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Paul Nothaft d62e21c1ba chore(main): release 3.105.1-beta.0 (#1066)
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Paul Nothaft 52db982661 fix(gallery): make per-event banner overrides actually work, both banners (#440, #932) (#1064)
* fix(gallery): make per-event banner overrides actually work, both banners (#440, #932)

The promo banner shipped with a per-event inherit/custom/off override that
never reached a guest. GalleryView reads promo_mode from the /photos payload,
and /photos never sent it — so every gallery resolved to 'inherit'. Setting a
gallery's promo banner to "Off" did nothing; the global banner kept rendering.
The info banner (#932) mirrored that shape and inherited the same gaps.

Four places dropped the fields; all four now carry both banners:

1. GET /gallery/:slug/photos — send promo_mode/promo_markdown alongside the
   info fields. This is the fix that makes "Off" mean off.
2. POST /admin/events — the validators accepted both banners and the insert
   discarded them, so an API client could POST info_mode:'off', get 201, and
   find the row on 'inherit'. Markdown is stored only for 'custom', matching
   the PUT rule.
3. POST /admin/events/:id/duplicate — copy both from the source row. The
   dialog promises the copy "inherits the branding, behaviour, feedback, and
   category configuration"; a muted gallery un-muting on duplication is the
   opposite of that.
4. PUT /admin/events/:id — resolve the effective mode from the STORED row when
   a partial update sends only the markdown. Previously updates.promo_mode was
   undefined on such a request and the text was parked on an inherit/off
   gallery, then resurfaced when someone later switched it to 'custom'. The
   lookup is lazy: one extra query, only on that path.

The two normalisation blocks are now one loop over both banners, so the pair
can't drift apart again.

Verified in a browser, both directions against the same global banner:
promo_mode='off' -> not rendered; 'inherit' -> rendered. The /photos payload
went from promo_mode ABSENT to carrying the value.

* fix(gallery): thread promo into the reveal view, drop stale markdown on duplicate

External review, round 1 on this PR. Two gaps in the plumbing it introduced:

- The reveal-hidden branch copied only the info fields from /photos. Now that
  /photos carries promo too, a reveal-hidden gallery with promo_mode 'off'
  still fell back to 'inherit' and showed the global banner on the first load
  after login. Thread both banners there.

- The duplicate copied markdown verbatim. A row written before the PUT
  normalisation landed can hold text while its mode is 'inherit'/'off', so the
  copy inherited hidden text that would resurface the moment someone switched
  it to 'custom' — violating the very invariant this PR establishes. Copy
  markdown only when the source mode is 'custom'.

Test covers the stale-markdown source explicitly.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-16 21:37:17 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 180f19d70d chore(main): release 3.105.0-beta.0 (#1065)
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2026-08-16 19:36:29 +00:00
Paul Nothaft b48fa62eea feat(gallery): info banner above the photo grid (#932) (#1063)
* feat(gallery): info banner above the photo grid (#932)

A short informational note rendered at the TOP of a gallery, above the
photos. Distinct from the promotional banner (#440), which stays by the
footer for marketing copy — the reporter's case is an onboarding hint ("use
the menu button to filter"), which is useless below a gallery the guest has
to scroll past first.

Mirrors the promo feature's shape rather than inventing a second one: a
global default in Settings → Branding (branding_info_markdown) plus a
per-event inherit/custom/off override. Markdown via the existing
MarkdownContent sanitiser — no raw HTML, no CSS injection. Empty global
default means nothing renders, so upgrading changes nothing visible.

Deliberately NOT included: an alignment knob (this is short helper copy, not
marketing layout) and guest dismissal — the issue lists dismissal as a
nice-to-have, and it needs per-guest persistence that is its own decision.

Migration 176 is idempotent (hasColumn / existing-key guarded).

Note on the payload plumbing: the per-event fields travel in the /photos
response, not just /info. GalleryAuthContext seeds its cached event from the
gallery LOGIN response — a small identity subset — so anything absent there
is undefined right after a guest signs in. /photos is the payload that
refreshes on every gallery load, which is why the fields were added there
and why GalleryView reads them from `data.event`. Verified in a browser
across all three modes; reading them from the context event instead silently
collapsed every override back to 'inherit'.

* fix(branding): map branding_info_markdown on read so saving can't wipe it (#932)

External review caught this. BrandingSettings declared no info_markdown and
formatBrandingSettings never mapped branding_info_markdown, so BrandingPage's
hydration — setBrandingSettings(prev => ({ ...prev, ...formatted })) — kept
the empty-string initializer instead of the persisted value. The form loaded
blank and the next Save posted '' back, wiping a configured banner. Silently:
the gallery keeps rendering the old copy until that save lands.

This is the same bug the footer/promo fields hit in #441 + #440 / #460, which
the read mapper still carries a comment about. Add the field to the interface
and the mapper, and pin the round-trip for the whole editable branding set so
the next field added is caught by a test rather than by a user losing copy.

Verified: the new test fails 3/4 with the mapper line removed.

* fix(gallery): honour the info-banner override in the reveal-hidden view (#932)

External review, round 2. The hidden-until-reveal branch renders GalleryLayout
with the context `event`, which is seeded from the gallery login response and
carries no banner fields — so while a gallery was hidden, a per-event 'off'
silently resolved to 'inherit' and the global banner appeared on a gallery the
admin had muted.

Resolve the fields there the same way the main render path does. The two
full-page layouts (gallery-premium, gallery-story) are deliberately left alone:
they return before GalleryLayout and render no header, footer or promo banner
either — injecting a wrapper into layouts documented as having 'their own
integrated UI' would be a design change, not a fix.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-16 21:33:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ab6ca6f82f chore(main): release 3.104.1-beta.0 (#1061)
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2026-08-16 17:34:09 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 3a11e6ebb5 fix(pdf): RFC 6266-encode Content-Disposition on quote/invoice PDFs (#1024) (#1055)
* fix(pdf): RFC 6266-encode Content-Disposition on quote/invoice PDFs (#1024)

The six quote/invoice PDF endpoints interpolated buildPdfFilename()'s result
straight into `inline; filename="${filename}"`. That result deliberately
preserves non-ASCII (it doubles as the PDF's internal Title metadata), and
HTTP header values are latin1 — so a customer label reaching the header
directly failed in one of two ways:

  - U+0080-U+00FF (ä ö ü ß — every German umlaut): no throw. The raw byte
    goes out and the client reads back a mangled name. Silent corruption.
  - above U+00FF (Polish ł, Czech ř, Turkish ş, €, Cyrillic, CJK, emoji):
    Node's setHeader rejects it with ERR_INVALID_CHAR. The throw lands
    after the PDF buffer is already rendered, so the request 500s.

Note this corrects the issue's diagnosis: it reported umlauts as the 500
case, but umlauts are inside latin1 and mangle rather than throw. Both
symptoms share this root cause and both are fixed here.

Route through buildContentDisposition() (utils/filenameSanitizer, already
used by secureImages.js), which emits an ASCII fallback plus the RFC 5987
`filename*=UTF-8''…` form, so the unicode name survives in browsers and the
header stays legal. Applied to all six sites: adminQuotes (persisted +
preview), adminInvoices (persisted + preview), customer (quote + invoice).

Also correct buildPdfFilename's docstring, which advertised the preserved
non-ASCII as suitable for Content-Disposition — the exact misreading that
produced these call sites.

* test(pdf): pin the ASCII fallback for fully non-Latin customer names (#1024)

A name written entirely in another script leaves the legacy filename= token
with just the document number (Q-2026-0042_.pdf) — filename* carries the real
name. That's the intended trade, but it's the token a client without RFC 5987
support actually saves, so assert it stays legal, non-empty and carries the
document number rather than leaving it unpinned.

* fix(pdf): don't split surrogate pairs when truncating the filename (#1024)

Codex review caught this. sanitiseSegment caps each segment at 80 UTF-16 code
units, so a cap landing inside an astral character (emoji, rarer CJK) left a
dangling high surrogate. encodeURIComponent throws URIError: URI malformed on
a lone surrogate, so buildContentDisposition — the helper this PR routes the
six PDF endpoints through — 500'd for e.g. company_name = 'a'.repeat(79)+'🎉',
well inside the 120-char validator limit. Same 500 the PR set out to remove,
reached a different way.

Drop the orphaned surrogate instead of widening the cap, so the byte budget
the limit exists to protect is unchanged. Tests cover both boundary cases and
assert the cap semantics; they fail against the previous slice().

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-16 19:31:19 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 959c18a864 chore(main): release 3.104.0-beta.0 (#1057)
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2026-08-16 17:04:35 +00:00
Luca 8809564aad feat(backup): open sqlite → pg .picpeak restore as the supported upgrade direction (#1041) (#1043)
Reshaped onto main after #1039 landed the coercion engine
(typedColumnsFor / epochToIso / coerceForTargetEngine) — this PR is now
only the policy delta on top of it:

- validateManifest: replace the CLI-only allowEngineSwitch opt-in with a
  direction rule — sqlite → pg allowed (upload UI and CLI alike),
  pg → sqlite refused with a message naming the supported direction
- importFromPicpeak: derive crossEngine from the manifest's engine
  (absent field = target engine, the exact pre-change behavior), log it,
  return it; route passes it through
- scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js: rely on the shared gate, drop
  the flag
- restore card: direction stated in the intro, cross-engine notice after
  a converting restore; both strings in en.json + de.json; removed the
  orphaned settings.backup.picpeak locale node (unreferenced, stale copy)
- picpeakCrossEngine.test.js: direction policy, epochToIso (ms, seconds,
  numeric strings), coerceForTargetEngine units, plus
  PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL-gated real-Postgres stored-value assertions

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <53005142+the-luap@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-16 19:01:36 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 18b1e0f66e ci(tests): run the gated real-Postgres .picpeak cases in the backend job (#1056)
The .picpeak restore suites gate their Postgres cases behind
PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL and describe.skip themselves out when it is unset. That
variable was set in no workflow, so those cases have never run in CI — the
suites reported green while silently skipping the half that needs a real
database: sequence resync, operator/role preservation across a cross-instance
restore, and whether a coerced row lands with the right STORED VALUES rather
than merely not throwing.

Add a postgres:15-alpine service to the backend job (same shape schema-drift
already uses) and point the variable at it. Everything else in the suite still
runs on SQLite; this only un-gates the cases that were skipping.

Verified against a real Postgres 15 before wiring: picpeakRestorePg 4/4 and
picpeakCrossEngine 11/11 (8 of which were previously skipped across both).

Matters now because #1043 opens sqlite -> pg restore to the upload UI, so the
coercion layer's correctness stops being a CLI-only concern.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-16 18:57:44 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 77cb65f5a2 chore(main): release 3.103.1-beta.0 (#1053)
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2026-08-16 13:17:54 +00:00
peipeimo 3600231d5f fix(storage): add S3 client timeouts so a dropped connection can't wedge uploads (#1049)
* fix(storage): add S3 client timeouts so a dropped connection can't wedge uploads

* fix(storage): use socketTimeout, not requestTimeout, for the dead-connection guard

* fix(storage): make S3 timeouts generous — short connectionTimeout breaks pooled reads

---------

Co-authored-by: Peifu Mo <peipeimo@Peifus-MacBook-Pro.local>
2026-08-16 15:14:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2728479d2a chore(main): release 3.103.0-beta.0 (#1052)
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2026-08-16 13:02:55 +00:00
Luca b118695474 feat(permissions): granular permission gating + role editor & presets (#747, phase 1 of #743) (#1045)
* feat(permissions): granular permission gating + role editor & presets

Make every admin feature permission-gateable so multi-user studios can
split capability across roles (#747, and phase 1 of #743).

- Split the catch-all settings.edit into dedicated dangerous-config perms
  (banking / domains / security / integrations / features): a team member
  can no longer change IBAN, domains, SSO, webhooks, API tokens or feature
  flags. Reads keep an OR with settings.view so existing roles keep
  visibility. The site-URL write inside /general is change-gated on
  settings.domains.
- Add dedicated perms for admin surfaces miscategorised under settings.*
  (whatsapp, event_types, image_security, notifications, system) plus
  roles.manage and vat_codes.view; gate the previously-ungated VAT read.
- Boot self-heal (_permissionsBoot.js): super_admin always holds every
  permission (tracks-all) so new perms never need a compensation
  migration; all other roles stay frozen (no silent escalation on upgrade).
- Seed two presets: Solo Photographer (full operator) and Team
  Photographer (contributor — view events + manage photos + read-only CRM;
  no settings/users/billing edits, no events.edit).
- Role editor: adminRoles CRUD (create/edit/clone/delete + permission
  matrix; system roles protected, super_admin immutable) and a Roles tab
  with a category-grouped matrix and preset cloning.
- Settings page tabs are permission-gated with snap-back; i18n en/de.

Migration 174. Backward-compatible: admin/editor/viewer unchanged.

* feat(permissions): hide in-page action buttons a role can't use

Wrap mutating controls on the surfaces restricted roles actually reach
(Events list, Archives, gallery photo grid, event detail) in
PermissionGate so they are HIDDEN when the user lacks the permission,
rather than shown-then-403:

- Events list: create / bulk archive / bulk delete / row archive /
  row delete / download-archive.
- Archives: restore / download / delete.
- Photo grid: single + bulk delete (photos.delete), per-photo download
  (photos.download), bulk move/hide/show (photos.edit).
- Event detail: edit / rename / publish (events.edit), duplicate
  (events.create), archive (events.archive), create-invoice
  (bills.manage); the Actions card is hidden entirely for view-only roles.
- Photos tab: upload / external import (photos.upload), export menu
  (photos.download).

Backend already enforces these with 403; this is the matching UX so a
Team Photographer never sees delete/settings controls.

* fix(permissions): close settings-split bypass via generic settings writers

Security review found the settings.edit split was bypassable: the generic
settings writers (/general, /analytics, /seo, /security) upsert arbitrary
setting_keys, so a role holding only settings.edit (or settings.security)
could write keys owned by a narrower permission — repointing the public
site URL (settings.domains), security policy (settings.security) or
VAT/accounting config (settings.banking) via the wrong endpoint.

Add stripUnauthorizedProtectedKeys(): before every generic upsert, drop
any protected key the caller isn't permitted to write (general_site_url →
settings.domains, security_* → settings.security, accounting_* →
settings.banking). Dedicated routes still work because their caller holds
the matching perm. Replaces the narrower in-handler site-URL guard.

Also fix two tests affected by the RBAC changes:
- authzPermissionGaps: API-token management moved to settings.integrations,
  so grant that (not settings.edit) to exercise the ownership 404.
- AdminPhotoGrid.viewToggle: stub PermissionGate (its buttons are now gated
  and the test renders without a PermissionsProvider).

* fix(permissions): address upstream review (#1045)

- Renumber migration 174 -> 175 (174 now taken by 174_sqlite_nullable_event_dates
  from #1035; the collision made picpeakImportService's forward-only restore
  guard treat both as order 174 and accept a newer .picpeak onto an older schema).
- Contain the roles.manage blast radius (delegation, not root escalation): a
  non-super_admin can no longer edit their own role, nor grant any permission
  their own role doesn't already hold (createRole + updateRole).
- Protected-key denial now 403s (naming the keys + required perms) instead of
  silently stripping and reporting "saved" (adminSettings generic writers).
- Reserve team_photographer so a custom role can't squat the preset name.
- Boot self-heal: per-step try/catch so a role_permissions insert race on one
  replica doesn't skip preset seeding.
- Forward-project the feature .manage perms that also replaced settings.edit
  gates (whatsapp/event_types/image_security/notifications/system), matching the
  settings.* split projection so the pattern is symmetric for phase-2.
- Guard exports.down's roles/admin_users queries with hasTable.

* fix(permissions): change-detection on protected-key 403 + commit guard tests (#1045)

Round-2 review:
- The protected-key 403 fired on key PRESENCE. The General tab re-posts
  general_site_url on every save, so a settings.edit-only role (the office
  manager this PR enables) got 403'd on every General save even when the URL
  was unchanged. Restore change-detection: compare the incoming value against
  the stored one and 403 only on an actual change; unchanged protected keys are
  dropped so the rest of the save proceeds. Only /general is affected.
- Commit the self-amplification guard test (was run locally, never staged):
  adminRolesGuards.test.js — non-super can't grant perms it lacks, can't edit
  its own role, can't escalate another role; super_admin bypasses;
  team_photographer name reserved.
- Add adminSettingsProtectedKeys.test.js pinning the change-detection: an
  unchanged general_site_url saves, an actual change 403s, super_admin changes it.
2026-08-16 14:59:52 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9b976386f9 chore(main): release 3.102.2-beta.0 (#1046)
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2026-08-13 16:57:48 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 6de30e5bf1 fix(docker): default NODE_ENV=production so non-compose deploys don't fall back to SQLite (#1038) (#1039)
* fix(docker): default NODE_ENV=production so non-compose deploys don't fall back to SQLite (#1038)

knexfile.js selects its config block by NODE_ENV and the `development` block
defaults to sqlite3. The image never set NODE_ENV, so every deployment that
doesn't go through our compose files — Kubernetes, Helm, plain `docker run` —
silently ran on SQLite and ignored DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD.

It stayed invisible because wait-for-db.sh is shell: it reads DB_HOST directly,
connects to Postgres, creates the database and logs "PostgreSQL is up" in the
same container where the Node process then writes to a SQLite file. Migrations
go through src/database/db.js → the same knexfile, so they also ran against
SQLite, leaving the provisioned Postgres database empty.

Setting the default alone would be unsafe: an affected install would flip to
Postgres on its next image pull and come up against an EMPTY database, which
reads as total data loss. So this adds a guard that runs before migrations
touch anything:

  - logs the resolved engine + target at boot (nothing did before, which is
    why this went unnoticed for so long)
  - refuses to start when pointed at a virgin Postgres while a populated
    SQLite file exists, naming the file and the .picpeak export path for
    moving the data, with PICPEAK_ALLOW_EMPTY_PG=true as the escape hatch
  - warns but boots when Postgres settings are present yet SQLite is in use

Compose files already set NODE_ENV explicitly, so compose users are unaffected.

The engine-selection tests resolve knexfile in a child process with a clean
cwd — dotenv.config() would otherwise let a developer's backend/.env decide
the answer instead of the knexfile defaults under test. Fake credentials in
the describeEngine tests are built at runtime rather than written inline, so
secret scanners don't flag a literal after `password:`.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): stay on SQLite instead of blocking, and add a migration path (#1038)

Reworks the guard from the previous commit after walking through what an
existing install actually experiences on its next image pull.

Blocking was the wrong trade. An operator who had unknowingly been running on
SQLite (because the image left NODE_ENV unset) would have pulled the fix and
got a CrashLoopBackOff: data safe, galleries offline, for something they did
not do. Now the boot RESOLVES the engine before migrations run and stays on
whichever one holds the data:

  - Postgres configured but holding no galleries, while a populated SQLite file
    exists → keep serving from SQLite, print what happened and how to migrate.
    Nothing moves until the operator decides.
  - once Postgres holds the data, the next restart switches over on its own.
  - an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT is always honoured.

The check is keyed on Postgres holding DATA, not on it having tables: a stray
`run-migrations` against the empty database creates every table, which would
otherwise blind the check and strand the operator on an empty install.

wait-for-db.sh resolves the engine and exports DATABASE_CLIENT before the
migration step, so the runner and the server always agree. Manual migration
runs (no entrypoint, no exported client) now refuse rather than build a schema
in the wrong database.

Adds scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js for moving the data across. It
reuses the .picpeak export/import services rather than hand-rolling a
cross-engine copy — they already handle FK suspension, JSON columns and
Postgres sequence resync. Two things had to be added for the SQLite → Postgres
direction, both opt-in and CLI-only so the upload/restore UI is untouched:

  - `allowEngineSwitch` relaxes the importer's same-engine guard
  - cross-engine row coercion: SQLite has no real date or boolean types, so
    its rows carry epoch numbers where Postgres wants a timestamp and 0/1
    where it wants a boolean. Postgres rejects both outright
    ("date/time field value out of range: 1786548038763"). Coercion is driven
    by the TARGET schema, never guessed from the value.

Verified end to end against a real PostgreSQL 15: a seeded SQLite install
migrated across with booleans, timestamps and foreign keys intact, and the
serial sequences correctly advanced (the next INSERT got id 2, not a
primary-key collision). Photo files on disk are never touched and the SQLite
file is left in place as a rollback.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close four review findings on the SQLite fallback + migration (#1038)

External review (codex) found four issues, all confirmed against the code and
fixed here. Two of them could have cost data.

1. The engine resolver was reachable only through wait-for-db.sh. A Kubernetes
   manifest that sets `command`/`args`, or a plain `docker run … node
   server.js`, bypasses the entrypoint — exactly the deployment styles this fix
   targets. With NODE_ENV now baked into the image, such an install would have
   resolved to Postgres and come up against an empty database while its SQLite
   data sat there unseen. server.js now resolves the engine itself, before
   anything requires knexfile, via the same script the entrypoint uses.
   Verified by running `node server.js` directly against an install with
   stranded SQLite data: it logs the banner and serves SQLite.

2. Cross-engine loads double-encoded JSON. SQLite has no json type, so its json
   columns are TEXT holding JSON; the export dumps that as a string and
   serialiseJsonColumns stringified it again, storing `true` as the scalar
   string "true". app_settings.setting_value is json on every install, so this
   reshaped every migrated setting. The text is decoded before serialisation
   now — verified against a real Postgres: json_typeof(setting_value) is
   `boolean`, matching a native install exactly.

3. The migration could silently miss concurrent writes. If the backend keeps
   serving, rows written after the export never reach Postgres and vanish from
   view once the engine switches. The script now fingerprints the SQLite tables
   whose loss would be noticed, checks for drift BEFORE loading Postgres (so a
   detected race leaves the target untouched) and again after, and refuses with
   the exact rows that moved. It also says plainly to stop the backend first.

4. The child phases shared stdout with winston. Outside production, and
   whenever LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true, createPicpeak's own log line was concatenated
   with the archive path and the migration failed on a bogus filename. Payloads
   travel through a result file now; verified with LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 2 — six more data-safety findings (#1038)

1. The engine choice is now PINNED once the data is in Postgres. Previously the
   boot decided from "does Postgres hold galleries", so an operator who later
   deleted every gallery would be sent back to the stale pre-migration SQLite
   file while their settings, admins and CRM data stayed in Postgres. The
   migration writes a marker next to the database file (and retires the file
   itself by renaming it); the marker wins over any probe.

2. The migration refused to overwrite Postgres only when it held GALLERIES. A
   target with admins, customers, invoices or projects but no galleries was
   wiped without --force. Both the source and target checks now look for user
   data across the tables that are empty on a fresh install.

3. Same bug in the other direction: an install with no galleries but real
   admins/settings/customers was refused a migration it was entitled to.

4. Drift detection covered four tables and only count/max(id), so an in-place
   UPDATE (event edit, password change) or a write to any other table passed
   unnoticed. It now fingerprints every table the export carries, including
   max(updated_at). It still is not a substitute for stopping the backend, and
   the script says so rather than implying a guarantee.

5. probeSqliteData() treated an unreadable or corrupt file as "no data", which
   would have switched the install to an empty Postgres — the very failure this
   module exists to prevent. It fails closed now and stays on SQLite so the real
   error surfaces.

6. The "you are leaving SQLite data behind" warning was unreachable: setting
   DATABASE_CLIENT skipped the probes, so the branch that produces it never had
   the inputs. Postgres and SQLite are both probed whenever Postgres is the
   engine in play.

Also: the final verification compares row counts for EVERY table rather than
just galleries, and flags only a shortfall — the import legitimately adds an
app_settings row (setSessionsValidAfter) that made the strict equality fail on
a first real run.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15 end to end, including: the marker keeps
an install on Postgres after every gallery is deleted; removing the marker and
restoring the file rolls back to SQLite as documented.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 3 — occupancy, bootstrap admin, secrets in /tmp (#1038)

1. Both engine probes judged occupancy by GALLERIES alone. An install whose
   galleries were all deleted, but which still has admins, customers or
   accounting records, was treated as empty: on the SQLite side that meant
   booting the empty Postgres and appearing to lose everything; on the Postgres
   side it meant diverting a live install to a stale SQLite file. Both now look
   across the tables that are empty on a fresh install, matching the migration
   script.

2. The migration ran migrate-schema BEFORE checking the target, and migration
   001 seeds a bootstrap admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set (common on legacy
   installs). The occupancy check then saw that admin and refused, pushing the
   operator towards --force against a genuinely empty database. The target is
   read first now.

3. probeSqliteData()'s warning went through the app logger, which writes to
   STDOUT when LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true — and the resolver's stdout is the protocol
   channel wait-for-db.sh captures, so DATABASE_CLIENT could have been set to a
   JSON log line. Diagnostics take an injected sink (stderr in the resolver),
   and the shell now validates the value it captured instead of trusting it.

4. The .picpeak archive holds password hashes, SMTP credentials and API keys in
   plaintext, and was only removed on the fully-successful path — any drift or
   import failure left it in /tmp. Every exit path removes it now.

5. A database-only migration still hauled every business-doc and upload through
   /tmp and back into the same volume. createPicpeak takes includeFiles:false
   for this path; rows move, files stay where they already are.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a gallery-less install with only an admin
account now stays on SQLite and migrates successfully with ADMIN_PASSWORD set;
the resolver emits exactly one token on stdout with LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true and a
corrupt database; a drift failure leaves Postgres untouched and no archive
behind.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): pin the boot to SQLite while a migration is unfinished (#1038)

Review round 4. A migration that dies after touching Postgres leaves rows
behind — schema creation alone seeds a bootstrap admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is
set, and a drift or row-count failure can leave a partial load. Since the
occupancy probes were widened in round 3, those rows read as "Postgres is
occupied", so the next restart would switch engines and hide the SQLite data
that is still the database of record.

The script now writes a pin file next to the database BEFORE its first Postgres
write and clears it only on success (after the success marker exists, so no
restart in between can pick the wrong engine). While the pin is present the
resolver stays on SQLite and explains why.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15 by reproducing the exact scenario: a
migration failed mid-run with ADMIN_PASSWORD set, leaving one bootstrap admin
in Postgres. With the pin the next boot resolves to sqlite3; with the pin
removed it resolves to pg — the failure this closes. The subsequent successful
re-run clears the pin and the boot moves to Postgres.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 5 — occupancy, path drift, retry, host default (#1038)

1. A seeded bootstrap admin counted as "Postgres is occupied". core/001_init.js
   inserts one whenever ADMIN_PASSWORD is set, so a Postgres that was
   initialised once and never used would have beaten a SQLite file full of real
   galleries — the exact failure the guard exists to prevent, reintroduced by
   widening the probe in round 3. The two sides are deliberately asymmetric now:
   the SQLite probe counts any user data (err towards keeping data visible),
   the Postgres probe ignores rows that schema creation seeds (err towards
   requiring proof of real use).

2. The guard resolved DATABASE_PATH with its own logic while knexfile trimmed
   whitespace and collapsed the legacy duplicated-backend form. A path either
   engine normalised differently meant probing a file nobody uses, concluding
   there was no SQLite data, and booting an empty Postgres. The resolution now
   lives in one module both require.

3. Re-running after a partial migration — the documented recovery — was refused
   unless the operator passed the destructive-sounding --force, because the
   half-written rows read as target data. An unfinished run of this same script
   is now recognised as a safe retry.

4. wait-for-db.sh verified readiness against its own default host (`postgres`)
   while knexfile's production block defaults to `db`. With NODE_ENV now baked
   in, a bare `docker run` without DB_HOST would have passed the readiness check
   against one host and then dialled another. The entrypoint exports the exact
   connection it verified. Compose sets DB_HOST explicitly and is unaffected.

Verified: a Postgres holding only a seeded admin now loses to real SQLite data;
a DATABASE_PATH with surrounding whitespace resolves to the identical file in
both knexfile and the guard.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 6 — explicit-client bypasses, retry scope, cleanup (#1038)

1. An explicit DATABASE_CLIENT bypassed the unfinished-migration pin, because
   decideBootEngine honoured it first. docker-compose sets DATABASE_CLIENT=pg,
   so a failed migration would have restarted on a half-written Postgres on
   exactly the deployments that pin it. Worse in the other direction: with
   DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3, a SUCCESSFUL migration renames the source file, so
   the next start created a NEW, empty SQLite database and served that. The pin
   now outranks explicit pg (clearing the marker is the override), explicit
   sqlite3 is left alone since it already points at the data, and the migration
   refuses up front when the deployment pins anything other than pg.

2. The retry allowance was bound to the SQLite file, not to the target. An
   operator who repointed DB_HOST/DB_NAME between attempts could have replaced
   an unrelated populated database without --force. The pin records the target
   and the allowance only applies when it matches.

3. The printed rollback did not roll back: with data on both sides and no
   marker, the resolver still selects Postgres. It now spells out all three
   steps, including DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3.

4. A failure inside createPicpeak left a partial archive — plaintext hashes and
   credentials — in the caller-supplied temp dir, which that service
   deliberately does not clean. The export phase removes it on error.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 7 — pin bypass on direct start, real admins (#1038)

1. server.js only ran the engine resolver when DATABASE_CLIENT was unset, so a
   deployment that both bypasses the entrypoint (Kubernetes `command:`) AND
   pins DATABASE_CLIENT=pg never consulted the migration pin — the round-6 fix
   was unreachable on exactly that path, and a failed migration would have
   served a half-populated Postgres. The resolver now also runs whenever a pin
   file exists.

2. Round 5 excluded admin_users from Postgres occupancy to stop a seeded
   bootstrap admin counting as real data. That over-corrected: an install that
   has completed first-run setup but has no galleries yet has exactly one
   user-created row — an admin — so Postgres looked empty and, with a stale
   SQLite file present, the boot would switch away and the admin's credentials
   and configuration would disappear.

   core/001_init.js seeds must_change_password=true; setupService writes false
   once a human completes setup. The FLAG, not the table, distinguishes them,
   and a legacy NULL counts as a real admin.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a Postgres holding only the seeded row
loses to real SQLite data, the same Postgres wins once setup is completed, and
a server started directly with DATABASE_CLIENT=pg and a pin present comes up on
SQLite with the warning.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 8 — reset admins, CLI config, JSON nulls (#1038)

1. must_change_password is mutable: resetAdminPassword() re-raises it on REAL
   accounts (userManagementService.js:474). Round 7's discriminator therefore
   read a gallery-less Postgres whose only admin had been reset as an untouched
   bootstrap seed — and with a stale SQLite file present, the boot would have
   switched away and hidden those live credentials. The rule is layered now:
   more than one admin, any admin that has logged in, or must_change_password
   false all count as use. Only core/001_init.js's exact leftovers — one admin,
   never logged in, still flagged — read as a seed.

2. The CLI read process.env directly but never loaded the configuration the
   child phases get through knexfile, so running it directly (or via
   `docker exec`, which does not inherit wait-for-db.sh's exports) failed the
   pre-flight checks even with valid settings in backend/.env or
   /run/secrets/db_password. Both sources are loaded up front now.

3. The migration's target check counted a seeded bootstrap admin as user data
   while probePgData classified the identical row as empty, so migrating into a
   previously-initialised-but-unused Postgres demanded --force. Same rule on
   both sides.

4. Cross-engine JSON handling is simpler and no longer lossy. SQLite keeps json
   columns as TEXT holding valid JSON and Postgres accepts JSON text directly,
   so the correct action is to pass them through untouched. Round 1 parsed then
   re-serialised them to undo a double-stringify; that round-tripped the JSON
   literal `null` into SQL NULL, changing data and breaking NOT NULL json
   columns. Not serialising at all fixes both.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a migrated install now carries
json_typeof = null for a JSON null, object for a nested object, and boolean for
a boolean — matching a native install exactly.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): close review round 9 — probe error classes, marker ordering (#1038)

1. probePgData() answered every failure with "Postgres has data". That is right
   for an unreachable server — the app cannot run on it either way, and
   diverting a healthy pg install to a stale SQLite file over a transient blip
   would be worse — but wrong for a server that answers and then fails the
   query, which is what a half-built or damaged schema looks like. That is not
   evidence of data, and reporting it as such booted the empty Postgres and hid
   a populated SQLite file: the exact failure this guard exists to prevent.

   Reachability is now established with SELECT 1 first, so the two cases get
   opposite answers: unreachable → leave the configured engine alone;
   reachable-but-uninspectable → unproven, and the SQLite side wins if it
   actually holds data.

2. The success marker was written after the SQLite file was renamed away. A
   failure in between — a full disk — left the source retired with no marker:
   the next attempt reported "No SQLite database", the in-progress pin stayed,
   and the operator never saw the rollback path. The marker is written first
   and updated with the retired filename once the rename succeeds, so a failure
   at any point leaves everything recoverable.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a reachable database whose admin_users
table lacks the probed column now resolves to sqlite3 rather than hiding the
data, while an unreachable host still resolves to pg.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): don't fail the migration on empty SQLite-only tables (#1038)

Review round 10. The final verification flagged every source table missing from
Postgres, regardless of whether it held rows — and SQLite-only tables do exist:
initializeDatabase() creates an `events_new` scratch table and, when its legacy
column copy throws, the catch swallows the error and leaves the empty table
behind (db.js:236). The importer correctly skips tables Postgres does not have,
so verification then reported a mismatch AFTER the data had already landed,
exited 1, and left the install pinned to SQLite with no way to finish.

An absent target table only matters if the source actually had rows. Empty ones
are now listed and skipped.

Reproduced both ways against a real PostgreSQL 15 with an events_new table
present: without the fix the run ends in "ROW COUNTS DO NOT MATCH" and leaves
the in-progress pin; with it, the table is reported as skipped, the migration
completes and the pin is released.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): a completed migration overrides an implicit SQLite config (#1038)

Review round 11. The migration allowed the one configuration it should have
worried about most: DATABASE_CLIENT unset AND NODE_ENV not "production", which
resolves to the development block — i.e. sqlite3. That is precisely the state
the affected installs are in, since it is why they ended up on SQLite at all,
so an operator can easily run the migration before fixing it. The script then
renames the source database away, and the next start resolved to the implicit
sqlite3, created a NEW empty database and served it — after reporting success.

The success marker now overrides an IMPLICITLY resolved sqlite3 when Postgres
settings are present, because the marker is durable proof of where the data
actually went. An explicit DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3 still wins: that is the
documented rollback.

The script says something rather than refusing — refusing would block exactly
the population this exists for.

Reproduced with NODE_ENV and DATABASE_CLIENT both empty, against a real
PostgreSQL 15: the migration completes, the source is renamed away, and the
next boot resolves to pg with the data intact. Before this it resolved to
sqlite3 and would have served an empty database.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* refactor(db): drop the dead reachability flag in probePgData (#1038)

github-code-quality flagged `if (reachable)` as always true, and it is right:
the unreachable branch returns, so everything below it runs only when the probe
connected. The variable and the conditional were leftovers from a first draft
that used a single catch for both failure classes.

No behaviour change — the two error paths still return opposite answers.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): refuse to choose when both databases hold data (#1038)

Review round 12.

1. An install that ran on PostgreSQL, lost NODE_ENV/DATABASE_CLIENT, and kept
   working on SQLite has REAL data on both sides: old rows in Postgres, newer
   ones in SQLite. The stranded-data rule only protected SQLite when Postgres
   was empty, so pulling this fix would have booted Postgres and hidden every
   gallery created since the switch — the exact failure this PR exists to
   prevent, in a variant I had not considered.

   A completed migration leaves a marker saying which side is current. Without
   one, two populated databases are a conflict: the boot stops and prints both
   targets, the two DATABASE_CLIENT values that resolve it, and the migration
   command that merges them. This is the only deliberate refusal in the change —
   guessing here would hide data AND split subsequent writes across two
   databases.

2. probePgData was handed knexConfig.connection even when knexfile had resolved
   to SQLite (a completed migration whose environment still says sqlite3), so
   node-postgres dialled its own localhost defaults instead of DB_HOST/DB_NAME —
   false "unreachable" diagnostics and a needless delay on every boot. The probe
   target is now built from the environment when the config is not pg.

The conflict is honoured by all three entry points: the resolver exits 3 with an
empty stdout, wait-for-db.sh stops the container, and server.js refuses to start.

Two existing tests asserted that Postgres wins when both sides hold data. They
encoded the pre-conflict assumption and described a state that cannot occur
after a real migration (which always leaves a marker); both now pass the marker.

Found while testing: the resolver's logger shim had no .error, so the conflict
path threw, was swallowed by the fallback, and silently chose Postgres — the
precise outcome this refuses to make. The shim is complete now.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): symmetric bootstrap rule, one resolved Postgres target (#1038)

Review round 13. Both findings are consequences of earlier rounds.

1. The conflict rule added in round 12 counted an untouched SQLite bootstrap
   admin as data. core/001_init.js seeds one whenever ADMIN_PASSWORD is set —
   including into the accidental SQLite database — so a healthy Postgres install
   that had ever started once without NODE_ENV would have had a seeded-only
   SQLite file beside it, been declared a both-populated conflict, and REFUSED
   TO BOOT. The bootstrap discrimination is applied on both sides now; a
   setup-completed or logged-in admin still counts as real use on either.

2. The CLI's child phases inherited whichever knexfile block NODE_ENV selected.
   The development block defaults Postgres to localhost/postgres/photo_sharing,
   production to db/picpeak/picpeak — and this script is explicitly meant to run
   with NODE_ENV unset. With DB_USER/DB_NAME left to defaults it would therefore
   have migrated into `photo_sharing`, after which following the script's own
   advice to set NODE_ENV=production pointed the app at an empty `picpeak`.

   The target is resolved once, with production defaults, and passed explicitly
   to every phase — so the block knexfile happens to pick can no longer decide
   which database the data lands in. The pin and success marker record that same
   resolved identity.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a live Postgres beside a seeded-only
SQLite file now boots pg rather than refusing, flipping that admin to
setup-completed restores the conflict, and a migration records
localhost:7102/picpeak_r13b as its target rather than a defaulted guess.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): one Postgres identity everywhere; protect the credentials file (#1038)

Review round 14. Three of the six findings were the same defect as round 13's,
surfacing through paths that fix did not cover: the connection used to PROBE or
MIGRATE could differ from the one the application then OPENS, because
knexfile's development block points Postgres at localhost/postgres/photo_sharing
while production uses db/picpeak/picpeak.

1. server.js exported only DATABASE_CLIENT=pg after the resolver decided, so
   knexfile filled in host/user/database from whichever block NODE_ENV selected.
   With SQLite already retired by a migration, that meant opening an empty
   database. The whole connection is pinned now.

2. Two defaults existed for DB_HOST: wait-for-db.sh resolves and exports
   `postgres`, knexfile's production block says `db`. Since the entrypoint
   exports its value, `postgres` is what a running container actually uses — so
   a `docker exec` migration, which inherits neither, has to agree with that,
   not with the default that is only reached when the entrypoint did not run.

3. The migration's Postgres phases inherited an unset NODE_ENV and therefore the
   development block, which ignores DB_SSL entirely — a managed Postgres
   requiring TLS could never be migrated into. The phases run with production
   semantics now.

4. core/001_init.js writes data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt, and that data directory
   belongs to the SOURCE install. Bootstrapping the Postgres schema replaced the
   operator's real credentials file with ones for a temporary admin the import
   immediately discards. The file is preserved across the phase, including when
   it fails.

5. The boot line described knexConfig, so an install redirected to Postgres by a
   migration marker still logged "Database engine: sqlite (...)", contradicting
   the warning printed one line earlier.

6. On a both-populated conflict resolveBootEngine returns client:null, and both
   migration runners told the operator their data was in "null" and to set
   DATABASE_CLIENT=null. They now present the two real choices.

Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a migrated install started directly with
NODE_ENV unset now logs `postgres (localhost:7102/picpeak_r14)` and opens it,
where before it would have gone to the development block's photo_sharing.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* refactor(db): resolve the PostgreSQL target in exactly one place (#1038)

Rounds 13 and 14 both traced back to the same thing, each time through a caller
the previous fix had not covered: three different defaults existed for the same
connection.

  knexfile development : localhost / postgres / photo_sharing
  knexfile production  : db        / picpeak  / picpeak
  wait-for-db.sh       : postgres  / picpeak  / picpeak   (and it EXPORTS them)

So a process that probed or migrated against one could hand over to a process
that opened another. Patching each caller was not converging — the guard, then
the CLI's child phases, then server.js — so this deletes the divergence instead.

`src/utils/pgConnection.js` now owns the resolution and knexfile's development
and production blocks both derive from it, as does the engine guard. Same shape
as the earlier sqlitePath.js extraction, for the same reason.

The database NAME is what made this dangerous: a wrong host or user fails
loudly at connect time, while a wrong name connects fine and presents an empty
installation.

BEHAVIOUR CHANGE: with DATABASE_CLIENT=pg and no DB_* variables, a
non-production environment now resolves to postgres/picpeak/picpeak instead of
localhost/postgres/photo_sharing. Deployments are unaffected — compose sets
these explicitly and wait-for-db.sh exports them — but a local machine running
Postgres bare now needs DB_HOST=localhost DB_USER=postgres DB_NAME=photo_sharing
(or DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3, which is what backend/.env already uses). The
failure mode of getting this wrong is a refused connection, not a silently empty
database.

Side effect worth having: DB_SSL is now honoured whatever NODE_ENV says, so the
managed-Postgres case is fixed at the root rather than by forcing production
semantics onto the migration's child phases.

The test block keeps its own photo_sharing_test default — isolation is the point
there.

Verified: every block plus the guard resolve identically from the same
environment; explicit DB_* still wins; production's pool tuning is preserved;
and a full SQLite → PostgreSQL migration with NODE_ENV unset lands in the right
database with JSON shapes intact.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): two more components that guessed the database instead of asking (#1038)

Both found while sweeping for copies of the connection defaults. Checked in
detail first — one of my suspicions about them was wrong.

scripts/set-admin-password.js hand-rolled its own knex config while all four
sibling scripts (reset-admin-password, create-admin, show-admin-credentials,
reset-admin-mfa) use the application's connection. Two consequences:

  - it read DB_CLIENT, a variable nothing else in this codebase sets, so it
    defaulted to Postgres and could not work on a SQLite install at all;
  - it defaulted to database `picpeak_dev`, a name no other component uses.

It now uses `require('../src/database/db')` like its siblings, so it follows
whatever engine the install actually runs on. Timestamps are written as ISO
strings because it reaches SQLite now, where raw Date objects are the documented
landmine.

NOT changed: the script's "all existing sessions have been invalidated" notice
is accurate — auth.js compares token iat against password_changed_at — and it
deliberately leaves must_change_password alone, which is right for an operator
choosing a password rather than being issued one.

routes/adminSystem.js re-derived three things the live connection already knows,
and each could disagree with it:

  - the engine, from DATABASE_CLIENT || 'sqlite3' — so a Postgres install
    without an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT took the SQLite branch;
  - the Postgres database, from DB_NAME || 'picpeak';
  - the SQLite file, from a hardcoded ../../data/photo_sharing.db that ignored
    DATABASE_PATH entirely.

All three now come from db.client.config, with pg_database_size(current_database()).

Verified: set-admin-password works on SQLite (new hash verifies, old rejected)
and still on PostgreSQL; and on a SQLite install with a custom DATABASE_PATH the
size logic reports the real database (1,748,992 bytes) where the old code
reported a different file entirely (1,851,392) — or 0 where that path does not
exist.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

* fix(db): bind the migration marker to its target; fix a phantom table (#1038)

Review round 15.

1. The marker records `host:port/database`, but only its EXISTENCE was checked.
   Repoint DB_NAME or DB_HOST at a different, empty PostgreSQL after migrating
   and the marker would vouch for that one too — booting it, presenting an empty
   installation, and suppressing the SQLite fallback while the real data sits in
   the recorded target and the renamed rollback copy. The marker is compared
   against the current connection now, and a mismatch stops the boot with both
   targets named and the two ways out.

2. `incoming_invoices` is not a table — supplier documents live in
   `inbound_documents` (core migration 124). Both occupancy lists skip tables
   that do not exist, so those records were silently not protecting anything:
   an install whose only remaining data was inbound documents could be switched
   away from, or overwritten without --force. Verified every other name in the
   lists against the live schema at the same time.

Verified: a marker naming picpeak_original with picpeak_mk configured refuses
with exit 3 and prints both; making them agree boots pg.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-13 18:50:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 89dc9623c1 fix(feedback): persist guest feedback settings, unshadow the guest route (#1030) (#1031)
Enabling Guest Feedback on an event could silently do nothing.

1. `updateEventFeedbackSettings` spread the request body straight into the
   knex UPDATE. The admin event form posts its whole client-side state,
   including three keys that were never columns on event_feedback_settings
   (`enable_rate_limiting`, `rate_limit_window_minutes`,
   `rate_limit_max_requests`), so the write threw and the route answered 500.
   Writable columns are now whitelisted; identity columns and timestamps stay
   server-managed.

2. EventDetailsPage swallowed that 500 in a bare `catch {}` ("Error already
   handled by mutation" — it is a different request), so the admin was left
   looking at "Event updated successfully" while the toggle never persisted.
   The error is surfaced now and the settings query is invalidated on success.

3. gallery.js declared a duplicate `GET /:slug/feedback-settings`. server.js
   mounts galleryRoutes before galleryFeedback, so it shadowed the real
   handler and dropped the per-guest caps (#655) from the guest payload — the
   gallery could never render the favorite/like limits or their counters.

Timestamps are written as ISO strings so they round-trip on both engines.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-13 18:50:52 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 34ee31141b fix(gallery): coerce SQLite 0/1 booleans in the guest surface (#1028) (#1034)
SQLite stores booleans as 0/1, Postgres as true/false. The guest gallery
compared strictly against `true`/`false`, so every flag read backwards on
SQLite installs:

    allow_downloads:    0 !== false → true   (header Download button shown
                                              with downloads disabled)
    allow_user_uploads: 1 === true  → false  (upload button hidden with
                                              uploads enabled)

Worse, all five download guards used `allow_downloads === false`, which never
fires against a stored 0 — so on SQLite "Allow photo downloads = off" was
inert end to end: single photo, download-all, download-selected, download-jobs
and the job-status poll all kept serving, as did the secure-images download
route. Per-category blocking (#640) was ignored for the same reason, the
protection toggles (right-click, devtools, canvas, watermark) reported false
while enabled, overlay_protection was stuck on, and show_feedback_to_guests
leaked feedback with the setting off.

The /info endpoint was already correct — it checks 0/'0' explicitly. The two
payloads had simply drifted. Everything now goes through parseBooleanInput
(utils/parsers.js), which normalises both engines and takes a per-column
default so legacy NULL rows keep their documented behaviour.

Tests run on the SQLite harness, so they assert the real engine values. Every
one of them fails on the unfixed code — the payload assertions return the
inverted value, and the guard assertions never get their 403 (the request
proceeds to serve instead).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-13 18:50:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 671c4dbd56 fix(events): make event_date/expires_at nullable on SQLite (#1029) (#1035)
Clearing a gallery's expiration failed on every SQLite install with

    SQLITE_CONSTRAINT: NOT NULL constraint failed: events.expires_at

surfacing in the admin UI as "Failed to update event".

Migration 061 added the event_require_event_date / event_require_expiration
settings and dropped the NOT NULL on both columns — but only for Postgres. It
skipped SQLite on the premise that "SQLite doesn't enforce NOT NULL as
strictly", which is untrue, so "never expires" was never reachable there. The
#426 work that allows clearing the expiration on edit therefore never worked
on SQLite either.

Migration 174 finishes 061 for SQLite. Knex implements .alter() on SQLite by
recreating the table; migration 073 already does that on `events`, so the path
is well-trodden. Postgres is skipped — it was handled in 061 and .alter() there
would needlessly rewrite a column that is already correct.

The test asserts against the real engine (the Jest harness runs SQLite) and
reproduces the reporter's exact error without the migration.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-13 18:50:42 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e2832725ea chore(main): release 3.102.1-beta.0 (#1026)
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2026-08-11 08:41:17 +00:00
Luca 27dedb13f3 docs: flip README links to docs.picpeak.app + delete docs/_to-migrate (#1000 phase 3) (#1023)
Phase 3 (final) of #1000. The deep content now lives on the docs site (PicPeak/docs#7), making docs.picpeak.app the single source of truth and removing the in-repo copies.

README links flip to docs.picpeak.app; the roadmap table is retired in favour of GitHub Issues. Deletes docs/_to-migrate/ and the five migrated pages. docs/migration-to-org.md stays — it's repo-transitional, not docs-site content.

In-app references to the deleted files are repointed at the docs site, including the CRM disclaimer strings in en.json/de.json and the contract-editor fallback.

Closes #1000.
2026-08-11 10:38:35 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 054c342c33 chore(main): release 3.102.0-beta.0 (#1025)
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2026-08-11 07:49:42 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 8e3573788b feat(downloads): per-gallery download resolutions (#858) (#1022)
Clients who need smaller files no longer make the photographer re-export. Two capabilities, both off by default.

STANDARD RESOLUTION — the size a gallery hands out for every ordinary download (single, selected, download-all). Global default in Settings, overridable per gallery with the NULL=inherit tri-state. The pre-built download-all zip is built AT the standard resolution, so changing it invalidates those archives, including a fan-out to inheriting galleries.

RESOLUTION PICKER — opt-in modal letting guests choose a different size. Custom archives are built as a DB-backed job the client polls, never cached. The picker never offers a size above the standard, and Original reappears only when the admin explicitly allows it.

Resize is fit:'inside' + withoutEnlargement — aspect preserved, never upscaled — applied before the watermark, since the mark is sized relative to its input.

Three rounds of external review hardened this: job archives are bound to the requester's visibility scope and re-validated at delivery, the streamed download-all path applies the cap, queue admission is bounded, and rejected resolutions no longer inflate download stats.

Closes #858.
2026-08-11 09:46:46 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 02deac9f10 chore(main): release 3.101.5-beta.0 (#1021)
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2026-08-10 11:36:23 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 75bfad2b6a fix(slideshow): stop "no crop" fit letterboxing a pre-cropped frame (#1015) (#1018)
The slideshow resolved its image as preview_url || hero_url || url. preview_url is only emitted when lightbox_preview_enabled is on (default false), so a default install fell through to hero_url — the 1920x1080 fit:'cover' centre crop built for gallery header banners. object-fit: contain then letterboxed an already-cropped 16:9 frame, so portrait photos lost their top and bottom and 'Black Bars (No crop)' looked inert.

Emits slideshow_url (same aspect-preserved preview tier) unconditionally for image photos; the show prefers it and never falls back to hero_url. preview_url stays gated so the lightbox opt-in is unchanged.

