fix(security): let cors() own Access-Control-Allow-Origin on protected images (#1118)
Closes #1116. secureImageMiddleware set its own Access-Control-Allow-Origin, overwriting the one cors(corsOptions) had already computed. server.js:247 mounts cors() on all of /api with credentials:true, so by the time the route handler ran the correct header was already there — and the local assignment replaced it with a worse answer in BOTH directions: unresolved -> '*'. Combined with the credentials:true that cors() sets, that is an invalid pair browsers reject outright. Unreachable on Docker until #1104 stopped compose injecting FRONTEND_URL; reachable on a fresh install from then until the wizard stores general_site_url. resolved -> the frontend origin, even when the request legitimately came from the allowlisted ADMIN_URL. A split admin host got a header naming the wrong origin and the browser rejected a request cors() had allowed. Deleting the line fixes both. cors() already validates the request Origin against the allowlist, sets Vary: Origin, omits the header entirely for a disallowed or absent Origin, and pairs correctly with credentials. Methods, Headers and Max-Age stay here: they are route-specific and cors() does not contradict them. Observed against a running instance before and after: allowlisted Origin ACAO: <that origin> + Vary: Origin + credentials:true disallowed Origin no ACAO no Origin header no ACAO Six tests, mounted on a real Express app with server.js's middleware order. Deliberately NOT a unit test against a response double: the first version of this fix was a guarded assignment that looked correct in isolation and still overwrote cors() whenever an origin resolved. A double cannot see middleware composition, which is exactly how that slipped through. Mutation-checked both ways — restoring the original `|| '*'` fails 5 of 6, and restoring the guarded assignment fails 3 of 6 including the admin-origin case.
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@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ const { db } = require('../database/db');
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const secureImageService = require('../services/secureImageService');
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const logger = require('../utils/logger');
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const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
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const { getFrontendBaseUrlSync } = require('../utils/frontendUrl');
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/**
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* Enhanced secure image middleware with comprehensive protection
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@@ -272,11 +271,18 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
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'X-Protected-Content': 'true',
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'X-Download-Policy': 'restricted',
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// CORS restrictions
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// Deliberately NOT derived from the request: reflecting the caller's
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// Origin would defeat the allowlist. Env, else the configured
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// general_site_url (cached), else the previous wildcard behaviour.
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'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': getFrontendBaseUrlSync() || '*',
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// Access-Control-Allow-ORIGIN is deliberately absent (#1116).
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// cors(corsOptions) already runs on all of /api (server.js:247) and owns
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// the whole policy: it validates the request Origin against the
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// allowlist, sets Vary: Origin, and pairs with credentials:true. Setting
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// the header again here only overwrote that with a worse answer —
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// unresolved -> '*', which combined with the credentials:true from
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// cors() is an invalid pair every browser rejects outright
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// resolved -> the frontend origin, even when the request legitimately
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// came from the allowlisted ADMIN_URL, so a split admin host got a
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// header for the wrong origin and the read failed
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// Methods/Headers/Max-Age stay: they are route-specific and cors() does
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// not contradict them.
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'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'GET',
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'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'Authorization, Content-Type',
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'Access-Control-Max-Age': '3600'
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