers is empty
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 999 });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false when password was changed after the token was issued', async () => {
-    // iat must be in the past, exp must be in the future so jwt.verify
-    // doesn't reject the token before /auth/session even gets to look
-    // at password_changed_at.
-    const tokenIssuedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60; // 1 min ago
-    const tokenExp = tokenIssuedAt + 86400;
-    fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-      id: 1,
-      username: 'admin',
-      email: 'a@b.com',
-      is_active: true,
-      password_changed_at: new Date((tokenIssuedAt + 30) * 1000), // 30s after iat
-    });
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1, iat: tokenIssuedAt, exp: tokenExp });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:true when password was changed BEFORE the token was issued', async () => {
-    const tokenIssuedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60;
-    const tokenExp = tokenIssuedAt + 86400;
-    fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-      id: 1,
-      username: 'admin',
-      email: 'a@b.com',
-      is_active: true,
-      password_changed_at: new Date((tokenIssuedAt - 3600) * 1000), // 1h before iat
-    });
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1, iat: tokenIssuedAt, exp: tokenExp });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false for a gallery token whose event is archived', async () => {
-    fakeDb.events.push({
-      id: 100,
-      slug: 'wedding',
-      is_active: true,
-      is_archived: true,
-      expires_at: null,
-    });
-    const token = signGalleryToken();
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false for a gallery token whose event is expired', async () => {
-    fakeDb.events.push({
-      id: 100,
-      slug: 'wedding',
-      is_active: true,
-      is_archived: false,
-      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - 86400_000),
-    });
-    const token = signGalleryToken();
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:true for an active gallery token', async () => {
-    fakeDb.events.push({
-      id: 100,
-      slug: 'wedding',
-      is_active: true,
-      is_archived: false,
-      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400_000),
-    });
-    const token = signGalleryToken();
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  /**
-   * What KIND of gallery session this is (#1149).
-   *
-   * The frontend used to keep this in sessionStorage, which is per-TAB while
-   * the cookie is per-browser: a gallery reopened in a second tab lost
-   * 'client' even though the backend still served it as one, and the UI hid
-   * the only control that clears the privileged cookie. Reported from the
-   * token so a restored session knows what it actually is.
-   */
-  describe('gallery session kind', () => {
-    beforeEach(() => {
-      fakeDb.events.push({
-        id: 100,
-        slug: 'wedding',
-        is_active: true,
-        is_archived: false,
-        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400_000),
-      });
-    });
-
-    it('reports a PIN-client session as client', async () => {
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ accessLevel: 'client' })}`);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('client');
-      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
-    });
-
-    it('reports a customer-portal session, which looks like a guest', async () => {
-      // via:'customer' runs at accessLevel 'guest' but bypasses reveal mode,
-      // so it is a credential that does not look like one.
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ via: 'customer', customerId: 7 })}`);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
-      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(true);
-    });
-
-    it('reports a plain guest as neither', async () => {
-      // The flags have to discriminate, or they would just hand every visitor
-      // a Logout button back.
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken()}`);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
-      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('returns valid:false when the token is revoked', async () => {
-    fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-      id: 1,
-      username: 'admin',
-      is_active: true,
-      password_changed_at: null,
-    });
-    fakeDb.revokedTokens.push(1);
-    const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-    const res = await request(makeApp())
-      .get('/auth/session')
-      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
-    expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  // Session-timeout symmetry — issue #350 recurrence on v3.39.1-beta.0.
-  // sessionTimeoutMiddleware (mounted on /api/admin) rejects idle/old-iat
-  // tokens with 401 SESSION_TIMEOUT, but /auth/session previously didn't.
-  // The new isSessionExpired helper closes that asymmetry.
-  describe('session-timeout symmetry', () => {
-    const { isSessionExpired } = require('../../src/middleware/sessionTimeout');
-
-    beforeEach(() => {
-      isSessionExpired.mockReset();
-      // Default to "active session" so the other admin checks above also
-      // pass when this branch runs.
-      isSessionExpired.mockResolvedValue(false);
-    });
-
-    it('returns valid:false when isSessionExpired reports the token has timed out', async () => {
-      fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-        id: 1,
-        username: 'admin',
-        is_active: true,
-        password_changed_at: null,
-      });
-      isSessionExpired.mockResolvedValue(true);
-      const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
-      expect(res.body.error).toBe('Session expired');
-    });
-
-    it('returns valid:true for an active admin token (helper says not expired)', async () => {
-      fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-        id: 1,
-        username: 'admin',
-        is_active: true,
-        password_changed_at: null,
-      });
-      isSessionExpired.mockResolvedValue(false);
-      const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-      expect(isSessionExpired).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-    });
-
-    it('does not call isSessionExpired for gallery tokens', async () => {
-      fakeDb.events.push({
-        id: 100,
-        slug: 'wedding',
-        is_active: true,
-        is_archived: false,
-        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400_000),
-      });
-      const token = signGalleryToken();
-
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-      expect(isSessionExpired).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    });
-
-    it('falls through (treats as valid) if the helper itself throws', async () => {
-      // Defensive: the require() in auth.js is wrapped in try/catch so a
-      // missing/broken helper doesn't fail-closed during early bootstrap.
-      fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
-        id: 1,
-        username: 'admin',
-        is_active: true,
-        password_changed_at: null,
-      });
-      isSessionExpired.mockRejectedValue(new Error('boom'));
-      const token = signAdminToken({ id: 1 });
-
-      const res = await request(makeApp())
-        .get('/auth/session')
-        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
-      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
-    });
-  });
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await require('../../src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices();
+  if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+});
+it('hydrates an active admin and its role', async () => {
+  const res = await session(sign());
+  expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ valid: true, type: 'admin', adminUser: { id: adminId, role: { name: 'super_admin' } } });
+});
+it.each(['disabled', 'password', 'deleted', 'idle'])('rejects an admin after %s', async reason => {
+  let bearer = sign();
+  if (reason === 'disabled') await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
+  if (reason === 'password') await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ password_changed_at: new Date().toISOString() });
+  if (reason === 'deleted') bearer = sign({ id: 999999 });
+  if (reason === 'idle') bearer = sign({ iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 7200 });
+  expect((await session(bearer)).body.valid).toBe(false);
+});
+it('accepts a session issued after a previous password change', async () => {
+  await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ password_changed_at: new Date(Date.now() - 120000).toISOString() });
+  expect((await session(sign())).body.valid).toBe(true);
+});
+it.each(['archived', 'expired', 'draft', 'inactive'])('rejects a gallery that is %s', async reason => {
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({
+    ...(reason === 'archived' && { is_archived: 1 }), ...(reason === 'draft' && { is_draft: 1 }),
+    ...(reason === 'inactive' && { is_active: 0 }), ...(reason === 'expired' && { expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - 1000).toISOString() }),
+  });
+  expect((await session(gallery())).body.valid).toBe(false);
+});
+it.each(['guest', 'client', 'customer'])('restores the %s gallery session kind', async kind => {
+  const res = await session(gallery(kind === 'customer' ? { via: 'customer', customerId } : { accessLevel: kind }));
+  expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ valid: true, accessLevel: kind === 'client' ? 'client' : 'guest', viaCustomer: kind === 'customer' });
+});
+it.each(['revoked', 'restore'])('invalidates both admin and gallery sessions after %s', async reason => {
+  const tokens = [sign(), gallery()];
+  if (reason === 'restore') await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
+  else for (const bearer of tokens) await require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation').revokeToken(bearer, 'test');
+  for (const bearer of tokens) expect((await session(bearer)).body.valid).toBe(false);
+});
+it('refuses a deactivated customer gallery session', async () => {
+  const bearer = gallery({ via: 'customer', customerId });
+  expect((await session(bearer)).body.valid).toBe(true);
+  await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: customerId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
+  expect((await session(bearer)).body.valid).toBe(false);
+});
+it('refuses an unrelated JWT type', async () => {
+  const res = await session(sign({ type: 'password-reset' }));
+  expect(res.status).toBe(403); expect(res.body.valid).toBe(false);
 });
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * PUT /api/admin/database-backup/config must reject a
+ * database_backup_destination_path that resolves inside a publicly served
+ * directory (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm class, #1365).
+ *
+ * Before #1365, database_backup_destination_path was silently ignored by
+ * databaseBackupService.backup() (a destructuring bug always fell back to
+ * the hardcoded /backup/database), so this setting being freely writable by
+ * any backup.create holder — the built-in `admin` role has it without
+ * settings.edit or backup.restore — was harmless. Making the setting
+ * actually take effect reopens the exact exfiltration path GHSA-jw8m fixed
+ * for the per-request override, through the persisted setting instead.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-config-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dbbackup-config-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('database backup destination-path config guard (GHSA-jw8m class, #1365)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminToken;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'limited-admin',
+      email: 'limited-admin-config@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id, username: 'limited-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/database-backup', require('../../src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('rejects a destination inside the public uploads/logos mount', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'uploads', 'logos') });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+
+    // The seeded default must survive untouched — the rejected value never lands.
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_destination_path' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe('/backup/database');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a destination inside the public fonts mount', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'fonts') });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a destination outside any public mount', async () => {
+    const safePath = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'db-backups');
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_destination_path: safePath });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_destination_path' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(safePath);
+  });
+
+  // A retention of 0 or less pushes cleanupOldBackups' cutoff to today or
+  // the future, deleting every completed backup on the next scheduled run
+  // — a backup.create holder achieving what backup.delete gates on /cleanup.
+  it.each([-1, 0])('rejects database_backup_retention_days=%s', async (bad) => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_retention_days: bad });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a positive database_backup_retention_days', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .put('/api/admin/database-backup/config')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ database_backup_retention_days: 90 });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'database_backup_retention_days' }).first();
+    expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(90);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+/** Real routes + migrated SQLite: the same session policy protects lists and media. */
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const fs = require('fs/promises');
+const path = require('path');
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'gallery-policy-regression-secret-at-least-32-characters';
+
+jest.mock('../../src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware', () => ({
+  secureImageAccess: (req, _res, next) => {
+    req.clientInfo = { fingerprint: 'policy-test', ip: '127.0.0.1', userAgent: 'jest' };
+    next();
+  },
+  getSecurityStatus: (_req, res) => res.json({}),
+}));
+
+let db, cleanup, app, adminId, customerId, foreignId, event, secure, cutoff, revokeToken;
+const eventId = 70001, photoId = 70002, slug = 'policy-test';
+const token = (claims = {}) => jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId, eventSlug: slug,
+  iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60, jti: crypto.randomUUID(), ...claims },
+process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth', expiresIn: '1h' });
+const get = (url, bearer) => {
+  const req = request(app).get(url);
+  return bearer ? req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${bearer}`) : req;
+};
+const endpoints = [`/api/gallery/${slug}/photos`, `/api/gallery/${slug}/photo/${photoId}`,
+  `/api/gallery/${slug}/thumbnail/${photoId}`, `/api/gallery/${slug}/download/${photoId}`];
+const expectDirect = async (bearer, status, suffix = '') => {
+  for (const url of endpoints) expect((await get(url + suffix, bearer)).status).toBe(status);
+};
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  ({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+  await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+  const [row] = await db('admin_users').insert({ username: 'foreign', email: 'foreign@example.test', password_hash: 'unused', is_active: 1 }).returning('id');
+  foreignId = row.id ?? row;
+  await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'viewer');
+  await db('events').insert({ id: eventId, slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Policy test',
+    event_date: '2026-01-01', host_email: 'h@example.test', admin_email: 'a@example.test', password_hash: 'unused',
+    share_link: '/gallery/policy-test', created_by: adminId });
+  const file = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, `events/active/${slug}/individual/fixture.jpg`);
+  await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+  await require('sharp')({ create: { width: 8, height: 8, channels: 3, background: '#228844' } }).jpeg().toFile(file);
+  await db('photos').insert({ id: photoId, event_id: eventId, filename: 'fixture.jpg', path: `${slug}/individual/fixture.jpg`,
+    type: 'individual', mime_type: 'image/jpeg', processing_status: 'complete', size_bytes: (await fs.stat(file)).size });
+  await db('event_customer_assignments').insert({ event_id: eventId, customer_account_id: customerId });
+  secure = require('../../src/services/secureImageService');
+  jest.spyOn(secure, 'createClientFingerprint').mockReturnValue('policy-test');
+  cutoff = require('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff');
+  ({ revokeToken } = require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation'));
+  app = express(); app.use(express.json()); app.use(cookieParser());
+  app.use('/api', require('../../src/middleware/csrf'));
+  app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+  app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  app.use('/api/images', require('../../src/routes/protectedImages'));
+  app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
+}, 120000);
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, require_password: 1,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000).toISOString(), reveal_mode: 0 });
+  await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: customerId }).update({ is_active: 1, password_changed_at: null });
+  if (!await db('event_customer_assignments').where({ event_id: eventId, customer_account_id: customerId }).first()) {
+    await db('event_customer_assignments').insert({ event_id: eventId, customer_account_id: customerId });
+  }
+  await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(0);
+  event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+});
+afterAll(async () => { secure?.dispose(); if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+it('serves a valid session as a real list and JPEG', async () => {
+  const bearer = token();
+  const list = await get(endpoints[0], bearer);
+  expect(list.status).toBe(200);
+  expect(list.body.photos).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([expect.objectContaining({ id: photoId })]));
+  const image = await get(endpoints[1], bearer);
+  expect(image.status).toBe(200); expect(image.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/image\/jpeg/);
+  expect(image.body.length).toBeGreaterThan(100);
+});
+it('scopes draft previews to the owner and current read permissions', async () => {
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ is_draft: 1 });
+  await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(foreignId), 403, '?admin_preview=1');
+  await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(adminId), 200, '?admin_preview=1');
+  // Ownership alone does not grant a user without a role read access.
+  const role = (await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).first()).role_id;
+  await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ role_id: null });
+  try { await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(adminId), 403, '?admin_preview=1'); }
+  finally { await db('admin_users').where({ id: adminId }).update({ role_id: role }); }
+});
+it.each(['revocation', 'restore'])('rejects gallery sessions after %s', async (reason) => {
+  const bearer = token();
+  if (reason === 'revocation') expect(await revokeToken(bearer, 'test')).toBe(true);
+  else await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
+  await expectDirect(bearer, 401);
+});
+it.each(['deactivated', 'password changed'])('rejects an assigned customer when %s', async (reason) => {
+  const bearer = token({ via: 'customer', customerId });
+  await expectDirect(bearer, 200);
+  await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: customerId }).update(reason === 'deactivated'
+    ? { is_active: 0 } : { password_changed_at: new Date().toISOString() });
+  await expectDirect(bearer, 401);
+});
+it.each(['ISO', 'epoch'])('enforces expiry immediately for public and JWT access (%s)', async (format) => {
+  const expiry = Date.now() - 1000;
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ require_password: 0, expires_at: format === 'ISO' ? new Date(expiry).toISOString() : expiry });
+  await expectDirect(undefined, 404); await expectDirect(token(), 404);
+  await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(adminId), 200, '?admin_preview=1');
+});
+it.each(['revocation', 'restore', 'expiry', 'customer'])('rechecks signed and secure image grants after %s', async (reason) => {
+  const bearer = token(reason === 'customer' ? { via: 'customer', customerId } : {});
+  const signed = await request(app).post(`/api/images/${slug}/photo/${photoId}/generate-url`).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${bearer}`).send({});
+  expect(signed.status).toBe(200);
+  const minted = await request(app).post(`/api/secure-images/${slug}/generate-token`).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${bearer}`).send({ photoId });
+  expect(minted.status).toBe(200);
+  const secureUrl = `/api/secure-images/${slug}/secure/${photoId}/${minted.body.token}`;
+  expect((await get(signed.body.url)).status).toBe(200);
+  expect((await get(secureUrl)).status).toBe(200);
+  if (reason === 'revocation') await revokeToken(bearer, 'test');
+  if (reason === 'restore') await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
+  if (reason === 'expiry') await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - 1000).toISOString() });
+  if (reason === 'customer') await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: customerId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
+  const status = reason === 'expiry' ? 404 : 401;
+  expect((await get(signed.body.url)).status).toBe(status);
+  expect((await get(secureUrl)).status).toBe(status);
+});
+
+it('blocks an empty cross-site cookie POST before the reveal state changes', async () => {
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ reveal_mode: 1, revealed_at: null });
+  const cookie = `admin_token=${mintAdminToken(adminId)}`;
+  const url = `/api/admin/events/${eventId}/reveal`;
+  const blocked = await request(app).post(url).set('Cookie', cookie).set('Origin', 'https://attacker.example')
+    .set('Sec-Fetch-Site', 'cross-site').set('Content-Type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded').send('');
+  expect(blocked.status).toBe(403);
+  expect((await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first()).revealed_at).toBeNull();
+  process.env.ADMIN_URL = 'https://admin.example.test';
+  try {
+    const allowed = await request(app).post(url).set('Cookie', cookie).set('Origin', process.env.ADMIN_URL)
+      .set('Sec-Fetch-Site', 'cross-site').send({});
+    expect(allowed.status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first()).revealed_at).not.toBeNull();
+  } finally { delete process.env.ADMIN_URL; }
+});
+
+it('toggles status on a fully migrated fresh database and records updated_at', async () => {
+  const response = await request(app).post(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/toggle-status`)
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${mintAdminToken(adminId)}`).send({});
+  expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+  expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.is_active);
+  expect(Number.isFinite(require('../../src/utils/dateNormalize').toTimestamp(row.updated_at))).toBe(true);
+});
+it('paginates after feedback filtering, with a total independent of page size', async () => {
+  const ids = [70003, 70004, 70005];
+  await db('photos').insert(ids.map(id => ({ id, event_id: eventId, filename: `${id}.jpg`, path: 'unused',
+    type: 'individual', like_count: 1, processing_status: 'complete' })));
+  await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({ event_id: eventId, feedback_enabled: 1, show_feedback_to_guests: 1 });
+  try {
+    const bearer = token();
+    const first = await get(`${endpoints[0]}?filter=liked&limit=2&page=1&sort=filename&order=asc`, bearer);
+    const second = await get(`${endpoints[0]}?filter=liked&limit=2&page=2&sort=filename&order=asc`, bearer);
+    expect(first.status).toBe(200); expect(second.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(first.body.pagination).toMatchObject({ total: 3, has_more: true });
+    expect(second.body.pagination).toMatchObject({ total: 3, has_more: false });
+    expect([...first.body.photos, ...second.body.photos].map(photo => photo.id)).toEqual(ids);
+  } finally {
+    await db('photos').whereIn('id', ids).del();
+    await db('event_feedback_settings').where({ event_id: eventId }).del();
+  }
+});
+
+it.each(['assignment removed', 'anonymized'])('rejects an existing customer grant after %s', async reason => {
+  const bearer = token({ via: 'customer', customerId });
+  await expectDirect(bearer, 200);
+  if (reason === 'assignment removed') await db('event_customer_assignments').where({ event_id: eventId, customer_account_id: customerId }).del();
+  else await require('../../src/services/customerAccountsService').eraseCustomer(customerId, adminId);
+  await expectDirect(bearer, reason === 'assignment removed' ? 403 : 401);
+});
+it('denies foreign editors and allows the editor who owns the gallery', async () => {
+  await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'editor');
+  try {
+    await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(foreignId), 403, '?admin_preview=1');
+    await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ created_by: foreignId });
+    await expectDirect(mintAdminToken(foreignId), 200, '?admin_preview=1');
+  } finally {
+    await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ created_by: adminId });
+    await assignAdminRole(db, foreignId, 'viewer');
+  }
+});
+it('bounds a large gallery response while retaining the complete count', async () => {
+  const rows = Array.from({ length: 5000 }, (_, index) => ({ id: 80000 + index, event_id: eventId,
+    filename: `large-${index}.jpg`, path: 'unused', type: 'individual', processing_status: 'complete' }));
+  try {
+    await db.batchInsert('photos', rows, 100);
+    const response = await get(`${endpoints[0]}?limit=999999&page=1`, token());
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.body.photos).toHaveLength(250);
+    expect(response.body.pagination).toMatchObject({ total: 5001, limit: 250, has_more: true });
+  } finally { await db('photos').where('id', '>=', 80000).where({ event_id: eventId }).del(); }
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/**
+ * Gallery tokens must carry a per-token `jti`. tokenRevocation falls back to
+ * `${eventId}-${iat}-gallery` without one, so a guest logging out would revoke
+ * every other guest whose token was minted for the same event in the same
+ * second (QR-code share links at an event make that routine).
+ */
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const mintSites = [
+  'src/routes/auth.js',
+  'src/routes/customer.js',
+  'src/routes/gallery/slideshow.js',
+];
+
+describe('gallery token mint sites', () => {
+  it.each(mintSites)('%s sets a unique jti on every gallery token', (file) => {
+    const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../', file), 'utf8');
+    const payloads = source.split('jwt.sign(').slice(1)
+      .map((chunk) => chunk.split('process.env.JWT_SECRET')[0])
+      .filter((payload) => payload.includes("type: 'gallery'"));
+    expect(payloads.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    for (const payload of payloads) expect(payload).toContain('jti: crypto.randomUUID()');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('revocation key', () => {
+  beforeAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'jti-regression-secret-at-least-32-characters-long'; });
+  it('is distinct for two same-second gallery logins of the same event', () => {
+    const { buildTokenId } = require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation');
+    const crypto = require('crypto');
+    const iat = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+    const mint = () => jwt.decode(jwt.sign({ eventId: 7, type: 'gallery', iat, jti: crypto.randomUUID() }, process.env.JWT_SECRET));
+    expect(buildTokenId(mint())).not.toBe(buildTokenId(mint()));
+    // Without a jti the key collapses to eventId + login second.
+    const bare = jwt.decode(jwt.sign({ eventId: 7, type: 'gallery', iat }, process.env.JWT_SECRET));
+    expect(buildTokenId(bare)).toBe(buildTokenId({ ...bare }));
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+const request = require('supertest');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+const { randomUUID } = require('crypto');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+let db, cleanup, adminId, customerId, eventId, apps, revocation;
+const slug = 'logout-revocation';
+const cases = [
+  ['auth', '/logout', 'admin', 'admin_token'],
+  ['auth', '/gallery/logout', 'gallery', `gallery_token_${slug}`],
+  ['customerAuth', '/logout', 'customer', 'customer_token'],
+  ['adminAuth', '/logout', 'admin', 'admin_token'],
+];
+const sign = type => jwt.sign({
+  type, ...(type === 'admin' ? { id: adminId } : type === 'customer' ? { customerId } : { eventId, eventSlug: slug }),
+  jti: randomUUID(),
+}, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  ({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+  await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+  const event = await require('../../src/services/eventCreationService').createEvent({
+    event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Logout revocation', event_date: '2026-10-01',
+    slug, password: 'Logout-Strong-Password-924!', expiration_days: 30,
+    customer_email: 'customer@example.test', admin_email: 'admin@example.test',
+  }, { actor: { id: adminId }, source: 'v1' });
+  eventId = event.id;
+  await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).update({ slug });
+  revocation = require('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation');
+  apps = Object.fromEntries(['auth', 'adminAuth', 'customerAuth'].map(name => [
+    name, buildRouteApp('/', require(`../../src/routes/${name}`)),
+  ]));
+});
+afterEach(() => jest.restoreAllMocks());
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await require('../../src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices();
+  if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+});
+
+it.each(cases)('%s%s revokes a no-expiry %s cookie session', async (route, path, type, cookie) => {
+  const token = sign(type);
+  const sessionApp = type === 'customer' ? apps.customerAuth : apps.auth;
+  const sessionPath = type === 'gallery' ? `/session?slug=${slug}` : '/session';
+  const session = () => request(sessionApp).get(sessionPath).set('Cookie', `${cookie}=${token}`);
+  const before = await session();
+  expect(before.status).toBe(200);
+  if (type !== 'customer') expect(before.body.valid).toBe(true);
+
+  const res = await request(apps[route]).post(path).set('Cookie', `${cookie}=${token}`).send({ slug });
+  expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  expect(res.headers['set-cookie'].some(value => value.startsWith(`${cookie}=;`))).toBe(true);
+  await revocation.cleanupExpiredRevocations();
+  expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(token))).toBe(true);
+  const after = await session();
+  if (type === 'customer') expect(after.status).toBe(401);
+  else expect(after.body.valid).toBe(false);
+});
+
+it.each(cases)('%s%s reports failed persistence for %s logout and clears its cookie', async (route, path, type, cookie) => {
+  const token = sign(type);
+  const realQuery = db.client.query;
+  jest.spyOn(db.client, 'query').mockImplementation(function (connection, query) {
+    if (/^insert into [`"]revoked_tokens[`"]/.test(query.sql)) {
+      return Promise.reject(new Error('simulated revocation write failure'));
+    }
+    return realQuery.call(this, connection, query);
+  });
+  const res = await request(apps[route]).post(path).set('Cookie', `${cookie}=${token}`).send({ slug });
+  expect(res.status).toBe(500);
+  expect(res.body.error).toBeTruthy();
+  expect(res.body.message).not.toBe('Logged out successfully');
+  expect(res.headers['set-cookie'].some(value => value.startsWith(`${cookie}=;`))).toBe(true);
+  expect(await revocation.isTokenRevoked(jwt.decode(token))).toBe(false);
+});
@@ -25,14 +25,18 @@ process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
 fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
 process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'crm-route-test-secret';

+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
 const request = require('supertest');
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, createPublicToken, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
 const tokenGuards = require('../../src/utils/publicTokenGuards');
+const { errorHandler } = require('../../src/middleware/errorHandler');

 describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
  let db;
  let cleanup;
  let app;
+  let appWithErrorHandler;
  let customerId;
  let contractId;

@@ -51,6 +55,17 @@ describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
    contractId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];

    app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/contracts', require('../../src/routes/publicContracts'));
+
+    // A second app instance wired to the REAL production error handler
+    // (buildRouteApp's is a simplified stand-in that only reads
+    // err.statusCode/err.status, which a bare MulterError doesn't set).
+    // Used below to verify the actual 4xx contract end-to-end, not just
+    // that multer aborted the request.
+    appWithErrorHandler = express();
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(express.json());
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(cookieParser());
+    appWithErrorHandler.use('/api/public/contracts', require('../../src/routes/publicContracts'));
+    appWithErrorHandler.use(errorHandler);
  }, 120000);

  afterAll(async () => {
@@ -131,6 +146,40 @@ describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
        .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
    });
+
+    // CVE-2026-82333 regression (#1374 follow-up): multer 2.3.0 added an
+    // opt-in `fieldArrayIndexLimit` that must be set to actually close the
+    // field-parser DoS — the version bump alone does nothing. This route is
+    // unauthenticated (token-in-URL only), so it's the sharpest place to
+    // prove a crafted request with an oversized array-index field name
+    // (`evil[999999999]`) is rejected rather than accepted or left to hang.
+    it('rejects a multipart request with an oversized array-index field name', async () => {
+      const token = await createPublicToken(db, 'contract_action_tokens', {
+        contract_id: contractId,
+      });
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/public/contracts/${token}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+        .field('evil[999999999]', 'x')
+        .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+      // multer aborts the request before the handler runs; buildRouteApp's
+      // generic error handler falls back to 500 for a bare MulterError
+      // (see appWithErrorHandler test below for the real 4xx contract), so
+      // here we only assert the upload was NOT accepted/processed.
+      expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+      expect(res.body.error).not.toBe(undefined);
+    });
+
+    it('maps the oversized array-index rejection to a 400 through the real error handler', async () => {
+      const token = await createPublicToken(db, 'contract_action_tokens', {
+        contract_id: contractId,
+      });
+      const res = await request(appWithErrorHandler)
+        .post(`/api/public/contracts/${token}/upload-signed-pdf`)
+        .field('evil[999999999]', 'x')
+        .attach('file', Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'), 'signed.pdf');
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.code).toBe('VALIDATION_ERROR');
+    });
  });

  describe('GET /:token/pdf', () => {
@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
  const mint = (photoId, eventId) => secureImageService.generateSecureToken(
    photoId,
    `gallery_public_${eventId}_${Date.now()}`,
-    { clientFingerprint: 'test-fp', maxUses: 100, expiresIn: 3600 },
+    { clientFingerprint: 'test-fp', maxUses: 100, expiresIn: 3600,
+      galleryAccess: require('../../src/services/galleryAccessService').grant({ id: eventId }, 'public') },
  );

  const view = (slug, photoId, token) => request(app)
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
    const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
    const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoB, token);
    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
-    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this photo/i);
+    expect(res.body.code).toBe('INVALID_GALLERY_GRANT');
  });

  it('rejects a gallery-A token replayed on gallery B with A\'s photoId', async () => {
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
    // check (sessionId gallery A != URL gallery B) must catch it.
    const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoA, token);
    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
-    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this gallery/i);
+    expect(res.body.code).toBe('INVALID_GALLERY_GRANT');
  });

  it('lets a token read its own gallery + photo (binding passes)', async () => {
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@

 jest.mock('axios', () => ({ post: jest.fn() }));
 jest.mock('../../src/utils/networkValidation', () => ({
-  validateExternalUrlAsync: jest.fn(async () => ({ valid: true, reason: 'ok' })),
+  validateExternalUrlAsync: jest.fn(async () => ({ valid: true, reason: 'ok', hostname: 'relay.example', addresses: [{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }] })),
 }));
 jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
  info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ beforeEach(() => {
  process.env.EMAIL_WEBHOOK_SECRET = SECRET;
  transport.__testing.setAllowPrivateUrls(false);
  transport.__testing.resetSecretWarning();
-  validateExternalUrlAsync.mockResolvedValue({ valid: true, reason: 'ok' });
+  validateExternalUrlAsync.mockResolvedValue({ valid: true, reason: 'ok', hostname: 'relay.example', addresses: [{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }] });
  axios.post.mockResolvedValue({ status: 200, data: streamOf('') });
 });