Fixes #1015.
2026-08-10 13:32:14 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 08e0098597 chore(main): release 3.101.4-beta.0 (#1016)
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2026-08-10 09:03:45 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e3830cd921 fix(deps): bump nanoid and js-yaml out of two HIGH advisories (#1013)
Both are production dependencies of the backend image (npm ci --omit=dev):

- nanoid 3.3.16 -> 3.3.18 (CVE-2026-67213, infinite loop in customAlphabet), transitive via postcss
- js-yaml 4.3.0 -> 4.3.1 (GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj, quadratic CPU in !!omap resolution), direct dependency

Lockfile-only; the existing ^ ranges already permitted both fixes. Clears the two open Trivy code-scanning alerts on main.
2026-08-10 10:59:53 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 03671f3b91 test(e2e): anchor the admin login button locator so SSO doesn't break it (#1012)
With OIDC enabled the login page also renders a 'Sign in with <provider>' button whose accessible name matches the unanchored /Sign In/ locator, so Playwright strict mode failed every test that logs in — 7 of 13 in the local smoke suite, which is also the pre-push gate. CI never hit it because its databases seed without OIDC config.

Anchors the regex to the full accessible name in all six call sites.
2026-08-10 09:53:18 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5503e6ca5e chore(main): release 3.101.3-beta.0 (#1011)
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2026-08-10 07:18:08 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a607cea110 fix(auth): issuer-tag the oversize SSO logout marker (#798) (#1010)
Phase 3 validated a stored ID token hint against the currently configured issuer, but the oversize path never got that check: an ID token above the 3.9KB cookie limit was stored as the bare string 'sso', which collapsed to an undefined hint at logout and skipped validation entirely. Changing the issuer while such a session was live bounced the user to the new IdP on logout.

Stores sso.<base64url(issuer)> instead and moves all marker interpretation into buildEndSessionUrl: raw ID token -> iss/aud-validated hint, issuer-tagged marker -> round-trip without a hint, anything else -> no round-trip. Every branch fails closed.

Refs #798.
2026-08-10 09:14:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fbe1d07228 chore(main): release 3.101.2-beta.0 (#1009)
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2026-08-10 06:30:01 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 1bf19a7caf fix(branding): route the gallery footer through <PoweredBy /> (#1008)
Closes #1003.

#999 centralised the attribution so branding_hide_powered_by is honoured
everywhere, but GalleryLayout kept its own inline guard. The gallery footer
therefore still flashed — it kept `!brandingSettings?.hide_powered_by`, where
undefined is falsy, so a white-labelled instance briefly showed the attribution
on first paint, on the surface a white-label customer is most likely to see.
And there were two implementations of one rule, which is the bug class #999
existed to close.

The footer appends the attribution to its copyright line inside an existing
<p>, so a straight swap would nest a <p> in a <p>. Added an inline variant
rendering a <span> that carries the leading ' | ' itself: the separator belongs
to the component, since a caller placing its own would have to repeat the
visibility guard to avoid leaving a dangling separator when the attribution is
hidden.

No extra request — GalleryView already uses usePublicSettings(), the same hook
and react-query key, so the cache is shared. The footer also picks up
common.poweredBy, so it is translated rather than hardcoded English.

Removes the now-unread hide_powered_by from GalleryLayout's prop type and the
mapping feeding it in GalleryView.

Four cases cover the variant — span not paragraph, separator present, separator
hidden with the attribution when white-labelled, hidden while loading. Each was
checked against the pre-fix shape: rendering a <p> or moving the separator out
breaks one.
2026-08-10 08:27:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 4ec93107a9 chore(main): release 3.101.1-beta.0 (#1007)
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2026-08-10 06:19:11 +00:00
Luca ddebd50d3f docs: slim README to a lean router, stage deep content for docs-site migration (#1001)
Phase 1 of the README slim / docs-migration plan in #1000.

README goes from 577 to ~191 lines: hero, one Quick Start, a Documentation
index, comparison table, tech stack and a table of contents. The deep inline
prose moves into a temporary docs/_to-migrate/ staging folder (webhooks,
storage backends, first-run setup, system requirements, roadmap) so README
links keep resolving until the docs-site pages are live.

Existing docs/*.md referenced by app code are deliberately left in place —
crm-disclaimers.md (frontend TSX, i18n, a backend route and migration),
fonts.md (server.js), accounting-inbound-invoices.md (Dockerfile) and
migration-to-org.md (UpdateNotification.tsx, MigrationBanner.tsx). Moving them
is a separate, code-touching change.

Verified before merge: merges cleanly against main with no conflicts; all 14
in-repo links resolve in the merged tree; no docs file is deleted or renamed;
and the registry-move notice from #995 survives the rewrite in condensed form,
keeping 'still responds but its tags are frozen at 2026-05-27' plus the
migration-to-org.md link. The fuller symptom explanation remains in that doc,
which the README links to.

Follow-up per #1000: port docs/_to-migrate/* into docs.picpeak.app, then flip
the README links and delete the staging folder.

Co-authored-by: Luca-Timo <Luca-Timo@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-10 08:16:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1c242d401f test(transfers): pin the PicTransfer ownership guards (#1006)
Closes #1005.

The two ownership guards added during the #998 review were correct on merge but
untested. They are the only thing between a scoped admin and every other
admin's ORIGINAL files, since a transfer serves those over an unauthenticated
token URL.

14 cases: filterOwnedPhotoIds (own / foreign / ownerless-legacy / mixed /
non-existent / super_admin), addFiles gating on the same rule, listTransfers
scoping plus the absence of token/upload_token/download_url/upload_url from the
list payload, and getTransferOwner.

Each was checked against the pre-fix behaviour rather than only passing against
current code — reverting each guard in turn fails exactly the cases covering it:
ownership filter 3, list scoping 1, payload strip 1, guard registered late 1.

requireTransferOwnership is module-local, so its two contracts are asserted at
the source following the #596 pattern: that router.use('/:id', ...) precedes
every /:id route — ordering is the whole mechanism, and a late registration
would guard nothing while still looking present — and that missing and foreign
ids both answer 404, so the endpoint is not an existence oracle.

Tests only; no production code touched.
2026-08-10 08:10:54 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 80599a5e47 chore(main): release 3.101.0-beta.0 (#1004)
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2026-08-09 11:43:36 +00:00
Luca 2e495d7c48 feat(transfers): add PicTransfer — cross-event file transfers (#998)
Closes #997.

Send original files from any event as a token-protected download link, with an
optional client-upload channel. Strictly opt-in behind a new `transfers`
feature flag, default OFF.

Migrations 170-172 (transfers, transfer_files, transfer_extra_files,
transfer_uploads, transfer_recipients, transfer_downloads, default settings and
two email templates) — all hasTable/hasColumn-guarded and idempotent, with
destructive statements confined to down().

Backend: transferService (CRUD, 256-bit download token, 6-char upload token,
cross-event ZIP streaming of originals), admin CRUD routes, and two public
token routes. transferCleanupService runs an hourly retention sweep; source-event
photos are never touched. All three routers fail closed via
requireFeatureFlag('transfers').

Review closed two ownership blockers, both the same root cause — permissions
used where ownership was needed:

- photoIds arrived from the request body and were validated only for existence,
  so a scoped admin could bundle any event's originals and hand them out through
  the public download token. filterOwnedPhotoIds now resolves ids to their events
  and gates them through filterOwnedEventIds, on both the create and add-files
  paths.
- The transfer list was unscoped and carried each row's download token, so any
  admin with events.view could read another's token and fetch their originals.
  The list is now scoped by created_by, the token/url fields are stripped from
  the list payload, and a single router.use('/:id', requireTransferOwnership)
  covers all twelve /:id routes, 404ing foreign and missing alike.

The admin photo picker filters its event list to the same rule, so the UI stops
offering picks the API would discard.

Fork-PR workflows had not been approved since the fix commits, so the PR's green
checks were stale against the pre-fix head. Verified by dispatching tests.yml
against the actual head: backend and frontend both green.

Follow-up: neither ownership guard has a regression test yet.

Co-authored-by: Luca-Timo <Luca-Timo@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 13:40:03 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e2d8ec86bd chore(main): release 3.100.2-beta.0 (#1002)
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2026-08-09 09:19:07 +00:00
Lutthy 3bb4f1a1a8 fix(branding): hide "Powered by PicPeak" on every page, not only the gallery (#999)
branding_hide_powered_by only hid the attribution on the main gallery footer. It
stayed visible on the gallery password screen, client access page, Premium
layout, admin and customer login, accept-invite and CMS pages — AdminLoginPage
rendered it unconditionally with no guard at all, so the setting genuinely did
not apply there.

Routes those surfaces through one <PoweredBy /> component in components/common
that reads the public setting itself (the DynamicFavicon pattern) and renders
nothing when white-labeling is on, including while the settings are still
loading so a white-labelled instance never flashes the attribution.

Also collapses three duplicate translation keys (gallery.poweredBy,
adminLogin.poweredBy, customer.login.poweredBy) into a single common.poweredBy,
and translates pages that had 'Powered by' hardcoded in English across all 8
locales.

Fork-PR workflows were never approved so CI did not run. Verified locally
against cf243b44: tsc --noEmit clean, ESLint clean, vitest 124 passed across 24
files, and npm run build succeeds.

GalleryLayout.tsx keeps its own inline guard and is not routed through the new
component; tracked separately.

Co-authored-by: lbossuyt <lbossuyt@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 11:16:18 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1f224f4ead chore(main): release 3.100.1-beta.0 (#996)
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2026-08-04 15:33:44 +00:00
Paul Nothaft b9e42591f5 docs: the retired registry path freezes, it does not stop serving (#995)
Closes #985.

README and migration-to-org.md both claimed the old path 'is no longer served'.
It is served — ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/backend:latest returns a complete image,
created 2026-05-27, label version: main. The registry responds normally; it just
never receives anything new.

That inaccuracy is what generates reports like #982. Told the path is not
served, an operator runs docker compose pull, watches it succeed, runs docker
rmi and pulls again, watches that succeed too, and concludes the problem lies
somewhere other than their image path. Nothing reports an error anywhere; the
only symptom is an update notice that never resolves.

Say what actually happens — the path freezes rather than failing — and add a
self-diagnosis via docker image inspect on both paths, with the 2026-05-27 date
and the 'main' version label as the tells. MigrationBanner's wording is left
alone: 'no longer being updated' was accurate.

This is the delivery mechanism for #985. There is no in-app channel:
MigrationBanner shipped a month after the freeze, the #993 update-check notice
cannot fire on installs running their own frozen backend, and the changelog
modal that renders release notes shipped two days after the freeze. What reaches
these operators is GitHub, and the GHCR page for the retired package — which
renders this README through the images' own org.opencontainers.image.source
label, so the fix propagates to the dead path's own page automatically.
2026-08-04 17:30:18 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9dc2b2166e chore(main): release 3.100.0-beta.0 (#994)
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2026-08-04 14:52:13 +00:00
Luca f00661511c feat(gallery): admin preview skips the password on protected galleries (#981)
Closes #868.

A logged-in admin opening a published, password-protected gallery is let
straight in, mirroring the existing draft-visibility bypass.

Mechanism: an explicit ?admin_preview=1 intent flag AND a verified admin session
read from the httpOnly admin_token cookie (or an admin-typed Bearer) — never a
token from the URL. This retires the old ?preview=<raw-admin-JWT> scheme, which
leaked a 24h admin token into the address bar, referrers and proxy logs.

Per-request bypass only: no gallery JWT is minted, the password endpoint is
never reached so the login_attempts lockout buckets stay clean, and admin
previews are excluded from guest analytics (access_logs, download counts,
per-photo view_count, notification bells).

Review (two rounds) closed three blockers and two concerns:

- Transport: verifyGalleryAccess now resolves admin preview before any gallery
  credential, and isAdminPreview reads the admin cookie first and type-checks
  every candidate — so an admin Bearer no longer 403s on the type gate, and a
  coexisting gallery session can no longer shadow the admin cookie.
- Reveal mode (#838) is a second consumer of isAdminPreview; its bypass is
  unchanged, only the transport moves. revealMode.test.js updated off the
  retired scheme and now carries a coexisting gallery Bearer.
- Admin previews no longer inflate per-photo view counts, and the internal photo
  redirects preserve the flag via withPreview() so they still authorise.
- Happy path: GalleryPage renders GalleryView directly for a preview instead of
  attempting the public empty-password auto-login, which 401'd against a
  genuinely protected gallery and stranded the page on the skeleton.

The backend job timed out once at the 10-minute CI limit; a re-run completed in
2m02s, in line with main's ~2m10s baseline, so that was a runner flake rather
than a hang.
2026-08-04 16:48:07 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 137a42f259 feat(admin): surface the registry move through the update check (#993)
Relates to #985 — does NOT close it.

Adds registryMigrationRequired to the update-check payload (stable channel below
3.45.0) and an amber block in UpdateNotification explaining that the retired
registry path still responds, so `docker compose pull` appears to succeed while
serving the same frozen build.

Known limitation, established in review and merged deliberately: this cannot
reach the operators #985 describes. PicPeak is self-hosted, so the update-check
code runs inside the operator's own image — a v3.44.0 install runs v3.44.0's
backend forever, and the only external call returns release metadata, not logic.
Every build containing this predicate is >= 3.45.0, where it is false by
definition. The release-notes fallback fails too: the changelog modal shipped
2026-05-29, two days after the freeze.

Correct for any future rename, no runtime cost, but #985 stays open — the
population it describes still has no in-app channel. Viable routes are external
(retired GHCR package description, repo README, docs).

'0.0.0' is excluded from the predicate: that is getCurrentVersion's fallback for
an unreadable package.json, i.e. a broken install, not a pre-rename one.
2026-08-04 16:36:50 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0c8ad6bbed fix(security): vet the destination project when linking a deal (#991)
linkDealToProject re-points a deal's quotes, contracts and events into
`projectId`. Its lineage guard vets the SOURCE events and its comment assumed
the route had vetted the destination — true only for attachDocumentToProject.
quoteService.create/update and contract crud.create/update take `projectId`
straight from the request body behind quotes.manage / contracts.manage, which
are permissions, not ownership; adminQuotes.js and adminContracts.js carry no
ownership guard at all.

The lineage guard did not cover it: it is skipped when the deal has produced no
event yet, which is the state of a newly created quote, and an unassigned
destination ADOPTS the deal's customer rather than rejecting it.

A scoped admin could therefore write into another admin's project, and on an
OWNERLESS project (created_by IS NULL — legacy rows migration 167 could not
attribute) escalate to a read: once the quote converts to an event it becomes
the project's only linked event, which is the condition ownedProjectsSubquery's
second branch grants ownership on.

Vetted at the service choke point all four callers share, ahead of both the
null-deal early return (callers write project_id before calling, and deal_uuid
is nullable) and the customer check (whose 422 vs 404 was an enumeration
oracle). 404 PROJECT_NOT_FOUND throughout. super_admin unaffected.
2026-08-04 16:36:12 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 083b3d86b0 chore(main): release 3.99.2-beta.0 (#989)
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2026-08-04 12:40:03 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 6c03feaef5 fix(deps): bump ip-address, brace-expansion and postcss for open CVEs (#987)
Closes Trivy code-scanning alerts #414-#418 on the backend image.

  brace-expansion  5.0.8  -> 5.0.9   CVE-2026-69152 (high)   DoS via unbounded
                                     intermediate arrays
  ip-address       10.2.0 -> 10.4.0  CVE-2026-69192 (high), CVE-2026-54272 and
                                     CVE-2026-69198 (medium) — SSRF and
                                     trust-boundary bypasses. Needs 10.3.1+ to
                                     clear all three.
  postcss          8.5.18 -> 8.5.23  CVE-2026-69153 (medium) information
                                     disclosure via crafted sourceMappingURL

ip-address and brace-expansion were already in overrides but pinned below the
new fixed versions; the floors just needed raising. postcss reaches the image
through sanitize-html — the direct pin is not an import, it forces the
transitive copy to dedupe to a known version, so it moves with the bump.

Only the backend image is affected: the frontend production stage is
nginx:1.30-alpine and ships no node_modules.

Each lockfile now holds exactly one entry per package, all at or above the
fixed version, and the image installs via npm ci --omit=dev so the lockfile is
authoritative.
2026-08-04 14:35:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0ef836df19 chore(main): release 3.99.1-beta.0 (#986)
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2026-08-04 12:21:08 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 4b53b64277 fix(accounting): gate cross-add counters on the permission their endpoint checks (#984)
Closes #983.

The two cross-add counter queries added in #979 were enabled on customers.edit,
but neither endpoint checks that permission:

  HoursSection      -> GET /expenses/inbound/by-customer/:id  needs accounting.view
  CustomerCrmPanels -> GET /customers/:id/hour-entries        needs customers.view

An admin holding customers.edit but not the corresponding read permission fired
a guaranteed 403 on every customer-detail render. It degraded safely — the count
stayed at its 0 default so the cross-add was never offered, which is the right
outcome for that role — so this was request noise rather than broken behaviour.

Each guard now requires both: the read permission to fetch the count, and the
write permission because there is no point offering the cross-add to someone who
cannot create the combined invoice.

No seeded role is affected: migration 123 grants accounting.view and
accounting.manage together, and customers.edit projects forward from
customers.create, which migration 090 always grants alongside customers.view.
2026-08-04 14:17:34 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 83d514315e chore(main): release 3.99.0-beta.0 (#980)
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2026-08-03 20:06:19 +00:00
Luca 165cebdb5c feat(accounting): re-bill proof attachment, CRM panel & hours↔re-bills cross-add (#979)
Closes #866.

Three features, all behind the `incomingInvoices` feature flag:

1. Attach the stored supplier proof PDF to the client-invoice email when a
   captured invoice is re-billed/passed through, as a SEPARATE attachment so
   invoice immutability holds. Global default (off), per-customer tri-state
   override, and per-file selection in a new Send dialog. A missing proof at
   issue time stamps inbound_documents.proof_attach_error rather than silently
   dropping, and never blocks the send. Proof filename is a configurable
   template with {INVOICE} {SUPPLIER} {YEAR} {MONTH} {SEQ}/{SEQ:0Nd} tokens.

2. Re-bills & passthrough panel under CRM → Customer, grouped Open/Sent/Paid
   with status derived from the linked invoice lifecycle rather than a
   duplicated column.

3. Cross-add dialog rolling open hours and open re-bills into one invoice,
   symmetric from both entry points. The two stay distinct, contiguous line
   groups — never merged into shared line items.

Migration 169 is additive, hasColumn-guarded and idempotent.

Review (two rounds) closed two concerns:

- Storno stranding: nothing cleared inbound_documents.billed_invoice_id when a
  covering invoice was cancelled, so a Storno'd re-bill showed as Open in the
  new panel while every billing path filters on that column being NULL — the
  supplier cost could never be re-billed. releaseRebillsForCancelledInvoice now
  detaches the linkage on both invoice-cancel paths, with a regression test on
  the issued-cancel path.

- Permission gating: the new controls rendered on data presence alone while
  their endpoints require accounting.view / accounting.manage / customers.edit.
  Now gated at both the query and render layers.

Known follow-up: two cross-add counter queries are gated on a permission their
endpoint does not check (HoursSection.tsx:174, CustomerCrmPanels.tsx:270) —
degrades safely, one line each.
2026-08-03 22:03:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d66425c8ee chore(main): release 3.98.6-beta.0 (#978)
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2026-08-03 12:52:55 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 67592fc569 fix(projects): stop the cockpit offering email controls the API rejects (#976)
Closes #969.

The cockpit's email feed rendered preview/resend/cancel/retry/send-now for every mail, consulting neither the caller's role nor their permissions, producing controls that always failed:

404 - requireOwnedQueuedEmail scopes queued mail through email_queue.event_id AND ownership of that event. CRM document mail carries no event_id; and project ownership does not imply event ownership, so a project the caller owns can hold another admin's event.
403 - preview needs events.view but the four write actions need email.send.

getProjectOverview now stamps each email with an authoritative canAct, mirroring filterOwnedEventIds; created_by is selected only for that check and stripped before the response. The cockpit reads canAct and combines it with email.send. A missing canAct reads as false.

Regression from the GHSA-93x4 fix in #960/#966, which added the ownership middleware.
2026-08-03 14:48:50 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6699855c93 fix(auth): fail closed when the adminAuth roles join errors (#974)
Closes #968.

The roles-join fallback in adminAuth fabricated role_name='super_admin' on ANY database error, so a transient fault (connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout, pool exhaustion) silently granted super_admin for its duration. roleName is the sole discriminator for every ownership check, so this inverted the authorization model rather than failing the request.

Gate the fallback on isMissingRolesSchema(), moved to utils/dbErrors.js and shared with apiTokenAuth. The predicate was also tightened: knex prefixes the failing SQL to err.message and that SQL always names `roles`, so the old /roles/i gate was vacuous and a generic /does not exist/ could accept unrelated faults. Now trusts SQLSTATE 42P01/42703 on Postgres and exact driver phrasing on SQLite.
2026-08-03 14:48:20 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 569ae39acb chore(main): release 3.98.5-beta.0 (#973)
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2026-08-02 19:27:37 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 7c0c0a5b7f fix(security): enforce project ownership on project + project-email routes (GHSA-wrg5, GHSA-93x4) (#960)
* fix(security): enforce project ownership (GHSA-wrg5, GHSA-93x4)

Project routes authorized on generic events.view / events.edit with NO
ownership check, so an editor-like admin could enumerate, read, update and
aggregate projects belonging to other admins' events. The project email
endpoints keyed on an email_queue id alone — any admin with events.view /
email.send could preview, resend, cancel or retry ANY queued mail by walking
ids.

The earlier 'needs a migration, deferred' assessment was wrong in one
direction and right in another: ownership IS derivable transitively via
events.project_id -> events.created_by, but only for projects that already
have a linked event. A brand-new EMPTY project has no derivable owner, which
is exactly where the create -> attach flow starts. So migration 167 adds
projects.created_by (backfilled from the single linked event owner, skipping
ambiguous multi-owner projects) and createProject finally persists the adminId
it was already being passed.

- ownedProjectIds(): union of the stored owner and the transitive path, so
  pre-167 rows and new empty projects both resolve. Reads created_by
  defensively so an instance that hasn't run 167 falls back to the transitive
  rule instead of throwing.
- requireProjectOwnership on detail/update/attach-event/attach-quote/
  attach-contract/overview; list filtered by an id allowlist (empty array
  means 'owns nothing' and must return no rows, hence null-vs-[] care).
- POST /:id/events also validates the INCOMING eventId — owning the project
  is not enough, or an editor could pull a foreign event in and read its
  rolled-up documents via /:id/overview.
- Queued-email routes scoped via email_queue.event_id. CRM document mail has
  event_id NULL and no ownable parent here, so a scoped caller is denied
  rather than guessed into access. 404 (not 403) so it isn't an id oracle.

Note: adminEmail.js:315/332 let any email.view/edit admin archive or delete
any email_queue row — the same class, pre-existing and outside these two
advisories. Left untouched and reported rather than silently widened.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — make the stored project owner authoritative (GHSA-wrg5)

The first predicate union'd 'any linked event I can see' with the stored
owner, which opened two holes:

- A project owned by admin B containing ONE legacy ownerless event became
  readable by every admin — and /:id/overview aggregates B's other events,
  invoices and emails, so a single legacy event exposed the whole project.
- Migration 167 deliberately leaves multi-owner (ambiguous) projects NULL
  rather than guessing an owner. A NULL owner was then treated as
  'everyone's', so exactly those mixed projects became globally accessible.

Now: the stored created_by wins outright, and a project without a usable
stored owner only derives access when EVERY linked event is accessible (and at
least one exists). A created_by pointing at a hard-deleted admin degrades to
'no usable owner' so the project falls back to its events instead of being
locked away — no ON DELETE SET NULL migration needed. A project with neither a
usable owner nor linked events stays super_admin-only: failing closed beats
failing open, and a super_admin can reassign it.

Also returns a knex SUBQUERY rather than a materialised id list, so a large
project count can't hit the driver's bind-parameter limit.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — enforce deal-lineage ownership on project attach (GHSA-wrg5)

requireProjectOwnership vets only the DESTINATION project, while attaching a
quote or contract cascades through linkDealToProject — which re-points every
event the deal produced into that project. An editor could therefore create an
empty project of their own, attach another admin's quote, and pull that admin's
events (plus the invoices, emails and gallery that roll up with them) into a
project they own and can read via /:id/overview. The single-customer guard did
not stand in the way: an unassigned project ADOPTS the deal's customer rather
than rejecting it.

linkDealToProject now refuses to move lineage events the actor cannot own, and
assignDocument cascades BEFORE stamping the document so a refused attach leaves
nothing half-applied (the old order committed the foreign document into the
caller's project and only then declined the cascade). The quote/contract
create+update paths, which reach the same cascade with an arbitrary project_id,
thread their adminId through as well; isSuperAdmin() resolves the role for them
and fails closed when it cannot.

Events are the only ownership signal a deal carries — quotes and contracts have
no created_by in this schema — so a lineage that produced no event still cannot
be attributed. That is a property of the CRM model, noted in the code.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

* docs(security): drop the stale ownership JSDoc left by the rebase (GHSA-wrg5)

Rebasing onto main (which had gained scopeEventsQuery from #957) replayed the
round-1 doc block above round-2's replacement, leaving a comment that describes
the ORIGINAL union rule — "a project is the caller's when … it has at least one
linked event they own" — directly above the code that deliberately no longer
does that. That union is the hole round 2 closed; a comment asserting it is
worse than none.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:24:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3fc6463873 chore(main): release 3.98.4-beta.0 (#971)
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2026-08-02 19:22:22 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 164129b8f5 fix(security): escape brand tokens, block tracker redirects, trim logo diagnostic (GHSA-j347, mw76, 29vm) (#961)
* fix(security): escape brand tokens, block tracker redirects, trim logo diagnostic (GHSA-j347, mw76, 29vm)

GHSA-j347 — buildCachedPayload sanitizes the operator's HTML and THEN runs
applyBrandTokens over the result with a plain String.replace, so any markup in
a token value reached the public origin unfiltered. The default templates
interpolate tokens into text AND into quoted attributes
(<img src="{{brand_logo_url}}" alt="{{company_name}} logo">,
href="mailto:{{support_email}}"), so a value could close the attribute and
inject. Token values are now HTML-escaped on substitution, mirroring
galleryOgService's escapeHtml. sanitizeBrandUrl's case-sensitive literal
'javascript:' check (which 'JavaScript:' walked straight past) is replaced by
an http/https scheme allowlist; relative logo paths are unaffected.

Writer is settings.edit (super_admin only) and the CSP blocks inline script,
so this is defence-in-depth — but sanitize-then-substitute is a real ordering
bug regardless.

GHSA-mw76 — the SSRF decline STANDS: self-hosted operators legitimately point
analytics at private addresses, so connection-time IP blocking would break real
deployments. Fixed only the narrow leak: undici strips
Authorization/Cookie/Proxy-Authorization/Host across a cross-origin redirect,
but umamiAdapter sends a CUSTOM x-umami-api-key header, which would be replayed
verbatim to the redirect target. Both adapters now use redirect: 'error'.

GHSA-29vm — the logo diagnostic echoed absolute storage roots, process.cwd()
and absolute candidate paths. It now reports candidates relative to
<STORAGE>/<CWD_STORAGE>, which answers the same 'which candidate existed'
question. It also still advertised the raw-absolute candidate that GHSA-c7x5
removed from resolveLogoFile, so it was misreporting what the resolver tries —
aligned with the real candidate list.

publicSiteService.test.js expectation updated: an '&' in a company name is now
emitted as '&amp;'. Renders identically; the raw payload string differs.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — stop the remaining logo-path disclosure, mirror the resolver (GHSA-29vm)

- sources[].value was still echoed verbatim. branding_logo_path is stored
  ABSOLUTE by multer, so relativising only resolvedTo and the candidate paths
  left the filesystem layout going out anyway. It is now relativised too.
- Round 1 dropped the raw-absolute candidate on the grounds that GHSA-c7x5
  removed it from resolveLogoFile — but the c7x5 follow-up RE-ADDED it (kept,
  subject to the containment filter, so a legitimate multer path still
  resolves). The diagnostic therefore reported every candidate as missing for
  a contained absolute logo while resolvedTo named the file. It now mirrors the
  resolver, containment filter included.

One deliberate cosmetic divergence, commented in place: for an absolute value
the resolver also tries path.join(root, value-minus-leading-slash), which can
never exist and would re-embed the absolute path this endpoint must stop
echoing. Omitted; every candidate that can actually match is still shown.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — mirror the resolver for root-relative logo paths (GHSA-29vm)

The logo diagnostic skipped the `<STORAGE>/<value>` candidates whenever
path.isAbsolute(value) was true. That test cannot distinguish a multer disk
path from a root-relative URL such as `/custom/logo.png`, and for the URL form
resolveLogoFile.generateCandidates() does try `<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png` and
can resolve it — so the endpoint reported "no source candidate exists" about a
logo that renders fine, and collapsed the configured value to its basename.

The stripped joins are now built unconditionally, exactly as the resolver does.
Disclosure stays closed: every candidate still passes the containment filter and
redact() rewrites survivors to `<STORAGE>/…`, never an absolute host path.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

* fix(security): gate the logo stripped-joins on containment, not isAbsolute (GHSA-29vm)

The previous commit dropped the isAbsolute() gate entirely and regressed
logoDiagnostic's own disclosure assertion: for a genuine multer disk path,
path.join(root, value-minus-leading-slash) yields
`<STORAGE>/tmp/…/storage/custom/logo.png`, and redact() only rewrites the
LEADING root — so the inner absolute path went straight back into the payload.

The right discriminator is not "is this absolute" (which cannot separate a disk
path from a root-relative URL) but "does the value already resolve inside a
storage root". If it does, it is a real disk path, the raw candidate already
covers it, and the stripped join is the double-prefixed junk that can never
exist. If it does not — the `/custom/logo.png` URL form — the stripped join is
exactly what resolveLogoFile resolves, and is shown.

Covered by a new case asserting both halves: the candidate appears for the URL
form, and the payload still contains neither the storage root nor cwd.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:17:17 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e2ce95ee48 fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697) (#957)
* fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697)

Migration 081 documents the intent — 'the token's effective permissions are
the intersection of the user's role permissions and the token's own scope
flags' — but it was never implemented.

- apiTokenAuth selected only id/username/email/role_id, so req.admin.roleName
  was undefined. Every ownership helper keys on roleName, so the v1 surface
  could not tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer. Now joins roles and
  emits the same req.admin shape adminAuth does, including the
  roles-table-missing upgrade fallback.
- No v1 route applied any ownership predicate: GET /events listed every event
  on the instance, and GET /events/:id/share-link returned ANY event's
  share_token — the gallery access credential, same class as GHSA-rh8r.
  List is now scoped via a new scopeEventsQuery helper; the three :id routes
  (detail, photo upload, share-link) use the existing requireEventOwnership.

Not a breaking change: tokens are minted by super_admins, who bypass
ownership. It closes the case where a token's owner is later demoted —
userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlived the
demotion with full read of every gallery's share token.

events.category.test.js stubbed apiTokenAuth without roleName; giving the
stub super_admin keeps requireEventOwnership from issuing a DB query and
desyncing that suite's sequenced dbMock.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — intersect v1 token scopes with role permissions (GHSA-9697)

Ownership scoping alone left half the documented control missing. Migration
081 defines a token's effective permissions as the INTERSECTION of the owner's
role permissions and the token's scope flags; requireApiScope only ever checked
the scope half. A token minted while its owner was super_admin therefore kept
write access after the owner was demoted to viewer — userManagementService
never touches api_tokens, so the token outlives the demotion, and ownership
scoping does not help because the demoted owner still owns their events.

Adds requirePermission to all six v1 routes (events.create on create,
events.view on the reads, photos.upload on upload). It keys on req.admin.id,
which apiTokenAuth already populates.

The two existing v1 suites mock the database, so a real permission lookup
500s — they now mock the permissions middleware as pass-through, matching how
they already mock apiTokenAuth. Those suites cover route logic; the
intersection is pinned by the new v1TokenPermissions suite.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — fail closed on the roles-join fallback (GHSA-9697)

The round-2 fix loaded the token owner's role so the v1 ownership checks could
tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer, and mirrored adminAuth's
roles-table-missing fallback. That fallback assigns role_name = 'super_admin',
and the catch around it was unconditional — so ANY failure of the joined query
(connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout) elevated the token owner to
super_admin as long as the simpler fallback query then succeeded. A restricted
owner could ride that into listing, reading and share-tokening every event on
the instance, which is the exact hole GHSA-9697 closes.

The fallback is now reached only for an error that genuinely names a missing
roles table/column (PG 42P01/42703 or the SQLite/MySQL wording); anything else
propagates to the 500 handler.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:17:14 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1b4e5fee3e fix(security): bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (GHSA-2qf9, pgmp, r794) (#959)
* fix(security): bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (GHSA-2qf9, pgmp, r794)

GHSA-2qf9 — emailIntakeService downloaded, parsed and persisted every message
with no size, attachment-count or attachment-byte limit, reachable
unauthenticated by anyone who can email the operator's mailbox:
- fetch the envelope with `size` (same cheap pass) and refuse an oversized
  message BEFORE downloading its source;
- cap attachment count and cumulative attachment bytes;
- limits env-overridable, defaults generous for real supplier invoices.

The teeth were in the dedup key. received_emails.message_id is varchar(512)
UNIQUE, and the failure path wrote `err-<uid>-<Date.now()>`, which can never
match the envelope-derived messageId the dedup pass compares against — so an
oversized (or overlong-Message-ID) mail was re-downloaded every poll forever,
and an OOM-kill/restart just resumed the loop. Size-skips are now recorded
under the REAL message id, and overlong ids collapse to a stable sha256 key
that always fits the column.

GHSA-pgmp / r794 — new sanitizeForLog() util (key-name deny-set, recursive,
cycle-safe) applied to the three request-body log sites in adminEvents/crud.js,
plus sanitizeValidationErrors() because express-validator's errors.array()
embeds the SUBMITTED value per field — a rejected plaintext password was still
logged. Scope is wider than filed: the update path also logged
client_password_hash and a LIVE client_share_token bearer credential.

Also: the one-time setup token was logged at warn AND printed to stdout on
every first boot, putting a live first-admin credential in combined.log,
security.log and `docker logs`. It is now written to the 0600 token file and
only surfaced when that write fails — the last-resort path it existed for.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — repair the first-run token recovery flow (GHSA-r794)

Two regressions from keeping the setup token out of the logs.

1. server.js decided whether to print the token by calling existsSync() on the
   candidate path. That answers a different question than "did the write
   succeed": a stale, read-only or directory-shaped SETUP_TOKEN reports as
   present, so the banner suppressed the live token and pointed the operator at
   content that is not it — leaving the current token only in combined.log
   under default production logging. setupService now records the path the
   write actually produced and exposes it via writtenSetupTokenFile().

2. The setup screen, its EN/DE strings, README, SIMPLE_SETUP and .env.example
   all still told first-time users to run
   `docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`. On the normal path
   that command now returns a path banner and no credential, so the documented
   browser-first onboarding could not be completed. They now point at
   `docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN`, with the log
   fallback described as what it is — the failure path.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:17:11 +02:00
Paul Nothaft da855cfef9 fix(security): scope dashboard stats/analytics/activity to the caller's events (GHSA-c2jj, gqx7, jhcf) (#958)
* fix(security): scope dashboard endpoints to the caller's events (GHSA-c2jj, gqx7, jhcf)

/dashboard/stats, /analytics and /activity are gated only by analytics.view,
which the editor role holds — but the events LIST restricts editors to their
own rows (adminEvents/crud.js: roleName === 'editor' -> created_by =
admin.id). So an editor saw instance-wide totals, and via /analytics
topGalleries other admins' gallery NAMES and SLUGS (the public gallery URL
component), for events invisible to them everywhere else.

- stats: all 10 aggregates scoped (events by id, photos/access_logs by
  event_id).
- analytics: all 8 series/aggregates scoped, including topGalleries. The
  external tracker device breakdown reports instance-wide data with no event
  filter, so a scoped caller falls through to the access_logs heuristic
  instead, which IS scoped.
- activity: feed scoped. activity_logs.event_id is nullable and the join is a
  leftJoin, so system-level rows (logins, settings changes) are deliberately
  excluded for a scoped caller — those are precisely the cross-admin actions
  the advisory is about.

Scoping keys on 'editor' to mirror the events list exactly, so the admin
role's dashboard is unchanged. filterOwnedEventIds uses the broader
'!== super_admin' rule; the two conventions disagree in this codebase and
matching the list is the no-regression choice.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — fix activity misattribution, scope via subquery (GHSA-jhcf, c2jj, gqx7)

- expenseService passed adminId as logActivity's THIRD positional parameter,
  which is eventId — so admin ids were being written into
  activity_logs.event_id. The /activity scoping filter trusts that column, and
  admin/event id sequences overlap, so a foreign admin's expense metadata could
  surface under an editor's event. All 11 calls now pass null for eventId and
  the admin as the actor, which is what they meant.
- Dashboard scoping now uses a SUBQUERY instead of pluck()+whereIn. An editor
  owning more events than the driver's bind-parameter limit (~999 SQLite,
  65535 Postgres) would have turned all three endpoints into 500s once each id
  became a placeholder; below the limit it still re-sent the full list for each
  of the ~10 aggregates per request.

Note: two billInboundNow() calls also end in ', adminId)' but have an unrelated
signature — verified untouched.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — correct legacy accounting activity rows (GHSA-jhcf)

expenseService called logActivity(type, metadata, adminId), but logActivity's
third positional parameter is eventId. Every expense / incoming-invoice entry
therefore stored the ACTING ADMIN'S ID in activity_logs.event_id.

Round 2 scoped the activity feed with
`WHERE activity_logs.event_id IN (SELECT id FROM events WHERE created_by = me)`,
which does nothing about the rows already on disk. Admin ids and event ids are
small integers from the same range, so on any upgraded instance an editor who
owns the event whose id happens to equal another admin's id is served that
admin's accounting activity, verbatim metadata included — GHSA-jhcf, still
live. Migration 168 re-attributes those rows (event_id holds exactly the actor
id that was lost) and then clears event_id so the scope predicate can no longer
match them. All ten activity types are emitted by expenseService and nothing
else, so no row with a genuine event_id is touched.

Also: the round-2 rewrite passed `{ type: 'admin', id: adminId }`
unconditionally, which stored actor_type='admin' with a null id for the
automated mailbox intake (emailIntakeService calls recordInboundDocument with
no adminId). adminActor() restores 'system' attribution for those.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:17:08 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0d4c30884e fix(security): backup/restore hardening — public-dir DB dump, restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest keying (#956)
* fix(security): stop caller-chosen database backup destination (GHSA-jw8m)

POST /api/admin/database-backup/backup forwarded req.body straight into
databaseBackupService.backup(), which merges options over config:
  const { destinationPath = '/backup/database', ... } = { ...config, ...options }

destinationPath is not a persistable setting — the /config allowlist only
accepts database_backup_* keys — so the request body was its only source.
The built-in `admin` role holds backup.create but neither settings.edit nor
backup.restore, so it could aim a full DB dump (admin bcrypt hashes, gallery
password hashes, encrypted SMTP creds) at the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
(server.js mounts it with no auth middleware) and then fetch it
unauthenticated. Filed low; it is a privilege escalation to unauthenticated
disclosure.

Forward only the real knobs, and only when present so absent keys can't
override config defaults via spread.

* fix(security): backup/restore hardening — restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest checksum keying (GHSA-fw4c, h652, hgp8)

- adminRestore /validate + /start: constrain caller-supplied source and
  manifestPath to the operator-configured backup roots — the SAME set the
  restore wizard discovers from — so disaster recovery from a rescued mount
  still works, with RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS as an escape hatch (GHSA-fw4c).
- restoreService.decompressFile: bound the EXPANDED size and abort the
  pipeline when exceeded; default 50 GB, RESTORE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES
  overrides (GHSA-h652).
- backupManifest: BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY upgrades new manifests to a keyed
  HMAC (GHSA-hgp8). Deliberately opt-in and verify-if-present — the key
  cannot live in the database because the database is inside the backup, so
  a mandatory HMAC would lock operators out of the exact disaster-recovery
  case this exists for.

Also fixes a pre-existing bug found while testing hgp8: the checksum passed
Object.keys().sort() as JSON.stringify's second argument, which is an array
REPLACER (a property allowlist applied at every depth), not a key sorter. All
nested keys — path, size, per-file checksum — were dropped before hashing, so
the file list sat outside the integrity check entirely and a manifest path
could be rewritten to ../../etc/passwd without disturbing the digest. Now
hashes a recursively-canonicalized copy, with the legacy serialization
accepted on validation so existing backups stay restorable.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — unbreak the restore wizard, share checksum verification, guard downgrades

- adminRestore: `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE ('local'|'s3'|'upload'),
  not a path — restoreService branches on those literals. The containment
  check treated it as a path, so path.resolve('local') fell outside the
  backup roots and BOTH /validate and /start returned 400, blocking every
  normal restore. Type tokens are now excluded from the path check.
- backupManifest: extracted verifyManifestChecksum() as the single source of
  truth for the legacy/keyed fallbacks. restoreService.performPreRestoreValidation
  recomputed the digest itself with the default canonical+keyed settings,
  which rejected EVERY backup written before this batch. It now delegates.
- backupManifest: guard the algorithm downgrade — with a key configured, an
  attacker able to rewrite the backup store could strip checksum_algorithm,
  edit the manifest and recompute a plain SHA-256 that verified. Opt-in via
  BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED so pre-key backups keep restoring by default.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — close two manifest-verification fail-opens (GHSA-hgp8)

verifyManifestChecksum returned valid for a manifest with no
verification.total_checksum at all, and restoreService only called it when
that field was present. Deleting the field was therefore a complete bypass of
the keying work: no digest check, no downgrade guard, no
BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED. Every manifest this codebase writes stamps the
field, so an absent one now fails validation, and the call site invokes the
verifier unconditionally.

Second fail-open: the strict-mode rejection of an unkeyed manifest was gated on
`&& key`, so with BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED=true and no BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY
configured a plain SHA-256 manifest sailed through. Strict mode is a statement
about the operator's manifests, not about the host — it is exactly the fresh
disaster-recovery box that lacks the secret. The rejection no longer depends on
a key being present.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:17:05 +02:00
Paul Nothaft acd6b453d1 chore(main): release 3.98.3-beta.0 (#954)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
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2026-08-02 20:25:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1c8f7d58a8 fix(security): redact gallery share tokens from analytics tracking (GHSA-7m6c) (#952)
* fix(security): redact gallery share tokens from analytics page-view tracking (GHSA-7m6c)

* fix(security): codex round-1 — actually disable raw auto-tracking (GHSA-7m6c)

The previous patch was inert: App.tsx passed autoTrack:true (so Umami's
data-auto-track=false was never set) and the sanitized trackPageView had no
caller (useAnalytics sits outside <Router>), so the raw token URL still hit
the collector.

- Umami: drop autoTrack:true → data-auto-track=false; page views now come
  from a sanitized manual tracker.
- Rybbit: its initial-load auto pageview can't be intercepted client-side, so
  use native data-mask-patterns=['/gallery/**'] to strip the token on every
  auto-tracked view; skip manual tracking for it to avoid double counting.
- Mount <AnalyticsRouteTracker/> INSIDE <Router> so manual tracking runs.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:38:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c2ce12c039 fix(security): authz/ownership gaps (token binding, auth revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging) (#950)
* fix(security): close authz/ownership gaps (secure-download binding, photo-auth+logout revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging)

* fix(security): codex round-1 — complete admin-token invalidation + preserve foreign assignments

- photoAuth: mirror adminAuth's active-admin lookup + iat<password_changed_at
  check in the admin branch, so a deactivated admin or a pre-password-change
  token can no longer fetch every photo (GHSA-x55x was only revoke+cutoff).
- adminAuth logout: revoke req.token (the token adminAuth authenticated with,
  cookie OR header) instead of header-only, and clear the auth cookie — a
  cookie-based logout previously left the JWT live (GHSA-cjqh).
- adminCustomers PUT /:id/events: preserve the customer's existing
  assignments to events the caller does NOT own, so a restricted admin can't
  revoke another admin's customer-event links via full-list replacement.

* fix(security): codex round-2 — don't 403 legit restricted-admin assignment edits

The Manage-galleries dialog submits the full initial assignment list, so a
restricted admin editing a customer that already has a foreign assignment hit
the denied.length 403 before the preservation logic ran. Reject only
NEWLY-supplied foreign/nonexistent ids; retain foreign ids the customer is
already assigned to (they can't be added or removed by a non-owner).

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:38:24 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8f91c2ca99 fix(security): neutralize spreadsheet formulas in all CSV/export cell-writers (CSV injection cluster) (#948)
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:37:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9050affd8d fix(security): unauth share_token leak (HIGH) + restore path-traversal, logo file-read, branding path keys (#946)
* fix(security): stop unauth share_token leak + block restore path-traversal, logo-path file read, branding path keys

* test: update resolveLogoFile for the c7x5 containment (reject outside-storage absolute paths, keep inside)

* fix(security): codex round-1 — escape LIKE wildcards in share-link resolve, keep in-storage absolute logos, guard restore verification

- shareLinkService: escape %/_ in the link_partial LIKE fallback so an
  anonymous /resolve/____… wildcard can't match an arbitrary share_link and
  leak its bearer token (reopened GHSA-rh8r). Explicit ESCAPE for SQLite.
- resolveLogoFile: re-add the raw absolute candidate but keep it subject to
  the storage-root containment filter (GHSA-c7x5) so legit in-storage
  absolute logos resolve while /etc/passwd stays rejected.
- restoreService: apply the same pathEscapes guard in post-restore
  verification so a skipped traversal entry isn't fs.access'd/hashed.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:37:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8cbb37310b chore(main): release 3.98.2-beta.0 (#945)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
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2026-08-01 17:37:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 82d68711cf fix(security): close authorization/ownership gaps (token scope, mass-assignment, category hero, project docs) (#943)
* fix(security): close authorization/ownership gaps (token scope, mass-assignment, category hero, project docs)

* fix(security): block archive columns in event mass-assignment per review

* fix(security): comprehensive event mass-assignment denylist + deal-cascade cross-domain permission gate (codex r2)

* fix(security): case-insensitive complete event denylist + project_id + empty-update no-op (codex r3)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:27 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b7005692b3 fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) (#941)
* fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster)

* fix(security): harden SSRF fix per review (rsync backup path, S3 config-save, webhook transient-DNS retry)

* fix(security): S3 endpoint validation on any endpoint update + no-connect on unresolved webhook host (codex r2)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:21 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8a87c9274b fix(security): block guest access to hidden/client-only photos across bulk + secure routes (#939)
* fix(security): block guest access to hidden/client-only photos across bulk + secure routes

* fix(security): harden hidden-photo fix per review (stale ZIP cache, legacy token mint, SQLite bool, client rebuild)

* fix(security): invalidate ZIP cache on photo visibility/category change (codex r2)

* fix(security): recheck photo visibility at signed/secure serve time (TOCTOU) + invalidate ZIP on client visibility change (codex r3)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fe615c82e4 fix(security): bump sanitize-html to 2.17.5 (CVE-2026-53606) (#937)
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cf37ad5389 chore(main): release 3.98.1-beta.0 (#935)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
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2026-08-01 10:32:31 +00:00
Paul Nothaft defeae9634 fix(uploads): prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes (#931) (#933)
* fix(uploads): prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes (#931)

* test: pin the suffixed photo filename format in the NFD pipeline suite (#931)

* test: make the suffix-uniqueness check deterministic-in-practice (#931)

* fix(uploads): widen the anti-collision suffix to 48 bits (#931)

* fix(uploads): hide staging files from list() + share one watermark limiter process-wide (#931)

* fix(uploads): reclaim orphaned staging files + revalidate watermark settings in queued jobs (#931)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 12:29:12 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2581f4af70 chore(main): release 3.98.0-beta.0 (#930)
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2026-07-31 09:56:00 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3bcded78a4 feat(gallery): multi-select feedback filters + sort direction controls (#889) (#929)
* feat(gallery): multi-select feedback filters + sort direction controls (#889)

* fix(gallery): keep mobile sidebar open while combining feedback filters (#889)

* fix(gallery): generic sort icon when direction is uncontrolled (#889)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-31 08:57:08 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 08ff9f20e7 feat(gallery): per-event toggle to hide the logo on the password page (#894) (#928)
* feat(gallery): per-event toggle to hide the logo on the password page (#894)

* fix(admin): harden login_logo_visible coercion for SQLite + string booleans (#894)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-31 08:56:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 926a4a540d feat(gallery): mouse-wheel zoom at cursor in the lightbox (#885) (#927)
* feat(gallery): mouse-wheel zoom at cursor in the lightbox (#885)

* fix(gallery): chain rapid wheel events synchronously + handle page-mode deltas (#885)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-31 08:56:29 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 39d397c086 chore(main): release 3.97.6-beta.0 (#926)
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2026-07-30 12:28:18 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 03087c798c fix(security): close GHSA-g94x (cross-gallery photo read) + GHSA-pv6w (admin DB export) (#924)
* fix(security): close two access-control advisories (GHSA-g94x, GHSA-pv6w)

GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f (HIGH) — the secure-image VIEW route
(/secure-images/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token) validated only the token
signature and took the gallery/photo from the URL, so a token minted on
any PUBLIC gallery read every other gallery's photos with no password
(its download sibling has verifyGalleryAccess; the view route can't —
it serves via <img src> with no header). Bind the token to its scope
instead: the URL photoId must equal the token's minted photoId (photos
belong to exactly one gallery, and minting is gallery-scoped), and the
gallery embedded in the token's sessionId must equal the URL gallery.

GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v (MEDIUM) — GET /admin/backup/picpeak/export dumps
every table unredacted (bcrypt hashes, 2FA, SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/webhook/S3
secrets) and was gated only by backup.create, which the built-in admin
role holds. Gate it behind super_admin, matching the restore side
(backup.restore, already admin-denied) and the masked config APIs.

Regression tests pin both: cross-gallery token reads 403 (photo and
gallery checks), backup export 403 for admin / passes for super_admin.

* test: stub requireSuperAdmin in the backup masking mock

adminBackup now calls requireSuperAdmin() at load (GHSA-pv6w export
gate), and backupSecretMasking mocks the permissions module — add the
new function to the mock so the module loads.

* fix(security): review follow-ups on the export gate (GHSA-pv6w)

- test: place the mocked export in its own mkdtemp dir. The route
  recursively deletes path.dirname(filePath) after download, so a stub
  in bare os.tmpdir() made the super_admin test wipe the whole temp
  root — other jest workers' DB files included (latent CI flake).
- ui: hide PicpeakExportCard from non-super_admins. The role keeps
  settings.view + backup.create, so after the gate its Download button
  always 403'd with a generic toast; gate the card on role super_admin
  to match the endpoint.

