fix(security): let cors() own Access-Control-Allow-Origin on protected images (#1118)

Closes #1116.

secureImageMiddleware set its own Access-Control-Allow-Origin, overwriting the
one cors(corsOptions) had already computed. server.js:247 mounts cors() on all
of /api with credentials:true, so by the time the route handler ran the correct
header was already there — and the local assignment replaced it with a worse
answer in BOTH directions:

  unresolved -> '*'. Combined with the credentials:true that cors() sets, that
    is an invalid pair browsers reject outright. Unreachable on Docker until
    #1104 stopped compose injecting FRONTEND_URL; reachable on a fresh install
    from then until the wizard stores general_site_url.

  resolved   -> the frontend origin, even when the request legitimately came
    from the allowlisted ADMIN_URL. A split admin host got a header naming the
    wrong origin and the browser rejected a request cors() had allowed.

Deleting the line fixes both. cors() already validates the request Origin
against the allowlist, sets Vary: Origin, omits the header entirely for a
disallowed or absent Origin, and pairs correctly with credentials. Methods,
Headers and Max-Age stay here: they are route-specific and cors() does not
contradict them.

Observed against a running instance before and after:

  allowlisted Origin    ACAO: <that origin> + Vary: Origin + credentials:true
  disallowed Origin     no ACAO
  no Origin header      no ACAO

Six tests, mounted on a real Express app with server.js's middleware order.
Deliberately NOT a unit test against a response double: the first version of
this fix was a guarded assignment that looked correct in isolation and still
overwrote cors() whenever an origin resolved. A double cannot see middleware
composition, which is exactly how that slipped through.

Mutation-checked both ways — restoring the original `|| '*'` fails 5 of 6, and
restoring the guarded assignment fails 3 of 6 including the admin-origin case.
This commit is contained in:
Paul Nothaft
2026-08-21 19:25:56 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent d241919604
commit 00776234fd
2 changed files with 112 additions and 6 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
/**
* CORS posture of the protected-image responses (#1116).
*
* secureImageMiddleware used to set its own Access-Control-Allow-Origin,
* overwriting the one cors(corsOptions) had already computed for the request.
* That was worse in both directions:
*
* unresolved -> '*', which with the credentials:true that cors() sets is an
* invalid pair every browser rejects outright
* resolved -> the frontend origin, even when the request legitimately came
* from the allowlisted ADMIN_URL
*
* The header now belongs to cors() alone. These tests are mounted on a real
* Express app with the same middleware order as server.js — a unit test against
* a response double cannot see middleware composition, which is precisely how
* the first version of this fix looked correct while still being wrong.
*/
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
const express = require('express');
const cors = require('cors');
const request = require('supertest');
jest.mock('../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn() }));
// A frontend origin IS resolvable here, deliberately. With the resolver empty
// (the default in tests) merely GUARDING the assignment looks identical to
// removing it — the admin-origin case below is what tells them apart, and it
// is the common one in production.
jest.mock('../src/utils/frontendUrl', () => ({
getFrontendBaseUrlSync: () => 'https://gallery.example.com',
}));
jest.useFakeTimers(); // the module schedules a cleanup setInterval at require time
const secureImageMiddleware = require('../src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware');
const FRONTEND = 'https://gallery.example.com';
const ADMIN = 'https://admin.example.com';
/** Mirrors server.js: cors() on /api, then the route sets its own headers. */
function buildApp() {
const app = express();
app.use('/api', cors({
origin: (origin, cb) => cb(null, !origin || [FRONTEND, ADMIN].includes(origin)),
credentials: true,
}));
app.get('/api/secure-images/:id', (req, res) => {
secureImageMiddleware.setSecurityHeaders(res);
res.status(200).send('ok');
});
return app;
}
afterAll(() => {
jest.clearAllTimers();
jest.useRealTimers();
});
describe('protected-image CORS headers', () => {
it('never emits a wildcard origin', async () => {
// '*' alongside the credentials:true that cors() sets is invalid, and the
// browser drops the whole response.
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', FRONTEND);
expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).not.toBe('*');
});
it('preserves the cors() answer for an allowlisted origin', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', FRONTEND);
expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).toBe(FRONTEND);
expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-credentials']).toBe('true');
});
it('does not repoint an allowlisted admin origin at the frontend', async () => {
// The regression the old code caused, and the case a guarded assignment
// still gets wrong: the resolver returns the FRONTEND origin here, so any
// code that writes it would stamp the wrong origin on an admin request
// that cors() had already allowed, and the browser would reject it.
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', ADMIN);
expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).toBe(ADMIN);
});
it('stays absent for a disallowed origin', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', 'https://evil.example.com');
expect(res.headers).not.toHaveProperty('access-control-allow-origin');
});
it('stays absent when there is no Origin at all', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1');
expect(res.headers).not.toHaveProperty('access-control-allow-origin');
});
it('still sets the route-specific security headers', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', FRONTEND);
expect(res.headers['x-content-type-options']).toBe('nosniff');
expect(res.headers['x-frame-options']).toBe('DENY');
expect(res.headers['cache-control']).toContain('no-store');
expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-methods']).toBe('GET');
});
});
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ const { db } = require('../database/db');
const secureImageService = require('../services/secureImageService');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
const { getFrontendBaseUrlSync } = require('../utils/frontendUrl');
/**
* Enhanced secure image middleware with comprehensive protection
@@ -272,11 +271,18 @@ class SecureImageMiddleware {
'X-Protected-Content': 'true',
'X-Download-Policy': 'restricted',
// CORS restrictions
// Deliberately NOT derived from the request: reflecting the caller's
// Origin would defeat the allowlist. Env, else the configured
// general_site_url (cached), else the previous wildcard behaviour.
'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': getFrontendBaseUrlSync() || '*',
// Access-Control-Allow-ORIGIN is deliberately absent (#1116).
// cors(corsOptions) already runs on all of /api (server.js:247) and owns
// the whole policy: it validates the request Origin against the
// allowlist, sets Vary: Origin, and pairs with credentials:true. Setting
// the header again here only overwrote that with a worse answer —
// unresolved -> '*', which combined with the credentials:true from
// cors() is an invalid pair every browser rejects outright
// resolved -> the frontend origin, even when the request legitimately
// came from the allowlisted ADMIN_URL, so a split admin host got a
// header for the wrong origin and the read failed
// Methods/Headers/Max-Age stay: they are route-specific and cors() does
// not contradict them.
'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'GET',
'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'Authorization, Content-Type',
'Access-Control-Max-Age': '3600'