@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
+/**
+ * Lazy rendition generation is single-flight per photo and rendition (#1020).
+ *
+ * ensureThumbnail / ensureHeroImage / ensurePreviewImage and the tier
+ * variants are check-then-generate, and the check reads the path off the row
+ * the caller already fetched. N concurrent cold requests for one photo all
+ * missed and all ran the same Sharp pass; worse, the hero and preview
+ * generators deleted the existing object before writing its replacement, so
+ * a reader landing between B's delete and B's write was redirected to the
+ * full original, and a regeneration whose source could not be read left the
+ * old rendition gone with the row still pointing at it.
+ *
+ * Driven against real Sharp output and the real LocalFsStorage, plus an
+ * in-memory backend with the S3 contract (no local paths, download on read),
+ * because the single-flight sits around withLocalCopy and the difference
+ * between one download and eight is the whole point.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+const EXTERNAL_ROOT = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-sf-ext-${process.pid}`);
+process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = EXTERNAL_ROOT;
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const state = { events: {}, updates: [] };
+  const api = (table) => {
+    if (table === 'events') {
+      return { where: (_col, id) => ({ first: async () => state.events[id] || null }) };
+    }
+    if (table === 'photos') {
+      return {
+        where: (criteria) => ({
+          update: async (values) => { state.updates.push({ criteria, values }); return 1; },
+        }),
+      };
+    }
+    if (table === 'app_settings') {
+      return { whereIn: () => ({ select: async () => [] }) };
+    }
+    throw new Error(`unexpected table in test: ${table}`);
+  };
+  api.__state = state;
+  return { db: api };
+});
+
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
+
+const MANAGED_EVENT = { id: 11, slug: 'managed-ev', source_mode: 'managed' };
+const EXTERNAL_EVENT = { id: 7, slug: 'nas-ev', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'weddings/sf' };
+
+let nextId = 1000;
+
+async function writeJpeg(absPath, { width = 2400, height = 1600 } = {}) {
+  await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(absPath), { recursive: true });
+  await sharp({ create: { width, height, channels: 3, background: { r: 30, g: 120, b: 200 } } })
+    .jpeg({ quality: 85 }).toFile(absPath);
+}
+
+async function jpegBuffer({ width = 2400, height = 1600 } = {}) {
+  return sharp({ create: { width, height, channels: 3, background: { r: 200, g: 60, b: 30 } } })
+    .jpeg({ quality: 85 }).toBuffer();
+}
+
+/**
+ * The S3 contract as imageProcessor sees it: kind() !== 'local', so validity
+ * is a stat only, and withLocalCopy has to download the source through
+ * getToFile before Sharp can open it.
+ */
+class MemoryObjectStore {
+  constructor() { this.objects = new Map(); this.puts = []; this.downloads = []; this.failNextPut = false; }
+  kind() { return 's3'; }
+  async init() {}
+  async put(key, body) {
+    if (this.failNextPut) { this.failNextPut = false; throw new Error('simulated upload failure'); }
+    this.puts.push(key);
+    this.objects.set(key, Buffer.from(body));
+  }
+  async stat(key) {
+    const b = this.objects.get(key);
+    return b ? { size: b.length, mtime: new Date() } : null;
+  }
+  async exists(key) { return this.objects.has(key); }
+  async getToFile(key, localPath) {
+    this.downloads.push(key);
+    const b = this.objects.get(key);
+    if (!b) throw new Error(`NoSuchKey: ${key}`);
+    await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(localPath), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.writeFile(localPath, b);
+  }
+  async delete(key) { this.objects.delete(key); }
+}
+
+describe('single-flight rendition generation (#1020)', () => {
+  let imageProcessor;
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    db.__state.events = { [MANAGED_EVENT.id]: MANAGED_EVENT, [EXTERNAL_EVENT.id]: EXTERNAL_EVENT };
+    db.__state.updates = [];
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(EXTERNAL_ROOT, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  describe('local storage', () => {
+    let storage; let storageRoot; let puts;
+
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sf-store-'));
+      storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
+      await storage.init();
+      const origPut = storage.put.bind(storage);
+      storage.put = async (key, ...rest) => {
+        if (storage.failNextPut) { storage.failNextPut = false; throw new Error('simulated write failure'); }
+        if (storage.holdNextPut) { const gate = storage.holdNextPut; storage.holdNextPut = null; await gate; }
+        puts.push(key);
+        return origPut(key, ...rest);
+      };
+      storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+    }, 30000);
+
+    beforeEach(() => { puts = []; storage.failNextPut = false; storage.holdNextPut = null; });
+
+    afterAll(async () => {
+      await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    });
+
+    async function managedPhoto() {
+      const id = nextId++;
+      const name = `managed-${id}.jpg`;
+      const rel = `${MANAGED_EVENT.slug}/${name}`;
+      await writeJpeg(path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', rel));
+      return { id, event_id: MANAGED_EVENT.id, source_origin: 'managed', path: rel, filename: name };
+    }
+
+    async function externalPhoto({ write = true } = {}) {
+      const id = nextId++;
+      const name = `external-${id}.jpg`;
+      const relpath = path.join(EXTERNAL_EVENT.external_path, name);
+      if (write) await writeJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, relpath));
+      return { id, event_id: EXTERNAL_EVENT.id, source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: relpath, filename: name };
+    }
+
+    const putsUnder = (prefix) => puts.filter((k) => k.startsWith(prefix));
+
+    it('ensurePreviewImage: eight concurrent cold requests share one generation', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 8 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)));
+
+      expect(results[0]).toMatch(/^previews\/preview_/);
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(1);
+      // One flight, one row write — not eight identical updates.
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(await storage.stat(results[0])).toBeTruthy();
+    });
+
+    it('ensureHeroImage: eight concurrent cold requests share one generation', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 8 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureHeroImage(photo)));
+
+      expect(results[0]).toMatch(/^heroes\/hero_/);
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(putsUnder('heroes/')).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('ensureThumbnail: eight concurrent cold requests for an external photo share one generation', async () => {
+      const photo = await externalPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 8 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo)));
+
+      expect(results[0]).toBe(`thumbnails/thumb_ext${photo.id}_${photo.filename}`);
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(putsUnder('thumbnails/')).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('a tier request that resolves to the canonical thumbnail shares the canonical flight', async () => {
+      // ensureThumbnailAtWidth hands the canonical width, and every video, to
+      // ensureThumbnail. That used to be the one unguarded path a guarded
+      // request could fall through into.
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const canonical = 300; // DEFAULT_THUMBNAIL_WIDTH; the settings mock returns no override
+      const results = await Promise.all([
+        imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, canonical),
+        imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, canonical),
+        imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo),
+        imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo),
+      ]);
+
+      expect(results[0]).toMatch(/^thumbnails\/thumb_/);
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(putsUnder('thumbnails/')).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ['ensureThumbnail', 'thumbnail_path', 'thumbnails/'],
+      ['ensureHeroImage', 'hero_path', 'heroes/'],
+      ['ensurePreviewImage', 'preview_path', 'previews/'],
+    ])('%s: a forced rebuild is never satisfied by joining a viewer\'s hot-path check', async (fn, column, prefix) => {
+      // adminThumbnails.js forces a rebuild by passing the row with the path
+      // nulled. If the validity check ran inside the flight, that call could
+      // join a viewer's flight for the same photo — one that was merely
+      // stat-ing an already good rendition — and be handed back the very
+      // file it was asked to replace, with the endpoint counting a success.
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const existing = await imageProcessor[fn](photo);
+      expect(existing).toMatch(new RegExp(`^${prefix}`));
+      expect(putsUnder(prefix)).toHaveLength(1);
+
+      const [viewer, forced] = await Promise.all([
+        imageProcessor[fn]({ ...photo, [column]: existing }),
+        imageProcessor[fn]({ ...photo, [column]: null }),
+      ]);
+
+      expect(viewer).toBe(existing);
+      expect(forced).toBe(existing);
+      // The forced call wrote a fresh rendition; the viewer's did not.
+      expect(putsUnder(prefix)).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ['ensureThumbnail', 'thumbnail_path', 'thumbnails/'],
+      ['ensurePreviewImage', 'preview_path', 'previews/'],
+    ])('%s: a forced rebuild runs after a lazy generation already in flight instead of adopting it', async (fn, column, prefix) => {
+      // The lazy flight read the settings when it started; after a settings
+      // change it is producing exactly what the admin's regenerate exists to
+      // replace. Joining it would count a success and leave the old size
+      // cached — the validity check only asks whether the file parses.
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      let release;
+      storage.holdNextPut = new Promise((r) => { release = r; });
+
+      const lazy = imageProcessor[fn](photo);                                   // blocks inside put
+      const forced = imageProcessor[fn]({ ...photo, [column]: null }, { force: true });
+      const joiner = imageProcessor[fn](photo);                                 // lazy miss after the forced call
+      let forcedSettled = false;
+      forced.then(() => { forcedSettled = true; });
+
+      await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 60));
+      expect(putsUnder(prefix)).toHaveLength(0);
+      expect(forcedSettled).toBe(false);
+
+      release();
+      const results = await Promise.all([lazy, forced, joiner]);
+      expect(results.every((k) => k === results[0])).toBe(true);
+      expect(results[0]).toMatch(new RegExp(`^${prefix}`));
+      // Lazy wrote once, the forced rebuild wrote once more after it; the
+      // later lazy miss joined the forced flight rather than starting a third.
+      expect(putsUnder(prefix)).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    it('a replaced photo (same id, new path) does not join a flight still rendering the old source', async () => {
+      // replacePhoto keeps the id and changes path/filename. Keyed by id and
+      // width alone, a request carrying the replacement row would join the
+      // old flight, be handed the old image, and the gallery would cache it.
+      const before = await managedPhoto();
+      const after = await managedPhoto();
+      const replacement = { ...after, id: before.id };
+
+      let release;
+      storage.holdNextPut = new Promise((r) => { release = r; });
+      const stale = imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(before, 600);        // blocks inside put
+      const fresh = imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(replacement, 600);
+      release();
+
+      const [oldKey, newKey] = await Promise.all([stale, fresh]);
+      expect(oldKey).toBe(`thumbnails/thumb_w600_p${before.id}_${before.filename}`);
+      expect(newKey).toBe(`thumbnails/thumb_w600_p${before.id}_${after.filename}`);
+      expect(putsUnder('thumbnails/').sort()).toEqual([oldKey, newKey].sort());
+
+      // Same shape for the canonical preview, which had no guard at all on
+      // base and must not gain a cross-source one now.
+      storage.holdNextPut = new Promise((r) => { release = r; });
+      const staleP = imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(before);
+      const freshP = imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(replacement);
+      release();
+      const [oldP, newP] = await Promise.all([staleP, freshP]);
+      expect(oldP).not.toBe(newP);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    it('different photos and different widths are separate flights', async () => {
+      const a = await managedPhoto();
+      const b = await externalPhoto();
+      const calls = [
+        ...Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(a, 640)),
+        ...Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(a, 1280)),
+        ...Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(b, 640)),
+        ...Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(a, 600)),
+        ...Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(b, 600)),
+      ];
+      const results = await Promise.all(calls);
+
+      expect(results.every(Boolean)).toBe(true);
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(5);
+      expect(results.slice(0, 4).every((k) => k === results[0])).toBe(true);
+      expect(results.slice(4, 8).every((k) => k === results[4])).toBe(true);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(3);
+      expect(putsUnder('thumbnails/')).toHaveLength(2);
+      // Tiers are pure cache: never written to the row.
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('a warm tier is served from storage without a second generation', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const first = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
+      const again = await Promise.all([
+        imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640),
+        imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640),
+      ]);
+
+      expect(again).toEqual([first, first]);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('a failed flight is cleared so the next request retries instead of adopting the failure', async () => {
+      const photo = await externalPhoto({ write: false });
+
+      const cold = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)));
+      expect(cold).toEqual([null, null, null, null]);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(0);
+
+      // The source appears (mount came back, file finished copying).
+      await writeJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, photo.external_relpath));
+      const warm = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
+      expect(warm).toBe(`previews/preview_ext${photo.id}_external-${photo.id}.jpg`);
+      expect(putsUnder('previews/')).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('a flight that returns null is shared by every waiter and cleared afterwards', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      db.__state.events = {}; // the event lookup inside the flight finds nothing
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 3 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo)));
+      expect(results).toEqual([null, null, null]);
+
+      db.__state.events = { [MANAGED_EVENT.id]: MANAGED_EVENT };
+      const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo);
+      expect(key).toMatch(/^thumbnails\/thumb_/);
+      expect(putsUnder('thumbnails/')).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('a flight that throws rejects every waiter identically and is cleared afterwards', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const boom = new Error('db down');
+      const realEvents = db.__state.events;
+      db.__state.events = new Proxy({}, { get: () => { throw boom; } });
+
+      // ensureThumbnail's event lookup is not wrapped in try/catch, so this
+      // propagates — to every caller of the shared flight, not just the first.
+      const settled = await Promise.allSettled(Array.from({ length: 3 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo)));
+      expect(settled.map((s) => s.status)).toEqual(['rejected', 'rejected', 'rejected']);
+      expect(settled.every((s) => s.reason === boom)).toBe(true);
+
+      db.__state.events = realEvents;
+      const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail(photo);
+      expect(key).toMatch(/^thumbnails\/thumb_/);
+    });
+
+    it('the existing hero survives a regeneration whose source cannot be read', async () => {
+      // generateHeroImage used to delete the target before Sharp had opened
+      // the source, so a corrupt file or a blipped mount stripped the old
+      // hero and returned null with the row still pointing at it.
+      const src = path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', MANAGED_EVENT.slug, 'hero-src.jpg');
+      await writeJpeg(src);
+      const key = await imageProcessor.generateHeroImage(src, { outputBasename: 'survive.jpg' });
+      expect(key).toBe('heroes/hero_survive.jpg');
+      const before = await storage.stat(key);
+
+      const junk = path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', MANAGED_EVENT.slug, 'hero-junk.jpg');
+      await fs.writeFile(junk, Buffer.from('this is not a jpeg'));
+      const result = await imageProcessor.generateHeroImage(junk, { regenerate: true, outputBasename: 'survive.jpg' });
+
+      expect(result).toBeNull();
+      const after = await storage.stat(key);
+      expect(after).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(after.size).toBe(before.size);
+      await expect(sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key)).metadata()).resolves.toMatchObject({ width: 1920 });
+    });
+
+    it('the existing preview survives a regeneration whose write fails', async () => {
+      // Probe succeeds, the pipeline runs, the put throws: the catch used to
+      // delete the key, which by then only ever held the PREVIOUS good file.
+      const src = path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', MANAGED_EVENT.slug, 'preview-src.jpg');
+      await writeJpeg(src);
+      const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { outputBasename: 'survive.jpg' });
+      expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_survive.jpg');
+      const before = await storage.stat(key);
+
+      storage.failNextPut = true;
+      const result = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true, outputBasename: 'survive.jpg' });
+
+      expect(result).toBeNull();
+      const after = await storage.stat(key);
+      expect(after).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(after.size).toBe(before.size);
+    });
+
+    it('the existing hero survives a regeneration whose write fails', async () => {
+      const src = path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', MANAGED_EVENT.slug, 'hero-src2.jpg');
+      await writeJpeg(src);
+      const key = await imageProcessor.generateHeroImage(src, { outputBasename: 'survive2.jpg' });
+      const before = await storage.stat(key);
+
+      storage.failNextPut = true;
+      const result = await imageProcessor.generateHeroImage(src, { regenerate: true, outputBasename: 'survive2.jpg' });
+
+      expect(result).toBeNull();
+      expect((await storage.stat(key)).size).toBe(before.size);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('S3 contract', () => {
+    let store;
+
+    beforeAll(() => {
+      store = new MemoryObjectStore();
+      storageModule.setStorageForTesting(store);
+    });
+
+    beforeEach(() => { store.puts = []; store.downloads = []; store.failNextPut = false; });
+
+    async function managedPhoto() {
+      const id = nextId++;
+      const name = `s3-${id}.jpg`;
+      const rel = `${MANAGED_EVENT.slug}/${name}`;
+      store.objects.set(`events/active/${rel}`, await jpegBuffer());
+      return { id, event_id: MANAGED_EVENT.id, source_origin: 'managed', path: rel, filename: name };
+    }
+
+    it('ensurePreviewImage: concurrent cold requests download the source once and upload once', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 6 }, () => imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)));
+
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(results[0]).toMatch(/^previews\/preview_/);
+      expect(store.downloads).toEqual([`events/active/${photo.path}`]);
+      expect(store.puts).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(await store.stat(results[0])).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('ensureHeroImage: concurrent cold requests download the source once and upload once', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 6 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureHeroImage(photo)));
+
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(store.downloads).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(store.puts).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('ensureThumbnailAtWidth: concurrent cold tier requests download the source once and upload once', async () => {
+      const photo = await managedPhoto();
+      const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 6 }, () => imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, 600)));
+
+      expect(new Set(results).size).toBe(1);
+      expect(results[0]).toBe(`thumbnails/thumb_w600_p${photo.id}_${photo.filename}`);
+      expect(store.downloads).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(store.puts).toEqual([results[0]]);
+    });
+
+    it('the existing preview object survives a regeneration whose upload fails', async () => {
+      // Fixed outputBasename, as the external and RAW branches pass: the key
+      // is the same on both runs, so the pre-fix delete would have hit the
+      // good object. (Through withLocalCopy the basename carries a random
+      // temp prefix and the two runs never share a key, which is why this
+      // drives the generator directly.)
+      const srcDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sf-s3src-'));
+      const src = path.join(srcDir, 'src.jpg');
+      await writeJpeg(src);
+      try {
+        const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { outputBasename: 's3-survive.jpg' });
+        expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_s3-survive.jpg');
+        const before = store.objects.get(key);
+        expect(before).toBeTruthy();
+
+        store.failNextPut = true;
+        const result = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true, outputBasename: 's3-survive.jpg' });
+
+        expect(result).toBeNull();
+        expect(store.objects.get(key)).toBe(before);
+      } finally {
+        await fs.rm(srcDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+      }
+    });
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/**
+ * Preview tier lookup and cleanup must agree with what the generator writes
+ * (#1020 follow-up).
+ *
+ * generatePreviewImage rewrites the extension to match the encoding (`.jpg`,
+ * or `.webp` for alpha / multi-frame sources). ensurePreviewImageAtWidth and
+ * previewTierKeys kept the SOURCE extension, so for a `.png`, `.JPG`, `.heic`
+ * or RAW source the tier was generated on every single request — the stat
+ * never matched — and cleanup never found the files, which piled up in
+ * storage for the life of the install.
+ *
+ * Driven against real Sharp output, because the whole question is which
+ * extension the encoder actually chose.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const state = { event: null };
+  const api = (table) => {
+    if (table === 'events') return { where: () => ({ first: async () => state.event }) };
+    if (table === 'photos') return { where: () => ({ update: async () => 1 }) };
+    if (table === 'app_settings') return { whereIn: () => ({ select: async () => [] }) };
+    throw new Error(`unexpected table in test: ${table}`);
+  };
+  api.__state = state;
+  return { db: api };
+});
+
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
+
+const EVENT = { id: 21, slug: 'fmt-ev', source_mode: 'managed' };
+let nextId = 5000;
+
+describe('preview tier keys follow the encoded extension', () => {
+  let storage; let storageRoot; let imageProcessor; let puts;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-tierkeys-'));
+    storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
+    await storage.init();
+    const origPut = storage.put.bind(storage);
+    storage.put = async (key, ...rest) => { puts.push(key); return origPut(key, ...rest); };
+    storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+    delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+  }, 30000);
+
+  beforeEach(() => { puts = []; db.__state.event = EVENT; });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function photoWith(name, { alpha = false } = {}) {
+    const id = nextId++;
+    const rel = `${EVENT.slug}/${name}`;
+    const abs = path.join(storageRoot, 'events/active', rel);
+    await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
+    const pipeline = sharp({
+      create: {
+        width: 2000, height: 1400, channels: alpha ? 4 : 3,
+        background: alpha ? { r: 10, g: 20, b: 30, alpha: 0.5 } : { r: 10, g: 20, b: 30 },
+      },
+    });
+    if (/\.png$/i.test(name)) await pipeline.png().toFile(abs);
+    else if (/\.webp$/i.test(name)) await pipeline.webp().toFile(abs);
+    else await pipeline.jpeg().toFile(abs);
+    return { id, event_id: EVENT.id, source_origin: 'managed', path: rel, filename: name };
+  }
+
+  it.each([
+    ['opaque PNG', 'photo.png', false, '.jpg'],
+    ['transparent PNG', 'photo-alpha.png', true, '.webp'],
+    ['uppercase JPG', 'IMG_0001.JPG', false, '.jpg'],
+    ['jpeg spelled out', 'photo.jpeg', false, '.jpg'],
+    ['lowercase jpg', 'photo.jpg', false, '.jpg'],
+  ])('%s: the second request is a cache hit, not a second generation', async (_label, name, alpha, ext) => {
+    const photo = await photoWith(name, { alpha });
+
+    const first = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
+    expect(first).toBe(`previews/preview_w640_p${photo.id}_${name.replace(/\.[^.]+$/, '')}${ext}`);
+    expect(puts).toEqual([first]);
+
+    const second = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
+    expect(second).toBe(first);
+    expect(puts).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['opaque PNG', 'cleanup.png', false],
+    ['transparent PNG', 'cleanup-alpha.png', true],
+    ['uppercase JPG', 'CLEANUP.JPG', false],
+  ])('%s: previewTierKeys covers the generated key, so deletePreviewTiers removes it', async (_label, name, alpha) => {
+    const photo = await photoWith(name, { alpha });
+    const k640 = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
+    const k1280 = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 1280);
+    expect(await storage.stat(k640)).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(await storage.stat(k1280)).toBeTruthy();
+
+    const keys = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys(photo);
+    expect(keys).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([k640, k1280]));
+
+    await imageProcessor.deletePreviewTiers(photo);
+    expect(await storage.stat(k640)).toBeNull();
+    expect(await storage.stat(k1280)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('a tier written before the extension rewrite is still found, by lookup and by cleanup', async () => {
+    // JPEG bytes under the source's `.png` name — what generatePreviewImage
+    // produced before it started rewriting the extension. Served as JPEG by
+    // the route (the Content-Type comes from the `.webp` suffix only).
+    const photo = await photoWith('legacy.png');
+    const legacyKey = `previews/preview_w640_p${photo.id}_legacy.png`;
+    await storage.put(legacyKey, await sharp({ create: { width: 640, height: 448, channels: 3, background: '#123' } }).jpeg().toBuffer());
+    puts = [];
+
+    expect(await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640)).toBe(legacyKey);
+    expect(puts).toHaveLength(0);
+
+    expect(imageProcessor.previewTierKeys(photo)).toContain(legacyKey);
+    await imageProcessor.deletePreviewTiers(photo);
+    expect(await storage.stat(legacyKey)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('never lists the canonical 1920 rendition, which preview_path owns', () => {
+    const keys = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys({ id: 9, path: 'e/a.png', source_origin: 'managed' });
+    expect(keys.some((k) => k.includes('w1920'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(keys.every((k) => k.includes('p9_'))).toBe(true);
+    // Both encodings plus the legacy source-extension key, per width.
+    expect(keys).toEqual([
+      'previews/preview_w640_p9_a.jpg', 'previews/preview_w640_p9_a.webp', 'previews/preview_w640_p9_a.png',
+      'previews/preview_w1280_p9_a.jpg', 'previews/preview_w1280_p9_a.webp', 'previews/preview_w1280_p9_a.png',
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('does not duplicate the legacy key when the source already is a lowercase .jpg', () => {
+    const keys = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys({ id: 9, path: 'e/a.jpg', source_origin: 'managed' });
+    expect(keys.filter((k) => k.includes('w640'))).toEqual([
+      'previews/preview_w640_p9_a.jpg', 'previews/preview_w640_p9_a.webp',
+    ]);
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ error: jest.fn() }));
+const { scheduledTask } = require('../../src/services/scheduledTask');
+beforeEach(() => jest.useFakeTimers());
+afterEach(() => jest.useRealTimers());
+it('starts once, skips overlap and drains the accepted run on stop', async () => {
+  let finish;
+  const work = jest.fn(() => new Promise(resolve => { finish = resolve; }));
+  const task = scheduledTask(work, { interval: 100 });
+  task.start(); task.start();
+  expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(1);
+  await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(300);
+  expect(work).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  let stopped = false;
+  const stop = task.stop().then(() => { stopped = true; });
+  await Promise.resolve(); expect(stopped).toBe(false);
+  finish(); await stop; expect(stopped).toBe(true);
+  expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+  await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(1000); expect(work).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+});
+it('cancels a delayed first run and can restart cleanly', async () => {
+  const work = jest.fn(); const task = scheduledTask(work, { interval: 100, initialDelay: 10 });
+  task.start(); await task.stop(); await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(200); expect(work).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  task.start(); await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(10); expect(work).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  await task.stop();
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn() }));
+const secure = require('../../src/services/secureImageService');
+beforeEach(() => { jest.useFakeTimers(); secure.dispose(); });
+afterEach(() => { secure.dispose(); jest.useRealTimers(); });
+it('owns one timer for many tokens and sweeps expired capabilities', () => {
+  for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) secure.generateSecureToken(i, 'gallery_public_1_1', { expiresIn: 1 });
+  expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(1); expect(secure.tokenCache.size).toBe(100);
+  jest.advanceTimersByTime(60000); expect(secure.tokenCache.size).toBe(0);
+  secure.dispose(); expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+});
+it('disposes all session/rate caches and restarts on demand', () => {
+  secure.generateSecureToken(1, 'session'); secure.sessionTokens.set('a', 'b'); secure.rateLimitCache.set('a', 'b');
+  secure.dispose(); expect(secure.sessionTokens.size + secure.rateLimitCache.size + secure.tokenCache.size).toBe(0);
+  secure.generateSecureToken(1, 'session'); expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(1);
+});
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ async function bootDb() {
    t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
    t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v1');
    t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+    t.boolean('prompt_shown').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
    t.string('installation_id', 64);
    t.string('public_key', 59);
    t.text('private_key_encrypted');
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ async function bootDb() {
    t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
    t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v2');
    t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+    t.boolean('prompt_shown').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
    t.string('installation_id', 64);
    t.string('public_key', 59);
    t.text('private_key_encrypted');
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ async function bootDb() {
    t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
    t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v1');
    t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+    t.boolean('prompt_shown').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
    t.string('installation_id', 64);
    t.string('public_key', 59);
    t.text('private_key_encrypted');
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ async function bootDb() {
    t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
    t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v1');
    t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+    t.boolean('prompt_shown').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
    t.string('installation_id', 64);
    t.string('public_key', 59);
    t.text('private_key_encrypted');
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/**
+ * generateVideoPlaceholder() must not touch the database when the caller
+ * already supplies width/height (videoProcessor.js's thumbnail-generation
+ * fallback does exactly this).
+ *
+ * Why it matters: processUploadedPhotos() (chunked video upload) holds a
+ * per-file SQLite transaction open across thumbnail generation. SQLite's
+ * knex pool defaults to a single connection, so any second, un-transacted
+ * db() query made while that transaction is open blocks until
+ * acquireConnectionTimeout (60s in production) — verified directly against
+ * an isolated SQLite db (codex review of #1371/#1372). Passing explicit
+ * dimensions must skip getThumbnailSettings()'s db() call entirely, not
+ * just tolerate its failure.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+
+const mockDbSpy = jest.fn(() => {
+  throw new Error('db() must not be called when width/height are supplied');
+});
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: (...args) => mockDbSpy(...args) }));
+
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+
+describe('generateVideoPlaceholder skips the settings DB lookup given explicit dimensions', () => {
+  let storage;
+  let root;
+  let imageProcessor;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-vidplaceholder-'));
+    storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root });
+    await storage.init();
+    storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+  }, 30000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => mockDbSpy.mockClear());
+
+  it('never calls db() when width/height are provided', async () => {
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generateVideoPlaceholder('demo.mp4', { width: 300, height: 300 });
+
+    expect(key).toBe('thumbnails/thumb_demo.jpg');
+    expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockDbSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('falls through to defaults (not a throw) when db() fails and no dimensions were given', async () => {
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generateVideoPlaceholder('demo2.mp4');
+
+    expect(key).toBe('thumbnails/thumb_demo2.jpg');
+    expect(mockDbSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn() }));
+
+describe.each(['backgroundProcessor', 'faceQueue'])('%s shutdown', name => {
+  let worker, db, processPhoto, featureEnabled, janitorUpdate, releases;
+  const prefix = name === 'faceQueue' ? 'FACE_PROCESSOR' : 'UPLOAD_PROCESSOR';
+  let previousEnv;
+  class SidecarUnavailableError extends Error {}
+
+  function deferred() {
+    let resolve;
+    const promise = new Promise(done => { resolve = done; });
+    releases.push(resolve);
+    return { promise, resolve };
+  }
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.useFakeTimers();
+    releases = [];
+    previousEnv = { ...process.env };
+    delete process.env[`${prefix}_DISABLED`];
+    process.env[`${prefix}_CONCURRENCY`] = '2';
+    process.env[`${prefix}_POLL_MS`] = '2000';
+    process.env.FACE_PROCESSOR_BACKOFF_MS = '30000';
+    processPhoto = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ status: 'skipped' });
+    featureEnabled = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true);
+    janitorUpdate = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(0);
+    const chain = { where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(), update: janitorUpdate };
+    db = jest.fn(() => chain);
+    db.client = { config: { client: 'pg' } };
+    // Claims and processing are controlled at the I/O boundary; the real
+    // workers, janitors, idle sleeps and stopServices run in every test.
+    db.transaction = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null);
+    jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/photoProcessor', () => ({ processPhoto }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/faceProcessor', () => ({
+      processPhotoFaces: processPhoto, TransientSourceError: class extends Error {},
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/faceClient', () => ({ SidecarUnavailableError }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/faceSettings', () => ({
+      isFeatureEnabled: featureEnabled, isEnabledForEvent: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    }));
+    worker = require(`../../src/services/${name}`);
+  });
+
+  afterEach(async () => {
+    releases.forEach(resolve => resolve());
+    const stopped = worker.stop();
+    // Also cleans up the original, non-interruptible implementation when a
+    // regression assertion fails; the test never needs to wait a real minute.
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(60000);
+    await stopped;
+    jest.useRealTimers();
+    process.env = previousEnv;
+  });
+
+  async function expectPromptStop(stop = () => worker.stop()) {
+    let done = false;
+    const stopped = stop().then(() => { done = true; });
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(done).toBe(true);
+    expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+    await stopped;
+  }
+
+  it('wakes all idle workers and the minute-long janitor through stopServices', async () => {
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(3);
+    // Confirm normal polling still runs before shutdown.
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2000);
+    expect(db.transaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(4);
+    await expectPromptStop(() => require('../../src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices());
+  });
+
+  it('wakes claim-error backoff and can start a fresh run after stopping', async () => {
+    db.transaction.mockRejectedValue(new Error('database unavailable'));
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    await expectPromptStop();
+    db.transaction.mockResolvedValue(null);
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(3);
+    await expectPromptStop();
+  });
+
+  it('drains active processing for every stop caller and prevents overlapping restarts', async () => {
+    const processing = deferred();
+    processPhoto.mockReturnValue(processing.promise);
+    db.transaction.mockResolvedValueOnce({ id: 1 });
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(processPhoto).toHaveBeenCalledWith(1);
+    let done = false;
+    const first = worker.stop();
+    expect(worker.stop()).toBe(first);
+    first.then(() => { done = true; });
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(done).toBe(false);
+    expect(db.transaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    processing.resolve({ status: 'skipped' });
+    await expectPromptStop();
+    expect(done).toBe(true);
+    expect(db.transaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it('drains a claim already in flight without starting another poll', async () => {
+    const claim = deferred();
+    db.transaction.mockReturnValueOnce(claim.promise);
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    const stopped = worker.stop();
+    claim.resolve({ id: 2 });
+    await expectPromptStop(() => stopped);
+    expect(processPhoto).toHaveBeenCalledWith(2);
+    expect(db.transaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it('does not schedule new waits when pending database work finishes after stop', async () => {
+    const claim = deferred();
+    const janitor = deferred();
+    db.transaction.mockReturnValue(claim.promise);
+    janitorUpdate.mockReturnValue(janitor.promise);
+    worker.start();
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    let done = false;
+    const stopped = worker.stop().then(() => { done = true; });
+    claim.resolve(null);
+    await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+    expect(done).toBe(false);
+    janitor.resolve(0);
+    await expectPromptStop(() => stopped);
+  });
+
+  if (name === 'faceQueue') {
+    it('interrupts the ten-second sleep with faces disabled by default', async () => {
+      featureEnabled.mockResolvedValue(false);
+      worker.start();
+      await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+      expect(db.transaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(3);
+      await expectPromptStop();
+    });
+
+    it('releases a claimed photo and interrupts the sidecar outage backoff', async () => {
+      db.transaction.mockResolvedValueOnce({ id: 3, event_id: 5 });
+      processPhoto.mockRejectedValue(new SidecarUnavailableError('offline'));
+      worker.start();
+      await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+      expect(janitorUpdate).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ face_status: 'pending', face_started_at: null });
+      await expectPromptStop();
+      expect(worker.inFlightByEvent.size).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('does not claim new work after a pending feature check resolves during shutdown', async () => {
+      const feature = deferred();
+      featureEnabled.mockReturnValue(feature.promise);
+      worker.start();
+      const stopped = worker.stop();
+      feature.resolve(true);
+      await expectPromptStop(() => stopped);
+      expect(db.transaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+  }
+});
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ describe('resolvePhotoContentType', () => {
 });

 describe('serving routes use the resolver', () => {
-  const routes = ['gallery.js', 'secureImages.js', 'protectedImages.js', 'adminPhotos.js'];
+  const routes = ['gallery/media.js', 'gallery/downloads.js', 'secureImages.js', 'protectedImages.js', 'adminPhotos.js'];
  it.each(routes)('%s sets no Content-Type from photo.mime_type directly', (name) => {
    const src = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../src/routes', name), 'utf8');
    expect(src).not.toMatch(/'Content-Type':\s*photo\.mime_type/);
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+const dns = require('dns');
+const http = require('http');
+const axios = require('axios');
+const { validateExternalUrlAsync } = require('../../src/utils/networkValidation');
+const { pinnedRequestOptions } = require('../../src/utils/pinnedRequest');
+afterEach(() => jest.restoreAllMocks());
+it('never performs a second DNS lookup that could reach a private listener', async () => {
+  const received = jest.fn();
+  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { received(); res.end('private'); });
+  await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
+  const url = `http://rebind.example:${server.address().port}/hook`;
+  const preflight = jest.spyOn(dns.promises, 'lookup').mockResolvedValue([{ address: '192.0.2.1', family: 4 }]);
+  const unsafeLookup = jest.spyOn(dns, 'lookup').mockImplementation((_host, opts, cb) => {
+    if (typeof opts === 'function') { cb = opts; opts = {}; }
+    cb(null, ...(opts.all ? [[{ address: '127.0.0.1', family: 4 }]] : ['127.0.0.1', 4]));
+  });
+  let options;
+  try {
+    const check = await validateExternalUrlAsync(url);
+    options = pinnedRequestOptions(check);
+    await expect(axios.post(url, 'private-data', { ...options, timeout: 200 })).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(preflight).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(unsafeLookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); expect(received).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  } finally {
+    options?.httpAgent.destroy(); options?.httpsAgent.destroy();
+    await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve));
+  }
+});
+it('preserves the original Host and refuses redirects while using the pinned address', async () => {
+  const hosts = [];
+  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+    hosts.push(req.headers.host); res.writeHead(302, { Location: 'http://localhost/private' }); res.end();
+  });
+  await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
+  const host = `pinned.example:${server.address().port}`;
+  // Test the transport in isolation: production checks reject this private IP.
+  const options = pinnedRequestOptions({ valid: true, hostname: 'pinned.example', addresses: [{ address: '127.0.0.1', family: 4 }] });
+  try {
+    const res = await axios.post(`http://${host}/hook`, 'body', { ...options, validateStatus: () => true });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(302); expect(hosts).toEqual([host]); expect(options.proxy).toBe(false);
+  } finally { options.httpAgent.destroy(); options.httpsAgent.destroy(); await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)); }
+});
+it('fails closed for missing DNS results', () => {
+  expect(() => pinnedRequestOptions({ valid: true })).toThrow('validated destination');
+});
+
+it('preserves TLS SNI and certificate hostname verification for a pinned connection', async () => {
+  const fs = require('fs/promises');
+  const path = require('path');
+  const dir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(require('os').tmpdir(), 'picpeak-tls-pin-'));
+  const key = path.join(dir, 'key.pem'), cert = path.join(dir, 'cert.pem');
+  require('child_process').execFileSync('openssl', ['req', '-x509', '-newkey', 'rsa:2048', '-nodes',
+    '-keyout', key, '-out', cert, '-days', '1', '-subj', '/CN=pinned.example',
+    '-addext', 'subjectAltName=DNS:pinned.example'], { stdio: 'ignore' });
+  const certificate = await fs.readFile(cert);
+  const seen = [];
+  const server = require('https').createServer({ key: await fs.readFile(key), cert: certificate }, (req, res) => {
+    seen.push({ host: req.headers.host, servername: req.socket.servername }); res.end('ok');
+  });
+  await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
+  const makeOptions = hostname => {
+    const options = pinnedRequestOptions({ valid: true, hostname, addresses: [{ address: '127.0.0.1', family: 4 }] });
+    options.httpsAgent.options.ca = certificate;
+    return options;
+  };
+  const allowed = makeOptions('pinned.example'), wrong = makeOptions('wrong.example');
+  try {
+    const host = `pinned.example:${server.address().port}`;
+    expect((await axios.post(`https://${host}/hook`, 'data', { ...allowed, timeout: 2000 })).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(seen).toEqual([{ host, servername: 'pinned.example' }]);
+    await expect(axios.post(`https://wrong.example:${server.address().port}/hook`, 'data', { ...wrong, timeout: 2000 }))
+      .rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID' });
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+  } finally {
+    for (const options of [allowed, wrong]) { options.httpAgent.destroy(); options.httpsAgent.destroy(); }
+    await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve));
+    await fs.rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+const EventEmitter = require('events');
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ info: jest.fn() }));
+const logger = require('../../src/utils/logger');
+const middleware = require('../../src/middleware/apiRequestLogger');
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../../src/utils/requestLogPath');
+const marker = 'SECRET_TEST_CAPABILITY';
+it.each([
+  `/api/gallery/g/photos?token=${marker}&password=${marker}`,
+  `/api/gallery/g/verify-token/${marker}`,
+  `/api/gallery/g/show/${marker}/state`,
+  `/api/images/g/photo/1/signed/${marker}`,
+  `/api/secure-images/g/secure/1/${marker}`,
+  `/api/secure-images/g/secure-download/1/${marker}`,
+  `/api/public/contracts/${marker}/sign`,
+  `/api/customer/auth/password-reset/${marker}`,
+  `/api/public/newsletter/unsubscribe/${marker}`,
+])('does not log capabilities on request or response: %s', (originalUrl) => {
+  logger.info.mockClear();
+  const res = new EventEmitter(); res.statusCode = 200;
+  middleware({ originalUrl, method: 'GET' }, res, jest.fn());
+  res.emit('finish');
+  expect(logger.info).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  expect(JSON.stringify(logger.info.mock.calls)).not.toContain(marker);
+});
+it('retains useful non-secret routes and removes control characters', () => {
+  expect(requestLogPath('/api/admin/events/12?search=private')).toBe('/api/admin/events/12');
+  expect(requestLogPath('/api/admin/events\nforged')).not.toContain('\n');
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+const http = require('http');
+it('directs Supertest to the actual IPv6 listener instead of an unrelated IPv4 port', async () => {
+  jest.resetModules();
+  const request = require('supertest');
+  const server = http.createServer((_req, res) => { res.end('actual test listener'); });
+  await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { server.once('error', reject); server.listen(0, '::1', resolve); });
+  try {
+    const response = await request(server).get('/');
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.text).toBe('actual test listener');
+    expect(response.request.url).toContain('://[::1]:');
+  } finally { await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)); }
+});
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
  const dbFn = () => ({
    insert(row) {
      inserted.push(row);
-      return { onConflict: () => ({ ignore: async () => undefined }) };
+      return { onConflict: () => ({ ignore: async () => undefined, merge: async () => undefined }) };
    },
  });
  return { db: dbFn };
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+// Supertest 6 binds an IPv6 wildcard listener but hardcodes an IPv4 URL.
+// macOS can allocate that IPv6 port while a different IPv4 service owns it.
+// Address the listener's actual family so a test cannot reach that service.
+jest.mock('supertest/lib/test', () => {
+  const Test = jest.requireActual('supertest/lib/test');
+  const serverAddress = Test.prototype.serverAddress;
+  Test.prototype.serverAddress = function(app, path) {
+    const url = serverAddress.call(this, app, path);
+    return app.address()?.family === 'IPv6'
+      ? url.replace('://127.0.0.1:', '://[::1]:')
+      : url;
+  };
+  return Test;
+});
+
 beforeAll(() => {
  process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
  process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'test-secret';
@@ -8,3 +23,11 @@ beforeAll(() => {
    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = '/storage';
  }
 });
+
+// Dispose resources loaded by this suite using the application's draining
+// shutdown. Individual fixtures still own temporary files and other DB pools.
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await require('./src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices();
+  const loadedDb = require.cache[require.resolve('./src/database/db')];
+  if (typeof loadedDb?.exports.db?.destroy === 'function') await loadedDb.exports.db.destroy();
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/** Fresh installs and upgraded databases expose the same event timestamp. */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasTable('events')) return;
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'updated_at')) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('events', table => {
+      table.timestamp('updated_at');
+    });
+  }
+  // Do not replace existing modification times on a repeated migration.
+  await knex('events').whereNull('updated_at').update({ updated_at: knex.ref('created_at') });
+};
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (await knex.schema.hasTable('events') && await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'updated_at')) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('events', table => table.dropColumn('updated_at'));
+  }
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/** Non-expiring JWTs need revocation records that cleanup never removes. */
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasTable('revoked_tokens')) return;
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasColumn('revoked_tokens', 'expires_at')) return;
+  const column = await knex('revoked_tokens').columnInfo('expires_at');
+  if (!column.nullable) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('revoked_tokens', table => {
+      table.timestamp('expires_at').nullable().alter();
+    });
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasTable('revoked_tokens')) return;
+  if (!await knex.schema.hasColumn('revoked_tokens', 'expires_at')) return;
+  // Refuse to discard permanent revocations or silently give them a TTL.
+  if (await knex('revoked_tokens').whereNull('expires_at').first()) {
+    throw new Error('Cannot roll back while permanent token revocations exist');
+  }
+  const column = await knex('revoked_tokens').columnInfo('expires_at');
+  if (column.nullable) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('revoked_tokens', table => {
+      table.timestamp('expires_at').notNullable().alter();
+    });
+  }
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// Tracks whether this installation has ever been offered the one-time
+// usage-reporting opt-in prompt shown to an existing admin on their first
+// login after an update (see UsageService.markPromptShown()). A fresh
+// install that went through the setup wizard's own opt-in step sets this
+// too, so upgraded and brand-new installs share one "already asked" marker
+// and neither gets asked twice. Separate from `notice_dismissed`, which
+// governs the persistent, re-visitable dashboard banner instead.
+const { formatBoolean } = require('../../src/utils/dbCompat');
+
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('product_usage_state'))) return;
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('product_usage_state', 'prompt_shown'))) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('product_usage_state', (t) => {
+      t.boolean('prompt_shown').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
+    });
+  }
+  // Existing participants already made their choice before this marker
+  // existed. Preserve it through withdrawal, pending delivery and identity
+  // recovery; none of those transitions should produce a fresh invitation.
+  await knex('product_usage_state')
+    .whereNot('status', 'disabled')
+    .update({ prompt_shown: formatBoolean(true) });
+};
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (
+    (await knex.schema.hasTable('product_usage_state')) &&
+    (await knex.schema.hasColumn('product_usage_state', 'prompt_shown'))
+  ) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('product_usage_state', (t) => t.dropColumn('prompt_shown'));
+  }
+};
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
  "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.123.0-beta.0",
+  "version": "3.131.3-beta.0",
  "lockfileVersion": 3,
  "requires": true,
  "packages": {
    "": {
      "name": "picpeak-backend",
-      "version": "3.123.0-beta.0",
+      "version": "3.131.3-beta.0",
      "dependencies": {
        "@aws-sdk/client-s3": "^3.850.0",
        "@aws-sdk/lib-storage": "^3.850.0",
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
        "knex": "^2.4.2",
        "mailparser": "^3.9.9",
        "mime-types": "^3.0.1",
-        "multer": "2.2.0",
+        "multer": "2.3.0",
        "node-cron": "^3.0.2",
        "node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
        "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
        "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
        "react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
        "sanitize-html": "2.17.7",
-        "sharp": "0.35.3",
+        "sharp": "0.35.4",
        "sqlite3": "^5.1.6",
        "swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
        "swagger-ui-express": "^5.0.1",
@@ -1716,9 +1716,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-darwin-arm64/-/sharp-darwin-arm64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-RMnFX7YQsMoh7lWfcM4NEHHymBX/rLuKNPVM84XE9ONPcaSCDgE7CHIHpSgPcO2xcRthgBy1HfNO319mwhIAkg==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-darwin-arm64/-/sharp-darwin-arm64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-Uhfl4V4lhP2nbUVF9+hyH1+luj86f1gUFeo8ALYxFoULoU+G87D43BfeMP8XHsk9boxAnCY/bf2EHwhA7MuGsA==",
      "cpu": [
        "arm64"
      ],
@@ -1734,13 +1734,13 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.3"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-darwin-x64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-darwin-x64/-/sharp-darwin-x64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Xo+5uFBtLN0BKqieTxiFzFPQAUlBbbH5iBKyRX/z1JrbnYsHTfKJnUfL8+p2TPXr1pXqao4eeL4Rl144uDpK9w==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-darwin-x64/-/sharp-darwin-x64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-hWniXY3bG5qKpkKrAwPe4y+VTPmf086YQAnkxWh7uA1YrlRouWGa0M0Mxj3ZjnXFkv7/TD1bTy9lGUK26vRvWw==",
      "cpu": [
        "x64"
      ],
@@ -1756,20 +1756,20 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": "1.3.3"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32/-/sharp-freebsd-wasm32-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-lUxcqWIj2wMQ9BrwNjngcr1gWUr5xgaGThBRqPPalIC2n67Cqj1uPh8NnA/ZhAg8hUbKl+kVHKwgUIwe6ZYPrg==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32/-/sharp-freebsd-wasm32-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-lIsKw/BU+kjB4eZjxrYrZmwOJYi3Ajrv66iAlBmUPyKc3HpnloevB1g3wxGD9P/5BbQ1brBGl65VRRrCvQDEqA==",
      "license": "Apache-2.0",
      "optional": true,
      "os": [
        "freebsd"
      ],
      "dependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-wasm32": "0.35.3"
+        "@img/sharp-wasm32": "0.35.4"
      },
      "engines": {
        "node": ">=20.9.0"
@@ -1779,9 +1779,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64/-/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-9J6ypZFpQBj4YnePGoq/S38w6nz+vqg5WZLrLGY4YuSemdMq47GMLBPO42MzwdGwpg/agZ7xzZcFHa48xlywfg==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64/-/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-suTBPTDGrI9WodccaDdwZItTSaBYASlBk1NSfElSHrUfzu3szG6lvIF58+WiFvnfzuK8ZBFS5zE00PxqxnRiPg==",
      "cpu": [
        "arm64"
      ],
@@ -1795,9 +1795,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64/-/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-m2pW1n6cns9VaubNwsZ+c3CRYjxNQWgJ5gPlnL1nbBcpkBvFm6SCFN5o0psFHI8w9n11NKhFkeEDns98tiqbEw==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64/-/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-FVJZ5mITMobmXIz/hPDTw0EintTW5H3WfrxwLqEqjiIihlu+hVRyGrFQ60xl0Lxn7Bt3zdpevPaQi0HEzqz9fw==",
      "cpu": [
        "x64"
      ],
@@ -1811,9 +1811,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm/-/sharp-libvips-linux-arm-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-1eMLzy92I4J6rmi4mAT8yC3HxOtniyGELlzGbNMLLeqe052ahFQ0h6LFq+lh5DsDIdYViIDst08abvSbcEdLXQ==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm/-/sharp-libvips-linux-arm-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-3rbU4vqXXc3hY/OiXdl52xZvT0F1yEngWfvqudtPJg/KkyiaQw2DRsFrNzpmLvfavbwOq3qXn36GP8obHRULQA==",
      "cpu": [
        "arm"
      ],
@@ -1827,9 +1827,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-dqVSFynCox4C/J8kT16V7SIFAns0IjgLwkvYT7p8LQVmJ5OS5b6tI9IGflxTeuBS//zXeFIUbwt5dwxyZ17cnA==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-0DaL0A6Xu6sQSQFwe4iVCrKWU2cCTItnRsYsCdxAMm9NF6twAA9BKnoqy4hqz4+azQ0JHuA26qiUKsf1XJ/v5A==",
      "cpu": [
        "arm64"
      ],
@@ -1843,9 +1843,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-3z0NHDxD6n5I9gc05U1eW1AyRm+Gznzq3naMrthPNqE6oYykcogW0l/jfpJdjYnuNl8R7yI9pNbE1XiUeyq0Aw==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-cdn1OvUBwsXhbC0zSzJnNzf5MZ/mTrobawDvNXBTxe8VtqKAm0sRuEY2Evzovb/w9JMk4TvRxqt1mekSuJz64w==",
      "cpu": [
        "ppc64"
      ],
@@ -1859,9 +1859,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-bsb4rI+NldGOsXuej2r8OdSS8+zXDVaCWxyWrcv6kneTOlgAHtZABRzBBCwdsPiD90J4myNJuHpg6kA20ImW/w==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-HjPVx7yKz+0lqdhDlTw1tt90wamBoxhiXpvl1XZpJLiHH4RCJ5yDTqH+VlYPv2fwFs89JFw4c1IexYOcQUi4IQ==",
      "cpu": [
        "riscv64"
      ],
@@ -1875,9 +1875,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x/-/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-/ABshyj8gCpyIrNXnHn4LorDJ0HHm1VhXPBlxZ8zAtfVPAaSafXPGn+sUSIRiwaSBy0mmFjSjiXI5mkcwdChKQ==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x/-/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-neWLh+3yCNThxnfy3c4BbVBeGgt9aftno+XbT56iK28RgeDs3UOFWviLWlUu0bArYVYJaFDK+RRohbicUNCm8Q==",
      "cpu": [
        "s390x"
      ],
@@ -1891,9 +1891,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-x64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-ITPEtgffGJ0S6G9dRyw/366tJQqFRcHWPHhC+Stpg3Z8AEMrDrTr2lhdz4f/Y/HMbRh//7Z5mBzEpVdi62Oc3w==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64/-/sharp-libvips-linux-x64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-4vKmvAst9nrowcqquKFAyZJUDolUaIp8uRiN0mWFguJ1IplC9/pitXtlnnlU4aa/eJw3J7i67V+pwUL+wZGdsA==",
      "cpu": [
        "x64"
      ],
@@ -1907,9 +1907,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64/-/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-zE9EdiUzUmg5mDT5a1rk5fYJ6GWPloTwWBYDS14naqHsL+EaMpDj1AWnpLgh3u0YCORv2Tt50wrcrpYqkP97Kw==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64/-/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-Y9kQaLMuNoB0bPYOOdcZMaseNrFpPodIWWMrx+CZyydf2xn68j9WYc6sWWRrDwNkzCQjKYfc68L7jKjGlHMibw==",
      "cpu": [
        "arm64"
      ],
@@ -1923,9 +1923,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64": {
-      "version": "1.3.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64/-/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64-1.3.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-m0lrLiUt+lBYnCFr8qV/65yMR4E/c7/wf78I5eKTdkEakFAlZ9QlzEM3QIhhAwVeUhLAHLcCq7a7Vszq/oFNZQ==",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64/-/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64-1.3.3.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-fj8Mv0HHfD1Rr+4I68+3agJynxDWtBFgicTbSOb9Bke6pIwzGcJ+RX/yHjmiEGFMCavY/dxvem7MyNaJF+wDiw==",
      "cpu": [
        "x64"
      ],
@@ -1939,9 +1939,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-linux-arm": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-arm/-/sharp-linux-arm-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-affVWCTLooy8TSxbDx2qkzuDeaWLNVBA+P//FNBirHsXpP2fuBhk5AuboYUnrDnzoXes8GFjpTx0SBFOCRg+FA==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-arm/-/sharp-linux-arm-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-7OAS8gI0EReKGVN2HssHlM6umJgxF5VI3xN0p9FA91p/YO+ou5hiNghLdZ5BEHztwaaK5+bLKRf8x/o2L2nk9A==",
      "cpu": [
        "arm"
      ],
@@ -1957,13 +1957,13 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm": "1.3.3"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-linux-arm64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-arm64/-/sharp-linux-arm64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-QgKDspHPnrU+GQ55XPhGwyhC8acLVOOSyAvo1oVfFmrIXLkDNmGWzAfDZ4xK8oSA1qBQrALcHX0G5UZni/SuFQ==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-arm64/-/sharp-linux-arm64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-De4jpEnAU8Hd5oT0j1G3uL4ZvTuipVMn7YC6vPaJhy6/7EwEae0SVAoBrUMYQbkLGDm85taVWwuPc1a44LTzCQ==",
      "cpu": [
        "arm64"
      ],
@@ -1979,13 +1979,13 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64": "1.3.3"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-linux-ppc64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-ppc64/-/sharp-linux-ppc64-0.35.3.tgz",
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+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-ppc64/-/sharp-linux-ppc64-0.35.4.tgz",
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@@ -2001,13 +2001,13 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64": "1.3.3"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-linux-riscv64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-riscv64/-/sharp-linux-riscv64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-0Eob78yjlYPfL5vMNWAW55l3R9Y6BQS/gOfe0ZcP9mEz9ohhKSt4im1hayiknXgf8AWrFqMvJcKIdmLmEe7yeQ==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-riscv64/-/sharp-linux-riscv64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-cPbNChoRURAWdebDIHSenxRpgEdy7JkPydSnUxRm9VvKD7m0/xVaR/8Fzlu81pk5nHEvHH87UZUA7cTtwnbJSA==",
      "cpu": [
        "riscv64"
      ],
@@ -2023,13 +2023,13 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64": "1.3.3"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-linux-s390x": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-s390x/-/sharp-linux-s390x-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-KgAxQ0DxpNOq1rG2t5cgTgShJFGSuU7XO45cqC+1NVOuZnP6tlgZRuSYOfNupGkHID0o3cJOsw4DVeJpMovcGw==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-s390x/-/sharp-linux-s390x-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-RY0JFY8Fd6RonCBtHz+DvadaPkXDSI1AUn6yWL9TipqkZ1vY8w8evqdgyDFnkm4/K1ve1TvZiaePP5oSd4+WVQ==",
      "cpu": [
        "s390x"
      ],
@@ -2045,13 +2045,13 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x": "1.3.3"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-linux-x64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-x64/-/sharp-linux-x64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-8pqvxubL2PGdhlPy6GLqzDYMUjyRmKAwKHYKixpdJYBUK7PJ0C029XdsnpFIdgRZG68fZiGdHVWcKPvtiPB4cA==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linux-x64/-/sharp-linux-x64-0.35.4.tgz",
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      "cpu": [
        "x64"
      ],
@@ -2067,13 +2067,13 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64": "1.3.3"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64/-/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Vz0iQjzzcSX3HCbfwFfCSG/9SCIqyO0mH2sXyiHaAYfBk0cRsCWXRyQYX0ovCK/PAQBbTzQ0dsPQHh5MAFL59w==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64/-/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-KB5jxpfWQTr0nc3xdHtWChdbifHrBGsd2SM62Eyxrl8afikm+f5qGBU75SJIZBT/S1MC8XyacdlXBMSWq6OURA==",
      "cpu": [
        "arm64"
      ],
@@ -2089,13 +2089,13 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64": "1.3.3"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64/-/sharp-linuxmusl-x64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-6O1NPKcDVj9QEdg7Hx549EX8U0rp6yXQERqru6yRN7fGBn32UvIRJUlWnk+8xDCiG76hXVBbX82NZ/ZKr0euIg==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64/-/sharp-linuxmusl-x64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-f+eZJZIQNEEd26RPSW+76chwOf1XtA2Y/O+5ocVyLliHkeih3e+jhLVBdNTd2rS3IbNXK8+ug93Vf5ZXtF5Lxg==",
      "cpu": [
        "x64"
      ],
@@ -2111,17 +2111,17 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64": "1.3.2"
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64": "1.3.3"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-wasm32": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-wasm32/-/sharp-wasm32-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-cZ0XkcYGpHZkqW6iCkqTcmUC0CD9DhD5d/qeZlZkfRBn6GnHniZXLUo5+9xw8Iv76YE6LQFN9YNBlKREcCG76w==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-wasm32/-/sharp-wasm32-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-zQnl4Kwp7Q6NHsENtU2T/00Zi+w3AQNwz3+UaTyVBy2FpXrzXzGjndpK61onhZjRtRpQXxCTeqw19bVyXOh7jA==",
      "license": "Apache-2.0 AND LGPL-3.0-or-later AND MIT",
      "optional": true,
      "dependencies": {
-        "@emnapi/runtime": "^1.11.1"
+        "@emnapi/runtime": "^1.11.3"
      },
      "engines": {
        "node": ">=20.9.0"
@@ -2131,16 +2131,16 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32/-/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-2rnq7bX3NzeR2T4YWgz8qiG4h3TSdMe+vN1iQXpJleSJ3SM5zQ8Fy2SyyXAWlbxpEZ2Y+Z4u1BePgJEYbSy80Q==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32/-/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-ESfNkywmCfPNyaZjxooddJQiQ+l/nTpGEOGthxiLnIHXC/CmcBixnfwUleX9mCz9ovrUUvKMap/pm8RYbzfwaA==",
      "cpu": [
        "wasm32"
      ],
      "license": "Apache-2.0",
      "optional": true,
      "dependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-wasm32": "0.35.3"
+        "@img/sharp-wasm32": "0.35.4"
      },
      "engines": {
        "node": ">=20.9.0"
@@ -2150,9 +2150,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-win32-arm64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-win32-arm64/-/sharp-win32-arm64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-4bPwFdMbeC4JQ8L8LOyWp6nsHcboP5fxkp6iPOXz2Vg49R42TuMs2whkJ5OAP4/Ul035qOzy0AecOF9VOscn4w==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-win32-arm64/-/sharp-win32-arm64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-iNdlBX9gLVvqe2I3uIJSIKTq6wckP/DYxZtcqxm09x5Gi24DnFBmPAWZmr60ZyYMG0xlzo6goG3670ar+RXvRw==",
      "cpu": [
        "arm64"
      ],
@@ -2169,9 +2169,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-win32-ia32": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-win32-ia32/-/sharp-win32-ia32-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-r53mXsBN6lFUDiST764SvgwUdHAqM4rPAiDzAmf4fLoB6X/rkfyTrLCg6+g17wJJiCmB3JYgHuUldCWUIRFSXw==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-win32-ia32/-/sharp-win32-ia32-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-kqRsbaa5CS6KHlpxnN7WhE6vAAugXyZButpRdvDWetlv6Qv4N9WTcrWzF7tXfB9T7MsoadqdI8hmwLq6UlLvtw==",
      "cpu": [
        "ia32"
      ],
@@ -2188,9 +2188,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@img/sharp-win32-x64": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-win32-x64/-/sharp-win32-x64-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-D4y1vNeZrIIJCN+uHaWVtH86B+aCrdMYYjicy9pXHvbGZeGYLLSd3wdVuC37FxVXlU1ARsk84eKWfWMXGYEqvA==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@img/sharp-win32-x64/-/sharp-win32-x64-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-XtmnYhBcrORsJ4XJngyzr/EWP0hRZLAZRFaApdKuviyqF78+ylxh2y06ZmtULAMOnObJ3ucpN0AcwSWnMowTRg==",
      "cpu": [
        "x64"
      ],
@@ -8084,9 +8084,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/joi": {
-      "version": "17.13.4",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/joi/-/joi-17.13.4.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-1RuuER6kmt8K8I3nIWvPZKi5RQCb568ZPyY4Pwjlua+yo+63ZTmIwxLZH0heBmiKN4uxjvCiarDrjaeH84xicQ==",
+      "version": "17.13.7",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/joi/-/joi-17.13.7.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-MF80Dm5Y2veNy8QWVx9Bj3ui4mo7+VPSPsR1M+oaHXV0Gx6zGX9a2F+OZG3Blby9tOlzU9Rs5FUimlEhbKtfnQ==",
      "license": "BSD-3-Clause",
      "dependencies": {
        "@hapi/hoek": "^9.3.0",
@@ -8120,9 +8120,9 @@
      "license": "MIT"
    },
    "node_modules/js-yaml": {
-      "version": "4.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/js-yaml/-/js-yaml-4.3.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-CY6crGq313MX8GkwvB7tzgp99vjQxY1++5y10/BKN/GUfHqWaOGQMNZkBvqSzsZKWk/ijwHlWzzkLulsGHhjWQ==",
+      "version": "4.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/js-yaml/-/js-yaml-4.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-SFNOvSJ+Dgf/9An904Yx+CgSlIPCkIpao4qo51lpee25TIRejdH3rhR4EZMGoNx3/TP3O+wzWuiTFl4sqbltzA==",
      "funding": [
        {
          "type": "github",
@@ -9195,9 +9195,9 @@
      "license": "MIT"
    },
    "node_modules/multer": {
-      "version": "2.2.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/multer/-/multer-2.2.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-6rdyFg2kLrMh9Jee7/BMPuV9lEAd7lLW2YUpF9/YxR7njyoUwwQ0ZPh3TaIY50Sw6vlyD2HW3wGOkTS4P79xrQ==",
+      "version": "2.3.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/multer/-/multer-2.3.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-cjNbm3sttszgZeGfJR124D+jFEfkXCVAsoPBmFn9X7UxmDSFHWqE2CoEj0vrmSpuAFnqWR1Szcm9QTsiHr60Xw==",
      "license": "MIT",
      "dependencies": {
        "append-field": "^1.0.0",
@@ -9398,9 +9398,9 @@
      }
    },
    "node_modules/nodemailer": {
-      "version": "9.0.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nodemailer/-/nodemailer-9.0.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Gwv8SQewT616ZM/URn0H54b8PWo/Wum7md3EW2aWy1lO27+WZCX+Xyak3J+NlmHUjDh5ME+uesJUDRbR3Ye8Bw==",
+      "version": "9.1.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nodemailer/-/nodemailer-9.1.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-izw9mVKFix6YSnC9eLgV6g1opl9DUlRio9ZNcq+Wu9Ujn2UwF+8Nl0B8nz22kEC+CTZCvinkxwJ0DeFbb6NwcQ==",
      "license": "MIT-0",
      "engines": {
        "node": ">=6.0.0"
@@ -11258,9 +11258,9 @@
      "license": "ISC"
    },
    "node_modules/sharp": {
-      "version": "0.35.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/sharp/-/sharp-0.35.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-ej0zVHuZGHCiABXcNxeYhpRnPNPAcvbG8RMdBAhDAxLKkCRVSpK3Iyu7qbqw3JMzoj0REeM6f3tJLtVwl0023Q==",
+      "version": "0.35.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/sharp/-/sharp-0.35.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-n++8XWcj+jCOr2IOl7h8LbKnGBDY4aPbmprMONBNFdn0ImXqpGVv5zliDs0V9HbmbCQLpbuo2ej9rAoOQTvMDA==",
      "license": "Apache-2.0",
      "dependencies": {
        "@img/colour": "^1.1.0",
@@ -11274,31 +11274,31 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/libvips"
      },
      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64": "1.3.2",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-ppc64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-riscv64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-s390x": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-win32-arm64": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-win32-ia32": "0.35.3",
-        "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "0.35.3"
+        "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-freebsd-wasm32": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64": "1.3.3",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-ppc64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-riscv64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-s390x": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-webcontainers-wasm32": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-win32-arm64": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-win32-ia32": "0.35.4",
+        "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "0.35.4"
      },
      "peerDependenciesMeta": {
        "@types/node": {
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
  "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.130.0-beta.0",
+  "version": "3.131.3-beta.0",
  "description": "Backend for PicPeak event photo sharing platform",
  "main": "server.js",
  "engines": {
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
    "knex": "^2.4.2",
    "mailparser": "^3.9.9",
    "mime-types": "^3.0.1",
-    "multer": "2.2.0",
+    "multer": "2.3.0",
    "node-cron": "^3.0.2",
    "node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
    "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
    "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
    "react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
    "sanitize-html": "2.17.7",
-    "sharp": "0.35.3",
+    "sharp": "0.35.4",
    "sqlite3": "^5.1.6",
    "swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
    "swagger-ui-express": "^5.0.1",
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ app.use((req, res, next) => {
 });