* fix(security): keep the token-mismatch audit values within varchar(20) (GHSA-g94x review)

image_access_logs.access_type is varchar(20) (migration 038), but
'token_gallery_mismatch' is 22 chars — on Postgres the audit write
threw value-too-long and logImageAccess swallowed it, so the security
event went unrecorded (the 403 still fired; log is best-effort). Shorten
to 'photo_mismatch' / 'gallery_mismatch' (14/16).

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 14:24:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 342dde3589 chore(main): release 3.97.5-beta.0 (#922)
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2026-07-30 10:19:02 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 252475fce2 fix(admin): code-review follow-ups on #910/#916 (MIME resolver + expiry reactivity) (#921)
* fix(admin): own-property lookup in the extension MIME map (#908 review round)

A client-controlled filename ending in .constructor / .__proto__ /
.toString made EXTENSION_TO_MIME[ext] return an inherited Object.prototype
member (truthy), and the downstream extMime.startsWith threw —
a permanent 500 on the admin view for that photo instead of the JPEG /
mp4 fallback. hasOwnProperty-gated now; test pins both a .constructor
image and a .__proto__ video.

* fix(admin): drop already-expired events from the dashboard card (#909 review round)

The expiring-soon card ran Math.max(1, ceil(delta)), so an event that
expired while the dashboard sat open (its query isn't polled) showed
'1 day left' indefinitely from the stale cached row. Expired rows are
now filtered out before render; the delta is therefore always positive
and the clamp is gone.

* fix(admin): honor safe stored image MIME for auto-imported formats (#908 review round 2)

My previous round made the image side map-only to dodge the migration
039 image/jpeg backfill and image/svg+xml — but that regressed the S3
auto-importer (STORAGE_AUTO_IMPORT), which stores correct types for
avif/bmp/tiff/heic whose extensions aren't in EXTENSION_TO_MIME. Those
now served as image/jpeg (JPEG-labelled non-JPEG bytes).

Precedence is now mapped-extension (still corrects the 039 backfill on
PNGs) -> stored MIME IF in a safe raster allowlist (avif/bmp/tiff/heic
+ the mapped ones) -> image/jpeg. Allowlist, not a regex: image/svg+xml
stays excluded (scriptable inline). Tests pin avif preserved and svg
degraded to jpeg.

* fix(admin): refresh expiry status live at the boundary (#909 review round 2)

Two review findings on the admin expiry surfaces:

- The dashboard 'expiring soon' card, list badges, and detail banner are
  all computed inline from Date.now() at render, so a page left open
  across an event's expiry kept showing 'active'/'1 day left' until an
  unrelated render — which for editor/viewer roles (no health poll)
  never happens.
- My round-1 client-side filter on the dashboard desynced the visible
  list from the cached total/stat ('no events expiring' beside 'view
  all N').

Both are fixed by new useExpiryRefresh: it fires once at the soonest
future expiry (setTimeout, overflow-guarded). The dashboard refetches
its expiring + stats queries — the backend already excludes expired
events, so rows/total/stats come back consistent (filter removed). The
list and detail pages bump a tick so the inline badges recompute. Hooks
are placed above the loading early-returns (rules-of-hooks is disabled
in eslint, so this was a latent crash otherwise).

* fix(admin): allow any header-safe raster MIME, deny svg/xml (#908 review round 3)

The round-2 hand-listed Set kept missing formats the S3 auto-importer
stores (apng/ico/jxl beyond avif/bmp/tiff). Replace it with a regex:
honor image/<token> EXCEPT the scriptable svg / *+xml family. Covers
every current and future raster type in one rule while still blocking
inline-scriptable svg and header injection. Tests pin apng + x-icon
preserved, svg still degraded to jpeg.

* fix(admin): expiry-refresh precision + filtered refetch (#909 review round 3)

Three refinements to round-2's live-expiry work:

- useExpiryRefresh now re-arms past setTimeout's ~24.8-day overflow
  limit (capped wake-up that re-evaluates) instead of dropping the timer,
  so a page mounted for weeks still updates.
- The dashboard requests the expiring list ordered by expires_at asc, so
  the five shown rows ARE the soonest to expire — the timer schedules
  against the true next boundary even when >5 events are expiring
  (getEvents gains optional sortBy/sortOrder; backend already whitelists
  expires_at).
- EventsListPage refetches instead of only re-rendering at the boundary:
  under the 'expiring' filter the backend drops expired rows, so a plain
  tick would leave a stale 'Expired' row + total. refetch keeps rows and
  totals correct under every filter.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 12:14:41 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fbc18a386b ci: batch stable releases into one daily version (#919)
* ci: batch stable releases into one daily version

The stable release PR was auto-merged the instant it went green, so a
day with N bugfixes produced N patch releases (3.45.8 AND 3.45.9 on
2026-07-29 alone) — N upgrade notifications for stable users and N
full Docker build cycles.

Fixes now accumulate in release-please's rolling release PR and are
cut as ONE version per day by release-stable-daily.yml (18:00 UTC).
Approval/merge mechanics are unchanged from the inline step (#719):
approve as github-actions[bot], auto-merge as the PAT so the merge
triggers the tag-cutting run.

- Urgent fix? workflow_dispatch the daily job or merge the release PR
  by hand — the schedule is a default, not a gate.
- Beta is untouched: instant beta releases are load-bearing for
  same-day reporter verification.
- schedule only fires from the default branch; the stable copy of the
  new workflow is inert and exists to keep branches in sync.

* ci: harden the daily stable-release cut (review round)

- P1: the daily job runs on a schedule, so a fork PR can spoof the head
  branch name 'release-please--branches--stable' — gh --head matches the
  name only. Pin --base stable AND require isCrossRepository == false so
  a fork PR can never be approved+auto-merged with the release PAT.
- P2: this scheduled job is now the ONLY automatic stable cut, so the
  auto-merge-enable step no longer swallows failures (|| true); it fails
  loudly and verifies autoMergeRequest is actually set. A silently
  expired PAT would otherwise stop releases while the workflow stays
  green. Approve stays tolerant (re-approval can return non-zero).

* ci: accept an immediately-merged release PR as success (review round 2)

gh pr merge --auto merges immediately when required checks are already
green — the normal 18:00 case, since fixes land hours earlier and CI
passes. The autoMergeRequest verify then saw null on a MERGED PR and
failed the job on the happy path. Now: MERGED = success, pending
auto-merge = success, still-open-with-no-auto-merge = real failure.

* ci: read release-PR state + auto-merge in one snapshot (review round 3)

Two separate gh pr view calls raced: a pending auto-merge completing
between them made the first read OPEN and the second read null on the
now-merged PR, failing the job on a successful release. Fetch state and
autoMergeRequest together.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 12:14:21 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 55b344b531 chore(main): release 3.97.4-beta.0 (#918)
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2026-07-29 20:26:14 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 487f55f2d9 fix(admin): stop marking events expired up to 24h early (#909) (#916)
differenceInDays truncates to whole days, so an event expiring in a few
hours returned 0 and three admin surfaces treated it as gone:

- EventsListPage: status chip said 'Expired' (days <= 0) while the
  public gallery — which compares real timestamps — correctly showed
  'expires in X hours'. This is the reporter's exact symptom.
- EventDetailsPage: same isExpired math on the detail view.
- AdminDashboard: the expiring-soon card showed '0 days left' on the
  final day.

Expired is now gated on the actual timestamp (expires_at <= now), and
the countdown chips use ceiling days so the last day reads '1 day
left' instead of flipping to Expired/0.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 22:23:55 +02:00
Paul Nothaft aca3c8e4bc fix(admin): expose view/download counters in the admin photos list (#895 follow-up) (#914)
* fix(admin): expose view/download counters in the admin photos list (#895 follow-up)

st-ivan's re-test after #904: statistics panel and event summary now
agree, but the per-image Engagement column still shows 0. Root cause:
the admin photos LIST endpoint maps rows to an explicit response object
that includes like/comment/rating/favorite counts but never included
view_count or download_count — the grid reads photo.view_count ?? 0,
so the column showed 0 regardless of what the DB counted. This mapper,
not stale data, is also why per-image downloads always displayed 0 in
the original report.

Suite extended with a list-endpoint assertion (beacon + download, then
the admin list reflects 1/1 and untouched photos 0/0). The skip test now
neutralizes the route's background pre-zip build, whose async ENOENT
against the intentionally missing file could land mid-suite.

* test: widen the fire-and-forget settle window (#895 follow-up)

The 100ms settle was marginal on loaded CI runners — the counter
increments are deliberately fire-and-forget, and the 909 PRs flaked on
exactly these assertions. 400ms keeps the suite fast while giving slow
runners room.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 22:23:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 888150ba2d chore(main): release 3.97.3-beta.0 (#913)
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2026-07-29 19:48:17 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 67c56c5b61 fix(admin): serve videos with their real MIME type in the admin photo view (#908) (#910)
* fix(admin): serve videos with their real MIME type in the admin photo view (#908)

The admin view route built Content-Type from the filename extension —
image/<ext> — which is invalid for videos (image/mp4). The admin player
fetches this URL into a blob that inherits the type, and browsers
refuse to play a <video> blob labeled image/*: blank/grey preview,
while download (which already uses photo.mime_type) worked fine.

Stored mime_type now wins; videos without one fall back to video/mp4,
images to the extension, and extensionless files to image/jpeg instead
of the equally invalid bare 'image/'.

Also unrefs chunkedUploadService's module-level hourly cleanup interval:
it kept Jest from exiting for any suite requiring adminPhotos (it's why
adminPhotos.reference sits on the CI ignore list). Production behavior
unchanged — the HTTP listener keeps the process alive.

New adminPhotoContentType suite pins all four MIME cases.

* fix(admin): harden admin photo Content-Type resolution (#908 review round)

External review findings, all verified:

- The header is now ALWAYS image/* or video/*. photos.mime_type is
  never echoed verbatim unless it is a video/ type — the chunked-upload
  path stores the client-sent MIME unvalidated, so a stored text/html
  served inline under the app origin was a same-origin XSS hazard.
- MIME-less videos map from the extension via the shared
  EXTENSION_TO_MIME (.mov → video/quicktime, .webm → video/webm)
  instead of a blanket video/mp4 that would mislabel them.
- Images ignore the stored MIME entirely: migration 039 backfilled
  image/jpeg onto every legacy row (PNGs included), so trusting it
  would regress previously-correct extension-derived types. Extension
  wins, normalized (jpg → image/jpeg).

Suite extended to 8 MIME cases including the XSS guard and the
039-backfill immunity.

* fix(admin): validate stored video MIME as a full header-safe token (#908 review round 2)

A prefix check let malformed client-stored values through:
'video/mp4\r\nX: y' makes res.setHeader throw ERR_INVALID_CHAR — a
permanent 500 for that photo — and a bare 'video/' is an invalid type.
Strict /^video\/[\w.+-]+$/ now gates the stored value; anything else
falls back to the extension map. Two new tests pin both shapes.

* fix(admin): map-only image Content-Type — no raw extension interpolation (#908 review round 3)

image/${ext} could synthesize image/svg+xml (scriptable when served
inline) or header-invalid values from client-controlled chunked-upload
filenames. The shared EXTENSION_TO_MIME map is now the allowlist on the
image side too; unmapped extensions serve as image/jpeg — browsers
sniff image bytes in img/blob contexts, so a mislabel is harmless where
an injected type is not.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 21:32:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1ee7fe7336 chore(main): release 3.97.2-beta.0 (#906)
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2026-07-29 16:02:10 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 78116e2e8b fix(analytics): make per-photo view/download counters actually count (#895) (#904)
* fix(analytics): make per-photo view/download counters actually count (#895)

Three stacked defects behind 'per-image stats stay 0':

- photos.view_count had NO writer anywhere — the admin IMAGES table and
  photo viewer display it, so it was permanently 0. It now increments
  when the full-size photo or its preview tier is served, excluding the
  slideshow kiosk (migration 138 design) and follow-up video Range
  requests (seeks are not views). Fire-and-forget so analytics can
  never fail the byte-serving path.
- Zip downloads (download-all, presigned download-all,
  download-selected) never incremented per-photo download_count — only
  single-photo downloads did, so zip-heavy galleries showed 0 forever.
  The zip routes now bump exactly the photos that went into the archive
  (the prebuilt-zip path mirrors the archive builders' category filter).
- Every admin surface used a different definition of 'downloads', which
  is the reporter's 46 vs 45 vs 0: event details counted only
  action='download' (no zips at all), the dashboard counted
  download+download_all but silently EXCLUDED download_selected and
  download_all_presigned. All queries now share one action set:
  download, download_all, download_all_presigned, download_selected.

New photoEngagementCounters suite pins all of it (7 tests).

* fix(analytics): count views via an explicit lightbox beacon (#895 review round)

External review flagged that request-level view counting is wrong in
both directions: the lightbox preloads prev/next neighbours (3 fetches
per open) while a preloaded neighbour promoted by a swipe is never
re-fetched (#505 keeps the DOM node), and enhanced/maximum galleries
never hit /photo at all (bytes come from /api/secure-images).

- Views now count via POST /:slug/photo/:photoId/view, fired by the
  lightbox exactly when a photo becomes the visible slide; the
  serving-route increments are removed. Covers protected galleries and
  the preview tier uniformly; slideshow kiosk stays excluded.
- bumpEventDownloadCounts mirrors downloadZipService._build (ALL event
  photos) — the category filter mismatched the prebuilt zip's actual
  contents. (That the builder ignores per-category allow_downloads is a
  separate pre-existing issue.)
- Zip loops count only successfully appended entries, with a pre-append
  storage stat: a lazy stream's async error bypassed the per-photo
  catch and hung the whole response — pre-existing bug, now fixed.

Suite extended to 9 tests (beacon semantics, serve-does-not-count,
skipped-entry exclusion).

* fix(analytics): fire the view beacon from the premium lightbox too (#895 review round 2)

gallery-premium events use yet-another-react-lightbox inside
GalleryPremiumLayout instead of PhotoLightbox, so the layout never
counted views. yarl's on.view fires on open and on every slide change —
identical semantics to the PhotoLightbox beacon.

Also documents the accepted prebuilt-zip approximation: _build can skip
entries whose watermark step fails and still publish the archive;
counting those exactly would need a persisted zip manifest.

* perf(analytics): skip the per-entry zip preflight on S3 (#895 review round 3)

The pre-append source check exists for LocalFs's lazy createReadStream
(async error would kill the whole zip response). S3's get() awaits
GetObject and rejects inside the loop's try/catch on a missing key, so
a HEAD per entry was a redundant serial round trip — 500 extra HEADs
on a 500-photo zip.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 17:58:54 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5171105938 chore(main): release 3.97.1-beta.0 (#901)
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2026-07-29 10:40:56 +00:00
Paul Nothaft d9ad982373 fix(tests): raise migration-boot hook timeout pins to the 120s default (#900)
The 3.97.0-beta.0 release PR (#899) failed its backend Tests job on
slideshowPublic.test.js: bootCrmDb's full migration chain crossed the
suite's explicit 30s beforeAll timeout argument on a slow runner. #860
raised the config default and the jest.setTimeout pins to 120s, but
hook-ARGUMENT pins override the config default and were left behind —
same time-bomb, different syntax.

Every beforeAll that boots the migration chain and pinned 30s/60s is
raised to 120000 (16 suites). Untouched on purpose: the three suites
whose pinned hooks don't run migrations (webhookDelivery,
imageProcessor.storage, storageBackend) and publicQuotes' 30s pin on
the rate-limit lockout test — neither grows with the migration chain.

No test logic changed.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 12:38:26 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 564e816bec chore(main): release 3.97.0-beta.0 (#899)
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2026-07-29 09:46:14 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 6a048d08bd feat(feedback): let guests remove their star rating (#884) (#893)
* feat(feedback): let guests remove their star rating (#884)

Clicking your current rating again clears it. rating: 0 is the wire
contract: the validator now accepts 0, and the service deletes the
guest's rating row (instead of storing a 0 that would drag the photo
average down) and recalculates photo stats. The lightbox stars send 0
on a same-star click; PhotoRating already did, but the backend rejected
it with a 400 until now.

* fix(feedback): harden the rating-clear path (#884 review round)

External review follow-ups: numerically normalize the clear sentinel so
a numeric-string "0" can't slip into the update/insert paths (validator
now also toInt()s), delete the full guest-scoped rating set on clear so
racy duplicate rows can't survive in the average (same defense as the
reaction path), and refresh the visible average/count after the
identity-modal submit path like the direct paths do.

* fix(feedback): round-2 review fixes for rating clear (#884)

- Clear sentinel matches only an explicit 0 / "0" — malformed input
  (undefined, NaN, garbage strings) can no longer delete a rating.
- Lightbox survives the photo list shrinking while open (clearing your
  rating under the Rated filter drops the photo on refetch): index is
  re-anchored and the lightbox closes when the list empties, instead of
  crashing on an out-of-range index.
- Story layout gets the same same-star-to-clear behavior, keyed off the
  session-local my-rating map, and an explicit 0 no longer falls back to
  displaying the photo average.

* fix(feedback): refresh guest-scoped caches after rating changes (#884 review round 3)

- GalleryView's onFeedbackChange now also invalidates ['my-feedback',
  slug]: in guest identity mode the Rated/Liked filter membership and
  chip counts come from that query (#538), so a cleared rating never
  left the Rated filter until the 30s staleTime lapsed.
- PhotoRating invalidates gallery-photos + my-feedback on success: the
  parent refetch fires optimistically in onMutate and could capture
  pre-mutation state, with nothing refreshing after the server accepted.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 11:34:23 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 435c558704 chore(main): release 3.96.1-beta.0 (#898)
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2026-07-29 09:30:02 +00:00
Paul Nothaft ec66cd2684 fix(gallery): keep the lightbox toolbar from masking the photo (#888) (#892)
The bottom info/action bar was a translucent gradient overlaying the
image, hiding the lower edge of the photo. The bar is now opaque and the
image area stops above it (measured via ResizeObserver, since the bar
height varies with flex-wrap, the optional filename line and safe-area
padding), so the photo is always fully visible.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 11:27:29 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9f7c644e0a chore(main): release 3.96.0-beta.0 (#897)
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2026-07-29 09:25:35 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 97f68899a2 feat(gallery): quick return from zoomed to fit-to-screen in the lightbox (#886) (#891)
Adds a fit-to-screen button next to the zoom controls (enabled while
zoomed) and double-click-to-reset on the image itself. Both snap the
photo back to 100% and re-centre it.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 11:23:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0f8b68c05c chore(main): release 3.95.5-beta.0 (#896)
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2026-07-29 08:55:34 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 34c2992521 fix(gallery): don't close the lightbox when clicking beside the photo (#883) (#890)
Clicking the black bars around the image (a missed arrow click) closed
the lightbox and dropped the guest back into the grid. The lightbox now
only closes via the X button or Escape, matching what gallery guests
expect while paging through photos.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 10:52:54 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d41cd9746d chore(main): release 3.95.4-beta.0 (#887)
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2026-07-27 22:12:46 +00:00
peipeimo 33f1bc42a9 fix: sync gallery feedback filters after lightbox like/rating in simple mode (#882)
In simple identity mode, likes and ratings submitted from the lightbox
never called onFeedbackChange, so the gallery's photo list (whose
like_count drives the Likes/Rated feedback filter chips) stayed stale
until a full page reload. Liked photos were missing from the Likes
filter; unliked photos stayed stuck in it.

The guest-identity-mode paths and the grid PhotoCard paths already call
onFeedbackChange after submitting - the simple-mode lightbox paths were
the only ones missing it. Add the call to the three missing paths:
submitLike (simple branch), submitRating (simple branch), and the
FeedbackIdentityModal onSubmit handler.

Verified locally (Docker build of main): like a photo in the lightbox
after navigating with Next/Prev, open the Likes filter - the photo now
appears immediately with no reload, and filter contents match the admin
feedback API exactly.
2026-07-28 00:10:27 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 06a9991a22 chore(main): release 3.95.3-beta.0 (#880)
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2026-07-27 07:57:33 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 08be2b84f1 fix(security): close 5 Trivy alerts — postcss/tar bumps + drop npm from the runtime image (#878)
* fix(security): close the 5 open Trivy alerts — dep bumps + drop npm from the runtime image

Backend deps:
- postcss 8.5.10 -> 8.5.18 (CVE-2026-45623, GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849; the pin
  exists to force sanitize-html's transitive copy onto a fixed version)
- tar pin/override >=7.5.16 -> >=7.5.21, resolves 7.5.22
  (GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m)

Runtime image:
- Remove the npm CLI from the final stage instead of upgrading it: npm's
  bundled node_modules ship tar 7.5.19 and brace-expansion 5.0.7 (no npm
  release bundles the fixed versions — checked 11.18.0 and 12.0.1), and
  npm never runs in production. wait-for-db.sh now invokes the migration
  runners via node directly. This ends the recurring npm-bundled-CVE
  alert class; the previous 'npm install -g npm@11' line was itself a
  patch for the last batch.

* fix(restore): run post-restore migrations via node — the image ships no npm

restoreService still shelled out to 'npm run migrate:safe' after a
restore; with npm removed from the runtime image that would ENOENT into
the non-fatal catch, silently leaving a restored older backup on a
schema behind the running code until the next container restart. Invoke
migrations/run-migrations-safe.js through node directly, matching
wait-for-db.sh. The PR #596 source-contract test now pins the new
invocation.
2026-07-27 09:54:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ea8bd9b3e9 chore(main): release 3.95.2-beta.0 (#876)
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2026-07-27 07:10:19 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a2e723413e fix(backup): make backup settings actually apply (#871) (#874)
* fix(backup): make backup settings actually apply (#871)

- Wire the What-to-Backup toggles into the walker: honor
  backup_include_thumbnails / backup_include_photos (opt-out,
  default ON) and accept the UI's backup_include_archives spelling
  for the archived gate (the engine expected _archived, so the
  Archives checkbox silently never worked).
- Fix the 167.6 TB dashboard size: file_size_bytes is a bigint that
  node-postgres returns as a string, and the S3 path concatenated it
  onto the byte counter; coerce to Number at the source.
- Compute the real next scheduled run (cron-parser) and return it as
  nextBackup; the UI read a field the API never sent and rendered a
  hardcoded 'Not scheduled'. A named schedule label now beats the
  stray default cron the UI always sent, which silently turned
  weekly schedules into daily 03:00 runs.
- Never back up filesystem noise (.nfs* silly-renames, .DS_Store,
  Thumbs.db) and honor backup_exclude_patterns in the walker
  (previously rsync-only).
- Remove the compression/encryption toggles from the configuration
  UI: no backend implementation exists, and collecting an encryption
  passphrase while uploading plaintext is a false promise.

Closes #871

* fix(backup): close the review gaps in the settings wiring

- The UI's backup_include_archives now beats the migration-seeded
  backup_include_archived: every install has the singular key seeded
  true, so the alias-only-when-absent lookup made unchecking Archives
  a no-op.
- rsync destinations now receive the de-selected What-to-Backup paths
  and the noise filters as anchored --exclude args; previously rsync
  synced the whole storage root and the walker's selection only shaped
  the manifest, which then misreported what was actually transferred.
- Escape regex metacharacters in the walker's glob matcher: '.nfs*'
  compiled to /^.nfs.*$/ whose leading dot matched any character, so
  files like anfs-photo.jpg were silently dropped from backups.
- The Backup Coverage report now uses the same gate as the walker
  (new 'skipped-by-setting' status) instead of re-implementing it
  without the opt-out toggles and the archives alias.

* fix(backup): make the coverage diagnostics agree with the walker

- The coverage table shows the alias-aware flag value the gate actually
  used, instead of the seeded backup_include_archived shadowed by the
  UI's plural key (true next to a 'Gated off' badge).
- skipped-by-setting paths are now counted in the coverage summary
  (backend, TS contract, summary card, EN/DE locales) so the totals
  reconcile again when Photos or Thumbnails is unchecked.
- The form's thumbnail default now matches the backend's never-saved
  fallback (include): the checkbox no longer shows 'off' while
  thumbnails are being backed up, and saving an unrelated setting no
  longer flips the backup scope.

* fix(backup): keep custom crons, exclude disabled rows from rsync, normalize flag display

- Saving a named schedule no longer wipes the stored custom cron: the
  backend already prefers the label, so the cron field stays inert for
  named schedules and is preserved for switching back to Custom. A
  custom schedule now validates the 5-field expression before saving
  (the backend silently fell back to daily 02:00 on a blank value).
- resolveExcludedBackupPaths now also returns rows disabled via
  include_in_default, so rsync excludes them; the enabled-only loader
  hid them and rsync transferred their contents anyway.
- The coverage table normalizes flag values like the walker does —
  Boolean('false') displayed true beside a gated-off badge.
2026-07-27 09:06:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0c65edd99a chore(main): release 3.95.1-beta.0 (#872)
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2026-07-26 18:41:13 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 38b8d476d1 fix(security): bump backend deps to close all 14 open Trivy code-scanning alerts (#869)
* fix(security): bump backend deps to close all open Trivy code-scanning alerts

- axios 1.16.0 -> 1.18.1 (GHSA-gcfj-64vw-6mp9 high + 10 medium advisories)
- sharp 0.34.3 -> 0.35.3 (GHSA-f88m-g3jw-g9cj, inherited libvips CVEs)
- mailparser 3.9.9 -> 3.9.14 (pulls linkify-it 5.0.2, CVE-2026-59887)
- brace-expansion override >=5.0.6 -> >=5.0.7 (CVE-2026-13149)
- body-parser 1.20.4 -> 1.20.6 via lockfile refresh (CVE-2026-12590)

* fix(images): migrate removed sharp failOnError option and enforce Node >=20.9

sharp 0.35 drops the deprecated failOnError constructor option, so
recoverably corrupt images would start failing upload validation and
thumbnail generation; use the failOn: 'none' equivalent instead.

sharp 0.35 also requires Node >=20.9: declare it in engines and make
picpeak-setup.sh compare the full version instead of only the major,
so native installs on Node 20.3-20.8 upgrade instead of breaking.

* fix(setup): align the Node floor with the whole dependency tree and gate native updates

html-to-text@10 needs Node >=20.19 and the glob/minimatch family excludes
Node 21, so declare engines as ^20.19.0 || >=22 and enforce the same range
in picpeak-setup.sh. Also run install_nodejs at the start of
update_native_installation so existing native installs on an old Node get
upgraded before the service is stopped, instead of restarting broken.

* fix(setup): make the update-path Node gate actually work

--update dispatches before detect_os, so install_nodejs saw an empty
PACKAGE_MANAGER, matched no install branch, and reported success on the
old runtime. Detect the OS on demand and re-verify the installed version
afterwards, failing loudly (before the service is stopped) when the
runtime still misses the engines range, e.g. a Node 21 that package
managers refuse to downgrade.
2026-07-26 20:38:05 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6e2e0a1a63 chore(main): release 3.95.0-beta.0 (#867)
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2026-07-25 13:10:23 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 219d07b04a feat(auth): OIDC logout-to-IdP — phase 3 (#798) (#865)
* feat(auth): OIDC logout-to-IdP — phase 3 (#798)

RP-initiated logout behind a new oidc_logout_from_idp setting: logging
out of PicPeak also ends the IdP session. The SSO callback stores the
raw ID token in an HttpOnly cookie (also the marker that the session
came in via SSO — local-password sessions never bounce to the IdP);
/logout builds the end_session URL from discovery metadata with
id_token_hint + post_logout_redirect_uri + client_id and returns it as
ssoLogoutUrl for the frontend to navigate to. Any failure (no
end_session_endpoint, IdP unreachable, feature off) degrades to the
plain local logout.

Settings surface exposes the toggle plus the computed post-logout
redirect URI to register at the IdP. Session timeouts deliberately stay
local-only.

6 integration tests over the mock IdP; live-verified against
Keycloak 26 (logout ends the Keycloak session, no confirmation prompt).

* fix(auth): harden the SSO logout marker cookie (#798 phase 3)

Codex review round 1:
- Derive the oidc_id_token cookie options from the shared cookie policy
  (COOKIE_SAMESITE / COOKIE_DOMAIN / secure resolution) — hardcoded Lax
  meant split-origin deployments running on SameSite=None never sent the
  marker to the cross-site /logout XHR, silently disabling logout-to-IdP.
- Oversized ID tokens (>3.9KB) now store a bare 'sso' marker instead of
  no cookie, so the claimed client_id-only end-session fallback actually
  happens; /logout only passes the value as id_token_hint when it is a
  real JWT.
- establishAdminSession clears any stale marker on every fresh login —
  sessions can die without /logout (deactivation, expiry, restore), and
  a surviving marker would bounce a later local-password session to the
  IdP. The SSO callback re-sets the marker for its own session.

Tests: oversized-token marker + hint-less end-session URL, stale-marker
cleared on local login; helper updated for the clear+set cookie pair.

* fix(auth): validate the logout hint against the current OIDC config (#798 phase 3)

Codex review round 2: an ID token stored at login can outlive an
issuer/client config change; sending it to the newly configured IdP as
id_token_hint strands the user on the IdP's error page (providers
validate iss/aud on the hint). buildEndSessionUrl now decodes the hint
(no verification — routing only): different issuer → skip the round-trip
entirely (the session belongs to another IdP); same issuer but changed
client → keep the round-trip, drop the unusable hint. Two tests pin both
paths.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-24 11:42:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c5dc790e28 chore(main): release 3.94.2-beta.0 (#864)
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2026-07-23 19:59:53 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 323dcae917 fix(gallery): block password form in Instagram in-app browser and unmask login errors (#863)
* fix(gallery): block password form in Instagram in-app browser (#654)

Field reports show gallery password login still failing inside
Instagram's IAB after the #656 input-attribute/trim defenses. Three
changes:

- Replace the advisory amber banner with a red blocking state: the
  password form is hidden in the Instagram IAB and replaced with
  platform-specific "open in external browser" instructions plus a
  copy-link button (clipboard API with execCommand fallback). A
  "try anyway" link restores the form as an escape hatch.
- Stop masking non-password failures as "incorrect password": a request
  that never got a response (offline, webview killed it) now reports a
  connection error, and a reCAPTCHA 400 reports a verification failure —
  both previously fell through to the wrong-password message and sent
  guests chasing the wrong cause.
- Strip invisible Unicode (zero-width chars, word joiner, BOM, soft
  hyphen) from the submitted password in addition to trimming — these
  ride along when the password is copy-pasted out of a chat app and fail
  byte-exact bcrypt compare server-side.

* fix(gallery): retry login with typed password + honor execCommand result (#654)

Codex review round 1:
- Stored passwords can legitimately contain the invisible code points the
  sanitizer strips (e.g. ZWJ emoji sequences) — creation paths don't
  normalize. On a 401 where the sanitized form differs from the typed
  (trimmed) input, retry once with the typed value. Skipped when a
  reCAPTCHA token is in play (single-use).
- document.execCommand('copy') signals failure via its return value, not
  by throwing — only show "Link copied" when it returns true.

* fix(gallery): move invisible-char password fallback server-side (#654)

Codex review round 2: the client-side retry either burned the single-use
reCAPTCHA token (making exotic-but-valid passwords impossible to enter
with reCAPTCHA on) or burned failed-attempt lockout quota on every
rescued login. Doing the fallback as a second bcrypt compare inside the
same gallery/verify request eliminates both: exact bytes are compared
first (stored passwords containing e.g. ZWJ emoji keep working), the
sanitized form only on mismatch, and trackFailedAttempt only fires when
both fail. Frontend goes back to plain trim-on-submit; the client-side
sanitizer util and retry are removed. 7 integration tests pin the
contract.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-23 21:45:07 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9ac23e5fe1 chore(main): release 3.94.1-beta.0 (#861)
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2026-07-22 19:30:46 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 40eb03f0d8 fix(tests): raise jest timeouts to survive the growing migration chain (#860)
The 3.94.0-beta.0 release PR (#859) failed its backend job on
workflowEngine.test.js: bootCrmDb() runs every core migration in
beforeAll, and with migrations 163-165 merged the setup crossed the
suite's jest.setTimeout(30000) on CI runners — the log shows migration
099 still seeding after the hook timed out. Same pass is green locally
and passed on #857's rebase minutes earlier: borderline-slow, not
deterministic.

- jest.config.js: testTimeout 120000 as the default, so bootCrmDb
  suites without an explicit pin stop being time bombs as the chain
  grows
- every suite-level jest.setTimeout below 120s raised to 120s — local
  pins OVERRIDE the config default, so the 30s/60s ones would keep
  flaking regardless of the global bump

No test logic changed anywhere.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-22 21:27:12 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f89d374236 chore(main): release 3.94.0-beta.0 (#859)
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2026-07-22 19:10:00 +00:00
Paul Nothaft c6ec93eef9 fix(dates): normalize SQLite epoch timestamps at remaining API surfaces (#485 follow-up) (#857)
The audit #485 called for: on SQLite (native installs), timestamp
columns written with a raw `new Date()` through knex store epoch-ms
numbers; Postgres returns ISO strings. Frontend code written against
Postgres calls parseISO() on them — parseISO(number) throws and crashes
the page. #485 fixed admin Users and listed api tokens / photos /
activity as out-of-scope follow-ups.

Verified crash on main: Timeline gallery layout parseISO(uploaded_at)
against photos written by the archive-RESTORE path (raw Date). Other
raw-write surfaces (api_tokens last_used_at/revoked_at, email_queue)
degrade rather than crash but violate the ISO contract.

- extract toIso() from adminUsers.js into utils/dateNormalize.js
  (contract unchanged — the 10 existing #485 tests still pin it)
- write-side: archive-restore uploaded_at, api-token last_used_at /
  revoked_at, email_queue created_at/sent_at now write ISO strings
- read-side (heals existing corrupted rows): gallery /photos normalizes
  uploaded_at/captured_at; api-tokens list normalizes all four
  timestamp fields
- frontend defence-in-depth: Timeline layout parses uploaded_at
  tolerantly (typeof guard) for stale caches / old backends
- 2 regression tests seed literal epoch numbers and assert the API
  serves ISO strings

activity_logs turned out safe (created_at comes from the DB default,
not a raw Date) — left untouched.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-22 21:07:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2f05fcc39d feat(gallery): reveal mode — hide gallery from guests until reveal (#838) (#856)
* feat(gallery): reveal mode — hide gallery from guests until reveal (#838)

Guests can upload during the event but see no photos until the host
reveals the gallery, manually ("Reveal now") or at a scheduled time.

- migration 165: events.reveal_mode / reveal_at / revealed_at. Effective
  visibility is computed at REQUEST time (reveal_at <= now opens the
  gate exactly on schedule); the minutely scheduler only stamps
  revealed_at durably and emits a gallery.revealed workflow trigger
- server-side enforcement in gallery.js: /photos returns the event
  shell with photos: [] + hidden_until_reveal for plain guests;
  image/download/stats endpoints 403 with GALLERY_HIDDEN (photo IDs are
  sequential — listing-only gating would be probeable); feedback-summary
  gated too. Slideshow tokens (surprise beamer), client access and the
  admin preview bypass; the guest upload route stays open
- admin: reveal toggle + optional scheduled datetime next to the guest
  upload settings, status line and "Reveal now" button on the overview;
  re-enabling the toggle clears revealed_at so a gallery can re-hide
- guest UI: upload-only view (hero, friendly message, scheduled time,
  upload button) for every layout; i18n for all 8 locales
- timestamps written as ISO strings — the SQLite driver stringifies raw
  Date objects into garbage; ISO round-trips on both engines
- 14 integration tests over minted gallery/slideshow/client/admin tokens

* fix(gallery): reveal/re-arm semantics + upload button i18n key (#838)

- "Reveal now" also clears a pending reveal_at: the schedule is
  consumed, so the full-form admin save can't accidentally re-hide a
  revealed gallery with a stale future date
- setting a FUTURE reveal_at on a revealed gallery re-arms hiding —
  the one intentional way to re-hide without double-toggling the mode
- guest upload button uses the existing upload.uploadPhotos key
  (gallery.uploadPhotos never existed; the button showed EN everywhere)

* fix(gallery): close reveal bypasses from review round 1 (#838)

- the hero-derivative route and the secure-images token-mint +
  secure-download routes are now reveal-gated: hero serves a 1920px
  derivative of ANY sequential photo id and secure tokens fetch
  originals — both were open bypasses while hidden. blockHiddenGallery
  moved to utils/revealMode.js and shared
- customer-portal tokens (via:'customer', no accessLevel) now bypass
  reveal mode — they are the host/customer, not a guest, and were
  getting the upload-only view
- an open hidden guest view refetches exactly at reveal_at plus a 60s
  fallback poll, so the gallery appears without a manual reload
- gallery.revealed added to the workflow editor's trigger picker so
  the advertised notification hook is reachable in the UI
- migration 165 guards each column independently (partial-state safe)

* fix(gallery): reveal round 2 — remaining bypass surfaces + lifecycle edges (#838)

- legacy /api/images router reveal-gated (view, secure-token + signed-url
  minting), and the signed-URL SERVE path re-checks hidden state via a
  backward-compatible bypass flag in the token payload
- secure-image tokens record revealBypass at mint and are re-validated
  at serve time — a re-hide kills in-flight guest tokens within the
  request, while slideshow/client tokens keep working
- OG metadata and the unauthenticated /og cover fall back to the brand
  logo / 404 while hidden — no hero-photo spoiler for social crawlers
- photo-feedback GET/POST reveal-gated (sequential ids were enumerable);
  /my-feedback returns the empty back-compat shape (rows leak filename +
  storage path)
- the reveal scheduler skips drafts — no premature stamp/notification
  for unpublished galleries
- emitWorkflowEvent gains an additive dedupSuffix; both reveal emitters
  pass the reveal timestamp so a re-hidden gallery's second reveal
  fires workflows again instead of deduping into silence

* fix(gallery): reveal round 3 — schedule consumption + two-way client sync (#838)

- the scheduler now consumes reveal_at when stamping (matching "Reveal
  now"), and re-arming via a partial API update clears a stale PAST
  schedule — previously {reveal_mode:true} without reveal_at could
  instantly re-open the gate through the leftover date
- /photos exposes reveal_armed so an open VISIBLE gallery keeps a 60s
  poll while the mode is on — a re-hide now propagates to open clients
  in both directions, not just hidden→visible

Codex round-3 claim about timestamp-without-timezone drift on non-UTC
Postgres was verified FALSE: knex's table.timestamp() creates
timestamptz on PG (confirmed via information_schema on a live install),
which stores absolute instants regardless of server TZ.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-22 20:59:59 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3d6c9848dc feat(feedback): emoji reactions on photos (#839) (#855)
* feat(feedback): emoji reactions on photos (#839)

Per-photo emoji reactions from a fixed curated set (❤️ 😂 😍 👏 🎉),
one reaction per guest per photo — same emoji toggles off, another
switches in place. Stored as feedback_type='reaction' rows with per-guest
scoping identical to likes (guest_id when present, device hash otherwise).

- migration 164: allow_reactions toggle (default on, still gated by the
  opt-in feedback_enabled master switch), photo_feedback.reaction value
  column, denormalized photos.reaction_count
- emoji whitelist enforced in the route validator AND the service
  (shared constants/reactions.js, mirrored in the frontend)
- per-emoji tallies + my_feedback.reaction in the photo feedback
  endpoint; hidden-by-moderator reactions leave all counts
- reactions ride the existing rate limiting (like-tier), guest identity
  modes, and moderation actions; long + pivot exports carry the emoji
- gallery: reaction bar in the photo feedback panel (grid lightbox);
  admin: allow_reactions toggle next to likes, analytics tile,
  create/duplicate event paths
- i18n for all 8 locales; 9 service-level tests

* fix(feedback): reach reactions without comments; numeric analytics totals (#839)

- the lightbox feedback-panel toggle was gated on allow_comments only —
  with comments off the new reaction bar was unreachable; the gate now
  opens for comments OR reactions
- the analytics summary now coerces Postgres string counts to numbers:
  total_feedback concatenated instead of adding ("00006")

* fix(feedback): harden reactions from review round 1 (#839)

- per-emoji tallies are gated on show_feedback_to_guests — with sharing
  off a guest sees only their own selection, no aggregate counts
- reaction toggle/switch operate on the guest-scoped row SET, so rows
  duplicated by the (like-parity) check-then-insert race collapse on the
  next interaction instead of counting twice
- rate-limit defaults merge UNDER the persisted settings object —
  stored rows predating the reaction key otherwise dropped it to the
  generic 100/h fallback
- optimistic revert uses the pre-mutation value via mutation context;
  the onError closure sees the post-optimistic render, so the old
  revert froze the wrong state on failed toggles

* fix(feedback): review round 2 — hide reaction_count with sharing off, admin list shows emoji (#839)

- summary.reaction_count is gated on show_feedback_to_guests like the
  per-emoji map, keeping the "no aggregates while sharing is off"
  promise consistent
- the admin feedback list renders the reaction emoji on reaction rows
  and the type filter gains a Reactions option (7 locales; es has no
  types block and falls back to EN defaults)

* fix(feedback): register reaction activity types with translated labels (#839)

photo_reaction / guest_feedback_reaction are logged by the submission
paths but were absent from the frontend activity-type union and the
admin.activities label maps — the recent-activity feed would have shown
the raw identifiers. All 8 locales.

* feat(feedback): reactions in guest CRM and the premium gallery layout (#839)

- guest CRM: per-guest reaction counts in the list aggregation and a
  Reacted tab (photo grid with emoji badges) + stats card in the guest
  detail modal; picks/aggregate/exports stay selection-only by design
- premium layout: its own yet-another-react-lightbox now gets a fixed
  reaction-bar overlay (per-photo fetch, optimistic switch) — reactions
  were otherwise unreachable in this layout since it bypasses the
  shared PhotoLightbox
- allowReactions threaded through the layout feedbackOptions; guest
  i18n keys for the 7 locales that carry the guests block

* fix(feedback): portal the premium reaction bar to document.body (#839)

Inside the layout tree an ancestor stacking context (framer-motion
transforms) painted the bar under yarl's body-level portal — visible
but unclickable, every tap landed on the slide image. As a direct body
child the z-index 10000 genuinely wins over yarl's 9999. Verified by
clicking through in the running app.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-22 20:59:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f8a95d29d2 feat(auth): OIDC role mapping + login policy — phase 2 (#798) (#854)
* feat(auth): OIDC role mapping + login policy — phase 2 (#798)

Role mapping: configurable dot-path roles claim (Keycloak realm_access.roles,
Authentik/Pocket ID groups, Entra roles), IdP-value → PicPeak-role mapping
table validated against the roles table, re-evaluated on every SSO login with
highest-priority-wins on multiple matches. The last active super_admin is
never demoted. Optional require-mapped-role policy refuses logins whose token
maps to no role (sso_error=no_role).

Login policy: oidc_disable_local_login makes the API refuse password logins
(403 LOCAL_LOGIN_DISABLED) and the login page render SSO-only; only effective
while SSO is enabled+configured, and OIDC_BREAK_GLASS=true always re-opens
local login. Public settings expose the EFFECTIVE flag only.

Settings UI: Role-mapping card (claim path, mapping rows editor, strict
toggle) and Login-policy card with break-glass hint, EN+DE.

14 new integration tests over the mock IdP.

* fix(auth): harden phase-2 review findings (#798)

- memoize the scrypt-derived OIDC key and serve /public/settings from a
  10s-TTL flag cache — the unauthenticated endpoint no longer pays a
  13-key config read + blocking scryptSync per request (login route
  still checks uncached)
- make the last-super-admin demotion guard atomic (FOR UPDATE on the
  active super rows) — concurrent mapped callbacks could previously
  both count 2 and demote both supers
- own-property lookup in role mapping: IdP values like `constructor`
  now count as unmapped instead of corrupting the roles query
- SsoTab clears oidc_disable_local_login in the same save that turns
  SSO off — the full-form payload otherwise hit the server-side 400

* fix(auth): guarantee break-glass reachability for SSO-only mode (#798)

- wire OIDC_BREAK_GLASS and OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY through the quick-start
  docker-compose.yml env allowlist (production compose already passes
  .env via env_file) and document both in .env.example
- refuse enabling oidc_disable_local_login unless an active
  local-password super_admin exists: OIDC_BREAK_GLASS only re-opens the
  password route, which OIDC-owned accounts can never use, and
  settings.edit is super_admin-only — an all-OIDC instance would be
  unrecoverable during an IdP outage

* fix(auth): close SSO-only lockout gaps from review round 3 (#798)

- role sync never demotes the last active LOCAL-password super_admin
  (an OIDC-owned super does not count as break-glass), and
  isLocalLoginDisabled() disarms itself when no such account remains —
  self-healing against manual demotion/deactivation/deletion paths
- the local-super save-time check now validates the MERGED state, so
  re-enabling SSO with a stored disable flag is checked too
- ALL oidc_* keys are reserved from the generic settings upserts/reads
  (prefix match) — policy and mapping invariants can only go through
  the validated PUT /sso
- /admin/login/mfa re-checks the policy so an mfa_pending token minted
  before the flip cannot complete into a local session

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-22 20:59:19 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ad326da35c chore(main): release 3.93.0-beta.0 (#853)
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2026-07-19 20:40:52 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a6a3c9f9f8 fix(crm): pass trx to logActivity inside transactions — audit rows silently lost on SQLite (#851)
* fix(crm): pass trx to logActivity inside transactions — audit rows were silently lost on SQLite

createContract, updateContract, createStorno and reissueInvoice called
logActivity() (contract paths also adminActor()) from inside a knex
transaction without the trx executor — the pattern db.js:648's comment
explicitly warns about. On single-connection SQLite the audit insert
waits on a second pool connection while the trx holds the only one:
a 60s acquire-timeout stall per call, then logActivity's catch swallows
the failure and the audit row is silently lost. Postgres unaffected.

Fix mirrors the one call site that already did it right
(contract_created_from_quote, conversions.js): resolve the audit actor
before the transaction opens and pass trx as logActivity's executor so
the insert rides the transaction's connection.

Verified NOT affected (logActivity outside any trx, unchanged):
cancelContract, contract_converted_to_event, contract_signed_by_customer,
contract_sent, invoice_sent/_cancelled(draft)/_released/monthly_bill.

Found by the #587 integration-test work (PR #850, which shrank the pool
acquire timeout to tolerate the stall — that workaround can be dropped
once both land).

* fix(crm): run reissueInvoice's createInvoice without a wrapping transaction (codex review of #851)

The round-1 fix passed trx to the reissue audit call — but that point
was never reached on single-connection SQLite: createInvoice internally
reads via the global connection (businessProfileService.getProfile,
getAppSetting, bank-account resolution), so the outer trx deadlocked
first and aborted the replacement AFTER the Storno had already
committed and been emailed.

createInvoice's five other callers all run it without a trx; reissue
now does the same and backlinks afterwards. Trade-off documented in
code: replacement + backlink are no longer atomic — a crash between
them leaves a visible draft without replaces_invoice_id, which beats
the guaranteed stall. New regression test drives a full cancel+reissue
on the SQLite harness and pins the invoice_reissued audit row.

* fix(crm): restore the reissue transaction by routing createInvoice's reads through trx (codex review of #851, round 2)

Round 2 was right that dropping the wrapping transaction traded the
deadlock for orphan drafts: createInvoice inserts the invoice row and
claims a sequence number BEFORE line-item validation can throw, so a
failed reissue would persist partial state after the Storno committed.

Proper fix: the transaction is back, and every read inside createInvoice
now rides it — getProfile and resolveBankAccountForCurrency gained an
optional conn param (default db, all other callers unchanged),
getAppSetting calls pass trx (crm_invoice_round_total + the
resolveNetDays default the regression test flushed out), and the
invoice_created audit uses the trx executor. The reissue regression test
now proves a full cancel+reissue commits atomically on single-connection
SQLite.
2026-07-19 22:36:52 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 997a85cdbc test(crm): mint-path integration tests — quote send, invoice storno, contract countersign (#850)
* test(crm): mint-path integration tests — quote send, invoice storno, contract countersign (#587)

End-to-end through the real HTTP → route → service → DB → email-queue →
file pipeline on full-migration SQLite (helpers/crmDb), real pdfkit/
pdf-lib rendering, no mock-fs, no network. 7 tests.

Deviations from the issue spec — the tests pin the code's real behavior:
- Storno route is POST /:id/cancel (not /:id/storno), responds 200 with
  { cancelled, stornoId } (not 201).
- Quote re-send rejects with 409 (not 400).
- Contract statuses are signed_by_customer → fully_signed; the hash
  columns are pdf_sha256 / signed_pdf_sha256 (no integrity_hash) — the
  test verifies the stored sha256 against the file on disk.
- Business-doc PDFs persist under process.cwd()/storage/business-docs,
  not STORAGE_PATH — isolated via chdir into the temp dir.

Two documented, test-scoped harness workarounds: shrunk pool acquire
timeout (guards against the pre-existing logActivity-inside-transaction
deadlock in createContract/createStorno on single-connection SQLite —
worth its own fix) and Date→ISO binding normalization (node-sqlite3's
cross-realm Date detection under jest's vm sandbox).

Assisted-by: task agent (worktree)

* test(crm): pin sendStorno side effects + real customer-sign flow (codex review of #850)

- Storno test now asserts the delivery leg cancelInvoice deliberately
  swallows on failure: storno status 'sent', PDF on disk, storno_issued
  email queued to the customer — a broken render/persist/queue no
  longer stays green.
- Contract seed goes through sendContract's token + a real
  recordCustomerSignature instead of a direct status UPDATE, so
  countersign exercises the signature-layering path; the test now also
  pins that the customer's signature asset survives countersigning.

* test(crm): prove both signature stamps are embedded in the countersigned PDF (codex review of #850, round 2)

Path/hash assertions alone stay green if countersign stamps the admin
onto the unsigned base PDF. New pdf-lib helper counts embedded image
XObjects per page of the final document and asserts the signature page
carries at least two — customer stamp AND admin stamp.
2026-07-19 22:36:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cb5b319f10 feat(notifications): surface guest activity in the admin bell (#849)
* feat(notifications): surface guest activity in the admin bell (#746)

Favorites already reached activity_logs (feedbackService), but gallery
opens and downloads only landed in access_logs — invisible in the
notification bell. Now:

- gallery_opened on the guest photo-list route, debounced in-memory to
  one notification per event per 6h (the endpoint fires per page load;
  per-hit notifications would spam the bell). Slideshow traffic stays
  excluded, matching the analytics exclusion.
- gallery_downloaded on all four download paths (streamed + pre-zipped +
  presigned download-all, download-selected) with scope metadata.
- Frontend: locale entries for galleryOpened/galleryDownloaded (and
  photoFavorite, which previously fell through to the generic 'system
  activity' line) in all 8 languages — resolved via the existing smart
  camelCase fallback, no switch cases needed. Distinct bell icons per
  type.

