diff --git a/backend/__tests__/secureImageHeaders.test.js b/backend/__tests__/secureImageHeaders.test.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6a334985
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/__tests__/secureImageHeaders.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/**
+ * CORS posture of the protected-image responses (#1116).
+ *
+ * secureImageMiddleware used to set its own Access-Control-Allow-Origin,
+ * overwriting the one cors(corsOptions) had already computed for the request.
+ * That was worse in both directions:
+ *
+ *   unresolved -> '*', which with the credentials:true that cors() sets is an
+ *     invalid pair every browser rejects outright
+ *   resolved   -> the frontend origin, even when the request legitimately came
+ *     from the allowlisted ADMIN_URL
+ *
+ * The header now belongs to cors() alone. These tests are mounted on a real
+ * Express app with the same middleware order as server.js — a unit test against
+ * a response double cannot see middleware composition, which is precisely how
+ * the first version of this fix looked correct while still being wrong.
+ */
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+
+const express = require('express');
+const cors = require('cors');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+jest.mock('../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn() }));
+
+// A frontend origin IS resolvable here, deliberately. With the resolver empty
+// (the default in tests) merely GUARDING the assignment looks identical to
+// removing it — the admin-origin case below is what tells them apart, and it
+// is the common one in production.
+jest.mock('../src/utils/frontendUrl', () => ({
+  getFrontendBaseUrlSync: () => 'https://gallery.example.com',
+}));
+
+jest.useFakeTimers(); // the module schedules a cleanup setInterval at require time
+const secureImageMiddleware = require('../src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware');
+
+const FRONTEND = 'https://gallery.example.com';
+const ADMIN = 'https://admin.example.com';
+
+/** Mirrors server.js: cors() on /api, then the route sets its own headers. */
+function buildApp() {
+  const app = express();
+  app.use('/api', cors({
+    origin: (origin, cb) => cb(null, !origin || [FRONTEND, ADMIN].includes(origin)),
+    credentials: true,
+  }));
+  app.get('/api/secure-images/:id', (req, res) => {
+    secureImageMiddleware.setSecurityHeaders(res);
+    res.status(200).send('ok');
+  });
+  return app;
+}
+
+afterAll(() => {
+  jest.clearAllTimers();
+  jest.useRealTimers();
+});
+
+describe('protected-image CORS headers', () => {
+  it('never emits a wildcard origin', async () => {
+    // '*' alongside the credentials:true that cors() sets is invalid, and the
+    // browser drops the whole response.
+    const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', FRONTEND);
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).not.toBe('*');
+  });
+
+  it('preserves the cors() answer for an allowlisted origin', async () => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', FRONTEND);
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).toBe(FRONTEND);
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-credentials']).toBe('true');
+  });
+
+  it('does not repoint an allowlisted admin origin at the frontend', async () => {
+    // The regression the old code caused, and the case a guarded assignment
+    // still gets wrong: the resolver returns the FRONTEND origin here, so any
+    // code that writes it would stamp the wrong origin on an admin request
+    // that cors() had already allowed, and the browser would reject it.
+    const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', ADMIN);
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).toBe(ADMIN);
+  });
+
+  it('stays absent for a disallowed origin', async () => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', 'https://evil.example.com');
+    expect(res.headers).not.toHaveProperty('access-control-allow-origin');
+  });
+
+  it('stays absent when there is no Origin at all', async () => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1');
+    expect(res.headers).not.toHaveProperty('access-control-allow-origin');
+  });
+
+  it('still sets the route-specific security headers', async () => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', FRONTEND);
+    expect(res.headers['x-content-type-options']).toBe('nosniff');
+    expect(res.headers['x-frame-options']).toBe('DENY');
+    expect(res.headers['cache-control']).toContain('no-store');
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-methods']).toBe('GET');
+  });
+});
diff --git a/backend/src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware.js b/backend/src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware.js
index 3b604ec7..7d86516e 100644
--- a/backend/src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware.js
+++ b/backend/src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware.js
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const secureImageService = require('../services/secureImageService');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
-const { getFrontendBaseUrlSync } = require('../utils/frontendUrl');
 
 /**
  * Enhanced secure image middleware with comprehensive protection
@@ -272,11 +271,18 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
       'X-Protected-Content': 'true',
       'X-Download-Policy': 'restricted',
       
-      // CORS restrictions
-      // Deliberately NOT derived from the request: reflecting the caller's
-      // Origin would defeat the allowlist. Env, else the configured
-      // general_site_url (cached), else the previous wildcard behaviour.
-      'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': getFrontendBaseUrlSync() || '*',
+      // Access-Control-Allow-ORIGIN is deliberately absent (#1116).
+      // cors(corsOptions) already runs on all of /api (server.js:247) and owns
+      // the whole policy: it validates the request Origin against the
+      // allowlist, sets Vary: Origin, and pairs with credentials:true. Setting
+      // the header again here only overwrote that with a worse answer —
+      //   unresolved -> '*', which combined with the credentials:true from
+      //     cors() is an invalid pair every browser rejects outright
+      //   resolved   -> the frontend origin, even when the request legitimately
+      //     came from the allowlisted ADMIN_URL, so a split admin host got a
+      //     header for the wrong origin and the read failed
+      // Methods/Headers/Max-Age stay: they are route-specific and cors() does
+      // not contradict them.
       'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'GET',
       'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'Authorization, Content-Type',
       'Access-Control-Max-Age': '3600'