 // CORS configuration (apply only to API routes)
-const { isAllowedOrigin, multipartOriginAllowed } = require('./src/utils/requestOrigin');
+const { isAllowedOrigin } = require('./src/utils/requestOrigin');

 const corsOptions = {
  origin: function (origin, callback) {
@@ -528,43 +528,10 @@ app.use(['/api/admin', '/api/v1'], express.json({ limit: '50mb' }));
 app.use(express.json({ limit: '2mb' }));
 app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true, limit: '2mb' }));

-// CSRF protection: require JSON Content-Type on mutating API requests
-// This blocks cross-origin form submissions which cannot set Content-Type: application/json
-app.use('/api', (req, res, next) => {
-  if (['POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH'].includes(req.method)) {
-    const contentType = req.headers['content-type'] || '';
-    const contentLength = parseInt(req.headers['content-length'] || '0', 10);
-    // Allow empty-body requests (e.g. logout), multipart for uploads, and JSON for API calls
-    if (contentLength > 0 && !contentType.includes('application/json') && !contentType.includes('multipart/form-data')) {
-      return res.status(415).json({ error: 'Unsupported Content-Type. Use application/json or multipart/form-data.' });
-    }
-    // multipart is exactly what a cross-site <form> can send without a
-    // preflight, and in a split-origin deployment (SameSite=None) the admin
-    // cookie rides along to the upload routes. Browsers label such a
-    // submission Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site (and always send Origin on a
-    // cross-origin POST); non-browser clients send neither header and pass.
-    if (contentType.includes('multipart/form-data') && !multipartOriginAllowed(req)) {
-      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Cross-site multipart request rejected' });
-    }
-  }
-  next();
-});
+// Validate the origin independently of body length/content type.
+app.use('/api', require('./src/middleware/csrf'));

-// Request logging for API routes (with timestamps)
-const apiRequestLogger = (req, res, next) => {
-  try {
-    const started = Date.now();
-    const ts = new Date().toISOString();
-    logger.info(`[${ts}] ${req.method} ${req.originalUrl}`);
-    res.on('finish', () => {
-      const ms = Date.now() - started;
-      const tsDone = new Date().toISOString();
-      logger.info(`[${tsDone}] ${req.method} ${req.originalUrl} -> ${res.statusCode} (${ms}ms)`);
-    });
-  } catch (_) {}
-  next();
-};
-app.use('/api', apiRequestLogger);
+app.use('/api', require('./src/middleware/apiRequestLogger'));

 // Maintenance mode middleware - add after body parsing but before routes
 app.use(maintenanceMiddleware);
@@ -1098,6 +1065,30 @@ if (spaCatchAll) {
 // Global error handler (must be last)
 app.use(errorHandler);

+// App construction is side-effect free with respect to listening and workers.
+let httpServer;
+let shutdownPromise;
+// Docker stops a container 10 s after SIGTERM by default (compose sets no
+// stop_grace_period), so the drain must finish inside that window.
+const SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS = Number(process.env.SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS) || 8000;
+async function stopServer() {
+  if (shutdownPromise) return shutdownPromise;
+  shutdownPromise = (async () => {
+    const close = httpServer ? new Promise((resolve, reject) => httpServer.close(err => err ? reject(err) : resolve())) : Promise.resolve();
+    const timeout = setTimeout(() => httpServer?.closeAllConnections(), Math.floor(SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS / 2));
+    timeout.unref();
+    try {
+      await Promise.all([close, require('./src/services/serviceShutdown').stopServices()]);
+    } finally {
+      clearTimeout(timeout);
+      // Always release the pool: a rejected service stop must not leave
+      // ref'd sockets keeping the process alive until SIGKILL.
+      await db.destroy();
+    }
+  })();
+  return shutdownPromise;
+}
+
 // Initialize services
 async function startServer() {
  try {
@@ -1122,14 +1113,8 @@ async function startServer() {
    const { initializeCleanupJob } = require('./src/utils/authSecurity');
    initializeCleanupJob();
    
-    // Initialize temp upload cleanup job
-    const { cleanupTempUploads } = require('./src/utils/cleanupTempUploads');
-    // Run cleanup on startup
-    cleanupTempUploads();
-    // Schedule periodic cleanup every hour
-    setInterval(cleanupTempUploads, 60 * 60 * 1000);
-    logger.info('Temp upload cleanup scheduled');
-    
+    require('./src/utils/cleanupTempUploads').startTempUploadCleanup();
+
    // Start file watcher
    startFileWatcher();
    // External-media folder watcher (issue 1187): imports new files into
@@ -1149,6 +1134,10 @@ async function startServer() {
    startTransferCleanup();
    // Custom-resolution download archives (#858) are disposable renditions —
    // sweep them once their TTL passes so .download-cache doesn't grow forever.
+    // Best-effort, as before the scheduler refactor: a transient DB error on
+    // this one UPDATE must not abort the whole server start.
+    await require('./src/services/downloadJobService').recoverOrphanedJobs()
+      .catch((err) => logger.error('Download job recovery failed', { error: err.message }));
    startDownloadJobCleanup();
    // Reveal-mode scheduler (#838): minutely stamp for scheduled reveals.
    startRevealScheduler();
@@ -1306,7 +1295,7 @@ async function startServer() {
    // lazy means they don't pay for a module graph they never use.
    require('./src/services/faceQueue').start();

-    app.listen(PORT, () => {
+    httpServer = app.listen(PORT, () => {
      logger.info(`Server running on port ${PORT}`);
      logger.info(`Admin interface: ${process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}`);
      logger.info(`Frontend: ${process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3001'}`);
@@ -1325,10 +1314,32 @@ async function startServer() {
    });
  } catch (error) {
    logger.error('Failed to start server:', error);
-    process.exit(1);
+    await stopServer();
+    process.exitCode = 1;
  }
 }

-startServer();
+if (require.main === module) {
+  let stopping = false;
+  for (const signal of ['SIGTERM', 'SIGINT']) {
+    process.on(signal, () => {
+      if (stopping) {
+        logger.warn(`Received ${signal} again during shutdown, exiting immediately`);
+        process.exit(1);
+      }
+      stopping = true;
+      // The drain itself has no deadline; a hung worker must not keep the
+      // process alive past the container's stop grace period.
+      setTimeout(() => {
+        logger.error(`Shutdown exceeded ${SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS}ms, forcing exit`);
+        process.exit(1);
+      }, SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS).unref();
+      stopServer().catch(error => { logger.error('Shutdown failed', { error: error.message }); process.exitCode = 1; });
+    });
+  }
+  startServer();
+}
+app.startServer = startServer;
+app.stopServer = stopServer;

 module.exports = app; // For testing
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ jest.mock('../database/db', () => {
  return { db: mockDb, withRetry };
 });

+jest.mock('../utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
+jest.mock('../utils/sessionCutoff', () => ({ isTokenBeforeCutoff: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
 jest.mock('../utils/logger', () => ({
  info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
 }));
@@ -83,8 +85,12 @@ function mockEventAndAssignment({ event, assignment }) {
  assignChain.where = jest.fn().mockReturnValue(assignChain);
  assignChain.first = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(assignment);

-  db.mockImplementationOnce(() => eventsChain)
-    .mockImplementationOnce(() => assignChain);
+  db.mockImplementation((table) => {
+    if (table === 'events') return eventsChain;
+    if (table === 'customer_accounts') return { ...eventsChain, first: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 7 }) };
+    if (table === 'event_customer_assignments') return assignChain;
+    throw new Error('Unexpected table: ' + table);
+  });

  return { eventsChain, assignChain };
 }
@@ -101,7 +107,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT with active assignment', (
  it('allows access when the event_customer_assignments row exists', async () => {
    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
-      type: 'gallery',
+      type: 'gallery', iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
      eventId: 42,
      via: 'customer',
      customerId: 7,
@@ -132,7 +138,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT after revocation', () => {
  it('returns 403 CUSTOMER_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKED when the junction row is gone', async () => {
    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
-      type: 'gallery',
+      type: 'gallery', iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
      eventId: 42,
      via: 'customer',
      customerId: 7,
@@ -162,7 +168,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — customer-minted JWT after revocation', () => {
    // and start 403'ing per-event-password sessions.
    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
-      type: 'gallery',
+      type: 'gallery', iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
      eventId: 42,
      customerId: 7,
      // intentionally no `via` claim
@@ -194,7 +200,7 @@ describe('verifyGalleryAccess — per-event-password JWT', () => {
  it('does NOT touch event_customer_assignments and passes through', async () => {
    getGalleryTokenFromRequest.mockReturnValue('tkn');
    jwt.verify.mockReturnValue({
-      type: 'gallery',
+      type: 'gallery', iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
      eventId: 42,
      // No via, no customerId — this is the legacy per-event-password
      // flow where every guest mints their own JWT after entering the
@@ -120,7 +120,14 @@ const createPhotoUploader = (options = {}) => {
      files: options.maxFiles || 2000,
      fieldSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024,
      parts: 10000,
-      headerPairs: 2000
+      headerPairs: 2000,
+      // CVE-2026-82333: no preset in this factory is currently wired up to
+      // a route (nothing imports createPhotoUploader et al. — routes build
+      // their own multer instances directly), but every preset gets the
+      // limit anyway so it can't be adopted later without it. None of the
+      // uploaders this factory builds have a legitimate use for
+      // array-indexed field names.
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0
    },
    fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.media, {
      validateMagicNumbers: true
@@ -146,7 +153,8 @@ const createLogoUploader = (options = {}) => {
      }
    }),
    limits: {
-      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.medium
+      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.medium,
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 // CVE-2026-82333 — see createPhotoUploader comment
    },
    fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.logos, {
      skipMagicValidation: ['image/svg+xml']
@@ -172,7 +180,8 @@ const createFaviconUploader = (options = {}) => {
      }
    }),
    limits: {
-      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.small
+      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.small,
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 // CVE-2026-82333 — see createPhotoUploader comment
    },
    fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.favicons, {
      skipMagicValidation: ['image/x-icon', 'image/vnd.microsoft.icon']
@@ -194,7 +203,8 @@ const createGalleryUploader = (destDir, options = {}) => {
    dest: destDir,
    limits: {
      fileSize: options.maxSize || SIZE_LIMITS.large,
-      files: options.maxFiles || 10
+      files: options.maxFiles || 10,
+      fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 // CVE-2026-82333 — see createPhotoUploader comment
    },
    fileFilter: createFileFilter(ALLOWED_TYPES.photos)
  };
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ async function initializeDatabase() {
      table.integer('user_id').nullable(); // User who owned the token
      table.string('token_type', 20); // admin, gallery, etc.
      table.timestamp('revoked_at').defaultTo(db.fn.now());
-      table.timestamp('expires_at').notNullable(); // When token would have expired
+      table.timestamp('expires_at').nullable(); // NULL retains tokens without a known expiry
      table.string('reason', 100); // password_change, logout, compromised, etc.
      table.text('metadata'); // Additional JSON data
      
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+const logger = require('../utils/logger');
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../utils/requestLogPath');
+module.exports = function apiRequestLogger(req, res, next) {
+  const started = Date.now();
+  const path = requestLogPath(req.originalUrl);
+  logger.info(`${req.method} ${path}`);
+  res.once('finish', () => {
+    logger.info(`${req.method} ${path} -> ${res.statusCode} (${Date.now() - started}ms)`);
+  });
+  next();
+};
@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
-const { db } = require('../database/db');
-const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
-const { isMissingRolesSchema } = require('../utils/dbErrors');
-const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
-const { isTokenBeforeCutoff } = require('../utils/sessionCutoff');
+const sessionAccess = require('../services/sessionAccessService');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { getAdminTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');

@@ -32,100 +28,10 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
    }
    
-    // Check if token is revoked
-    if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
-      logger.warn('Revoked token used', {
-        userId: decoded.id,
-        tokenType: decoded.type
-      });
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token has been revoked', code: 'TOKEN_REVOKED' });
-    }
-
-    // Reject any session issued before the global cutoff (set by a .picpeak
-    // restore, which can reassign admin ids). Forces every pre-restore admin
-    // session to re-authenticate against the restored data.
-    if (await isTokenBeforeCutoff(decoded)) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session invalidated', code: 'SESSION_INVALIDATED' });
-    }
-    
-    // Verify token type
-    if (decoded.type !== 'admin') {
-      logger.warn('Non-admin token used for admin endpoint', { 
-        userId: decoded.id,
-        tokenType: decoded.type 
-      });
-      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Insufficient permissions' });
-    }
-    
-    // IP validation (optional - can be strict or just log)
-    const currentIp = req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress;
-    if (decoded.ip && decoded.ip !== currentIp) {
-      logger.warn('Token used from different IP', {
-        userId: decoded.id,
-        tokenIp: decoded.ip,
-        currentIp: currentIp
-      });
-    }
-    
-    // Check if admin still exists and is active, including role info
-    // Use try/catch to handle case where roles table doesn't exist yet (upgrade scenario)
-    let admin;
-    try {
-      admin = await db('admin_users')
-        .leftJoin('roles', 'roles.id', 'admin_users.role_id')
-        .where({ 'admin_users.id': decoded.id, 'admin_users.is_active': formatBoolean(true) })
-        .select(
-          'admin_users.id',
-          'admin_users.username',
-          'admin_users.email',
-          'admin_users.password_changed_at',
-          'roles.id as role_id',
-          'roles.name as role_name'
-        )
-        .first();
-    } catch (joinError) {
-      // Fail CLOSED on anything that isn't a genuinely missing roles schema:
-      // the fallback below fabricates super_admin, so a transient query failure
-      // (connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout, pool exhaustion) must
-      // not become a free privilege upgrade for every scoped admin. Rethrow →
-      // outer catch → 401, which is already how every other transient DB fault
-      // in this try block behaves (isTokenRevoked / isTokenBeforeCutoff both
-      // hit the DB here). apiTokenAuth takes the same posture on the v1
-      // surface, differing only in its 500.
-      if (!isMissingRolesSchema(joinError)) throw joinError;
-      // Fallback: roles table may not exist yet during upgrade
-      // Query without role join - user will have no role info but can still authenticate
-      logger.debug('Roles table not available, falling back to basic auth', { error: joinError.message });
-      admin = await db('admin_users')
-        .where({ id: decoded.id, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-        .select('id', 'username', 'email', 'password_changed_at')
-        .first();
-      if (admin) {
-        admin.role_id = null;
-        admin.role_name = 'super_admin'; // Assume super_admin for existing users during upgrade
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (!admin) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
-    }
-
-    // Check if password was changed after token was issued. JWT `iat` has
-    // 1-second resolution; `password_changed_at` is sub-second. Floor the
-    // comparison so a token issued in the *same* second as the password
-    // change isn't incorrectly rejected — that race used to bite anyone
-    // logging in immediately after a password reset/change.
-    if (admin.password_changed_at) {
-      const passwordChangedSeconds = Math.floor(
-        new Date(admin.password_changed_at).getTime() / 1000
-      );
-      if (decoded.iat < passwordChangedSeconds) {
-        logger.warn('Token used after password change', { userId: decoded.id });
-        return res.status(401).json({
-          error: 'Token invalid due to password change',
-          code: 'PASSWORD_CHANGED'
-        });
-      }
+    const admin = await sessionAccess.admin(decoded);
+    const requestIp = req.ip || req.connection?.remoteAddress;
+    if (decoded.ip && requestIp && decoded.ip !== requestIp) {
+      logger.info('admin session IP changed', { accountId: admin.id, tokenIp: decoded.ip, requestIp });
    }

    // Add user info to request (enhanced with role)
@@ -146,7 +52,10 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
    next();
  } catch (error) {
    logger.error('Auth middleware error:', error);
-    res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication failed' });
+    res.status(error.statusCode || 401).json({
+      error: error.isOperational ? error.message : 'Authentication failed',
+      ...(error.isOperational && { code: error.code }),
+    });
  }
 }

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+const { mutationOriginAllowed } = require('../utils/requestOrigin');
+
+module.exports = function csrfProtection(req, res, next) {
+  if (!['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE'].includes(req.method)) return next();
+  if (!mutationOriginAllowed(req)) {
+    return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Cross-site request rejected' });
+  }
+  const contentType = (req.headers['content-type'] || '').split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase();
+  const hasBody = Number(req.headers['content-length']) > 0 || !!req.headers['transfer-encoding'];
+  const jsonLike = contentType === 'application/json' || contentType.endsWith('+json');
+  if (hasBody && !jsonLike && contentType !== 'multipart/form-data') {
+    return res.status(415).json({ error: 'Unsupported Content-Type. Use application/json or multipart/form-data.' });
+  }
+  next();
+};
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../utils/requestLogPath');
 /**
 * Customer Authentication Middleware
 *
@@ -10,10 +11,7 @@
 */

 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
-const { db } = require('../database/db');
-const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
-const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
-const { isTokenBeforeCutoff } = require('../utils/sessionCutoff');
+const sessionAccess = require('../services/sessionAccessService');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { getCustomerTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');

@@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ async function customerAuth(req, res, next) {
      // normal (page polling, pre-login session probes). Bump to debug
      // for noisy investigations only.
      logger.debug('[customerAuth] no token on request', {
-        url: req.originalUrl,
+        url: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl),
        hasCookieHeader: !!req.headers?.cookie,
        cookieKeys: Object.keys(req.cookies || {}),
      });
@@ -42,7 +40,7 @@ async function customerAuth(req, res, next) {
      decoded = verified.payload;
    } catch (err) {
      logger.warn('[customerAuth] jwt verification failed', {
-        url: req.originalUrl,
+        url: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl),
        errorName: err.name,
        errorMessage: err.message,
      });
@@ -52,71 +50,10 @@ async function customerAuth(req, res, next) {
      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token', code: 'JWT_INVALID' });
    }

-    if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
-      logger.warn('[customerAuth] token revoked', {
-        url: req.originalUrl,
-        customerId: decoded.customerId,
-        tokenType: decoded.type,
-        iat: decoded.iat,
-      });
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token has been revoked', code: 'TOKEN_REVOKED' });
-    }
-
-    // Reject sessions issued before the global restore cutoff.
-    if (await isTokenBeforeCutoff(decoded)) {
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session invalidated', code: 'SESSION_INVALIDATED' });
-    }
-
-    if (decoded.type !== 'customer') {
-      logger.warn('[customerAuth] wrong token type', {
-        url: req.originalUrl,
-        tokenType: decoded.type,
-      });
-      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Insufficient permissions', code: 'WRONG_TOKEN_TYPE' });
-    }
-
-    // IP drift gets logged but doesn't reject — same lenient policy as
-    // adminAuth. Customers may roam between mobile networks frequently.
-    const currentIp = req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress;
-    if (decoded.ip && decoded.ip !== currentIp) {
-      logger.info('Customer token used from different IP', {
-        customerId: decoded.customerId,
-        tokenIp: decoded.ip,
-        currentIp,
-      });
-    }
-
-    const customer = await db('customer_accounts')
-      .where({ id: decoded.customerId, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-      .select('id', 'email', 'display_name', 'first_name', 'last_name', 'password_changed_at', 'preferred_language')
-      .first();
-
-    if (!customer) {
-      // Either deleted, deactivated, or the id was forged. 401 across the
-      // board so the frontend session-expiry handler kicks in.
-      logger.warn('[customerAuth] customer row not found / inactive', {
-        url: req.originalUrl,
-        customerId: decoded.customerId,
-      });
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token', code: 'CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUND' });
-    }
-
-    if (customer.password_changed_at) {
-      const passwordChangedSeconds = Math.floor(
-        new Date(customer.password_changed_at).getTime() / 1000
-      );
-      if (decoded.iat < passwordChangedSeconds) {
-        logger.warn('[customerAuth] token rejected: password_changed_at', {
-          url: req.originalUrl,
-          customerId: decoded.customerId,
-          iat: decoded.iat,
-          passwordChangedSeconds,
-        });
-        return res.status(401).json({
-          error: 'Token invalid due to password change',
-          code: 'PASSWORD_CHANGED',
-        });
-      }
+    const customer = await sessionAccess.customer(decoded);
+    const requestIp = req.ip || req.connection?.remoteAddress;
+    if (decoded.ip && requestIp && decoded.ip !== requestIp) {
+      logger.info('customer session IP changed', { accountId: customer.id, tokenIp: decoded.ip, requestIp });
    }

    req.customer = {
@@ -131,7 +68,10 @@ async function customerAuth(req, res, next) {
    next();
  } catch (error) {
    logger.error('Customer auth middleware error:', error);
-    res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication failed' });
+    res.status(error.statusCode || 401).json({
+      error: error.isOperational ? error.message : 'Authentication failed',
+      ...(error.isOperational && { code: error.code }),
+    });
  }
 }

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../utils/requestLogPath');
 /**
 * Global error handler middleware.
 * Catches all errors and returns standardized responses.
@@ -92,6 +93,16 @@ const handleKnownErrors = (err) => {
    return new ValidationError('Unexpected file field');
  }

+  // CVE-2026-82333: multer 2.3.0's fieldArrayIndexLimit rejects multipart
+  // field names with an oversized bracket array index (e.g. `a[99999999]`)
+  // before the DoS-prone field parser runs. Without this mapping the
+  // resulting MulterError has no .statusCode/.status and falls through to
+  // a 500 here, so map it to a proper 400 like the other multer limits.
+  if (err.code === 'LIMIT_FIELD_ARRAY_INDEX') {
+    const { ValidationError } = require('../utils/errors');
+    return new ValidationError('Field name array index too large');
+  }
+
  return err;
 };

@@ -119,7 +130,7 @@ const errorHandler = (err, req, res, next) => {

  // Log the error
  const logContext = {
-    url: req.originalUrl,
+    url: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl),
    method: req.method,
    ip: req.ip,
    statusCode,
@@ -161,7 +172,7 @@ const errorHandler = (err, req, res, next) => {
 */
 const notFoundHandler = (req, res, next) => {
  const { NotFoundError } = require('../utils/errors');
-  next(new NotFoundError('Route', req.originalUrl));
+  next(new NotFoundError('Route', requestLogPath(req.originalUrl)));
 };

 /**
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const cleanupTimers = new Set();
 const crypto = require('crypto');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
@@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ function strictRateLimit(options = {}) {
  const store = new Map();
  
  // Clean up old entries periodically
-  setInterval(() => {
+  const cleanupTimer = setInterval(() => {
    const now = Date.now();
    for (const [key, data] of store.entries()) {
      if (data.resetTime < now) {
@@ -219,6 +220,8 @@ function strictRateLimit(options = {}) {
      }
    }
  }, windowMs);
+  cleanupTimer.unref();
+  cleanupTimers.add(cleanupTimer);
  
  return (req, res, next) => {
    const ip = req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress;
@@ -255,6 +258,7 @@ function strictRateLimit(options = {}) {
 }

 module.exports = {
+  dispose() { cleanupTimers.forEach(clearInterval); cleanupTimers.clear(); },
  feedbackRateLimit,
  strictRateLimit,
  generateGuestIdentifier,
@@ -1,267 +1,104 @@
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
 const { db, withRetry } = require('../database/db');
-const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const { getGalleryTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
-const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
-const { isTokenBeforeCutoff } = require('../utils/sessionCutoff');
+const access = require('../services/galleryAccessService');

-/**
- * True when a logged-in admin is explicitly previewing this gallery (#868).
- *
- * Two conditions, both required:
- *   1. The explicit intent flag `?admin_preview=1` is present. The plain share
- *      link stays byte-identical to a guest's, so the password gate is still
- *      testable as a guest while logged in as admin — and the bypass is visible
- *      in the URL without being reusable (it carries no secret).
- *   2. A VERIFIED admin session — the httpOnly `admin_token` cookie (rides along
- *      on same-origin API calls) or an Authorization: Bearer header, never the
- *      URL. Must decode as `type: 'admin'`, issuer `picpeak-auth`.
- *
- * The cookie is tried FIRST and the Bearer is accepted only when it is itself an
- * admin token (#981 review): the frontend attaches a gallery Bearer to gallery
- * endpoints, and a header-first, type-blind read would let a coexisting gallery
- * session shadow the admin cookie and wrongly disable the preview.
- *
- * Fails closed on any verification error. Replaces the old `?preview=<raw-JWT>`
- * scheme, which leaked a 24h admin token into the address bar.
- */
+// Cookie first: a coexisting gallery Bearer must not shadow an admin preview.
 function decodeAdminPreview(req) {
  if (req.query?.admin_preview !== '1') return null;
-  // Cookie first, then a Bearer — but only an admin-typed token satisfies it.
-  const candidates = [];
-  if (req.cookies?.admin_token) candidates.push(req.cookies.admin_token);
+  const candidates = [req.cookies?.admin_token];
  const header = req.headers?.authorization;
-  if (header && header.startsWith('Bearer ')) candidates.push(header.slice(7));
-  for (const token of candidates) {
+  if (header?.startsWith('Bearer ')) candidates.push(header.slice(7));
+  for (const token of candidates.filter(Boolean)) {
    try {
-      const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+      const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
+        issuer: 'picpeak-auth', algorithms: ['HS256'],
+      });
      if (decoded.type === 'admin') return decoded;
    } catch { /* try the next candidate */ }
  }
  return null;
 }

+// Signature-only predicate retained for UI-intent callers. It never authorizes.
 function isAdminPreview(req) {
  return decodeAdminPreview(req) !== null;
 }

-/**
- * The full session check behind the preview bypass. A verified signature is
- * not a live session: adminAuth also rejects revoked tokens, tokens issued
- * before the restore cutoff, deactivated admins and tokens minted before the
- * admin's last password change. Without those a logged-out or deactivated
- * admin token kept unlocking every draft and password gallery until `exp`
- * (30 days with remember-me). Sets req.isAdminPreview on success so the
- * downstream reveal-mode and logging checks read one verified flag.
- */
-async function verifyAdminPreview(req) {
-  if (req.isAdminPreview === true) return true;
+function attachAccess(req, event, grant) {
+  req.event = event;
+  req.galleryAccess = grant;
+  req.isAdminPreview = grant.kind === 'admin';
+  req.accessLevel = grant.session?.accessLevel || 'guest';
+  req.viaCustomer = grant.session?.via === 'customer';
+  req.sessionID = req.isAdminPreview ? `gallery_admin_preview_${event.id}`
+    : `gallery_${grant.kind === 'public' ? 'public_' : ''}${event.id}_${Date.now()}`;
+  const ip = req.ip || req.connection?.remoteAddress || 'unknown';
+  const userAgent = req.get?.('User-Agent') || 'unknown';
+  req.clientInfo = {
+    ip, userAgent, fingerprint: `${ip}-${userAgent}`.substring(0, 32), timestamp: Date.now(),
+  };
+}
+
+async function verifyAdminPreview(req, event) {
+  if (req.isAdminPreview && req.galleryAccess && (!event || event.id === req.event?.id)) return true;
  const decoded = decodeAdminPreview(req);
  if (!decoded) return false;
  try {
-    if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded) || await isTokenBeforeCutoff(decoded)) return false;
-    const admin = await withRetry(async () => db('admin_users')
-      .where({ id: decoded.id, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
-      .select('id', 'password_changed_at')
-      .first());
-    if (!admin) return false;
-    if (admin.password_changed_at) {
-      const changedSeconds = Math.floor(new Date(admin.password_changed_at).getTime() / 1000);
-      if (decoded.iat < changedSeconds) return false;
-    }
-  } catch (err) {
-    logger.warn('Admin preview session check failed', { error: err.message });
+    const slug = req.params?.slug || req.requestedSlug;
+    if (!event && !slug) return false;
+    event = event || await db('events').where({ slug }).select('*').first();
+    if (!event) return false;
+    const grant = access.grant(event, 'admin', decoded);
+    await access.authorize(event, grant);
+    attachAccess(req, event, grant);
+    return true;
+  } catch (error) {
+    logger.debug('Admin gallery preview denied', { code: error.code });
+    req.adminPreviewDenied = error;
    return false;
  }
-  req.isAdminPreview = true;
-  return true;
 }

-// Middleware to verify gallery access
+function decodeGalleryToken(token) {
+  try {
+    return jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'], issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+  } catch (error) {
+    // Legacy gallery tokens lacked an issuer, but still need the same type,
+    // lifecycle and session checks as current tokens.
+    if (error.name === 'JsonWebTokenError' && error.message.includes('jwt issuer invalid')) {
+      return jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
+    }
+    throw error;
+  }
+}
+
 async function verifyGalleryAccess(req, res, next) {
  try {
-    const requestedSlug = req.params.slug || req.requestedSlug;
-
-    // Admin preview (#868) is resolved BEFORE any gallery credential (#981
-    // review): a coexisting gallery token/Bearer must not shadow it, and the
-    // admin session must never fall into the `type !== 'gallery'` reject path
-    // below. Per-request bypass — draft + password relaxed, NO gallery JWT
-    // minted (a lingering guest cookie would muddy the coexisting-cookies case).
-    // req.isAdminPreview flags downstream logging to keep it out of guest stats.
-    if (await verifyAdminPreview(req)) {
-      if (!requestedSlug) {
-        return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
-      }
-      const previewEvent = await withRetry(async () => db('events')
-        .where({ slug: requestedSlug, is_active: formatBoolean(true), is_archived: formatBoolean(false) })
-        .select('*').first());
-      if (!previewEvent) {
-        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
-      }
-      req.event = previewEvent;
-      req.isAdminPreview = true;
-      req.sessionID = `gallery_admin_preview_${previewEvent.id}`;
-      req.clientInfo = {
-        ip: req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress || 'unknown',
-        userAgent: req.get('User-Agent') || 'unknown',
-        fingerprint: `${req.ip}-${req.get('User-Agent')}`.substring(0, 32),
-        timestamp: Date.now()
-      };
-      return next();
-    }
-
-    const token = getGalleryTokenFromRequest(req, requestedSlug);
-    let event;
-
-    if (!token) {
-      if (!requestedSlug) {
-        return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
-      }
-
-      event = await withRetry(async () => db('events')
-        .where({
-          slug: requestedSlug,
-          is_active: formatBoolean(true),
-          is_archived: formatBoolean(false),
-          is_draft: formatBoolean(false)
-        })
-        .select('*').first());
-
-      if (!event) {
-        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
-      }
-
-      const requiresPassword = !(event.require_password === false || event.require_password === 0 || event.require_password === '0');
-      if (!requiresPassword) {
-        req.event = event;
-        req.sessionID = `gallery_public_${event.id}_${Date.now()}`;
-        req.clientInfo = {
-          ip: req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress || 'unknown',
-          userAgent: req.get('User-Agent') || 'unknown',
-          fingerprint: `${req.ip}-${req.get('User-Agent')}`.substring(0, 32),
-          timestamp: Date.now()
-        };
-        return next();
-      }
-
-      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
-    }
-
-    // Try to verify with issuer first, fallback to no issuer for backward compatibility
-    let decoded;
-    try {
-      decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
-        algorithms: ['HS256'],
-        issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
-      });
-    } catch (error) {
-      // If verification fails with issuer, try without issuer (backward compatibility)
-      if (error.name === 'JsonWebTokenError' && error.message.includes('jwt issuer invalid')) {
-        decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
-      } else {
-        throw error;
-      }
-    }
-    logger.debug('[verifyGalleryAccess] Token decoded successfully', { eventId: decoded.eventId, slug: requestedSlug });
-
-    // Only gallery-scoped tokens grant gallery access. Every legitimate
-    // path (password login, share link, client access, customer-minted,
-    // slideshow) mints type:'gallery'. Reject anything else — e.g. a guest
-    // identity token (type:'guest', for feedback attribution) that carries a
-    // matching eventId — instead of relying on other token types incidentally
-    // lacking an eventId to fail the id match below.
-    if (decoded.type !== 'gallery') {
+    if (await verifyAdminPreview(req)) return next();
+    // The caller asked for a preview explicitly: report why it was refused
+    // instead of falling through to a misleading guest-token error.
+    if (req.adminPreviewDenied?.isOperational) throw req.adminPreviewDenied;
+    const slug = req.params.slug || req.requestedSlug;
+    const token = getGalleryTokenFromRequest(req, slug);
+    const decoded = token ? decodeGalleryToken(token) : null;
+    if (decoded && decoded.type !== 'gallery') {
      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Invalid token type for gallery access' });
    }
-
-    // If we have a slug in the URL params or from pre-middleware, verify it matches.
-    // (Admin preview never reaches here — it returns above — so drafts stay
-    // filtered for every real gallery-token request.)
-    if (requestedSlug) {
-      // Verify by slug and ensure it matches the token's event
-      event = await withRetry(async () => db('events')
-        .where({
-          slug: requestedSlug,
-          is_active: formatBoolean(true),
-          is_archived: formatBoolean(false),
-          is_draft: formatBoolean(false)
-        })
-        .select('*').first());
-
-      // Verify the token's eventId matches
-      if (event && event.id !== decoded.eventId) {
-        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Token does not match requested gallery' });
-      }
-    } else {
-      // Fallback to using eventId from token
-      event = await withRetry(async () => db('events')
-        .where({
-          id: decoded.eventId,
-          is_active: formatBoolean(true),
-          is_archived: formatBoolean(false),
-          is_draft: formatBoolean(false)
-        })
-        .select('*').first());
-    }
-    
-    if (!event) {
-      logger.warn('[verifyGalleryAccess] Event not found for slug', { slug: requestedSlug || 'no-slug', tokenEventId: decoded.eventId });
-      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
-    }
-
-    // Customer-minted gallery JWTs (#354): when the customer obtained
-    // this token via /api/customer/events/:slug/access-token, the
-    // payload carries `via:'customer'` and `customerId`. The admin
-    // can revoke the customer's access at any time by removing the
-    // event_customer_assignments row from the "Manage galleries"
-    // dialog on the customer detail page. Re-check that row here so
-    // the revocation takes effect on the customer's very next
-    // request — no token-blacklisting machinery required.
-    if (decoded.via === 'customer' && decoded.customerId) {
-      const assignment = await withRetry(async () => {
-        return await db('event_customer_assignments')
-          .where({
-            event_id: event.id,
-            customer_account_id: decoded.customerId,
-          })
-          .first();
-      });
-      if (!assignment) {
-        logger.info('[verifyGalleryAccess] Customer assignment revoked, rejecting token', {
-          customerId: decoded.customerId,
-          eventId: event.id,
-        });
-        return res.status(403).json({
-          error: 'Access to this gallery has been revoked',
-          code: 'CUSTOMER_ASSIGNMENT_REVOKED',
-        });
-      }
-    }
-
-    logger.debug('[verifyGalleryAccess] Event located', { eventId: event.id, slug: event.slug });
-    req.event = event;
-    req.accessLevel = decoded.accessLevel || 'guest';
-    // Customer-portal provenance (#746/#849): portal-minted tokens carry
-    // via:'customer' but NO accessLevel (they default to guest), while
-    // PIN-client logins carry accessLevel:'client' without `via`. Activity
-    // attribution/dedup needs the distinction, so surface it explicitly.
-    req.viaCustomer = decoded.via === 'customer';
-    req.sessionID = decoded.sessionId || `gallery_${event.id}_${Date.now()}`;
-
-    // Create client info for logging (similar to secureImageMiddleware but simpler)
-    req.clientInfo = {
-      ip: req.ip || req.connection.remoteAddress || 'unknown',
-      userAgent: req.get('User-Agent') || 'unknown',
-      fingerprint: `${req.ip}-${req.get('User-Agent')}`.substring(0, 32), // Limit to 32 chars for DB column
-      timestamp: Date.now()
-    };
-    
-    logger.debug('[verifyGalleryAccess] Access granted', { eventId: event.id, slug: event.slug });
-    next();
+    if (!slug && !decoded?.eventId) return res.status(401).json({ error: 'No token provided' });
+    const event = await withRetry(() => db('events').where(slug ? { slug } : { id: decoded.eventId }).select('*').first());
+    if (!event) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found or expired' });
+    const grant = access.grant(event, decoded ? 'gallery' : 'public', decoded);
+    await access.authorize(event, grant);
+    attachAccess(req, event, grant);
+    return next();
  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Error verifying gallery access', { error: error.message, stack: error.stack });
-    res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
+    if (!error.isOperational) logger.error('Error verifying gallery access', { error: error.message });
+    return res.status(error.statusCode || 401).json({
+      error: error.isOperational ? error.message : 'Invalid token',
+      ...(error.code && error.isOperational && { code: error.code }),
+    });
  }
 }

@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');