* fix(notifications): single-photo download activity + render per-type bell icons (codex review of #849)

- The per-photo Save route (GET /:slug/download/:photoId) only wrote to
  access_logs — the most common download path never reached the bell.
  Now emits gallery_downloaded with scope 'single', debounced to one
  notification per event per hour: a guest saving 30 photos is one
  signal, not thirty (exact counts stay in access_logs/analytics).
- getNotificationStyle's icon names were dead — AdminHeader hard-coded
  <Bell> for every row. Added an icon map so gallery opens (Eye),
  downloads (Download), favorites (Heart) and the pre-existing style
  names render their intended icons.

* fix(notifications): notify after successful delivery, complete the icon map (codex review of #849, round 2)

- Single-photo notification now fires on res 'finish' with status < 400:
  emitting up-front logged downloads that then 404ed/failed AND burned
  the 1h debounce window against the next real download.
- Icon map completed over every name getNotificationStyle returns
  (grep-verified) — settings/user/mail/etc. styles render their declared
  icons instead of falling back to Bell.

Deliberately NOT taken from the review: DB-backed debounce state for
multi-worker deployments. The backend's current deployment contract is
single-process (no PM2 cluster in-repo; multi-replica explicitly parked
in #799 — chunked-upload/session state is process-local for the same
reason). Worst case under a future multi-worker setup is N notifications
per window, which degrades, not breaks; a shared-store debounce belongs
to the #799 phase-3 work.

* fix(notifications): attribute client sessions, log cached-ZIP after finish, add Trash2 icon (codex review of #849, round 3)

- gallery_opened/gallery_downloaded now carry the real actor: client
  sessions (accessLevel 'client') are recorded as 'customer' instead of
  being mislabeled 'guest' — #746 explicitly covers client activity, so
  they are attributed, not excluded.
- Cached-ZIP streaming path logs on res 'finish' (< 400) like the
  single-photo path — piping is not delivery. The presigned-redirect
  and on-the-fly-archiver paths keep their existing timing (redirect
  handoff / post-finalize).
- Trash2 added to the icon map (customer_erased, bulk_delete_completed
  no longer fall back to Bell — the grep that built the map missed the
  digit in the name).

* fix(notifications): dashboard formatting, portal dedup, actor-aware wording, archiver finish-hooks (codex review of #849, confirmation round)

- activity_logs feed TWO surfaces: the dashboard's Recent Activity used
  admin.activities.<type> keys that didn't exist, rendering raw
  identifiers — added gallery_opened/gallery_downloaded entries in all
  8 locales.
- Customer-portal opens already log customer_event_access at the
  access-token mint; the ensuing /photos call no longer double-notifies
  (client sessions surface via downloads only).
- gallery_downloaded formatting is actor-aware: customer sessions render
  'Customer downloaded…' (new galleryDownloadedCustomer key ×8) instead
  of 'A guest…'.
- Both on-the-fly ZIP paths (download-all fallback + download-selected)
  notify on res 'finish' < 400 — archive.finalize() ends Archiver's
  input, not the HTTP transfer.

* fix(notifications): key customer dedup/attribution on portal provenance, neutral favorite wording (codex review of #849, final round)

The previous dedup was inverted: portal-minted tokens carry
via:'customer' but NO accessLevel (they run as guest), while PIN-client
logins carry accessLevel:'client' and log nothing else. So PIN clients'
only open signal was suppressed while portal opens still double-
notified and portal downloads read as guest activity.

verifyGalleryAccess now surfaces req.viaCustomer; gallery_opened dedups
on THAT (portal only), and galleryActor treats via-customer OR
accessLevel-client as 'customer'. photoFavorite wording is actor-neutral
across all 8 locales — feedbackService logs favorites without an actor,
so claiming 'a guest' was wrong for customer favorites.
2026-07-19 22:36:23 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e8dad4b40d feat(slideshow): guest-scannable share-link QR overlay (#848)
* feat(slideshow): guest-scannable share-link QR overlay (#837)

- Global settings (Settings → Slideshow): slideshow_qr_enabled/position/
  opacity/size — same option shape and cascade as the watermark.
- Per-event tri-state show_qr (migration 163): NULL inherits the global,
  true/false force on/off; editable in the per-event slideshow card.
- State endpoint ships the QR as a PNG data URI (cached per share URL —
  the 3s projector poll never re-encodes), so the kiosk needs no QR lib
  and no extra authenticated request.
- Kiosk renders the QR in a white padded corner box so it stays
  scannable on any photo.
- i18n: en + de (the slideshow namespace has no other locales yet).

* fix(slideshow): persist per-event QR override, show QR on empty shows, bound the QR cache (codex review of #848)

- OverviewTab never passed event.show_qr into the settings card (and the
  Event type lacked the field), so a stored true/false override always
  displayed as 'inherit' and the next save silently reset it to NULL.
- The QR overlay was nested inside the photos.length > 0 branch — an
  empty or category-filtered live gallery showed only 'Waiting for
  photos', exactly when 'scan to add the first photos' matters most.
  Now rendered for any running show.
- slideshowQrCache: insertion-order eviction at 50 entries — rotated
  tokens and past events no longer accumulate base64 PNGs forever.

* fix(slideshow): derive the QR origin from the kiosk request when the base is loopback (codex review of #848, round 2)

With the compose-default FRONTEND_URL=http://localhost:3000 (or no base
configured) the overlay QR sent scanning phones to their own localhost.
The state poll comes from the kiosk browser itself, so its Host header +
protocol (trust proxy is configured) are exactly the public origin
guests can reach — used whenever the configured base is missing or
loopback. Mirrors the ?origin= fallback #847 uses for the admin-side
QR downloads.

* fix(slideshow): kiosk passes its origin for the QR fallback (codex review of #848, round 3)

req.get('host') is not the browser origin behind the standard proxies —
frontend/nginx.conf forwards $host with the port stripped, so a compose
LAN deployment on :3000 encoded port 80. The kiosk now sends
window.location.origin with the session/state calls (validated
server-side, same pattern as #847's admin downloads); the Host-derived
origin remains as second fallback.

* fix(slideshow): reject loopback kiosk origins, throttle QR regeneration per event (codex review of #848, confirmation round)

- A loopback window.location.origin from the kiosk is no more
  guest-reachable than the loopback base it would replace — rejected;
  when no reachable URL remains the overlay is suppressed entirely (no
  QR beats a QR that sends phones to their own localhost). New test
  pins the suppression.
- The QR cache is keyed by event id with a 60s regeneration throttle:
  the origin is caller-influenced when the base is loopback, so
  URL-keyed caching let a slideshow-link holder force a fresh
  QRCode.toDataURL per request via unique origins — a cheap CPU
  exhaustion path. Encode rate is now bounded per event regardless of
  input. QR margin also raised to the 4-module spec quiet zone,
  matching #847.

* fix(slideshow): never serve a mismatched cached QR + single-flight encoding (codex review of #848, final round)

- A slideshow-token holder could poison the projector's QR: an
  attacker-origin entry cached per event was served to the legitimate
  kiosk for the rest of the throttle window. A cached artifact is now
  only served when its URL matches the request; mismatches inside the
  window suppress the overlay briefly instead of showing foreign
  content.
- Cold-cache stampede closed: concurrent polls share one in-flight
  encode promise instead of each scheduling a 512px render.

Rejected from the same round (false positive, verified empirically):
the loopback regex claim — /^https?:\/\/(localhost|127\.)/ matches
'http://localhost:3000' and '127.0.0.1:port' just fine (no trailing
slash required), and the suppression test runs green.
2026-07-19 22:36:03 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 60cdd07085 feat(events): gallery QR code + printable table-card/poster PDFs (#847)
* feat(events): gallery QR code + printable table-card/poster PDFs (#836)

- GET /api/admin/events/:id/qr — share-link QR as PNG (128-2048px) or
  SVG, inline or attachment; adminAuth + events.view + ownership.
- GET /api/admin/events/:id/qr-print — pdfkit-rendered A6 table card /
  A4 poster with event name, QR, localized caption (8 locales; Cyrillic
  falls back to English — built-in Helvetica has no Cyrillic glyphs) and
  the share URL as footer.
- Event detail: QR section in ShareLinkCard with live preview (blob
  fetch — Bearer auth) and PNG/SVG/table-card/poster downloads; print
  language follows the admin UI language. i18n keys in all 8 locales.
- qrcode + pdfkit were already dependencies (MFA / CRM PDFs).

* fix(events): QR origin fallback, Unicode PDF font, bounded layout, stale-preview guard (codex review of #847)

- QR URLs: prefer the configured public base, but fall back to the admin
  browser's origin (passed as ?origin=, validated) when the base is
  missing or localhost — mirrors buildShareLinkUrl so the QR encodes the
  same URL the card displays instead of an unusable localhost target.
- PDFs render with the bundled IBM Plex Sans TTFs (Latin+Cyrillic+Greek)
  instead of WinAnsi-only Helvetica: Cyrillic event names no longer
  silently disappear, and the caption's English-fallback hack is gone.
- Fixed vertical layout: title gets a bounded two-line ellipsis region
  and all positions derive from constants, so long event names can't
  push the QR/caption over the footer; URL footer bounded too.
- ShareLinkCard preview: stale-response guard — a late blob response
  after unmount/event-switch is revoked instead of leaking and
  overwriting the newer event's QR.

* fix(events): bundle complete IBM Plex Sans for QR PDFs + IPv6 loopback fallback (codex review of #847, round 2)

Round 2 caught that the pre-existing assets/fonts/IBM-Plex-Sans/ files
are 270-glyph Latin SUBSETS — my round-1 font swap didn't actually fix
Cyrillic titles and regressed the ru caption. Now bundling the complete
IBM Plex Sans 400/700 TTFs (1019 glyphs, Latin+Cyrillic+Greek — cmap
verified via fontkit, rendering verified on a generated PDF) under
assets/fonts/IBM-Plex-Sans-Full/ with the OFL license alongside.
~400 KB total; source: IBM/plex release zip @ibm/plex-sans@1.1.0.

Also: LOCAL_BASE_RE now recognizes IPv6 loopback ([::1]) so a
FRONTEND_URL of http://[::1]:3000 falls back to the browser origin like
the frontend's own URL logic does.

Note for a follow-up: the CRM invoice/quote PDFs use the same Latin-only
subsets and share the Cyrillic gap.

* fix(events): responsive QR card that survives preview failures (codex review of #847, round 3)

- The QR section keys off share-link availability instead of a loaded
  preview: a transient failure of the preview request no longer hides
  every download button until reload; a placeholder tile renders in
  place of the image.
- Preview + actions stack on phone widths and the button grid drops to
  one column below sm, so 'Tischkarte (A6)'-length labels don't
  overflow.

* fix(events): QR encodes the stored share_link + spec quiet zone (codex review of #847, confirmation round)

- The QR target is now the STORED share_link — exactly what the card
  displays and the admin copies. Rebuilding from current slug/token/
  short-URL setting could diverge for legacy absolute links or events
  created under a different short-URL setting; a printed QR encoding a
  different URL than the card is a permanent mistake. Rebuild remains
  only as fallback when no share_link is stored.
- QR margin back to the library's 4-module default for all generated
  assets — the spec's quiet zone; margin 2 risks scan failures when the
  printout sits against colored surroundings.

* fix(events): bare share_link tokens resolve as /gallery/<token> in QR URLs (codex review of #847, final round)

Quote-/contract-converted events persist share_link as the raw token —
the frontend's buildShareLinkUrl prefixes those with /gallery/, but the
QR path normalization only added a leading slash, encoding
<origin>/<token> into every image/PDF for such events. Now mirrors the
frontend exactly.

* test(events): 30s timeout for the print-PDF cases (CI fix)

The poster PDF now embeds the full IBM Plex Sans TTFs (~200 KB each);
font parsing + subsetting exceeds jest's 5s default on slower CI
runners — the suite went red on exactly that test after the font
commit.
2026-07-19 22:35:44 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 613133c29c chore(main): release 3.92.2-beta.0 (#852)
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2026-07-19 20:05:52 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 8337a716b1 fix(file-watcher): bound concurrent photo processing (#846)
* fix(file-watcher): bound concurrent photo processing

chokidar fires 'add' once per file — with no ignoreInitial option the
boot scan fires it for every existing file, and a bulk drop into the
watch folder fires it for every new one at once. Each handler runs DB
lookups plus (for new files) a full sharp pipeline; sharp.concurrency(2)
only caps libvips threads WITHIN one operation, not the number of
parallel pipelines, so unbounded handlers can OOM small hosts.

Gate both 'add' and 'unlink' through a shared p-limit
(FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY, default 2, floor 1) — mass deletes otherwise
burst DB work and ZIP-cache invalidation the same way. p-limit is pinned
to ^3.1.0, the last CommonJS release.

Adapted from the filpgame fork (426ca491) — thanks @filpgame; extended
to cover 'unlink', documented in .env.example, plus a lock-in test for
the existing Sharp cache/concurrency caps this bound relies on.

* chore(compose): pass FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY into the backend container (codex review of #846)

The backend service uses an explicit environment list (no env_file), so
the documented override never reached the container in the default
compose deployments. Added to both compose files + root .env.example.
2026-07-19 22:00:46 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0310c46fdd fix(uploads): keep videos when thumbnail generation fails (#845)
* fix(uploads): keep videos when thumbnail generation fails

processUploadedVideo() (ffmpeg probe + thumbnail) was unguarded in both
pipeline paths, while the image branch next to each already survives its
thumbnail failures:

- processUploadedPhotos (sync): the throw failed the whole upload — the
  video was lost.
- processPhoto (async worker, the path real uploads take): the throw
  marked the row 'failed', and the guest gallery only lists 'complete' —
  the video became permanently invisible despite being fully uploaded.

Both call sites now fall back to extractVideoMetadata() alone and keep
the video without a preview; if even the probe fails, the video is kept
with no metadata. Idea from the munin92 fork (2026-07-02), reimplemented
for both paths + regression test.

* fix(uploads): placeholder thumbnail for rescued videos (codex review of #845)

A completed video with a NULL thumbnail made the gallery grid fetch the
ORIGINAL video file as an <img> blob (thumbnail_url || url) — a
potentially multi-GB download for a broken tile. Both fallback paths now
generate the existing sharp-rendered play-button placeholder
(generateVideoPlaceholder — ffmpeg-free), so rescued videos get a real
tile. Test asserts the placeholder key lands in thumbnail_path.
2026-07-19 22:00:08 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8060fedf6a fix(security): read the password-complexity key the settings UI writes (#843)
* fix(security): read the password-complexity key the settings UI writes

The settings UI saves the admin's complexity choice as
security_password_complexity (useSettingsState.ts prefixes security_ to
password_complexity), but getPasswordComplexitySettings() queried
security_password_complexity_level — written by nothing — so the setting
was silently ignored and password validation always used the 'moderate'
default. Spotted in the filpgame fork (their main, 2026-07-14).

* fix(security): accept the Postgres json-column shape of the complexity value (codex review of #843)

On SQLite the TEXT column returns the JSON-stringified value
('"very_strong"'), but on Postgres (production default) setting_value
is a json column and arrives already decoded ('very_strong') — the bare
JSON.parse threw and the outer catch silently fell back to 'moderate'
again. Parse with fallback, mirroring getAppSetting's documented
pattern; test now covers both driver shapes + the empty-value default.
2026-07-19 20:04:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f891b16503 chore(main): release 3.92.1-beta.0 (#842)
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2026-07-19 09:22:09 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 216c282542 Merge pull request #841 from PicPeak/chore/storage-ignore-dead-code
chore(backend): ignore runtime storage in git/docker, remove dead getSafeFilename
2026-07-19 11:18:59 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f7fd89387b Merge pull request #834 from Dodothereal/fix/821-bug
fix(uploads): support configured raw formats
2026-07-19 11:18:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2f4b8a64c0 chore(backend): ignore runtime storage in git/docker, remove dead getSafeFilename
Follow-ups from the codex review of #834:

- .gitignore: backend/storage/ is runtime-generated (media, previews,
  thumbnails, business docs) and was only partially ignored — E2E runs
  left it dangling as untracked, which is how ~12 MB of artifacts nearly
  landed in a commit. Ignore the whole directory (nothing under it is
  tracked); replaces the narrower business-docs rule.
- backend/.dockerignore: the granular storage/* rules missed
  storage/previews, so locally generated previews were copied into
  production images. Exclude storage entirely — the Dockerfile creates
  the needed directories itself (RUN mkdir -p, Dockerfile:96).
- fileSecurityUtils.js: remove getSafeFilename — zero callers across the
  repo, and its private extension whitelist silently drifted from the
  real validation paths (see #834), which is exactly the trap dead
  security code sets.
2026-07-19 00:40:53 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c8eb334637 test(uploads): harden frontend map parser, drop dead getSafeFilename edit (codex review of #834)
- getFrontendExtensionMap now tolerates quoted keys and trailing comments
  and throws on any other unparsable map line, so future syntax drift fails
  loudly instead of silently dropping entries from the comparison.
- Revert the .dng/.heic/.heif addition to getSafeFilename: the helper has
  no callers, so the edit was dead code. Live validation paths already
  cover these formats.
2026-07-18 23:46:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 14d5fa6ca5 chore(main): release 3.92.0-beta.0 (#840)
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2026-07-18 19:02:48 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 84f370f4c2 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into pr-834
# Conflicts:
#	frontend/src/components/gallery/UserPhotoUpload.tsx
#	frontend/src/i18n/locales/de.json
#	frontend/src/i18n/locales/en.json
#	frontend/src/i18n/locales/es.json
#	frontend/src/i18n/locales/fr.json
#	frontend/src/i18n/locales/nl.json
#	frontend/src/i18n/locales/pt.json
#	frontend/src/i18n/locales/ru.json
#	frontend/src/i18n/locales/sl.json
#	frontend/src/services/publicSettings.service.ts
#	frontend/src/utils/__tests__/fileTypes.test.ts
2026-07-18 21:02:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8c260c4eeb Merge pull request #833 from PicPeak/feat/guest-upload-dng-raw
feat(uploads): DNG / camera-RAW support via embedded-preview extraction (#821)
2026-07-18 20:58:44 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ec69ad84f2 chore(main): release 3.91.0-beta.0 (#835)
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2026-07-18 18:52:51 +00:00
Paul Nothaft d7ba781c0f Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/guest-upload-dng-raw
# Conflicts:
#	backend/src/services/uploadSettings.js
#	backend/src/utils/fileSecurityUtils.js
#	frontend/src/utils/fileTypes.ts
2026-07-18 20:52:08 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ee9d2f70d3 Merge pull request #832 from PicPeak/feat/guest-upload-heic-dynamic-hint
feat(uploads): HEIC/HEIF support + dynamic format hint on guest upload (#821)
2026-07-18 20:47:36 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d0ccadbc99 fix(uploads): RAW derivative key collision, watermark skip, dev exiftool (codex review of #833 round 2)
- Derivative key collision: processUploadedPhotos/replacePhoto passed the
  client-supplied original filename as the RAW output basename, but thumbnails/
  heroes/previews are global keys — two galleries uploading IMG_0001.dng would
  overwrite each other's derivative. Use the unique stored newFilename instead.
  (processPhoto already used the unique photo.filename.)
- Watermark: the watermark path opens the original with sharp, which can't decode
  RAW, so it fell back to the original bytes and recorded the copy as watermarked.
  Skip RAW in generateForPhoto (like videos) so the watermark state stays honest
  until RAW watermarking is properly supported.
- exiftool added to Dockerfile.dev so dev/native runtimes don't accept a DNG then
  fail it with ENOENT.
2026-07-17 22:50:24 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b743ea0398 fix(uploads): apply RAW extraction in the actual async ingest path (codex review of #833)
The RAW/DNG extraction was only wired into processUploadedPhotos() (the
synchronous path), but real uploads queue to 'pending' and are handled by the
background worker → processPhoto(), which generated the thumbnail + dimensions
directly from the DNG (both fail) and then marked the photo 'complete' — success
with no thumbnail. Wire withProcessableImage() into processPhoto() (the live
path) and into photoReplacementService.replacePhoto() (replace-by-name), so all
three ingest paths extract the embedded JPEG preview for RAW.

Updates the processPhoto test's imageProcessor mock with the new
withProcessableImage dependency (pass-through for ordinary images).
2026-07-17 22:35:11 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 808d305549 fix(gallery): serve JPEG preview for non-displayable originals in lightbox (codex review of #832)
The lightbox falls back to photo.url (the ORIGINAL) when preview_url is null,
which happens by default (lightbox_preview_enabled=false). For HEIC/HEIF/DNG the
original bytes aren't renderable in an <img>, so the lightbox showed a broken
image. Now force preview_url for those formats (by MIME or extension) regardless
of the toggle, so the browser always gets the generated JPEG preview. Covers DNG
too (forward-compatible with #833).

EXPERIMENTAL caveat unchanged: whether the preview actually renders still depends
on the backend decoding the source — HEVC-in-HEIC on the prod Alpine image is
unverified, DNG needs exiftool (#833). Documented on the PR.
2026-07-17 22:21:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e732e13f24 fix(uploads): DNG magic must be a single entry (.every validation)
The magic-number check in validateFileContent uses .every(), so the two
endianness entries (II + MM) could never both match — an admin DNG upload would
be rejected at content validation. Use the little-endian II magic only (Apple
ProRAW / camera DNGs); a rare big-endian DNG fails the check and is rejected,
which is safe since the embedded-preview extraction validates real content.
2026-07-17 22:07:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft c9b64d9c1a fix(uploads): register HEIC/HEIF with the file validator + fix admin format hint (codex review of #832)
Two findings from the Codex review:

- validateFileType requires an ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES entry, which had neither
  image/heic nor image/heif — so HEIC was rejected before sharp ever saw it,
  despite the EXTENSION_TO_MIME additions. Added both with a single 'ftyp'
  (offset 4) magic number (the check is .every, so alternatives can't be
  separate entries).

- Changing the shared upload.fileRequirements string to interpolate {{formats}}
  left the admin PhotoUpload caller passing only { limit }, rendering the
  placeholder literally (it was also already dropping {{sizeLimit}} from #823).
  The admin caller now passes formats + sizeLimit + limit, from the admin
  settings it already loads.
2026-07-17 22:06:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft be2ec0a4a1 feat(uploads): DNG / camera-RAW support via embedded-preview extraction (#821)
Sharp's bundled libvips has no raw loader, so a DNG can't be thumbnailed
directly. This adds a preview-extraction step so RAW/DNG uploads get a proper
thumbnail + gallery preview while the original RAW is kept for download.

- imageProcessor: isRawFilename() + extractRawPreview() (exiftool extracts the
  embedded full-res JPEG — JpgFromRaw → PreviewImage → ThumbnailImage, validated
  with sharp) + withProcessableImage() which is a pass-through for ordinary
  images and swaps in the extracted JPEG for RAW. Wired into ingest
  (photoProcessor) and all three on-demand generators (ensureThumbnail/Hero/
  Preview). generateHeroImage/generatePreviewImage gained outputBasename so
  RAW-derived outputs stay named after the source.
- Dockerfile: add exiftool (confirmed present in Alpine v3.24 community).
- Format maps: dng → image/x-adobe-dng in uploadSettings.js and fileTypes.ts;
  ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES gains a DNG entry (TIFF magic numbers) so it passes the
  security file-validator.

Strictly gated by extension: nothing in this path runs for jpg/png/webp/etc, so
existing photos are unaffected. If extraction fails (corrupt RAW, no embedded
preview), the photo is marked 'failed' with a clear error — same as any
unreadable upload.

Verification boundary (please validate on a real DNG after the image rebuilds):
the exiftool extraction itself couldn't be exercised in the dev sandbox
(exiftool isn't a dev dependency and there's no DNG fixture). Unit tests cover
the gating (RAW detection + non-RAW pass-through + clean failure without
exiftool); existing processPhoto tests still pass. Known limitation: a DNG is
only accepted when the browser reports its MIME as image/x-adobe-dng (Chrome
does); browsers that send an empty type reject it client- and server-side —
a follow-up can add extension-based acceptance for the RAW set.

Companion to the HEIC/dynamic-hint PR; targets main only.
2026-07-17 21:51:21 +02:00
Dodothereal f4b685a5ab fix(uploads): allow configured raw formats
Assisted-by: Claude Code
2026-07-17 21:50:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8e0005e170 chore(main): release 3.90.2-beta.0 (#826)
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2026-07-17 19:45:29 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 43c6d22bdd Merge pull request #830 from PicPeak/fix/guest-upload-size-followup
fix(uploads): tighten guest max-file-size setting (codex review of #823)
2026-07-17 21:39:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2b5b23b96f feat(uploads): HEIC/HEIF support + dynamic format hint on guest upload (#821)
Two of the three things from #821:

- HEIC/HEIF (iPhone) can now be enabled. Sharp's bundled libvips decodes `heif`
  input (verified: sharp.format.heif.input.file === true on 0.34.3 / libvips
  8.17.1), so thumbnails generate. Added heic/heif to EXTENSION_TO_MIME in both
  the backend (uploadSettings.js) and the frontend (fileTypes.ts) maps, which
  are kept in sync. (iOS Safari usually transcodes HEIC→JPEG at file selection,
  but a genuine .heic upload is now handled when it arrives.)

- The upload requirements hint no longer hardcodes "JPEG, PNG or WebP". New
  extensionsToLabel() renders the actually-configured, supported formats (e.g.
  "JPG, PNG, WEBP, MOV"), and upload.fileRequirements interpolates {{formats}}
  across all 8 locales. Unsupported extensions are dropped from the label so it
  never advertises a format the backend would reject.

DNG / camera RAW is deliberately NOT included: Sharp's libvips has no raw loader,
so a DNG would upload then fail thumbnailing (photo → 'failed', no preview).
Proper RAW support (embedded-preview extraction) is a separate PR.

Adds vitest coverage for extensionsToLabel + the HEIC mapping.
2026-07-17 21:39:34 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0245e445ca Merge pull request #828 from PicPeak/fix/hero-logo-visible-null-validation
fix(events): accept hero_logo_visible: null on create/update (#822)
2026-07-17 21:39:12 +02:00
Dodothereal 433fb9a989 fix(uploads): show configured guest file types
Assisted-by: Claude Code
2026-07-17 21:35:53 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e03d13efde fix(uploads): tighten guest max-file-size setting (codex review of #823)
Three follow-ups from the Codex review of #823:

1. PublicSettings TypeScript interface was missing general_max_file_size_mb,
   so UserPhotoUpload's access produced TS2339 under `tsc -b` (build:check). CI
   didn't catch it because the pipeline runs `build` (esbuild, no typecheck),
   but it's a real type gap — the #614 count field is declared, this one wasn't.
   Added the optional numeric field.

2. The general-settings update endpoint validated general_max_files_per_upload
   but not general_max_file_size_mb, so an out-of-range value (0, -1, huge)
   could persist. publicSettings then advertised the raw value while
   getMaxFileSizeMb() normalised it — the guest UI would reject files the
   backend accepts. Added the same validate-and-clamp block (1..MAX_ALLOWED_FILE_SIZE_MB).

3. The update route cleared the file-count cache but not the new file-size
   cache, so for up to 60s the public endpoint could advertise a new limit
   while multer still enforced the old one. Now clears both under the same
   uploadLimitTouched guard.

Follow-up on the merged #823 (main-only), so this targets main only.
2026-07-17 21:30:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b97b130cad fix(events): accept hero_logo_visible: null on create/update (#822)
hero_logo_visible is nullable — null means "inherit the global
branding_logo_display_hero toggle" (#756, migration 152). But the create and
update validators used `.optional()` without `{ nullable: true }`, which only
skips `undefined`; an explicit `null` still ran `.isBoolean()` and failed with
HTTP 400 "Invalid value". Saving an event with `hero_logo_visible: null` (the
inherit state the frontend sends) was rejected on v3.45.2.

- Both routes: `body('hero_logo_visible').optional({ nullable: true }).isBoolean()`,
  matching the already-correct `hero_logo_size` rule next to it.
- Create handler: guard on `!= null` instead of `!== undefined` so an explicit
  null stores NULL (inherit) rather than being coerced to 0/false by
  formatBoolean on SQLite. The update handler already did `=== null ? null`.

Left hero_logo_position on plain `.optional()` on purpose: its column is NOT
NULL (no inherit migration) and its handler always resolves to a concrete value
via `|| brandingDefaults`, so null is genuinely invalid there — allowing it
would trade the 400 for a 500.

Adds smoke tests: PUT accepts hero_logo_visible: null and stores NULL; a
non-boolean value is still rejected.
2026-07-17 21:13:39 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2a0361a83b Merge pull request #824 from PicPeak/fix/update-instructions-production-compose
fix(update): target docker-compose.production.yml in dashboard update steps + gate mailhog
2026-07-17 21:03:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 29f1d23a0a Merge pull request #823 from PicPeak/fix/guest-upload-max-file-size
fix(uploads): apply configured max file size to guest uploads (#613 follow-up)
2026-07-17 21:02:35 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 51a505e379 fix(update): target docker-compose.production.yml in dashboard update steps
Production installs use docker-compose.production.yml (the README's documented
path, pinned GHCR images, no dev services), but the dashboard's update
instructions emitted bare `docker compose pull` / `up -d`. Bare `docker compose`
operates on docker-compose.yml — a different, build-based stack — so a
production user who followed the steps:
  - never pulled/recreated their real containers (stayed on the old version,
    e.g. stuck on 3.44.0 after "updating" to 3.45.2), and
  - started the dev-only mailhog service that docker-compose.yml defines
    (reported restart-looping).

The backend runs inside a container and can't stat the host's compose files, but
docker-compose.production.yml passes PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL into the backend env
and docker-compose.yml does not. detectEnvironment() now derives
isProductionCompose from it, and the Docker update steps prepend
`-f docker-compose.production.yml` when set. The non-production branch keeps the
bare commands but the warning now tells users to add `-f docker-compose.production.yml`
if they installed with it.

Also gates the mailhog service in docker-compose.yml behind a `dev` compose
profile so a plain `docker compose up -d` never starts it (opt in with
`docker compose --profile dev up -d`). Nothing depends on it (SMTP_HOST comes
from .env), so gating is safe. Verified: `docker compose config` lists mailhog
only with `--profile dev`; production compose is unchanged.

Adds unit tests for the production-vs-default command generation.
2026-07-17 20:55:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1e38d84808 fix(uploads): apply configured max file size to guest uploads (#613 follow-up)
The admin's Settings → General → "Max File Size (MB)" value
(general_max_file_size_mb) never applied to guest gallery uploads — the guest
route hardcoded multer's per-file cap at 50MB (gallery.js) and the guest UI
hardcoded the same 50MB client-side guard and "max 50MB" hint text. So a guest
could not upload a large video even when the admin raised the limit (reported by
mat1990dj on #613). Same class as the file-count miss fixed in #614, for size.

- uploadSettings.js: new getMaxFileSizeMb()/getMaxFileSizeBytes() reading
  general_max_file_size_mb (default 50MB, cached 60s, clamped to a 10GB ceiling),
  mirroring getMaxFilesPerUpload.
- gallery.js (guest upload): multer limits.fileSize now resolves from the
  setting; a LIMIT_FILE_SIZE error returns an actionable "max N MB" message.
- publicSettings.js: exposes general_max_file_size_mb (default 50) so the gallery
  UI can render the real limit and guard client-side before an oversized POST.
- UserPhotoUpload.tsx: reads the limit, uses it for the client-side size guard,
  and passes it to the requirements hint. The "max 50MB" literal in
  upload.fileRequirements is now interpolated ({{sizeLimit}}) across all 8
  locales; adds upload.fileTooLarge (en/de; others fall back to en).

Scope: guest path only (the reported gap). The admin path keeps its generous
10GB cap — admins are trusted and default 50MB would otherwise regress large
admin video uploads. Format and batch-size limits already work correctly and are
untouched. Adds SQLite-backed unit tests for the new getter.

Verified end-to-end on a booted instance: admin sets 500MB → persisted → public
settings exposes 500 → guest multer sources its cap from it.
2026-07-17 20:41:27 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1b32d4691e chore(main): release 3.90.1-beta.0 (#820)
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2026-07-17 07:35:38 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e7ca8bdb7f Merge pull request #817 from PicPeak/fix/legacy-events-router-bola
fix(security): remove unguarded legacy /api/events router (GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq)
2026-07-17 09:29:20 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6cd546e86a fix(security): remove unguarded legacy /api/events router (GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq)
The legacy gallery router mounted at /api/events exposed create/list/update/
delete/extend guarded by adminAuth ALONE — no requirePermission, no
requireEventOwnership. adminAuth only checks the token is a valid type:'admin'
session, which every back-office role holds, down to read-only `viewer`. So any
non-super-admin account could:
  - GET /api/events → every gallery's bcrypt password_hash, share_token, and
    client name/email (the list handler selects * and mapEventForApi keeps
    those columns),
  - PUT /api/events/:id → reset any gallery's password (full takeover),
  - DELETE /api/events/:id → delete any gallery,
all bypassing the per-photographer ownership isolation the canonical
/api/admin/events router enforces. Affects any instance with more than the
single super_admin.

Fix: remove the legacy router entirely (mount + require + src/routes/events.js).
It was a superseded duplicate of /api/admin/events and unused by the frontend
EXCEPT for one live route — POST /:id/extend (the "Extend expiration" UI action,
which hit /api/events/:id/extend via the api client's /api base). That route is
migrated to the canonical mount as POST /api/admin/events/:id/extend with the
same guards as every other gallery mutation (adminAuth + requirePermission
('events.edit') + requireEventOwnership), and the frontend is repointed to it.
Behaviour of the extend itself is unchanged (expires_at + reactivate).

Verified end-to-end on a booted instance: /api/events (all methods) now 404;
/api/admin/events/:id/extend returns 401 unauth, 200 for the owner, 403 for a
non-owning editor; the full login→create→extend flow works. Adds a regression
test pinning the router removal and the extend ownership check.
2026-07-17 09:16:51 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7f22a9ee3d chore(main): release 3.90.0-beta.0 (#816)
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2026-07-16 12:08:11 +00:00
Paul Nothaft f12606b4e0 Merge pull request #806 from PicPeak/feat/oidc-sso-phase1
feat(auth): OIDC SSO for admin users — phase 1
2026-07-16 14:04:39 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cbde7636aa Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/oidc-sso-phase1
# Conflicts:
#	backend/src/middleware/maintenance.js
2026-07-16 13:53:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b5ac24ea46 chore(main): release 3.89.0-beta.0 (#814)
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2026-07-16 11:43:50 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a77c2c2c57 Merge pull request #813 from PicPeak/feat/harden-picpeak-restore-robustness
feat(security): harden .picpeak restore robustness — sessions, roles, sequences
2026-07-16 13:39:17 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7ebc232620 Merge pull request #811 from PicPeak/fix/security-advisories-backend
fix(security): close 4 open security advisories (backup takeover, share-login bypass, ZIP slip, chunked-upload traversal)
2026-07-16 13:37:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 199dab82ae Merge pull request #808 from PicPeak/fix/docker-image-os-cves
chore(security): close 21 frontend image CVEs — nginx 1.30 base + apk cache-bust
2026-07-16 13:37:25 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 340d91bdd5 feat(security): harden .picpeak restore robustness — sessions, roles, sequences
Implements the three restore-hardening items deferred from the #811 Codex
review (all validated against a real Postgres, see __tests__/integration/
picpeakRestorePg.test.js). Backend-only; targets main (feature, not a backport).

1. Global session cutoff (utils/sessionCutoff.js). A restore reassigns admin/
   customer/event ids, so ANY pre-restore JWT can rebind to a different restored
   principal. Revoking just the importing token wasn't enough. importFromPicpeak
   now stamps a unix-second cutoff in app_settings after the restore commits, and
   adminAuth / galleryAuth / verifyGalleryAccess / customerAuth reject any token
   whose iat predates it (cached 30s → one in-memory compare on the hot path).
   The operator's forced re-login mints a token past the cutoff, so it passes.

2. Role preservation across an RBAC replace (captureOperatorRole /
   preserveOperatorRole). The operator's role + granted permission NAMES are
   captured before the wipe; after roles/role_permissions are replaced the role
   is resolved by NAME against the restored data, and re-created with its grants
   if the backup omits it — so a crafted or cross-instance backup can't silently
   downgrade or lock out the operator. reinjectCurrentAdmin now returns the
   operator's id so the row can be re-pointed at the resolved role.

3. Postgres identity-sequence resync (resyncSequences). batchInsert writes
   explicit ids without advancing the sequences, so the next natural insert into
   any restored table collided on the PK. Runs AFTER commit (setval isn't
   transactional) and guards every table with a column-existence check —
   pg_get_serial_sequence RAISES on id-less tables like role_permissions.
   No-op on SQLite.

Tests: SQLite unit tests for the cutoff and role preservation; a gated Postgres
integration suite (npm run test:pg with PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL) covering sequence
resync, the id-less-table guard, explicit-id reinject, role re-creation, and a
full cross-instance replaceAllTables run asserting operator preservation, role
re-establishment, FK integrity, and collision-free post-restore inserts.

Stacks on #811 (shares the reinject hardening); merge after it.
2026-07-16 12:56:34 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 38fd41aad3 fix(security): harden .picpeak restore operator-preservation (GHSA-qxfx follow-up)
The req.admin.id fix activated reinjectCurrentAdmin(); hardening its preservation
logic (found across Codex review rounds of #811):

- MFA hijack: reinject wrote back only password_hash/is_active/
  must_change_password, leaving a crafted backup's two_factor_* on the
  operator's row — it could strip or replace their second factor. The email-
  matched row is now updated with the operator's full AUTH set (login identity,
  password, and all two_factor_* columns). Relationship/audit FKs (role_id,
  created_by) are deliberately NOT forced from the snapshot: on a cross-instance
  restore those pre-restore ids may be absent from the backup and would dangle
  the FK (SQLite rolls back at commit); the restored row keeps its own valid
  values.

- Cross-instance restore rollback / FK safety: reinject matched only by email,
  so a backup shipping a different admin with the default `admin` username hit
  UNIQUE(username) and rolled the whole restore back; email and username could
  even collide on two different rows. Reconciliation is now non-destructive:
  the email-matching row is updated in place (id preserved → restored FKs like
  events.created_by stay valid); any different row holding the operator's
  username is RENAMED, not deleted (deletion would fire ON DELETE actions /
  dangle references); only when no row has the operator's email is a fresh row
  inserted, with created_by nulled and an explicit max(id)+1 id (batchInsert
  left the Postgres identity sequence unadvanced, so a sequence-based insert
  could collide).

- Stale session after restore: admin_users ids shift on restore, but the
  operator's live JWT is bound only to decoded.id (IP logged not enforced; the
  backup controls password_changed_at). The route now revokes the token (result
  checked and logged) and clears the admin cookie; the client redirects to a
  fresh login via a sessionInvalidated flag. Cookie clear is the unconditional
  guarantee.

Adds SQLite-backed reinject regression tests (in-place login/MFA restore with id
and FK columns preserved, username-only rename, email+username on different rows,
clean insert with created_by nulled) and the frontend redirect on
sessionInvalidated.

Deferred (design decisions / pre-existing, need a Postgres test env — see PR
discussion): global "invalidate all pre-restore sessions" cutoff; preserving the
operator's ROLE semantics across an RBAC-table replace; and resyncing Postgres
identity sequences after any restore (batchInsert leaves them behind max(id) —
pre-existing, affects every restored table).
2026-07-16 12:27:59 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 31bc01cb4b fix(security): sanitize chunked-upload filename (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j)
The chunked video upload stored req.body.filename unmodified and later built
the merged path as path.join(tempDir, uploadMeta.filename). path.join does not
neutralise '../', so a filename like '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the
temp dir on merge and overwrote arbitrary files. Requires admin with
photos.upload.

Fix: path.basename() the client filename in initializeUpload() and reject
names that collapse to nothing. Adds a regression test.
2026-07-16 10:55:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9cd6b08441 fix(security): reject ZIP-slip entries in archive/backup restore (GHSA-jfhw-fj23-fx6x)
node-stream-zip's extract(null, root) writes each entry to path.join(root,
entry.name) without neutralising '../', so a crafted archive entry named
'../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the target dir and overwrote arbitrary
files (logos, .env, route files → RCE on source deploys). Requires admin with
archives.restore.

Adds assertZipEntriesWithin() to utils/safePath.js — a lexical containment
check run on the entry list BEFORE extract() — and guards both extract sinks:
adminArchives.js (the reported route) and picpeakImportService.js (the sibling
.picpeak import, same sink). Adds unit tests for traversal, absolute-path, and
sibling-prefix entries.
2026-07-16 10:55:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7dace044dc fix(security): share-login must not bypass gallery password (GHSA-9hmx-68vc-qpqw)
POST /auth/gallery/share-login validated only the 128-bit share token and then
minted a full type:'gallery' access token regardless of require_password —
computing requiresPassword at the end only to echo it, never enforce it. Anyone
holding a gallery's share link could read and download every photo in a
password-protected gallery via a direct API call, no password needed.

Fix: compute requiresPassword before minting; for a password-protected gallery
return { requires_password: true } with NO token and NO cookie. The client then
goes through /gallery/verify, which does bcrypt.compare the password. The public
(no-password) auto-login path is unchanged. The frontend already falls through
to the password prompt when share-login returns no token/event.

Adds route regression test covering the bypass, the public path, and bad tokens.
2026-07-16 10:55:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 348894efef fix(security): preserve current admin on .picpeak restore (GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f)
adminAuth populates req.admin, not req.user, so currentAdminId was always
undefined in the /api/admin/picpeak/import handler. reinjectCurrentAdmin()
then had no account to preserve and the admin_users table was fully replaced
by the uploaded backup — a crafted .picpeak let any admin with backup.restore
take over every admin account (critical). One-line fix: pass req.admin.id.

Closes GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f and its duplicate GHSA-pjp6-jcrj-3cr5.
2026-07-16 10:55:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft efccecb3d8 chore(main): release 3.88.1-beta.0 (#810)
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2026-07-16 08:36:29 +00:00
Paul Nothaft eadf282755 Merge pull request #807 from PicPeak/fix/settings-secret-exposure-mfa-maintenance
fix(security): mask backup credentials on read + unblock MFA login during maintenance
2026-07-16 10:32:19 +02:00
Paul Nothaft eb03b61268 chore(security): close 21 frontend image CVEs — nginx 1.30 base + apk cache-bust
The frontend image kept shipping vulnerable OS packages (nginx 1.28.3-r1,
curl/libcurl 8.19.0, c-ares 1.34.6) despite the apk upgrade line, for two
independent reasons:

1. The runtime stage's apk upgrade layer was cached indefinitely — the
   CACHEBUST build-arg CI passes (github.run_number) was only declared in
   the builder stage, and ARGs don't cross stage boundaries. Both
   Dockerfiles now redeclare CACHEBUST in the runtime stage and consume it
   in the apk RUN, so every build re-runs the upgrade and picks up current
   Alpine security updates.

2. nginx itself can never upgrade via apk on the nginx.org-based image:
   the bundled nginx-module-* packages pin the exact nginx version, so
   Alpine's patched 1.28.3-r4 is unreachable (verified empirically —
   apk add --upgrade nginx is a silent no-op). nginx fixes must come via
   the base tag, so bump to nginx:1.30-alpine (current stable, 1.30.4 on
   Alpine 3.24, same nginx.org conf.d layout — drop-in).

Verified: local image build scans clean with Trivy (0 OS findings, was 21);
container serves /health, SPA fallback, and BRAND_TITLE envsubst as non-root
nginx user.

Closes code-scanning alerts 371-374, 376-392 (nginx HTTP/2 & module CVEs,
curl CVE-2026-5773/-6276 + 6 medium, c-ares CVE-2026-33630).
2026-07-16 10:29:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 07f2c90055 fix(security): mask backup credentials on read + unblock MFA login during maintenance
Two pre-existing bugs surfaced while reviewing #806 (kept separate per
scope policy — no OIDC code here):

- backup_s3_secret_key and backup_rsync_ssh_key (an SSH PRIVATE KEY)
  were returned in PLAINTEXT by GET /admin/backup/config and by the
  generic settings reads (GET /admin/settings and /admin/settings/:type
  — which mask the recaptcha/umami/rybbit keys but not these). All
  three now mask with the established bullet sentinel, and
  PUT /admin/backup/config skips the sentinel on write so the edit form
  round-trips without clobbering stored credentials (same pattern as
  the email/WhatsApp config endpoints)
- /api/auth/admin/login/mfa was missing from the maintenance-mode
  allowlist: the first login step passed, the second factor got a 503 —
  any MFA-enrolled admin was locked out exactly while maintenance mode
  was on

Regression tests: masking on all three read paths, sentinel round-trip
preserves stored values, real rotation still writes.
2026-07-16 10:13:34 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e91c7deaa4 fix(oidc): local-credential lockout, session hydration, split-origin gaps (codex round 3)
- OIDC-owned accounts can never authenticate locally: the password
  login rejects auth_provider='oidc' rows outright (generic 401), and
  the super-admin password reset refuses them with a clear message —
  previously a reset would have minted a local password bypassing the
  IdP's MFA/access policies
- /auth/session now returns a full adminUser payload (role join) and
  AdminAuthContext hydrates user state from it: an SSO redirect
  establishes the session without any login JSON, which left the header
  identity blank and current-admin form defaults empty
- the /sso/login error path redirects absolute to the frontend base
  (same split-origin reasoning as the callback)
- docker-compose.yml passes API_URL through to the backend (production
  compose uses env_file and needs nothing; dev compose is gitignored)
- authSession.symmetry test mock taught the joined admin lookup
  (leftJoin, prefixed columns, aliases) — the route change made the old
  mock throw, which read as "table missing, trust token"

Tests: new case pins that a known-good password on an OIDC-owned row
still gets 401. 14/14 OIDC, 13/13 symmetry.
2026-07-16 10:07:59 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7f7d38a57f fix(oidc): security + robustness hardening from codex review rounds 1-2
Round 1:
- bind SSO identities to (external_issuer, external_subject): OIDC only
  guarantees sub uniqueness within an issuer, so a sub-only lookup let a
  newly configured IdP's user inherit an old IdP's admin account on
  subject collision; migration 162 gains external_issuer + composite
  unique index (unmerged migration, edited in place)
- fetch UserInfo (with sub cross-check) when the ID token carries no
  email — spec-compliant providers may serve email/profile claims only
  there; ID-token claims win on merge
- allowlist /admin/sso/login + /callback in maintenance mode, or
  SSO-only (JIT) admins are locked out exactly when they need in
- strip reserved keys (oidc_client_secret, setup_token) from BOTH
  generic settings reads (GET / and GET /:type)

Round 2:
- redirect_uri prefers API_URL (the API's public origin — where the
  state cookie lives); final redirects absolute to the frontend base;
  login button builds its URL via buildResourceUrl — split-origin
  deployments (absolute VITE_API_URL) work end to end
- PUT /sso validates the MERGED resulting state (partial update cannot
  blank issuer/client while enabled=true survives; enabling requires a
  derivable redirect URI)
- openid scope forced into oidc_scopes on save
- discovery-cache key includes a secret fingerprint (multi-worker
  secret rotation)
- email→admin linking claims the row atomically (conditional update on
  external_subject IS NULL) — concurrent first-time callbacks with the
  same verified email but different subjects can't both authenticate

Tests: mock IdP gains userinfo endpoint + email-via-userinfo-only mode;
new cases pin the userinfo merge and issuer-collision non-inheritance;
redirect assertions updated for absolute URLs. 13/13.
2026-07-16 09:41:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ac1838fbd7 fix(oidc): fail clearly when no public base URL is configured
CI exposed that getFrontendBaseUrl() returns '' without FRONTEND_URL or
the general_site_url setting (local runs were masked by backend/.env):
the flow then sent a RELATIVE redirect_uri to the IdP, which surfaced
as an opaque IdP-side error. getRedirectUri now throws OIDC_BAD_CONFIG
with an actionable message (login route maps it to sso_error=config);
the settings GET degrades to an empty redirect_uri instead of 500ing.
The test pins FRONTEND_URL explicitly so it runs identically with and
without a local .env.
2026-07-16 08:59:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ed5fc5ad5c feat(auth): OIDC SSO for admin users — phase 1 (#798)
Authorization-code + PKCE against a single configurable IdP via
openid-client v5, with JIT provisioning. Verified end-to-end against a
real Keycloak 26 (realm + confidential client + verified-email user):
settings → discovery test → login button → Keycloak → dashboard.

Backend:
- migration 162: admin_users.auth_provider ('local' default) +
  external_subject, composite unique index
- oidcService: settings-driven config (client secret AES-256-GCM at
  rest, mfaService pattern, OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY fallback JWT_SECRET),
  cached discovery, sub-based identity binding — email linking of
  existing admins only with email_verified=true; JIT behind
  oidc_autoprovision with configurable default role and an unusable
  random password hash
- GET /api/auth/admin/sso/login + /callback: state/nonce/PKCE verifier
  cross the redirect in a 10-min signed httpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie;
  the callback reuses the local login's session establishment
  (completeAdminLogin split into establishAdminSession + JSON wrapper)
  so SSO sessions are identical downstream; every failure lands on
  /admin/login?sso_error=<key> as a translated toast
- dedicated /admin/settings/sso GET/PUT/test endpoints (secret
  write-only, redacted to a set-flag; registered ABOVE the generic
  /:type matcher which would shadow them); oidc_client_secret added to
  the reserved keys stripped from generic settings upserts
- public settings expose only oidc_enabled + oidc_button_label for the
  login page

Frontend:
- Settings → Single Sign-On (OIDC) tab: issuer/client/secret, scopes,
  autoprovision + default role, button label, enable toggle, redirect
  URI copy box, server-side discovery test
- login page: SSO button (custom label) when enabled; sso_error query
  param surfaced as translated toasts; EN+DE i18n

Tests: 11 integration cases against an in-process mock IdP (real
discovery/JWKS/PKCE/ID-token validation) — JIT on/off, sub-vs-email
binding, unverified-email rejection, deactivated admin, missing/forged
state cookie, nonce tamper, secret encryption round-trip, disabled 404.