+function canAccessEvent(admin, event) {
+  return Boolean(admin && event && (admin.roleName === 'super_admin'
+    || event.created_by == null || Number(event.created_by) === Number(admin.id)));
+}
+
 /**
 * Middleware to enforce event ownership for non-super_admin users.
 * Super admins bypass the check. Other admins can only access events they created.
@@ -23,7 +28,7 @@ function requireEventOwnership(req, res, next) {
        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
      }
      // Allow access if: event has no owner (legacy/system), or admin owns it
-      if (event.created_by && event.created_by !== req.admin.id) {
+      if (!canAccessEvent(req.admin, event)) {
        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Access denied' });
      }
      next();
@@ -165,6 +170,7 @@ function requireProjectOwnership(req, res, next) {
 }

 module.exports = {
+  canAccessEvent,
  requireEventOwnership,
  filterOwnedEventIds,
  scopeEventsQuery,
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../utils/requestLogPath');
 /**
 * Permission Checking Middleware for RBAC
 * Provides role-based access control with caching for performance
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ function requirePermission(permissions, options = { requireAll: false }) {
          userId: req.admin.id,
          username: req.admin.username,
          requiredPermissions: permArray,
-          path: req.path,
+          path: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl || req.path),
          method: req.method
        });
        throw new ForbiddenError('Insufficient permissions');
@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ function requireSuperAdmin() {
        logger.warn('Super admin access denied', {
          userId: req.admin.id,
          username: req.admin.username,
-          path: req.path,
+          path: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl || req.path),
          method: req.method
        });
        throw new ForbiddenError('Super Admin access required');
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const { requestLogPath } = require('../utils/requestLogPath');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const secureImageService = require('../services/secureImageService');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
@@ -10,12 +11,24 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
    this.suspiciousIPs = new Set();
    this.blockedFingerprints = new Set();
    this.rateLimitViolations = new Map();
+    this.cleanupTimer = null;
+  }
+
+  start() {
+    if (this.cleanupTimer) return;
+    this.cleanupTimer = setInterval(() => this.cleanup(), 300000);
+    this.cleanupTimer.unref();
+  }
+  dispose() {
+    clearInterval(this.cleanupTimer); this.cleanupTimer = null;
+    this.suspiciousIPs.clear(); this.blockedFingerprints.clear(); this.rateLimitViolations.clear();
  }

  /**
   * Main security middleware for image access
   */
  secureImageAccess = async (req, res, next) => {
+    this.start();
    try {
      const startTime = Date.now();
      const clientIP = this.getClientIP(req);
@@ -56,7 +69,7 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
        error: error.message,
        stack: error.stack,
        ip: req.ip,
-        path: req.path
+        path: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl || req.path)
      });
      
      res.status(500).json({ 
@@ -328,7 +341,7 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
        client_ip: req.clientInfo?.ip || req.ip,
        client_fingerprint: req.clientInfo?.fingerprint,
        user_agent: req.get('User-Agent')?.substring(0, 255),
-        request_path: req.path,
+        request_path: requestLogPath(req.originalUrl || req.path),
        request_method: req.method,
        details: JSON.stringify(details),
        timestamp: new Date().toISOString()
@@ -409,9 +422,4 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
 // Create singleton instance
 const secureImageMiddleware = new SecureImageMiddleware();

-// Setup cleanup interval
-setInterval(() => {
-  secureImageMiddleware.cleanup();
-}, 300000); // Every 5 minutes
-
 module.exports = secureImageMiddleware;
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ const CACHE_DURATION = 30 * 60 * 1000; // 30 minutes - reduced DB queries
 // behaviour is unchanged: the timer fires every 5 min as long as
 // the server has anything else keeping the loop alive (HTTP server,
 // other intervals), which is always.
-setInterval(() => {
+const cleanupTimer = setInterval(() => {
  const now = Date.now();
  for (const [token, lastActivity] of sessions.entries()) {
    if (now - lastActivity > DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT) {
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ function getActiveSessions() {
 }

 module.exports = {
+  dispose: () => { clearInterval(cleanupTimer); sessions.clear(); cachedTimeout = null; cacheExpiry = 0; },
  sessionTimeoutMiddleware,
  isSessionExpired,
  endSession,
@@ -182,16 +182,17 @@ router.post('/logout', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
  // old header-only read skipped revocation entirely for cookie-based logout,
  // leaving the JWT valid until expiry while reporting a successful logout.
  const token = req.token;
+  clearAdminAuthCookie(res);
  if (token) {
    // End the in-memory session AND revoke the JWT (GHSA-cjqh) — the token
    // is otherwise valid until expiry, so photoAuth/adminAuth would keep
    // honouring it after logout. isTokenRevoked() checks this store.
    endSession(token);
    const { revokeToken } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
-    await revokeToken(token, 'logout');
+    if (!await revokeToken(token, 'logout')) {
+      throw new Error('Token revocation failed');
+    }
  }
-  // Clear the auth cookie so the browser stops sending the (now revoked) JWT.
-  clearAdminAuthCookie(res);

  // Log activity
  await logActivity('admin_logout',
@@ -202,7 +202,11 @@ const picpeakUpload = multer({
    destination: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, os.tmpdir()),
    filename: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, `picpeak-upload-${Date.now()}-${crypto.randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}.picpeak`),
  }),
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5 GB — .picpeak with photos can be large
+  // CVE-2026-82333: this route only ever consumes a single unnamed file
+  // field (`backup`) — no legitimate bracket-indexed field name (e.g.
+  // `a[0]`) exists in its form. fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 rejects any field
+  // name using array-index syntax at all, closing multer's field-parser DoS.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 5 GB — .picpeak with photos can be large
 });

 // Upload + restore a .picpeak onto THIS instance. DESTRUCTIVE: full override of
@@ -109,7 +109,9 @@ const pdfLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({

 const pdfLogoUpload = multer({
  storage: pdfLogoStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 },
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `logo` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
  fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
    const allowed = ['image/png', 'image/jpeg', 'image/svg+xml'];
    if (allowed.includes(file.mimetype)) cb(null, true);
@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ const pageLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({

 const pageLogoUpload = multer({
  storage: pageLogoStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 },
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `logo` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
  fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
    const allowed = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/svg+xml'];
    if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowed)) cb(null, true);
@@ -73,7 +73,9 @@ const signedPdfStorage = multer.diskStorage({

 const signedPdfUpload = multer({
  storage: signedPdfStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 10 MB
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `file` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 10 MB
  fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
    const allowed = ['application/pdf'];
    if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowed)) return cb(null, true);
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ const express = require('express');
 const router = express.Router();
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
-const { databaseBackupService } = require('../services/databaseBackup');
+const { databaseBackupService, isUnderPubliclyServableRoot } = require('../services/databaseBackup');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
@@ -60,7 +60,28 @@ router.put('/config', requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
      'database_backup_email_on_failure',
      'database_backup_email_on_success'
    ];
-    
+
+    // A backup.create holder (the built-in `admin` role has it without
+    // settings.edit or backup.restore) could otherwise point backups at a
+    // public static mount and fetch the dump unauthenticated — see
+    // isUnderPubliclyServableRoot's comment (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm class).
+    if (
+      typeof req.body.database_backup_destination_path === 'string'
+      && isUnderPubliclyServableRoot(req.body.database_backup_destination_path)
+    ) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Destination path must not be inside a publicly served directory' });
+    }
+
+    // A retention of 0 or less pushes cleanupOldBackups' cutoff to today or
+    // the future, deleting every completed backup on the next scheduled run
+    // — a backup.create holder achieving what backup.delete gates on /cleanup.
+    if (
+      req.body.database_backup_retention_days !== undefined
+      && (!Number.isFinite(req.body.database_backup_retention_days) || req.body.database_backup_retention_days < 1)
+    ) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'database_backup_retention_days must be a positive number' });
+    }
+
    const updates = [];
    
    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(req.body)) {
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
-const { slugify } = require('../../utils/slug');
+
 const { adminAuth } = require('../../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission, userHasAllPermissions } = require('../../middleware/permissions');
 const { IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL } = require('../../utils/emailNormalization');
@@ -25,14 +25,13 @@ const eventTypeService = require('../../services/eventTypeService');
 const { normaliseEventTimeTriple } = require('../../services/eventService');
 const { hasColumnCached } = require('../../utils/schemaCache');
 const { requireEventOwnership } = require('../../middleware/ownership');
-const { getAppSetting } = require('../../utils/appSettings');
+
 const { galleryPasswordColumns, dropCopiesIfStorageOff } = require('../../utils/galleryPasswordVault');
-const { clampIntOrUndefined } = require('../../utils/numericHelpers');
+
 const { getFrontendBaseUrl, getAbsoluteFrontendUrl } = require('../../utils/frontendUrl');
 const downloadZipService = require('../../services/downloadZipService');
-const { resolveEventFeedbackDefaults, applyFeedbackDefaults, KEYBIND_MODES } = require('../../services/feedbackDefaults');
-const { validateHeroImageAnchor, getEventFieldRequirements, readBooleanSetting, getDownloadProtectionDefaults,
-  getImageSecurityDefaults, resolveImageSecurityColumns, getBrandingDefaults, getCustomerNameFromPayload, getCustomerEmailFromPayload, getCustomerPhoneFromPayload, isPhoneFieldEnabled, mapEventForApi, hasCustomerContactColumns, deleteEventCascade, SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS, SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS } = require('./helpers');
+const { KEYBIND_MODES } = require('../../services/feedbackDefaults');
+const { validateHeroImageAnchor, getCustomerNameFromPayload, getCustomerEmailFromPayload, getCustomerPhoneFromPayload, isPhoneFieldEnabled, mapEventForApi, hasCustomerContactColumns, deleteEventCascade } = require('./helpers');

 /**
 * `events.slug` is UNIQUE, and both routes that mint one do a read-then-insert
@@ -174,7 +173,6 @@ async function queueGalleryCreatedEmail(event, { password, requirePassword } = {

 module.exports = (router) => {

-
  // Create new event
  router.post('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('events.create'), [
    body('event_type').notEmpty().trim().custom(async (value) => {
@@ -240,7 +238,6 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
    body('watermark_text').optional().trim(),
    // #328 follow-up: per-event opt-in for presigned-URL "Download All".
    // Bypasses watermarks; admin must enable knowingly.
-    body('allow_presigned_download').optional().isBoolean(),
    // Feedback sub-toggles (#1044). Optional: omitting them inherits the
    // global Settings > Events defaults.
    body('allow_ratings').optional().isBoolean(),
@@ -298,571 +295,13 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
        return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
      }

-      // Get field requirements from settings
-      const fieldRequirements = await getEventFieldRequirements();
-
-      const {
-        event_type,
-        event_name,
-        event_date,
-        // Migration 137 — calendar time fields. is_full_day defaults to
-        // true at the service layer when undefined (legacy form payloads).
-        event_time_start,
-        event_time_end,
-        is_full_day,
-        admin_email,
-        password,
-        welcome_message = '',
-        color_theme = null,
-        expiration_days = 30,
-        allow_user_uploads = false,
-        upload_category_id = null,
-        allow_downloads = true,
-        disable_right_click = false,
-        enable_devtools_protection: enableDevtoolsProtectionInput,
-        watermark_downloads = false,
-        watermark_text = null,
-        allow_presigned_download = false,
-        require_password: requirePasswordInput,
-        // Feedback settings. The allow_* sub-toggles deliberately have NO
-        // destructuring defaults: `undefined` means "the caller didn't say",
-        // which inherits the global Settings > Events default (#1044). The
-        // admin create form posts explicit values (it seeds its own panel
-        // from the same globals), so inheritance here is what covers the v1
-        // API and any other caller that omits them.
-        feedback_enabled: feedbackEnabledInput,
-        allow_ratings: allowRatingsInput,
-        allow_likes: allowLikesInput,
-        allow_comments: allowCommentsInput,
-        allow_favorites: allowFavoritesInput,
-        allow_reactions: allowReactionsInput,
-        allow_color_labels: allowColorLabelsInput,
-        keybind_mode: keybindModeInput,
-        require_name_email = false,
-        moderate_comments = true,
-        show_feedback_to_guests = true,
-        // The create form has always shown the identity-mode chooser and this
-        // route has never read it, so a gallery created as 'guest' quietly came
-        // out 'simple' and the photographer had to set it again on the event.
-        // Surfaced by adding a third mode (#1197); the fix is the same for all
-        // three. Unknown values fall back rather than reaching the column,
-        // which on Postgres is guarded by a CHECK constraint.
-        identity_mode: identityModeInput,
-        // CSS Template
-        css_template_id = null,
-        // Hero logo settings
-        hero_logo_visible = true,
-        // Header style settings
-        header_style = 'standard',
-        hero_divider_style = 'wave',
-        // Hero image anchor position (#162)
-        hero_image_anchor = 'center',
-        // Photo cap
-        photo_cap = null,
-        // Client access settings (#172)
-        client_access_enabled = false,
-        client_password = null,
-        // Draft mode
-        is_draft = true,
-        // Default photo sort
-        default_photo_sort = 'upload_date_desc',
-        // Banner overrides (#440 / #932) — see the insert below.
-        promo_mode = 'inherit',
-        promo_markdown = null,
-        info_mode = 'inherit',
-        info_markdown = null
-      } = req.body;
-
-      const customerName = getCustomerNameFromPayload(req.body);
-      const customerEmail = getCustomerEmailFromPayload(req.body);
-      // Phone field is opt-in via the global setting (#322). If disabled,
-      // ignore whatever the client posted — defence in depth against form
-      // bypass.
-      const phoneEnabled = await isPhoneFieldEnabled();
-      const customerPhone = phoneEnabled ? getCustomerPhoneFromPayload(req.body) : null;
-
-      const customerColumnsAvailable = await hasCustomerContactColumns();
-
-      // Conditional validation based on settings
-      const validationErrors = [];
-      if (fieldRequirements.require_customer_name && !customerName) {
-        validationErrors.push({ path: 'customer_name', msg: 'Customer name is required' });
-      }
-      if (fieldRequirements.require_customer_email && !customerEmail) {
-        validationErrors.push({ path: 'customer_email', msg: 'Customer email is required' });
-      }
-      if (fieldRequirements.require_admin_email && !admin_email) {
-        validationErrors.push({ path: 'admin_email', msg: 'Admin email is required' });
-      }
-      if (fieldRequirements.require_event_date && !event_date) {
-        validationErrors.push({ path: 'event_date', msg: 'Event date is required' });
-      }
-
-      if (validationErrors.length > 0) {
-        return res.status(400).json({ errors: validationErrors });
-      }
-
-      // Default require_password from global "event_default_require_password"
-      // setting when the body omits it (#317 — admins want to flip the default).
-      let requirePasswordFallback = true;
-      if (requirePasswordInput === undefined) {
-        const setting = await readBooleanSetting('event_default_require_password');
-        if (setting !== undefined) requirePasswordFallback = setting;
-      }
-      const requirePassword = parseBooleanInput(requirePasswordInput, requirePasswordFallback);
-
-      // Default feedback_enabled from global "event_default_feedback_enabled"
-      // setting when the body omits it (#520 — same pattern as require_password
-      // above, lets admins make Guest Feedback ON the out-of-box default for
-      // new events instead of toggling it on every time).
-      let feedbackEnabledFallback = false;
-      if (feedbackEnabledInput === undefined) {
-        const setting = await readBooleanSetting('event_default_feedback_enabled');
-        if (setting !== undefined) feedbackEnabledFallback = setting;
-      }
-      const feedback_enabled = parseBooleanInput(feedbackEnabledInput, feedbackEnabledFallback);
-
-      // Sub-toggle defaults from the global Settings > Events values (#1044).
-      // One batched read; an explicitly-sent body value still wins.
-      const feedbackDefaults = applyFeedbackDefaults({
-        allow_ratings: allowRatingsInput,
-        allow_likes: allowLikesInput,
-        allow_comments: allowCommentsInput,
-        allow_favorites: allowFavoritesInput,
-        allow_reactions: allowReactionsInput,
-        allow_color_labels: allowColorLabelsInput,
-        keybind_mode: keybindModeInput,
-      }, await resolveEventFeedbackDefaults());
-
-      // Debug logging
-      logger.debug('Download control values', {
-        allow_downloads,
-        disable_right_click,
-        watermark_downloads,
-        watermark_text,
-        require_password: requirePassword,
-        types: {
-          allow_downloads: typeof allow_downloads,
-          disable_right_click: typeof disable_right_click,
-          watermark_downloads: typeof watermark_downloads
-        }
-      });
-    
-      let passwordValidation = null;
-
-      if (requirePassword) {
-        passwordValidation = await validatePasswordInContext(password, 'gallery', {
-          eventName: event_name
-        });
-
-        if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
-          return res.status(400).json({ 
-            error: 'Password does not meet security requirements',
-            details: passwordValidation.errors,
-            score: passwordValidation.score,
-            feedback: passwordValidation.feedback
-          });
-        }
-      }
-    
-      // Generate unique slug. Uses the shared util so accented names
-      // (Família, Decoração, etc.) get transliterated instead of dropped
-      // — see backend/src/utils/slug.js for the why (#525).
-      const processedEventName = slugify(event_name);
-
-      // Use event_date in slug if provided, otherwise use random suffix
-      const slugSuffix = event_date || crypto.randomBytes(3).toString('hex');
-      const baseSlug = `${event_type}-${processedEventName}-${slugSuffix}`;
-      let slug = baseSlug;
-      let counter = 1;
-
-      while (await db('events').where({ slug }).first()) {
-        slug = `${baseSlug}-${counter}`;
-        counter++;
-      }
-    
-      // Generate share link respecting configured format
-      const shareToken = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
-      const { shareUrl, shareLinkToStore } = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug, shareToken });
-    
-      // Hash password with configurable rounds (random placeholder when not required)
-      const password_hash = requirePassword
-        ? await bcrypt.hash(password, getBcryptRounds())
-        : await bcrypt.hash(crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex'), getBcryptRounds());
-    
-      // Calculate expiration date (days after event date)
-      // If expiration is not required, expires_at will be null (never expires)
-      // If event_date is not provided, use current date as base for expiration
-      let expires_at = null;
-      if (fieldRequirements.require_expiration) {
-        const baseDate = event_date || new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0];
-        // Parse YYYY-MM-DD format as local date to avoid timezone issues
-        if (baseDate.match(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/)) {
-          const [year, month, day] = baseDate.split('-').map(num => parseInt(num, 10));
-          expires_at = new Date(year, month - 1, day);
-        } else {
-          expires_at = new Date(baseDate);
-        }
-        expires_at.setDate(expires_at.getDate() + parseInt(expiration_days, 10));
-      }
-    
-      // Create folder structure
-      const storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../../storage');
-      const eventPath = path.join(storagePath, 'events/active', slug);
-      await fs.mkdir(path.join(eventPath, 'collages'), { recursive: true });
-      await fs.mkdir(path.join(eventPath, 'individual'), { recursive: true });
-    
-      // Sync header_style / hero_divider_style from color_theme JSON when not
-      // explicitly provided in the request body (#158).
-      let effectiveHeaderStyle = header_style;
-      let effectiveDividerStyle = hero_divider_style;
-      if (color_theme && (!req.body.header_style || !req.body.hero_divider_style)) {
-        try {
-          if (typeof color_theme === 'string' && color_theme.startsWith('{')) {
-            const parsed = JSON.parse(color_theme);
-            if (!req.body.header_style && parsed.headerStyle) {
-              effectiveHeaderStyle = parsed.headerStyle;
-            }
-            if (!req.body.hero_divider_style && parsed.heroDividerStyle) {
-              effectiveDividerStyle = parsed.heroDividerStyle;
-            }
-          }
-        } catch (_) {
-        // color_theme is not JSON – nothing to extract
-        }
-      }
-
-      // Get branding defaults for hero logo settings (Feature 7: Branding Inheritance)
-      const brandingDefaults = await getBrandingDefaults();
-      // hero_logo_visible: store NULL ("inherit") unless the admin explicitly
-      // set it, so the global branding_logo_display_hero toggle keeps
-      // controlling this gallery afterwards (#756). Only an explicit per-event
-      // choice overrides the global. `!= null` treats an explicit null the same
-      // as omitted (both → inherit); otherwise formatBoolean(null) would coerce
-      // to 0/false on SQLite instead of NULL (the PUT handler already does this).
-      const effectiveHeroLogoVisible = req.body.hero_logo_visible != null
-        ? formatBoolean(hero_logo_visible)
-        : null;
-      // NULL = inherit the global branding_logo_size (#756), resolved at read
-      // time. Only an explicit per-event size overrides it.
-      const effectiveHeroLogoSize = req.body.hero_logo_size || null;
-      const effectiveHeroLogoPosition = req.body.hero_logo_position || brandingDefaults.hero_logo_position;
-
-      // Inherit "Detect dev tools" from the global Image Security setting unless
-      // the request explicitly overrides it (#317 — admin disabled it globally
-      // but new events still got it ON because the column default is true).
-      const protectionDefaults = await getDownloadProtectionDefaults();
-      // #1296 — the other four Image-security settings, which were written,
-      // rendered as controls, and read by nothing. Same inheritance rule as
-      // the devtools setting below. Creation-time only; see
-      // getImageSecurityDefaults for why existing events are left alone.
-      const imageSecurityColumns = resolveImageSecurityColumns(
-        req.body,
-        await getImageSecurityDefaults(),
-      );
-      const effectiveEnableDevtoolsProtection =
-      enableDevtoolsProtectionInput !== undefined
-        ? enableDevtoolsProtectionInput
-        : protectionDefaults.enable_devtools_protection !== undefined
-          ? protectionDefaults.enable_devtools_protection
-          : true;
-
-      // Migration 137 — normalise calendar time triple. Throws AppError
-      // 400 when is_full_day=false but times are malformed/inverted.
-      const calendarTriple = normaliseEventTimeTriple({
-        event_time_start, event_time_end, is_full_day,
-      });
-      const calendarColumnsExist = await hasColumnCached('events', 'is_full_day');
-
-      // Insert into database
-      // Seed the new event's Live Slideshow display style from the PICPEAK-WIDE
-      // preset (app_settings, Settings → Slideshow). New events inherit it and the
-      // admin can still override per event. Watermark is left NULL = inherit the
-      // global watermark; the share token is minted on demand, not seeded. Guarded
-      // so un-migrated installs (mid-branch) don't reference missing columns.
-      let slideshowSeed = {};
-      if (await hasColumnCached('events', 'show_interval_ms')) {
-        try {
-          // parseInt-first: the previous `Number.isFinite(+v)` pre-check let
-          // NaN through for null/''/true (+null is 0, parseInt(null) is NaN),
-          // producing show_interval_ms=NaN in the INSERT — PG rejects that
-          // with "invalid input syntax for type integer" while SQLite
-          // silently stores NULL, so event creation 500'd on PG whenever the
-          // slideshow app_settings rows were absent.
-          const intP = (v, min, max) => clampIntOrUndefined(v, min, max);
-          const oneOf = (v, allowed) => (allowed.includes(v) ? v : undefined);
-          const i = intP(await getAppSetting('slideshow_interval_ms', undefined), 1000, 120000);
-          const tr = oneOf(await getAppSetting('slideshow_transition', undefined), SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS);
-          const tms = intP(await getAppSetting('slideshow_transition_ms', undefined), 100, 5000);
-          const cf = oneOf(await getAppSetting('slideshow_colorfilter', undefined), SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS);
-          if (i !== undefined) slideshowSeed.show_interval_ms = i;
-          if (tr) slideshowSeed.show_transition = tr;
-          if (tms !== undefined) slideshowSeed.show_transition_ms = tms;
-          if (cf) slideshowSeed.show_colorfilter = cf;
-        } catch (e) {
-          logger.warn('Failed to seed slideshow settings from global preset', { error: e.message });
-        }
-      }
-
-      const insertResult = await db('events').insert({
-        slug,
-        event_type,
-        event_name,
-        ...slideshowSeed,
-        event_date: event_date || null,
-        ...(calendarColumnsExist ? {
-          event_time_start: calendarTriple.event_time_start,
-          event_time_end: calendarTriple.event_time_end,
-          is_full_day: formatBoolean(calendarTriple.is_full_day),
-        } : {}),
-        ...(customerColumnsAvailable ? { customer_name: customerName, customer_email: customerEmail } : {}),
-        ...(customerPhone ? { customer_phone: customerPhone } : {}),
-        host_name: customerName || null,
-        host_email: customerEmail || null,
-        admin_email: admin_email || null,
-        password_hash,
-        // Opt-in recoverable copy (#1271), written with the hash so the two
-        // can never disagree. Empty unless the security setting is on.
-        ...(await galleryPasswordColumns({
-          ...(requirePassword && password ? { password } : {}),
-          ...(client_access_enabled && client_password ? { clientPassword: client_password } : {}),
-        })),
-        welcome_message,
-        color_theme,
-        share_link: shareLinkToStore,
-        share_token: shareToken,
-        expires_at: expires_at ? expires_at.toISOString() : null,
-        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
-        created_by: req.admin.id,
-        allow_user_uploads,
-        upload_category_id,
-        allow_downloads: formatBoolean(allow_downloads !== undefined ? allow_downloads : true),
-        disable_right_click: formatBoolean(disable_right_click !== undefined ? disable_right_click : false),
-        enable_devtools_protection: formatBoolean(effectiveEnableDevtoolsProtection),
-        // Request value, else the global default, else the column default —
-        // a key absent here is one the database fills in (#1296).
-        ...imageSecurityColumns,
-        watermark_downloads: formatBoolean(watermark_downloads !== undefined ? watermark_downloads : false),
-        watermark_text,
-        allow_presigned_download: formatBoolean(allow_presigned_download === true || allow_presigned_download === 'true'),
-        require_password: formatBoolean(requirePassword),
-        css_template_id: css_template_id || null,
-        // Already formatBoolean-coerced above, or null = inherit global (#756).
-        hero_logo_visible: effectiveHeroLogoVisible,
-        hero_logo_size: effectiveHeroLogoSize,
-        hero_logo_position: effectiveHeroLogoPosition,
-        // Banner overrides. Both were accepted by the validators above and
-        // then dropped here, so an API client could POST info_mode:'off' or a
-        // custom banner, get 201, and find the row still on 'inherit'.
-        // Markdown is only stored for 'custom' — same rule the PUT applies.
-        promo_mode: ['inherit', 'custom', 'off'].includes(promo_mode) ? promo_mode : 'inherit',
-        promo_markdown: promo_mode === 'custom' && typeof promo_markdown === 'string' && promo_markdown.trim()
-          ? promo_markdown.trim() : null,
-        info_mode: ['inherit', 'custom', 'off'].includes(info_mode) ? info_mode : 'inherit',
-        info_markdown: info_mode === 'custom' && typeof info_markdown === 'string' && info_markdown.trim()
-          ? info_markdown.trim() : null,
-        header_style: effectiveHeaderStyle || 'standard',
-        hero_divider_style: effectiveDividerStyle || 'wave',
-        hero_image_anchor: hero_image_anchor || 'center',
-        photo_cap: photo_cap || null,
-        is_draft: formatBoolean(parseBooleanInput(is_draft, true)),
-        default_photo_sort: default_photo_sort || 'upload_date_desc',
-        // Client access (#172)
-        client_access_enabled: formatBoolean(client_access_enabled),
-        ...(client_access_enabled && client_password ? {
-          client_password_hash: await bcrypt.hash(client_password, getBcryptRounds()),
-          client_share_token: crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex')
-        } : {}),
-        // Per-event opt-in for hero-photo OG share image (#474). Defaults
-        // false on create — admin opts in from the event detail page once
-        // they've picked a hero they're comfortable surfacing publicly.
-        og_image_share_enabled: formatBoolean(req.body.og_image_share_enabled === true),
-      }).returning('id');
-    
-      // Handle both PostgreSQL (returns array of objects) and SQLite (returns array of IDs)
-      const eventId = insertResult[0]?.id || insertResult[0];
-      // #1271 — the setting was read before the hashes; re-check after the write
-      await dropCopiesIfStorageOff(eventId);
-
-      // Apply customer-account assignments (#354). Skip when the customer
-      // portal flag is off — the frontend hides the picker in that case,
-      // but a stale tab could still POST customer_account_ids; we ignore
-      // them rather than 403 the entire create.
-      if (Array.isArray(req.body.customer_account_ids)) {
-        try {
-          const customerAccountsService = require('../../services/customerAccountsService');
-          if (await customerAccountsService.isCustomerPortalEnabled()) {
-            await customerAccountsService.setAssignmentsForEvent(
-              eventId,
-              req.body.customer_account_ids,
-              req.admin.id
-            );
-          }
-        } catch (e) {
-          logger.error('Failed to set customer assignments on event create', {
-            eventId, error: e.message,
-          });
-        }
-      }
-
-      // Insert feedback settings if feedback is enabled
-      if (feedback_enabled) {
-        await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
-          event_id: eventId,
-          feedback_enabled: formatBoolean(feedback_enabled),
-          allow_ratings: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_ratings),
-          allow_likes: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_likes),
-          allow_comments: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_comments),
-          allow_favorites: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_favorites),
-          allow_reactions: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_reactions),
-          allow_color_labels: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_color_labels),
-          keybind_mode: feedbackDefaults.keybind_mode,
-          require_name_email: formatBoolean(require_name_email),
-          moderate_comments: formatBoolean(moderate_comments),
-          show_feedback_to_guests: formatBoolean(show_feedback_to_guests),
-          identity_mode: ['simple', 'guest', 'shared'].includes(identityModeInput)
-            ? identityModeInput
-            : 'simple',
-          created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
-          updated_at: new Date().toISOString()
-        });
-      }
-    
-      // Log activity
-      await logActivity('event_created',
-        { event_type, expires_at, require_password: requirePassword, password_strength: passwordValidation?.score },
-        eventId,
-        { type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username }
-      );
-
-      // Fire event.created webhook (#327). If the event is being published
-      // immediately (not a draft), event.published also fires below.
-      // Payload uses canonical event subject (#341) so receivers always see
-      // the same shape (id/slug/event_name + customer contact + share_*).
-      try {
-        const webhookService = require('../../services/webhookService');
-        await webhookService.fire('event.created', {
-          event: {
-            ...webhookService.buildEventSubject({
-              id: eventId,
-              slug,
-              event_name,
-              event_type,
-              event_date,
-              share_url: shareUrl,
-              share_token: shareToken,
-              customer_name: customerName,
-              customer_email: customerEmail,
-              customer_phone: customerPhone,
-            }),
-            is_draft: parseBooleanInput(is_draft, true),
-          },
-        });
-      } catch (e) { /* webhookService.fire never throws but be defensive */ }
-
-      // Queue creation email (only if there is a recipient and event is not a draft)
-      // Language detection is handled by email processor
-      const isDraft = parseBooleanInput(is_draft, true);
-
-      if (customerEmail && !isDraft) {
-      // Build email data with optional client access info
-        const emailData = {
-          customer_name: customerName,
-          customer_email: customerEmail,
-          host_name: customerName || (customerEmail ? customerEmail.split('@')[0] : null),
-          event_name,
-          event_date: event_date,  // Pass raw date - will be formatted by email processor
-          gallery_link: shareUrl,
-          gallery_password: requirePassword ? password : 'No password required',
-          expiry_date: expires_at ? expires_at.toISOString() : null,  // Pass ISO string - will be formatted by email processor
-          welcome_message: welcome_message || ''
-        };
-
-        // Include client access info in email when enabled (#172)
-        if (client_access_enabled && client_password) {
-          const createdEvent = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
-          // Same FRONTEND_URL-before-APP_URL order as before: APP_URL is
-          // passed as the override so it still outranks the general_site_url
-          // setting and the request origin. Chaining it after the resolver
-          // would make it dead code, because the resolver only returns falsy
-          // when NOTHING is configured (#1104).
-          const frontendUrl = await getAbsoluteFrontendUrl(req, { override: process.env.APP_URL });
-          emailData.client_link = `${frontendUrl}/gallery/${slug}/client-access?token=${createdEvent.client_share_token}`;
-          emailData.client_password = client_password;
-        }
-
-        await db('email_queue').insert({
-          event_id: eventId,
-          recipient_email: customerEmail,
-          email_type: 'gallery_created',
-          email_data: JSON.stringify(emailData),
-          status: 'pending',
-          created_at: new Date()
-        // scheduled_at will use default value
-        });
-      }
-
-      // WhatsApp gallery_ready notification (#640D). Fires when the event is
-      // created NOT as a draft, the `whatsapp` flag is on, a config exists, and
-      // the customer supplied a phone number. Non-fatal: a queue failure should
-      // never block gallery creation.
-      if (!isDraft && customerPhone) {
-        try {
-          const { queueWhatsapp, getWhatsAppConfig } = require('../../services/whatsappProcessor');
-          const waConfig = await getWhatsAppConfig();
-          if (waConfig && waConfig.enabled) {
-            await queueWhatsapp(eventId, customerPhone, 'gallery_created', {
-              customer_name: customerName || '',
-              event_name,
-              gallery_link: shareUrl,
-              gallery_password: requirePassword ? password : '',
-              expiry_date: expires_at ? expires_at.toISOString() : null,
-              language: null, // resolved by processor via general_default_language
-            });
-          }
-        } catch (waError) {
-          logger.warn('Failed to queue WhatsApp notification on create', { error: waError.message });
-        }
-      }
-
-      // Fire event.published when the event is created NOT as a draft. The
-      // separate /publish endpoint fires it for the draft → live transition;
-      // this covers the "create-and-publish in one shot" path.
-      if (!isDraft) {
-        try {
-          const webhookService = require('../../services/webhookService');
-          await webhookService.fire('event.published', {
-            event: webhookService.buildEventSubject({
-              id: eventId,
-              slug,
-              event_name,
-              event_type,
-              event_date,
-              share_url: shareUrl,
-              share_token: shareToken,
-              customer_name: customerName,
-              customer_email: customerEmail,
-              customer_phone: customerPhone,
-            }),
-          });
-        } catch (e) { /* non-fatal */ }
-      }
-
-      res.json({
-        id: eventId,
-        slug,
-        event_name,
-        event_type,
-        customer_name: customerName,
-        customer_email: customerEmail,
-        require_password: requirePassword,
-        photo_cap: photo_cap || null,
-        is_draft: isDraft,
-        share_link: shareUrl,
-        expires_at: expires_at ? expires_at.toISOString() : null,
-        created_at: new Date().toISOString()
+      const created = await require('../../services/eventCreationService').createEvent(req.body, {
+        actor: req.admin,
+        frontendUrl: await getAbsoluteFrontendUrl(req, { override: process.env.APP_URL }),
      });
+      res.json(created);
    } catch (error) {
+      if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json(error.responseBody || { error: error.message, code: error.code });
      if (isDuplicateSlugError(error)) {
        logger.warn('Event creation lost the slug race', { error: error.message });
        return res.status(409).json(DUPLICATE_SLUG_RESPONSE);
@@ -1425,6 +864,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
        share_token: shareToken,
        expires_at: newExpiresAt ? newExpiresAt.toISOString() : null,
        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
        created_by: req.admin.id,
        allow_user_uploads: source.allow_user_uploads,
        upload_category_id: source.upload_category_id,
@@ -1441,7 +881,6 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
        use_canvas_rendering: source.use_canvas_rendering,
        watermark_downloads: source.watermark_downloads,
        watermark_text: source.watermark_text,
-        allow_presigned_download: source.allow_presigned_download,
        require_password: source.require_password,
        css_template_id: source.css_template_id || null,
        hero_logo_visible: source.hero_logo_visible,
@@ -1598,7 +1037,6 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
    body('disable_right_click').optional().isBoolean(),
    body('watermark_downloads').optional().isBoolean(),
    body('watermark_text').optional().trim(),
-    body('allow_presigned_download').optional().isBoolean(),
    body('source_mode').optional().isIn(['managed', 'reference']),
    body('external_path').optional({ nullable: true }).isString().trim(),
    body('external_watch').optional().isBoolean(),
@@ -2029,8 +1467,6 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
        }
      }

-
-
      // Sync header_style / hero_divider_style from color_theme JSON when not
      // explicitly provided in the request body (#158).  This ensures the
      // database columns stay in sync even if the frontend only sends the
@@ -2232,12 +1668,12 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
      }

-      const newStatus = !event.is_active;
+      const newStatus = !parseBooleanInput(event.is_active, false);
      await db('events')
        .where('id', id)
        .update({
-          is_active: newStatus,
-          updated_at: new Date()
+          is_active: formatBoolean(newStatus),
+          updated_at: new Date().toISOString()
        });

      // Log activity
@@ -1,392 +1,9 @@
-// Extracted verbatim from the original routes/adminEvents.js (see ./index.js).
-// Shared helpers + module-level caches used across the adminEvents sub-routers.
-
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
 const fs = require('fs').promises;
 const path = require('path');
 const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
-const { parseStringInput } = require('../../utils/parsers');
+const settings = require('../../services/eventSettings');

-// Shared validator for hero_image_anchor – accepts legacy keywords or "X% Y%" focal point
-const validateHeroImageAnchor = (value) => {
-  if (['top', 'center', 'bottom'].includes(value)) return true;
-  if (typeof value === 'string' && /^\d{1,3}%\s+\d{1,3}%$/.test(value)) {
-    const [x, y] = value.split(/\s+/).map(v => parseInt(v));
-    if (x >= 0 && x <= 100 && y >= 0 && y <= 100) return true;
-  }
-  throw new Error('Must be top, center, bottom, or "X% Y%" (0-100)');
-};
-
-// Get storage path from environment or default
-const getStoragePath = () => process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../../../storage');
-
-// Helper to get event field requirements from settings
-const getEventFieldRequirements = async () => {
-  try {
-    const settings = await db('app_settings')
-      .whereIn('setting_key', [
-        'event_require_customer_name',
-        'event_require_customer_email',
-        'event_require_admin_email',
-        'event_require_event_date',
-        'event_require_expiration'
-      ])
-      .select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
-
-    const requirements = {
-      require_customer_name: true,
-      require_customer_email: true,
-      require_admin_email: true,
-      require_event_date: true,
-      require_expiration: true
-    };
-
-    settings.forEach(s => {
-      let value = s.setting_value;
-      if (typeof value === 'string') {
-        try {
-          value = JSON.parse(value);
-        } catch (e) {
-          value = value === 'true';
-        }
-      }
-      if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_customer_name') requirements.require_customer_name = value;
-      if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_customer_email') requirements.require_customer_email = value;
-      if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_admin_email') requirements.require_admin_email = value;
-      if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_event_date') requirements.require_event_date = value;
-      if (s.setting_key === 'event_require_expiration') requirements.require_expiration = value;
-    });
-
-    return requirements;
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to get event field requirements', { error: error.message });
-    return {
-      require_customer_name: true,
-      require_customer_email: true,
-      require_admin_email: true,
-      require_event_date: true,
-      require_expiration: true
-    };
-  }
-};
-
-// Helper to read app_settings booleans by key, used to inherit per-setting
-// defaults onto new events. Returns `undefined` for missing/non-boolean rows
-// so callers can fall back to a legacy default.
-/**
- * Decode an app_settings value into the JS value it represents.
- *
- * setting_value is JSON text on SQLite and may already be decoded by the
- * driver on a PG json column, so one parse does not normalise both. On top
- * of that, the Image Security tab used to PUT back values it had read
- * undecoded, wrapping another layer of quoting around each one on every
- * save — the GET handler decodes now, but installs carry however many
- * layers they accumulated before that.
- *
- * Every reader of app_settings has to agree about this, or the admin UI
- * shows one thing while event creation does another.
- *
- * Terminates: each parse of a string is strictly shorter than its input.
- */
-const decodeSettingValue = (raw) => {
-  let value = raw;
-  while (typeof value === 'string') {
-    let parsed;
-    try { parsed = JSON.parse(value); } catch { break; }
-    if (parsed === value) break;
-    value = parsed;
-  }
-  return value;
-};
-
-const readBooleanSetting = async (key) => {
-  try {
-    const setting = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', key).first();
-    if (!setting) return undefined;
-    const value = decodeSettingValue(setting.setting_value);
-    return typeof value === 'boolean' ? value : undefined;
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to read app setting', { key, error: error.message });
-    return undefined;
-  }
-};
-
-// Helper to read the global "enable_devtools_protection" admin setting so
-// new events inherit it instead of always falling back to the DB column default
-// (#317 — admin disabled it globally but new events still got it ON).
-const getDownloadProtectionDefaults = async () => {
-  return { enable_devtools_protection: await readBooleanSetting('enable_devtools_protection') };
-};
-
-/**
- * The rest of Settings → Image security, as creation defaults (#1296).
- *
- * Four settings in that panel were written, reloaded and rendered as
- * controls, and read by nothing:
- *
- *   default_protection_level     → events.protection_level
- *   default_image_quality        → events.image_quality
- *   enable_canvas_rendering      → events.use_canvas_rendering
- *
- * Each maps onto a column migration 038 already created, and each is
- * labelled "… by default", so applying them at creation is what the panel
- * has always claimed to do. `enable_devtools_protection` above is the only
- * one of the five that was ever wired.
- *
- * Creation-time only, deliberately. Applying them to EXISTING events would
- * silently change live galleries on upgrade — an install with
- * enable_canvas_rendering already on would switch every grid to canvas
- * rendering, which is memory-expensive at scale and is the profile under
- * investigation in #1287. New events only; existing rows untouched.
- *
- * Any value that is missing or malformed comes back undefined so the caller
- * falls through to the column default, exactly as before this existed.
- */
-const PROTECTION_LEVELS = ['basic', 'standard', 'enhanced', 'maximum'];
-
-// parseInt would rescue malformed settings instead of rejecting them:
-// parseInt('72oops') is 72, parseInt(72.5) is 72, parseInt([72]) is 72.
-// That matters because the settings PUT stores whatever JSON it is handed
-// without validating the value (adminImageSecurity.js writes
-// JSON.stringify(value) for any allow-listed key), so those shapes really
-// can be sitting in app_settings. Accept only a genuine integer, or a
-// string that is exactly one.
-const toInteger = (value) => {
-  if (typeof value === 'number') return Number.isInteger(value) ? value : undefined;
-  if (typeof value === 'string' && /^[+-]?\d+$/.test(value.trim())) return Number(value.trim());
-  return undefined;
-};
-
-const getImageSecurityDefaults = async (trx = null) => {
-  const defaults = {};
-  try {
-    // Accepts a transaction the way getAppSetting does. It matters on
-    // sqlite3, whose pool holds a single connection: a caller already inside
-    // db.transaction() that read through the global `db` would block on the
-    // connection its own transaction holds until the acquire timeout, and
-    // the catch below would then quietly swallow it and drop the defaults.
-    const query = trx || db;
-    const rows = await query('app_settings')
-      .whereIn('setting_key', [
-        'default_protection_level',
-        'default_image_quality',
-        'enable_canvas_rendering',
-      ])
-      .select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
-
-    // app_settings holds JSON text on SQLite, while a PG json column comes
-    // back already decoded — so one parse is not enough to normalise both.
-    // Worse, GET /api/admin/image-security/settings returns setting_value
-    // without decoding it and the settings tab PUTs the whole fetched object
-    // straight back through JSON.stringify, so opening the tab and saving
-    // re-encodes every value it read as text. After one such round trip
-    // `true` is stored as "\"true\"" and a single parse yields the string
-    // 'true', which the type checks below reject — the settings would go
-    // quietly dead again, which is the bug this whole change exists to fix.
-    // The GET handler now decodes, so this stops accumulating — but installs
-    // that already stacked N layers have to keep working, and N is however
-    // many times someone opened that tab. So unwrap until it stops being a
-    // JSON string rather than to a fixed depth; this terminates because each
-    // parse of a string is strictly shorter than its input.
-    const read = (key) => {
-      const row = rows.find((r) => r.setting_key === key);
-      if (!row) return undefined;
-      return decodeSettingValue(row.setting_value);
-    };
-
-    const level = read('default_protection_level');
-    if (typeof level === 'string' && PROTECTION_LEVELS.includes(level)) {
-      defaults.protection_level = level;
-    }
-
-    // The column is an integer percentage; anything outside 1..100 is a
-    // misconfiguration and falls through rather than being clamped into
-    // something the operator did not choose.
-    const quality = toInteger(read('default_image_quality'));
-    if (quality !== undefined && quality >= 1 && quality <= 100) {
-      defaults.image_quality = quality;
-    }
-
-    const canvas = read('enable_canvas_rendering');
-    if (typeof canvas === 'boolean') {
-      defaults.use_canvas_rendering = canvas;
-    }
-
-  } catch (error) {
-    // A settings read must never block event creation; the column defaults
-    // are a correct fallback.
-    logger.error('Failed to read image-security defaults', { error: error.message });
-  }
-  return defaults;
-};
-
-/**
- * Build the image-security columns for a NEW event: an explicit request
- * value wins, then the global default, then the column default (the key is
- * omitted entirely so the database supplies it).
- *
- * Shared by the admin create route and POST /api/v1/events so the configured
- * security level cannot depend on which entry point created the gallery —
- * the same split that made #592 (devtools) a separate bug from #317.
- *
- * `body` values are already validated by the route's express-validator
- * chain; `defaults` come from getImageSecurityDefaults(), which validates
- * them itself.
- */
-const resolveImageSecurityColumns = (body = {}, defaults = {}) => {
-  const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
-  const columns = {};
-  // express-validator runs isInt/isIn/isBoolean element-wise on arrays, so a
-  // single-element array like `image_quality: [72]` passes the route's chain
-  // and arrives here still an array. The routes reject those with
-  // .not().isArray(); this guard means any future caller cannot write one
-  // into a scalar column (a PG insert error, or `[false]` coerced to true).
-  const scalar = (v) => (v !== null && typeof v === 'object' ? undefined : v);
-  const pick = (key) => {
-    const fromBody = scalar(body[key]);
-    return fromBody !== undefined ? fromBody : defaults[key];
-  };
-
-  const level = pick('protection_level');
-  if (level !== undefined) columns.protection_level = level;
-
-  const quality = pick('image_quality');
-  if (quality !== undefined) columns.image_quality = quality;
-
-  const canvas = pick('use_canvas_rendering');
-  if (canvas !== undefined) columns.use_canvas_rendering = formatBoolean(canvas);
-
-
-  return columns;
-};
-
-// Helper to get branding defaults for new events (Feature 7: Branding Inheritance).
-//
-// Note: `branding_logo_position` (header bar — left/center/right) is a
-// different concept from `hero_logo_position` (hero block — top/center/
-// bottom) and must NOT be mapped here. A previous version copied the
-// branding value over, which wrote 'left'/'right' into per-event
-// hero_logo_position columns and broke any subsequent PUT validation
-// (#357). Migration 084 heals existing rows.
-const getBrandingDefaults = async () => {
-  try {
-    const settings = await db('app_settings')
-      .whereIn('setting_key', [
-        'branding_logo_display_hero',
-        'branding_logo_size'
-      ])
-      .select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
-
-    const defaults = {
-      hero_logo_visible: true,
-      hero_logo_size: 'medium',
-      hero_logo_position: 'top'
-    };
-
-    settings.forEach(s => {
-      let value = s.setting_value;
-      if (typeof value === 'string') {
-        try { value = JSON.parse(value); } catch (e) { /* use as-is */ }
-      }
-      if (s.setting_key === 'branding_logo_display_hero') {
-        defaults.hero_logo_visible = value !== false;
-      }
-      if (s.setting_key === 'branding_logo_size' && value) {
-        defaults.hero_logo_size = value;
-      }
-    });
-
-    return defaults;
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Failed to get branding defaults', { error: error.message });
-    return {
-      hero_logo_visible: true,
-      hero_logo_size: 'medium',
-      hero_logo_position: 'top'
-    };
-  }
-};
-
-// Use parseStringInput from shared parsers for customer data extraction
-const getCustomerNameFromPayload = (payload = {}) => parseStringInput(payload.customer_name);
-const getCustomerEmailFromPayload = (payload = {}) => parseStringInput(payload.customer_email);
-const getCustomerPhoneFromPayload = (payload = {}) => parseStringInput(payload.customer_phone);
-
-// Whether the global "phone field" toggle (#322) is enabled. Cached for
-// the request via a module-level read; drift is acceptable since this
-// only governs whether to persist the field, not security boundaries.
-const isPhoneFieldEnabled = async () => {
-  try {
-    const row = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'event_phone_field_enabled').first();
-    if (!row) return false;
-    let value = row.setting_value;
-    if (typeof value === 'string') {
-      try { value = JSON.parse(value); } catch { /* keep raw */ }
-    }
-    return value === true;
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.debug('Failed to read event_phone_field_enabled', { error: error.message });
-    return false;
-  }
-};
-
-const RECOVERABLE_PASSWORD_COLUMNS = ['password_recoverable', 'client_password_recoverable'];
-
-const mapEventForApi = (event) => {
-  if (!event || typeof event !== 'object') {
-    return event;
-  }
-
-  const {
-    host_name,
-    host_email,
-    customer_name,
-    customer_email,
-    customer_phone,
-    // Bound only to exclude the secrets from `...rest` — never read.
-    password_hash: _ph, client_password_hash: _cph,
-    ...rest
-  } = event;
-  // #1271 — the encrypted copies never leave the server except via
-  // /:id/password. Removed by name (not destructured) so a secret scanner
-  // does not read the binding as a hard-coded password.
-  for (const column of RECOVERABLE_PASSWORD_COLUMNS) delete rest[column];
-
-  return {
-    ...rest,
-    customer_name: customer_name ?? host_name ?? null,
-    customer_email: customer_email ?? host_email ?? null,
-    customer_phone: customer_phone ?? null
-  };
-};
-
-let customerColumnCache = null;
-const hasCustomerContactColumns = async () => {
-  if (customerColumnCache === true) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  try {
-    const hasColumn = await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'customer_email');
-    if (hasColumn) {
-      customerColumnCache = true;
-    }
-    return hasColumn;
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.debug('Failed to detect customer_email column', { error: error.message });
-    return false;
-  }
-};
-
-// Cascade-delete a single event: photos, audit/access logs, queued emails,
-// the event row itself (in one transaction), then the on-disk folder /
-// archive zip / hero logo (best-effort — file failures don't unwind the DB
-// changes since the source of truth is the database). Used by both the
-// per-event DELETE /:id route and the bulk-delete route to avoid drift.
-//
-// Throws { code: 'EVENT_NOT_FOUND' } if the event id doesn't exist so the
-// bulk-delete loop can report it as a per-id failure without aborting the
-// whole batch. Any other error propagates and is the caller's problem.
 async function deleteEventCascade(eventId, adminContext) {
  const event = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
  if (!event) {
@@ -678,40 +295,4 @@ async function deleteEventCascade(eventId, adminContext) {
  return { id: event.id, name: event.event_name };
 }

-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Live Slideshow ("Diashow") — a token-only fullscreen kiosk link for live
-// events that auto-picks-up new uploads (migration 138). Mirrors the
-// client-access second-token pattern: the link is minted on demand, rotatable
-// and disable-able, independent of the gallery password / share link.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-// Allowed slide transition styles (kept in sync with the SlideshowPage).
-// dipwhite/dipblack = fade through highlights / lowlights between images.
-const SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS = ['crossfade', 'cut', 'slide', 'kenburns', 'dipwhite', 'dipblack'];
-// Allowed per-slide color filters.
-const SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS = ['none', 'bw', 'sepia', 'warm', 'cool', 'vignette'];
-// Allowed slideshow play orders (#202). 'chronological' = upload order,
-// 'random' = client-side shuffle.
-const SLIDESHOW_ORDERS = ['chronological', 'random'];
-module.exports = {
-  RECOVERABLE_PASSWORD_COLUMNS,
-  validateHeroImageAnchor,
-  getStoragePath,
-  getEventFieldRequirements,
-  readBooleanSetting,
-  decodeSettingValue,
-  getDownloadProtectionDefaults,
-  getImageSecurityDefaults,
-  resolveImageSecurityColumns,
-  getBrandingDefaults,
-  getCustomerNameFromPayload,
-  getCustomerEmailFromPayload,
-  getCustomerPhoneFromPayload,
-  isPhoneFieldEnabled,
-  mapEventForApi,
-  hasCustomerContactColumns,
-  deleteEventCascade,
-  SLIDESHOW_ORDERS,
-  SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS,
-  SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS,
-};
+module.exports = { ...settings, deleteEventCascade };
@@ -31,7 +31,9 @@ const eventLogoStorage = multer.diskStorage({

 const eventLogoUpload = multer({
  storage: eventLogoStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5MB
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `logo` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 5MB
  fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
    const allowedMimeTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/svg+xml'];
    if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowedMimeTypes)) {
@@ -41,7 +41,10 @@ function diskUpload(subdir) {
      },
      filename: (_req, file, cb) => cb(null, `${subdir.split('/').pop()}-${Date.now()}${path.extname(file.originalname) || ''}`),
    }),
-    limits: { fileSize: 15 * 1024 * 1024 },
+    // CVE-2026-82333: both callers (`inboundUpload` → 'file', `proofUpload`
+    // → 'proof') take a single unnamed field — no legitimate array-indexed
+    // field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+    limits: { fileSize: 15 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
    fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => (ALLOWED_MIME.includes(file.mimetype) ? cb(null, true) : cb(new Error('Only PDF, JPEG or PNG files are allowed'))),
  });
 }
@@ -72,7 +72,9 @@ const importedInvoiceStorage = multer.diskStorage({
 });
 const importedInvoiceUpload = multer({
  storage: importedInvoiceStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024 },
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `pdf` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
  fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
    if (file.mimetype === 'application/pdf') cb(null, true);
    else cb(new Error('Only PDF files are allowed for imported invoices'));
@@ -112,7 +112,12 @@ const createUpload = (maxFileSizeBytes) => multer({
    files: 2000, // Hard safety ceiling; actual limit enforced dynamically
    fieldSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB for non-file fields
    parts: 10000,
-    headerPairs: 2000
+    headerPairs: 2000,
+    // CVE-2026-82333: files arrive as repeated `photos` parts via
+    // multer's own .array('photos', N) — not bracket-indexed field names
+    // like `photos[0]` — so no legitimate field name uses array-index
+    // syntax at all. Reject any that do.
+    fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0
  },
  fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
    // req.allowedMimeTypes is populated by the middleware that runs before multer
@@ -153,7 +153,10 @@ const { validateFileType } = require('../utils/fileSecurityUtils');

 const upload = multer({
  storage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5MB
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed field (`logo` or `watermarkLogo`) per
+  // route — no legitimate array-indexed field names, so reject any
+  // bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 5MB
  fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
    // Note: SVG files are excluded from magic number validation for logos
    const allowedMimeTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/svg+xml'];
@@ -181,7 +184,9 @@ const faviconStorage = multer.diskStorage({

 const faviconUpload = multer({
  storage: faviconStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 2 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 2MB — roomy enough for a 512×512+ square PNG
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `favicon` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 2 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 2MB — roomy enough for a 512×512+ square PNG
  fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
    const allowedMimeTypes = ['image/png', 'image/x-icon', 'image/vnd.microsoft.icon'];
    const name = file.originalname.toLowerCase();
@@ -204,7 +204,9 @@ router.post('/regenerate', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.edit'), async (r
          // cannot clobber each other, and writes thumbnail_path back itself.
          // Nulling thumbnail_path is what stops it short-circuiting on
          // isThumbnailValid — the same trick /regenerate-previews uses.
-          const newThumbnailPath = await ensureThumbnail({ ...photo, thumbnail_path: null });
+          // `force` is what stops it joining a lazy generation that is still
+          // running under the OLD settings and adopting that result (#1020).
+          const newThumbnailPath = await ensureThumbnail({ ...photo, thumbnail_path: null }, { force: true });

          if (newThumbnailPath) {
            // Drop the superseded canonical rendition when the key MOVED.
@@ -293,7 +295,8 @@ router.post('/regenerate-previews', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.edit'),
          // is precisely the case this endpoint exists for (a replaced
          // reference source, or a corrupted rendition).
          await require('../services/imageProcessor').deletePreviewTiers(photo);
-          const newPreviewPath = await ensurePreviewImage({ ...photo, preview_path: null });
+          // `force`: never adopt a lazy generation already in flight (#1020).
+          const newPreviewPath = await ensurePreviewImage({ ...photo, preview_path: null }, { force: true });
          if (newPreviewPath) {
            successCount++;
          } else {
@@ -50,7 +50,10 @@ const tempStorage = multer.diskStorage({
 function buildAdminUploader(maxSizeBytes, allowed) {
  return multer({
    storage: tempStorage,
-    limits: { fileSize: maxSizeBytes, files: ADMIN_MAX_FILES },
+    // CVE-2026-82333: files arrive as repeated `files` parts via .array(),
+    // not bracket-indexed field names like `files[0]` — no legitimate
+    // field name uses array-index syntax at all. Reject any that do.
+    limits: { fileSize: maxSizeBytes, files: ADMIN_MAX_FILES, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
    fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
      if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowed)) return cb(null, true);
      return cb(new Error('This file type is not allowed'));
@@ -73,6 +73,13 @@ router.post(
  '/dismiss',
  wrap(async (_req, res) => res.json(await service.dismiss()))
 );
+// Acknowledges the one-time opt-in prompt (setup wizard or the post-update
+// modal) regardless of whether the admin enabled or declined — either way it
+// must not ask this installation again.
+router.post(
+  '/prompt-seen',
+  wrap(async (_req, res) => res.json(await service.markPromptShown()))
+);
 router.post(
  '/enable',
  wrap(async (req, res) =>
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
+const { isGalleryAvailable } = require('../utils/galleryLifecycle');
 const express = require('express');
 const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
 const { body, validationResult } = require('express-validator');

 const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
@@ -354,7 +356,9 @@ router.post('/logout', async (req, res) => {

    if (token) {
      // Revoke the token so it can't be reused, then end the session
-      await revokeToken(token, 'user_logout');
+      if (!await revokeToken(token, 'user_logout')) {
+        throw new Error('Token revocation failed');
+      }
      endSession(token);

      try {
@@ -398,6 +402,8 @@ router.post('/logout', async (req, res) => {

    res.json({ message: 'Logged out successfully', ...(ssoLogoutUrl ? { ssoLogoutUrl } : {}) });
  } catch (error) {
+    clearAdminAuthCookie(res);
+    clearGalleryAuthCookies(res);
    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Logout failed');
  }
 });
@@ -420,7 +426,7 @@ router.post('/gallery/verify', [
      .where({ slug, is_active: formatBoolean(true), is_archived: formatBoolean(false) })
      .first();

-    if (!event) {
+    if (!isGalleryAvailable(event)) {
      // Perform a dummy bcrypt compare to prevent timing-based slug enumeration
      await bcrypt.compare(password || '', DUMMY_BCRYPT_HASH);
      await trackFailedAttempt(`gallery:${slug}`, ipAddress, userAgent);
@@ -496,6 +502,9 @@ router.post('/gallery/verify', [
      eventId: event.id, 
      eventSlug: event.slug,
      type: 'gallery',
+      // Unique per token: the revocation key falls back to eventId+iat otherwise,
+      // so one guest's logout would revoke every same-second login (#1357).
+      jti: crypto.randomUUID(),
      ip: ipAddress,
      loginTime: Date.now()
    }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { 
@@ -545,7 +554,7 @@ router.post('/gallery/:slug/client-login', [
      .where({ slug, is_active: formatBoolean(true), is_archived: formatBoolean(false) })
      .first();

-    if (!event || !event.client_access_enabled || !event.client_password_hash) {
+    if (!isGalleryAvailable(event) || !event.client_access_enabled || !event.client_password_hash) {
      await trackFailedAttempt(`client:${slug}`, ipAddress, userAgent);
      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid credentials' });
    }
@@ -570,6 +579,9 @@ router.post('/gallery/:slug/client-login', [
      eventId: event.id,
      eventSlug: event.slug,
      type: 'gallery',
+      // Unique per token: the revocation key falls back to eventId+iat otherwise,
+      // so one guest's logout would revoke every same-second login (#1357).
+      jti: crypto.randomUUID(),
      accessLevel: 'client',
      ip: ipAddress,
      loginTime: Date.now()
@@ -631,14 +643,14 @@ router.post('/gallery/share-login', [
      .where({ slug, is_active: formatBoolean(true), is_archived: formatBoolean(false) })
      .first();

-    if (!event) {
+    if (!isGalleryAvailable(event)) {
      const resolved = await resolveShareIdentifier(slug);
      if (resolved?.event) {
        event = resolved.event;
      }
    }

-    if (!event) {
+    if (!isGalleryAvailable(event)) {
      await trackFailedAttempt(shareIdentifier, ipAddress, userAgent);
      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found' });
    }
@@ -666,6 +678,9 @@ router.post('/gallery/share-login', [
      eventId: event.id,
      eventSlug: event.slug,
      type: 'gallery',
+      // Unique per token: the revocation key falls back to eventId+iat otherwise,
+      // so one guest's logout would revoke every same-second login (#1357).
+      jti: crypto.randomUUID(),
      ip: ipAddress,
      loginTime: Date.now()
    }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
@@ -703,11 +718,14 @@ router.post('/gallery/logout', async (req, res) => {
    const { slug } = req.body || {};
    const token = getGalleryTokenFromRequest(req, slug);
    if (token) {
-      await revokeToken(token, 'gallery_logout');
+      if (!await revokeToken(token, 'gallery_logout')) {
+        throw new Error('Token revocation failed');
+      }
    }
    clearGalleryAuthCookies(res, slug);
    res.json({ message: 'Logged out successfully' });
  } catch (error) {
+    clearGalleryAuthCookies(res, req.body?.slug);
    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Logout failed');
  }
 });
@@ -743,106 +761,26 @@ router.get('/session', async (req, res) => {
        issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
      });

-      // Check if token has been revoked (e.g. after logout)
-      const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
-      if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
-        return res.status(401).json({ valid: false, error: 'Session has been invalidated' });
-      }
-
-      // The redirect loop reported on the v3.32.4-beta.0 release came
-      // from /auth/session reporting valid: true while the protected
-      // adminAuth / galleryAuth middleware rejected the same token for
-      // reasons /auth/session never checked: the admin user was
-      // deactivated, the admin's password had been changed since iat,
-      // or the gallery event was archived/deleted. Mirror those checks
-      // here so the session endpoint is always at least as strict as
-      // what the protected endpoints will enforce next.
-      // Full user payload for admin sessions — the SSO callback establishes
-      // the session via redirect (no JSON response the SPA could store), so
-      // session restoration must be able to hydrate the user object (#798).
+      const sessions = require('../services/sessionAccessService');
      let adminUser = null;
-
      if (decoded.type === 'admin') {
-        let admin = null;
-        try {
-          admin = await db('admin_users')
-            .leftJoin('roles', 'roles.id', 'admin_users.role_id')
-            .where({ 'admin_users.id': decoded.id, 'admin_users.is_active': formatBoolean(true) })
-            .select(
-              'admin_users.id', 'admin_users.username', 'admin_users.email',
-              'admin_users.password_changed_at', 'admin_users.must_change_password',
-              'roles.name as role_name', 'roles.display_name as role_display_name'
-            )
-            .first();
-        } catch (lookupErr) {
-          // admin_users table not present (test fixture, fresh DB) — fall
-          // through and trust the token. Real deployments always have it.
-          admin = null;
-          // intentional swallow; if the table is missing we do not want
-          // to fail-closed during e.g. early bootstrap.
-        }
-
-        if (admin === null) {
-          // Lookup didn't run because the table is missing; skip the
-          // existence/password checks and treat the token as valid.
-        } else if (!admin) {
-          return res.json({ valid: false, error: 'Admin account no longer active' });
-        } else if (admin.password_changed_at) {
-          const passwordChangedSeconds = Math.floor(
-            new Date(admin.password_changed_at).getTime() / 1000
-          );
-          if (decoded.iat < passwordChangedSeconds) {
-            return res.json({ valid: false, error: 'Token invalid due to password change' });
-          }
-        }
-
-        // Mirror the session-timeout check that sessionTimeoutMiddleware
-        // enforces on every /api/admin endpoint. Without this, /auth/session
-        // returns valid:true for an idle/old-iat token that protected
-        // endpoints reject with 401 SESSION_TIMEOUT — the same redirect-loop
-        // shape as the issuer-claim and password-change asymmetries (issue
-        // #350 recurrence on v3.39.1-beta.0).
-        try {
-          const { isSessionExpired } = require('../middleware/sessionTimeout');
-          if (await isSessionExpired(token, decoded)) {
-            return res.json({ valid: false, error: 'Session expired' });
-          }
-        } catch (timeoutErr) {
-          // Helper lookup failed (test stub may not export it) — fall through
-          // and trust the token. Real deployments always have the middleware.
-        }
-
-        if (admin) {
-          adminUser = {
-            id: admin.id,
-            username: admin.username,
-            email: admin.email,
-            mustChangePassword: admin.must_change_password || false,
-            role: admin.role_name ? {
-              name: admin.role_name,
-              displayName: admin.role_display_name
-            } : null
-          };
+        const admin = await sessions.admin(decoded, { includeProfile: true });
+        const { isSessionExpired } = require('../middleware/sessionTimeout');
+        if (await isSessionExpired(token, decoded)) {
+          return res.json({ valid: false, error: 'Session expired' });
        }
+        adminUser = {
+          id: admin.id, username: admin.username, email: admin.email,
+          mustChangePassword: !!admin.must_change_password,
+          role: admin.role_name ? { name: admin.role_name, displayName: admin.role_display_name } : null,
+        };
      } else if (decoded.type === 'gallery') {
-        try {
-          const event = await db('events')
-            .where({
-              id: decoded.eventId,
-              is_active: formatBoolean(true),
-              is_archived: formatBoolean(false),
-            })
-            .first();
-          if (!event) {
-            return res.json({ valid: false, error: 'Gallery no longer available' });
-          }
-          if (event.expires_at && new Date(event.expires_at) < new Date()) {
-            return res.json({ valid: false, error: 'Gallery has expired' });
-          }
-        } catch (galleryLookupErr) {
-          // events table missing in this context — same fallback as
-          // admin path; trust the token rather than fail-closed.
-        }
+        const access = require('../services/galleryAccessService');
+        const event = await db('events').where({ id: decoded.eventId }).first();
+        if (!event) return res.json({ valid: false, error: 'Gallery no longer available' });
+        await access.authorize(event, access.grant(event, 'gallery', decoded));
+      } else {
+        return res.status(403).json({ valid: false, error: 'Invalid token type' });
      }

      // Calculate remaining time
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const { isGalleryAvailable, isGalleryExpired } = require('../utils/galleryLifecycle');
 /**
 * Customer dashboard routes
 *
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@
 const express = require('express');
 const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
 const { body, param, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
 const { getBcryptRounds, MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH } = require('../utils/passwordValidation');
@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ router.get('/events/:slug/access-token', [
    if (event.is_archived) {
      return res.status(410).json({ error: 'This gallery has been archived' });
    }
-    if (event.expires_at && new Date(event.expires_at) < new Date()) {
+    if (isGalleryExpired(event)) {
      return res.status(410).json({ error: 'This gallery has expired' });
    }