MFA is delegated to the IdP on the SSO path; local login stays
available as break-glass. Role-claim mapping and logout-to-IdP follow
in phase 2/3.
2026-07-16 08:54:26 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f0cdcddb92 chore(main): release 3.88.0-beta.0 (#805)
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2026-07-15 21:07:21 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 0751a08aa6 Merge pull request #804 from PicPeak/fix/gallery-feedback-filter-chips
fix(gallery): show feedback filter chips on desktop for galleries without categories
2026-07-15 23:02:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d64eef8abf Merge pull request #803 from PicPeak/fix/event-type-hardcoded-deps
fix(event-types): un-hardcode event type dependencies in v1 API and CRM
2026-07-15 23:02:35 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 109aba8598 Merge pull request #801 from PicPeak/feat/setup-wizard-event-types
feat(setup): event-types step in first-run wizard + un-hardcode event type dependencies
2026-07-15 23:01:36 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b9283386a5 fix(gallery): show feedback filter chips on desktop for galleries without categories (#802)
The desktop feedback-filter chips (All/Likes/Saved/Rated/Commented)
were nested inside the categories row conditional, and the standalone
fallback block is lg:hidden — so a gallery without photo categories
(the default) rendered no feedback filter at all on desktop, despite
the docs and a fully working filter implementation behind it.

Render the row whenever either part has content and gate only the
category scroller on categories existing. The media-count label hides
below lg when no categories exist so the mobile layout stays unchanged
(mobile keeps its own chip block). With-categories galleries render
identically to before.

Regression test pins both chip groups in the DOM with and without
categories (fails on the pre-fix component).
2026-07-15 22:51:22 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5da1c3a12f fix(event-types): un-hardcode event type dependencies in v1 API and CRM (#800)
Split out of #801 so the public-API behavior change gets its own review:

- v1 POST /events validates event_type against the live event_types
  catalog instead of the hardcoded whitelist — custom types created in
  Settings → Event Types were rejected with 400. BREAKING for the
  never-seeded 'family' slug, which the old whitelist silently accepted
  and wrote as a dangling reference; create a matching event type to
  keep using it
- new GET /api/v1/event-types (read scope) so API-token clients can
  discover valid slugs; OpenAPI enum replaced accordingly
- standalone contract→event conversion no longer hardcodes
  event_type: 'wedding' — it resolves via crm_default_event_type, then
  the catalog catch-all, same chain as quote→event conversion
- resolveDefaultEventType moved from quoteService to eventTypeService
  for shared use (no behavior change)
2026-07-15 22:31:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 93301002ba refactor: move v1 API + CRM event-type un-hardcoding to a follow-up PR
Keeps #801 scoped to the setup-wizard event-types feature and its
load-bearing guards. The v1 validator/discovery endpoint and the
contract-conversion default fix ship separately so the public-API
behavior change gets its own review weight.
2026-07-15 22:30:00 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f8ba669716 fix(event-types): harden setup window + catalog validation (codex review)
Three review rounds on PR #801; fixes in response:

- isValidEventType: live catalog is authoritative when it has rows — a
  deleted or deactivated slug no longer validates via the legacy
  fallback (fallback now only serves an empty-catalog install)
- deleteEventType: refuse deleting the last (and last ACTIVE) type;
  updateEventType: refuse deactivating the last active type (unknown
  slugs are rejected since the validator change, so an empty active
  catalog would brick event creation)
- setup window fails closed: only an explicit stored `false` opens it
  (a portable-backup restore can leave the key absent) and a normal
  admin login durably closes it (abandoned-wizard case)
- reserved bootstrap keys (setup_wizard_completed, setup_token) are
  stripped from ALL generic settings upserts (/general, /security,
  /analytics, /seo) so the marker is genuinely one-way
- wizard step: deletes ordered so the catalog can never end up empty,
  and a genuinely failed system-type deletion reloads the list and
  stays on the step instead of advancing past the only window in which
  it can be retried
- CreateEventPage: snap the hardcoded initial 'wedding' selection to
  the first active type when the catalog no longer contains it
- v1 API: new GET /event-types (read scope) so token clients can
  discover valid slugs; OpenAPI enum replaced with the live-catalog
  description
2026-07-15 22:21:20 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 00fff24a1c test(v1): stub eventTypeService in events.create suite + cover unknown-type 400
The catalog-backed event_type validator (#800) makes a db('event_types')
lookup before the handler runs, which consumed the first queued mock
chain and shifted the pinned db() call sequence — 5 tests failed on CI.
Stub isValidEventType to true (validation isn't this suite's subject)
and add an explicit test for the new 400-on-unknown-type path.
2026-07-15 21:36:50 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7eb6357b4a feat(setup): event-types step in first-run wizard + un-hardcode event type deps (#800)
Fresh installs can now shape the event-type catalog during the setup
wizard — rename, delete or replace the seeded defaults while nothing
references them. On existing installs system types stay protected.

- New wizard step between features and config: edit name/URL prefix,
  remove, or add types; defaults shown as recommendations
- setup_wizard_completed app setting (migration 161): seeded true when
  an admin already exists, false on fresh installs; POST /api/setup/
  complete (adminAuth) flips it when the wizard finishes
- deleteEventType: system types deletable only while the flag is unset;
  in-use check extended to quotes; per-type reminder template
  (event_reminder_<slug>) is deleted with the type
- reminder-template self-heal no longer resurrects templates for slugs
  removed from the catalog
- v1 API event creation validates event_type against the live catalog
  instead of a hardcoded whitelist (custom types were rejected; the
  never-seeded 'family' slug is no longer silently accepted)
- contract→event conversion resolves the event type via
  crm_default_event_type / resolveDefaultEventType instead of
  hardcoding 'wedding' (resolveDefaultEventType moved from quoteService
  to eventTypeService for reuse)
2026-07-15 21:30:23 +02:00
Paul Nothaft aab9e1a937 chore(main): release 3.87.0-beta.0 (#797)
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2026-07-11 20:24:23 +00:00
Paul Nothaft ffd4a7eee6 Merge pull request #796 from Luca-Timo/feat/invoice-vat-note
feat(invoices): configurable VAT note under MwSt. line + fix multi-page page-number overlap (#794)
2026-07-11 22:21:41 +02:00
Luca 1476884dd0 feat(invoices): configurable VAT/free-text note + fix multi-page page-number overlap (#794)
Two invoice-PDF changes from #794.

1. VAT / free-text note (Benedikt's request, placement A). A new
   `crm_invoices_vat_note_text` setting (Settings → CRM → Invoices) prints a
   free-text line directly under the MwSt. row on every invoice. Data-driven:
   the admin types the exact wording (Austrian Kleinunternehmer § 6 Abs. 1 Z 27
   UStG, German § 19, reverse-charge, …) — no jurisdiction hardcoded. The
   totals-block reserve grows by the measured note height so a long note can't
   push the grand total into the footer. Read in invoice/render.js, threaded
   through normaliseContext, drawn in drawTotals. Empty → row omitted; quotes
   unaffected.

2. Multi-page footer overlap. On a full continuation page the line-item table
   filled to the bottom margin, but the "Seite X von Y" stamp was drawn at
   marginBottom-12 — INSIDE that fill zone — so items overlapped the page
   number. Move the stamp into the bottom margin (below the content edge),
   zeroing that page's bottom margin during the write so it can't trigger
   PDFKit's auto-page-break. Verified: on a full page the lowest item text is
   at pdfkitY ~790 while the page number sits at ~816 — ~26pt clearance.

Tests: render the note on a single page (byte-delta proves it renders) and
paginate a long invoice with the note (2–3 pages, no stray blank page).
2026-07-11 02:01:20 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e3d597b89a Merge pull request #787 from PicPeak/ci/push-images-to-dockerhub
ci(docker): also publish images to Docker Hub (picpeak/backend, picpeak/frontend)
2026-07-10 20:35:58 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ea9caa9c5d chore(main): release 3.86.0-beta.0 (#795)
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2026-07-10 18:30:28 +00:00
Paul Nothaft d51112e761 Merge pull request #790 from Luca-Timo/feat/category-reorder
feat(categories): per-event category ordering — global default + override (#782)
2026-07-10 20:26:11 +02:00
Luca a4b4485d32 fix(categories): address PR #790 review — event ownership, migration renumber, nits
- 🔴 Event ownership: GET /event/:eventId and DELETE /reorder/:eventId now use
  requireEventOwnership; POST /reorder (event_id in body) gets the equivalent
  inline check (super_admin bypasses; others limited to owned/ownerless events).
  New test covers a settings.edit-holding non-super_admin blocked (403) on all
  three per-event routes.
- 🔴 Migration renumber: 158→159, 159→160 (upstream #788 already took 158);
  headers + the test's require path updated.
- 🟢 Nits: stale inline "Drag the arrows" fallback → "Use the arrows" (matches
  en.json; control is click-only); invalid bg-accent-dark/150 → bg-accent-dark.
2026-07-10 20:10:40 +02:00
Luca 8d0a946478 test(categories): integration tests for layered category ordering (#782)
Real-DB coverage: migration 158 backfill; global default reorder + a
non-customised event following it; per-event override + isolation from other
events; override accepts globals / rejects a foreign event's category; reset
clears the override; create appends.
2026-07-10 16:24:17 +02:00
Luca 4698402b54 feat(categories): per-event category ordering — global default + override (#782)
Order a gallery's categories in the flow of the day instead of A–Z. Two layers,
resolved per event: per-event override > global default > name.

- migration 158: photo_categories.display_order (global default), backfilled
  from the current alphabetical order so existing galleries don't reshuffle.
- migration 159: event_category_order (event_id, category_id, position) — the
  per-event override; no backfill, every event starts on the default.
- utils/categoryOrder: shared resolution used by the admin event view and the
  public gallery; fails safe to the global default if the table is absent.
- adminCategories: POST /reorder sets a per-event override (globals +
  event-specific, interleaved); DELETE /reorder/:eventId resets; POST
  /reorder-global sets the global default. Ordering endpoints + create append.
- gallery renders the resolved order.
- Settings → Photo Categories reorders the global default; an event's Categories
  tab reorders that gallery (one combined list + Reset to default). Up/down
  buttons — no drag-and-drop dependency.
- en/de strings.
2026-07-10 16:24:17 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ed0fa3241b chore(main): release 3.85.0-beta.0 (#793)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-backend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-frontend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
2026-07-10 13:38:57 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 54676424f2 Merge pull request #788 from PicPeak/feat/slideshow-order-category
feat(slideshow): per-event play order + category filter (#202)
2026-07-10 15:35:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b41cb1586d chore(main): release 3.84.1-beta.0 (#792)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-backend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-frontend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
2026-07-10 12:21:09 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 1f3bc3c343 Merge pull request #791 from PicPeak/fix/docker-v-tag-via-ref
fix(ci): publish v-prefixed image tags via type=ref,event=tag (#668)
2026-07-10 14:17:11 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 39db7bf6cb fix(ci): publish v-prefixed image tags via type=ref,event=tag (#668)
#783 added `type=semver,pattern=v{{version}}` to the merge-job metadata,
but metadata-action silently dropped it on prereleases — the 3.84.0-beta.0
build published only :3.84.0-beta.0 + :sha, not :v3.84.0-beta.0 (verified
in the merge-backend push log + GHCR: :v3.84.0-beta.0 → 404).

Replace the v{{version}}/v{{major}} semver patterns with type=ref,event=tag,
which emits the git-tag name verbatim (v3.45.0 / v3.84.0-beta.0) for both
stable and beta tags — exactly the string users pin (matches the GitHub
release). Applies to both backend + frontend merge metadata steps.

Takes effect on the next release build. The bare :3.84.0-beta.0 tags stay
(the {{version}} patterns are unchanged), so both forms resolve.
2026-07-10 14:13:17 +02:00
Paul Nothaft aeade94a35 Merge pull request #786 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-backend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-frontend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
chore(main): release 3.84.0-beta.0
2026-07-10 13:04:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b768a53c5b feat(slideshow): per-event play order + category filter (#202)
The Live Slideshow already covers the core of #202 (fullscreen kiosk,
live-appending new uploads, timing/transitions/watermark, per-event
opt-in via the share link). This adds the two customization dimensions
the reporter also asked for:

- **Play order** (show_order): 'chronological' (upload order, default) or
  'random' — the client shuffles the initial set (Fisher-Yates) so
  live-appended uploads keep working.
- **Category filter** (show_category_id): restrict the slideshow to a
  single photo category (NULL = all photos, default). Enforced
  server-side on the slideshow /photos access and mirrored in the
  /session + /state photo_count, so the kiosk viewer can't widen the set.

Per-event enable/disable (default off) is unchanged — it's the existing
'Generate/Disable slideshow link' flow (no token = no slideshow).

- Migration 158: show_order (default 'chronological') + show_category_id.
- Admin: Play-order dropdown + category picker in the Live Slideshow card
  (picker hidden for events without categories); EN + DE i18n.
- Verified: migration (SQLite + PG); live API (category filter → 3/2/5
  photos + matching count; order propagates) and the running kiosk
  requests exactly the filtered set; tsc clean, 136 backend tests pass.
2026-07-10 10:46:54 +02:00
Luca 1f19fbb1b2 ci(docker): mirror published images to Docker Hub
Add picpeak/backend + picpeak/frontend on Docker Hub alongside GHCR. The
merge jobs already assemble the multi-arch manifest from the per-arch GHCR
digests via 'imagetools create'; adding Docker Hub to metadata-action's
images list + a Docker Hub login makes the same command push the manifest to
both registries (blobs copied from GHCR). No change to the build-by-digest
jobs.

Full tag parity (main, stable, latest, semver, sha). Gated on
DOCKERHUB_ENABLED (github.repository == PicPeak/picpeak) so forks stay
GHCR-only and keep building. Requires repo secrets DOCKERHUB_USERNAME and
DOCKERHUB_TOKEN.
2026-07-10 10:26:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 03ded870bf chore(main): release 3.84.0-beta.0 2026-07-10 10:20:17 +02:00
Paul Nothaft df5aeaba41 Merge pull request #785 from PicPeak/docs/releasing-stable-version-alignment
docs(releasing): align stable version to main on promote (Option A)
2026-07-10 10:20:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 279e0472c7 Merge pull request #784 from PicPeak/feat/admin-github-repo-button
feat(admin): GitHub repo button in the sidebar footer (#778)
2026-07-10 10:19:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2ee4146d9a Merge pull request #783 from PicPeak/fix/docker-versioned-tags-v-prefix
fix(ci): publish v-prefixed image tags so :vX.Y.Z resolves (#668)
2026-07-10 10:19:22 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5dea0c9695 docs(releasing): align stable version to main on promote (Option A)
The two release-please tracks count independently — main bumps on every
merge, stable only on promotion — so they drifted far apart (main
v3.83.x-beta while stable sat at v3.45.0 for the same code). Document
the alignment convention: a promotion pins the stable version to main's
base version via a Release-As commit (new step 5 in the cut procedure),
so stable tracks main instead of lagging.

Also records the release-engineering note that release-please.yml must
keep target-branch: stable (the missing pin cut a bogus v2.7.0 once).
2026-07-10 10:03:30 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d3d7df46f2 feat(admin): GitHub repo button in the sidebar footer (#778)
Adds a subtle 'View PicPeak on GitHub' link in the admin sidebar footer
(next to the version/storage widgets), so admins can reach the repo —
star it, browse source, report an issue — from anywhere in the dashboard,
not just the setup screen.

- Centralizes the repo URL as `repoUrl` in utils/githubReleaseUrl.ts
  (githubReleaseUrl now derives from it) so the org URL lives in one place.
- target=_blank + rel=noopener noreferrer; EN + DE i18n
  (`admin.viewOnGithub`); dark-mode aware, matches the muted footer style.
2026-07-10 09:50:05 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 784d059c3d fix(ci): publish v-prefixed image tags so :vX.Y.Z resolves (#668)
docker/metadata-action's type=semver strips the leading 'v', so releases
published only :3.45.0 / :3.83.1-beta.0. But git tags + GitHub releases
are named v3.45.0, so anyone pinning ghcr.io/.../backend:v3.45.0 (the
obvious choice) hit 'manifest unknown' — exactly #664.

Add v-prefixed semver patterns (v{{version}}, v{{major}}.{{minor}},
v{{major}}) alongside the existing bare ones, for both backend and
frontend. Now both :v3.45.0 and :3.45.0 resolve.

Applies to future releases; the already-published v3.45.0 only has the
bare :3.45.0 tag (retagging past releases is out of scope).
2026-07-10 09:46:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft dbe4b588eb chore(main): release 3.83.1-beta.0 (#776)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-backend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-frontend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
2026-07-09 11:17:23 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 274ef0cd73 Merge pull request #774 from PicPeak/fix/release-please-stable-target
fix(release): target stable in release-please + undo bogus 2.7.0 bump
2026-07-09 13:13:23 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 65ac6eddac fix(release): target stable in release-please.yml + undo the bogus 2.7.0 bump
The stable release-please workflow (release-please.yml, triggered on
push to stable) had no `target-branch`, so it defaulted to the repo
default branch (main) and computed the next version from main's stale
`.release-please-manifest.json` (2.6.1) — cutting a spurious **v2.7.0**
stable release (a version regression from 3.44.0) when #771 landed on
stable, and bumping main's package.json + manifest to 2.7.0.

- release-please.yml: add `target-branch: stable` so it releases from
  the stable branch (3.44.0 → 3.45.0), like release-please-beta.yml
  already pins `target-branch: main`.
- Restore main's version to 3.83.0-beta.0 (backend + frontend
  package.json), set `.release-please-manifest.json` to 3.44.0, and drop
  the bogus 2.7.0 CHANGELOG section.