+    if (!isGalleryAvailable(event)) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
+
    const hasAccess = await customerAccountsService.customerHasAccessToEvent(
      req.customer.id,
      event.id
@@ -189,10 +193,12 @@ router.get('/events/:slug/access-token', [
      eventId: event.id,
      eventSlug: event.slug,
      type: 'gallery',
+      // Unique per token: the revocation key falls back to eventId+iat otherwise,
+      // so one guest's logout would revoke every same-second login (#1357).
+      jti: crypto.randomUUID(),
      ip: ipAddress,
      loginTime: Date.now(),
-      // Optional bookkeeping claim — surfaces the originating customer in
-      // logs when the token is later used. Doesn't affect authorization.
+      // Rechecked on each gallery/media request, including account status.
      via: 'customer',
      customerId: req.customer.id,
    }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
@@ -181,7 +181,9 @@ router.post('/logout', async (req, res) => {
  try {
    const token = getCustomerTokenFromRequest(req);
    if (token) {
-      await revokeToken(token, 'user_logout');
+      if (!await revokeToken(token, 'user_logout')) {
+        throw new Error('Token revocation failed');
+      }
    }
    clearCustomerAuthCookie(res);
    res.json({ message: 'Logged out successfully' });
@@ -0,0 +1,945 @@
+const express = require('express');
+const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
+const { parseBooleanInput } = require('../../utils/parsers');
+const archiver = require('archiver');
+const path = require('path');
+const { resolvePhotoContentType } = require('../../utils/photoContentType');
+const router = express.Router();
+const watermarkService = require('../../services/watermarkService');
+const { verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken } = require('../../middleware/gallery');
+const { noStoreCache } = require('../../middleware/noStoreCache');
+const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
+const { pipeStreamToResponse } = require('../../utils/streamResponse');
+const { resolvePhotoFilePath, resolvePhotoStorageKey } = require('../../services/photoResolver');
+const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { blockHiddenGallery } = require('../../utils/revealMode');
+const downloadZipService = require('../../services/downloadZipService');
+const { renderPhotoForDownload, resolveWatermarkSettings } = require('../../services/downloadRendition');
+const downloadJobService = require('../../services/downloadJobService');
+const {
+  resolveEventDownloadPolicy,
+  pickRequestedResolution,
+  parseResolution,
+} = require('../../utils/downloadResolutions');
+const { applyPhotoVisibilityFilter, canSeeHiddenPhotos } = require('../../utils/photoVisibility');
+const {
+  getUseOriginalFilenames,
+  pickRawDownloadName,
+  getZipEntryNames,
+} = require('../../services/downloadFilenameService');
+const { buildContentDisposition } = require('../../utils/filenameSanitizer');
+const { getStorage } = require('../../services/storage');
+const fs = require('fs');
+function parseByteRange(header, size) {
+  if (!header || typeof header !== 'string' || !size) return null;
+  const match = /^bytes=(\d*)-(\d*)$/.exec(header.trim());
+  if (!match) return null;
+
+  const [, rawStart, rawEnd] = match;
+  if (rawStart === '' && rawEnd === '') return null;
+
+  let start;
+  let end;
+  if (rawStart === '') {
+    // Suffix form: the last N bytes.
+    const suffix = parseInt(rawEnd, 10);
+    if (!suffix) return null;
+    start = Math.max(0, size - suffix);
+    end = size - 1;
+  } else {
+    start = parseInt(rawStart, 10);
+    end = rawEnd === '' ? size - 1 : parseInt(rawEnd, 10);
+  }
+
+  if (!Number.isFinite(start) || !Number.isFinite(end)) return null;
+  if (start > end || start >= size) return null;
+  return { start, end: Math.min(end, size - 1) };
+}
+function galleryActor(req) {
+  // Portal tokens run as accessLevel 'guest' but carry via:'customer'
+  // (req.viaCustomer); PIN-client logins carry accessLevel 'client'.
+  // Both are customers, not guests (codex review of #849, final round).
+  const isCustomer = !!(req && (req.viaCustomer || req.accessLevel === 'client'));
+  return { type: isCustomer ? 'customer' : 'guest' };
+}
+const SINGLE_DOWNLOAD_DEBOUNCE_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
+const singleDownloadNotifiedAt = new Map();
+function notifySinglePhotoDownload(event, req) {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const last = singleDownloadNotifiedAt.get(event.id) || 0;
+  if (now - last < SINGLE_DOWNLOAD_DEBOUNCE_MS) return;
+  singleDownloadNotifiedAt.set(event.id, now);
+  logActivity('gallery_downloaded', { scope: 'single' }, event.id, galleryActor(req));
+}
+
+router.get('/:slug/download/:photoId', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, blockHiddenGallery, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const { photoId } = req.params;
+
+    // Check if downloads are allowed for this event
+    if (!parseBooleanInput(req.event.allow_downloads, true)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Downloads are disabled for this gallery' });
+    }
+
+    const photo = await db('photos')
+      .where({ id: photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
+      .first();
+
+    if (!photo) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
+    }
+
+    // Block guest access to hidden photos
+    if (photo.visibility === 'hidden' && req.accessLevel !== 'client') {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+    }
+
+    // Per-category download permission (#640). Photos without a category are
+    // always downloadable when the event allows downloads — only categorised
+    // photos can opt out per-category.
+    if (photo.category_id) {
+      const cat = await db('photo_categories')
+        .where('id', photo.category_id)
+        .first('allow_downloads');
+      if (cat && !parseBooleanInput(cat.allow_downloads, true)) {
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Downloads are disabled for this category' });
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Download resolution (#858). Resolved BEFORE the counters below: a
+    // rejected resolution must not inflate download stats, which a guest
+    // could otherwise do by replaying ?resolution=bogus.
+    const isVideo = photo.media_type === 'video'
+      || (photo.mime_type && photo.mime_type.startsWith('video/'));
+    const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy(req.event);
+    const requested = pickRequestedResolution(policy, req.query.resolution);
+    if (requested === null) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Resolution not available for this gallery' });
+    }
+    const box = isVideo ? null : parseResolution(requested);
+
+    // A HEAD is a metadata probe, not a download. Answering it below the
+    // counters recorded every probe as a real download, and answering it below
+    // renderPhotoForDownload fetched and watermarked an image whose body Node
+    // then discards. Both happen before this point in a GET, so HEAD leaves
+    // here — with no side effects and no bytes read.
+    if (req.method === 'HEAD') {
+      const headUseOriginal = await getUseOriginalFilenames();
+      const headHeaders = {
+        'Content-Type': resolvePhotoContentType(photo),
+        'Content-Disposition': buildContentDisposition(pickRawDownloadName(photo, headUseOriginal)),
+        'Accept-Ranges': 'bytes',
+      };
+
+      // Content-Length only when the bytes ship untransformed AND the size can
+      // be read without fetching them. A watermark or resize changes the
+      // length, and the only way to learn the new one is to do the work this
+      // branch exists to avoid — HEAD is allowed to omit it.
+      const headWatermark = await resolveWatermarkSettings(req.event);
+      if (!box && !headWatermark) {
+        try {
+          const headKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(req.event, photo);
+          const headStorage = getStorage();
+          if (headKey && headStorage.kind() !== 'local') {
+            const headStat = await headStorage.stat(headKey);
+            if (!headStat) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' });
+            headHeaders['Content-Length'] = headStat.size;
+            if (headStat.mtime) headHeaders['Last-Modified'] = new Date(headStat.mtime).toUTCString();
+          }
+        } catch (headErr) {
+          // No length is a valid HEAD; not worth failing the probe over.
+          logger.debug('HEAD probe could not stat the object', { photoId, error: headErr.message });
+        }
+      }
+
+      res.set(headHeaders);
+      return res.end();
+    }
+
+    // Admin preview (#868) downloads are excluded from the download count +
+    // guest analytics — kept out of client-facing stats.
+    if (!req.isAdminPreview) {
+      // Update download count
+      await db('photos').where('id', photoId).increment('download_count', 1);
+
+      // Log download
+      await db('access_logs').insert({
+        event_id: req.event.id,
+        ip_address: req.ip,
+        user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
+        action: 'download',
+        photo_id: photoId
+      });
+    }
+    // Surface in the admin notification bell (#746) — debounced, and only
+    // once the response actually finished: notifying up-front would log a
+    // download that then 404s/fails and the debounce would suppress the
+    // next real one for an hour (codex review of #849).
+    res.on('finish', () => {
+      if (res.statusCode < 400 && !req.isAdminPreview) notifySinglePhotoDownload(req.event, req);
+    });
+    
+    // #493: if the admin enabled "use original filenames", surface the
+    // pre-rename camera filename in Content-Disposition. Storage path is
+    // unchanged — only the user-visible download name is swapped.
+    const useOriginal = await getUseOriginalFilenames();
+    const downloadName = pickRawDownloadName(photo, useOriginal);
+    const contentDisposition = buildContentDisposition(downloadName);
+
+    // The gallery's standard applies to EVERY ordinary download, single photos
+    // included — otherwise a lowered standard is trivially bypassed by
+    // downloading photos one at a time. `box` was resolved above, before the
+    // counters. Videos have no resize path and always ship as-is.
+    //
+    // renderPhotoForDownload (#858) owns the resize-then-watermark ordering
+    // and the storage fetch, and is what the zip builders below already use.
+    // It returns null when the photo needs no transformation at all, which is
+    // the default gallery's common case and lets us ship the stored bytes
+    // without buffering a full-size original into memory.
+    const effectiveSettings = await resolveWatermarkSettings(req.event);
+
+    let rendered;
+    try {
+      rendered = await renderPhotoForDownload(req.event, photo, box, effectiveSettings);
+    } catch (renderError) {
+      // Classify, the same way the pass-through branch below does. This can
+      // reject because the source object is gone, but equally because
+      // getToFile timed out, the tmp filesystem filled up, or sharp failed —
+      // and reporting an operational failure as 404 tells the guest their
+      // photo does not exist and tells us nothing.
+      const gone = renderError.code === 'ENOENT'
+        || renderError.name === 'NoSuchKey'
+        || renderError.name === 'NotFound'
+        || renderError.$metadata?.httpStatusCode === 404;
+      logger.error('Failed to render photo for download', {
+        slug: req.params.slug,
+        photoId,
+        eventId: req.event.id,
+        error: renderError.message,
+      });
+      return gone
+        ? res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' })
+        : res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to download photo' });
+    }
+
+    if (rendered) {
+      res.set({
+        'Content-Type': resolvePhotoContentType(photo),
+        'Content-Disposition': contentDisposition,
+        'Content-Length': rendered.length
+      });
+
+      return res.send(rendered);
+    }
+
+    // Untransformed: ship the stored bytes.
+    //
+    // Managed photos live behind the storage abstraction and on an S3/R2
+    // deployment are not on local disk at all — resolving a filesystem path
+    // unconditionally here is what made every single-photo download 404 with
+    // ENOENT in S3 mode (#1048), while download-all and secure-images worked
+    // because they already went through getStorage().
+    //
+    // resolvePhotoStorageKey returns null for external/reference photos: those
+    // live on a local mount and keep the sendFile path.
+    let storageKey = null;
+    try {
+      storageKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(req.event, photo);
+    } catch (resolveError) {
+      logger.error('Failed to resolve photo storage key for download', {
+        slug: req.params.slug,
+        photoId,
+        eventId: req.event.id,
+        error: resolveError.message,
+      });
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' });
+    }
+
+    const storage = getStorage();
+    if (storageKey && storage.kind() !== 'local') {
+      // Deliberately NOT the local path: res.sendFile emits Content-Length,
+      // Accept-Ranges, ETag and Last-Modified and answers Range requests with
+      // a 206, and a bare stream.pipe(res) has none of that. On local disk
+      // sendFile stays the better implementation, so it stays the branch.
+      //
+      // On S3 we reproduce the parts that matter for a download: the length
+      // (browsers need it for the progress indicator, which matters most on
+      // exactly the large files this route serves) and Range, so an
+      // interrupted download resumes instead of appending a second full body
+      // onto the partial file. Conditional requests are not reproduced —
+      // there is no ETag here, so a client revalidating gets the whole body,
+      // same as it does today.
+      const stat = await storage.stat(storageKey);
+      if (!stat) {
+        logger.error('Photo not found in storage backend for download', {
+          slug: req.params.slug,
+          photoId,
+          eventId: req.event.id,
+          storageKey,
+        });
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' });
+      }
+
+      const lastModified = stat.mtime ? new Date(stat.mtime).toUTCString() : null;
+      const headers = {
+        'Content-Type': resolvePhotoContentType(photo),
+        'Content-Disposition': contentDisposition,
+        'Accept-Ranges': 'bytes',
+      };
+      if (lastModified) headers['Last-Modified'] = lastModified;
+
+      // If-Range: a client resuming an interrupted download sends back the
+      // validator it was given last time. If the object has been replaced
+      // since — the watcher re-importing a swapped file, an admin re-upload —
+      // answering 206 from the NEW bytes lets the client splice two different
+      // versions into one corrupt file. A validator that doesn't match means
+      // a full 200, which is the whole point of the header.
+      const ifRange = req.headers['if-range'];
+      const staleValidator = !!ifRange && (!lastModified || ifRange.trim() !== lastModified);
+      const range = staleValidator ? null : parseByteRange(req.headers.range, stat.size);
+
+      // Open the stream BEFORE any header is staged or sent. stat() succeeding
+      // does not mean get() will: a concurrent delete or replace, or a
+      // transient backend error, lands here. Once writeHead(206) has gone out
+      // the outer catch can do nothing but throw ERR_HTTP_HEADERS_SENT, and in
+      // the non-range case it would send its 500 JSON underneath the staged
+      // image/jpeg attachment headers — a .jpg file full of JSON.
+      let stream;
+      try {
+        stream = range
+          ? await storage.getRange(storageKey, range.start, range.end)
+          : await storage.get(storageKey);
+      } catch (fetchError) {
+        const gone = fetchError.code === 'ENOENT'
+          || fetchError.name === 'NoSuchKey'
+          || fetchError.name === 'NotFound'
+          || fetchError.$metadata?.httpStatusCode === 404;
+        logger.error('Failed to open photo stream for download', {
+          slug: req.params.slug,
+          photoId,
+          eventId: req.event.id,
+          storageKey,
+          error: fetchError.message,
+        });
+        return gone
+          ? res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' })
+          : res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to download photo' });
+      }
+
+      if (range) {
+        // status()+set() rather than writeHead(): writeHead commits the
+        // response immediately, so a stream that resolves and THEN errors
+        // before its first chunk would leave pipeStreamToResponse able only to
+        // destroy the connection. Staged headers are flushed by the first body
+        // write, which means an error at byte zero can still clear them and
+        // return a clean, retryable status instead of a transport reset.
+        res.status(206).set({
+          ...headers,
+          'Content-Range': `bytes ${range.start}-${range.end}/${stat.size}`,
+          'Content-Length': (range.end - range.start) + 1,
+        });
+      } else {
+        res.set({ ...headers, 'Content-Length': stat.size });
+      }
+      pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, {
+        context: range ? `download range for photo ${photo.id}` : `download for photo ${photo.id}`,
+      });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    let filePath;
+    try {
+      filePath = resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo);
+    } catch (resolveError) {
+      logger.error('Failed to resolve photo path for download', {
+        slug: req.params.slug,
+        photoId,
+        eventId: req.event.id,
+        error: resolveError.message,
+      });
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' });
+    }
+
+    // res.download() builds Content-Disposition itself but doesn't emit the
+    // RFC 5987 filename* parameter, so unicode camera filenames would lose
+    // their bytes on download. Set the header explicitly and stream the
+    // file with res.sendFile-equivalent semantics.
+    res.set({
+      'Content-Type': resolvePhotoContentType(photo),
+      'Content-Disposition': contentDisposition,
+    });
+    res.sendFile(filePath, (downloadError) => {
+      if (downloadError) {
+        logger.error('Error streaming gallery download', {
+          slug: req.params.slug,
+          photoId,
+          eventId: req.event.id,
+          error: downloadError.message,
+        });
+      }
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to download photo');
+  }
+});
+
+// Download all photos as ZIP
+// Zip downloads count toward each contained photo's download_count (#895)
+// — previously only single-photo downloads did, so galleries whose guests
+// grab the zip showed 0 per-photo downloads forever. Used by the
+// pre-generated-zip branches only: it mirrors downloadZipService._build,
+// which zips EVERY event photo with no per-category allow_downloads
+// filter — the counter has to reflect what actually shipped. (That the
+// prebuilt zip ignores per-category download opt-outs is a separate,
+// pre-existing issue.) Known approximation: _build skips entries whose
+// WATERMARK step fails and still publishes the zip; counting those
+// would need a persisted archive manifest, which isn't worth it for
+// that tail case. Fire-and-forget at the call sites: counters must
+// never fail a download.
+async function bumpEventDownloadCounts(eventId) {
+  await db('photos').where('event_id', eventId).increment('download_count', 1);
+}
+
+router.get('/:slug/download-all', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, blockHiddenGallery, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    // Check if downloads are allowed for this event
+    if (!parseBooleanInput(req.event.allow_downloads, true)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Downloads are disabled for this gallery' });
+    }
+
+    // Try to serve pre-generated zip (instant download with Content-Length).
+    // Guests may use the prebuilt cache ONLY when the event has no hidden
+    // photos: a cache built before a photo was hidden — or before this
+    // visibility-aware builder shipped — could otherwise still leak it, and
+    // getZipInfo only checks the DB pointer + file stat, not freshness. When
+    // hidden photos exist, guests fall through to the visibility-filtered
+    // stream below. PIN-clients always stream a full archive.
+    const isClient = canSeeHiddenPhotos(req.accessLevel);
+    const eventHasHidden = await db('photos')
+      .where({ event_id: req.event.id, visibility: 'hidden' })
+      .first()
+      .then(Boolean);
+    const zipInfo = (isClient || eventHasHidden)
+      ? null
+      : await downloadZipService.getZipInfo(req.event.id);
+    if (zipInfo) {
+      const storage = getStorage();
+
+      // Stream via the authenticated route so logout, restore and account
+      // changes are checked on every download, including S3-backed archives.
+      res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/zip');
+      res.setHeader('Content-Length', zipInfo.size);
+      res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `attachment; filename="${req.event.slug}.zip"`);
+      const stream = await storage.get(zipInfo.key);
+      pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, { context: `prepared zip for event ${req.event.id}`, missingStatus: 410 });
+
+      // Log bulk download (admin preview #868 excluded — stats stay client-only).
+      if (!req.isAdminPreview) {
+        db('access_logs').insert({
+          event_id: req.event.id,
+          ip_address: req.ip,
+          user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
+          action: 'download_all'
+        }).catch(() => {});
+        bumpEventDownloadCounts(req.event.id).catch(() => {});
+        // Surface in the admin notification bell (#746) — only once the
+        // stream actually finished; logging at pipe-time would report
+        // downloads that then broke mid-transfer (codex review of #849).
+        res.on('finish', () => {
+          if (res.statusCode < 400) logActivity('gallery_downloaded', { scope: 'all' }, req.event.id, galleryActor(req));
+        });
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Fallback: on-the-fly streaming (existing behavior). Only pre-build the
+    // guest cache when it will actually be served next time — a guest
+    // download of an event with no hidden photos. Client bypasses and
+    // hidden-photo events always stream, so rebuilding the guest archive on
+    // those requests is wasted I/O (codex review).
+    if (!isClient && !eventHasHidden) {
+      downloadZipService.generateZip(req.event.id).catch(err =>
+        logger.warn('Background zip generation failed', { eventId: req.event.id, error: err.message })
+      );
+    }
+
+    // Fetch photos — exclude photos in categories that disabled downloads (#640).
+    // Uncategorised photos are always included; categories without the column
+    // (pre-migration-135) fall through the LEFT JOIN's null and are included.
+    const photos = await applyPhotoVisibilityFilter(
+      db('photos')
+        .leftJoin('photo_categories', 'photos.category_id', 'photo_categories.id')
+        .where('photos.event_id', req.event.id)
+        .where(function () {
+          this.whereNull('photos.category_id')
+            .orWhere('photo_categories.allow_downloads', true)
+            .orWhereNull('photo_categories.allow_downloads');
+        }),
+      req.accessLevel
+    )
+      .select('photos.*')
+      .orderBy('photos.type', 'asc')
+      .orderBy('photos.uploaded_at', 'desc');
+
+    if (photos.length === 0) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'No photos found' });
+    }
+
+    // Count unique types
+    const uniqueTypes = new Set(photos.map(p => p.type)).size;
+    const hasMultipleTypes = uniqueTypes > 1;
+
+    res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/zip');
+    res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `attachment; filename="${req.event.slug}.zip"`);
+
+    const archive = archiver('zip', { zlib: { level: 5 } });
+    archive.on('error', (err) => {
+      throw err;
+    });
+
+    archive.pipe(res);
+
+    // Get watermark settings - apply if global setting OR event-level setting is enabled
+    const watermarkSettings = await watermarkService.getWatermarkSettings();
+    const eventWatermarkEnabled = req.event.watermark_downloads === true || req.event.watermark_downloads === 1;
+    const shouldApplyWatermark = (watermarkSettings && watermarkSettings.enabled) || eventWatermarkEnabled;
+    const effectiveSettings = shouldApplyWatermark ? {
+      ...watermarkSettings,
+      enabled: true,
+      text: req.event.watermark_text || watermarkSettings?.text || 'Protected'
+    } : null;
+
+    // The gallery's standard resolution applies to the streamed archive too,
+    // not only the cached one (#858).
+    const { standardBox: bulkBox } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy(req.event);
+
+    // Add photos to archive — managed photos via storage backend, external via local path.
+    const { resolvePhotoStorageKey } = require('../../services/photoResolver');
+    const storage = getStorage();
+    // #493: resolve a unique display filename per photo up-front so collisions
+    // get a deterministic `_1` suffix before the entries hit the archive.
+    const useOriginalBulk = await getUseOriginalFilenames();
+    const bulkEntryNames = getZipEntryNames(photos, useOriginalBulk);
+    // Only photos whose append succeeded count as downloaded (#895) — the
+    // catch below deliberately skips missing/corrupt sources, and those
+    // never make it into the archive.
+    const appendedIds = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < photos.length; i += 1) {
+      const photo = photos[i];
+      const storageKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(req.event, photo);
+      const entryName = bulkEntryNames[i];
+      let archiveName;
+      if (hasMultipleTypes) {
+        const folderName = photo.type === 'individual' ? 'Individual Photos' : 'Collages';
+        archiveName = path.join(folderName, entryName);
+      } else {
+        archiveName = entryName;
+      }
+
+      try {
+        // Verify the source exists BEFORE appending — but only for local
+        // sources: fs.createReadStream is lazy, so its error fires outside
+        // this try/catch and the archive 'error' handler then kills the
+        // whole response instead of skipping one photo (#895 review). S3's
+        // get() awaits GetObject and rejects right here on a missing key,
+        // so a preflight HEAD per entry would just be a redundant serial
+        // round trip (500-photo zip = 500 extra HEADs).
+        if (storageKey && storage.kind() === 'local') {
+          const srcStat = await storage.stat(storageKey);
+          if (!srcStat) {
+            throw new Error(`Photo missing in storage: ${storageKey}`);
+          }
+        } else if (!storageKey && !fs.existsSync(resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo))) {
+          throw new Error('Photo file missing on disk');
+        }
+
+        // Resize to the gallery's standard resolution (#858) and/or watermark.
+        // This branch runs whenever the cached zip isn't usable — the first
+        // download after an invalidation, PIN clients, and galleries with
+        // hidden photos all land here, so skipping the cap would leak
+        // full-resolution files for exactly those cases.
+        const rendered = await renderPhotoForDownload(req.event, photo, bulkBox, effectiveSettings);
+        if (rendered) {
+          archive.append(rendered, { name: archiveName });
+        } else if (storageKey) {
+          const stream = await storage.get(storageKey);
+          archive.append(stream, { name: archiveName });
+        } else {
+          archive.file(resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo), { name: archiveName });
+        }
+        appendedIds.push(photo.id);
+      } catch (err) {
+        logger.warn('Skipping photo in bulk download due to error', {
+          slug: req.params.slug,
+          photoId: photo.id,
+          eventId: req.event.id,
+          error: err.message,
+        });
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Notification only after the response actually finished — finalize()
+    // ends Archiver's input, not the HTTP transfer (codex review of #849,
+    // confirmation round). Registered before finalize so it can't be missed.
+    // Admin preview (#868) streams the archive but is excluded from stats.
+    if (!req.isAdminPreview) {
+      res.on('finish', () => {
+        if (res.statusCode < 400) logActivity('gallery_downloaded', { scope: 'all' }, req.event.id, galleryActor(req));
+      });
+    }
+    await archive.finalize();
+
+    if (!req.isAdminPreview) {
+      // Log bulk download
+      await db('access_logs').insert({
+        event_id: req.event.id,
+        ip_address: req.ip,
+        user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
+        action: 'download_all'
+      });
+      // Exactly the photos that made it into this archive (#895) — skipped
+      // (missing/corrupt) sources don't count.
+      if (appendedIds.length > 0) {
+        db('photos').whereIn('id', appendedIds)
+          .increment('download_count', 1).catch(() => {});
+      }
+    }
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to create download archive');
+  }
+});
+
+// Download selected photos as ZIP
+router.post('/:slug/download-selected', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, blockHiddenGallery, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    // Check if downloads are allowed for this event
+    if (!parseBooleanInput(req.event.allow_downloads, true)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Downloads are disabled for this gallery' });
+    }
+
+    const ids = Array.isArray(req.body?.photo_ids) ? req.body.photo_ids : [];
+    if (!ids.length) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'photo_ids is required (non-empty array)' });
+    }
+
+    // Clean IDs
+    const photoIds = ids
+      .map((v) => parseInt(v, 10))
+      .filter((v) => Number.isInteger(v))
+      .slice(0, 500);
+
+    if (photoIds.length === 0) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No valid photo IDs provided' });
+    }
+
+    // Fetch photos — exclude photos in categories that disabled downloads (#640).
+    // Same LEFT JOIN pattern as the download-all endpoint.
+    const photos = await applyPhotoVisibilityFilter(
+      db('photos')
+        .leftJoin('photo_categories', 'photos.category_id', 'photo_categories.id')
+        .where('photos.event_id', req.event.id)
+        .whereIn('photos.id', photoIds)
+        .where(function () {
+          this.whereNull('photos.category_id')
+            .orWhere('photo_categories.allow_downloads', true)
+            .orWhereNull('photo_categories.allow_downloads');
+        }),
+      req.accessLevel
+    )
+      .select('photos.*')
+      .orderBy('photos.uploaded_at', 'desc');
+
+    if (photos.length === 0) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'No photos found for selected IDs' });
+    }
+
+    // Download resolution (#858). Resolve BEFORE any header goes out — once
+    // the archive starts streaming we can no longer return a JSON error.
+    const selectedPolicy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy(req.event);
+    const selectedResolution = pickRequestedResolution(selectedPolicy, req.body?.resolution);
+    if (selectedResolution === null) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Resolution not available for this gallery' });
+    }
+    const selectedBox = parseResolution(selectedResolution);
+
+    const archiveName = `${req.event.slug}-selected.zip`;
+    res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/zip');
+    res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `attachment; filename="${archiveName}"`);
+
+    const archive = archiver('zip', { zlib: { level: 5 } });
+    archive.on('error', (err) => {
+      logger.error('Zip error generating selected download', {
+        slug: req.params.slug,
+        eventId: req.event?.id,
+        error: err.message,
+      });
+      try {
+        res.status(500).end();
+      } catch (_) {
+        // ignore double-send errors
+      }
+    });
+    archive.pipe(res);
+
+    // Check watermark settings - apply if global setting OR event-level setting is enabled
+    const watermarkSettings = await watermarkService.getWatermarkSettings();
+    const eventWatermarkEnabled = req.event.watermark_downloads === true || req.event.watermark_downloads === 1;
+    const shouldApplyWatermark = (watermarkSettings && watermarkSettings.enabled) || eventWatermarkEnabled;
+    const effectiveSettings = shouldApplyWatermark ? {
+      ...watermarkSettings,
+      enabled: true,
+      text: req.event.watermark_text || watermarkSettings?.text || 'Protected'
+    } : null;
+
+    const { resolvePhotoStorageKey: resolveSelectedKey } = require('../../services/photoResolver');
+    const selectedStorage = getStorage();
+    // #493: same display-name resolution as bulk download, with dedup.
+    const useOriginalSelected = await getUseOriginalFilenames();
+    const selectedEntryNames = getZipEntryNames(photos, useOriginalSelected);
+    // Only photos whose append succeeded count as downloaded (#895).
+    const appendedIds = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < photos.length; i += 1) {
+      const photo = photos[i];
+      const name = selectedEntryNames[i] || `photo-${photo.id}.jpg`;
+      const storageKey = resolveSelectedKey(req.event, photo);
+      try {
+        // Same pre-append source check as download-all (#895 review),
+        // local backend only: a lazy fs stream's async error would kill
+        // the response instead of skipping the photo; S3's get() rejects
+        // at the await below, so no redundant per-entry HEAD there.
+        if (storageKey && selectedStorage.kind() === 'local') {
+          const srcStat = await selectedStorage.stat(storageKey);
+          if (!srcStat) {
+            throw new Error(`Photo missing in storage: ${storageKey}`);
+          }
+        } else if (!storageKey && !fs.existsSync(resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo))) {
+          throw new Error('Photo file missing on disk');
+        }
+
+        // Resize (#858) and/or watermark. renderPhotoForDownload returns null
+        // when neither applies, so the untransformed case still streams from
+        // storage rather than buffering the whole photo.
+        const rendered = await renderPhotoForDownload(req.event, photo, selectedBox, effectiveSettings);
+        if (rendered) {
+          archive.append(rendered, { name });
+        } else if (storageKey) {
+          const stream = await selectedStorage.get(storageKey);
+          archive.append(stream, { name });
+        } else {
+          archive.file(resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo), { name });
+        }
+        appendedIds.push(photo.id);
+      } catch (err) {
+        logger.warn('Skipping selected photo due to error', {
+          slug: req.params.slug,
+          photoId: photo.id,
+          eventId: req.event.id,
+          error: err.message,
+        });
+      }
+    }
+
+    // See download-all: notify only on response 'finish'.
+    // Admin preview (#868) streams the archive but is excluded from stats.
+    if (!req.isAdminPreview) {
+      res.on('finish', () => {
+        if (res.statusCode < 400) logActivity('gallery_downloaded', { scope: 'selected', photo_count: photoIds.length }, req.event.id, galleryActor(req));
+      });
+    }
+    await archive.finalize();
+
+    if (!req.isAdminPreview) {
+      await db('access_logs').insert({
+        event_id: req.event.id,
+        ip_address: req.ip,
+        user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
+        action: 'download_selected'
+      });
+      // Exactly the photos that made it into this archive (#895) — skipped
+      // (missing/corrupt) sources don't count.
+      if (appendedIds.length > 0) {
+        db('photos').whereIn('id', appendedIds)
+          .increment('download_count', 1).catch(() => {});
+      }
+    }
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to download selected photos');
+  }
+});
+
+// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Custom-resolution download jobs (#858).
+//
+// The plain download-all is served from the pre-built cache at the gallery's
+// STANDARD resolution. Picking a different size has nothing to cache against,
+// and resizing a whole gallery inside one request would sit far past any
+// reverse-proxy timeout — so those archives are built as a job the client
+// polls. Same access rules as the download routes above.
+// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// Kick off (or join) a build. Returns the polling token.
+router.post('/:slug/download-jobs', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, blockHiddenGallery, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    if (!parseBooleanInput(req.event.allow_downloads, true)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Downloads are disabled for this gallery' });
+    }
+
+    const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy(req.event);
+    if (!policy.pickerEnabled) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Resolution choice is not enabled for this gallery' });
+    }
+    const resolution = pickRequestedResolution(policy, req.body?.resolution);
+    if (resolution === null) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Resolution not available for this gallery' });
+    }
+
+    // Optional subset. Absent = the whole visible gallery.
+    let photoIds = null;
+    if (Array.isArray(req.body?.photo_ids) && req.body.photo_ids.length) {
+      photoIds = req.body.photo_ids
+        .map((v) => parseInt(v, 10))
+        .filter((v) => Number.isInteger(v))
+        .slice(0, 500);
+      if (photoIds.length === 0) {
+        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No valid photo IDs provided' });
+      }
+    }
+
+    let job;
+    try {
+      job = await downloadJobService.createJob({
+        event: req.event,
+        resolution,
+        photoIds,
+        accessLevel: req.accessLevel,
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err.code === 'NO_PHOTOS') {
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'No photos available for this selection' });
+      }
+      if (err.code === 'BUSY') {
+        return res.status(429).json({ error: 'Too many downloads are being prepared right now — please try again shortly' });
+      }
+      throw err;
+    }
+
+    res.status(202).json({
+      token: job.token,
+      status: job.status,
+      resolution: job.resolution,
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to start download preparation');
+  }
+});
+
+// Poll. The token is unguessable, but it is never sufficient on its own —
+// verifyGalleryAccess still runs and the job must belong to THIS event.
+// no-store: a cached 'preparing' would strand the caller in a poll that can
+// never observe the job finishing.
+router.get('/:slug/download-jobs/:token', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, blockHiddenGallery, noStoreCache, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const job = await downloadJobService.getStatus(req.params.token);
+    if (!job || job.event_id !== req.event.id) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Download job not found' });
+    }
+    res.json({
+      status: job.status,
+      resolution: job.resolution,
+      photo_count: job.photo_count || 0,
+      size_bytes: job.size_bytes || null,
+      error: job.status === 'failed' ? (job.error || 'Preparation failed') : undefined,
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to read download job');
+  }
+});
+
+// Deliver the finished archive.
+router.get('/:slug/download-jobs/:token/file', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, blockHiddenGallery, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    // Downloads can be switched off after a job was created — every other
+    // download route re-checks this per request, so this one must too.
+    if (!parseBooleanInput(req.event.allow_downloads, true)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Downloads are disabled for this gallery' });
+    }
+
+    const job = await downloadJobService.getStatus(req.params.token);
+    if (!job || job.event_id !== req.event.id) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Download job not found' });
+    }
+    // The token alone never grants access: the archive was built under one
+    // visibility scope, and only a requester still in that scope may take it.
+    // Without this, a leaked client token would hand hidden photos to a guest.
+    if (job.visibility_scope !== downloadJobService.visibilityScopeFor(req.accessLevel)) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Download job not found' });
+    }
+    if (job.status !== 'ready' || !job.zip_path) {
+      return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Download is not ready yet', status: job.status });
+    }
+    if (new Date(job.expires_at).getTime() <= Date.now()) {
+      return res.status(410).json({ error: 'This download has expired — please request it again' });
+    }
+    // A photo hidden AFTER this archive was built is still inside it, and the
+    // scope check above can't see that — both sides remain 'public'. Re-run
+    // the visibility query over the packaged set before handing it over.
+    if (!(await downloadJobService.isStillDeliverable(job, req.event, req.accessLevel))) {
+      return res.status(409).json({
+        error: 'This gallery changed since the download was prepared — please request it again',
+        status: 'stale',
+      });
+    }
+
+    const storage = getStorage();
+    const stat = await storage.stat(job.zip_path);
+    if (!stat) {
+      return res.status(410).json({ error: 'This download is no longer available' });
+    }
+
+    // Stats parity with the other bulk paths (#895): only count once the
+    // response actually completed, and keep admin previews out of guest stats.
+    res.on('finish', () => {
+      if (res.statusCode >= 400 || req.isAdminPreview) return;
+      // The DELIVERED set, not the requested one: a photo whose source was
+      // missing at build time isn't in the zip and must not be counted.
+      let ids = [];
+      try {
+        ids = JSON.parse(job.delivered_photo_ids || job.photo_ids || '[]');
+      } catch (_) { /* malformed row — skip counting rather than fail */ }
+      if (ids.length > 0) {
+        db('photos').whereIn('id', ids).increment('download_count', 1).catch(() => {});
+      }
+      db('access_logs').insert({
+        event_id: req.event.id,
+        ip_address: req.ip,
+        user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
+        action: 'download',
+        photo_id: null,
+      }).catch(() => {});
+      logActivity('gallery_downloaded', { scope: 'all', resolution: job.resolution },
+        req.event.id, galleryActor(req));
+    });
+
+    const suffix = job.resolution === 'original' ? 'original' : job.resolution;
+    res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/zip');
+    res.setHeader('Content-Length', stat.size);
+    res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `attachment; filename="${req.event.slug}-${suffix}.zip"`);
+    const stream = await storage.get(job.zip_path);
+    pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, { context: `download job ${job.id}`, missingStatus: 410 });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to serve prepared download');
+  }
+});
+
+// Explicit per-photo view beacon (#895). Counting views on the image-
+// serving routes is wrong in both directions: the lightbox preloads the
+// prev/next neighbours (three fetches per open), while a preloaded
+// neighbour that becomes the current slide is never re-fetched (#505
+// keeps the DOM node alive across the swipe) — so request-level counters
+// overcount preloads AND undercount swipe-throughs. Instead the lightbox
+// pings this endpoint exactly when a photo becomes the visible slide.
+// This also covers enhanced/maximum-protection galleries, whose bytes
+// are served by /api/secure-images and never pass the routes below.
+// The slideshow kiosk is excluded (denySlideshowToken; migration 138).
+
+module.exports = router;
@@ -0,0 +1,639 @@
+const express = require('express');
+const { db } = require('../../database/db');
+const path = require('path');
+const { resolvePhotoContentType } = require('../../utils/photoContentType');
+const router = express.Router();
+const watermarkService = require('../../services/watermarkService');
+const watermarkGeneratorService = require('../../services/watermarkGeneratorService');
+const { verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken } = require('../../middleware/gallery');
+const withPreview = (req, url) => (req.isAdminPreview ? `${url}${url.includes('?') ? '&' : '?'}admin_preview=1` : url);
+const secureImageService = require('../../services/secureImageService');
+const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
+const { pipeStreamToResponse } = require('../../utils/streamResponse');
+
+const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { blockHiddenGallery } = require('../../utils/revealMode');
+const { ensureThumbnail, ensureHeroImage, ensurePreviewImage, withLocalCopy } = require('../../services/imageProcessor');
+const { getStorage } = require('../../services/storage');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const { getStoragePath } = require('../../config/storage');
+
+router.post('/:slug/photo/:photoId/view',
+  verifyGalleryAccess,
+  denySlideshowToken,
+  blockHiddenGallery,
+  async (req, res) => {
+    try {
+      const photo = await db('photos')
+        .where({ id: req.params.photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
+        .first('id', 'visibility');
+      if (!photo) {
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
+      }
+      if (photo.visibility === 'hidden' && req.accessLevel !== 'client') {
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+      }
+      // Admin preview (#981 review) is excluded from per-photo view analytics.
+      if (!req.isAdminPreview) {
+        await db('photos').where('id', photo.id).increment('view_count', 1);
+      }
+      res.status(204).end();
+    } catch (error) {
+      errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to record view');
+    }
+  });
+
+// View single photo (with watermark if enabled)
+router.get('/:slug/photo/:photoId',
+  verifyGalleryAccess,
+  blockHiddenGallery,
+  async (req, res) => {
+    try {
+      const { photoId } = req.params;
+
+      const photo = await db('photos')
+        .where({ id: photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
+        .first();
+
+      if (!photo) {
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
+      }
+
+      // Block guest access to hidden photos
+      if (photo.visibility === 'hidden' && req.accessLevel !== 'client') {
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+      }
+
+      // Check if this is a video
+      const isVideo = photo.media_type === 'video' || (photo.mime_type && photo.mime_type.startsWith('video/'));
+
+      // Check protection level - basic and standard protection allow direct JWT access
+      const protectionLevel = req.event.protection_level || 'standard';
+
+      if (protectionLevel === 'enhanced' || protectionLevel === 'maximum') {
+        // For enhanced/maximum protection, redirect to secure endpoint
+        return res.status(302).json({
+          error: 'Secure access required',
+          secureEndpoint: `/api/secure-images/${req.params.slug}/generate-token`,
+          photoId: photoId
+        });
+      }
+
+      // Resolve where to read the photo bytes from. For external/reference
+      // photos the source is always a local mount path. For managed photos
+      // we go through the storage abstraction so S3 deployments work too
+      // (#432 — previously this route did fs.* directly and 500'd in S3
+      // mode because the file wasn't on the container's local fs).
+      const { resolvePhotoStorageKey, resolvePhotoFilePath } = require('../../services/photoResolver');
+      const storage = getStorage();
+      const isExternal = photo.source_origin === 'external' || photo.source_origin === 'reference';
+      const useStorageBackend = !isExternal;
+
+      let filePath = null;     // Local fs path (external photos OR LocalFs storage)
+      let storageKey = null;   // Relative storage key (managed photos via storage abstraction)
+      let stat;
+      let fileSize;
+
+      if (useStorageBackend) {
+        try {
+          storageKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(req.event, photo);
+        } catch (resolveError) {
+          logger.error('Failed to resolve photo storage key', {
+            slug: req.params.slug,
+            photoId,
+            eventId: req.event.id,
+            error: resolveError.message,
+            photoPath: photo.path,
+            photoFilename: photo.filename
+          });
+          return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' });
+        }
+        stat = await storage.stat(storageKey);
+        if (!stat) {
+          logger.error('Photo not found in storage backend', {
+            slug: req.params.slug,
+            photoId,
+            eventId: req.event.id,
+            storageKey
+          });
+          return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' });
+        }
+        fileSize = stat.size;
+      } else {
+        try {
+          filePath = resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo);
+        } catch (resolveError) {
+          logger.error('Failed to resolve photo path', {
+            slug: req.params.slug,
+            photoId,
+            eventId: req.event.id,
+            error: resolveError.message,
+            photoPath: photo.path,
+            photoFilename: photo.filename
+          });
+          return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' });
+        }
+        if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
+          logger.error('Photo file does not exist at resolved path', {
+            slug: req.params.slug,
+            photoId,
+            eventId: req.event.id,
+            resolvedPath: filePath,
+            photoPath: photo.path
+          });
+          return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' });
+        }
+        stat = fs.statSync(filePath);
+        fileSize = stat.size;
+      }
+
+      // Handle video streaming with range requests
+      if (isVideo) {
+        const range = req.headers.range;
+
+        if (range) {
+          const parts = range.replace(/bytes=/, '').split('-');
+          const start = parseInt(parts[0], 10);
+          const end = parts[1] ? parseInt(parts[1], 10) : fileSize - 1;
+          // Validate before writing the 206: a NaN, inverted or out-of-file
+          // range used to be committed to the headers and then throw while
+          // streaming (or read past the end).
+          if (!Number.isInteger(start) || !Number.isInteger(end)
+              || start < 0 || end < start || start >= fileSize) {
+            res.set('Content-Range', `bytes */${fileSize}`);
+            return res.status(416).end();
+          }
+          const boundedEnd = Math.min(end, fileSize - 1);
+          const chunksize = (boundedEnd - start) + 1;
+
+          res.writeHead(206, {
+            'Content-Range': `bytes ${start}-${boundedEnd}/${fileSize}`,
+            'Accept-Ranges': 'bytes',
+            'Content-Length': chunksize,
+            'Content-Type': resolvePhotoContentType(photo),
+            'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800',
+            'X-Protection-Level': 'basic'
+          });
+
+          const file = useStorageBackend
+            ? await storage.getRange(storageKey, start, boundedEnd)
+            : fs.createReadStream(filePath, { start, end: boundedEnd });
+          pipeStreamToResponse(file, res, { context: `video range for photo ${photo.id}` });
+        } else {
+          res.writeHead(200, {
+            'Content-Length': fileSize,
+            'Content-Type': resolvePhotoContentType(photo),
+            'Accept-Ranges': 'bytes',
+            'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800',
+            'X-Protection-Level': 'basic'
+          });
+          const file = useStorageBackend
+            ? await storage.get(storageKey)
+            : fs.createReadStream(filePath);
+          pipeStreamToResponse(file, res, { context: `video for photo ${photo.id}` });
+        }
+        return;
+      }
+
+      // Image path
+      const watermarkSettings = await watermarkService.getWatermarkSettings();
+
+      const mtimeMs = stat.mtime ? stat.mtime.getTime() : 0;
+      const watermarkHash = watermarkSettings?.enabled
+        ? `-wm${watermarkSettings.opacity}${watermarkSettings.position}${watermarkSettings.size}`
+        : '-nowm';
+      // orientation_checked_at participates because the backfill (#1198) can
+      // change these bytes without touching either of the other two inputs:
+      // it rewrites the derived renditions while the ORIGINAL's mtime and the
+      // watermark settings both stay exactly as they were. Without it a guest
+      // holding a pre-fix ETag keeps getting 304 and keeps their cached
+      // sideways image, however many times the backfill succeeds.
+      const orientationVersion = photo.orientation_checked_at
+        ? `-o${new Date(photo.orientation_checked_at).getTime()}`
+        : '';
+      const etag = `"${photoId}-${mtimeMs}${watermarkHash}${orientationVersion}"`;
+
+      if (req.headers['if-none-match'] === etag) {
+        return res.status(304).end();
+      }
+
+      if (watermarkSettings && watermarkSettings.enabled) {
+        // Pre-generated watermarked file: served via the storage backend
+        // (managed) or directly from local fs (external).
+        if (photo.watermark_path) {
+          try {
+            if (useStorageBackend) {
+              const wmStat = await storage.stat(photo.watermark_path);
+              if (wmStat) {
+                res.set({
+                  'Content-Type': resolvePhotoContentType(photo),
+                  'Content-Length': wmStat.size,
+                  'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800',
+                  'ETag': etag,
+                  'X-Protection-Level': 'basic'
+                });
+                const wmStream = await storage.get(photo.watermark_path);
+                return pipeStreamToResponse(wmStream, res, { context: `watermarked photo ${photo.id}` });
+              }
+            } else {
+              const watermarkFilePath = path.join(getStoragePath(), photo.watermark_path);
+              if (fs.existsSync(watermarkFilePath)) {
+                res.set({
+                  'Content-Type': resolvePhotoContentType(photo),
+                  'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800',
+                  'ETag': etag,
+                  'X-Protection-Level': 'basic'
+                });
+                return res.sendFile(watermarkFilePath);
+              }
+            }
+          } catch (err) {
+            logger.warn(`Pre-generated watermark not found for photo ${photoId}, falling back to on-the-fly`);
+          }
+        }
+
+        // Fallback: apply watermark on-the-fly. applyWatermark needs a
+        // local file path (sharp + fs.readFile) — for managed photos in
+        // S3 mode, withLocalCopy materializes to a tmp file and cleans up.
+        const watermarkedBuffer = useStorageBackend
+          ? await withLocalCopy(storageKey, (localPath) =>
+            watermarkService.applyWatermark(localPath, watermarkSettings))
+          : await watermarkService.applyWatermark(filePath, watermarkSettings);
+
+        // Queue watermark generation in background for next request
+        watermarkGeneratorService.generateForPhoto(photo.id)
+          .catch(err => logger.warn(`Background watermark generation failed for photo ${photo.id}:`, err.message));
+
+        res.set({
+          'Content-Type': resolvePhotoContentType(photo),
+          'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800',
+          'ETag': etag,
+          'X-Protection-Level': 'basic'
+        });
+
+        res.send(watermarkedBuffer);
+      } else {
+        res.set({
+          'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800',
+          'ETag': etag,
+          'X-Protection-Level': 'basic'
+        });
+        if (useStorageBackend) {
+          res.set('Content-Length', stat.size);
+          res.set('Content-Type', resolvePhotoContentType(photo));
+          const stream = await storage.get(storageKey);
+          pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, { context: `photo ${photo.id}` });
+        } else {
+          const absolutePath = path.isAbsolute(filePath) ? filePath : path.resolve(filePath);
+          res.sendFile(absolutePath);
+        }
+      }
+    } catch (error) {
+      errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to serve photo');
+    }
+  }
+);
+
+// Serve thumbnail
+router.get('/:slug/thumbnail/:photoId',
+  verifyGalleryAccess,
+  blockHiddenGallery,
+  async (req, res) => {
+    try {
+      const { photoId } = req.params;
+
+      const photo = await db('photos')
+        .where({ id: photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
+        .first();
+
+      if (!photo) {
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
+      }
+
+      // Block guest access to hidden photos
+      if (photo.visibility === 'hidden' && req.accessLevel !== 'client') {
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+      }
+
+      // Ensure thumbnail exists and is valid, regenerate if needed
+      // Responsive tier (#1095), whitelisted the same way the preview route's
+      // is. Unrecognised or absent falls through to the canonical 300px
+      // thumbnail, so existing clients are untouched.
+      const { THUMBNAIL_WIDTHS, normalizeTierWidth, ensureThumbnailAtWidth } =
+        require('../../services/imageProcessor');
+      const thumbTier = normalizeTierWidth(req.query.w, THUMBNAIL_WIDTHS);
+
+      const thumbnailPath = thumbTier
+        ? (await ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, thumbTier)) || (await ensureThumbnail(photo))
+        : await ensureThumbnail(photo);
+
+      // What was actually resolved, not what was asked for. A tier request can
+      // land on the canonical thumbnail — generation failed, or the row is a
+      // video — and stamping the requested tier into the ETag below would then
+      // have the client cache a 300px image under its 900px key for the full
+      // max-age, with no way to notice.
+      const servedTier = thumbTier && thumbnailPath
+        && path.basename(thumbnailPath).startsWith(`thumb_w${thumbTier}_`)
+        ? thumbTier
+        : null;
+
+      if (!thumbnailPath) {
+        logger.error(`Failed to generate thumbnail for photo ${photoId}`);
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Thumbnail generation failed' });
+      }
+
+      // Read thumbnail metadata via the storage abstraction so we work in
+      // both LocalFs and S3 modes (#432). The previous fs.statSync on the
+      // resolved local path 500'd in S3 deployments because the thumbnail
+      // only exists in the bucket, not on the container's local fs.
+      const storage = getStorage();
+      const stat = await storage.stat(thumbnailPath);
+      if (!stat) {
+        logger.error(`Thumbnail not found in storage backend for photo ${photoId}`, { thumbnailPath });
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Thumbnail not found' });
+      }
+
+      // Log thumbnail access
+      await secureImageService.logImageAccess(
+        photoId,
+        req.event.id,
+        req.clientInfo,
+        'thumbnail'
+      );
+
+      // Check if watermarks are enabled and apply to thumbnail
+      const watermarkSettings = await watermarkService.getWatermarkSettings();
+
+      // ETag uses storage stat mtime + photo id + watermark hash.
+      const mtimeMs = stat.mtime ? stat.mtime.getTime() : 0;
+      const watermarkHash = watermarkSettings?.enabled
+        ? `-wm${watermarkSettings.opacity}${watermarkSettings.position}${watermarkSettings.size}`
+        : '-nowm';
+      // Tier in the ETag, same reason as the preview route: without it a
+      // client holding the 300px thumbnail gets a 304 for its 600px request
+      // and renders the small one, which is this feature inverted.
+      const etag = `"thumb-${photoId}-${servedTier || 'def'}-${mtimeMs}${watermarkHash}"`;
+
+      // Check if client has valid cached version
+      if (req.headers['if-none-match'] === etag) {
+        return res.status(304).end();
+      }
+
+      // Set appropriate headers with enhanced security
+      res.set({
+        'Content-Type': 'image/jpeg',
+        'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800', // Reduced cache time
+        'Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy': 'cross-origin',
+        'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
+        'X-Protected-Thumbnail': 'true',
+        'ETag': etag
+      });
+
+      if (watermarkSettings && watermarkSettings.enabled) {
+        // Watermarking needs a local file path (sharp + fs.readFile).
+        // Materialize via withLocalCopy — no-op in local mode, downloads
+        // to a tmp file then cleans up in S3 mode.
+        const watermarkedBuffer = await withLocalCopy(thumbnailPath, (localPath) =>
+          watermarkService.applyWatermark(localPath, watermarkSettings)
+        );
+        res.send(watermarkedBuffer);
+      } else {
+        res.setHeader('Content-Length', stat.size);
+        const stream = await storage.get(thumbnailPath);
+        pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, { context: `thumbnail for photo ${photoId}` });
+      }
+    } catch (error) {
+      errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to serve thumbnail');
+    }
+  }
+);
+
+// Serve hero-optimized image (1920x1080 for full-width hero sections)
+router.get('/:slug/hero/:photoId',
+  verifyGalleryAccess,
+  // Reveal-gated too: this route serves a 1920px derivative of ANY photo id,
+  // not just the chosen hero — an open bypass while hidden (review round 1).
+  blockHiddenGallery,
+  async (req, res) => {
+    try {
+      const { photoId } = req.params;
+
+      const photo = await db('photos')
+        .where({ id: photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
+        .first();
+
+      if (!photo) {
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
+      }
+
+      // Block guest access to hidden photos
+      if (photo.visibility === 'hidden' && req.accessLevel !== 'client') {
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+      }
+
+      // Check if this is a video - videos don't get hero images
+      const isVideo = photo.media_type === 'video' || (photo.mime_type && photo.mime_type.startsWith('video/'));
+      if (isVideo) {
+        // For videos, redirect to the regular photo endpoint
+        return res.redirect(withPreview(req, `/api/gallery/${req.params.slug}/photo/${photoId}`));
+      }
+
+      // Ensure hero image exists and is valid, regenerate if needed
+      const heroPath = await ensureHeroImage(photo);
+
+      if (!heroPath) {
+        // If hero generation fails, fall back to original photo
+        logger.warn(`Failed to generate hero image for photo ${photoId}, falling back to original`);
+        return res.redirect(withPreview(req, `/api/gallery/${req.params.slug}/photo/${photoId}`));
+      }
+
+      // Hero images are always written via the storage abstraction (see
+      // imageProcessor.generateHeroImage), so they're a managed-storage
+      // key in both LocalFs and S3 modes (#432). Read via storage.
+      const storage = getStorage();
+      const stat = await storage.stat(heroPath);
+      if (!stat) {
+        logger.error('Hero image file does not exist in storage backend', {
+          slug: req.params.slug,
+          photoId,
+          eventId: req.event.id,
+          heroPath
+        });
+        return res.redirect(withPreview(req, `/api/gallery/${req.params.slug}/photo/${photoId}`));
+      }
+
+      const mtimeMs = stat.mtime ? stat.mtime.getTime() : 0;
+      const etag = `"hero-${photoId}-${mtimeMs}"`;
+      if (req.headers['if-none-match'] === etag) {
+        return res.status(304).end();
+      }
+
+      const watermarkSettings = await watermarkService.getWatermarkSettings();
+
+      res.set({
+        'Content-Type': 'image/jpeg',
+        'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=3600', // Cache for 1 hour
+        'Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy': 'cross-origin',
+        'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
+        'X-Hero-Image': 'true',
+        'ETag': etag
+      });
+
+      if (watermarkSettings && watermarkSettings.enabled) {
+        // applyWatermark needs a local file path; materialize via
+        // withLocalCopy so this works in S3 mode too.
+        const watermarkedBuffer = await withLocalCopy(heroPath, (localPath) =>
+          watermarkService.applyWatermark(localPath, watermarkSettings)
+        );
+        res.send(watermarkedBuffer);
+      } else {
+        res.setHeader('Content-Length', stat.size);
+        const stream = await storage.get(heroPath);
+        pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, { context: `hero for photo ${photoId}` });
+      }
+    } catch (error) {
+      logger.error('Error serving hero image:', {
+        error: error.message,
+        photoId: req.params.photoId,
+        eventId: req.event?.id
+      });
+      // Fall back to original photo on any error
+      res.redirect(withPreview(req, `/api/gallery/${req.params.slug}/photo/${req.params.photoId}`));
+    }
+  }
+);
+
+// Lightbox preview tier (#492). Aspect-preserved JPEG capped at 1920px
+// long edge — admin-controlled opt-in via app_settings.lightbox_preview_enabled.
+// Mirrors the hero route shape: same auth, ETag from preview mtime,
+// fall back to original on any failure so the lightbox never shows a
+// broken image. The watermark application path is preserved so a
+// preview surfaced in the lightbox carries the same protection a
+// guest would see on the full original.
+router.get('/:slug/preview/:photoId',
+  verifyGalleryAccess,
+  blockHiddenGallery,
+  async (req, res) => {
+    try {
+      const { photoId } = req.params;
+
+      const photo = await db('photos')
+        .where({ id: photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
+        .first();
+
+      if (!photo) {
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
+      }
+
+      if (photo.visibility === 'hidden' && req.accessLevel !== 'client') {
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+      }
+
+      // Videos don't get a preview tier — fall through to the regular
+      // photo endpoint (which serves the source). The frontend should
+      // already be checking media_type before requesting /preview but
+      // belt-and-braces in case a stale tab does.
+      const isVideo = photo.media_type === 'video' || (photo.mime_type && photo.mime_type.startsWith('video/'));
+      if (isVideo) {
+        return res.redirect(withPreview(req, `/api/gallery/${req.params.slug}/photo/${photoId}`));
+      }
+
+      // Responsive tier (#1095). Whitelisted only — an open ?w= would let
+      // anyone fill the disk with renditions nobody asked for. An unrecognised
+      // or absent value falls through to the canonical 1920 preview, so old
+      // clients and hand-typed URLs behave exactly as before.
+      const { PREVIEW_WIDTHS, normalizeTierWidth, ensurePreviewImageAtWidth } =
+        require('../../services/imageProcessor');
+      const tierWidth = normalizeTierWidth(req.query.w, PREVIEW_WIDTHS);
+
+      // Lazy generation: ensurePreviewImage returns null on any
+      // failure (corrupt source, sharp OOM, storage unavailable, …).
+      // Fall back to the original so the lightbox always renders.
+      const previewPath = tierWidth
+        ? (await ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, tierWidth)) || (await ensurePreviewImage(photo))
+        : await ensurePreviewImage(photo);
+      if (!previewPath) {
+        logger.warn(`Failed to generate preview for photo ${photoId}, falling back to original`);
+        return res.redirect(withPreview(req, `/api/gallery/${req.params.slug}/photo/${photoId}`));
+      }
+
+      const storage = getStorage();
+      const stat = await storage.stat(previewPath);
+      if (!stat) {
+        logger.error('Preview file does not exist in storage backend', {
+          slug: req.params.slug, photoId, eventId: req.event.id, previewPath,
+        });
+        return res.redirect(withPreview(req, `/api/gallery/${req.params.slug}/photo/${photoId}`));
+      }
+
+      const mtimeMs = stat.mtime ? stat.mtime.getTime() : 0;
+      const watermarkSettings = await watermarkService.getWatermarkSettings();
+      const watermarkHash = watermarkSettings?.enabled
+        ? `-wm${watermarkSettings.opacity}${watermarkSettings.position}${watermarkSettings.size}`
+        : '-nowm';
+      // Tier is part of the etag: without it a client that already holds the
+      // 1920 rendition would get a 304 for its 640 request and render the
+      // wrong size, which is the whole point of the feature inverted.
+      const etag = `"preview-${photoId}-${tierWidth || 'def'}-${mtimeMs}${watermarkHash}"`;
+      if (req.headers['if-none-match'] === etag) {
+        return res.status(304).end();
+      }
+
+      res.set({
+        // From the key, not hard-coded: a preview of a transparent or animated
+        // source is WebP, because JPEG carries neither. `nosniff` below means
+        // getting this wrong shows a broken image rather than being silently
+        // corrected by the browser. Pre-existing keys have no .webp suffix and
+        // are JPEG, so they keep their old header.
+        'Content-Type': previewPath.endsWith('.webp') ? 'image/webp' : 'image/jpeg',
+        // Cache aggressively — preview only changes on photo
+        // re-upload (which generates a new preview key) or settings
+        // regenerate (which writes a new mtime + ETag).
+        'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=3600',
+        'Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy': 'cross-origin',
+        'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
+        'X-Preview-Image': 'true',
+        'ETag': etag,
+      });
+
+      if (watermarkSettings && watermarkSettings.enabled) {
+        // No Content-Type override here. applyWatermark PRESERVES the source
+        // format (watermarkService.js: png -> png, webp -> webp, else jpeg),
+        // and its input is this preview — so the output format matches the key
+        // the header was already derived from. Forcing image/jpeg would
+        // mislabel a watermarked WebP preview, and `nosniff` means the browser
+        // will not correct it.
+        //
+        // What is still lost is the animation: the compositor flattens a
+        // multi-frame source to one frame while keeping the WebP container.
+        // That is a separate problem and a much larger one.
+        const watermarkedBuffer = await withLocalCopy(previewPath, (localPath) =>
+          watermarkService.applyWatermark(localPath, watermarkSettings)
+        );
+        res.send(watermarkedBuffer);
+      } else {
+        res.setHeader('Content-Length', stat.size);
+        const stream = await storage.get(previewPath);
+        pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, { context: `preview for photo ${photoId}` });
+      }
+    } catch (error) {
+      logger.error('Error serving preview image:', {
+        error: error.message,
+        photoId: req.params.photoId,
+        eventId: req.event?.id,
+      });
+      res.redirect(withPreview(req, `/api/gallery/${req.params.slug}/photo/${req.params.photoId}`));
+    }
+  }
+);
+
+// GET /:slug/feedback-settings lives in galleryFeedback.js. A duplicate of it
+// used to sit here, and since server.js mounts galleryRoutes before
+// galleryFeedback it shadowed the real handler — dropping the per-guest caps
+// (#655) from the guest payload, so the gallery could never render the
+// favorite/like limits or their counters (#1030).
+
+// Get photo stats. no-store: view/download/visitor counters are private
+// gallery analytics and change on every request.
+
+module.exports = router;
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+const { isGalleryExpired } = require('../../utils/galleryLifecycle');
+const express = require('express');
+const { db } = require('../../database/db');
+const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
+const { getAppSetting } = require('../../utils/appSettings');
+const { timingSafeEqualStr } = require('../../utils/timingSafe');
+const router = express.Router();
+const { resolveHeroLogoVisible } = require('../../services/galleryModel');
+const { verifyAdminPreview } = require('../../middleware/gallery');
+const { noStoreCache } = require('../../middleware/noStoreCache');
+const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
+const { getEventShareToken, resolveShareIdentifier, buildShareLinkVariants } = require('../../services/shareLinkService');
+const { handleAsync, errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { isGalleryHidden } = require('../../utils/revealMode');
+const { NotFoundError } = require('../../utils/errors');
+async function checkSlugRedirect(slug) {
+  try {
+    const hasTable = await db.schema.hasTable('slug_redirects');
+    if (!hasTable) return null;
+
+    const redirect = await db('slug_redirects')
+      .where({ old_slug: slug })
+      .first();
+
+    return redirect ? redirect.new_slug : null;
+  } catch (error) {
+    logger.warn('Error checking slug redirect:', { slug, error: error.message });
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+router.get('/resolve/:identifier', handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+  const { identifier } = req.params;
+  let result = await resolveShareIdentifier(identifier);
+
+  // If not found, check for redirect
+  if (!result) {
+    const newSlug = await checkSlugRedirect(identifier);
+    if (newSlug) {
+      return res.status(301).json({
+        redirect: true,
+        newSlug,
+        message: 'Gallery has been renamed'
+      });
+    }
+    throw new NotFoundError('Gallery');
+  }
+
+  const { event, matchType, shareToken } = result;
+  const requiresPassword = !(event.require_password === false || event.require_password === 0 || event.require_password === '0');
+
+  // The share_token is a bearer secret. Only return it (and the share
+  // links/URLs that embed it) when the caller already proved they hold it —
+  // i.e. they resolved via the token or the full share link. A bare *slug*
+  // lookup (slugs appear in gallery URLs and are guessable) must NOT hand
+  // back the secret, or an anonymous caller could turn a known slug into
+  // share-link access to a no-password gallery (GHSA-rh8r).
+  const callerHasToken = matchType !== 'slug';
+  if (!callerHasToken) {
+    return res.json({ slug: event.slug, matchType, requires_password: requiresPassword });
+  }
+
+  const linkVariants = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug: event.slug, shareToken });
+  res.json({
+    slug: event.slug,
+    token: shareToken,
+    matchType,
+    share_link: event.share_link,
+    share_path: linkVariants.sharePath,
+    share_url: linkVariants.shareUrl,
+    short_enabled: linkVariants.shortEnabled,
+    requires_password: requiresPassword
+  });
+}));
+
+// Verify share token. no-store: this is an authorization decision — a cached
+// `{ valid: true }` would keep answering for a token the admin has rotated.
+router.get('/:slug/verify-token/:token', noStoreCache, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+  const { slug, token } = req.params;
+
+  const event = await db('events')
+    .where({ slug, is_active: formatBoolean(true), is_archived: formatBoolean(false), is_draft: formatBoolean(false) })
+    .select('id', 'share_link', 'share_token')
+    .first();
+
+  if (!event) {
+    throw new NotFoundError('Gallery');
+  }
+
+  const expectedToken = getEventShareToken(event);
+  if (!expectedToken || !timingSafeEqualStr(String(token), expectedToken)) {
+    throw new NotFoundError('Gallery', 'Invalid gallery link');
+  }
+
+  res.json({ valid: true });
+}));
+
+// Get gallery info (with optional token verification)
+router.get('/:slug/info', async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const { slug } = req.params;
+    const { token } = req.query;
+
+    let event = await db('events')
+      .where({ slug })
+      .select(
+        'id',
+        'created_by',
+        'event_name',
+        'event_type',
+        'event_date',
+        'expires_at',
+        'is_active',
+        'is_archived',
+        'share_link',
+        'share_token',
+        'allow_downloads',
+        'allow_user_uploads',
+        'reveal_mode',
+        'reveal_at',
+        'revealed_at',
+        'disable_right_click',
+        'watermark_downloads',
+        'watermark_text',
+        'require_password',
+        'color_theme',
+        'enable_devtools_protection',
+        'use_canvas_rendering',
+        'hero_logo_visible',
+        'hero_logo_size',
+        'hero_logo_position',
+        'hero_logo_url',
+        'login_logo_visible',
+        'header_style',
+        'hero_divider_style',
+        'hero_image_anchor',
+        'is_draft',
+        'default_photo_sort',
+        // Per-event promotional override (#440). Resolution into a
+        // ready-to-render markdown string happens below so the
+        // frontend doesn't have to know about modes.
+        'promo_mode',
+        'promo_markdown',
+        'info_mode',
+        'info_markdown'
+      )
+      .first();
+
+    if (!event) {
+      // Check for redirect
+      const newSlug = await checkSlugRedirect(slug);
+      if (newSlug) {
+        return res.status(301).json({
+          redirect: true,
+          newSlug,
+          message: 'Gallery has been renamed'
+        });
+      }
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found' });
+    }
+
+    // Check if event is archived
+    if (event.is_archived) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery has been archived and is no longer available' });
+    }
+
+    // Admin preview (#868) bypasses both the draft gate and — below — the
+    // password gate. Computed once and reused.
+    const adminPreview = await verifyAdminPreview(req, event);
+    // Check if event is a draft (allow admin preview)
+    if (event.is_draft && !adminPreview) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery is not yet published' });
+    }
+    
+    // If token provided, verify it matches the share link
+    if (token) {
+      const expectedToken = getEventShareToken(event);
+      if (!expectedToken || !timingSafeEqualStr(String(token), expectedToken)) {
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Invalid gallery link' });
+      }
+    }
+    
+    // Admin preview skips the guest password on published, protected galleries
+    // (#868) — the admin already sees every photo through the admin routes.
+    const requiresPassword = adminPreview
+      ? false
+      : !(event.require_password === false || event.require_password === 0 || event.require_password === '0');
+    const globalHeroLogoVisible = await getAppSetting('branding_logo_display_hero', true);
+    const globalLogoSize = await getAppSetting('branding_logo_size', 'medium');
+
+    res.json({
+      event_name: event.event_name,
+      event_type: event.event_type,
+      event_date: event.event_date,
+      expires_at: event.expires_at,
+      is_active: event.is_active,
+      is_expired: !event.is_active || isGalleryExpired(event),
+      requires_password: requiresPassword,
+      color_theme: event.color_theme,
+      allow_downloads: !(event.allow_downloads === false || event.allow_downloads === 0 || event.allow_downloads === '0'),
+      allow_user_uploads: event.allow_user_uploads === true || event.allow_user_uploads === 1 || event.allow_user_uploads === '1',
+      // Reveal mode (#838): effective hidden state (computed, time-exact) so
+      // the landing page can hint at the reveal before login too.
+      hidden_until_reveal: isGalleryHidden(event),
+      reveal_at: isGalleryHidden(event) ? (event.reveal_at || null) : null,
+      disable_right_click: event.disable_right_click === true || event.disable_right_click === 1 || event.disable_right_click === '1',
+      watermark_downloads: event.watermark_downloads === true || event.watermark_downloads === 1 || event.watermark_downloads === '1',
+      watermark_text: event.watermark_text,
+      enable_devtools_protection: event.enable_devtools_protection === true || event.enable_devtools_protection === 1 || event.enable_devtools_protection === '1',
+      use_canvas_rendering: event.use_canvas_rendering === true || event.use_canvas_rendering === 1 || event.use_canvas_rendering === '1',
+      hero_logo_visible: resolveHeroLogoVisible(event.hero_logo_visible, globalHeroLogoVisible),
+      // #894: only an explicit false hides the logo on the password page;
+      // NULL keeps the default (show).
+      login_logo_visible: !(event.login_logo_visible === false || event.login_logo_visible === 0 || event.login_logo_visible === '0'),
+      // #756: NULL per-event size inherits the global branding_logo_size.
+      hero_logo_size: event.hero_logo_size || globalLogoSize || 'medium',
+      hero_logo_position: event.hero_logo_position || 'top',
+      hero_logo_url: event.hero_logo_url || null,
+      header_style: event.header_style || 'standard',
+      hero_divider_style: event.hero_divider_style || 'wave',
+      hero_image_anchor: event.hero_image_anchor || 'center',
+      default_photo_sort: event.default_photo_sort || 'upload_date_desc',
+      // Per-event promotional override (#440). Frontend resolves
+      // 'inherit' against branding_promo_markdown from public settings.
+      promo_mode: event.promo_mode || 'inherit',
+      promo_markdown: event.promo_markdown || null,
+      // Info banner (#932). Same inherit/custom/off semantics as promo,
+      // resolved against branding_info_markdown from public settings.
+      info_mode: event.info_mode || 'inherit',
+      info_markdown: event.info_markdown || null
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch gallery info');
+  }
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Live Slideshow ("Diashow") — token-only fullscreen kiosk surface
+// (migration 138). The token in the URL IS the secret (no gallery password),
+// so these routes are unauthenticated except for the token match itself. The
+// slideshow shows ALL public/visible, finished photos — exactly the guest
+// set — so once /session mints a short-lived `accessLevel:'slideshow'` JWT,
+// the page reuses the normal /photos + image endpoints unchanged.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// Photos a slideshow may display: published, finished, non-hidden. Mirrors the
+// guest filter in GET /:slug/photos so the live count matches the rendered set.
+
+module.exports = router;
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+const express = require('express');
+const { db, logActivity } = require('../../database/db');
+const router = express.Router();
+const { verifyGalleryAccess } = require('../../middleware/gallery');
+const { resolveGuest } = require('../../middleware/guestAuth');
+const { noStoreCache } = require('../../middleware/noStoreCache');
+const { generateGuestIdentifier } = require('../../middleware/feedbackRateLimit');
+const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { guestBlockedByReveal } = require('../../utils/revealMode');
+const downloadZipService = require('../../services/downloadZipService');
+const GALLERY_OPENED_DEBOUNCE_MS = 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+const galleryOpenedNotifiedAt = new Map();
+function galleryActor(req) {
+  // Portal tokens run as accessLevel 'guest' but carry via:'customer'
+  // (req.viaCustomer); PIN-client logins carry accessLevel 'client'.
+  // Both are customers, not guests (codex review of #849, final round).
+  const isCustomer = !!(req && (req.viaCustomer || req.accessLevel === 'client'));
+  return { type: isCustomer ? 'customer' : 'guest' };
+}
+function notifyGalleryOpened(event, req) {
+  // Customer-PORTAL opens already log `customer_event_access` on the
+  // access-token mint — a second `gallery_opened` per portal click would
+  // double-notify. Keyed on the portal provenance (req.viaCustomer), NOT
+  // on accessLevel: PIN-client logins are 'client' without any other
+  // open signal and must keep notifying (codex review of #849, final
+  // round — the previous check had this inverted).
+  if (req && req.viaCustomer) return;
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const last = galleryOpenedNotifiedAt.get(event.id) || 0;
+  if (now - last < GALLERY_OPENED_DEBOUNCE_MS) return;
+  galleryOpenedNotifiedAt.set(event.id, now);
+  // Fire-and-forget — logActivity swallows its own errors.
+  logActivity('gallery_opened', {}, event.id, galleryActor(req));
+}
+
+router.get('/:slug/photos', verifyGalleryAccess, resolveGuest, noStoreCache, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const payload = await require('../../services/galleryQueryService').getGalleryPhotos({
+      event: req.event, slug: req.params.slug, query: req.query,
+      identity: { guestId: req.guest?.id, guestIdentifier: generateGuestIdentifier(req) },
+      accessLevel: req.accessLevel, adminPreview: req.isAdminPreview,
+      hiddenForGuest: guestBlockedByReveal(req),
+    });
+    // Log view — but NOT for the Live Slideshow kiosk. A running projector
+    // refetches this list on every new-upload poll, which would massively
+    // inflate total_views / unique_visitors. The slideshow is explicitly
+    // excluded from real visitor analytics (migration 138 design).
+    // Admin preview (#868) is excluded from guest analytics + the "gallery
+    // opened" bell — it's the photographer looking at their own gallery.
+    if (req.accessLevel !== 'slideshow' && !req.isAdminPreview && !(Number(req.query.page) > 1)) {
+      await db('access_logs').insert({
+        event_id: req.event.id,
+        ip_address: req.ip,
+        user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
+        action: 'view'
+      });
+      notifyGalleryOpened(req.event, req);
+    }
+    
+    res.json(payload);
+  } catch (error) { errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch photos'); }
+});
+
+/**
+ * People in this gallery (#1074).
+ *
+ * Returns [] rather than 403 whenever the feature is unavailable — a guest
+ * must not be able to tell "this gallery has no people" from "this gallery
+ * has the feature switched off". Same reasoning as reveal mode returning an
+ * empty photo set rather than an error.
+ *
+ * Counts and cover faces are computed against the caller's own visibility
+ * scope inside facePeopleService; nothing here reads face_count_total.
+ */
+// no-store for the same reason as /photos: the people list and its scan
+// progress are scoped to what THIS viewer may see.
+router.get('/:slug/people', verifyGalleryAccess, resolveGuest, noStoreCache, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const isClient = req.accessLevel === 'client';
+    const { isEnabledForEvent, areFacesVisibleToGuests, getThresholds } =
+      require('../../services/faceSettings');
+
+    if (!(await isEnabledForEvent(req.event))) {
+      return res.json({ people: [] });
+    }
+    if (!isClient && !areFacesVisibleToGuests(req.event)) {
+      return res.json({ people: [] });
+    }
+    // While a gallery is hidden behind reveal mode (#838), a plain guest sees
+    // no photos — so they see no people either.
+    if (guestBlockedByReveal(req)) {
+      return res.json({ people: [] });
+    }
+
+    const { listPeople, getScanStatus } = require('../../services/facePeopleService');
+    const thresholds = await getThresholds();
+
+    const people = await listPeople(req.event.id, {
+      isClient,
+      forAdmin: false,
+      minClusterSize: thresholds.face_min_cluster_size,
+    });
+
+    // Drives the "Finding people… 240/1200" progress line during a backfill.
+    // Scoped to what this viewer may see — an unscoped total would leak the
+    // number of hidden photos through the progress bar.
+    const status = await getScanStatus(req.event.id, { isClient });
+
+    res.json({
+      people,
+      scan: {
+        in_progress: status.in_progress,
+        scanned: status.scanned,
+        total: status.total,
+      },
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to fetch people');
+  }
+});
+
+// Toggle photo visibility (client-only)
+router.patch('/:slug/photos/:photoId/visibility', verifyGalleryAccess, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    if (req.accessLevel !== 'client') {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Client access required' });
+    }
+
+    const { photoId } = req.params;
+    const { visibility } = req.body;
+
+    if (!['visible', 'hidden'].includes(visibility)) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid visibility value' });
+    }
+
+    const photo = await db('photos')
+      .where({ id: photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
+      .first();
+
+    if (!photo) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
+    }
+
+    await db('photos')
+      .where({ id: photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
+      .update({ visibility });
+
+    // A client hiding/showing a photo changes the guest download bundle —
+    // drop the cached ZIP so it rebuilds fresh (codex review).
+    downloadZipService.invalidate(req.event.id);
+
+    res.json({ message: 'Photo visibility updated', visibility });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update photo visibility');
+  }
+});
+
+// Bulk toggle photo visibility (client-only)
+router.patch('/:slug/photos/visibility/bulk', verifyGalleryAccess, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    if (req.accessLevel !== 'client') {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Client access required' });
+    }
+
+    const { photoIds, visibility } = req.body;
+
+    if (!Array.isArray(photoIds) || photoIds.length === 0) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid photo IDs' });
+    }
+
+    if (!['visible', 'hidden'].includes(visibility)) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid visibility value' });
+    }
+
+    const count = await db('photos')
+      .whereIn('id', photoIds)
+      .where('event_id', req.event.id)
+      .update({ visibility });
+
+    // Client bulk hide/show alters the guest download bundle — invalidate
+    // the cached ZIP (codex review).
+    downloadZipService.invalidate(req.event.id);
+
+    res.json({ message: `${count} photos updated`, visibility });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update photo visibility');
+  }
+});
+
+// Download single photo
+
+module.exports = router;
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+const { isGalleryAvailable } = require('../../utils/galleryLifecycle');
+const express = require('express');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const { db } = require('../../database/db');
+const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
+
+const router = express.Router();
+const { noStoreCache } = require('../../middleware/noStoreCache');
+const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
+const { getEventShareToken, buildShareLinkVariants } = require('../../services/shareLinkService');
+const { handleAsync } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
+const { NotFoundError } = require('../../utils/errors');
+const { setGalleryAuthCookies } = require('../../utils/tokenUtils');
+const { getSlideshowGlobals } = require('../../utils/slideshowGlobals');
+const { isFeatureEnabled } = require('../../middleware/requireFeatureFlag');
+
+function slideshowPhotosQuery(eventId, categoryId = null) {
+  const q = db('photos')
+    .where('photos.event_id', eventId)
+    .where(function() {
+      this.where('photos.processing_status', 'complete').orWhereNull('photos.processing_status');
+    })
+    .where(function() {
+      this.where('photos.visibility', 'visible').orWhereNull('photos.visibility');
+    });
+  // Category filter (#202) — keep the /session + /state count in sync with the
+  // photos the kiosk actually renders.
+  if (categoryId) q.where('photos.category_id', categoryId);
+  return q;
+}
+
+// Resolve an active slideshow by slug + token. Returns the event row, or null
+// when the link is missing/rotated/disabled or the gallery isn't live (archived
+// / draft / inactive / expired) — every one of those collapses to a 404 so a
+// dead link reveals nothing and stops any projector on its next poll.
+async function resolveSlideshow(slug, token) {
+  if (!token) return null;
+  // The `slideshow` feature flag is a master kill-switch: when an admin turns
+  // Live Slideshow off, every existing /show/ link dies on its next request
+  // (the running projector stops within one /state poll), not just the admin UI.
+  if (!(await isFeatureEnabled('slideshow'))) return null;
+  const event = await db('events')
+    .where({
+      slug,
+      show_share_token: token,
+      is_active: formatBoolean(true),
+      is_archived: formatBoolean(false),
+      is_draft: formatBoolean(false)
+    })
+    .first();
+  if (!isGalleryAvailable(event)) return null;
+  return event;
+}
+
+// Resolve the slideshow's live styling, including the ZDF/ARD-ident-style
+// watermark (a white, semi-transparent corner logo). The logo URL is resolved
+// from the chosen source so the kiosk renders it without knowing about
+// branding/event internals; null url = nothing to overlay.
+async function slideshowSettings(event, req) {
+  // The global look/fit (Settings → Slideshow) + branding logo URLs come from a
+  // short-TTL cached bundle so a 3s projector poll doesn't re-fire ~10 settings
+  // reads each time (PR #646 review, concern 2).
+  const g = await getSlideshowGlobals();
+
+  // Watermark: the LOOK (logo/position/opacity/style/size) is configured ONCE
+  // globally; it is NOT duplicated per event. The only per-event control is
+  // whether the watermark shows: `show_watermark` NULL inherits the global
+  // enabled flag, true/false force it on/off.
+  const wm = event.show_watermark;
+  const inherit = (wm === null || wm === undefined);
+  const enabled = inherit ? g.watermark_enabled : (wm === true || wm === 1 || wm === '1');
+  let watermark = null;
+  if (enabled) {
+    // Resolve the chosen logo to a URL. Branding assets come from settings;
+    // the event source uses the event's own hero logo.
+    let url;
+    if (g.watermark_source === 'event') {
+      url = event.hero_logo_url || null;
+    } else if (g.watermark_source === 'logo_dark') {
+      url = g.branding_logo_url_dark;
+    } else if (g.watermark_source === 'favicon') {
+      url = g.branding_favicon_url;
+    } else {
+      url = g.branding_logo_url;
+    }
+    if (url) {
+      watermark = {
+        url,
+        position: g.watermark_position,
+        opacity: g.watermark_opacity,
+        style: g.watermark_style,
+        size: g.watermark_size,
+      };
+    }
+  }
+  // QR overlay (#837): like the watermark, the LOOK is global-only and the
+  // per-event `show_qr` tri-state (NULL = inherit) decides visibility. The QR
+  // encodes the gallery share URL and ships as a data URI so the public
+  // slideshow client needs no QR library and no extra authenticated endpoint.
+  const qrOverride = event.show_qr;
+  const qrInherit = (qrOverride === null || qrOverride === undefined);
+  const qrEnabled = qrInherit ? g.qr_enabled : (qrOverride === true || qrOverride === 1 || qrOverride === '1');
+  let qr = null;
+  if (qrEnabled) {
+    const dataUrl = await slideshowQrDataUrl(event, req);
+    if (dataUrl) {
+      qr = {
+        data_url: dataUrl,
+        position: g.qr_position,
+        opacity: g.qr_opacity,
+        size: g.qr_size,
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return {
+    interval_ms: event.show_interval_ms || 5000,
+    transition: event.show_transition || 'crossfade',
+    transition_ms: event.show_transition_ms || 800,
+    colorfilter: event.show_colorfilter || 'none',
+    // Play order (#202): 'chronological' | 'random'. The client shuffles when
+    // 'random' so live-appended uploads keep working.
+    order: event.show_order || 'chronological',
+    fit: g.fit,
+    watermark,
+    qr,
+  };
+}
+
+// The state endpoint is polled every ~3s per projector — cache the generated
+// QR data URI per share URL instead of re-encoding on every poll. Bounded:
+// entries live for past events / rotated tokens too, so without eviction the
+// map would grow with every share URL ever displayed (codex review of #848).
+// Insertion-order eviction is enough — concurrently-shown events stay hot.
+const SLIDESHOW_QR_CACHE_MAX = 50;
+// Keyed by event id (NOT by URL): the origin is caller-influenced when the
+// configured base is loopback, so URL-keyed caching would let a slideshow
+// -link holder force a fresh QRCode.toDataURL per request with unique
+// origins — a cheap CPU-exhaustion path (codex review of #848,
+// confirmation round). Per-event entries + a regeneration throttle bound
+// the encode rate regardless of what the caller sends.
+const SLIDESHOW_QR_REGEN_MS = 60_000;
+const slideshowQrCache = new Map(); // eventId -> { url, dataUrl, at }
+// Localhost/relative guard (codex review of #848): with the compose-default
+// FRONTEND_URL=http://localhost:3000 (or none configured) the QR would send
+// scanning phones to THEIR localhost. The state poll comes from the kiosk
+// browser itself, so its Host header + protocol are exactly the public
+// origin guests can reach — prefer that whenever the configured base is
+// missing or loopback. trust proxy is configured, so req.protocol respects
+// X-Forwarded-Proto behind the standard reverse-proxy setups.
+// Centralised in utils/frontendUrl (#705) so the QR path and the public-origin
+// resolver agree on what counts as a non-shareable base.
+const QR_LOCAL_BASE_RE = { test: (v) => require('../../utils/frontendUrl').isLoopbackBase(v) };
+const QR_ORIGIN_RE = /^https?:\/\/[^\s/]+$/i;
+async function slideshowQrDataUrl(event, req) {
+  try {
+    const shareToken = getEventShareToken(event);
+    if (!shareToken) return null;
+    let { shareUrl, sharePath } = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug: event.slug, shareToken });
+    if (!/^https?:\/\//i.test(shareUrl) || QR_LOCAL_BASE_RE.test(shareUrl)) {
+      // Prefer the kiosk's own window.location.origin (?origin=, validated):
+      // req.get('host') is NOT the browser origin behind the standard
+      // proxies — frontend/nginx.conf forwards $host (port stripped), so a
+      // compose LAN deployment on :3000 would encode port 80. A LOOPBACK
+      // kiosk origin is rejected too: it is no more guest-reachable than
+      // the loopback base it would replace (codex review of #848).
+      const rawOrigin = req?.query?.origin;
+      const queryOrigin = typeof rawOrigin === 'string' && QR_ORIGIN_RE.test(rawOrigin) && !QR_LOCAL_BASE_RE.test(rawOrigin)
+        ? rawOrigin.replace(/\/$/, '')
+        : null;
+      const host = req && req.get ? req.get('host') : null;
+      const hostOrigin = host ? `${req.protocol}://${host}` : null;
+      if (queryOrigin) shareUrl = `${queryOrigin}${sharePath}`;
+      else if (hostOrigin && !QR_LOCAL_BASE_RE.test(hostOrigin)) shareUrl = `${hostOrigin}${sharePath}`;
+      // Still loopback/relative → no reachable URL exists; suppress the
+      // overlay rather than encode a QR that sends phones to localhost.
+      else return null;
+    }
+
+    const cached = slideshowQrCache.get(event.id);
+    if (cached && cached.url === shareUrl) return cached.dataUrl;
+    // URL differs from the cached one: NEVER serve the mismatched artifact —
+    // a slideshow-token holder could otherwise poison the projector's QR
+    // with an attacker origin for a whole throttle window (codex review of
+    // #848, final round). Inside the window the overlay is briefly
+    // suppressed instead; regeneration stays bounded per event.
+    if (cached && Date.now() - cached.at < SLIDESHOW_QR_REGEN_MS) {
+      return cached.pending ? cached.dataUrl : null;
+    }
+    // Single-flight: concurrent polls on a cold cache must not each
+    // schedule their own 512px encode — reserve the entry with a shared
+    // promise before awaiting.
+    if (cached && cached.pending && cached.url === shareUrl) return cached.pending;
+    const QRCode = require('qrcode');
+    const entry = { url: shareUrl, dataUrl: null, at: Date.now(), pending: null };
+    entry.pending = QRCode.toDataURL(shareUrl, { width: 512, margin: 4 }).then((dataUrl) => {
+      entry.dataUrl = dataUrl;
+      entry.pending = null;
+      return dataUrl;
+    }).catch((e) => {
+      slideshowQrCache.delete(event.id);
+      throw e;
+    });
+    if (!slideshowQrCache.has(event.id) && slideshowQrCache.size >= SLIDESHOW_QR_CACHE_MAX) {
+      slideshowQrCache.delete(slideshowQrCache.keys().next().value);
+    }
+    slideshowQrCache.set(event.id, entry);
+    return await entry.pending;
+  } catch (e) {
+    logger.error('Slideshow QR generation failed:', e);
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+// Open a slideshow session: validate the token and mint a short-lived gallery
+// JWT scoped to `accessLevel:'slideshow'` (treated as a guest by the photo /
+// image endpoints → visible photos only, no client-only/hidden). The page
+// stores this token and the existing axios interceptor injects it.
+// no-store: this response *is* a credential (it mints a gallery JWT and sets
+// the per-slug auth cookie), so it must never be retained anywhere.
+router.get('/:slug/show/:token/session', noStoreCache, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+  const { slug, token } = req.params;
+  const event = await resolveSlideshow(slug, token);
+  if (!event) {
+    throw new NotFoundError('Slideshow');
+  }
+
+  const sessionToken = jwt.sign({
+    eventId: event.id,
+    eventSlug: event.slug,
+    type: 'gallery',
+    // Unique per token: the revocation key falls back to eventId+iat otherwise,
+    // so one guest's logout would revoke every same-second login (#1357).
+    jti: crypto.randomUUID(),
+    accessLevel: 'slideshow',
+    loginTime: Date.now()
+  }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
+    expiresIn: '12h',
+    issuer: 'picpeak-auth'
+  });
+
+  // <img> tags can't carry an Authorization header, so the photo/thumbnail/
+  // preview endpoints authenticate via the per-slug gallery cookie. Set it
+  // here so the kiosk's image requests are authorized with zero extra wiring.
+  setGalleryAuthCookies(res, sessionToken, event.slug);
+
+  const [{ count }] = await slideshowPhotosQuery(event.id, event.show_category_id).count('* as count');
+
+  res.json({
+    token: sessionToken,
+    event: {
+      event_name: event.event_name,
+      event_type: event.event_type,
+      color_theme: event.color_theme
+    },
+    settings: await slideshowSettings(event, req),
+    photo_count: parseInt(count, 10) || 0,
+    expires_at: event.expires_at || null
+  });
+}));
+
+// Cheap live-poll endpoint (tiny payload, hit every ~3s by the running show):
+// current settings + the visible photo count. The page diffs photo_count to
+// decide when to refetch the full list, and re-reads settings so admin changes
+// take effect live. A dead/disabled link 404s here → the projector stops.
+router.get('/:slug/show/:token/state', noStoreCache, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+  const { slug, token } = req.params;
+  const event = await resolveSlideshow(slug, token);
+  if (!event) {
+    throw new NotFoundError('Slideshow');
+  }
+
+  const [{ count }] = await slideshowPhotosQuery(event.id, event.show_category_id).count('* as count');
+
+  res.json({
+    ...(await slideshowSettings(event, req)),
+    photo_count: parseInt(count, 10) || 0,
+    expires_at: event.expires_at || null
+  });
+}));
+
+// Get all photos.
+//
+// no-store (B6): the payload is private and per-guest — it carries the
+// viewer's own likes/favorites/ratings and, for a client token, photos hidden
+// from plain guests. With no Cache-Control at all a browser applies heuristic
+// freshness and may reuse a body it stored on disk, on a shared device, for a
+// gallery whose password has since been rotated. Express still computes its
+// weak ETag, so a caller that does revalidate (React Query's own in-memory
+// cache is unaffected either way) still gets a correct 304.
+
+module.exports = router;
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+const express = require('express');
+const { db } = require('../../database/db');
+const router = express.Router();
+const { verifyGalleryAccess } = require('../../middleware/gallery');
+const { noStoreCache } = require('../../middleware/noStoreCache');
+const { blockHiddenGallery } = require('../../utils/revealMode');
+
+router.get('/:slug/stats', verifyGalleryAccess, blockHiddenGallery, noStoreCache, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const totalPhotos = await db('photos')
+      .where('event_id', req.event.id)
+      .count('id as count')
+      .first();
+    
+    const totalViews = await db('access_logs')
+      .where('event_id', req.event.id)
+      .where('action', 'view')
+      .count('id as count')
+      .first();
+    
+    const totalDownloads = await db('photos')
+      .where('event_id', req.event.id)
+      .sum('download_count as total')
+      .first();
+    
+    const uniqueVisitors = await db('access_logs')
+      .where('event_id', req.event.id)
+      .countDistinct('ip_address as count')
+      .first();
+    
+    res.json({
+      total_photos: totalPhotos.count,
+      total_views: totalViews.count,
+      total_downloads: totalDownloads.total || 0,
+      unique_visitors: uniqueVisitors.count
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch stats' });
+  }
+});
+
+// User photo upload endpoint
+
+module.exports = router;
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+const express = require('express');
+const { db } = require('../../database/db');
+const router = express.Router();
+const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
+
+router.get('/:slug/css-template', async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const { slug } = req.params;
+
+    // Find the event by slug
+    const event = await db('events')
+      .where({ slug })
+      .select('css_template_id')
+      .first();
+
+    if (!event || !event.css_template_id) {
+      // No custom CSS - return 204 No Content
+      return res.status(204).send();
+    }
+
+    // Get the template if it's enabled
+    const template = await db('css_templates')
+      .where({ id: event.css_template_id, is_enabled: true })
+      .select('css_content')
+      .first();
+
+    if (!template || !template.css_content) {
+      return res.status(204).send();
+    }
+
+    // Return CSS with caching headers
+    res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/css');
+    res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=3600'); // 1 hour cache
+    res.send(template.css_content);
+  } catch (error) {
+    logger.error('Get CSS template error:', error);
+    res.status(500).send('/* Error loading template */');
+  }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+const express = require('express');
+const { db } = require('../../database/db');
+
+const router = express.Router();
+const { verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken } = require('../../middleware/gallery');
+const { noStoreCache } = require('../../middleware/noStoreCache');
+const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
+const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
+
+router.post('/:eventId/upload', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const eventId = parseInt(req.params.eventId);
+
+    // Verify the event matches the token
+    if (req.event.id !== eventId) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Access denied' });
+    }
+
+    // Check if user uploads are allowed
+    if (!req.event.allow_user_uploads) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'User uploads are not allowed for this event' });
+    }
+
+    // Ensure temp upload directory exists
+    const fs = require('fs');
+    const tempUploadDir = '/tmp/uploads/';
+    if (!fs.existsSync(tempUploadDir)) {
+      try {
+        fs.mkdirSync(tempUploadDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o755 });
+        logger.info('Created temp upload directory:', tempUploadDir);
+      } catch (mkdirErr) {
+        return errorResponse(res, mkdirErr, 500, 'Server configuration error: unable to create upload directory');
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Import multer and photo processing
+    const multer = require('multer');
+    const { getAllowedMimeTypes, getMaxFilesPerUpload, getMaxFileSizeBytes, DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB } = require('../../services/uploadSettings');
+    const { validateFileType } = require('../../utils/fileSecurityUtils');
+
+    // Resolve allowed MIME types from settings
+    let allowedMimeTypes;
+    try {
+      allowedMimeTypes = await getAllowedMimeTypes();
+    } catch {
+      allowedMimeTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'];
+    }
+
+    // #613 — per-batch file count was hardcoded to 10 here, so the admin's
+    // Settings → General → "Max Files per Upload" value silently didn't
+    // apply to guest uploads (only admin uploads honoured it via
+    // adminPhotos.js:131). Zszywany reported uploading 16 files succeeded
+    // even with the limit set to 10. Mirror the admin path: resolve from
+    // settings (cached for 60s in the service) and feed multer both
+    // `limits.files` and the `.array(...)` cap. Fall back to the service's
+    // default if the read fails.
+    let maxFilesPerUpload;
+    try {
+      maxFilesPerUpload = await getMaxFilesPerUpload();
+    } catch {
+      maxFilesPerUpload = 500;
+    }
+
+    // Per-file size cap was hardcoded to 50MB here, so the admin's Settings →
+    // General → "Max File Size (MB)" value (general_max_file_size_mb) never
+    // applied to guest uploads — a guest could not upload a large video even
+    // when the admin allowed it (reported on #613 by mat1990dj). Resolve it from
+    // settings like the count above; fall back to the 50MB default on read error.
+    let maxFileSizeBytes;
+    try {
+      maxFileSizeBytes = await getMaxFileSizeBytes();
+    } catch {
+      maxFileSizeBytes = DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB * 1024 * 1024;
+    }
+
+    const upload = multer({
+      dest: tempUploadDir,
+      limits: {
+        fileSize: maxFileSizeBytes,
+        files: maxFilesPerUpload,
+        // CVE-2026-82333: files arrive as repeated `photos` parts via
+        // .array(), not bracket-indexed field names like `photos[0]` — no
+        // legitimate field name uses array-index syntax at all. Reject any
+        // that do.
+        fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0
+      },
+      fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
+        if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowedMimeTypes)) {
+          cb(null, true);
+        } else {
+          cb(new Error('Invalid file type'));
+        }
+      }
+    }).array('photos', maxFilesPerUpload);
+    
+    // Handle upload
+    upload(req, res, async (err) => {
+      if (err) {
+        logger.error('Upload error:', err);
+        // Turn multer's generic "File too large" into an actionable message
+        // that names the configured limit.
+        if (err.code === 'LIMIT_FILE_SIZE') {
+          const limitMb = Math.floor(maxFileSizeBytes / (1024 * 1024));
+          return res.status(400).json({ error: `File too large. Maximum size is ${limitMb} MB per file.` });
+        }
+        return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message });
+      }
+      
+      if (!req.files || req.files.length === 0) {
+        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No files uploaded' });
+      }
+
+      const { queueFilesForProcessing } = require('../../services/photoProcessor');
+      const rawCategory = req.body.category_id || req.event.upload_category_id || null;
+      const numericCategoryId = (() => {
+        if (rawCategory === null || rawCategory === undefined) return null;
+        const n = parseInt(rawCategory, 10);
+        return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
+      })();
+
+      try {
+        // Queue files as 'pending' — the background worker will process
+        // thumbnails / EXIF / dimensions off the request thread (#357).
+        const result = await queueFilesForProcessing(req.files, {
+          eventId,
+          photoType: 'individual',
+          categoryId: numericCategoryId,
+        });
+
+        res.status(202).json({
+          message: 'Photos queued for processing',
+          upload_id: result.uploadId,
+          count: result.photos.length,
+          photo_ids: result.photos.map((p) => p.id),
+          photos: result.photos,
+          errors: result.errors.length > 0 ? result.errors : undefined,
+        });
+      } catch (processError) {
+        errorResponse(res, processError, 500, 'Failed to process photos');
+      }
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to upload photos');
+  }
+});
+
+// A guest upload_id is `crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex')`
+// (photoProcessor.js). The pattern is deliberately a little wider than that so
+// an id-format change does not silently 400, but narrow enough that the value
+// can only ever be an opaque token.
+const UPLOAD_ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$/;
+// The guest UI uploads one file per request, so a batch of N files yields N
+// upload ids. Batching them into a single poll keeps the request rate flat
+// regardless of batch size; the cap bounds the IN-list.
+const MAX_UPLOAD_STATUS_IDS = 50;
+
+/**
+ * GET /:slug/uploads/status?ids=<upload_id>[,<upload_id>…]
+ *
+ * Guest-facing processing status for the guest's own uploads (B7).
+ *
+ * The upload route answers 202 and queues the files, and /photos only returns
+ * rows that reached `processing_status: 'complete'`. Without this the gallery
+ * had to poll /photos blind, could not say "processing…", and could not tell a
+ * slow worker from a photo that failed outright — the guest just watched their
+ * upload not appear.
+ *
+ * Authorization: `verifyGalleryAccess` already resolved `req.event` from the
+ * caller's gallery token, and the query is filtered on `event_id = req.event.id`
+ * as well as the ids. An id belonging to another gallery therefore matches no
+ * row rather than being reported as forbidden — no cross-event read, and no
+ * existence oracle either. Slideshow tokens are denied because a kiosk never
+ * uploads.
+ *
+ * The response is counts only. The guest already knows which files they sent;
+ * anything more (filenames, `processing_error` strings, which can carry
+ * internal paths) would be leaking beyond "how far along is my upload".
+ */
+router.get('/:slug/uploads/status', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, noStoreCache, async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const ids = String(req.query.ids || '')
+      .split(',')
+      .map((id) => id.trim())
+      .filter(Boolean);
+
+    if (ids.length === 0 || ids.length > MAX_UPLOAD_STATUS_IDS || !ids.every((id) => UPLOAD_ID_PATTERN.test(id))) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid upload ids' });
+    }
+
+    const rows = await db('photos')
+      .where('event_id', req.event.id)
+      .whereIn('upload_id', ids)
+      .select('processing_status');
+
+    const summary = { total: rows.length, pending: 0, processing: 0, complete: 0, failed: 0 };
+    for (const row of rows) {
+      // NULL is a pre-async-migration row, treated as complete exactly as the
+      // /photos filter treats it.
+      const status = row.processing_status || 'complete';
+      if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(summary, status) && status !== 'total') {
+        summary[status] += 1;
+      }
+    }
+
+    res.json(summary);
+  } catch (error) {
+    errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to read upload status');
+  }
+});
+
+/**
+ * GET /:slug/css-template
+ * Get custom CSS template for gallery (public endpoint)
+ */
+
+module.exports = router;
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ const { verifyGalleryAccess } = require('../middleware/gallery');
 const { blockHiddenGallery, bypassesReveal, isGalleryHidden } = require('../utils/revealMode');
 const watermarkService = require('../services/watermarkService');
 const secureImageService = require('../services/secureImageService');
+const galleryAccessService = require('../services/galleryAccessService');
 const { getStorage } = require('../services/storage');
 const { resolvePhotoStorageKey, resolvePhotoFilePath } = require('../services/photoResolver');
 const { withLocalCopy } = require('../services/imageProcessor');
@@ -19,16 +20,13 @@ const router = express.Router();
 /**
 * Generate a signed URL token for image access
 */
-function generateImageToken(photoId, expiresIn = 3600, revealBypass = false, clientBypass = false) {
+function generateImageToken(photoId, expiresIn = 3600, revealBypass = false, clientBypass = false, galleryAccess) {
  const secret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
  const expires = Date.now() + (expiresIn * 1000);
-  // Third segment (#838): whether the minting context bypasses reveal mode
-  // (slideshow/client/admin). Fourth segment: whether the minter was a
-  // PIN-client, allowing the serve route to still deliver a photo that was
-  // hidden AFTER minting (TOCTOU) — a guest's token carries 0, so it stops
-  // working the moment the photo is hidden. Old shorter tokens verify
-  // unchanged and read both flags as no-bypass.
-  const data = `${photoId}:${expires}:${revealBypass ? 1 : 0}:${clientBypass ? 1 : 0}`;
+  // Bind the URL to its issuing access grant. Old tokens without a grant
+  // must be refreshed: they cannot prove session revocation or ownership.
+  const grant = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(galleryAccess)).toString('base64url');
+  const data = `${photoId}:${expires}:${revealBypass ? 1 : 0}:${clientBypass ? 1 : 0}:${grant}`;
  const signature = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(data).digest('hex');
  return `${Buffer.from(data).toString('base64')}.${signature}`;
 }
@@ -41,7 +39,7 @@ function verifyImageToken(token) {
    const secret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
    const [data, signature] = token.split('.');
    const decoded = Buffer.from(data, 'base64').toString();
-    const [photoId, expires, bypassFlag, clientFlag] = decoded.split(':');
+    const [photoId, expires, bypassFlag, clientFlag, grant] = decoded.split(':');