The v2.7.0 tag/release is deleted separately; the real v3.45.0 stable is
cut by re-running release-please on the stable branch after this lands.
2026-07-09 11:39:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft be710eb1de Merge pull request #773 from PicPeak/release-please--branches--main
chore(main): release 2.7.0
2026-07-08 21:14:07 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 58a86af868 chore(main): release 2.7.0 2026-07-08 20:46:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1250306d11 Merge pull request #772 from PicPeak/ci/run-tests-on-stable
ci: run the Tests workflow on stable-targeted PRs
2026-07-08 20:42:01 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 80503c52b9 ci: run the Tests workflow on stable-targeted PRs
tests.yml (the backend/frontend Jest+Vitest jobs) only triggered on
main/beta, but those two jobs are required status checks on the stable
branch. A beta→stable promote PR therefore hung forever on
'Expected — Waiting for status to be reported' for backend/frontend,
while docker-build / install-smoke / schema-drift (already listing
stable) ran fine. Add stable to the push + pull_request filters so the
Tests suite runs on promote PRs too.
2026-07-08 20:29:19 +02:00
378 changed files with 26734 additions and 12544 deletions
+13
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@ NODE_ENV=production
# Generate one with: openssl rand -base64 64
#JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here
# OIDC SSO for admins (#798) — configured in the admin UI; only these two
# values live in the environment:
# Key encrypting the OIDC client secret at rest (defaults to JWT_SECRET).
#OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
# Break-glass: 'true' re-enables local password login even while the SSO
# settings disable it (recovery when the IdP is down or misconfigured).
#OIDC_BREAK_GLASS=false
# Auth cookie Secure flag
# unset - default: follows NODE_ENV (production=true, dev=false)
# true - always set Secure (HTTPS-only cookies; breaks plain-HTTP access)
@@ -107,6 +115,11 @@ VITE_API_URL=/api
# DB_PORT=5432
# REDIS_PORT=6379
# File watcher (watch-folder auto-import, local storage only)
# Max photos processed in parallel — raise on hosts with memory headroom,
# lower to 1 on very small hosts. Default: 2
# FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY=2
# Release Channel
# Options: 'stable' (default), 'beta', or specific version like 'v2.3.0'
# 'stable' uses the :stable tag (same as :latest on main)
+97 -20
View File
@@ -95,6 +95,15 @@ jobs:
repo_lc="${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}"
echo "BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME=${repo_lc}/backend" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
echo "FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME=${repo_lc}/frontend" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
# Mirror manifests to Docker Hub (picpeak/{backend,frontend}) only on the
# canonical org repo, where the DOCKERHUB_* secrets live. Forks (and any
# other owner) fall back to GHCR-only — the Docker Hub image line and login
# are gated on this flag so their builds keep working unchanged.
if [[ "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" == "PicPeak/picpeak" ]]; then
echo "DOCKERHUB_ENABLED=true" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
else
echo "DOCKERHUB_ENABLED=false" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
fi
- name: Prepare platform pair
run: |
@@ -203,14 +212,6 @@ jobs:
format: 'sarif'
output: 'trivy-backend-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }}.sarif'
severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
# Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not actionable: the
# Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a CACHEBUST,
# so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting them
# buries the findings someone can actually do something about.
# Dropping them is also the precondition for ever setting
# exit-code: 1, which build-backend's comment flags as a
# deliberate follow-up.
ignore-unfixed: true
timeout: '10m'
- name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
@@ -241,6 +242,15 @@ jobs:
repo_lc="${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}"
echo "BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME=${repo_lc}/backend" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
echo "FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME=${repo_lc}/frontend" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
# Mirror manifests to Docker Hub (picpeak/{backend,frontend}) only on the
# canonical org repo, where the DOCKERHUB_* secrets live. Forks (and any
# other owner) fall back to GHCR-only — the Docker Hub image line and login
# are gated on this flag so their builds keep working unchanged.
if [[ "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" == "PicPeak/picpeak" ]]; then
echo "DOCKERHUB_ENABLED=true" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
else
echo "DOCKERHUB_ENABLED=false" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
fi
- name: Download digest artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
@@ -274,11 +284,24 @@ jobs:
echo "is_prerelease=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
fi
- name: Log in to Docker Hub
if: env.DOCKERHUB_ENABLED == 'true'
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
registry: docker.io
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Extract metadata for Backend
id: meta-backend
uses: docker/metadata-action@v5
with:
images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME }}
# GHCR always; Docker Hub (picpeak/backend) added on the canonical repo so
# the same tag scheme is mirrored to both registries. metadata-action drops
# the blank second line on forks → GHCR-only there.
images: |
${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME }}
${{ env.DOCKERHUB_ENABLED == 'true' && 'docker.io/picpeak/backend' || '' }}
labels: |
org.opencontainers.image.title=PicPeak Backend
org.opencontainers.image.description=PicPeak photo sharing platform backend service
@@ -290,6 +313,10 @@ jobs:
type=semver,pattern={{version}}
type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
type=semver,pattern={{major}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
# #668/#783: publish the git-tag name verbatim (v3.45.0 / v3.84.0-beta.0)
# so users can pin the same string as the GitHub release. metadata-action's
# `pattern=v{{version}}` silently dropped it on prereleases, so use type=ref.
type=ref,event=tag
type=sha,format=short
# `:latest` + `:stable` follow the stable channel (the `stable` branch +
# stable release tags). The default branch is now `main` (active dev),
@@ -306,10 +333,15 @@ jobs:
docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \
$(printf "${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME }}@sha256:%s " *)
- name: Inspect manifest
- name: Inspect manifest (GHCR)
run: |
docker buildx imagetools inspect ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME }}:${{ steps.meta-backend.outputs.version }}
- name: Inspect manifest (Docker Hub)
if: env.DOCKERHUB_ENABLED == 'true'
run: |
docker buildx imagetools inspect docker.io/picpeak/backend:${{ steps.meta-backend.outputs.version }}
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Frontend: per-arch build, then merge into a multi-arch manifest
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -339,6 +371,15 @@ jobs:
repo_lc="${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}"
echo "BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME=${repo_lc}/backend" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
echo "FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME=${repo_lc}/frontend" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
# Mirror manifests to Docker Hub (picpeak/{backend,frontend}) only on the
# canonical org repo, where the DOCKERHUB_* secrets live. Forks (and any
# other owner) fall back to GHCR-only — the Docker Hub image line and login
# are gated on this flag so their builds keep working unchanged.
if [[ "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" == "PicPeak/picpeak" ]]; then
echo "DOCKERHUB_ENABLED=true" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
else
echo "DOCKERHUB_ENABLED=false" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
fi
- name: Prepare platform pair
run: |
@@ -433,14 +474,6 @@ jobs:
format: 'sarif'
output: 'trivy-frontend-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }}.sarif'
severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
# Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not actionable: the
# Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a CACHEBUST,
# so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting them
# buries the findings someone can actually do something about.
# Dropping them is also the precondition for ever setting
# exit-code: 1, which build-backend's comment flags as a
# deliberate follow-up.
ignore-unfixed: true
timeout: '10m'
- name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
@@ -466,6 +499,15 @@ jobs:
repo_lc="${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}"
echo "BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME=${repo_lc}/backend" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
echo "FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME=${repo_lc}/frontend" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
# Mirror manifests to Docker Hub (picpeak/{backend,frontend}) only on the
# canonical org repo, where the DOCKERHUB_* secrets live. Forks (and any
# other owner) fall back to GHCR-only — the Docker Hub image line and login
# are gated on this flag so their builds keep working unchanged.
if [[ "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" == "PicPeak/picpeak" ]]; then
echo "DOCKERHUB_ENABLED=true" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
else
echo "DOCKERHUB_ENABLED=false" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
fi
- name: Download digest artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
@@ -499,11 +541,24 @@ jobs:
echo "is_prerelease=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
fi
- name: Log in to Docker Hub
if: env.DOCKERHUB_ENABLED == 'true'
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
registry: docker.io
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Extract metadata for Frontend
id: meta-frontend
uses: docker/metadata-action@v5
with:
images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME }}
# GHCR always; Docker Hub (picpeak/frontend) added on the canonical repo so
# the same tag scheme is mirrored to both registries. metadata-action drops
# the blank second line on forks → GHCR-only there.
images: |
${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME }}
${{ env.DOCKERHUB_ENABLED == 'true' && 'docker.io/picpeak/frontend' || '' }}
labels: |
org.opencontainers.image.title=PicPeak Frontend
org.opencontainers.image.description=PicPeak photo sharing platform frontend application
@@ -515,6 +570,10 @@ jobs:
type=semver,pattern={{version}}
type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
type=semver,pattern={{major}},enable=${{ steps.context.outputs.is_prerelease == 'false' }}
# #668/#783: publish the git-tag name verbatim (v3.45.0 / v3.84.0-beta.0)
# so users can pin the same string as the GitHub release. metadata-action's
# `pattern=v{{version}}` silently dropped it on prereleases, so use type=ref.
type=ref,event=tag
type=sha,format=short
# `:latest` + `:stable` follow the stable channel (the `stable` branch +
# stable release tags). The default branch is now `main` (active dev),
@@ -531,10 +590,15 @@ jobs:
docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \
$(printf "${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME }}@sha256:%s " *)
- name: Inspect manifest
- name: Inspect manifest (GHCR)
run: |
docker buildx imagetools inspect ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME }}:${{ steps.meta-frontend.outputs.version }}
- name: Inspect manifest (Docker Hub)
if: env.DOCKERHUB_ENABLED == 'true'
run: |
docker buildx imagetools inspect docker.io/picpeak/frontend:${{ steps.meta-frontend.outputs.version }}
summary:
needs: [build-backend, merge-backend, build-frontend, merge-frontend]
if: always()
@@ -548,6 +612,15 @@ jobs:
repo_lc="${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}"
echo "BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME=${repo_lc}/backend" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
echo "FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME=${repo_lc}/frontend" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
# Mirror manifests to Docker Hub (picpeak/{backend,frontend}) only on the
# canonical org repo, where the DOCKERHUB_* secrets live. Forks (and any
# other owner) fall back to GHCR-only — the Docker Hub image line and login
# are gated on this flag so their builds keep working unchanged.
if [[ "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" == "PicPeak/picpeak" ]]; then
echo "DOCKERHUB_ENABLED=true" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
else
echo "DOCKERHUB_ENABLED=false" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
fi
- name: Build Summary
run: |
@@ -586,6 +659,10 @@ jobs:
echo "### 📦 Images" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- Backend: \`${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.BACKEND_IMAGE_NAME }}\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- Frontend: \`${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.FRONTEND_IMAGE_NAME }}\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
if [[ "$DOCKERHUB_ENABLED" == "true" ]]; then
echo "- Backend (Docker Hub): \`docker.io/picpeak/backend\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- Frontend (Docker Hub): \`docker.io/picpeak/frontend\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
fi
echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "### 🏗️ Architectures" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
+1 -3
View File
@@ -131,7 +131,5 @@ docker-compose.dev.yml
new-layouts/
# Backend runtime storage (generated media, previews, thumbnails,
# CRM/accounting documents) — never commit. Matches main: a dev instance
# writes event photos into backend/storage/, and the narrower
# business-docs-only rule let `git add -A` sweep them into a commit.
# CRM/accounting documents) — never commit
backend/storage/
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
{
".": "3.83.0-beta.0"
".": "3.105.1-beta.0"
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"3.46.5"}
{".":"3.44.0"}
+1561 -984
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+101 -464
View File
@@ -1,90 +1,48 @@
# 📸 PicPeak - Open Source Photo Sharing for Events
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **PicPeak has moved to its own GitHub organization.**
>
> - **Docker images** are now published at `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/{backend,frontend}`. The old path (`ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/...`) is no longer served — update your `docker-compose.yml`.
> - **Branches**: active development is now on `main` (was `beta`); the curated stable channel is now `stable` (was `main`). Existing PRs and clones auto-redirect via GitHub.
>
> See **[`docs/migration-to-org.md`](docs/migration-to-org.md)** for the one-line `docker-compose.yml` edit and full details.
<div align="center">
<img src="docs/picpeak-logo.png" alt="PicPeak Logo" width="300" />
# 📸 PicPeak
**Open-source, self-hosted photo sharing for events.**
[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
[![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/docker-%230db7ed.svg?style=flat&logo=docker&logoColor=white)](https://www.docker.com/)
[![Node.js](https://img.shields.io/badge/node.js-6DA55F?style=flat&logo=node.js&logoColor=white)](https://nodejs.org/)
[![React](https://img.shields.io/badge/react-%2320232a.svg?style=flat&logo=react&logoColor=%2361DAFB)](https://reactjs.org/)
[![Buy Me A Coffee](https://img.shields.io/badge/Buy%20Me%20a%20Coffee-theluap-FFDD00?logo=buymeacoffee&logoColor=black)](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap)
[Homepage](https://www.picpeak.app) · [Live Demo](https://demo.picpeak.app) · [Documentation](https://docs.picpeak.app) · [Support the project ](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap)
[Homepage](https://www.picpeak.app) · [Live Demo](https://demo.picpeak.app) · [Documentation](https://docs.picpeak.app) · [Support ☕](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap)
</div>
**PicPeak** is a powerful, self-hosted open-source alternative to commercial photo-sharing platforms like PicDrop.com and Scrapbook.de. Designed specifically for photographers and event organizers, PicPeak makes it simple to share beautiful, time-limited photo galleries with clients while maintaining full control over your data and branding.
---
**PicPeak** is a powerful, self-hosted open-source alternative to commercial photo-sharing platforms like PicDrop.com and Scrapbook.de. Built for photographers and event organizers, it makes it simple to share beautiful, time-limited photo galleries with clients while keeping full control over your data and branding.
![PicPeak Gallery Preview](docs/screenshot-gallery.png)
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **PicPeak has moved to its own GitHub organization.** Docker images are now at `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/{backend,frontend}` and active development is on `main`. The old `ghcr.io/the-luap/...` path still responds but its tags are **frozen** at 2026-05-27 — if updates never arrive, check your image path first. See **[`docs/migration-to-org.md`](docs/migration-to-org.md)** for the one-line `docker-compose.yml` edit.
## Contents
- [Live Demo](#-live-demo)
- [Quick Start](#-quick-start)
- [Why PicPeak?](#-why-picpeak)
- [Features](#-features)
- [Documentation](#-documentation)
- [Comparison](#-comparison-with-alternatives)
- [Tech Stack](#-tech-stack)
- [Contributing & Support](#-contributing)
- [License](#-license)
## 🎮 Live Demo
Try PicPeak without installing anything:
Try PicPeak without installing anything — [demo.picpeak.app](https://demo.picpeak.app) · [admin panel](https://demo.picpeak.app/admin)
| | |
| Email | Password |
|---|---|
| **Demo URL** | [demo.picpeak.app](https://demo.picpeak.app) |
| **Admin Panel** | [demo.picpeak.app/admin](https://demo.picpeak.app/admin) |
| **Email** | `demo@picpeak.app` |
| **Password** | `Demo2026!` |
| `demo@picpeak.app` | `Demo2026!` |
> The demo resets periodically. Uploaded content may be removed without notice.
## 🌟 Why Choose PicPeak?
Unlike expensive SaaS solutions, PicPeak gives you:
- **💰 No Monthly Fees** - One-time setup, unlimited galleries
- **🔒 Complete Data Control** - Your photos stay on your server
- **🎨 White-Label Ready** - Full branding customization
- **📱 Mobile-First Design** - Beautiful on all devices
- **🚀 Lightning Fast** - Optimized performance and caching
- **🌍 Multi-Language** - Built-in i18n support (EN, DE)
## ✨ Key Features
### For Photographers
- 📁 **Drag & Drop Upload** - Simply drop photos into folders
- 🔗 **External Media (Reference Mode)** - Browse and import from a readonly external folder library without copying originals
-**Auto-Expiring Galleries** - Set expiration dates (default: 30 days)
- 🔐 **Password Protection** - Secure client galleries
- 📧 **Automated Emails** - Creation confirmations and expiration warnings
- 📊 **Analytics Dashboard** - Track views, downloads, and engagement
- 📽️ **Live Slideshow** - A separate fullscreen "Diashow" link per event for projectors at live events — auto-picks-up new uploads while it runs, with transitions, a logo watermark, and image-fit/colour options ([guide](docs/live-slideshow.md))
- 🎨 **Custom Themes** - Match your brand perfectly
- 🌐 **Public Landing Page** - Publish a curated marketing page when guests visit your root URL
### For Clients
- 🖼️ **Beautiful Galleries** - Clean, modern interface
- 📱 **Mobile Optimized** - Swipe through photos on any device
- ⬇️ **Bulk Downloads** - Download all photos with one click
- 🔍 **Smart Search** - Find photos quickly
- 📤 **Guest Uploads** - Optional client photo uploads
- 🛡️ **Download Protection** - Advanced image protection with watermarking and right-click prevention
### Technical Excellence
- 🐳 **Docker Ready** - Deploy in minutes
- 🔄 **Auto-Processing** - Automatic thumbnail generation
- 🗂️ **Reference Library Support** - Point PicPeak at `EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT` to reference existing originals, index quickly, and generate thumbnails on demand
- 💾 **Smart Storage** - Automatic archiving of expired galleries
- 🛡️ **Security First** - JWT auth, rate limiting, CORS protection
- 📈 **Scalable** - From small studios to large agencies
### For Studios — CRM & Accounting (Beta · off by default)
- 📝 **Quotes → Contracts → Invoices** - One deal lineage; cancel-and-reissue (Storno) keeps issued invoices immutable
- ⏱️ **Hours Logging & Calendar** - Per-customer time tracking; admin calendar of events, logged hours, and pending quotes/contracts
- 🧾 **Inbound Supplier Invoices & Expenses** - Capture received invoices (upload/camera, rasterised server-side), categorise, and re-bill costs to clients
- 📊 **Tax Report & Accountant Export** - Period-scoped income/cost report with VAT breakdown; PDF/CSV plus a Treuhänder/Banana (Swiss/LI) journal export, scopable to income-only or cost-only
- 🌍 **VAT & Multi-currency** - Single VAT-code registry snapshotted onto each document; data-driven per-country rates
- ⚠️ **Verify locally** - Feature-flagged off by default. Seeded contracts, QR/IBAN and tax defaults are **examples only** — review your own legal **and tax** regulations first (see disclaimers below)
## 🚀 Quick Start
Get PicPeak running in under 5 minutes:
@@ -96,8 +54,8 @@ cd picpeak
# Copy the environment template — the defaults work out of the box.
# Machine secrets (JWT, DB, Redis) are auto-generated on first run, and the
# admin account is created in the browser (see below). Edit .env only to
# customise (domain, SMTP, storage paths, …) — nothing is required.
# admin account is created in the browser. Edit .env only to customise
# (domain, SMTP, storage paths, …) — nothing is required.
cp .env.example .env
# Start with Docker Compose
@@ -106,293 +64,61 @@ docker compose up -d
# Access at http://localhost:3000
```
### First run — create your admin account
On first start, open **http://localhost:3000/admin** and follow the in-browser setup to create your admin account. Full details — the one-time setup token, Docker file permissions, and ARM64 notes — are in **[First-run setup](https://docs.picpeak.app/getting-started/first-login)**.
On first start with no `ADMIN_PASSWORD` set, PicPeak has **no admin account yet** and greets you with an in-browser setup screen — no credentials in `.env`:
> **Updating / release channels:** set `PICPEAK_CHANNEL` (`stable` default, or `beta`) in `.env`, then `docker compose pull && docker compose up -d`. See [RELEASING.md](RELEASING.md) for the promotion cadence.
1. Open **http://localhost:3000/admin** — you'll be redirected to `/setup`.
2. Read the **one-time setup token** from the 0600 file the backend writes it to
(it is deliberately *not* printed to the logs — that would leave a live
bootstrap credential in `docker logs`):
```bash
docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN
```
It is bind-mounted, so `sudo cat data/SETUP_TOKEN` on the host works too. Only
if that file could not be written does the backend fall back to logging the
token (`docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`).
3. Paste the token, set your admin **email + password**, and you're in. The token is single-use, and the setup screen closes permanently once an admin exists.
## 🌟 Why PicPeak?
> Prefer the old behaviour? Set `ADMIN_PASSWORD` in `.env` and PicPeak auto-creates the admin on first boot instead (credentials written to `data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt`).
Unlike expensive SaaS solutions, PicPeak gives you:
Note on Docker file permissions
- The backend container starts as root, chowns bind-mounted host directories (`./storage`, `./data`, `./logs`) to UID 1001 (`nodejs`), then drops privileges via `su-exec` before running the app. No host-side setup needed for fresh installs.
- If you pin `user:` in a compose override (e.g. to map a specific host UID), the self-chown is skipped and you must pre-chown the host directories to that UID — see [docs.picpeak.app/deployment/docker#permissions](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/docker#permissions).
- **💰 No Monthly Fees** — one-time setup, unlimited galleries
- **🔒 Complete Data Control** — your photos stay on your server
- **🎨 White-Label Ready** — full branding customization
- **📱 Mobile-First Design** — beautiful on all devices
- **🌍 Multi-Language** — built-in i18n (EN, DE)
**ARM64 (aarch64) systems:** Pre-built images include native `linux/arm64`, no platform flags or emulation needed. If you're on an older image tag that's still amd64-only, see [docker-compose.amd64.override.yml](docker-compose.amd64.override.yml) for a transitional fallback.
## ✨ Features
## 🔄 Release Channels
**For photographers** — drag & drop upload, auto-expiring & password-protected galleries, automated emails, an analytics dashboard, custom themes, a public landing page, and a [Live Slideshow](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/live-slideshow) projector view that auto-picks-up new uploads during live events.
PicPeak offers two release channels for different needs. Stable promotions are cut from a known-good beta point every 46 weeks — see [RELEASING.md](RELEASING.md) for the maintainer's promotion criteria and cadence policy.
**For clients** — clean mobile-optimized galleries, one-click bulk downloads, smart search, optional guest uploads, and download protection (watermarking + right-click prevention).
### Stable Channel (Recommended)
- Production-ready releases
- Thoroughly tested before release
- Docker tags: `stable`, `latest`, or specific version like `v2.3.0`
**Technical** — Docker-ready, automatic thumbnail generation, external media reference mode, smart archiving of expired galleries, S3-compatible [storage backends](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/storage-backends), [webhooks](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/webhooks), and security-first defaults (JWT, rate limiting, CORS).
### Beta Channel
- Early access to new features
- May contain bugs or incomplete functionality
- Docker tags: `beta` or specific version like `v2.3.0-beta.1`
<details>
<summary><strong>🧾 For studios — CRM &amp; Accounting (Beta, off by default)</strong></summary>
### Switching Channels
- 📝 **Quotes → Contracts → Invoices** — one deal lineage; cancel-and-reissue (Storno) keeps issued invoices immutable
- ⏱️ **Hours Logging & Calendar** — per-customer time tracking; admin calendar of events, logged hours, and pending quotes/contracts
- 🧾 **Inbound Supplier Invoices & Expenses** — capture received invoices (upload/camera, rasterised server-side), categorise, and re-bill costs to clients
- 📊 **Tax Report & Accountant Export** — period-scoped income/cost report with VAT breakdown; PDF/CSV plus a Treuhänder/Banana (Swiss/LI) journal export
- 🌍 **VAT & Multi-currency** — single VAT-code registry snapshotted onto each document
Set the `PICPEAK_CHANNEL` environment variable in your `.env` file:
</details>
```bash
# For stable releases (default)
PICPEAK_CHANNEL=stable
# For beta releases
PICPEAK_CHANNEL=beta
# For a specific version
PICPEAK_CHANNEL=v2.3.0
```
Then update your containers:
```bash
docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml up -d
```
### Update Notifications
The admin dashboard automatically notifies you when updates are available for your channel. To disable update checks, set:
```bash
UPDATE_CHECK_ENABLED=false
```
> [!WARNING]
> **CRM & Accounting — examples only, verify locally.** Feature-flagged off by default. Seeded contract blocks are written by the maintainer, **not a lawyer**; QR-bills/SEPA payloads and every tax, VAT and Treuhänder/Banana figure are computed from your input and defaults and are **jurisdiction-specific guidance only**. Have your lawyer review contracts, scan a test QR with your bank's app, and verify all numbers with your accountant / Treuhänder / tax authority before customer-facing use. Read **[the CRM disclaimers](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm/disclaimers)** first.
## 📖 Documentation
Full documentation lives at **[docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app)** — deployment, admin settings reference, API docs, webhooks, archive lifecycle, branding, and everything else. Some quick links:
Full documentation lives at **[docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app)** — deployment, admin settings, API, branding, and more.
- 🚀 [**Deployment**](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment) - Docker, environment variables, reverse proxy, SSL
- ⚙️ [**Admin Settings**](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/admin-settings) - Every tab in the Settings panel
- 🎯 [**Creating Events**](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/creating-events) - Full event field reference
- 📽️ [**Live Slideshow**](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/live-slideshow) - Fullscreen projector view that auto-updates during live events
- 💾 [**Backup & Restore**](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/backup-restore) - Backup configuration, restore wizard, full disaster recovery
- 🔌 [**API Reference**](https://docs.picpeak.app/api) - REST endpoints, OpenAPI spec, webhooks
- 🪝 [**Webhooks**](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/webhooks) - Event payloads, signing, filters, templates
Project meta:
- 🤝 [**Contributing**](CONTRIBUTING.md) - How to contribute
- 📜 [**License**](LICENSE) - MIT License
- 🔒 [**Security**](SECURITY.md) - Security policies
- 📋 [**Code of Conduct**](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) - Community guidelines
## 🌐 Public Landing Page
Spotlight your studio with a customizable marketing page at `/`:
- Head to **Admin → CMS Pages** to enable the public landing page toggle.
- Edit the provided HTML template (rich sections, hero, testimonials) and optional CSS overrides.
- The preview renders in a sandboxed iframe so you can iterate safely before publishing.
- PicPeak sanitizes stored HTML and CSS server-side—scripts, iframes, and unsafe attributes are stripped automatically.
- Use **Reset to default** anytime to restore the bundled template.
- The backend caches the rendered landing page for 60 seconds by default; override with `PUBLIC_SITE_CACHE_TTL_MS` if you need a different TTL.
- When the landing page is disabled PicPeak continues to serve the admin SPA/login exactly as before.
## 🎯 Use Cases
Perfect for:
- 💒 **Wedding Photographers** - Share ceremony photos securely
- 🎂 **Event Photography** - Birthday parties, corporate events
- 📸 **Portrait Studios** - Client galleries with download limits
- 🏢 **Corporate Events** - Internal photo sharing with branding
- 🎓 **School Photography** - Secure parent access with expiration
- 📽️ **Live Events** - Put a [Live Slideshow](docs/live-slideshow.md) on the venue projector that updates as you shoot
## 🏗️ Tech Stack
- **Backend**: Node.js, Express, SQLite/PostgreSQL
- **Frontend**: React, Tailwind CSS, Framer Motion
- **Storage**: Local filesystem (default) or S3-compatible object store (AWS S3, MinIO, R2, B2, Wasabi, Spaces) — see [Storage Backends](#storage-backends)
- **Email**: SMTP with customizable templates
- **Analytics**: Privacy-focused with Umami integration
## 💾 Storage Backends
PicPeak supports two storage backends for photos, thumbnails, hero images, watermarks, and archive zips. Both are configured via environment variables; no code change is required to switch.
| Capability | `STORAGE_BACKEND=local` (default) | `STORAGE_BACKEND=s3` |
|---|---|---|
| Photo / thumbnail / hero storage | Local filesystem under `STORAGE_PATH` | Bucket on any S3-compatible service |
| Admin UI upload | ✅ | ✅ |
| Filesystem auto-import (chokidar watcher) | ✅ | ❌ — disabled (use the upload API) |
| Watermarks, fingerprinting, fragmentation | ✅ | ✅ (materialized to a tmp file just-in-time) |
| Bulk download zips (cached + on-the-fly) | ✅ | ✅ |
| Backups | ✅ | ✅ |
| External media reference mode (`EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT`) | ✅ (always local) | ✅ (still local — not migrated) |
### Switching to an S3-compatible backend
1. Provision a bucket and credentials. The minimum IAM policy is documented in `.env.example`.
2. Set `STORAGE_BACKEND=s3` plus `STORAGE_S3_BUCKET`, `STORAGE_S3_REGION`, `STORAGE_S3_ACCESS_KEY`, `STORAGE_S3_SECRET_KEY`. For non-AWS providers (MinIO, R2, B2, …) also set `STORAGE_S3_ENDPOINT`.
3. If you have existing local content, copy it first: `node backend/scripts/migrate-storage.js --dry-run` then `node backend/scripts/migrate-storage.js`. The script is idempotent and writes a failures CSV.
4. Restart the backend. The startup check pings the bucket and refuses to boot on misconfig.
Note: presigned-URL serving (zero-bandwidth direct downloads from S3) is intentionally **not** in v1 — every request still streams through the backend so watermarks, devtools-detection, and access logging keep working.
## 🔔 Webhooks
PicPeak POSTs event/photo lifecycle notifications to URLs you configure under **Settings → Webhooks**. Each delivery is signed `HMAC-SHA256` with a per-webhook secret in the `X-PicPeak-Signature` header so receivers can verify the request really came from your PicPeak instance.
### Event types
| Event | Fires when |
| Topic | Link |
|---|---|
| `event.created` | Gallery created (admin or API) |
| `event.published` | Draft becomes live (`is_draft: true → false`) — also fires when an event is created with `is_draft=false` |
| `event.archived` | Bulk-archive, manual archive, or auto-archive on expiry |
| `event.expired` | Expiration checker marks the gallery inactive (fires before `event.archived` in the cascade) |
| `photo.uploaded` | Admin upload, API upload, guest upload, or auto-import |
| `photo.deleted` | Single delete, bulk delete (NOT fired per-photo when an event is archived — receivers infer from `event.archived` to avoid flooding) |
| 🚀 Deployment (Docker, env, reverse proxy, SSL) | [docs.picpeak.app/deployment](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment) |
| ⚙️ Admin settings reference | [docs.picpeak.app/guides/admin-settings](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/admin-settings) |
| 🎯 Creating events | [docs.picpeak.app/guides/creating-events](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/creating-events) |
| 📽️ Live Slideshow | [docs.picpeak.app/features/live-slideshow](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/live-slideshow) |
| 💾 Backup & Restore | [docs.picpeak.app/guides/backup-restore](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/backup-restore) |
| 🔌 API reference | [docs.picpeak.app/api](https://docs.picpeak.app/api) |
| 🪝 Webhooks | [docs.picpeak.app/features/webhooks](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/webhooks) |
| 💾 Storage backends (local / S3) | [docs.picpeak.app/features/storage-backends](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/storage-backends) |
| 💻 System requirements & tuning | [docs.picpeak.app/deployment/system-requirements](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/system-requirements) |
| 🧾 CRM & Accounting | [docs.picpeak.app/features/crm](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm) · [disclaimers](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm/disclaimers) |
| 🗺️ Roadmap | [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) |
### Payload shape
```json
{
"id": "delivery-uuid",
"type": "event.published",
"created_at": "2026-04-28T05:25:00.000Z",
"data": {
"event": { "id": 123, "slug": "wedding-smith", "share_url": "https://..." }
}
}
```
Also sent on every request:
- `X-PicPeak-Signature` — `HMAC-SHA256(secret, raw_body)` as hex
- `X-PicPeak-Event` — the event type (handy for routing without parsing the body)
- `X-PicPeak-Delivery` — UUID for idempotency on the receiver side
- `User-Agent: PicPeak-Webhooks/1.0`
### Verifying signatures
**Node.js**
```js
const crypto = require('crypto');
function verify(secret, rawBody, signature) {
const expected = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(rawBody).digest('hex');
const a = Buffer.from(expected, 'hex');
const b = Buffer.from(signature, 'hex');
if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b);
}
```
**Python**
```python
import hmac, hashlib
def verify(secret: str, raw_body: bytes, signature: str) -> bool:
expected = hmac.new(secret.encode(), raw_body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
return hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature)
```
**curl + openssl** (one-liner for a quick replay)
```sh
SIG=$(printf '%s' "$BODY" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$SECRET" | awk '{print $2}')
[ "$SIG" = "$RECEIVED_SIG" ] && echo OK || echo MISMATCH
```
### Retries + observability
- `2xx` → success, recorded with latency
- Non-`2xx` or network error → exponential backoff: `1m → 5m → 30m → 2h → 12h`, max 5 attempts
- After max attempts: status `failed`, surfaces in **Settings → Webhooks → Deliveries** with a "Replay" button
- Up to 5 deliveries in flight at once; one slow consumer can't block others (configurable via `WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_CONCURRENCY`)
- Response body truncated to 1KB before storage so chatty receivers don't bloat the audit log
The deliveries page (`/admin/webhooks/:id/deliveries`) shows every attempt with timestamp, status, HTTP code, latency, payload sent, signature, and response. Click "Send test event" to fire a synthetic delivery for any event type.
### SSRF protection
Webhook URLs are validated against the same private-IP blocklist used elsewhere in the app — loopback, private RFC1918 ranges, link-local, `.local`/`.internal` hostnames, cloud metadata endpoints. The check runs both at create time and per-delivery (DNS-rebinding mitigation).
For local development with a receiver on the same machine or docker network, set `WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=true`. Production deployments must leave this OFF.
## 💻 System Requirements
### Minimum Requirements
- **CPU**: 2 CPU cores
- **RAM**: **4 GB minimum** for a normal photo-upload workload — sharp/libvips
decodes the full uncompressed frame before resize, and the default two
worker loops at sharp-concurrency 2 can push peak RSS past 1.5 GB on a
batch of 20-MP+ photos. On a 2 GB VPS that's enough to OOM-kill the
backend mid-batch (surfaces as 503s on thumbnails — see [Low-memory
hosts](#low-memory-hosts) below for the recipe to run on 2 GB).
- **Storage**: 20GB minimum (plus photo storage needs)
- **OS**: Linux (Ubuntu 20.04+), macOS, or Windows with WSL2
- **Node.js**: v18.0.0 or higher
- **Database**: SQLite (included) or PostgreSQL 12+
### Docker Requirements (Recommended)
- **Docker**: v20.10.0+
- **Docker Compose**: v2.0.0+
### Low-memory hosts
Running on 2 GB RAM (e.g. an entry-level VPS) is workable but requires
tuning the upload-processor concurrency down. The backend auto-detects
total RAM at startup via `os.totalmem()` — on a host that reports < 3 GB,
it defaults `UPLOAD_PROCESSOR_CONCURRENCY` to **1** instead of 2 and logs
a one-shot warning. You can pin the value explicitly in `.env`:
```env
# Single worker loop — slower batch processing, lower peak RSS
UPLOAD_PROCESSOR_CONCURRENCY=1
```
The trade-off is throughput: a single worker processes one photo at a
time, so a 100-photo batch takes ~2× as long but won't OOM. **Health-check
note**: if the backend dies under memory pressure, the gallery serves
`503 Service Unavailable` on thumbnails until Docker's
`restart: unless-stopped` brings the container back. Persistent 503s
during/after an upload batch on a low-memory host are almost always this.
### Video Support Requirements
When enabling video uploads, consider these additional resources:
| Resource | Recommendation | Notes |
|----------|----------------|-------|
| **RAM** | 4GB+ recommended | FFmpeg processing requires more memory |
| **Storage** | Plan for 10-100x more | Videos are significantly larger than images |
| **CPU** | Additional cores help | Video thumbnail extraction is CPU-intensive |
| **Bandwidth** | Higher throughput | Video streaming requires more bandwidth |
**Technical Notes:**
- FFmpeg is bundled via npm (`@ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg`) - no system installation required
- Maximum upload size: **10GB per video file**
- Chunked upload support for files >100MB (resumable uploads)
- Supported formats: MP4, WebM, MOV, AVI
- Video thumbnails are automatically generated from the first few seconds
**For Nginx/Reverse Proxy:**
If using Nginx, increase the client max body size:
```nginx
client_max_body_size 10G;
proxy_read_timeout 3600;
proxy_send_timeout 3600;
```
## 🤝 Contributing
We love contributions! PicPeak is built by photographers, for photographers. Whether you're fixing bugs, adding features, or improving documentation, your help is welcome.
See our [Contributing Guide](CONTRIBUTING.md) for details.
**Project meta:** [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) · [License](LICENSE) · [Security](SECURITY.md) · [Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)
## 📊 Comparison with Alternatives
@@ -409,168 +135,79 @@ See our [Contributing Guide](CONTRIBUTING.md) for details.
| Quotes / Contracts / Invoices | 🧪 Beta | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Incoming Invoices & Accounting | 🧪 Beta | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
*You still bring your own server (own hardware or a VPS) and, if you want one, a domain.
**Limited only by your server storage.
***Pixieset's "unlimited" is photos only; video is capped by plan (roughly 010 h depending on tier).
🧪 Beta = built but feature-flagged off by default (see [Beta Features](#-beta-features-use-at-your-own-risk)).
<sub>*You bring your own server and, optionally, a domain. **Limited only by your server storage. ***Pixieset's "unlimited" is photos only; video is capped by plan. 🧪 Beta = built but feature-flagged off by default.</sub>
## 🛡 Security
## 🏗 Tech Stack
PicPeak takes security seriously:
- 🔐 Password hashing with bcrypt
- 🎫 JWT-based authentication
- 🚦 Rate limiting on all endpoints
- 🛡️ CORS protection
- 📝 Activity logging
- 🔒 Secure file access
Found a security issue? Please open a [security issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub
- **Backend**: Node.js, Express, SQLite/PostgreSQL
- **Frontend**: React, Tailwind CSS, Framer Motion
- **Storage**: Local filesystem (default) or S3-compatible object store (AWS S3, MinIO, R2, B2, Wasabi, Spaces) — see [Storage Backends](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/storage-backends)
- **Email**: SMTP with customizable templates
- **Analytics**: Privacy-focused with Umami integration
- **External media**: point PicPeak at `EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT` to reference existing originals read-only, index quickly, and generate thumbnails on demand
## 📸 Screenshots
### 🎛️ **Admin Dashboard**
Get a complete overview of your photo galleries, analytics, and system status.
<details>
<summary>Click to see the admin dashboard, analytics, and event management</summary>
### 🎛️ Admin Dashboard
<img src="docs/screenshot-dashboard.png" alt="PicPeak Admin Dashboard" width="800" />
### 📊 **Analytics & Insights**
Track gallery performance, view statistics, and monitor user engagement.
### 📊 Analytics & Insights
<img src="docs/screenshot-analytics.png" alt="PicPeak Analytics Dashboard" width="800" />
### 📁 **Event Management**
Organize and manage your photo galleries with intuitive event management tools.
### 📁 Event Management
<img src="docs/screenshots-events.png" alt="PicPeak Events Management" width="800" />
### ✨ **Key Interface Highlights**
<details>
<summary>👆 Click to see more interface details</summary>
#### What makes PicPeak's interface special:
- **🎨 Clean Design**: Modern, photographer-friendly interface
- **📱 Responsive**: Perfect on desktop, tablet, and mobile
- **⚡ Fast Loading**: Optimized for quick photo browsing
- **🔒 Secure Access**: Password-protected galleries with expiration
- **📤 Easy Uploads**: Drag & drop functionality for effortless photo management
- **🎯 Client-Focused**: Intuitive gallery experience for your clients
</details>
## 🗺️ Roadmap
## 🤝 Contributing
We're constantly improving PicPeak and welcome contributions from our community! If you have ideas for new features or want to help implement existing ones, please open an issue or submit a pull request. Your contributions help make PicPeak better for everyone.
We love contributions! PicPeak is built by photographers, for photographers — whether you're fixing bugs, adding features, or improving docs. See the [Contributing Guide](CONTRIBUTING.md) to get started.
### 🚧 Beta Features (Use at your own risk)
These features are currently in beta testing and may have limited functionality or stability:
| Feature | Description | Status |
|---------|-------------|--------|
| **CRM & Accounting Module** | Quotes, contracts, invoices (+ Storno), hours logging, calendar, and tax report — plus inbound supplier-invoice capture, internal expenses, and a Treuhänder/Banana (Swiss/LI) accountant-journal export. Feature-flagged off by default. Seeded contract blocks, payment terms, IBAN / QR-bill and tax defaults are **examples only** and need legal / financial / **tax** review before customer-facing use. See [docs.picpeak.app/features/crm](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm). | 🧪 Beta |
| **Simple Deployment Script** | One-click deployment script for quick server setup with automated configuration and dependency installation | 🧪 Beta |
### 📋 Future Enhancements
| Feature | Description | Priority | Status |
|---------|-------------|----------|---------|
| **Backup & Restore** | Comprehensive backup system with S3/MinIO support, automated scheduling, and safe restore functionality | High | ✅ Implemented |
| **External Media Library (Reference Mode)** | Use an external folder library as a readonly source with import and ondemand thumbnail generation | High | ✅ Implemented |
| **Download Protection** | Advanced image protection system with canvas rendering, invisible watermarking, right-click prevention, and DevTools detection to protect photos from unauthorized downloads | High | ✅ Implemented |
| **Gallery Templates** | Multiple gallery layouts (grid, masonry, carousel, timeline, hero, mosaic) with custom CSS styling support. Includes starter templates like Apple Liquid Glass for complete visual customization | Medium | ✅ Implemented |
| **Face Recognition** | AI-powered face detection to help guests find their photos and create automatic person-based albums | Low | 🔄 Open |
| **Gallery Feedback** | Allow guests to like, rate, and comment on photos with admin notifications and moderation | Medium | ✅ Implemented |
| **Video Support** | Upload and display videos alongside photos in galleries with streaming support | Low | ✅ Implemented |
| **Multiple Administrators** | Support for multiple admin accounts with role-based permissions and activity tracking | Low | ✅ Implemented |
| **Filtering & Export Options** | Filter photos by likes, ratings, comments, or favorites. Search by filename. Sort by date, name, size, or rating. Export filtered selections as ZIP or generate Capture One/Lightroom-compatible file lists for professional workflows | Medium | ✅ Implemented |
**Status Legend:** ✅ Implemented | 🚧 In Progress | 🔄 Open | 📋 Planned
Found a security issue? Please open a [security issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security). See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the policy.
## ☕ Support the Project
PicPeak is free, open source, and self-hostable forever. If it saves you time or replaces a paid subscription, consider buying me a coffee — it directly funds the time spent on new features, bug fixes, and keeping the demo + docs running.
<p align="left">
<a href="https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap" target="_blank">
<img src="https://img.buymeacoffee.com/button-api/?text=Buy%20me%20a%20coffee&emoji=☕&slug=theluap&button_colour=FFDD00&font_colour=000000&font_family=Cookie&outline_colour=000000&coffee_colour=ffffff" alt="Buy Me A Coffee" />
</a>
</p>
Other ways to support without spending anything: ⭐ star the repo, share it with photographer friends, file good bug reports, or open a PR.
PicPeak is free, open source, and self-hostable forever. If it saves you time or replaces a paid subscription, consider [buying me a coffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap) — it directly funds new features, bug fixes, and keeping the demo + docs running. You can also ⭐ star the repo, share it, file good bug reports, or open a PR.
## 🙏 Acknowledgments
PicPeak is inspired by the best features of commercial platforms while remaining completely open source. Special thanks to all contributors who make this project possible.
PicPeak is inspired by the best features of commercial platforms while remaining completely open source. It's developed with AI assistance, but human-tested end-to-end, security-audited, and human-reviewed for quality.
### 👥 Contributors
A huge thank you to the people whose code, reports, and feedback have shaped PicPeak:
- [**@the-luap**](https://github.com/the-luap) — creator and lead maintainer. Started the project and built PicPeak's foundation and the entire gallery experience (events, galleries, uploads, sharing, download protection, templates), plus backup & restore, analytics, system health, branding/theming, and WhatsApp notifications — and the architecture every later feature builds on.
- [**@Luca-Timo**](https://github.com/Luca-Timo) — native Apple Silicon multi-arch images, external-URL toggle for legal CMS pages, the lazy-loaded folder tree picker, the admin-email picker on event creation, the data-driven self-hosted webfont system, the gallery header/banner decoupling, several typed-API refactors, and the CRM + accounting suite (quotes/contracts/invoices, hours logging, calendar, tax report, inbound supplier-invoice capture, expenses, and the Treuhänder/Banana export). Consistently raises the bar with thoughtful PRs.
- [**@Rekoo-PS**](https://github.com/Rekoo-PS) — sharp-eyed bug reporter and product feedback. Filed the issues that drove the login-loop fix, the gallery-loading skeleton work, the redirection cleanup, the mobile-lightbox overhaul, the admin-events search-counter fix, the photo-count column, and the bulk-delete workflow. Also a [BuyMeACoffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap) supporter — the kind of feedback loop that keeps the project useful for real deployments.
**[@the-luap](https://github.com/the-luap)** — creator and lead maintainer
- Gallery foundation (events, uploads, sharing, download protection, templates)
- Backup & restore, analytics, branding/theming
- The architecture every later feature builds on
**[@Luca-Timo](https://github.com/Luca-Timo)**
- Native Apple Silicon multi-arch images
- CRM & accounting suite (quotes/contracts/invoices)
- Hours logging & Treuhänder/Banana tax export
- Gallery header/banner decoupling
**[@Rekoo-PS](https://github.com/Rekoo-PS)** — bug reports & product feedback
- Login-loop fix, mobile-lightbox overhaul, bulk-delete workflow
- Also a [BuyMeACoffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap) supporter
If you've contributed and aren't listed here, please open a PR — this list is meant to grow.
### 🤖 AI-Assisted Development
This project was generated with the assistance of AI technology, but has been:
- ✅ **Fully tested end-to-end** by human developers
- 🔒 **Security audited** with comprehensive security checks
- 👨‍💻 **Human-reviewed** for code quality and best practices
- 🧪 **Production-tested** in real-world scenarios
We believe in transparent development practices and the responsible use of AI as a tool to accelerate development while maintaining high standards of quality and security.
## ⚠️ CRM & Accounting disclaimers — examples only, verify locally
The CRM & accounting modules (contracts, invoices, QR-bills, the tax
report and the accountant exports) ship seeded content and computed
figures that are intended as a **starting point only**:
- **Contract blocks** (image rights, NDA, model release, cancellation,
jurisdiction, …) are written by the maintainer, **not by a lawyer**.
Every operator must have their lawyer review and adapt them before
sending any contract to a customer.
- **QR-bills and SEPA EPC payloads** are rendered from the data you
typed. Picpeak is open source — please scan a test invoice with your
bank's app to check the QR actually works. We are not responsible for
any mistakes that come from sending an invoice with bad data on it.
- **Tax, VAT & accounting figures** (the tax report, VAT-payable, the
per-rate breakdown, the Treuhänder / Banana export, etc.) are computed
from the data you enter and the defaults you configure. They are
**guidance only and jurisdiction-specific** — tax rules, VAT rates,
deduction schemes (e.g. the Liechtenstein 20 % Gewinnungskosten flat
rate) and filing duties differ by country and change over time. **Every
operator must check their own tax / VAT regulations and verify the
numbers with their accountant / Treuhänder / tax authority before
relying on any figure or export.** Picpeak makes no warranty that the
output is correct for your jurisdiction or situation.
Read [`docs/crm-disclaimers.md`](docs/crm-disclaimers.md) before
enabling the Contracts, Invoices or Accounting features.
## 📄 License
PicPeak is released under the [MIT License](LICENSE). Use it freely for personal or commercial projects.
## 🚀 Ready to Get Started?
1.**Star this repository** to show your support
2. 📖 Read the [docs at docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app)
3. 🐛 Report issues or request features
4. 🤝 Join our community and contribute!
---
<p align="center">
Made with ❤️ by photographers, for photographers
<br>
<a href="https://www.picpeak.app">Homepage</a>
<a href="https://demo.picpeak.app">Live Demo</a>
<a href="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak">GitHub</a>
<a href="https://docs.picpeak.app">Documentation</a> •
<a href="https://www.picpeak.app">Homepage</a> ·
<a href="https://demo.picpeak.app">Live Demo</a> ·
<a href="https://docs.picpeak.app">Documentation</a> ·
<a href="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues">Support</a>
</p>
+18 -4
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@@ -52,13 +52,19 @@ The actual mechanics, in order:
- **`.release-please-manifest.json`** — keep `stable`'s; release-please owns this file.
- Any other auto-merged file — spot-check that the auto-merge produced something sensible, especially for security-sensitive files (`backend/src/middleware/`, `backend/src/utils/tokenUtils.js`).
5. **Wait for CI on the PR.** All ten checks (the original eight plus `merge-backend` and `merge-frontend`) must be green. If anything fails, fix on the release branch (NOT on `main` — `main` has already moved on).
5. **Pin the stable version to match `main` (number alignment — see Versioning).** Determine `X.Y.Z` = the `main` tip's **base** version (its `vX.Y.Z-beta.N`, dropping the `-beta.N` suffix), and add an empty commit on the release branch:
```bash
git commit --allow-empty -m "chore: release X.Y.Z" -m "Release-As: X.Y.Z"
```
The `Release-As:` footer forces release-please to cut exactly `X.Y.Z`. Without it, release-please computes the next MINOR from the *previous stable* tag (e.g. `3.45.0` → `3.46.0`) while `main` is already at `3.84.x`, so the stable number drifts ever further behind for the same code.
6. **Merge.** Standard merge commit, not squash — the PR's history (the individual feature commits) carries forward into `stable`'s log.
6. **Wait for CI on the PR.** All ten checks (the original eight plus `merge-backend` and `merge-frontend`) must be green. If anything fails, fix on the release branch (NOT on `main` — `main` has already moved on).
7. **release-please picks it up.** Within minutes, release-please will open a new `chore(stable): release X.Y.Z` PR proposing the stable release. Review the auto-generated CHANGELOG.md entries for accuracy, edit if needed, and merge. That merge creates the `vX.Y.Z` git tag, publishes Docker images on the `:stable` and `:latest` tags, and creates the GitHub Release page.
7. **Merge.** Standard merge commit, not squash — the PR's history (the individual feature commits) carries forward into `stable`'s log.
8. **Close the loop.** Bulk-close any `bug` issues that were fixed-but-not-closed and now appear in the released changelog. Reference the merge commit so reporters know which version contains the fix.
8. **release-please picks it up.** Within minutes, release-please will open a new `chore(stable): release X.Y.Z` PR proposing the stable release. Review the auto-generated CHANGELOG.md entries for accuracy, edit if needed, and merge. That merge creates the `vX.Y.Z` git tag, publishes Docker images on the `:stable` and `:latest` tags, and creates the GitHub Release page.
9. **Close the loop.** Bulk-close any `bug` issues that were fixed-but-not-closed and now appear in the released changelog. Reference the merge commit so reporters know which version contains the fix.
## Hotfix path (backport to current stable)
@@ -83,6 +89,14 @@ PicPeak follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/) with one project-spec
release-please derives all of this from conventional commit prefixes (`feat:`, `fix:`, `BREAKING CHANGE:`, etc.) automatically.
### Stable ↔ pre-release number alignment
The two channels run **independent** release-please counters: `main` bumps on every merge (racing ahead), while `stable` only bumps on a promotion. Left to itself, `stable` computes each promotion as the next MINOR from the *previous stable tag*, so the two drift far apart — e.g. `main` at `v3.83.x-beta.0` while `stable` sat at `v3.45.0` for the **same code**, which reads as "stable is 38 versions behind" when it isn't.
To keep the numbers legible, **a promotion sets the stable version to the current `main` base version** (the `X.Y.Z` of the `main` tip's `vX.Y.Z-beta.N`, minus the suffix). Promoting a `main` at `v3.84.2-beta.0` therefore cuts stable `v3.84.2`, and the stable number tracks `main` instead of lagging. This is forced with the `Release-As:` commit in step 5 of the cut procedure — the one-time catch-up jump (e.g. `3.45.0 → 3.84.x`) is expected and happens only on the first aligned promotion.
> **Release-engineering note (2026-07):** `release-please.yml` (the stable workflow) *must* keep `target-branch: stable`. Without it, release-please defaults to the repo's default branch (`main`), reads `main`'s stale `.release-please-manifest.json`, and cuts a wrong/regressed version — this is what produced a bogus `v2.7.0` once. If a promotion ever yields an unexpected version, check that first.
## Things that don't go through this process
- **Documentation-only changes** can land on either `stable` or `main` directly (no release cut needed); release-please will pick them up on the next regular release.
+1 -3
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
node_modules
npm-debug.log
.env
storage/events/active/*
storage/events/archived/*
storage/thumbnails/*
storage
data/*.db
logs/*
coverage
+6
View File
@@ -106,6 +106,12 @@ ARCHIVE_PATH=/app/storage/events/archived
# EVENTS_PATH=./storage/events
# ARCHIVE_PATH=./storage/events/archived
# File watcher (auto-import from the events/active folder, local storage only)
# Max photos processed in parallel by the watcher. The boot scan and bulk
# folder drops fire one handler per file — this bound keeps thumbnail
# generation from exhausting memory on small hosts. Default: 2
# FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY=2
# Analytics Backend Configuration (OPTIONAL)
# Used for server-side tracking only
# Primary configuration should be done through Admin UI > Settings > Analytics
+5 -2
View File
@@ -77,9 +77,12 @@ RUN rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm /usr/local/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npx
# PDFs to flat PNGs server-side so the admin UI NEVER renders a raw (possibly
# malicious) PDF. pdftoppm does not execute embedded JS or fetch remote
# resources, so it doubles as the SSRF/phone-home guard for untrusted inbound
# documents (see docs/accounting-inbound-invoices.md).
# documents (see https://docs.picpeak.app/features/accounting/incoming-invoices).
# exiftool extracts the embedded full-res JPEG preview from RAW/DNG uploads
# (Apple ProRAW etc.) — sharp's libvips has no raw loader, so the pipeline
# thumbnails/displays that preview while keeping the original for download.
RUN apk add --no-cache dumb-init postgresql-client ffmpeg su-exec \
fontconfig ttf-dejavu ttf-liberation poppler-utils && \
fontconfig ttf-dejavu ttf-liberation poppler-utils exiftool && \
fc-cache -f
# Create non-root user
+4 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ RUN apk upgrade --no-cache
# Install dumb-init for proper signal handling and ffmpeg for video uploads.
# Alpine's ffmpeg ships both ffmpeg + ffprobe built natively against musl;
# the npm-bundled binary doesn't run reliably on Alpine. Match production.
RUN apk add --no-cache dumb-init ffmpeg
# exiftool: extract embedded JPEG previews from RAW/DNG uploads (#821) — kept in
# sync with the production Dockerfile so dev/native runtimes don't accept a DNG
# and then fail it with ENOENT.
RUN apk add --no-cache dumb-init ffmpeg exiftool
# Copy package files
COPY package*.json ./
@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
/**
* POST /admin/thumbnails/regenerate for external/reference photos (#1129).
*
* STABLE TWIN. Diverges from the main version in one place: stable has no
* responsive ?w= tiers (#1095/#1109), so there is no deleteThumbnailTiers call
* to assert and the "drops the tiers first" test is absent here. Everything
* else — the external rebuild, the thumbnail_path:null contract, video
* skipping, per-event scoping and the superseded-key deletion — is identical.
*
* The route used to resolve every source as `storage/events/active/<path>` and
* `fs.access` it. External and reference rows do not live there — their
* originals sit under `events.external_path` — so every one of them failed the
* check and was counted as an error.
*
* That alone would be inert. What made it destructive is that the tier
* deletion runs FIRST (deliberately, so S3 and external rows are not skipped):
* on a reference install the button dropped every ?w= tier and rebuilt
* nothing, while the UI reported success — the response is sent before the
* background loop starts.
*
* The background work is fired with setImmediate, so every assertion here has
* to wait for it to drain rather than trusting the response.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
describe('admin thumbnail regeneration (#1129)', () => {
let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let app; let imageProcessor; let storage;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-'));
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'test.db');
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
await fs.promises.mkdir(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester' }; next(); },
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
// One instance, not a fresh object per call — the route and the
// assertions have to be looking at the same mock.
jest.doMock('../../src/services/storage', () => {
const instance = { delete: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
return { getStorage: () => instance };
});
jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
ensureThumbnail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('thumbnails/thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'),
ensurePreviewImage: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('previews/p.jpg'),
deletePreviewTiers: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
}));
// bootCrmDb, not run-migrations: the latter calls process.exit(0) on
// success, which ends the jest worker mid-suite.
({ db, cleanup } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
storage = require('../../src/services/storage').getStorage();
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/admin/thumbnails', require('../../src/routes/adminThumbnails'));
}, 180000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(async () => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
await db('photos').del();
await db('events').del();
});
async function seedEvent() {
const [row] = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'nas-wedding', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'nas',
event_date: '2026-01-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x', share_link: 'nas-share', expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'weddings/2026-08',
}).returning('id');
return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
}
async function seedPhoto(eventId, overrides = {}) {
const [row] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId, filename: 'shot.jpg', path: 'nas-wedding/shot.jpg',
type: 'individual', ...overrides,
}).returning('id');
return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
}
/** The work runs in setImmediate; give it room to finish. */
const drain = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 150));
it('rebuilds the canonical thumbnail for an external photo instead of erroring', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await seedPhoto(eventId, {
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: 'shot.jpg',
thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/stale.jpg',
});
const res = await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await drain();
// The whole bug: this used to be zero calls and one logged
// "Original file not found" per photo.
expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('nulls thumbnail_path so the valid-thumbnail short-circuit cannot skip the rebuild', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await seedPhoto(eventId, {
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: 'shot.jpg',
thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/still-on-disk.jpg',
});
await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
await drain();
// Without this the endpoint is a no-op whenever the OLD thumbnail is still
// readable — which is the normal case after a settings change, and exactly
// when the admin pressed the button.
const [photoArg] = imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mock.calls[0];
expect(photoArg.thumbnail_path).toBeNull();
expect(photoArg.source_origin).toBe('external');
// Carried through so ensureThumbnail can resolve off the mount rather than
// under events/active.
expect(photoArg.external_relpath).toBe('shot.jpg');
});
it('leaves videos alone rather than handing a container file to Sharp', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await seedPhoto(eventId, { source_origin: 'managed', media_type: 'video', filename: 'clip.mp4' });
await seedPhoto(eventId, { source_origin: 'managed', filename: 'still.jpg' });
const res = await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
await drain();
expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mock.calls[0][0].filename).toBe('still.jpg');
});
/**
* On S3, ensureThumbnail downloads the source to a randomly-named temp file,
* and for non-RAW input withProcessableImage passes no outputBasename — so
* generateThumbnail derives the key from that random name and it differs on
* every run. Nulling thumbnail_path hides the old key from everything that
* would otherwise clean it up, so each regeneration would strand a full
* thumbnail in the bucket, once per photo per run.
*/
describe('superseded canonical renditions', () => {
it('removes the old thumbnail when the key moved', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await seedPhoto(eventId, {
source_origin: 'managed',
thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_OLDRANDOM_shot.jpg',
});
imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_NEWRANDOM_shot.jpg');
await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
await drain();
expect(storage.delete).toHaveBeenCalledWith('thumbnails/thumb_OLDRANDOM_shot.jpg');
});
it('does NOT delete when the key is unchanged — that is the new file', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await seedPhoto(eventId, {
source_origin: 'managed',
thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_stable.jpg',
});
// Local storage resolves to a stable path, so the key is identical.
imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_stable.jpg');
await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
await drain();
expect(storage.delete).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it.each([
['a Windows-style legacy path', 'thumbnails\\thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'],
['a leading ./', './thumbnails/thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'],
['a doubled separator', 'thumbnails//thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'],
])('does not delete the file it just wrote when the old path is %s', async (_name, stored) => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await seedPhoto(eventId, { source_origin: 'managed', thumbnail_path: stored });
// Both storage backends fold these to the same key, so this is the SAME
// object — deleting it would remove the freshly generated thumbnail and
// leave the row pointing at nothing.
imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_ext1_shot.jpg');
await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
await drain();
expect(storage.delete).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('counts the photo as regenerated even if the old object cannot be removed', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await seedPhoto(eventId, {
source_origin: 'managed',
thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_OLD.jpg',
});
imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_NEW.jpg');
storage.delete.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('bucket said no'));
await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
await drain();
// Losing the old object is untidy; the regeneration itself succeeded.
expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
it('scopes to one event when asked', async () => {
const a = await seedEvent();
await seedPhoto(a, { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'a.jpg' });
const [b] = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'other', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'other', event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
share_link: 'other-share', expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
await seedPhoto(typeof b === 'object' ? b.id : b, { source_origin: 'managed' });
const res = await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({ eventId: a });
await drain();
expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
/**
* Backup credential exposure regression tests.
*
* The generic settings reads (GET /admin/settings, GET /admin/settings/:type)
* masked the recaptcha/umami/rybbit keys but returned backup_s3_secret_key
* and backup_rsync_ssh_key (an SSH PRIVATE KEY) in plaintext to any
* settings.view holder; GET /admin/backup/config returned them too. Both now
* mask, and PUT /admin/backup/config skips the mask sentinel so the edit
* form round-trips without clobbering stored credentials.
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.mock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => {
req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'test-admin' };
next();
},
}));
jest.mock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
requireSuperAdmin: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
describe('backup credential masking', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// Upsert: several backup_* keys are pre-seeded by the backup migrations.
const seed = [
{ setting_key: 'backup_destination_type', setting_value: JSON.stringify('s3'), setting_type: 'backup' },
{ setting_key: 'backup_s3_endpoint', setting_value: JSON.stringify('https://s3.example.com'), setting_type: 'backup' },
{ setting_key: 'backup_s3_bucket', setting_value: JSON.stringify('backups'), setting_type: 'backup' },
{ setting_key: 'backup_s3_access_key', setting_value: JSON.stringify('AKIAEXAMPLE'), setting_type: 'backup' },
{ setting_key: 'backup_s3_secret_key', setting_value: JSON.stringify('super-secret-s3-key'), setting_type: 'backup' },
{ setting_key: 'backup_rsync_ssh_key', setting_value: JSON.stringify('-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----abc'), setting_type: 'backup' },
];
for (const row of seed) {
await db('app_settings').insert(row).onConflict('setting_key').merge();
}
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/backup', require('../../src/routes/adminBackup'));
app.use('/api/admin/settings', require('../../src/routes/adminSettings'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
it('masks the credentials in GET /admin/backup/config', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/admin/backup/config').expect(200);
expect(res.body.backup_s3_secret_key).toBe('••••••••');
expect(res.body.backup_rsync_ssh_key).toBe('••••••••');
// Non-secret fields stay readable for the form.
expect(res.body.backup_s3_bucket).toBe('backups');
});
it('masks the credentials in the generic GET /admin/settings/:type read', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/admin/settings/backup').expect(200);
expect(res.body.backup_s3_secret_key).toBe('••••••••');
expect(res.body.backup_rsync_ssh_key).toBe('••••••••');
});
it('masks the credentials in the generic GET /admin/settings read', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/admin/settings').expect(200);
expect(res.body.backup_s3_secret_key).toBe('••••••••');
expect(res.body.backup_rsync_ssh_key).toBe('••••••••');
});
it('PUT /admin/backup/config keeps the stored secret when the sentinel round-trips', async () => {
await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/backup/config')
.send({
backup_destination_type: 's3',
backup_s3_endpoint: 'https://s3.example.com',
backup_s3_bucket: 'renamed-bucket',
backup_s3_access_key: 'AKIAEXAMPLE',
backup_s3_secret_key: '••••••••',
backup_rsync_ssh_key: '••••••••',
})
.expect(200);
const secret = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'backup_s3_secret_key' }).first();
expect(JSON.parse(secret.setting_value)).toBe('super-secret-s3-key');
const sshKey = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'backup_rsync_ssh_key' }).first();
expect(JSON.parse(sshKey.setting_value)).toBe('-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----abc');
const bucket = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'backup_s3_bucket' }).first();
expect(JSON.parse(bucket.setting_value)).toBe('renamed-bucket');
});
it('PUT /admin/backup/config stores a genuinely new secret', async () => {
await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/backup/config')
.send({ backup_s3_secret_key: 'rotated-s3-key' })
.expect(200);
const secret = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'backup_s3_secret_key' }).first();
expect(JSON.parse(secret.setting_value)).toBe('rotated-s3-key');
});
});
@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
/**
* Backfilling captured_at on a library imported before #1172.
*
* The point of the endpoint, rather than a migration: it resolves originals
* through resolvePhotoFilePath, which is the only path that reaches an
* external row. The thumbnail regenerator resolves under
* storage/events/active/<photo.path>, which never exists for those (#1129) —
* so it cannot be the model.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
const sharp = require('sharp');
describe('capture date backfill (#1172)', () => {
let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot;
const writeJpegWithExif = async (abs, iso) => {
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
const d = new Date(iso);
const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, '0');
const exifDate = `${d.getUTCFullYear()}:${pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1)}:${pad(d.getUTCDate())} `
+ `${pad(d.getUTCHours())}:${pad(d.getUTCMinutes())}:${pad(d.getUTCSeconds())}`;
await sharp({ create: { width: 60, height: 40, channels: 3, background: { r: 9, g: 9, b: 9 } } })
.withExif({ IFD2: { DateTimeOriginal: exifDate } }).jpeg().toFile(abs);
};
const settle = async () => { for (let i = 0; i < 60; i++) { await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50)); const s = await status(); if (!s.body.isRunning) return s; } throw new Error('backfill did not settle'); };
const status = () => request(app).get('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates/status');
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capfill-'));
mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'capfill-secret';
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
}));
({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotoDimensions'));
}, 180000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (db) await db.destroy?.();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
async function seed({ relpath, exifIso, writeFile = true, archived = false }) {
await db('photos').del();
await db('events').del();
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'capfill', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'capfill', event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `capfill-${Math.random()}`, expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'trip', is_archived: archived,
}).returning('id');
const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
if (writeFile) await writeJpegWithExif(path.join(mediaRoot, 'trip', relpath), exifIso);
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId, filename: path.basename(relpath), path: `capfill/${path.basename(relpath)}`,
// Root-relative, as this branch stores it (#1163) — the file lives at
// <mediaRoot>/trip/<relpath>.
type: 'individual', source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: `trip/${relpath}`,
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(), captured_at: null,
}).returning('id');
return { eventId, photoId: typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p };
}
it('fills captured_at for an external photo the thumbnail regenerator cannot reach', async () => {
const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'a.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z' });
const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
const done = await settle();
expect(done.body.lastResult.success).toBe(1);
expect((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toBeTruthy();
});
it('counts a photo with no EXIF separately from a failure', async () => {
// "The mount is broken" and "these files carry no date" need different
// answers from an operator, so they are not the same number.
await db('photos').del(); await db('events').del();
const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'plain.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z', writeFile: false });
await sharp({ create: { width: 40, height: 30, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 1, b: 1 } } })
.jpeg().toFile(path.join(mediaRoot, 'trip', 'plain.jpg'));
await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
const done = await settle();
expect(done.body.lastResult).toMatchObject({ success: 0, noExif: 1, failed: 0 });
expect((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toBeNull();
});
it('counts an unreachable original as a failure, not as missing EXIF', async () => {
await seed({ relpath: 'gone.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z', writeFile: false });
await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
const done = await settle();
expect(done.body.lastResult).toMatchObject({ success: 0, noExif: 0, failed: 1 });
});
it('reports nothing to do once every photo has a date', async () => {
const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'b.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-02T09:00:00Z' });
await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).update({ captured_at: new Date().toISOString() });
const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
expect((await status()).body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
});
it('skips a watcher-imported video, which carries media_type "image"', async () => {
// fileWatcher.processNewPhoto sets type='video' and a video/* mime but
// never media_type (fileWatcher.js:128-130), so the row keeps the 'image'
// default from migration 048. Filtering on media_type alone queued it every
// run: extractCaptureDate returns null for a video, captured_at stays null,
// and the backlog never cleared.
const { eventId } = await seed({ relpath: 'clip.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z', writeFile: false });
await db('photos').del();
await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId, filename: 'clip.mp4', path: 'capfill/clip.mp4',
type: 'video', media_type: 'image', mime_type: 'video/mp4',
source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'trip/clip.mp4',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(), captured_at: null,
});
const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
const s = await status();
// And it is not counted as a permanent backlog either.
expect(s.body.total).toBe(0);
expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
});
it('never reports more dated photos than it has photos', async () => {
// Both counts come from one aggregate; as two queries an import committing
// between them produced withCaptureDate > total and a negative backlog.
const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'counted.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-05T08:00:00Z' });
await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).update({ captured_at: new Date().toISOString() });
const s = await status();
expect(s.body.total).toBe(1);
expect(s.body.withCaptureDate).toBe(1);
expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
});
it('skips archived events instead of failing them on every run', async () => {
// Archiving deletes the originals and keeps the rows, so an archived photo
// can never get a date. Counting it would fail it every pass and leave the
// status endpoint permanently reporting a backlog.
await seed({ relpath: 'archived.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-04T09:00:00Z', archived: true });
const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
const s = await status();
expect(s.body.total).toBe(0);
expect(s.body.withoutCaptureDate).toBe(0);
expect(s.body.isRunning).toBe(false);
});
it('does not overwrite a date written while it was running', async () => {
// whereNull on the update: an import or a replacement finishing mid-run has
// already written a better value than this pass would.
const { photoId } = await seed({ relpath: 'c.jpg', exifIso: '2026-06-03T09:00:00Z' });
const claimed = '2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z';
const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).update({ captured_at: claimed });
const done = await settle();
expect(new Date((await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first()).captured_at).toISOString()).toBe(claimed);
expect(done.body.lastResult.success).toBe(0);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
/**
* Layered per-event category ordering (#782).
*
* Two ordering layers, resolved per event:
* - GLOBAL default — photo_categories.display_order (migration 159),
* set via POST /reorder-global; applies everywhere.
* - PER-EVENT override — event_category_order (migration 160), set via
* POST /reorder; overrides the default for one gallery.
* - DELETE /reorder/:eventId clears an event's override.
*
* Verified against a real SQLite DB with the full core-migration set applied.
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const {
bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
} = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('category ordering (#782)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let token;
let app;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
const { adminId } = await seedMinimal(db);
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
app = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/categories', require('../../src/routes/adminCategories'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
const auth = (r) => r.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
async function insertEvent(slug) {
await db('events').insert({
event_type: 'wedding', password_hash: 'x',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 9e9).toISOString(),
is_active: true, is_archived: false, slug, share_link: slug,
event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-01-01',
});
return (await db('events').where({ slug }).first()).id;
}
async function insertCat(name, { is_global = false, event_id = null, display_order = 0 } = {}) {
const res = await db('photo_categories').insert({
name,
slug: name.toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, '-'),
is_global: is_global ? 1 : 0,
event_id,
display_order,
}).returning('id');
return res[0]?.id ?? res[0];
}
const getEvent = (eventId) => auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/categories/event/${eventId}`)).expect(200);
describe('migration 159 backfill', () => {
it('seeds display_order from alphabetical order, scoped per event', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent('backfill-ev');
await insertCat('Reception', { event_id: eventId });
await insertCat('Ceremony', { event_id: eventId });
await insertCat('Pre-Ceremony', { event_id: eventId });
// Re-run the migration: addColumn is guarded (no-op); the backfill loop
// re-runs and assigns per-scope alphabetical order — what an upgrade does.
await require('../../migrations/core/159_add_category_display_order').up(db);
const evCats = await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId }).orderBy('display_order', 'asc');
expect(evCats.map((c) => c.name)).toEqual(['Ceremony', 'Pre-Ceremony', 'Reception']);
expect(evCats.map((c) => c.display_order)).toEqual([1, 2, 3]);
});
});
describe('global default order (POST /reorder-global)', () => {
it('reverses the global order and every non-customised event follows it', async () => {
const before = (await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/categories/global')).expect(200)).body;
expect(before.length).toBeGreaterThan(1);
const reversedIds = before.map((c) => c.id).reverse();
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder-global'))
.send({ orderedIds: reversedIds })
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.map((c) => c.id)).toEqual(reversedIds);
// A fresh event (no override) shows globals in the new global order.
const eventId = await insertEvent('follows-global');
const globalsInEvent = (await getEvent(eventId)).body.filter((c) => c.is_global).map((c) => c.id);
expect(globalsInEvent).toEqual(reversedIds);
});
});
describe('per-event override (POST /reorder)', () => {
it('pins a custom order for one event without affecting another', async () => {
const eventA = await insertEvent('override-a');
const eventB = await insertEvent('override-b');
const a1 = await insertCat('A-Ceremony', { event_id: eventA });
const a2 = await insertCat('A-Reception', { event_id: eventA });
// Current resolved list for A (globals + A's two categories).
const listA = (await getEvent(eventA)).body;
// Put A-Reception first, then A-Ceremony, then the globals in their order.
const globalsA = listA.filter((c) => c.is_global).map((c) => c.id);
const desired = [a2, a1, ...globalsA];
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder'))
.send({ event_id: eventA, orderedIds: desired })
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.map((c) => c.id)).toEqual(desired);
// override_position is set on every row for a customised event.
expect(res.body.every((c) => c.override_position != null)).toBe(true);
// Event B is untouched — no override, follows the global default.
const listB = (await getEvent(eventB)).body;
expect(listB.every((c) => c.override_position == null)).toBe(true);
});
it('accepts global ids but rejects another events category', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent('scope-ev');
const own = await insertCat('Own', { event_id: eventId });
const global = (await db('photo_categories').where('is_global', 1).first()).id;
const foreign = await insertCat('Foreign', { event_id: await insertEvent('other-ev') });
// A global id is allowed (globals can be arranged per event).
await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder'))
.send({ event_id: eventId, orderedIds: [own, global] })
.expect(200);
// A foreign event's category is out of scope.
await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder'))
.send({ event_id: eventId, orderedIds: [own, foreign] })
.expect(400);
});
});
describe('reset (DELETE /reorder/:eventId)', () => {
it('clears the override and reverts to the global default', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent('reset-ev');
const c1 = await insertCat('R-One', { event_id: eventId });
const list = (await getEvent(eventId)).body;
const globals = list.filter((c) => c.is_global).map((c) => c.id);
await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder'))
.send({ event_id: eventId, orderedIds: [c1, ...globals] })
.expect(200);
expect((await getEvent(eventId)).body.some((c) => c.override_position != null)).toBe(true);
const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/categories/reorder/${eventId}`)).expect(200);
expect(res.body.every((c) => c.override_position == null)).toBe(true);
expect(await db('event_category_order').where({ event_id: eventId }).first()).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('event ownership (PR #790 review)', () => {
let limitedToken;
let foreignEventId;
beforeAll(async () => {
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
// A non-super_admin role that DOES hold settings.view + settings.edit —
// the exact case the review flagged (settings.edit is grantable).
const roleRes = await db('roles').insert({ name: 'gallery-mgr', display_name: 'Gallery Mgr' }).returning('id');
const roleId = roleRes[0]?.id ?? roleRes[0];
const permIds = await db('permissions').whereIn('name', ['settings.view', 'settings.edit']).pluck('id');
await db('role_permissions').insert(permIds.map((permission_id) => ({ role_id: roleId, permission_id })));
const a2 = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'limited', email: 'limited@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('x', 4), role_id: roleId,
must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
limitedToken = mintAdminToken(a2[0]?.id ?? a2[0]);
// An event owned by a DIFFERENT admin (the seeded super_admin).
const owner = (await db('admin_users').where({ username: 'tester' }).first()).id;
await db('events').insert({
event_type: 'wedding', password_hash: 'x',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 9e9).toISOString(),
is_active: true, is_archived: false, slug: 'owned-ev', share_link: 'owned-ev',
event_name: 'Owned', event_date: '2026-01-01', created_by: owner,
});
foreignEventId = (await db('events').where({ slug: 'owned-ev' }).first()).id;
});
const limitedAuth = (r) => r.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${limitedToken}`);
it('blocks a non-owner from reading, reordering or resetting another event', async () => {
await limitedAuth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/categories/event/${foreignEventId}`)).expect(403);
await limitedAuth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder'))
.send({ event_id: foreignEventId, orderedIds: [1] }).expect(403);
await limitedAuth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/categories/reorder/${foreignEventId}`)).expect(403);
});
});
describe('POST / (create) appends to the end of its scope', () => {
it('assigns display_order = max + 1 within the event', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent('append-ev');
await insertCat('First', { event_id: eventId, display_order: 1 });
await insertCat('Second', { event_id: eventId, display_order: 2 });
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories'))
.send({ name: 'Third', is_global: false, event_id: eventId })
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.display_order).toBe(3);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,413 @@
/**
* CRM mint-and-send paths — integration tests (#587).
*
* Pins the three document "mint" flows end-to-end through the real
* HTTP → route → service → DB → email-queue → file pipeline:
*
* 1. POST /api/admin/quotes/:id/send (draft → sent + PDF + token + email)
* 2. POST /api/admin/invoices/:id/cancel (issued → cancelled + Storno row)
* — the issue spec named this /:id/storno; the real route is
* /:id/cancel (invoiceService.cancelInvoice → createStorno).
* 3. POST /api/admin/contracts/:id/countersign
* (signed_by_customer → fully_signed + stamped PDF + sha256 + email)
*
* Real SQLite with the full core-migration run (helpers/crmDb), real
* pdfkit/pdf-lib rendering — no mock-fs, no network.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const request = require('supertest');
const {
bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
} = require('./helpers/crmDb');
// Full migration run + cold-requiring pdfService/emailProcessor is slow
// under CI load; match the other CRM integration suites.
jest.setTimeout(120000);
const CUSTOMER_EMAIL = 'customer@example.com';
// 1x1 transparent PNG — smallest valid signature pad output.
const SIGNATURE_DATA_URL = 'data:image/png;base64,'
+ 'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNkYPhfDwAChwGA60e6kgAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==';
// SQLite round-trips dates inconsistently (epoch ms number, numeric
// string, or ISO string) — parse robustly before comparing.
const toMillis = (v) => {
if (typeof v === 'number') return v;
if (typeof v === 'string' && /^\d+$/.test(v)) return Number(v);
return Date.parse(v);
};
const sha256 = (buf) => crypto.createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest('hex');
// Count embedded image XObjects per page via pdf-lib — used to prove BOTH
// signature stamps (customer + admin) made it into the final PDF instead of
// only asserting file existence/hash (codex review of #850 round 2).
async function countImagesPerPage(pdfPath) {
const { PDFDocument, PDFName, PDFDict } = require('pdf-lib');
const doc = await PDFDocument.load(fs.readFileSync(pdfPath));
return doc.getPages().map((page) => {
const resources = page.node.Resources();
const xobjects = resources && resources.lookupMaybe(PDFName.of('XObject'), PDFDict);
if (!xobjects) return 0;
let images = 0;
for (const [, ref] of xobjects.entries()) {
const stream = page.doc.context.lookup(ref);
const subtype = stream && stream.dict && stream.dict.get(PDFName.of('Subtype'));
if (subtype && subtype.toString() === '/Image') images += 1;
}
return images;
});
}
let db;
let cleanup;
let tmpDir;
// Real (symlink-resolved) storage root — on macOS os.tmpdir() returns
// /var/... while the services persist under process.cwd() which
// resolves to /private/var/....
let storageRoot;
let adminId;
let customerId;
let token;
let quoteApp;
let invoiceApp;
let contractApp;
let quoteService;
let invoiceService;
let contractService;
const prevCwd = process.cwd();
const auth = { get Authorization() { return `Bearer ${token}`; } };
async function enableFlag(key) {
const updated = await db('feature_flags').where({ key }).update({ value: true });
if (!updated) await db('feature_flags').insert({ key, value: true });
}
// ----- per-path seed helpers -----------------------------------------
async function seedQuote() {
const id = await quoteService.createQuote({
customerAccountId: customerId,
currency: 'CHF',
vatRate: 0,
eventName: 'Testshooting',
lineItems: [
{ position: 1, quantity: 1, description: 'Photo package', unit_price_minor: 150000, discount_percent: 0 },
],
}, adminId);
return id;
}
async function seedIssuedInvoice(status = 'sent') {
const { invoiceIds } = await invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: customerId,
currency: 'CHF',
vatRate: 7.7,
lineItems: [
{ position: 1, quantity: 1, description: 'Wedding coverage', unit_price_minor: 200000, discount_percent: 0 },
],
}, adminId);
const id = invoiceIds[0];
// Fast-forward past the send step — Storno only applies to issued
// documents (sent/paid/overdue), and rendering+sending the original
// is covered by the quote path already.
await db('invoices').where({ id }).update({
status, sent_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
});
return db('invoices').where({ id }).first();
}
async function seedCustomerSignedContract() {
const id = await contractService.createContract({
customerAccountId: customerId,
title: 'Fotografie-Vertrag',
}, adminId);
// Real send + customer-sign flow (codex review of #850): a direct
// status UPDATE skipped the customer's signature asset and stamped
// PDF, so countersign exercised its unsigned-PDF fallback and a
// regression dropping the customer's signature would stay green.
const { token } = await contractService.sendContract(id, adminId);
await contractService.recordCustomerSignature({
token,
name: 'Custo Mer',
ip: '127.0.0.1',
signatureDataUrl: SIGNATURE_DATA_URL,
accepted: true,
});
return db('contracts').where({ id }).first();
}
// ----- suite ----------------------------------------------------------
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
// Business-doc PDFs (quotes/invoices/contracts) persist under
// `process.cwd()/storage/business-docs/...` — chdir into the temp dir
// so every test artifact lands isolated and gets cleaned up.
process.chdir(tmpDir);
storageRoot = path.join(fs.realpathSync(tmpDir), 'storage', 'business-docs');
// Fail-fast on the pre-existing logActivity-inside-transaction
// deadlock: createContract and createStorno call logActivity() from
// inside a knex transaction WITHOUT passing the trx as executor, so
// the audit insert tries to grab a second connection from the
// single-connection SQLite pool while the trx holds it. In
// production that stalls each call for the full 60 s acquire
// timeout (the error is then swallowed by logActivity's catch);
// here we shrink the timeout so the same swallowed failure costs
// 2 s instead of blowing the per-test budget. Behaviour under test
// is unchanged — the mint paths themselves never wait on this.
db.client.pool.acquireTimeoutMillis = 2000;
// node-sqlite3 detects Date bind params via `InstanceOf(global.Date)`
// against the NATIVE realm's Date — under jest's vm sandbox the
// service code's `new Date()` is a different constructor, the check
// fails, and the value stringifies to the literal "[object Object]"
// (the exact pathology helpers/crmDb.js documents for
// createPublicToken). Normalize Date bindings to ISO strings before
// they reach the driver so the real service inserts round-trip the
// same way they do outside jest.
// Patch on the prototype — knex mints transaction clients via
// Object.create(prototype), so an instance-level patch would miss
// every query issued inside a db.transaction().
const clientProto = Object.getPrototypeOf(db.client);
const origQuery = clientProto._query;
clientProto._query = function patchedQuery(connection, obj) {
if (obj && Array.isArray(obj.bindings)) {
obj.bindings = obj.bindings.map(
(b) => (b && typeof b === 'object' && typeof b.toISOString === 'function' ? b.toISOString() : b),
);
}
return origQuery.call(this, connection, obj);
};
({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
// CRM surfaces are feature-flagged; migration 107 seeds them OFF.
await enableFlag('quotes');
await enableFlag('bills');
await enableFlag('contracts');
quoteService = require('../../src/services/quoteService');
invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
contractService = require('../../src/services/contractService');
quoteApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/quotes', require('../../src/routes/adminQuotes'));
invoiceApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/invoices', require('../../src/routes/adminInvoices'));
contractApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/contracts', require('../../src/routes/adminContracts'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
process.chdir(prevCwd);
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('POST /api/admin/quotes/:id/send', () => {
test('draft quote: 200 → sent + sent_at + PDF on disk + action token + quote_sent email', async () => {
const quoteId = await seedQuote();
await db('email_queue').del();
const res = await request(quoteApp)
.post(`/api/admin/quotes/${quoteId}/send`)
.set(auth);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.sent).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.token).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
// DB state
const quote = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first();
expect(quote.status).toBe('sent');
expect(quote.sent_at).toBeTruthy();
// PDF persisted inside the isolated storage root
expect(quote.pdf_path).toBeTruthy();
expect(quote.pdf_path.startsWith(path.join(storageRoot, 'quote'))).toBe(true);
expect(fs.existsSync(quote.pdf_path)).toBe(true);
expect(fs.statSync(quote.pdf_path).size).toBeGreaterThan(0);
// Action token row: right quote, future expiry
const tokenRow = await db('quote_action_tokens').where({ token: res.body.token }).first();
expect(tokenRow).toBeTruthy();
expect(tokenRow.quote_id).toBe(quoteId);
expect(toMillis(tokenRow.expires_at)).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
// Email queued to the customer's primary address
const emails = await db('email_queue').where({ email_type: 'quote_sent' });
expect(emails).toHaveLength(1);
expect(emails[0].recipient_email).toBe(CUSTOMER_EMAIL);
const emailData = JSON.parse(emails[0].email_data);
expect(emailData.quote_number).toBe(quote.quote_number);
});
test('already-sent quote: 409 (spec said 400; service throws 409)', async () => {
const quoteId = await seedQuote();
await request(quoteApp).post(`/api/admin/quotes/${quoteId}/send`).set(auth).expect(200);
const res = await request(quoteApp)
.post(`/api/admin/quotes/${quoteId}/send`)
.set(auth);
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/cannot send a quote with status 'sent'/i);
});
});
describe('POST /api/admin/invoices/:id/cancel (Storno mint)', () => {
test('sent invoice: original cancelled, Storno row minted with negated totals + lineage', async () => {
const original = await seedIssuedInvoice('sent');
await db('email_queue').del();
const res = await request(invoiceApp)
.post(`/api/admin/invoices/${original.id}/cancel`)
.set(auth);
// Route responds via successResponse default — 200, not the 201
// the issue spec assumed.
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.cancelled).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.stornoId).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const storno = await db('invoices').where({ id: res.body.stornoId }).first();
expect(storno.kind).toBe('storno');
expect(storno.cancels_invoice_id).toBe(original.id);
expect(storno.deal_uuid).toBe(original.deal_uuid);
// Negated amounts
expect(storno.net_amount_minor).toBe(-original.net_amount_minor);
expect(storno.vat_amount_minor).toBe(-original.vat_amount_minor);
expect(storno.total_amount_minor).toBe(-original.total_amount_minor);
// Freshly sequenced number from the same series
expect(typeof storno.invoice_number).toBe('string');
expect(storno.invoice_number.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(storno.invoice_number).not.toBe(original.invoice_number);
// Line items snapshotted onto the Storno
const originalItems = await db('invoice_line_items').where({ invoice_id: original.id });
const stornoItems = await db('invoice_line_items').where({ invoice_id: storno.id });
expect(stornoItems).toHaveLength(originalItems.length);
// Original flipped + back-linked
const refreshed = await db('invoices').where({ id: original.id }).first();
expect(refreshed.status).toBe('cancelled');
expect(refreshed.cancellation_storno_id).toBe(storno.id);
// sendStorno side effects (codex review of #850): cancelInvoice
// swallows a sendStorno failure by design, so without these
// assertions a broken render/persist/queue leg would stay green.
const sentStorno = await db('invoices').where({ id: storno.id }).first();
expect(sentStorno.status).toBe('sent');
expect(sentStorno.pdf_path).toBeTruthy();
expect(fs.existsSync(sentStorno.pdf_path)).toBe(true);
const stornoEmails = await db('email_queue').where({ email_type: 'storno_issued' });
expect(stornoEmails.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
expect(stornoEmails[0].recipient_email).toBe(CUSTOMER_EMAIL);
});
test('paid invoice can be cancelled via Storno too (refund document leg)', async () => {
const original = await seedIssuedInvoice('paid');
const res = await request(invoiceApp)
.post(`/api/admin/invoices/${original.id}/cancel`)
.set(auth);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.stornoId).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const refreshed = await db('invoices').where({ id: original.id }).first();
expect(refreshed.status).toBe('cancelled');
});
test('already-cancelled invoice: 409 ALREADY_CANCELLED', async () => {
const original = await seedIssuedInvoice('sent');
await request(invoiceApp).post(`/api/admin/invoices/${original.id}/cancel`).set(auth).expect(200);
const res = await request(invoiceApp)
.post(`/api/admin/invoices/${original.id}/cancel`)
.set(auth);
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('ALREADY_CANCELLED');
});
});
describe('POST /api/admin/contracts/:id/countersign', () => {
test('customer-signed contract: 200 → fully_signed + stamped PDF + sha256 + signature asset + email with attachment', async () => {
const contract = await seedCustomerSignedContract();
await db('email_queue').del();
const res = await request(contractApp)
.post(`/api/admin/contracts/${contract.id}/countersign`)
.set(auth)
.send({ name: 'Admin Tester', signatureDataUrl: SIGNATURE_DATA_URL });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.status).toBe('fully_signed');
const row = await db('contracts').where({ id: contract.id }).first();
expect(row.status).toBe('fully_signed');
expect(row.signed_admin_name).toBe('Admin Tester');
expect(row.signed_by_admin_at).toBeTruthy();
// The customer's own signature (from the real sign flow in the seed)
// must survive countersigning — layered, not replaced.
expect(row.signed_customer_signature_path).toBeTruthy();
expect(fs.existsSync(row.signed_customer_signature_path)).toBe(true);
expect(row.signed_customer_name).toBe('Custo Mer');
// Admin signature image persisted under the storage root
expect(row.signed_admin_signature_path).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.signed_admin_signature_path.startsWith(
path.join(storageRoot, 'contract', 'signatures'),
)).toBe(true);
expect(fs.existsSync(row.signed_admin_signature_path)).toBe(true);
// Stamped, fully-signed PDF written and hashed. The issue spec
// called this `integrity_hash`; the real column is
// `signed_pdf_sha256` (plus `pdf_sha256` for the unsigned base).
expect(row.signed_pdf_render_failed_at).toBeFalsy();
expect(row.signed_pdf_path).toBeTruthy();
expect(fs.existsSync(row.signed_pdf_path)).toBe(true);
expect(row.signed_pdf_sha256).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
expect(sha256(fs.readFileSync(row.signed_pdf_path))).toBe(row.signed_pdf_sha256);
// BOTH stamps must be embedded in the final document — a regression
// stamping the admin onto the unsigned base PDF would keep every
// path/hash assertion above green (codex review of #850 round 2).
const imagesPerPage = await countImagesPerPage(row.signed_pdf_path);
const maxImagesOnAPage = Math.max(...imagesPerPage);
expect(maxImagesOnAPage).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
// contract_fully_signed email to the customer's primary address,
// carrying the signed PDF as attachment (plus the audit cert).
const emails = await db('email_queue').where({ email_type: 'contract_fully_signed' });
const customerCopy = emails.find((e) => e.recipient_email === CUSTOMER_EMAIL);
expect(customerCopy).toBeTruthy();
const emailData = JSON.parse(customerCopy.email_data);
expect(emailData.contract_number).toBe(contract.contract_number);
expect(Array.isArray(emailData.attachments)).toBe(true);
const pdfAttachment = emailData.attachments.find(
(a) => a.filename === `${contract.contract_number}-signed.pdf`,
);
expect(pdfAttachment).toBeTruthy();
expect(pdfAttachment.contentType).toBe('application/pdf');
expect(fs.existsSync(pdfAttachment.contentPath)).toBe(true);
});
test('draft contract: 409 — countersign requires sent/signed_by_customer', async () => {
const draftId = await contractService.createContract({
customerAccountId: customerId,
title: 'Noch nicht versendet',
}, adminId);
const res = await request(contractApp)
.post(`/api/admin/contracts/${draftId}/countersign`)
.set(auth)
.send({ name: 'Admin Tester' });
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/cannot counter-sign a contract with status 'draft'/i);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
/**
* Download resolutions (#858).
*
* Pins the contracts that are easy to break later:
*
* - the global → per-event cascade, including NULL = inherit
* - the picker never offers a size ABOVE the standard (a photographer who
* lowers the standard is not silently handing out full-res), and 'Original'
* only reappears when the admin explicitly allows it
* - `fit: 'inside'` + no-upscaling resize semantics, which is exactly what
* the requester asked for on the issue
* - a guest-supplied resolution is validated against the policy rather than
* trusted
*/
const sharp = require('sharp');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
// Both modules under test pull in src/database/db.js transitively. bootCrmDb
// only works when it runs BEFORE the first require of db.js (it sets
// TEST_DATABASE_PATH, which knexfile reads at module-init time), so these are
// required lazily in beforeAll rather than at module scope — otherwise knex
// binds to the shared default SQLite file and every run after the first one
// fails with "table `migrations` already exists".
let resolveEventDownloadPolicy;
let pickRequestedResolution;
let parseResolution;
let invalidateDownloadGlobals;
let resizeToBox;
describe('Download resolutions (#858)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
const setGlobal = async (key, value) => {
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).del();
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: key,
setting_value: JSON.stringify(value),
setting_type: 'download',
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
invalidateDownloadGlobals();
};
const PRESETS = [
{ label: 'Large', width: 3000, height: 2000 },
{ label: 'Medium', width: 1500, height: 1000 },
{ label: 'Small', width: 800, height: 600 },
];
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
({
resolveEventDownloadPolicy,
pickRequestedResolution,
parseResolution,
invalidateDownloadGlobals,
} = require('../../src/utils/downloadResolutions'));
({ resizeToBox } = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await setGlobal('download_resolutions', PRESETS);
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', 'original');
await setGlobal('download_resolution_picker_enabled', false);
await setGlobal('download_allow_original', false);
});
describe('cascade', () => {
it('inherits the global standard when the event has no override', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({ download_standard_resolution: null });
expect(policy.standard).toBe('1500x1000');
expect(policy.standardBox).toEqual({ width: 1500, height: 1000 });
});
it('lets an event override the global standard', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({ download_standard_resolution: '800x600' });
expect(policy.standard).toBe('800x600');
});
it('treats a NULL picker flag as inherit and an explicit false as override', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_resolution_picker_enabled', true);
expect((await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({ download_resolution_picker_enabled: null })).pickerEnabled).toBe(true);
expect((await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({ download_resolution_picker_enabled: false })).pickerEnabled).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('choice list', () => {
it('never offers a size larger than the standard', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const { choices } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(choices.map((c) => c.id)).toEqual(['1500x1000', '800x600']);
// The regression that matters: 3000x2000 must not be reachable.
expect(choices.some((c) => c.id === '3000x2000')).toBe(false);
});
it('bounds EACH dimension, not the pixel area (codex review round 2)', async () => {
// 2000x700 is 1.4MP — under 1500x1000's 1.5MP — so an area comparison
// would offer it and hand back a 2000px-wide file despite a 1500px cap.
await setGlobal('download_resolutions', [
...PRESETS,
{ label: 'Wide', width: 2000, height: 700 },
]);
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const { choices } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(choices.some((c) => c.id === '2000x700')).toBe(false);
});
it('omits Original when the standard is capped and the admin has not allowed it', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const { choices } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(choices.some((c) => c.id === 'original')).toBe(false);
});
it('re-adds Original when the admin explicitly allows it', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
await setGlobal('download_allow_original', true);
const { choices } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(choices[0].id).toBe('original');
});
it('offers Original when the standard already is original', async () => {
const { choices } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(choices[0].id).toBe('original');
expect(choices.map((c) => c.id)).toContain('3000x2000');
});
});
describe('request validation', () => {
it('falls back to the standard when nothing is requested', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(pickRequestedResolution(policy, undefined)).toBe('1500x1000');
});
it('refuses any explicit request while the picker is off', async () => {
const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(policy.pickerEnabled).toBe(false);
expect(pickRequestedResolution(policy, '800x600')).toBeNull();
});
it('refuses a size that is not on the offered list', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_resolution_picker_enabled', true);
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
// Above the standard → not offered → rejected rather than silently served.
expect(pickRequestedResolution(policy, '3000x2000')).toBeNull();
expect(pickRequestedResolution(policy, '9999x9999')).toBeNull();
expect(pickRequestedResolution(policy, '800x600')).toBe('800x600');
});
it('parses only well-formed resolution ids', () => {
expect(parseResolution('original')).toBeNull();
expect(parseResolution(null)).toBeNull();
expect(parseResolution('abc')).toBeNull();
expect(parseResolution('0x0')).toBeNull();
expect(parseResolution('1500x1000')).toEqual({ width: 1500, height: 1000 });
});
});
describe('job dedup identity (codex review round 1)', () => {
// The leak this pins: a PIN client's archive contains hidden photos. If the
// dedup key ignored the visibility scope, a guest asking for the same size
// would be handed the client's job token — and the delivery route only
// checked the event id.
let jobService;
beforeAll(() => {
jobService = require('../../src/services/downloadJobService');
});
it('separates client and guest archives of the same size and photo set', () => {
const guest = jobService.dedupKey(1, '1500x1000', [1, 2, 3], false, 'public');
const client = jobService.dedupKey(1, '1500x1000', [1, 2, 3], false, 'hidden');
expect(guest).not.toBe(client);
});
it('keys on the RESOLVED photo set, so a stale archive is not reused', () => {
const before = jobService.dedupKey(1, '1500x1000', [1, 2, 3], false, 'public');
const afterUpload = jobService.dedupKey(1, '1500x1000', [1, 2, 3, 4], false, 'public');
const afterHide = jobService.dedupKey(1, '1500x1000', [1, 2], false, 'public');
expect(new Set([before, afterUpload, afterHide]).size).toBe(3);
});
it('is order-independent for the same set', () => {
expect(jobService.dedupKey(1, 'original', [3, 1, 2], true, 'public'))
.toBe(jobService.dedupKey(1, 'original', [1, 2, 3], true, 'public'));
});
it('maps access levels onto the two visibility scopes', () => {
expect(jobService.visibilityScopeFor('client')).toBe('hidden');
expect(jobService.visibilityScopeFor('guest')).toBe('public');
expect(jobService.visibilityScopeFor(undefined)).toBe('public');
});
});
describe('resize semantics', () => {
const make = (w, h) => sharp({
create: { width: w, height: h, channels: 3, background: { r: 10, g: 100, b: 200 } },
}).jpeg().toBuffer();
const box = { width: 1500, height: 1000 };
it('fits a 3:2 photo exactly into a 3:2 box', async () => {
const out = await sharp(await resizeToBox(await make(6000, 4000), box)).metadata();
expect([out.width, out.height]).toEqual([1500, 1000]);
});
it('treats the box as an "up to" bound for other aspect ratios', async () => {
// Portrait: height is the binding edge, width comes out smaller.
const portrait = await sharp(await resizeToBox(await make(4000, 6000), box)).metadata();
expect(portrait.height).toBe(1000);
expect(portrait.width).toBeLessThan(1500);
const fourThree = await sharp(await resizeToBox(await make(4000, 3000), box)).metadata();
expect(fourThree.height).toBe(1000);
expect(fourThree.width).toBeLessThan(1500);
});
it('never upscales an image already smaller than the box', async () => {
const out = await sharp(await resizeToBox(await make(800, 600), box)).metadata();
expect([out.width, out.height]).toEqual([800, 600]);
});
it('passes the buffer through untouched for the original size', async () => {
const src = await make(4000, 3000);
expect(await resizeToBox(src, null)).toBe(src);
});
it('keeps the source format so the filename and mime type stay honest', async () => {
// A .gif re-encoded as JPEG would ship mislabelled bytes, since the
// download routes keep the original filename and mime type.
const gif = await sharp({
create: { width: 4000, height: 3000, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 2, b: 3 } },
}).gif().toBuffer();
const out = await sharp(await resizeToBox(gif, box)).metadata();
expect(out.format).toBe('gif');
expect(out.width).toBe(1333);
});
it('returns the input rather than throwing on an undecodable source', async () => {
const junk = Buffer.from('not an image');
expect(await resizeToBox(junk, box)).toBe(junk);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
/**
* Catalog-driven event-type defaults (#800 follow-up).
*
* The contract→event conversion used to hardcode `event_type: 'wedding'` and
* the v1 API validated against a fixed whitelist. Both now follow the live
* event_types catalog; these tests pin the shared resolver.
*/
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
describe('resolveDefaultEventType follows the catalog', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let eventTypeService;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// Require AFTER bootCrmDb so the service shares this db instance
// (see crmDb.js — a second knex pool on one SQLite file deadlocks).
eventTypeService = require('../../src/services/eventTypeService');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
it("prefers the 'other' catch-all while it is active", async () => {
expect(await eventTypeService.resolveDefaultEventType()).toBe('other');
});
it('falls over to the first active type when other is deactivated', async () => {
const other = await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: 'other' }).first();
await db('event_types').where({ id: other.id }).update({ is_active: 0 });
const resolved = await eventTypeService.resolveDefaultEventType();
expect(resolved).not.toBe('other');
expect(await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: resolved }).first()).toBeTruthy();
await db('event_types').where({ id: other.id }).update({ is_active: 1 });
});
it("returns the literal 'other' only for an empty catalog", async () => {
const rows = await db('event_types').select('*');
await db('event_types').del();
expect(await eventTypeService.resolveDefaultEventType()).toBe('other');
await db('event_types').insert(rows);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
/**
* Setup-window event type deletion (#800).
*
* The first-run setup wizard may delete the seeded SYSTEM event types —
* but ONLY while the `setup_wizard_completed` flag is unset (migration 161
* seeds it false on a fresh install, true when an admin already exists).
* These tests pin the whole contract:
*
* - fresh install → flag false → system types deletable (in-use checks
* still apply), and the per-type reminder template goes with the type
* - reminder-template self-heal does NOT resurrect templates for slugs
* that no longer exist in the catalog
* - after markSetupWizardCompleted() → system deletion is refused again
*/
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
describe('event type deletion during the setup window (#800)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let eventTypeService;
let setupService;
let ensureEventReminderTemplatesSeeded;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// Require AFTER bootCrmDb so every service shares this db instance
// (see crmDb.js — a second knex pool on one SQLite file deadlocks).
eventTypeService = require('../../src/services/eventTypeService');
setupService = require('../../src/services/setupService');
({ ensureEventReminderTemplatesSeeded } = require('../../src/services/eventReminderTemplates'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
it('migration 161 seeds the flag false on a fresh (admin-less) install', async () => {
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_wizard_completed' }).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(false);
expect(await setupService.isSetupWizardCompleted()).toBe(false);
});
it('refuses to delete a system type that events already use, even in the window', async () => {
const corporate = await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: 'corporate' }).first();
await db('events').insert({
slug: 'corporate-test-2026-01-01',
event_name: 'Test',
event_type: 'corporate',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: 'share-corporate-test',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000),
});
await expect(eventTypeService.deleteEventType(corporate.id))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'IN_USE' });
});
it('deletes an unused system type in the window, taking its reminder template along', async () => {
// Seed the per-type reminder templates first so there is something to clean up.
await ensureEventReminderTemplatesSeeded(db);
expect(await db('email_templates').where({ template_key: 'event_reminder_wedding' }).first()).toBeTruthy();
const wedding = await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: 'wedding' }).first();
expect(wedding.is_system).toBeTruthy();
const result = await eventTypeService.deleteEventType(wedding.id);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: 'wedding' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
expect(await db('email_templates').where({ template_key: 'event_reminder_wedding' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
// The deleted slug must NOT stay creatable through the legacy fallback —
// the live catalog is authoritative while it has rows.
expect(await eventTypeService.isValidEventType('wedding')).toBe(false);
expect(await eventTypeService.isValidEventType('birthday')).toBe(true);
});
it('does not resurrect reminder templates for deleted types on the next self-heal pass', async () => {
// The seeder caches success per process — reset the module to force a
// genuine second pass, exactly what a backend restart would run.
jest.resetModules();
const fresh = require('../../src/services/eventReminderTemplates');
await fresh.ensureEventReminderTemplatesSeeded(db);
expect(await db('email_templates').where({ template_key: 'event_reminder_wedding' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
// Types still in the catalog keep their templates.
expect(await db('email_templates').where({ template_key: 'event_reminder_birthday' }).first()).toBeTruthy();
expect(await db('email_templates').where({ template_key: 'event_reminder_default' }).first()).toBeTruthy();
});
it('re-locks system types once the wizard is marked complete', async () => {
await setupService.markSetupWizardCompleted();
expect(await setupService.isSetupWizardCompleted()).toBe(true);
const birthday = await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: 'birthday' }).first();
await expect(eventTypeService.deleteEventType(birthday.id))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYSTEM_TYPE' });
// Custom (non-system) types remain deletable as before.
const custom = await eventTypeService.createEventType({ name: 'Family', slug_prefix: 'family' });
const result = await eventTypeService.deleteEventType(custom.id);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
});
it('fails closed when the completion marker row is missing', async () => {
// A portable-backup restore can replace app_settings with a set that
// predates migration 161 (which will not rerun) — absence must mean
// "configured instance", never an open deletion window.
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_wizard_completed' }).del();
expect(await setupService.isSetupWizardCompleted()).toBe(true);
await setupService.markSetupWizardCompleted();
});
it('refuses to delete the last remaining event type', async () => {
// Reduce the catalog to a single custom type via direct db writes (the
// service paths are already covered above), then hit the guard.
const solo = await eventTypeService.createEventType({ name: 'Solo', slug_prefix: 'solo' });
await db('events').del();
await db('event_types').whereNot('id', solo.id).del();
await expect(eventTypeService.deleteEventType(solo.id))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'LAST_TYPE' });
// Deactivating it would empty the ACTIVE catalog just the same.
await expect(eventTypeService.updateEventType(solo.id, { is_active: false }))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'LAST_ACTIVE' });
});
});
@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
/**
* External imports must record captured_at (#1172).
*
* Managed uploads get it from photoProcessor, which external media never goes
* through — so every externally imported photo carried captured_at NULL, and
* the gallery's "Date Taken" sort fell back to uploaded_at through its
* COALESCE. On a library imported in two batches that ordered a 12-day trip by
* which folder was imported first: the reporter's first two days landed at
* positions 4204-5296 of 5555.
*
* Driven through the real route against real files carrying real EXIF, because
* the whole question is whether the import reads the file it already has open.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
const sharp = require('sharp');
describe('external import capture dates (#1172)', () => {
let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot;
/**
* A real JPEG carrying DateTimeOriginal.
*
* IFD2, not IFD0 — DateTimeOriginal lives in the Exif IFD, and exifr does not
* see it anywhere else (IFD0 takes plain DateTime, which surfaces as
* ModifyDate instead).
*/
const writeJpegWithExif = async (rel, iso) => {
const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
const d = new Date(iso);
const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, '0');
const exifDate = `${d.getUTCFullYear()}:${pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1)}:${pad(d.getUTCDate())} `
+ `${pad(d.getUTCHours())}:${pad(d.getUTCMinutes())}:${pad(d.getUTCSeconds())}`;
await sharp({ create: { width: 60, height: 40, channels: 3, background: { r: 10, g: 20, b: 30 } } })
.withExif({ IFD2: { DateTimeOriginal: exifDate } })
.jpeg()
.toFile(full);
return full;
};
const writeJpegNoExif = async (rel) => {
const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
await sharp({ create: { width: 60, height: 40, channels: 3, background: { r: 200, g: 10, b: 10 } } })
.jpeg().toFile(full);
};
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capdate-'));
mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'capdate-secret';
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => {
const actual = jest.requireActual('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
return { ...actual, generateThumbnail: jest.fn(async () => 'thumbnails/mock.jpg'), ensureThumbnail: jest.fn() };
});
jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
}));
({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('../../src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
}, 180000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (db) await db.destroy?.();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
async function seedEvent() {
await db('photos').del();
await db('events').del();
await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `capdate-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'capdate', event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `capdate-${Math.random()}`, expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
source_mode: 'reference',
}).returning('id');
return typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
}
const runImport = (eventId, external_path) => request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/external-media/events/${eventId}/import-external`)
.send({ external_path, recursive: true });
it('records the EXIF capture date on import', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await writeJpegWithExif('trip/a.jpg', '2026-06-01T09:45:03Z');
await runImport(eventId, 'trip');
const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
expect(photo.captured_at).toBeTruthy();
// NOT asserted as an absolute instant. EXIF carries a naive wall-clock
// time and exifr resolves it against the HOST timezone, so the stored UTC
// value differs between a CEST developer machine and a UTC runner. What
// this fix is about is that the field is populated and orders correctly;
// that captured_at is not a true instant is a separate, pre-existing
// problem shared with managed uploads (#1172's own footnote).
expect(new Date(photo.captured_at).getUTCFullYear()).toBe(2026);
expect(new Date(photo.captured_at).getUTCMonth()).toBe(5); // June
});
it('imports a photo with no EXIF date rather than failing it', async () => {
// Plenty of sources carry none; that must stay an import, not an error.
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await writeJpegNoExif('trip/plain.jpg');
const res = await runImport(eventId, 'trip');
expect(res.body.imported).toBe(1);
const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
expect(photo.captured_at).toBeNull();
});
it('orders a two-batch import by capture time, not by batch', async () => {
// The reported shape: the FIRST days of the trip imported second. Sorting
// on COALESCE(captured_at, uploaded_at) put them after the last days,
// because uploaded_at is the import timestamp.
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await writeJpegWithExif('late/day12.jpg', '2026-06-12T10:00:00Z');
await runImport(eventId, 'late');
await writeJpegWithExif('early/day01.jpg', '2026-06-01T10:00:00Z');
await runImport(eventId, 'early');
const rows = await db('photos')
.where({ event_id: eventId })
.orderByRaw('COALESCE(captured_at, uploaded_at) asc')
.select('filename');
expect(rows.map((r) => r.filename)).toEqual(['day01.jpg', 'day12.jpg']);
});
});
@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
/**
* Two overlapping external imports insert every file twice (#1162).
*
* The route checked for an existing external_relpath and then inserted, with
* an fs.stat and a `sharp().metadata()` read sitting in between. A reporter
* double-clicked a slow import of a 6012-file tree and got 8004 rows.
*
* Both halves of the fix are driven here through the real route:
*
* - the in-flight guard, which turns the second click into a 409 instead of
* a second full walk of the tree;
* - convergence when the guard cannot help (another replica, another
* process), which is the unique index from migration 186 firing and the
* loop counting a skip rather than dying or duplicating.
*
* The second is exercised by inserting a competing row from inside the mocked
* `sharp().metadata()` call — literally inside the window the bug lived in.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
describe('concurrent external imports (#1162)', () => {
let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot;
// When set, the mocked sharp metadata read inserts this row first — the
// other run winning the race between our SELECT and our INSERT.
let stealDuringMetadata = null;
let thumbnailDelayMs = 0;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-extdup-'));
mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(mediaRoot, 'nas', 'individual'), { recursive: true });
for (const name of ['a.jpg', 'b.jpg', 'c.jpg']) {
await fs.promises.writeFile(path.join(mediaRoot, 'nas', 'individual', name), 'not-a-real-jpeg');
}
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'extdup-secret';
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
// The window. In production this is a real decode of a NAS-hosted file —
// hundreds of milliseconds during which the row we just proved absent can
// appear. Standing in for the other run here makes that deterministic.
jest.doMock('sharp', () => () => ({
metadata: async () => {
if (stealDuringMetadata) {
const { db: liveDb } = require('../../src/database/db');
await liveDb('photos').insert(stealDuringMetadata);
stealDuringMetadata = null;
}
return { width: 100, height: 200 };
},
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
generateThumbnail: jest.fn(async () => {
if (thumbnailDelayMs) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, thumbnailDelayMs));
return 'thumbnails/mock.jpg';
}),
ensureThumbnail: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
}));
({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('../../src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
}, 180000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (db) await db.destroy?.();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
async function seedEvent() {
await db('photos').del();
await db('events').del();
stealDuringMetadata = null;
thumbnailDelayMs = 0;
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `extdup-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'extdup',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `extdup-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
source_mode: 'reference',
}).returning('id');
return typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
}
const runImport = (eventId) => request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/external-media/events/${eventId}/import-external`)
.send({ external_path: 'nas', recursive: true });
async function relpathCounts(eventId) {
const rows = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).select('external_relpath');
const counts = new Map();
for (const r of rows) counts.set(r.external_relpath, (counts.get(r.external_relpath) || 0) + 1);
return counts;
}
it('rejects a second import while the first is still running', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
// Enough to keep the first request inside its loop while the second
// arrives — the "slow import looks hung, so I clicked again" case.
thumbnailDelayMs = 20;
const [first, second] = await Promise.all([runImport(eventId), runImport(eventId)]);
const statuses = [first.status, second.status].sort();
expect(statuses).toEqual([200, 409]);
const rejected = first.status === 409 ? first : second;
expect(rejected.body.error).toMatch(/already running/i);
});
it('leaves exactly one row per file after both runs', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
thumbnailDelayMs = 20;
await Promise.all([runImport(eventId), runImport(eventId)]);
const counts = await relpathCounts(eventId);
expect(counts.size).toBe(3);
expect([...counts.values()]).toEqual([1, 1, 1]);
});
it('releases the event once the import finishes, so a re-import still works', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
expect((await runImport(eventId)).status).toBe(200);
// Not 409 — the guard is per run, not a permanent lock on the event.
const second = await runImport(eventId);
expect(second.status).toBe(200);
expect(second.body.imported).toBe(0);
expect(second.body.skipped).toBe(3);
});
it('converges when another writer wins the race mid-file', async () => {
// The guard is in-process, so it cannot see a second replica. This is what
// the unique index is for: the insert bounces, and the file is counted as
// skipped rather than duplicated or lost to a 500.
const eventId = await seedEvent();
stealDuringMetadata = {
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'a.jpg',
path: 'x/a.jpg',
type: 'individual',
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: path.join('nas', 'individual', 'a.jpg'),
};
const res = await runImport(eventId);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const counts = await relpathCounts(eventId);
expect(counts.get(path.join('nas', 'individual', 'a.jpg'))).toBe(1);
// Two imported by us, one lost to the other writer and reported honestly.
expect(res.body.imported).toBe(2);
expect(res.body.skipped).toBe(1);
});
it('does not let one contended file abort the rest of the import', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
stealDuringMetadata = {
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'a.jpg',
path: 'x/a.jpg',
type: 'individual',
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: path.join('nas', 'individual', 'a.jpg'),
};
await runImport(eventId);
// All three files present — the contended one via the other writer's row.
expect((await relpathCounts(eventId)).size).toBe(3);
});
});
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
/**
* Importing a second folder must not move the photos already in the event (#1163).
*
* events.external_path is overwritten by every import, and external_relpath
* used to be stored relative to it — so a second import silently rebased every
* existing row onto the new folder. The reporter had 7547 of 8004 originals
* pointing at files that do not exist, and nothing said so: thumbnails are
* written to local storage during the import while the base path is still
* correct, so the grid carries on rendering.
*
* Driven through the real route and the real resolver, against a real
* directory tree — the failure is entirely about whether a file is where the
* app looks for it.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
describe('a second external import (#1163)', () => {
let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot; let resolvePhotoFilePath;
const touch = async (rel) => {
const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
await fs.promises.writeFile(full, 'not-a-real-jpeg');
};
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-ext2nd-'));
mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'ext2nd-secret';
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
jest.doMock('sharp', () => () => ({ metadata: async () => ({ width: 100, height: 200 }) }));
jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
generateThumbnail: jest.fn(async () => 'thumbnails/mock.jpg'),
ensureThumbnail: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
}));
({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
({ resolvePhotoFilePath } = require('../../src/services/photoResolver'));
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('../../src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
}, 180000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (db) await db.destroy?.();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
async function seedEvent() {
await db('photos').del();
await db('events').del();
await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `ext2nd-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'ext2nd',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `ext2nd-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
source_mode: 'reference',
}).returning('id');
return typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
}
const runImport = (eventId, external_path) => request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/external-media/events/${eventId}/import-external`)
.send({ external_path, recursive: true });
/** Where the app would go looking for this photo's original, right now. */
async function resolved(eventId, filename) {
const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId, filename }).first();
return resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo);
}
it('stores paths relative to the media root, not to the imported folder', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await touch('Trip/Leknes/old.jpg');
await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
expect(photo.external_relpath).toBe(path.join('Trip', 'Leknes', 'old.jpg'));
});
it('leaves the first folders originals reachable after a second import', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await touch('Trip/Leknes/old.jpg');
await touch('Trip/Sub/new.jpg');
await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
const before = await resolved(eventId, 'old.jpg');
await runImport(eventId, 'Trip/Sub');
const after = await resolved(eventId, 'old.jpg');
// The regression: `after` used to be <root>/Trip/Sub/Leknes/old.jpg.
expect(after).toBe(before);
expect(fs.existsSync(after)).toBe(true);
});
it('every original in the event is still on disk afterwards', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await touch('Trip/Leknes/a.jpg');
await touch('Trip/Leknes/b.jpg');
await touch('Trip/Sub/c.jpg');
await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
await runImport(eventId, 'Trip/Sub');
const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
const photos = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId });
expect(photos).toHaveLength(3);
for (const photo of photos) {
expect(fs.existsSync(resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo))).toBe(true);
}
});
it('does not re-insert a file the first import already took', async () => {
// The dedupe check compares stored paths, so it has to be comparing the
// same shape the insert writes.
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await touch('Trip/Sub/c.jpg');
await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
const second = await runImport(eventId, 'Trip/Sub');
expect(second.body.imported).toBe(0);
expect(second.body.skipped).toBe(1);
expect(await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
});
it('resolves a subfolder that repeats its parents name', async () => {
// The old resolver stripped the relpath's first segment when it matched the
// base path's last one, which broke exactly this layout.
const eventId = await seedEvent();
await touch('Trip/Trip/x.jpg');
await runImport(eventId, 'Trip');
const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
const photo = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
expect(resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo)).toBe(path.join(mediaRoot, 'Trip', 'Trip', 'x.jpg'));
});
});
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
/**
* PostgreSQL integration test for the external-path fold (#1163).
*
* Gated the same way as picpeakRestorePg: runs only when PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL
* points at a throwaway Postgres DB, e.g.
* PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:picpeak_secure_pass_2024@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_fold_test" \
* npx jest __tests__/integration/externalRelpathFoldPg.test.js
*
* This exists because of a defect SQLite could not have caught. The two-pass
* rewrite parks each row on a temporary value, and that value was first written
* with a leading NUL. SQLite stores NUL in TEXT without complaint; Postgres
* rejects it outright ("invalid byte sequence for encoding UTF8"), so migration
* 187 would have rolled back on exactly the installs needing the repair — and
* only on the engine most of them run.
*
* The staging value is therefore an engine-level contract, not an
* implementation detail, and it is pinned here on the engine that constrains it.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
maybe('external relpath fold on Postgres', () => {
let pgDb; let mediaRoot; let fold;
const touch = async (rel, bytes) => {
const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
await fs.promises.writeFile(full, Buffer.alloc(bytes));
return bytes;
};
beforeAll(async () => {
mediaRoot = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-foldpg-'));
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
jest.resetModules();
({ foldExternalRelpaths: fold } = require('../../src/services/externalRelpathFold'));
pgDb = knex({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL });
}, 60000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (pgDb) await pgDb.destroy();
await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
delete process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT;
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS photos, events, app_settings CASCADE');
await pgDb.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.text('external_path');
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.integer('event_id');
t.text('external_relpath');
t.bigInteger('size_bytes');
t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('setting_key');
t.text('setting_value');
t.string('setting_type');
t.string('updated_at');
});
await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
});
const relpaths = async () =>
(await pgDb('photos').orderBy('id').select('external_relpath')).map((r) => r.external_relpath);
it('completes the two-pass repair that a NUL staging value would abort', async () => {
// The exact shape that forces staging: `photo.jpg` repairs up to
// `Trip/photo.jpg`, while the row already holding `Trip/photo.jpg` folds
// deeper. Every final value is distinct, but a final value equals another
// row's current one, so the rewrite has to park first.
const a = await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 11);
const b = await touch('Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg', 22);
await pgDb('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
await pgDb('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: a, source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/photo.jpg', size_bytes: b, source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await fold(pgDb);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/photo.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg']);
});
it('leaves no staging value behind', async () => {
await touch('Trip/a.jpg', 8);
await pgDb('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
await pgDb('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', size_bytes: 8, source_origin: 'external' });
await fold(pgDb);
const rows = await relpaths();
expect(rows).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
expect(rows.some((r) => r.includes('staging'))).toBe(false);
});
it('folds and marks in one transaction', async () => {
await touch('Trip/a.jpg', 8);
await pgDb('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
await pgDb('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', size_bytes: 8, source_origin: 'external' });
await fold(pgDb);
// Second run is a no-op: the marker committed with the rewrites.
await fold(pgDb);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
});
});
@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
/**
* Guest filters must respect show_feedback_to_guests (#1044 follow-up).
*
* Every filter token on /photos is an OR of two halves: what THIS viewer
* marked, and what ANYONE marked. The response fields built from the second
* half — like_count, comment_count — are all gated on
* show_feedback_to_guests. The FILTER was not.
*
* So with the setting off, the numbers were hidden but `?filter=liked` still
* returned exactly the photos other people had liked: the same information as
* a set instead of a count, one token at a time. These tests pin the gate on
* every token, and pin that the viewer's own half is never gated — filtering
* by what you yourself marked is yours to do regardless.
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'filter-visibility-secret';
const SLUG = 'filter-visibility-event';
const ME = 'guest-me-identifier';
const SOMEONE_ELSE = 'guest-other-identifier';
describe('guest filters and show_feedback_to_guests (#1044)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let eventId;
let mine;
let theirs;
let myGuestRowId;
const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const setVisibility = (visible) => db('event_feedback_settings')
.where({ event_id: eventId })
.update({ show_feedback_to_guests: visible });
// A real verified guest, which is how the viewer's own feedback is actually
// identified — NOT the `guest_id` query parameter the frontend invents.
const guestToken = () => jwt.sign(
{ type: 'guest', guestId: myGuestRowId, eventId },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const filter = async (token, { as = 'me', claimGuestId } = {}) => {
const req = request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.query({ filter: token, ...(claimGuestId ? { guest_id: claimGuestId } : {}) })
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
if (as === 'me') req.set('x-guest-token', guestToken());
const res = await req;
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const photos = Array.isArray(res.body) ? res.body : res.body.photos;
return (photos || []).map((p) => p.id).sort((a, b) => a - b);
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Filter Visibility',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'filter-visibility-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
const addPhoto = async (name) => {
const p = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: name,
path: `events/filter/${name}`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
};
mine = await addPhoto('mine.jpg');
theirs = await addPhoto('theirs.jpg');
await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
event_id: eventId,
feedback_enabled: true,
allow_likes: true,
allow_comments: true,
allow_ratings: true,
allow_favorites: true,
moderate_comments: false,
show_feedback_to_guests: true,
});
const guestRow = await db('gallery_guests').insert({
event_id: eventId,
name: 'Me',
identifier: ME,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
last_seen_at: new Date().toISOString(),
is_deleted: false,
}).returning('id');
myGuestRowId = guestRow[0]?.id ?? guestRow[0];
const feedback = (photoId, who, type, extra = {}) => db('photo_feedback').insert({
photo_id: photoId,
event_id: eventId,
guest_identifier: who,
// Submission links to the per-person guest row when one is present, and
// that is the column the viewer's own half resolves through.
guest_id: who === ME ? myGuestRowId : null,
feedback_type: type,
is_approved: true,
is_hidden: false,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...extra,
});
// Everything on `theirs` belongs to somebody else; `mine` is this viewer's.
await feedback(mine, ME, 'like');
await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'like');
await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'favorite');
await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'comment', { comment_text: 'lovely' });
await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'rating', { rating: 5 });
// The denormalized counters the aggregate half of the filter reads.
await db('photos').where('id', theirs).update({
like_count: 1, favorite_count: 1, comment_count: 1, average_rating: 5,
});
await db('photos').where('id', mine).update({ like_count: 1 });
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('with feedback visible to guests', () => {
beforeAll(() => setVisibility(true));
it('shows other people\'s marks through every token, as before', async () => {
expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([mine, theirs].sort((a, b) => a - b));
expect(await filter('favorited')).toEqual([theirs]);
expect(await filter('rated')).toEqual([theirs]);
expect(await filter('commented')).toEqual([theirs]);
});
});
describe('with feedback hidden from guests', () => {
beforeAll(() => setVisibility(false));
it('stops every token from selecting on other people\'s marks', async () => {
// `theirs` is the photo only other guests marked. It must not come back
// through any token — a filter that selects on hidden feedback reports
// that feedback just as surely as a count would.
expect(await filter('favorited')).toEqual([]);
expect(await filter('rated')).toEqual([]);
expect(await filter('commented')).toEqual([]);
});
it('still filters by what the viewer marked themselves', async () => {
// The viewer's own half is never gated: this is their own action, and
// hiding it would break "show me the ones I liked" for no privacy gain.
expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([mine]);
});
it('drops the viewer\'s own feedback once an admin hides it', async () => {
// Moderation has to reach the filter too. getPhotoFeedback excludes
// hidden rows for the guest's OWN feedback, so a photo matching here
// would come back with nothing visible on it to explain why.
await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: mine, guest_id: myGuestRowId, feedback_type: 'like' })
.update({ is_hidden: true });
expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([]);
await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: mine, guest_id: myGuestRowId, feedback_type: 'like' })
.update({ is_hidden: false });
expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([mine]);
});
it('ignores a guest_id supplied by the caller', async () => {
// The own-half is resolved from the request identity. If it honoured the
// query string instead, anyone holding another guest's identifier could
// read that guest's hidden memberships one token at a time — straight
// back through the gate this file exists to pin.
expect(await filter('favorited', { claimGuestId: SOMEONE_ELSE })).toEqual([]);
// And an anonymous caller claiming to be me gets nothing of mine.
expect(await filter('liked', { as: 'anon', claimGuestId: ME })).toEqual([]);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
/**
* Gallery password invisible-Unicode fallback (#654).
*
* Passwords relayed through chat apps (Instagram DMs especially) pick up
* invisible characters on copy-paste — zero-width space/joiners, word
* joiner, BOM, soft hyphen — which fail the byte-exact bcrypt compare and
* surface as "incorrect password" for a correct password. The verify route
* retries the compare with those characters stripped, in the SAME request,
* so the fallback costs no reCAPTCHA token and no failed-attempt quota.
*
* Pins the contract:
* - exact submitted bytes always win first, so stored passwords that
* legitimately contain these characters (e.g. ZWJ emoji sequences)
* keep working
* - paste artifacts (mid-string ZWSP, leading BOM, trailing space) are
* rescued by the sanitized fallback compare
* - the fallback never invents a match (missing ZWJ still 401s), and a
* rescued login records no failed attempt