    // Verify signature (constant-time — avoids leaking the HMAC byte-by-byte)
    const expectedSignature = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(decoded).digest('hex');
@@ -50,7 +48,7 @@ function verifyImageToken(token) {
    }

    // Check expiration
-    if (Date.now() > parseInt(expires)) {
+    if (!Number.isFinite(Number(expires)) || Date.now() >= Number(expires) || !grant) {
      return null;
    }

@@ -59,6 +57,7 @@ function verifyImageToken(token) {
      expires: parseInt(expires),
      revealBypass: bypassFlag === '1',
      clientBypass: clientFlag === '1',
+      galleryAccess: JSON.parse(Buffer.from(grant, 'base64url').toString()),
    };
  } catch (error) {
    return null;
@@ -170,6 +169,7 @@ router.get('/:slug/photo/:photoId/view', verifyGalleryAccess, blockHiddenGallery
    res.send(finalImage);
    
  } catch (error) {
+    if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json({ error: error.message, code: error.code });
    logger.error('Error serving protected image:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to serve image' });
  }
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ router.post('/:slug/photo/:photoId/generate-secure-token', verifyGalleryAccess,
    // Generate secure token. clientBypass lets a client's token keep serving
    // a photo hidden after minting; a guest's stops at the serve route.
    const token = secureImageService.generateSecureToken(photoId, req.sessionID || 'anonymous', {
+      galleryAccess: req.galleryAccess,
      expiresIn,
      maxUses: protectionLevel === 'maximum' ? 1 : 3,
      clientFingerprint,
@@ -222,6 +223,7 @@ router.post('/:slug/photo/:photoId/generate-secure-token', verifyGalleryAccess,
    });
    
  } catch (error) {
+    if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json({ error: error.message, code: error.code });
    logger.error('Error generating secure token:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to generate token' });
  }
@@ -262,7 +264,7 @@ router.post('/:slug/photo/:photoId/generate-url', verifyGalleryAccess, async (re
    // Generate signed token. The client-bypass flag lets a PIN-client's
    // token keep serving a photo hidden after minting; a guest's token
    // (clientBypass=0) stops the moment the photo is hidden.
-    const token = generateImageToken(photoId, 3600, bypassesReveal(req), canSeeHiddenPhotos(req.accessLevel));
+    const token = generateImageToken(photoId, 3600, bypassesReveal(req), canSeeHiddenPhotos(req.accessLevel), req.galleryAccess);
    const signedUrl = `/api/images/${req.params.slug}/photo/${photoId}/signed/${token}`;
    
    res.json({ 
@@ -271,6 +273,7 @@ router.post('/:slug/photo/:photoId/generate-url', verifyGalleryAccess, async (re
    });
    
  } catch (error) {
+    if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json({ error: error.message, code: error.code });
    logger.error('Error generating signed URL:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to generate URL' });
  }
@@ -299,6 +302,8 @@ router.get('/:slug/photo/:photoId/signed/:token', async (req, res) => {
      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Event not found' });
    }

+    await galleryAccessService.authorize(event, tokenData.galleryAccess);
+
    // Reveal mode (#838): a signed URL minted before a re-hide must not keep
    // serving hidden photos; tokens minted by bypass contexts carry the flag.
    if (isGalleryHidden(event) && !tokenData.revealBypass) {
@@ -338,7 +343,7 @@ router.get('/:slug/photo/:photoId/signed/:token', async (req, res) => {
    res.set({
      'Content-Type': resolvePhotoContentType(photo),
      'Content-Length': imageBuffer.length,
-      'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=3600',
+      'Cache-Control': 'private, no-store',
      'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff'
    });
    
@@ -346,9 +351,10 @@ router.get('/:slug/photo/:photoId/signed/:token', async (req, res) => {
    res.send(imageBuffer);
    
  } catch (error) {
+    if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json({ error: error.message, code: error.code });
    logger.error('Error serving signed image:', error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to serve image' });
  }
 });

-module.exports = router;
+module.exports = router;
@@ -62,7 +62,10 @@ const signedPdfStorage = multer.diskStorage({

 const signedPdfUpload = multer({
  storage: signedPdfStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 10 MB
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `file` field only, and this route is
+  // unauthenticated (token-only) — no legitimate array-indexed field
+  // names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 }, // 10 MB
  fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
    if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, ['application/pdf'])) return cb(null, true);
    return cb(new Error('Only PDF files are allowed'));
@@ -122,7 +122,11 @@ const tempStorage = multer.diskStorage({
 function buildUploader(maxSizeBytes, allowed) {
  return multer({
    storage: tempStorage,
-    limits: { fileSize: maxSizeBytes, files: MAX_FILES_PER_UPLOAD },
+    // CVE-2026-82333: files arrive as repeated `files` parts via .array(),
+    // not bracket-indexed field names like `files[0]`, and this route is
+    // unauthenticated (token-only) — no legitimate field name uses
+    // array-index syntax at all. Reject any that do.
+    limits: { fileSize: maxSizeBytes, files: MAX_FILES_PER_UPLOAD, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
    fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => {
      if (validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowed)) return cb(null, true);
      return cb(new Error('This file type is not allowed'));
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken } = require('../middleware/gallery');
 const { blockHiddenGallery, bypassesReveal, isGalleryHidden } = require('../utils/revealMode');
 const secureImageService = require('../services/secureImageService');
+const galleryAccessService = require('../services/galleryAccessService');
 const secureImageMiddleware = require('../middleware/secureImageMiddleware');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ router.post('/:slug/generate-token', async (req, res, next) => {
    
    // Generate secure token with appropriate settings
    const tokenOptions = {
+      galleryAccess: req.galleryAccess,
      expiresIn: protectionLevel === 'maximum' ? 180 : 300, // 3-5 minutes
      maxUses: accessType === 'download' ? 1 : 3,
      clientFingerprint,
@@ -96,6 +98,7 @@ router.post('/:slug/generate-token', async (req, res, next) => {
    });

  } catch (error) {
+    if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json({ error: error.message, code: error.code });
    logger.error('Error generating secure token', {
      error: error.message,
      photoId: req.body.photoId,
@@ -151,6 +154,10 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token',
        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found' });
      }

+      // Revalidate the issuing session, ownership and gallery lifecycle at
+      // every use, including capabilities minted before logout or restore.
+      await galleryAccessService.authorize(event, tokenValidation.data?.galleryAccess);
+
      // Bind the token to the gallery + photo it was minted for
      // (GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f). This route serves via <img src> with the
      // token in the URL, so it can't require verifyGalleryAccess like the
@@ -248,6 +255,7 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token',
      res.send(processedImage);

    } catch (error) {
+      if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json({ error: error.message, code: error.code });
      logger.error('Error serving secure image', {
        error: error.message,
        photoId,
@@ -292,6 +300,8 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure-download/:photoId/:token',
        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Invalid or expired token' });
      }

+      await galleryAccessService.authorize(req.event, tokenValidation.data?.galleryAccess);
+
      // Bind the token to the photo it was minted for (GHSA-crxv) — the
      // /secure serve route does this, but secure-download did not, so a
      // token minted for photo A could download photo B (incl. a hidden one).
@@ -386,6 +396,7 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure-download/:photoId/:token',
      res.send(fileBuffer);

    } catch (error) {
+      if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json({ error: error.message, code: error.code });
      logger.error('Error serving secure download', {
        error: error.message,
        photoId: req.params.photoId
@@ -414,6 +425,7 @@ router.get('/security/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), asy
    res.json(stats);

  } catch (error) {
+    if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json({ error: error.message, code: error.code });
    logger.error('Error getting security stats', { error: error.message });
    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get security stats' });
  }
@@ -1,283 +1,74 @@
-/**
- * Regression tests for issue #550.
- *
- * Two related bugs in POST /v1/events:
- *   1. color_theme was not accepted on the request body and never written
- *      to the events row. Editing such an event later in the admin UI
- *      snapped the theme picker to GALLERY_THEME_PRESETS.default and
- *      saving overwrote whatever theme was inherited visually.
- *   2. event_feedback_settings row was never created, so the gallery UI
- *      read it as "feedback off" regardless of the global
- *      event_default_feedback_enabled toggle (#520).
- *
- * Test pattern mirrors events.category.test.js — queue up db() chains
- * with db.__setImplementations() in the exact order the handler invokes
- * them, then assert against the captured payloads.
- */
-
+/** Persisted contracts, not a mock tied to the number/order of Knex calls. */
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../../../../__tests__/integration/helpers/crmDb');
 const request = require('supertest');
 const express = require('express');
-
-const buildChain = ({ firstResult, insertResult, returningResult, selectResult } = {}) => {
-  const chain = {
-    where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
-    whereIn: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
-    andWhere: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
-    orWhere: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
-    // `select` resolves to an array so `await db(...).whereIn(...).select(...)`
-    // gives an iterable result (used by the branding-defaults probe added in
-    // #592 follow-up). Tests that don't need it leave selectResult undefined
-    // and get `[]`, which is a safe no-op for any caller that iterates.
-    select: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(selectResult ?? []),
-    first: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(firstResult),
-    insert: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
-    returning: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(returningResult ?? insertResult ?? [{ id: 1 }]),
-  };
-  return chain;
-};
-
-jest.mock('../../../database/db', () => {
-  const dbMock = jest.fn();
-  dbMock.raw = jest.fn();
-  dbMock.__setImplementations = (...chains) => {
-    dbMock.mockReset();
-    chains.forEach((chain) => {
-      dbMock.mockImplementationOnce(() => chain);
-    });
-  };
-  return {
-    db: dbMock,
-    logActivity: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-  };
+let db, cleanup, app, adminId, adminToken, apiToken;
+const base = { event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Creation parity', event_date: '2030-06-15',
+  customer_name: 'Ada', customer_email: 'ada@example.test', admin_email: 'admin@example.test',
+  require_password: false, is_draft: false, expires_at: '2030-07-15T00:00:00.000Z' };
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb()); ({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db)); await assignAdminRole(db, adminId);
+  adminToken = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+  const generated = require('../../../middleware/apiTokenAuth').generateApiToken(); apiToken = generated.plaintext;
+  await db('api_tokens').insert({ name: 'parity', hashed_token: generated.hashed, scopes: 'admin', created_by: adminId });
+  app = express(); app.use(express.json());
+  app.use('/admin', require('../../adminEvents'));
+  app.use('/v1', require('../events'));
+}, 120000);
+afterAll(async () => { await require('../../../services/serviceShutdown').stopServices(); await cleanup(); });
+async function create(source, extra) {
+  const input = { ...base, ...extra };
+  if (source === 'legacy') return require('../../../services/eventService').createEvent(input, { actor: { id: adminId } });
+  const response = await request(app).post(source === 'admin' ? '/admin' : '/v1/events')
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${source === 'admin' ? adminToken : apiToken}`).send(input);
+  expect(response.status).toBe(source === 'admin' ? 200 : 201);
+  return response.body;
+}
+it.each(['admin', 'v1', 'legacy'])('%s stores theme, owner, dates and feedback defaults through one use case', async source => {
+  const theme = JSON.stringify({ primaryColor: '#ff0066' });
+  const created = await create(source, { color_theme: theme, feedback_enabled: true });
+  const row = await db('events').where({ id: created.id }).first();
+  expect(row).toMatchObject({ color_theme: theme, created_by: adminId, event_name: base.event_name, customer_email: base.customer_email });
+  expect(require('../../../utils/dateNormalize').toIso(row.expires_at)).toBe(base.expires_at);
+  expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.require_password);
+  expect(row.updated_at).toBeTruthy(); expect(row.share_token).toBeTruthy(); expect(row.password_hash).toBeTruthy();
+  const feedback = await db('event_feedback_settings').where({ event_id: row.id }).first();
+  for (const key of ['feedback_enabled','allow_ratings','allow_likes','allow_comments','allow_favorites','allow_reactions','moderate_comments','show_feedback_to_guests']) expect([true, 1]).toContain(feedback[key]);
+  expect([false, 0]).toContain(feedback.allow_color_labels); expect(feedback.keybind_mode).toBe('colors');
 });
-
-// RBAC is enforced on these routes since GHSA-9697 (requirePermission), but
-// this suite mocks the database, so a real permission lookup would 500. These
-// tests cover route logic, not authorization — the intersection of token
-// scopes and role permissions is pinned in __tests__/routes/v1EventOwnership.
-jest.mock('../../../middleware/permissions', () => ({
-  requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
-  userHasAnyPermission: async () => true,
-  userHasAllPermissions: async () => true,
-}));
-
-jest.mock('../../../middleware/apiTokenAuth', () => ({
-  apiTokenAuth: (req, _res, next) => {
-    req.apiToken = { id: 1, admin_id: 1, scopes: ['admin'] };
-    req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'token-admin' };
-    next();
-  },
-  requireApiScope: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
-}));
-
-// bcrypt.hash is awaited twice per request (real path + dummy path).
-// Stub it to a constant so tests don't burn CPU on bcrypt rounds.
-jest.mock('bcrypt', () => ({
-  hash: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('$2b$10$mocked-hash'),
-}));
-
-jest.mock('../../../services/shareLinkService', () => ({
-  buildShareLinkVariants: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
-    shareUrl: 'https://example.test/gallery/some-slug?t=abc',
-    shareLinkToStore: '/gallery/some-slug?t=abc',
-  }),
-}));
-
-// Webhook fire is in a try/catch; stub to silence the predictable
-// failure log so test output stays clean.
-jest.mock('../../../services/webhookService', () => ({
-  fire: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-  buildEventSubject: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({}),
-}));
-
-// event_type is validated against the live event_types catalog (#800) —
-// that lookup would consume the first queued db() chain and shift the
-// call sequence these tests pin. Stub it valid; the invalid path has its
-// own test below.
-jest.mock('../../../services/eventTypeService', () => ({
-  isValidEventType: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
-}));
-
-const { db } = require('../../../database/db');
-const { isValidEventType } = require('../../../services/eventTypeService');
-const eventsRouter = require('../events');
-
-const buildApp = () => {
-  const app = express();
-  app.use(express.json());
-  app.use('/', eventsRouter);
-  return app;
-};
-
-const BASE_BODY = {
-  event_name: 'Issue 550 Wedding',
-  event_type: 'wedding',
-  event_date: '2026-06-15',
-  require_password: false,
-};
-
-// db() call sequence for BASE_BODY (no feedback / devtools provided,
-// require_password supplied so its probe is skipped, no customer_phone,
-// no slug collision):
-//   1. app_settings.where('event_default_feedback_enabled').first()       (#550)
-//   2. app_settings.where('enable_devtools_protection').first()           (#592)
-//   3. app_settings.whereIn([branding_logo_display_hero,...]).select(...) (#592 follow-up)
-// Then slug probe, events insert, optional feedback insert.
-const baseSettingsChains = () => [
-  buildChain({ firstResult: null }), // feedback default
-  buildChain({ firstResult: null }), // devtools default
-  buildChain({ selectResult: [] }),  // image-security whereIn → empty rows (#1296)
-  buildChain({ selectResult: [] }),  // branding whereIn → empty rows
-];
-
-describe('v1 POST /events — issue #550 (color_theme + feedback row)', () => {
-  beforeEach(() => {
-    jest.clearAllMocks();
-  });
-
-  it('persists color_theme to the events row when provided', async () => {
-    const slugChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
-    const insertChain = buildChain({ returningResult: [{ id: 42 }] });
-    db.__setImplementations(...baseSettingsChains(), slugChain, insertChain);
-
-    await request(buildApp())
-      .post('/events')
-      .send({ ...BASE_BODY, color_theme: 'default' })
-      .expect(201);
-
-    const insertedRow = insertChain.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
-    expect(insertedRow).toMatchObject({
-      event_name: 'Issue 550 Wedding',
-      color_theme: 'default',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('accepts a JSON-encoded theme string and persists it verbatim', async () => {
-    const slugChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
-    const insertChain = buildChain({ returningResult: [{ id: 43 }] });
-    db.__setImplementations(...baseSettingsChains(), slugChain, insertChain);
-
-    const customTheme = JSON.stringify({ primaryColor: '#ff0066' });
-    await request(buildApp())
-      .post('/events')
-      .send({ ...BASE_BODY, color_theme: customTheme })
-      .expect(201);
-
-    const insertedRow = insertChain.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
-    expect(insertedRow.color_theme).toBe(customTheme);
-  });
-
-  it('creates event_feedback_settings row when feedback_enabled=true is sent', async () => {
-    // feedback_enabled provided → feedback probe SKIPPED. Sequence:
-    //   1. devtools probe
-    //   2. image-security probe (whereIn → select, #1296)
-    //   3. branding probe (whereIn → select)
-    //   4. slug probe
-    //   5. events insert
-    //   6. feedback sub-toggle defaults probe (whereIn → select, #1044)
-    //   7. event_feedback_settings insert
-    const devtoolsChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
-    const imageSecurityChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
-    const brandingChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
-    const slugChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
-    const insertChain = buildChain({ returningResult: [{ id: 50 }] });
-    const feedbackDefaultsChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
-    const feedbackInsertChain = buildChain();
-    db.__setImplementations(
-      devtoolsChain, imageSecurityChain, brandingChain, slugChain, insertChain,
-      feedbackDefaultsChain, feedbackInsertChain,
-    );
-
-    await request(buildApp())
-      .post('/events')
-      .send({ ...BASE_BODY, feedback_enabled: true })
-      .expect(201);
-
-    expect(db).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(7, 'event_feedback_settings');
-
-    const feedbackRow = feedbackInsertChain.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
-    expect(feedbackRow).toMatchObject({ event_id: 50 });
-    // formatBoolean() returns 1/0 on SQLite and true/false on PG. Either
-    // way the value must be truthy/falsy in the right places — assert by
-    // coercion so the test stays driver-agnostic.
-    expect(Boolean(feedbackRow.feedback_enabled)).toBe(true);
-    expect(Boolean(feedbackRow.allow_ratings)).toBe(true);
-    expect(Boolean(feedbackRow.allow_likes)).toBe(true);
-    expect(Boolean(feedbackRow.allow_comments)).toBe(true);
-    expect(Boolean(feedbackRow.allow_favorites)).toBe(true);
-    // #1044: this insert used to omit allow_reactions entirely, so v1-created
-    // events only got reactions by accident of the column default.
-    expect(Boolean(feedbackRow.allow_reactions)).toBe(true);
-    // Colour labels are opt-in, so they stay off until the global is flipped.
-    expect(Boolean(feedbackRow.allow_color_labels)).toBe(false);
-    expect(feedbackRow.keybind_mode).toBe('colors');
-    expect(Boolean(feedbackRow.require_name_email)).toBe(false);
-    expect(Boolean(feedbackRow.moderate_comments)).toBe(true);
-    expect(Boolean(feedbackRow.show_feedback_to_guests)).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it('honours the event_default_feedback_enabled global when body omits feedback_enabled', async () => {
-    // Feedback probe returns serialized "true" → fallback kicks in and
-    // the feedback insert runs. Sequence: feedback probe, devtools probe,
-    // image-security probe (#1296), branding probe, slug, insert, sub-toggle
-    // defaults probe (#1044), feedback insert (8 calls total).
-    const feedbackProbe = buildChain({
-      firstResult: { setting_key: 'event_default_feedback_enabled', setting_value: 'true' },
-    });
-    const devtoolsChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
-    const imageSecurityChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
-    const brandingChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
-    const slugChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
-    const insertChain = buildChain({ returningResult: [{ id: 51 }] });
-    const feedbackDefaultsChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
-    const feedbackInsertChain = buildChain();
-    db.__setImplementations(
-      feedbackProbe, devtoolsChain, imageSecurityChain, brandingChain, slugChain,
-      insertChain, feedbackDefaultsChain, feedbackInsertChain,
-    );
-
-    await request(buildApp())
-      .post('/events')
-      .send(BASE_BODY)
-      .expect(201);
-
-    expect(db).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(8, 'event_feedback_settings');
-    expect(feedbackInsertChain.insert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-  });
-
-  it('does NOT create a feedback row when global setting is unset and body omits feedback_enabled', async () => {
-    const slugChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
-    const insertChain = buildChain({ returningResult: [{ id: 52 }] });
-    db.__setImplementations(...baseSettingsChains(), slugChain, insertChain);
-
-    await request(buildApp())
-      .post('/events')
-      .send(BASE_BODY)
-      .expect(201);
-
-    // 6 db() calls: feedback + devtools + image-security + branding probes,
-    // slug, insert. event_feedback_settings is never touched.
-    expect(db).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(6);
-    expect(db).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith('event_feedback_settings');
-  });
-
-  it('rejects non-boolean feedback_enabled with 400', async () => {
-    // Validators run before any db() call, so no chain queueing needed.
-    await request(buildApp())
-      .post('/events')
-      .send({ ...BASE_BODY, feedback_enabled: 'maybe' })
-      .expect(400);
-  });
-
-  it('rejects an event_type unknown to the catalog with 400 (#800)', async () => {
-    isValidEventType.mockResolvedValueOnce(false);
-    const res = await request(buildApp())
-      .post('/events')
-      .send({ ...BASE_BODY, event_type: 'nope' })
-      .expect(400);
-
-    expect(isValidEventType).toHaveBeenCalledWith('nope');
-    expect(JSON.stringify(res.body.errors)).toContain('event_type');
-    expect(db).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
+it('inherits global feedback and preserves explicit overrides for every entry point', async () => {
+  await db('app_settings').insert({ setting_key: 'event_default_feedback_enabled', setting_value: 'true', setting_type: 'boolean' })
+    .onConflict('setting_key').merge({ setting_value: 'true' });
+  for (const source of ['admin', 'v1', 'legacy']) {
+    const inherited = await create(source, {});
+    expect(await db('event_feedback_settings').where({ event_id: inherited.id }).first()).toBeTruthy();
+    const override = await create(source, { feedback_enabled: false });
+    expect(await db('event_feedback_settings').where({ event_id: override.id }).first()).toBeUndefined();
+  }
+});
+it('queues a publication email only for published galleries', async () => {
+  const draft = await create('admin', { is_draft: true });
+  expect(await db('email_queue').where({ event_id: draft.id })).toHaveLength(0);
+  const published = await create('v1', {});
+  expect(await db('email_queue').where({ event_id: published.id, email_type: 'gallery_created' })).toHaveLength(1);
+});
+it('rejects a required password that is missing with 400 on both routes', async () => {
+  for (const source of ['admin', 'v1']) {
+    const response = await request(app).post(source === 'admin' ? '/admin' : '/v1/events')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${source === 'admin' ? adminToken : apiToken}`).send({ ...base, require_password: true });
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+  }
+});
+it('keeps accepting "0"/"1" string booleans on the v1 surface', async () => {
+  const created = await create('v1', { require_password: '0', feedback_enabled: '1' });
+  const row = await db('events').where({ id: created.id }).first();
+  expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.require_password);
+  expect(await db('event_feedback_settings').where({ event_id: row.id }).first()).toBeTruthy();
+});
+it.each([{ feedback_enabled: 'maybe' }, { event_type: 'unknown' }])('rejects invalid creation data before persistence: %j', async extra => {
+  for (const source of ['admin', 'v1']) {
+    const response = await request(app).post(source === 'admin' ? '/admin' : '/v1/events')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${source === 'admin' ? adminToken : apiToken}`).send({ ...base, ...extra });
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+  }
 });
@@ -30,15 +30,13 @@ const { requireEventOwnership, scopeEventsQuery } = require('../../middleware/ow
 // requirePermission gates supply the missing half; they key on req.admin.id,
 // which apiTokenAuth populates.
 const { requirePermission } = require('../../middleware/permissions');
-const { resolveEventFeedbackDefaults } = require('../../services/feedbackDefaults');
-const { galleryPasswordColumns, dropCopiesIfStorageOff } = require('../../utils/galleryPasswordVault');
+
 const { buildShareLinkVariants } = require('../../services/shareLinkService');
 const { generateThumbnail } = require('../../services/imageProcessor');
 const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
-const { slugify } = require('../../utils/slug');
+
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
-const { parseBooleanInput } = require('../../utils/parsers');
-const { getImageSecurityDefaults, resolveImageSecurityColumns, decodeSettingValue } = require('../adminEvents/helpers');
+
 const { isValidEventType } = require('../../services/eventTypeService');
 const { replacePhoto } = require('../../services/photoReplacementService');
 const { getMaxFileSizeBytes, DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB } = require('../../services/uploadSettings');
@@ -71,7 +69,9 @@ const photoStorage = multer.diskStorage({
 });
 const buildPhotoUpload = (maxFileSizeBytes) => multer({
  storage: photoStorage,
-  limits: { fileSize: maxFileSizeBytes },
+  // CVE-2026-82333: single unnamed `photo` field only — no legitimate
+  // array-indexed field names, so reject any bracket-index field name.
+  limits: { fileSize: maxFileSizeBytes, fieldArrayIndexLimit: 0 },
  fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
    if (/^image\//.test(file.mimetype)) cb(null, true);
    else cb(new Error('Only image uploads are accepted on this endpoint'));
@@ -195,262 +195,12 @@ router.post(
    try {
      const errors = validationResult(req);
      if (!errors.isEmpty()) return res.status(400).json({ errors: safeValidationErrors(errors) });
-      const {
-        event_name, event_type, event_date,
-        customer_name = null, customer_email = null, customer_phone = null,
-        admin_email = null,
-        require_password: requirePasswordInput,
-        password,
-        expires_at = null,
-        color_theme = null,
-        feedback_enabled: feedbackEnabledInput,
-        enable_devtools_protection: devtoolsInput,
-        hero_logo_visible: heroLogoVisibleInput,
-        hero_logo_size: heroLogoSizeInput,
-        hero_logo_position: heroLogoPositionInput
-      } = req.body;
-
-      // Issue #550 — mirror the admin POST path so API-created events
-      // pick up the global "Enable Guest Feedback by default" toggle
-      // (event_default_feedback_enabled). Without this, the UI reads
-      // a missing event_feedback_settings row as "feedback off"
-      // regardless of the admin's chosen default.
-      let feedbackEnabledFallback = false;
-      if (feedbackEnabledInput === undefined) {
-        const setting = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'event_default_feedback_enabled').first();
-        if (setting) {
-          try {
-            const parsed = JSON.parse(setting.setting_value);
-            if (typeof parsed === 'boolean') feedbackEnabledFallback = parsed;
-          } catch { /* keep false */ }
-        }
-      }
-      const feedback_enabled = parseBooleanInput(feedbackEnabledInput, feedbackEnabledFallback);
-
-      // Issue #592 — same shape as the feedback fallback above. The
-      // events table column default is `true`, so without this an admin
-      // who disabled devtools detection globally still gets it ON for
-      // every API-created gallery. Mirrors adminEvents.js behaviour.
-      let devtoolsFallback = true;
-      if (devtoolsInput === undefined) {
-        const setting = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'enable_devtools_protection').first();
-        if (setting) {
-          // Shared decoder: a legacy row can carry several layers of JSON
-          // quoting, and a single parse would leave the string 'false' here,
-          // reject it, and quietly enable protection the operator disabled.
-          const parsed = decodeSettingValue(setting.setting_value);
-          if (typeof parsed === 'boolean') devtoolsFallback = parsed;
-        }
-      }
-      const enable_devtools_protection = parseBooleanInput(devtoolsInput, devtoolsFallback);
-
-      // #1296 — same shape again, for the four Image Security settings that
-      // were stored and applied nowhere. Shared with the admin create route
-      // so a gallery's security level does not depend on which endpoint made
-      // it; #592 above is the bug this would otherwise repeat.
-      const imageSecurityColumns = resolveImageSecurityColumns(
-        req.body,
-        await getImageSecurityDefaults(),
-      );
-
-      // Same shape as the feedback / devtools fallbacks: honour the global
-      // event_default_require_password toggle (#317). Without this an admin
-      // who disabled "require password by default" globally still got
-      // password-required galleries through the API.
-      let requirePasswordFallback = true;
-      if (requirePasswordInput === undefined) {
-        const setting = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'event_default_require_password').first();
-        if (setting) {
-          try {
-            const parsed = JSON.parse(setting.setting_value);
-            if (typeof parsed === 'boolean') requirePasswordFallback = parsed;
-          } catch { /* keep true */ }
-        }
-      }
-      const require_password = parseBooleanInput(requirePasswordInput, requirePasswordFallback);
-
-      // Branding inheritance (Feature 7) — mirror adminEvents.js
-      // getBrandingDefaults so API-created events inherit the global
-      // hero logo visibility + size. hero_logo_position is intentionally
-      // NOT settings-backed (see migration 084 / #357 — branding_logo_position
-      // is the *header bar*, a different concept than the hero block).
-      let heroLogoVisibleFallback = true;
-      let heroLogoSizeFallback = 'medium';
-      const brandingRows = await db('app_settings')
-        .whereIn('setting_key', ['branding_logo_display_hero', 'branding_logo_size'])
-        .select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
-      for (const row of brandingRows) {
-        let value = row.setting_value;
-        if (typeof value === 'string') {
-          try { value = JSON.parse(value); } catch { /* keep raw */ }
-        }
-        if (row.setting_key === 'branding_logo_display_hero') heroLogoVisibleFallback = value !== false;
-        if (row.setting_key === 'branding_logo_size' && value) heroLogoSizeFallback = value;
-      }
-      const hero_logo_visible = heroLogoVisibleInput !== undefined ? heroLogoVisibleInput : heroLogoVisibleFallback;
-      const hero_logo_size = heroLogoSizeInput || heroLogoSizeFallback;
-      const hero_logo_position = heroLogoPositionInput || 'top';
-
-      if (require_password && (!password || password.length < 6)) {
-        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Password is required when require_password is true (min 6 chars)' });
-      }
-
-      // Honour global phone-field toggle (#322).
-      let persistPhone = null;
-      if (customer_phone) {
-        const setting = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'event_phone_field_enabled').first();
-        const enabled = setting ? JSON.parse(setting.setting_value) === true : false;
-        persistPhone = enabled ? customer_phone : null;
-      }
-
-      // Generate unique slug.
-      const baseSlug = `${event_type}-${slugify(event_name)}-${event_date || crypto.randomBytes(3).toString('hex')}`;
-      let slug = baseSlug;
-      let counter = 1;
-      while (await db('events').where({ slug }).first()) slug = `${baseSlug}-${counter++}`;
-
-      const shareToken = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
-      const { shareUrl, shareLinkToStore } = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug, shareToken });
-
-      // password_hash is NOT NULL; use a random placeholder when no
-      // password is required so the column constraint is satisfied.
-      const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
-      const passwordHash = require_password
-        ? await bcrypt.hash(password, 10)
-        : await bcrypt.hash(crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex'), 10);
-
-      const insertResult = await db('events').insert({
-        slug,
-        event_type,
-        event_name,
-        event_date: event_date || null,
-        host_name: customer_name,
-        host_email: customer_email,
-        admin_email,
-        password_hash: passwordHash,
-        // #1271 — recoverable copy rides with the hash; only when there is one
-        ...(require_password && password ? await galleryPasswordColumns({ password }) : {}),
-        require_password,
-        share_link: shareLinkToStore,
-        share_token: shareToken,
-        expires_at: expires_at || null,
-        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
-        created_by: req.admin.id,
-        is_draft: false,
-        // Issue #550 — without this, editing an API-created event in the
-        // admin UI snaps the theme picker to GALLERY_THEME_PRESETS.default
-        // and saving overwrites whatever theme was inherited visually.
-        color_theme,
-        // Issue #592 — write the resolved devtools setting (input value
-        // or global fallback) so the column default doesn't shadow it.
-        enable_devtools_protection: formatBoolean(enable_devtools_protection),
-        // Request value, else the global default, else the column default.
-        ...imageSecurityColumns,
-        // Branding inheritance — resolved value from body or app_settings.
-        hero_logo_visible: formatBoolean(hero_logo_visible),
-        hero_logo_size,
-        hero_logo_position,
-        ...(customer_name ? { customer_name } : {}),
-        ...(customer_email ? { customer_email } : {}),
-        ...(persistPhone ? { customer_phone: persistPhone } : {})
-      }).returning('id');
-      const id = insertResult[0]?.id || insertResult[0];
-      if (require_password && password) await dropCopiesIfStorageOff(id);
-
-      // Issue #550 — mirror adminEvents.js: create event_feedback_settings
-      // row when feedback is enabled, so the gallery actually shows feedback
-      // UI. The sub-flags come from the shared global defaults (#1044) rather
-      // than a hard-coded list, which is how this path silently shipped
-      // without allow_reactions for two releases.
-      if (feedback_enabled) {
-        const feedbackDefaults = await resolveEventFeedbackDefaults();
-        await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
-          event_id: id,
-          feedback_enabled: formatBoolean(true),
-          allow_ratings: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_ratings),
-          allow_likes: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_likes),
-          allow_comments: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_comments),
-          allow_favorites: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_favorites),
-          allow_reactions: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_reactions),
-          allow_color_labels: formatBoolean(feedbackDefaults.allow_color_labels),
-          keybind_mode: feedbackDefaults.keybind_mode,
-          require_name_email: formatBoolean(false),
-          moderate_comments: formatBoolean(true),
-          show_feedback_to_guests: formatBoolean(true),
-          created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
-          updated_at: new Date().toISOString()
-        });
-      }
-
-      await logActivity('event_created', { via: 'api_v1', event_type }, id, {
-        type: 'admin', id: req.admin.id, name: req.admin.username
+      const created = await require('../../services/eventCreationService').createEvent(req.body, {
+        actor: req.admin, source: 'v1',
      });
-
-      // Customer notifications (#647 follow-up). v1 events go live in the
-      // same call (not draft-aware), so the gallery_created email + WhatsApp
-      // fire here — mirroring the adminEvents.js create-and-publish path.
-      // Both are best-effort: a queue failure must not block the API response.
-      const expiryIso = expires_at ? new Date(expires_at).toISOString() : null;
-      if (customer_email) {
-        try {
-          const { queueEmail } = require('../../services/emailProcessor');
-          await queueEmail(id, customer_email, 'gallery_created', {
-            customer_name: customer_name || '',
-            customer_email,
-            host_name: customer_name || '',
-            event_name,
-            event_date: event_date || null,
-            gallery_link: shareUrl,
-            gallery_password: require_password ? password : 'No password required',
-            expiry_date: expiryIso,
-            welcome_message: ''
-          });
-        } catch (emailError) {
-          logger.warn('v1 POST /events: failed to queue gallery_created email', { error: emailError.message });
-        }
-      }
-      if (persistPhone) {
-        try {
-          const { queueWhatsapp, getWhatsAppConfig } = require('../../services/whatsappProcessor');
-          const waConfig = await getWhatsAppConfig();
-          if (waConfig && waConfig.enabled) {
-            await queueWhatsapp(id, persistPhone, 'gallery_created', {
-              customer_name: customer_name || '',
-              event_name,
-              gallery_link: shareUrl,
-              gallery_password: require_password ? password : '',
-              expiry_date: expiryIso,
-              language: null,
-            });
-          }
-        } catch (waError) {
-          logger.warn('v1 POST /events: failed to queue WhatsApp notification', { error: waError.message });
-        }
-      }
-
-      // Webhook lifecycle (#327). v1 events are not draft-aware, so they're
-      // both created AND published in the same call. Canonical event
-      // subject (#341) — customer contact + share_token always included.
-      try {
-        const webhookService = require('../../services/webhookService');
-        const eventSubject = webhookService.buildEventSubject({
-          id,
-          slug,
-          event_name,
-          event_type,
-          event_date,
-          share_url: shareUrl,
-          share_token: shareToken,
-          customer_name,
-          customer_email,
-          customer_phone,
-        });
-        await webhookService.fire('event.created', { event: eventSubject });
-        await webhookService.fire('event.published', { event: eventSubject });
-      } catch (e) { /* non-fatal */ }
-
-      res.status(201).json({ id, slug, share_url: shareUrl, share_token: shareToken });
+      res.status(201).json({ id: created.id, slug: created.slug, share_url: created.share_link, share_token: created.share_token });
    } catch (error) {
+      if (error.isOperational) return res.status(error.statusCode).json(error.responseBody || { error: error.message, code: error.code });
      logger.error('v1 POST /events failed', { error: error.message, stack: error.stack });
      res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create event', detail: error.message });
    }
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-const { DatabaseBackupService } = require('../databaseBackup');
 const { db } = require('../../database/db');
 const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const path = require('path');
 const crypto = require('crypto');

 // Mock dependencies
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ jest.mock('../../database/db');
 jest.mock('../../utils/logger');
 jest.mock('../emailProcessor');
 jest.mock('child_process');
+jest.mock('node-cron', () => ({ schedule: jest.fn(() => ({ stop: jest.fn() })) }));
+
+const { DatabaseBackupService, startScheduledBackups, databaseBackupService, isUnderPubliclyServableRoot } = require('../databaseBackup');
+const cron = require('node-cron');

 describe('DatabaseBackupService', () => {
  let service;
@@ -191,6 +195,213 @@ describe('DatabaseBackupService', () => {
    });
  });

+  describe('backup() destination path resolution (#1365)', () => {
+    // getBackupConfig() returns database_backup_*-prefixed keys.
+    // Regression: backup() used to destructure the unprefixed names
+    // (`destinationPath`, ...) straight off that object, which never
+    // matched, so the configured path was silently ignored and every
+    // run tried to create the hardcoded /backup/database default.
+    it('creates the directory from database_backup_destination_path when configured', async () => {
+      db.mockReturnValue({
+        where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+        select: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([
+          { setting_key: 'database_backup_destination_path', setting_value: JSON.stringify('/data/db-backups') }
+        ])
+      });
+
+      const stop = new Error('stop after mkdir — nothing past it matters for this test');
+      const mkdirSpy = jest.spyOn(fs, 'mkdir').mockRejectedValue(stop);
+
+      await expect(service.backup({})).rejects.toThrow(stop.message);
+
+      expect(mkdirSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/data/db-backups', { recursive: true });
+      mkdirSpy.mockRestore();
+    });
+
+    it('falls back to /backup/database only when nothing is configured', async () => {
+      db.mockReturnValue({
+        where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+        select: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([])
+      });
+
+      const stop = new Error('stop after mkdir');
+      const mkdirSpy = jest.spyOn(fs, 'mkdir').mockRejectedValue(stop);
+
+      await expect(service.backup({})).rejects.toThrow(stop.message);
+
+      expect(mkdirSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/backup/database', { recursive: true });
+      mkdirSpy.mockRestore();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('isUnderPubliclyServableRoot (GHSA-jw8m class, #1365)', () => {
+    const originalStoragePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
+    const storage = '/tmp/picpeak-test-storage';
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+      process.env.STORAGE_PATH = storage;
+    });
+
+    afterAll(() => {
+      if (originalStoragePath === undefined) {
+        delete process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
+      } else {
+        process.env.STORAGE_PATH = originalStoragePath;
+      }
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      path.join(storage, 'uploads', 'logos'),
+      path.join(storage, 'uploads', 'logos', 'sub'),
+      path.join(storage, 'uploads', 'favicons'),
+      path.join(storage, 'fonts'),
+      path.join(storage, 'fonts', 'inter'),
+      // Bundled fallback fonts — nodejs-owned per the Dockerfile's
+      // COPY --chown, and served at the same public /fonts route.
+      path.resolve(__dirname, '../../../assets/fonts'),
+      // Case-insensitive-but-preserving filesystems (APFS, NTFS, Docker
+      // Desktop bind mounts of either) resolve this to the same directory
+      // as uploads/logos even though path.resolve() never folds case.
+      path.join(storage, 'UPLOADS', 'Logos')
+    ])('flags %s as publicly servable', (candidate) => {
+      expect(isUnderPubliclyServableRoot(candidate)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      path.join(storage, 'backups'),
+      path.join(storage, 'uploads', 'contracts', 'signed'),
+      path.join(storage, 'uploads', 'transfers', '123'),
+      '/data/db-backups'
+    ])('does not flag %s', (candidate) => {
+      expect(isUnderPubliclyServableRoot(candidate)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('backup() refuses a destination inside a publicly servable root without ever calling mkdir', async () => {
+      const publicPath = path.join(storage, 'uploads', 'logos');
+      db.mockReturnValue({
+        where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+        select: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([
+          { setting_key: 'database_backup_destination_path', setting_value: JSON.stringify(publicPath) }
+        ])
+      });
+
+      const mkdirSpy = jest.spyOn(fs, 'mkdir');
+
+      await expect(service.backup({})).rejects.toThrow('publicly served directory');
+
+      expect(mkdirSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      mkdirSpy.mockRestore();
+    });
+
+    it('flags FRONTEND_DIR — the all-in-one image serves its built SPA unauthenticated', () => {
+      const originalFrontendDir = process.env.FRONTEND_DIR;
+      process.env.FRONTEND_DIR = '/app/frontend/dist';
+      try {
+        expect(isUnderPubliclyServableRoot('/app/frontend/dist')).toBe(true);
+        expect(isUnderPubliclyServableRoot(path.join('/app/frontend/dist', 'assets'))).toBe(true);
+      } finally {
+        if (originalFrontendDir === undefined) delete process.env.FRONTEND_DIR;
+        else process.env.FRONTEND_DIR = originalFrontendDir;
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('resolves a symlinked alias of a public root to the same real directory (all-in-one /app/storage -> /data/storage)', async () => {
+      const os = require('os');
+      const realRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-real-'));
+      const linkRoot = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-link-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
+      await fs.mkdir(path.join(realRoot, 'uploads', 'logos'), { recursive: true });
+      await fs.symlink(realRoot, linkRoot, 'dir');
+
+      try {
+        // STORAGE_PATH (what the guard's roots are built from) is the real
+        // path; the attacker-supplied destination goes through the symlink
+        // — exactly the all-in-one image's /app/storage -> /data/storage.
+        process.env.STORAGE_PATH = realRoot;
+        const aliased = path.join(linkRoot, 'uploads', 'logos');
+
+        expect(isUnderPubliclyServableRoot(aliased)).toBe(true);
+      } finally {
+        await fs.unlink(linkRoot);
+        await fs.rm(realRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+      }
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('startScheduledBackups (#1365)', () => {
+    // Same key-mismatch bug as backup(): getBackupConfig() returns
+    // database_backup_*-prefixed keys, but this read `config.enabled` /
+    // `config.schedule` / `config.retentionDays` — always undefined, so
+    // the scheduler silently treated every install as disabled.
+    it('does not start the schedule while database_backup_enabled is false', async () => {
+      db.mockReturnValue({
+        where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+        select: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([
+          { setting_key: 'database_backup_enabled', setting_value: 'false' }
+        ])
+      });
+
+      await startScheduledBackups();
+
+      expect(cron.schedule).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('starts the schedule with the configured cron when database_backup_enabled is true', async () => {
+      db.mockReturnValue({
+        where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+        select: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([
+          { setting_key: 'database_backup_enabled', setting_value: 'true' },
+          { setting_key: 'database_backup_schedule', setting_value: JSON.stringify('0 4 * * *') }
+        ])
+      });
+
+      await startScheduledBackups();
+
+      expect(cron.schedule).toHaveBeenCalledWith('0 4 * * *', expect.any(Function));
+    });
+
+    it('re-reads retention on every tick instead of the value captured at schedule start (#1365)', async () => {
+      db.mockReturnValue({
+        where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+        select: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([
+          { setting_key: 'database_backup_enabled', setting_value: 'true' },
+          { setting_key: 'database_backup_retention_days', setting_value: JSON.stringify(30) }
+        ])
+      });
+
+      await startScheduledBackups();
+      const tick = cron.schedule.mock.calls[0][1];
+
+      // A /config update between schedule-start and this tick raised
+      // retention to 365 — the closed-over 30 must not be what runs.
+      db.mockReturnValue({
+        where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+        select: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([
+          { setting_key: 'database_backup_enabled', setting_value: 'true' },
+          { setting_key: 'database_backup_retention_days', setting_value: JSON.stringify(365) }
+        ])
+      });
+      jest.spyOn(databaseBackupService, 'backup').mockResolvedValue({ success: true });
+      const cleanupSpy = jest.spyOn(databaseBackupService, 'cleanupOldBackups').mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+
+      await tick();
+
+      expect(cleanupSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(365);
+
+      jest.restoreAllMocks();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('cleanupOldBackups destructive-retention guard (#1365)', () => {
+    it.each([-1, 0, NaN, Infinity])('refuses retentionDays=%s without touching the database', async (bad) => {
+      const dbSpy = jest.fn();
+      db.mockImplementation(dbSpy);
+
+      await service.cleanupOldBackups(bad);
+
+      expect(dbSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+  });
+
  describe('cleanupOldBackups', () => {
    it('should delete old backup files and records', async () => {
      const oldBackups = [
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+jest.mock('../../utils/logger');
+jest.mock('fluent-ffmpeg');
+jest.mock('../storage', () => ({
+  getStorage: jest.fn()
+}));
+jest.mock('../imageProcessor', () => ({
+  generateVideoPlaceholder: jest.fn(),
+  DEFAULT_THUMBNAIL_WIDTH: 300,
+  DEFAULT_THUMBNAIL_HEIGHT: 300
+}));
+
+const ffmpeg = require('fluent-ffmpeg');
+const { getStorage } = require('../storage');
+const { generateVideoPlaceholder } = require('../imageProcessor');
+const {
+  extractVideoMetadata,
+  processUploadedVideo
+} = require('../videoProcessor');
+
+describe('extractVideoMetadata (#1370)', () => {
+  afterEach(() => jest.clearAllMocks());
+
+  it('returns null duration rather than 0 when ffprobe has none, so "unknown" and "a real 0s clip" stay distinguishable', async () => {
+    ffmpeg.ffprobe = jest.fn((videoPath, cb) => {
+      cb(null, {
+        streams: [{ codec_type: 'video', width: 1920, height: 1080, codec_name: 'hevc' }],
+        format: {} // no duration field at all
+      });
+    });
+
+    const metadata = await extractVideoMetadata('/tmp/video.mp4');
+
+    expect(metadata.duration).toBeNull();
+    expect(metadata.width).toBe(1920);
+    expect(metadata.videoCodec).toBe('hevc');
+  });
+
+  it('floors a real duration', async () => {
+    ffmpeg.ffprobe = jest.fn((videoPath, cb) => {
+      cb(null, { streams: [], format: { duration: 12.9 } });
+    });
+
+    const metadata = await extractVideoMetadata('/tmp/video.mp4');
+
+    expect(metadata.duration).toBe(12);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('processUploadedVideo degrades gracefully instead of rejecting the whole video (#1370)', () => {
+  let storage;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    storage = { putFromFile: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined), exists: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true) };
+    getStorage.mockReturnValue(storage);
+    generateVideoPlaceholder.mockResolvedValue('thumbnails/thumb_placeholder.jpg');
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => jest.clearAllMocks());
+
+  it('keeps the thumbnail when only metadata extraction fails', async () => {
+    ffmpeg.ffprobe = jest.fn((videoPath, cb) => cb(new Error('moov atom not found')));
+    ffmpeg.mockImplementation(() => ({
+      screenshots: jest.fn(function screenshots({ filename, folder }) {
+        require('fs').writeFileSync(require('path').join(folder, filename), 'jpeg-bytes');
+        return this;
+      }),
+      on(event, handler) {
+        if (event === 'end') setImmediate(handler);
+        return this;
+      }
+    }));
+
+    const result = await processUploadedVideo('/tmp/video.mp4', 'thumbnails/thumb_video.jpg');
+
+    expect(result.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(result.metadata).toBeNull();
+    expect(result.thumbnailKey).toBe('thumbnails/thumb_video.jpg');
+    // A real thumbnail already succeeded — never touch the placeholder path.
+    expect(generateVideoPlaceholder).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to the SVG placeholder when thumbnail generation fails, so the gallery never falls back to rendering the raw video as an <img> (codex review)', async () => {
+    ffmpeg.ffprobe = jest.fn((videoPath, cb) => {
+      cb(null, {
+        streams: [{ codec_type: 'video', width: 1080, height: 1920, codec_name: 'h264' }],
+        format: { duration: 5.4 }
+      });
+    });
+    ffmpeg.mockImplementation(() => ({
+      screenshots() { return this; },
+      on(event, handler) {
+        if (event === 'error') setImmediate(() => handler(new Error('ffmpeg seek failed')));
+        return this;
+      }
+    }));
+
+    const result = await processUploadedVideo('/tmp/video.mp4', 'thumbnails/thumb_wedding_001.jpg');
+
+    expect(result.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(result.metadata).toEqual(expect.objectContaining({ duration: 5, videoCodec: 'h264' }));
+    // thumbnailKey is always thumbnails/thumb_<name>.jpg — strip the prefix
+    // back to a filename so generateVideoPlaceholder recomputes the same key.
+    // Explicit width/height so generateVideoPlaceholder skips its DB-backed
+    // settings lookup — this can run inside an open per-file SQLite
+    // transaction (chunked video upload), where that lookup deadlocks.
+    expect(generateVideoPlaceholder).toHaveBeenCalledWith('wedding_001.jpg', { width: 300, height: 300 });
+    expect(result.thumbnailKey).toBe('thumbnails/thumb_placeholder.jpg');
+    expect(storage.putFromFile).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('throws when metadata, thumbnail generation, AND the placeholder all fail, so the caller surfaces a retryable failure instead of completing with nothing to show (codex review)', async () => {
+    ffmpeg.ffprobe = jest.fn((videoPath, cb) => cb(new Error('Invalid data found when processing input')));
+    ffmpeg.mockImplementation(() => ({
+      screenshots() { return this; },
+      on(event, handler) {
+        if (event === 'error') setImmediate(() => handler(new Error('ffmpeg seek failed')));
+        return this;
+      }
+    }));
+    generateVideoPlaceholder.mockRejectedValue(new Error('sharp render failed'));
+
+    await expect(processUploadedVideo('/tmp/corrupt.mp4', 'thumbnails/thumb_corrupt.jpg'))
+      .rejects.toThrow('Unable to generate any thumbnail');
+  });
+});
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More