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'sanitize-test-secret';
const PLAIN_SLUG = 'sanitize-plain-event';
const ZWJ_SLUG = 'sanitize-zwj-event';
const PLAIN_PASSWORD = 'wedding2026';
// Stored password legitimately containing a ZWJ emoji sequence.
const ZWJ_PASSWORD = 'Family\u{1F468}\u200D\u{1F469}Aa1';
describe('gallery/verify invisible-Unicode fallback (#654)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
const makeEvent = async (slug, password) => {
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: `Sanitize ${slug}`,
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash(password, 4),
share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
share_token: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
};
let plainEventId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
plainEventId = await makeEvent(PLAIN_SLUG, PLAIN_PASSWORD);
await makeEvent(ZWJ_SLUG, ZWJ_PASSWORD);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/auth', require('../../src/routes/auth'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
const verify = (slug, password) =>
request(app).post('/api/auth/gallery/verify').send({ slug, password });
it('accepts the exact password', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, PLAIN_PASSWORD);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('rescues a mid-string zero-width space from chat-app copy-paste', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, 'wedding\u200B2026');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('rescues leading BOM + trailing space paste artifacts', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, `\uFEFF${PLAIN_PASSWORD} `);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('records no login_fail for a rescued login (single-request fallback)', async () => {
await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, 'wedding\u200B2026').expect(200);
const failed = await db('access_logs')
.where({ event_id: plainEventId, action: 'login_fail' });
expect(failed).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('still accepts a stored password that legitimately contains a ZWJ', async () => {
const res = await verify(ZWJ_SLUG, ZWJ_PASSWORD);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('does not invent a match when the ZWJ is missing from the input', async () => {
const res = await verify(ZWJ_SLUG, 'Family\u{1F468}\u{1F469}Aa1');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('rejects a plain wrong password', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, 'not-the-password');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
/**
* Minimal in-process OIDC provider for integration tests (#798).
*
* Serves just enough of the spec for openid-client's full validation to
* pass: discovery, JWKS (RS256), authorization endpoint (immediate redirect,
* no login UI), and token endpoint (authorization_code + PKCE). Claims for
* the next login are scripted per test via `setNextUser()`.
*
* Runs on an ephemeral localhost port over plain http — the service allows
* that in NODE_ENV=test only.
*/
const http = require('http');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const { URL } = require('url');
function b64url(input) {
return Buffer.from(input).toString('base64url');
}
class MockOidcProvider {
constructor() {
const { publicKey, privateKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });
this.privateKey = privateKey;
this.publicJwk = publicKey.export({ format: 'jwk' });
this.publicJwk.kid = 'test-key-1';
this.publicJwk.alg = 'RS256';
this.publicJwk.use = 'sig';
this.clientId = 'picpeak-test';
this.clientSecret = 'test-client-secret';
this.codes = new Map(); // code -> { nonce, redirectUri, codeChallenge, user }
this.nextUser = { sub: 'user-1', email: 'sso@example.com', email_verified: true };
// Test hooks:
this.tamperNonce = false; // sign the ID token with a WRONG nonce
this.emailViaUserinfoOnly = false; // omit email from the ID token; serve it on /userinfo
this.advertiseEndSession = true; // include end_session_endpoint in discovery (#798 phase 3)
this.accessTokens = new Map(); // access_token -> user (for /userinfo)
this.server = null;
this.issuer = null;
}
setNextUser(user) {
this.nextUser = user;
}
signIdToken({ sub, nonce, extraClaims = {} }) {
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const header = { alg: 'RS256', kid: this.publicJwk.kid, typ: 'JWT' };
const payload = {
iss: this.issuer,
aud: this.clientId,
sub,
iat: now,
exp: now + 300,
nonce,
...extraClaims,
};
const signingInput = `${b64url(JSON.stringify(header))}.${b64url(JSON.stringify(payload))}`;
const signature = crypto.sign('RSA-SHA256', Buffer.from(signingInput), this.privateKey);
return `${signingInput}.${signature.toString('base64url')}`;
}
async start() {
this.server = http.createServer((req, res) => this.handle(req, res));
await new Promise((resolve) => this.server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
this.issuer = `http://127.0.0.1:${this.server.address().port}`;
return this.issuer;
}
async stop() {
if (this.server) await new Promise((resolve) => this.server.close(resolve));
}
handle(req, res) {
const url = new URL(req.url, this.issuer);
const json = (status, body) => {
res.writeHead(status, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify(body));
};
if (url.pathname === '/.well-known/openid-configuration') {
return json(200, {
issuer: this.issuer,
authorization_endpoint: `${this.issuer}/authorize`,
token_endpoint: `${this.issuer}/token`,
userinfo_endpoint: `${this.issuer}/userinfo`,
jwks_uri: `${this.issuer}/jwks`,
...(this.advertiseEndSession ? { end_session_endpoint: `${this.issuer}/logout` } : {}),
response_types_supported: ['code'],
subject_types_supported: ['public'],
id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ['RS256'],
code_challenge_methods_supported: ['S256'],
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ['client_secret_basic', 'client_secret_post'],
});
}
if (url.pathname === '/jwks') {
return json(200, { keys: [this.publicJwk] });
}
if (url.pathname === '/authorize') {
// "Log in" instantly: mint a code bound to this request's params and
// bounce back to the redirect_uri like a real IdP would.
const code = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url');
this.codes.set(code, {
nonce: url.searchParams.get('nonce'),
redirectUri: url.searchParams.get('redirect_uri'),
codeChallenge: url.searchParams.get('code_challenge'),
user: this.nextUser,
});
const back = new URL(url.searchParams.get('redirect_uri'));
back.searchParams.set('code', code);
back.searchParams.set('state', url.searchParams.get('state'));
res.writeHead(302, { location: back.href });
return res.end();
}
if (url.pathname === '/token' && req.method === 'POST') {
let body = '';
req.on('data', (c) => { body += c; });
req.on('end', () => {
const params = new URLSearchParams(body);
const stored = this.codes.get(params.get('code'));
if (!stored) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant' });
this.codes.delete(params.get('code'));
// PKCE check — S256(code_verifier) must match the challenge.
const verifier = params.get('code_verifier') || '';
const challenge = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(verifier).digest('base64url');
if (challenge !== stored.codeChallenge) {
return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'PKCE verification failed' });
}
const { sub, ...extraClaims } = stored.user;
// Spec-compliant providers may keep profile/email claims OFF the ID
// token and serve them from /userinfo only — this hook simulates that.
const idTokenClaims = this.emailViaUserinfoOnly ? {} : extraClaims;
const idToken = this.signIdToken({
sub,
nonce: this.tamperNonce ? 'tampered-nonce' : stored.nonce,
extraClaims: idTokenClaims,
});
const accessToken = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url');
this.accessTokens.set(accessToken, stored.user);
return json(200, {
access_token: accessToken,
token_type: 'Bearer',
expires_in: 300,
id_token: idToken,
});
});
return undefined;
}
if (url.pathname === '/userinfo') {
const auth = req.headers.authorization || '';
const user = this.accessTokens.get(auth.replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, ''));
if (!user) return json(401, { error: 'invalid_token' });
return json(200, { ...user });
}
return json(404, { error: 'not_found' });
}
}
module.exports = { MockOidcProvider };
@@ -1,245 +0,0 @@
/**
* Hidden feedback, seen from the guest who left it (#1150).
*
* Everything in the system treats a hidden row as absent: getPhotoFeedback
* drops it even for the guest's own feedback, the /photos filters drop it, and
* updatePhotoFeedbackStats does not count it. One place disagreed — the
* per-viewer `is_liked` heart — so a like the photographer had hidden still
* showed as liked on a photo whose like_count was zero. (The `my_color_label`
* badge has the same shape on main; colour labels are not on this branch.)
*
* Making those two agree exposes the second half: the duplicate check that
* powers like/favorite toggling did NOT skip hidden rows, so the now-empty
* heart, when clicked, found the hidden row and toggled it OFF. The click
* appeared to do nothing and it took two more to get back to a filled heart.
*
* Hiding a non-comment is deliberate, not an accident of the raw route: #839
* and #1044 both ship it, with tests asserting that a hidden reaction or
* colour label stops counting. So the fix is to make hidden mean absent
* consistently — not to stop admins hiding these.
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'hidden-feedback-secret';
const SLUG = 'hidden-own-feedback';
const ME = 'guest-me-identifier';
describe('a guest\'s own hidden feedback (#1150)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let feedbackService;
let eventId; let photoId; let myGuestRowId;
const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const guestToken = () => jwt.sign(
{ type: 'guest', guestId: myGuestRowId, eventId },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const getPhoto = async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.set('x-guest-token', guestToken());
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const photos = Array.isArray(res.body) ? res.body : res.body.photos;
return (photos || []).find((p) => p.id === photoId);
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
feedbackService = require('../../src/services/feedbackService');
const [ev] = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Hidden Own Feedback',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'hidden-own-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = typeof ev === 'object' ? ev.id : ev;
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId, filename: 'shot.jpg', path: 'events/hidden/shot.jpg',
type: 'individual', uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
photoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
const [g] = await db('gallery_guests').insert({
event_id: eventId, name: 'Me', identifier: ME,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(), last_seen_at: new Date().toISOString(),
is_deleted: false,
}).returning('id');
myGuestRowId = typeof g === 'object' ? g.id : g;
await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
event_id: eventId, feedback_enabled: true, allow_likes: true,
moderate_comments: false,
show_feedback_to_guests: true,
});
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/galleryFeedback'));
}, 180000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
const like = () => db('photo_feedback').insert({
photo_id: photoId, event_id: eventId, guest_identifier: ME,
guest_id: myGuestRowId, feedback_type: 'like',
is_approved: true, is_hidden: false, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('photo_feedback').where({ photo_id: photoId }).del();
await db('photos').where('id', photoId).update({ like_count: 0 });
});
describe('the read surfaces agree with each other', () => {
it('un-fills the heart once the like is hidden', async () => {
await like();
await feedbackService.updatePhotoFeedbackStats(photoId);
expect((await getPhoto()).is_liked).toBe(true);
await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
.update({ is_hidden: true });
await feedbackService.updatePhotoFeedbackStats(photoId);
const photo = await getPhoto();
// like_count already ignored hidden rows, so the heart was the only
// thing still claiming this photo was liked.
expect(photo.like_count).toBe(0);
expect(photo.is_liked).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('and every other surface agrees', () => {
it('keeps a hidden like out of /my-feedback', async () => {
await like();
await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
.update({ is_hidden: true });
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/my-feedback`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.set('x-guest-token', guestToken());
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// In guest identity mode the Liked/Favorited/Rated chips and their
// filters are built from THIS array, not from is_liked — so a hidden
// like left an empty heart while the chip still counted it.
expect(res.body.filter((f) => f.feedback_type === 'like')).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('does not count a hidden row against the guest cap', async () => {
await db('event_feedback_settings')
.where({ event_id: eventId }).update({ max_likes_per_guest: 1 });
await like();
await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
.update({ is_hidden: true });
// The hidden row is room, not an occupant: the guest sees an empty
// heart, and meeting that click with limit_reached leaves the control
// dead until they un-like something they can still see.
const result = await feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: ME, guest_id: myGuestRowId,
});
expect(result.limit_reached).toBeUndefined();
await db('event_feedback_settings')
.where({ event_id: eventId }).update({ max_likes_per_guest: null });
});
it('leaves other anonymous rows alone when there is no identity to scope by', async () => {
// With neither guest_id nor guest_identifier the collapse scope degrades
// to `guest_identifier IS NULL` — every identifier-less row on the
// photo, i.e. other people's.
const anon = (extra) => ({
photo_id: photoId, event_id: eventId, feedback_type: 'like',
is_approved: true, created_at: new Date().toISOString(), ...extra,
});
const [h] = await db('photo_feedback').insert(anon({ is_hidden: true })).returning('id');
const hiddenId = typeof h === 'object' ? h.id : h;
await db('photo_feedback').insert(anon({ is_hidden: false }));
await db('photo_feedback').insert(anon({ is_hidden: false }));
await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(hiddenId, 'approve', 1);
expect(await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like', is_hidden: false }))
.toHaveLength(3);
});
it('collapses the replacement when an admin unhides the original', async () => {
await like();
const original = await db('photo_feedback').where({ photo_id: photoId }).first();
await db('photo_feedback').where('id', original.id).update({ is_hidden: true });
await feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: ME, guest_id: myGuestRowId,
});
expect(await db('photo_feedback').where({ photo_id: photoId })).toHaveLength(2);
await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(original.id, 'approve', 1);
// Two visible rows for one guest would double-count in the tallies and
// need two toggles to clear, since each deletes a single row.
const visible = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like', is_hidden: false });
expect(visible).toHaveLength(1);
expect(visible[0].id).toBe(original.id);
});
});
describe('and clicking still works afterwards', () => {
it('re-liking creates a fresh row instead of toggling the hidden one off', async () => {
await like();
await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
.update({ is_hidden: true });
// What the guest sees is an empty heart, so this is an ADD.
const result = await feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
feedback_type: 'like',
guest_identifier: ME,
guest_id: myGuestRowId,
});
// Before this, the duplicate check found the hidden row and deleted it —
// `removed: true` — so the click did nothing visible and the moderation
// was silently undone.
expect(result.removed).toBeUndefined();
const visible = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like', is_hidden: false });
expect(visible).toHaveLength(1);
expect((await getPhoto()).is_liked).toBe(true);
});
});
});
@@ -1,233 +0,0 @@
/**
* Shared run state for the maintenance sweeps (#1181).
*
* The behaviour that matters here cannot be observed from one process holding
* a module-level flag, which is exactly why the flag moved into the database.
* A second replica is simulated the only way that is honest in a single-process
* test: by asserting on the shared row itself, and by driving claim() twice —
* a second caller getting null is precisely what a second replica gets.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
describe('maintenance job state (#1181)', () => {
let tmpDir; let db; let app; let jobs;
const dimStatus = () => request(app).get('/api/admin/photos/repair-dimensions/status');
const capStatus = () => request(app).get('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates/status');
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mjs-'));
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mjs-secret';
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
}));
({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
jobs = require('../../src/services/maintenanceJobState');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotoDimensions'));
}, 180000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (db) await db.destroy?.();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('maintenance_jobs').update({
is_running: false, started_at: null, heartbeat_at: null, finished_at: null, last_result: null, owner: null, claim_token: null,
});
});
test('the lease table is kept out of .picpeak archives', () => {
// It is live state, not data. An archive taken mid-sweep would otherwise
// carry is_running = true and a claim token owned by a process on the
// SOURCE install; restored inside the staleness window, the target reports
// the job as running and refuses new POSTs with no runner to release it.
// The importer filters on this same set, so archives written before the
// exclusion are skipped on restore too.
const { EXCLUDED_TABLES } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService');
expect(EXCLUDED_TABLES.has('maintenance_jobs')).toBe(true);
});
test('the migration seeds a row for each job', async () => {
const names = await db('maintenance_jobs').pluck('job_name');
expect(names.sort()).toEqual(['photo_capture_date_backfill', 'photo_dimension_repair']);
});
test('a second claim is refused while the first is alive', async () => {
expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
// What a second replica's POST does. Nothing about the first claim lives in
// this process, so this is the same question the other replica asks.
expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toBeNull();
});
test('the two jobs claim independently', async () => {
expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
});
test('each claim gets a distinct token', async () => {
const first = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, first);
const second = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
// Same process, same pid — so an owner string would have collided here and
// the fencing below would be worthless.
expect(second).not.toBe(first);
});
test('a claim whose heartbeat has gone quiet can be taken over', async () => {
expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toBeNull();
// The replica holding it was killed: no release, no further heartbeats.
const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
});
test('a superseded runner cannot renew its lease', async () => {
const oldToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
const newToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
expect(newToken).toEqual(expect.any(String));
// The old runner is still alive and mid-loop. Its renewal must tell it so,
// which is what makes the route loop stop instead of running alongside the
// new owner.
expect(await jobs.heartbeat(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, oldToken)).toBe(false);
expect(await jobs.heartbeat(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, newToken)).toBe(true);
});
test('a superseded runner cannot release the new owner\'s claim', async () => {
const oldToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
const newToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
// The old runner finishes late and tries to write its result. Unfenced,
// this cleared is_running under the new owner and let a THIRD sweep start.
expect(await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, oldToken, { success: 999, noExif: 0, failed: 0 })).toBe(false);
const state = await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
expect(state.isRunning).toBe(true);
expect(state.lastResult).toBeNull();
// And the row is still the new owner's to release.
expect(await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, newToken, { success: 1, noExif: 0, failed: 0 })).toBe(true);
});
test('a stale run reads as not running, so the button comes back', async () => {
await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).isRunning).toBe(true);
const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
// is_running is still true in the row — nothing released it — but a status
// poll must not leave the operator staring at a job that cannot finish.
expect((await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).first()).is_running).toBeTruthy();
expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).isRunning).toBe(false);
});
test('a heartbeat keeps a long run claimed', async () => {
const token = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString();
await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ heartbeat_at: longAgo });
expect(await jobs.heartbeat(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR, token)).toBe(true);
expect(await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).toBeNull();
expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR)).isRunning).toBe(true);
});
test('release stores the result and read gives it back parsed', async () => {
const token = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, token, { success: 3, noExif: 2, failed: 1 });
const state = await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
expect(state.isRunning).toBe(false);
expect(state.lastResult).toEqual({ success: 3, noExif: 2, failed: 1 });
});
test('releasing without a result keeps the previous run visible', async () => {
const first = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, first, { success: 7, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
// The "nothing to do" path: claimed, found no candidates, released. It must
// not blank the numbers the last real run reported.
const second = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, second);
expect((await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL)).lastResult).toEqual({ success: 7, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
});
test('a malformed result does not take the status endpoint down', async () => {
await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR }).update({ last_result: 'not json' });
const state = await jobs.read(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
expect(state.lastResult).toBeNull();
expect(state.isRunning).toBe(false);
});
test('both status endpoints report the shared row, not process memory', async () => {
await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_DIMENSION_REPAIR);
const capToken = await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
await jobs.release(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL, capToken, { success: 1, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
// Written straight to the row, exactly as another replica would have.
const dim = await dimStatus();
expect(dim.status).toBe(200);
expect(dim.body.isRunning).toBe(true);
const cap = await capStatus();
expect(cap.status).toBe(200);
expect(cap.body.isRunning).toBe(false);
expect(cap.body.lastResult).toEqual({ success: 1, noExif: 0, failed: 0 });
});
test('a POST is refused while another replica holds the claim', async () => {
// The claim was taken by "another replica" — this process knows nothing
// about it beyond the row.
await jobs.claim(jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL);
const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
const dimRes = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-dimensions');
// The other job is untouched by that claim, so it is free to start.
expect(dimRes.status).toBe(200);
});
test('the no-op path releases the claim it took', async () => {
// No photos at all, so both endpoints take their "nothing to do" exit.
await db('photos').del();
const res = await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates');
expect(res.body.count).toBe(0);
const row = await db('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: jobs.JOB_CAPTURE_DATE_BACKFILL }).first();
expect(row.is_running).toBeFalsy();
// ...and a second POST is therefore accepted rather than 409ing forever.
expect((await request(app).post('/api/admin/photos/repair-capture-dates')).status).toBe(200);
});
});
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
/**
* PostgreSQL checks for the shared maintenance-job state (#1181).
* Gated: runs only when PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL points at a throwaway database, e.g.
* PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:picpeak_secure_pass_2024@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_mjs_test" \
* npx jest __tests__/integration/maintenanceJobStatePg.test.js
*
* What SQLite cannot answer: the claim leans on comparing a `timestamp` column
* against an ISO-8601 string, and on an UPDATE ... WHERE guard being atomic
* under real concurrent connections. SQLite compares those strings
* lexicographically and serialises writes anyway, so it would pass either way —
* exactly the shape of divergence that has bitten this repo before.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
maybe('maintenance job state on Postgres', () => {
let pgDb;
let jobs;
const JOB = 'photo_dimension_repair';
beforeAll(async () => {
pgDb = knex({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL, pool: { min: 0, max: 10 } });
await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS maintenance_jobs');
await require('../../migrations/core/179_maintenance_job_state').up(pgDb);
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: pgDb }));
jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
}));
jobs = require('../../src/services/maintenanceJobState');
}, 60000);
afterAll(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
if (pgDb) await pgDb.destroy();
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').update({
is_running: false, started_at: null, heartbeat_at: null, finished_at: null, last_result: null, owner: null, claim_token: null,
});
});
test('the ISO-string cutoff really compares as a timestamp, not as text', async () => {
expect(await jobs.claim(JOB)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(await jobs.claim(JOB)).toBeNull();
await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB })
.update({ heartbeat_at: new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString() });
// If Postgres had rejected or mis-cast the ISO string this would either
// throw or never match.
expect(await jobs.claim(JOB)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
const row = await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB }).first();
expect(row.heartbeat_at).toBeInstanceOf(Date);
});
test('concurrent claims on real connections produce exactly one winner', async () => {
// The whole point of the conditional UPDATE. Ten connections race; nine
// must lose. SQLite cannot demonstrate this — it serialises writers.
const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 10 }, () => jobs.claim(JOB)));
expect(results.filter(Boolean)).toHaveLength(1);
// ...and the winner holds a token nobody else can forge.
expect(results.find(Boolean)).toEqual(expect.any(String));
});
test('a released job can be re-claimed exactly once again', async () => {
const token = await jobs.claim(JOB);
await jobs.release(JOB, token, { success: 2, failed: 0 });
const results = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 5 }, () => jobs.claim(JOB)));
expect(results.filter(Boolean)).toHaveLength(1);
expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).lastResult).toEqual({ success: 2, failed: 0 });
});
test('a superseded runner is fenced out on real Postgres', async () => {
const oldToken = await jobs.claim(JOB);
await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB })
.update({ heartbeat_at: new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 60000).toISOString() });
const newToken = await jobs.claim(JOB);
expect(await jobs.heartbeat(JOB, oldToken)).toBe(false);
expect(await jobs.release(JOB, oldToken, { success: 999, failed: 0 })).toBe(false);
// The new owner still holds it, with its result unwritten.
expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).isRunning).toBe(true);
expect(await jobs.release(JOB, newToken, { success: 4, failed: 0 })).toBe(true);
});
test('read() reports a live claim as running and a stale one as not', async () => {
await jobs.claim(JOB);
expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).isRunning).toBe(true);
await pgDb('maintenance_jobs').where({ job_name: JOB })
.update({ heartbeat_at: new Date(Date.now() - jobs.DEFAULT_STALE_MS - 1000).toISOString() });
expect((await jobs.read(JOB)).isRunning).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
/**
* OIDC logout-to-IdP integration tests (#798 phase 3).
*
* Same full-stack shape as oidcSso.test.js: real routes over a mock
* in-process IdP, genuine discovery/JWKS/PKCE via openid-client. Pins:
*
* - the SSO callback stores the raw ID token in the oidc_id_token cookie
* - /logout with that cookie + oidc_logout_from_idp=true returns the
* IdP end-session URL (id_token_hint, post_logout_redirect_uri,
* client_id) and clears the cookie
* - feature off → no ssoLogoutUrl even for an SSO session
* - no oidc_id_token cookie (local-password session) → no ssoLogoutUrl
* even with the feature on — local sessions never bounce to the IdP
* - IdP without an end_session_endpoint → no ssoLogoutUrl, logout still 200
* - settings surface: GET exposes the flag + post_logout_redirect_uri,
* PUT persists the flag
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
const { MockOidcProvider } = require('./helpers/mockOidcProvider');
describe('OIDC logout-to-IdP (#798 phase 3)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let idp;
let oidcService;
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'oidc-logout-test-secret';
process.env.FRONTEND_URL = 'http://localhost:5199';
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
idp = new MockOidcProvider();
const issuer = await idp.start();
oidcService = require('../../src/services/oidcService');
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_enabled: true,
oidc_issuer_url: issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp.clientSecret,
oidc_autoprovision: true,
oidc_default_role: 'viewer',
oidc_logout_from_idp: true,
});
const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/auth', authRouter);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (idp) await idp.stop();
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
/** Drive login → IdP → callback like a browser; returns the callback response. */
async function ssoRoundTrip() {
const loginRes = await request(app).get('/api/auth/admin/sso/login').expect(302);
const stateCookie = (loginRes.headers['set-cookie'] || [])
.find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_state='))
.split(';')[0];
const idpRes = await fetch(loginRes.headers.location, { redirect: 'manual' });
expect(idpRes.status).toBe(302);
const back = new URL(idpRes.headers.get('location'));
return request(app)
.get(`${back.pathname}?${back.searchParams.toString()}`)
.set('Cookie', stateCookie)
.expect(302);
}
/**
* The oidc_id_token cookie pair ("oidc_id_token=<jwt>") from a callback
* response. The callback carries TWO Set-Cookie headers for this name —
* establishAdminSession clears any stale marker, then the callback sets
* the fresh one — and browsers apply them in order, so the LAST wins.
*/
function idTokenCookie(res) {
const cookies = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).filter((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_id_token='));
const last = cookies[cookies.length - 1];
return last ? last.split(';')[0] : null;
}
it('stores the raw ID token in the oidc_id_token cookie on SSO login', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'logout-sub-1', email: 'logout@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
const cookie = idTokenCookie(res);
expect(cookie).toBeTruthy();
// Raw JWT, HttpOnly, scoped to /api/auth.
const raw = decodeURIComponent(cookie.replace('oidc_id_token=', ''));
expect(raw.split('.')).toHaveLength(3);
const setCookies = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).filter((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_id_token='));
const full = setCookies[setCookies.length - 1];
expect(full).toMatch(/HttpOnly/i);
expect(full).toMatch(/Path=\/api\/auth/i);
});
it('returns the IdP end-session URL on logout and clears the cookie', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'logout-sub-2', email: 'logout2@example.com', email_verified: true });
const cbRes = await ssoRoundTrip();
const cookie = idTokenCookie(cbRes);
const rawIdToken = decodeURIComponent(cookie.replace('oidc_id_token=', ''));
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', cookie)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeTruthy();
const url = new URL(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl);
expect(url.href.startsWith(`${idp.issuer}/logout`)).toBe(true);
expect(url.searchParams.get('id_token_hint')).toBe(rawIdToken);
expect(url.searchParams.get('post_logout_redirect_uri')).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login');
expect(url.searchParams.get('client_id')).toBe(idp.clientId);
// Cookie must be cleared so a later local-password logout in the same
// browser doesn't bounce to the IdP again.
const cleared = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_id_token='));
expect(cleared).toBeTruthy();
expect(cleared).toMatch(/Expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970|Max-Age=0/i);
});
it('omits ssoLogoutUrl when the feature is disabled', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'logout-sub-3', email: 'logout3@example.com', email_verified: true });
const cbRes = await ssoRoundTrip();
const cookie = idTokenCookie(cbRes);
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_logout_from_idp: false });
try {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', cookie)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeUndefined();
} finally {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_logout_from_idp: true });
}
});
it('omits ssoLogoutUrl without an oidc_id_token cookie (local-password session)', async () => {
const res = await request(app).post('/api/auth/logout').expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeUndefined();
});
it('omits ssoLogoutUrl when the IdP advertises no end_session_endpoint', async () => {
// Separate provider whose discovery document lacks end_session_endpoint;
// repointing the settings invalidates the discovery cache.
const bareIdp = new MockOidcProvider();
bareIdp.advertiseEndSession = false;
const bareIssuer = await bareIdp.start();
try {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_issuer_url: bareIssuer,
oidc_client_id: bareIdp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: bareIdp.clientSecret,
});
bareIdp.setNextUser({ sub: 'logout-sub-4', email: 'logout4@example.com', email_verified: true });
const cbRes = await ssoRoundTrip();
const cookie = idTokenCookie(cbRes);
expect(cookie).toBeTruthy();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', cookie)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeUndefined();
} finally {
await bareIdp.stop();
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_issuer_url: idp.issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp.clientSecret,
});
}
});
it('stores an issuer-tagged marker for oversized ID tokens; logout still round-trips, without a hint', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'logout-sub-5',
email: 'logout5@example.com',
email_verified: true,
// ~9KB of group claims — far past the 4KB cookie limit.
groups: Array.from({ length: 300 }, (_, i) => `group-${String(i).padStart(4, '0')}-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx`),
});
const cbRes = await ssoRoundTrip();
const cookie = idTokenCookie(cbRes);
expect(cookie).toBeTruthy();
// Issuer-tagged marker, not the (oversized) token itself.
const marker = decodeURIComponent(cookie.replace('oidc_id_token=', ''));
expect(marker.startsWith('sso.')).toBe(true);
expect(Buffer.from(marker.split('.')[1], 'base64url').toString('utf8')).toBe(idp.issuer);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', cookie)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeTruthy();
const url = new URL(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl);
expect(url.searchParams.get('id_token_hint')).toBeNull();
expect(url.searchParams.get('client_id')).toBe(idp.clientId);
});
it('skips the round-trip for an oversized-token marker from a DIFFERENT issuer', async () => {
const foreignMarker = `sso.${Buffer.from('http://other-idp.example').toString('base64url')}`;
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', `oidc_id_token=${foreignMarker}`)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeUndefined();
});
it('a fresh local-password login clears a stale SSO marker', async () => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'stale-marker-admin',
email: 'stale-marker@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('StaleMarker123!', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
must_change_password: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
// Stale marker from a dead SSO session rides along on the login request.
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.set('Cookie', 'oidc_id_token=stale.jwt.value')
.send({ username: 'stale-marker-admin', password: 'StaleMarker123!' })
.expect(200);
const cleared = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_id_token='));
expect(cleared).toBeTruthy();
expect(cleared).toMatch(/Expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970|Max-Age=0/i);
});
it('skips the round-trip when the stored hint was issued by a DIFFERENT issuer (config changed)', async () => {
// Fake-but-well-formed JWT from another IdP — payload is all that matters,
// buildEndSessionUrl decodes without verification for routing only.
const b64 = (obj) => Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(obj)).toString('base64url');
const foreignToken = `${b64({ alg: 'none' })}.${b64({ iss: 'http://other-idp.example', aud: idp.clientId })}.sig`;
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', `oidc_id_token=${foreignToken}`)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeUndefined();
});
it('drops only the hint when the issuer matches but the client changed', async () => {
const b64 = (obj) => Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(obj)).toString('base64url');
const oldClientToken = `${b64({ alg: 'none' })}.${b64({ iss: idp.issuer, aud: 'previous-client-id' })}.sig`;
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', `oidc_id_token=${oldClientToken}`)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeTruthy();
const url = new URL(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl);
expect(url.searchParams.get('id_token_hint')).toBeNull();
expect(url.searchParams.get('client_id')).toBe(idp.clientId);
});
it('exposes the flag and post_logout_redirect_uri via getOidcConfig/getPostLogoutRedirectUri', async () => {
// Settings-route auth chains are covered in oidcSso.test.js; here the
// service surface the routes read from is pinned directly.
const cfg = await oidcService.getOidcConfig();
expect(cfg.logoutFromIdp).toBe(true);
expect(await oidcService.getPostLogoutRedirectUri()).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login');
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
/**
* OIDC role mapping + login policy integration tests (#798, phase 2).
*
* Same harness as oidcSso.test.js: supertest over the real routes, mock
* in-process IdP with genuine RS256/PKCE validation, fresh-SQLite DB. Pins:
*
* - JIT provisioning takes the MAPPED role from a nested dot-path claim
* (Keycloak's realm_access.roles), not the static default
* - roles are re-evaluated on every SSO login (upgrade AND downgrade)
* - several mapped roles → the highest-priority one wins
* - non-strict: unmapped login keeps the current role / default at JIT
* - strict (require_mapped_role): unmapped login → sso_error=no_role
* - the last active super_admin is never demoted by mapping
* - space-separated string claim values work (flat `roles` claim)
* - disable_local_login: password login → 403; OIDC_BREAK_GLASS=true
* re-opens it; flag is inert while SSO is disabled
* - PUT /sso validation: unknown mapping target and
* disable-local-login-without-SSO are rejected
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
const { MockOidcProvider } = require('./helpers/mockOidcProvider');
describe('OIDC role mapping + login policy (#798 phase 2)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let idp;
let oidcService;
let superAdminToken;
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'oidc-test-secret';
process.env.FRONTEND_URL = 'http://localhost:5199';
delete process.env.OIDC_BREAK_GLASS;
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
idp = new MockOidcProvider();
const issuer = await idp.start();
oidcService = require('../../src/services/oidcService');
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_enabled: true,
oidc_issuer_url: issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp.clientSecret,
oidc_autoprovision: true,
oidc_default_role: 'viewer',
oidc_role_mapping_enabled: true,
oidc_roles_claim: 'realm_access.roles',
oidc_role_mappings: {
'pp-super': 'super_admin',
'pp-admins': 'admin',
'pp-view': 'viewer',
},
});
const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
const adminSettingsRouter = require('../../src/routes/adminSettings');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/auth', authRouter);
app.use('/api/admin/settings', adminSettingsRouter);
// A real super_admin row + token for the settings-validation tests.
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'root-admin',
email: 'root@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('RootPass123', 4),
role_id: superRole.id,
is_active: 1,
auth_provider: 'local',
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
superAdminToken = jwt.sign(
{ id: rootId, username: 'root-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
delete process.env.OIDC_BREAK_GLASS;
if (idp) await idp.stop();
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
/** Drive login → IdP → callback like a browser; returns the callback response. */
async function ssoRoundTrip() {
const loginRes = await request(app).get('/api/auth/admin/sso/login').expect(302);
const stateCookie = (loginRes.headers['set-cookie'] || [])
.find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_state=')).split(';')[0];
const idpRes = await fetch(loginRes.headers.location, { redirect: 'manual' });
expect(idpRes.status).toBe(302);
const back = new URL(idpRes.headers.get('location'));
return request(app)
.get(`${back.pathname}?${back.searchParams.toString()}`)
.set('Cookie', stateCookie)
.expect(302);
}
async function roleOf(email) {
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ email }).first();
const role = await db('roles').where({ id: row.role_id }).first();
return role.name;
}
it('JIT-provisions with the role mapped from the nested dot-path claim', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['irrelevant', 'pp-admins'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('admin');
});
it('re-evaluates the role on every login — downgrade lands', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-view'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('viewer');
});
it('re-evaluates the role on every login — upgrade lands and the session JWT carries it', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-admins'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('admin');
// The freshly-minted session token must already carry the NEW role —
// the sync happens before session establishment.
const adminCookie = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('admin_token='));
const token = decodeURIComponent(adminCookie.split(';')[0].replace('admin_token=', ''));
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
expect(decoded.role).toBe('admin');
});
it('picks the highest-priority role when several IdP values map', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-multi',
email: 'multi@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-view', 'pp-admins'] },
});
await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(await roleOf('multi@example.com')).toBe('admin');
});
it('non-strict: an unmapped login keeps the current role / gets the default at JIT', async () => {
// Existing admin keeps its role.
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['nothing-mapped'] },
});
let res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('admin');
// JIT falls back to the configured default role.
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-unmapped-jit',
email: 'unmapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['nothing-mapped'] },
});
res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('unmapped@example.com')).toBe('viewer');
});
it('strict mode refuses unmapped logins with sso_error=no_role and no session', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_require_mapped_role: true });
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['nothing-mapped'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_require_mapped_role: false });
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=no_role');
expect((res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('admin_token='))).toBeFalsy();
// Role untouched by the refused attempt.
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('admin');
});
it('never demotes the last active super_admin', async () => {
// Make the SSO admin the ONLY active super_admin.
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const ssoAdmin = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'mapped@example.com' }).first();
await db('admin_users').where({ role_id: superRole.id }).update({ is_active: 0 });
await db('admin_users').where({ id: ssoAdmin.id }).update({ role_id: superRole.id, is_active: 1 });
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-view'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
// Still super_admin — the demotion was refused, the login was not.
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('super_admin');
// Restore: root admin back to active super_admin, SSO admin back to admin.
const adminRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ is_active: 1 });
await db('admin_users').where({ id: ssoAdmin.id }).update({ role_id: adminRole.id });
// With ANOTHER active super_admin present the same downgrade goes through.
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-view'] },
});
await db('admin_users').where({ id: ssoAdmin.id }).update({ role_id: superRole.id });
await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('viewer');
});
it('never demotes the last LOCAL-password super_admin even when an OIDC-owned super exists', async () => {
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const viewerRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'viewer' }).first();
// A local-password super admin, SSO-linked via verified email so role
// sync applies to it.
const [localId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'local-super',
email: 'local-super@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('LocalSuper123', 4),
role_id: superRole.id,
is_active: 1,
auth_provider: 'local',
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
// The only OTHER active super is OIDC-owned (root goes inactive) — the
// plain last-super guard would allow the demotion, the break-glass
// guard must not.
const ssoAdmin = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'mapped@example.com' }).first();
await db('admin_users').where({ id: ssoAdmin.id }).update({ role_id: superRole.id });
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ is_active: 0 });
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-local-super',
email: 'local-super@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-view'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: localId }).first();
// Restore the fixture state before asserting.
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ is_active: 1 });
await db('admin_users').where({ id: ssoAdmin.id }).update({ role_id: viewerRole.id });
await db('admin_users').where({ id: localId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(row.role_id).toBe(superRole.id); // kept — it is the break-glass account
});
it('treats prototype-property IdP values (constructor/toString) as unmapped, not as an error', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-proto',
email: 'proto@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['constructor', 'toString', '__proto__'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
// Non-strict: unmapped → JIT with the default role, login succeeds.
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('proto@example.com')).toBe('viewer');
});
it('accepts a space-separated string value on a flat claim', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_roles_claim: 'roles' });
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-flat',
email: 'flat@example.com',
email_verified: true,
roles: 'other pp-admins',
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_roles_claim: 'realm_access.roles' });
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('flat@example.com')).toBe('admin');
});
it('refuses local password login while disable_local_login is effective', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_disable_local_login: true });
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: 'root@example.com', password: 'RootPass123' });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('LOCAL_LOGIN_DISABLED');
});
it('OIDC_BREAK_GLASS=true re-opens local login despite the policy', async () => {
process.env.OIDC_BREAK_GLASS = 'true';
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: 'root@example.com', password: 'RootPass123' });
delete process.env.OIDC_BREAK_GLASS;
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.user).toBeTruthy();
});
it('the stored flag is inert while SSO is disabled', async () => {
// Simulate a torn-down SSO config with the stale flag still set — the
// runtime check must ignore it (no lockout).
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'oidc_enabled' })
.update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(false) });
expect(await oidcService.isLocalLoginDisabled()).toBe(false);
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'oidc_enabled' })
.update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(true) });
expect(await oidcService.isLocalLoginDisabled()).toBe(true);
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_disable_local_login: false });
});
it('the policy disarms itself when no active local-password super admin remains', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_disable_local_login: true });
expect(await oidcService.isLocalLoginDisabled()).toBe(true);
// The break-glass account disappears (e.g. manual demotion/deactivation
// while the policy is on) → local login must re-open by itself.
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ auth_provider: 'oidc' });
expect(await oidcService.isLocalLoginDisabled()).toBe(false);
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ auth_provider: 'local' });
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_disable_local_login: false });
});
it('PUT /sso rejects a mapping onto an unknown role', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/settings/sso')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superAdminToken}`)
.send({ oidc_role_mappings: { 'pp-admins': 'does_not_exist' } });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/does_not_exist/);
// Stored mapping unchanged.
const cfg = await oidcService.getOidcConfig();
expect(cfg.roleMappings['pp-admins']).toBe('admin');
});
it('PUT /sso rejects disabling local login while SSO is (being turned) off', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/settings/sso')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superAdminToken}`)
.send({ oidc_enabled: false, oidc_disable_local_login: true });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/while SSO is enabled/);
});
it('PUT /sso refuses SSO-only mode without an active local-password super admin', async () => {
// Make every active super_admin OIDC-owned — break-glass would then
// re-open a password route that no account can use.
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
await db('admin_users').where({ role_id: superRole.id }).update({ auth_provider: 'oidc' });
const denied = await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/settings/sso')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superAdminToken}`)
.send({ oidc_disable_local_login: true });
// Restore the local break-glass account, then the same request passes.
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ auth_provider: 'local' });
expect(denied.status).toBe(400);
expect(denied.body.error).toMatch(/break-glass/);
const allowed = await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/settings/sso')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superAdminToken}`)
.send({ oidc_disable_local_login: true });
expect(allowed.status).toBe(200);
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_disable_local_login: false });
});
it('GET /sso returns the phase-2 fields', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/settings/sso')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superAdminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.oidc_role_mapping_enabled).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.oidc_roles_claim).toBe('realm_access.roles');
expect(res.body.oidc_role_mappings).toEqual({
'pp-super': 'super_admin',
'pp-admins': 'admin',
'pp-view': 'viewer',
});
expect(res.body.oidc_require_mapped_role).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.oidc_disable_local_login).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
/**
* OIDC SSO integration tests (#798, phase 1).
*
* Full-stack over a mock in-process IdP (mockOidcProvider): supertest drives
* the real /admin/sso/login and /admin/sso/callback routes on a fresh-SQLite
* database, openid-client does genuine discovery/JWKS/PKCE/ID-token
* validation against the mock issuer. Pins:
*
* - happy path: JIT provisioning creates an admin and sets the session cookie
* - JIT off → not_provisioned redirect, no row created
* - repeat login matches by sub, not email (email change ≠ new account)
* - verified-email one-time link onto an existing local admin
* - unverified email must NOT link (falls through to JIT/or error)
* - deactivated admin → inactive redirect
* - missing/forged state cookie → state redirect
* - nonce tamper from the IdP → idp redirect
* - settings endpoints: secret write-only, generic /general upsert cannot
* clobber oidc_client_secret
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
const { MockOidcProvider } = require('./helpers/mockOidcProvider');
describe('OIDC SSO (#798)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let idp;
let oidcService;
const agentCookies = {};
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'oidc-test-secret';
// The redirect_uri derives from the public base URL — pin it explicitly:
// CI has no backend/.env, and getFrontendBaseUrl() returning '' makes
// buildAuthorizationRequest fail (by design) with OIDC_BAD_CONFIG.
process.env.FRONTEND_URL = 'http://localhost:5199';
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
idp = new MockOidcProvider();
const issuer = await idp.start();
// Require AFTER bootCrmDb so services share this db instance.
oidcService = require('../../src/services/oidcService');
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_enabled: true,
oidc_issuer_url: issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp.clientSecret,
oidc_autoprovision: true,
oidc_default_role: 'viewer',
});
const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/auth', authRouter);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (idp) await idp.stop();
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
/** Drive login → IdP → callback like a browser; returns the callback response. */
async function ssoRoundTrip({ mutateState } = {}) {
const loginRes = await request(app).get('/api/auth/admin/sso/login').expect(302);
const idpUrl = loginRes.headers.location;
expect(idpUrl.startsWith(idp.issuer)).toBe(true);
let stateCookie = (loginRes.headers['set-cookie'] || [])
.find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_state='));
expect(stateCookie).toBeTruthy();
stateCookie = stateCookie.split(';')[0];
if (mutateState === 'drop') stateCookie = null;
if (mutateState === 'forge') {
stateCookie = `oidc_state=${jwt.sign({ type: 'oidc_state', s: 'x', n: 'y', cv: 'z' }, 'wrong-secret', { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' })}`;
}
// "Browser" follows the redirect to the IdP, which instantly bounces back.
const idpRes = await fetch(idpUrl, { redirect: 'manual' });
expect(idpRes.status).toBe(302);
const back = new URL(idpRes.headers.get('location'));
let cb = request(app).get(`${back.pathname}?${back.searchParams.toString()}`);
if (stateCookie) cb = cb.set('Cookie', stateCookie);
return cb.expect(302);
}
it('JIT-provisions an unknown user and establishes an admin session', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-jit-1', email: 'jit@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
const adminCookie = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('admin_token='));
expect(adminCookie).toBeTruthy();
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'jit@example.com' }).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.auth_provider).toBe('oidc');
expect(row.external_subject).toBe('sub-jit-1');
const role = await db('roles').where('id', row.role_id).first();
expect(role.name).toBe('viewer');
// The session JWT must be a normal admin token.
const token = adminCookie.split(';')[0].replace('admin_token=', '');
const decoded = jwt.verify(decodeURIComponent(token), process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
expect(decoded.type).toBe('admin');
expect(decoded.id).toBe(row.id);
agentCookies.jitAdminId = row.id;
});
it('matches repeat logins by sub even when the email changed at the IdP', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-jit-1', email: 'renamed@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
// No second row — resolved via external_subject.
expect(await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'renamed@example.com' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
const byId = await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).first();
expect(byId.external_subject).toBe('sub-jit-1');
});
it('links an existing local admin one-time via VERIFIED email and stamps the sub', async () => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
const [localId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'local-admin',
email: 'local@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('LocalPass123', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
auth_provider: 'local',
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-local-1', email: 'local@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: localId }).first();
expect(row.external_subject).toBe('sub-local-1');
expect(row.auth_provider).toBe('local'); // password keeps working
});
it('does NOT link by unverified email — provisions a separate account instead', async () => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'victim-admin',
email: 'victim@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('VictimPass123', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
auth_provider: 'local',
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
});
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-attacker', email: 'victim@example.com', email_verified: false });
// JIT would need this email but the victim row owns it (unique) — the
// insert fails and the flow must land on an error, never on the
// victim's session.
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toMatch(/sso_error=/);
const victim = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'victim@example.com' }).first();
expect(victim.external_subject).toBeNull();
});
it('refuses a deactivated admin with sso_error=inactive', async () => {
await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-jit-1', email: 'renamed@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=inactive');
await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).update({ is_active: 1 });
});
it('rejects a callback without the state cookie', async () => {
const res = await ssoRoundTrip({ mutateState: 'drop' });
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=state');
});
it('rejects a forged state cookie (wrong signing key)', async () => {
const res = await ssoRoundTrip({ mutateState: 'forge' });
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=state');
});
it('rejects an ID token whose nonce does not match', async () => {
idp.tamperNonce = true;
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-nonce', email: 'nonce@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
idp.tamperNonce = false;
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=idp');
expect(await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'nonce@example.com' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
});
it('blocks JIT with sso_error=not_provisioned when autoprovision is off', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_autoprovision: false });
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-new-user', email: 'new@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=not_provisioned');
expect(await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'new@example.com' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_autoprovision: true });
});
it('stores the client secret encrypted and survives a config round-trip', async () => {
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'oidc_client_secret' }).first();
const stored = JSON.parse(row.setting_value);
expect(stored).not.toContain(idp.clientSecret);
expect(oidcService.decryptSecret(stored)).toBe(idp.clientSecret);
const cfg = await oidcService.getOidcConfig();
expect(cfg.clientSecret).toBe(idp.clientSecret);
});
it('refuses local password login for OIDC-owned accounts', async () => {
// Give the JIT admin a KNOWN password hash directly in the DB — the
// auth_provider check must reject the login even with valid credentials
// (otherwise a password reset would mint an IdP-bypassing local login).
await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).update({
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('KnownPass123', 4),
});
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).first();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: row.email, password: 'KnownPass123' });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('returns 404 from /sso/login when SSO is disabled', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_enabled: false });
await request(app).get('/api/auth/admin/sso/login').expect(404);
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_enabled: true });
});
it('merges email from the UserInfo endpoint when the ID token omits it', async () => {
idp.emailViaUserinfoOnly = true;
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-userinfo', email: 'userinfo@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
idp.emailViaUserinfoOnly = false;
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'userinfo@example.com' }).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.external_subject).toBe('sub-userinfo');
});
it('binds identities per ISSUER — a sub collision on a new IdP must not inherit the old account', async () => {
// The JIT admin from the first test is bound to (issuer A, 'sub-jit-1').
const boundAdmin = await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).first();
expect(boundAdmin.external_issuer).toBe(idp.issuer);
// Same sub, DIFFERENT issuer: a second IdP the instance switches to.
const idp2 = new MockOidcProvider();
await idp2.start();
try {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_issuer_url: idp2.issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp2.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp2.clientSecret,
});
idp2.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-jit-1', email: 'colliding@example.com', email_verified: true });
const loginRes = await request(app).get('/api/auth/admin/sso/login').expect(302);
const stateCookie = (loginRes.headers['set-cookie'] || [])
.find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_state=')).split(';')[0];
const idpRes = await fetch(loginRes.headers.location, { redirect: 'manual' });
const back = new URL(idpRes.headers.get('location'));
const res = await request(app)
.get(`${back.pathname}?${back.searchParams.toString()}`)
.set('Cookie', stateCookie)
.expect(302);
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
// A NEW row bound to issuer B — the issuer-A admin is untouched and
// its role was not inherited.
const collider = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'colliding@example.com' }).first();
expect(collider).toBeTruthy();
expect(collider.id).not.toBe(agentCookies.jitAdminId);
expect(collider.external_issuer).toBe(idp2.issuer);
const original = await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).first();
expect(original.external_issuer).toBe(idp.issuer);
} finally {
await idp2.stop();
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_issuer_url: idp.issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp.clientSecret,
});
}
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
/**
* PostgreSQL integration tests for the .picpeak restore robustness fixes.
* Gated: runs only when PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL points at a throwaway Postgres DB,
* e.g.
* PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:picpeak_secure_pass_2024@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_restore_test" \
* npx jest __tests__/integration/picpeakRestorePg.test.js
*
* Validates the Postgres-specific paths that SQLite can't exercise: identity
* sequences left stale by explicit-id inserts, pg_get_serial_sequence raising on
* id-less tables, reinject/role-recreate explicit-id inserts, and FK integrity.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
maybe('picpeak restore on Postgres', () => {
let pgDb;
let svc;
beforeAll(async () => {
pgDb = knex({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL });
await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS role_permissions, events, admin_users, roles, permissions, app_settings CASCADE');
await pgDb.schema.createTable('roles', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('name', 50).notNullable().unique();
t.string('display_name', 100);
t.integer('priority').defaultTo(0);
t.boolean('is_system').defaultTo(false);
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('permissions', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('name', 100).notNullable().unique();
t.string('display_name', 150);
t.string('category', 50);
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('role_permissions', (t) => {
t.integer('role_id').notNullable().references('id').inTable('roles').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.integer('permission_id').notNullable().references('id').inTable('permissions').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.primary(['role_id', 'permission_id']);
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('username').notNullable().unique();
t.string('email').notNullable().unique();
t.string('password_hash');
t.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
t.boolean('must_change_password').defaultTo(false);
t.integer('role_id').references('id').inTable('roles').onDelete('SET NULL');
t.integer('created_by').references('id').inTable('admin_users').onDelete('SET NULL');
t.boolean('two_factor_enabled').defaultTo(false);
t.string('two_factor_secret');
t.text('two_factor_recovery_codes');
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('slug');
t.integer('created_by').references('id').inTable('admin_users').onDelete('SET NULL');
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('setting_key').notNullable().unique();
t.json('setting_value');
t.string('setting_type');
t.timestamp('updated_at').defaultTo(pgDb.fn.now());
});
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg' }));
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: pgDb }));
svc = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService');
});
afterAll(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
if (pgDb) await pgDb.destroy();
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await pgDb('role_permissions').del();
await pgDb('events').del();
await pgDb('admin_users').del();
await pgDb('roles').del();
await pgDb('permissions').del();
});
test('resyncSequences fast-forwards stale sequences and skips id-less tables', async () => {
// Simulate a restore: explicit-id inserts leave the sequence at 1.
await pgDb('roles').insert([{ id: 5, name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'SA' }]);
await pgDb('admin_users').insert([{ id: 9, username: 'a', email: 'a@x.io', password_hash: 'h' }]);
await pgDb('permissions').insert([{ id: 3, name: 'events.create', display_name: 'C', category: 'events' }]);
await pgDb('role_permissions').insert([{ role_id: 5, permission_id: 3 }]); // id-less table
// Must not throw on role_permissions (no `id` column → pg_get_serial_sequence raises unguarded).
await expect(svc.resyncSequences(['roles', 'admin_users', 'permissions', 'role_permissions'])).resolves.toBeUndefined();
// Natural inserts (no explicit id) now avoid the restored ids.
const [adminId] = await pgDb('admin_users').insert({ username: 'b', email: 'b@x.io', password_hash: 'h' }).returning('id');
expect(Number(adminId.id || adminId)).toBe(10); // max(9)+1, no duplicate-key error
const [roleId] = await pgDb('roles').insert({ name: 'editor', display_name: 'Ed' }).returning('id');
expect(Number(roleId.id || roleId)).toBe(6);
});
test('reinjectCurrentAdmin insert branch works with a stale sequence (explicit max+1)', async () => {
await pgDb('admin_users').insert({ id: 9, username: 'backup', email: 'backup@x.io', password_hash: 'h' });
const operator = { id: 1, username: 'admin', email: 'op@x.io', password_hash: 'OP', is_active: true, created_by: 42 };
await pgDb.transaction((trx) => svc.reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator));
const op = await pgDb('admin_users').where({ email: 'op@x.io' }).first();
expect(op.id).toBe(10); // max(9)+1
expect(op.password_hash).toBe('OP');
expect(op.created_by).toBeNull(); // self-ref FK nulled so the insert can't dangle
});
test('preserveOperatorRole re-creates a missing role on Postgres and keeps FK integrity', async () => {
await pgDb('permissions').insert([{ id: 3, name: 'events.create', display_name: 'C', category: 'events' }]);
await pgDb('roles').insert([{ id: 2, name: 'viewer', display_name: 'V' }]);
await pgDb('admin_users').insert({ id: 1, username: 'admin', email: 'op@x.io', password_hash: 'h', role_id: null });
const snapshot = { role: { name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'SA', priority: 100, is_system: true }, permissions: ['events.create', 'missing.perm'] };
await pgDb.transaction((trx) => svc.preserveOperatorRole(trx, 1, snapshot));
await svc.resyncSequences(['roles']); // post-commit, mirrors importFromPicpeak
const role = await pgDb('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
expect(role).toBeTruthy();
const op = await pgDb('admin_users').where({ id: 1 }).first();
expect(op.role_id).toBe(role.id); // FK valid, operator not downgraded
const grants = await pgDb('role_permissions').where({ role_id: role.id }).pluck('permission_id');
expect(grants).toEqual([3]); // existing perm granted, missing.perm skipped
});
test('full replaceAllTables: cross-instance backup preserves the operator, role, FKs, and sequences', async () => {
// A backup from ANOTHER instance: omits the operator's email AND their
// super_admin role; uses explicit ids that leave sequences stale.
const staging = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-pgtest-'));
const dataDir = path.join(staging, 'data');
fs.mkdirSync(dataDir);
const write = (t, rows) => fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dataDir, `${t}.ndjson`), rows.map((r) => JSON.stringify(r)).join('\n'));
write('roles', [{ id: 5, name: 'admin', display_name: 'Admin', priority: 50, is_system: true }]);
write('permissions', [{ id: 3, name: 'events.create', display_name: 'C', category: 'events' }]);
write('role_permissions', [{ role_id: 5, permission_id: 3 }]);
write('admin_users', [{ id: 9, username: 'backupadmin', email: 'backup@x.io', password_hash: 'h', role_id: 5, is_active: true }]);
write('events', [{ id: 2, slug: 'restored-ev', created_by: 9 }]);
const operator = { id: 1, username: 'admin', email: 'op@x.io', password_hash: 'OP', is_active: true, role_id: 999, created_by: null };
const roleSnapshot = { role: { name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'Super Admin', priority: 100, is_system: true }, permissions: ['events.create'] };
const tables = ['roles', 'permissions', 'role_permissions', 'admin_users', 'events'];
// replaceAllTables isn't exported, so drive its exact transaction sequence
// (suspend FKs, wipe, batchInsert, reinject, preserve role) through the
// exported units against real Postgres.
const importSvc = svc;
await pgDb.transaction(async (trx) => {
await trx.raw('SET session_replication_role = \'replica\'');
for (const t of tables) await trx(t).del();
for (const t of tables) {
const rows = fs.readFileSync(path.join(dataDir, `${t}.ndjson`), 'utf8').split('\n').filter(Boolean).map((l) => JSON.parse(l));
if (rows.length) await trx.batchInsert(t, rows, 100);
}
const opId = await importSvc.reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator);
await importSvc.preserveOperatorRole(trx, opId, roleSnapshot);
await trx.raw('SET session_replication_role = \'origin\'');
});
await importSvc.resyncSequences(tables);
// Operator preserved (inserted, since email absent from backup).
const op = await pgDb('admin_users').where({ email: 'op@x.io' }).first();
expect(op).toBeTruthy();
expect(op.password_hash).toBe('OP');
// super_admin role re-created and the operator bound to it.
const sa = await pgDb('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
expect(sa).toBeTruthy();
expect(op.role_id).toBe(sa.id);
expect(await pgDb('role_permissions').where({ role_id: sa.id }).pluck('permission_id')).toEqual([3]);
// Restored event's created_by FK to the backup admin still valid.
const ev = await pgDb('events').where({ slug: 'restored-ev' }).first();
expect(ev.created_by).toBe(9);
// Sequences resynced → natural inserts don't collide.
const [newAdmin] = await pgDb('admin_users').insert({ username: 'fresh', email: 'fresh@x.io', password_hash: 'h' }).returning('id');
expect(Number(newAdmin.id || newAdmin)).toBeGreaterThan(op.id);
fs.rmSync(staging, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
/**
* Issue #866 — the createInvoice-free halves of the re-bill proof + CRM panel
* feature, against a real SQLite schema:
*
* • listCustomerRebills — status DERIVED from the linked invoice lifecycle
* (open / sent / paid; a cancelled/Storno'd cover drops back to open) plus
* cost-vs-rebilled math and mode.
* • collectRebillProofAttachments — the Send-dialog per-file selection, the
* all-or-none default resolution (per-customer override else global), the
* Beleg-<inv#> filename (suffix only when >1), and the missing-file marker.
*
* The invoice-MINTING paths (billCombinedForCustomer / billPendingRebills) call
* createInvoice inside a db.transaction, which deadlocks on the SQLite harness
* (global-db sequence write vs. held write lock) — same limitation the sibling
* incomingInvoiceRebill.test.js documents. They're covered by the existing
* billPendingRebills / billUnbilledEntries suites; here we hand-craft billed
* state instead.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('#866 re-bill proof attachment + CRM panel', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let adminId;
let expenseService;
let rebillProofs;
let flagCache;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
const dbModule = require('../../src/database/db');
dbModule.logActivity = async () => {};
({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
expenseService = require('../../src/services/expenseService');
rebillProofs = require('../../src/services/invoice/rebillProofs');
flagCache = require('../../src/middleware/requireFeatureFlag');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
const unwrapId = (ins) => (typeof ins[0] === 'object' ? ins[0].id : ins[0]);
let seq = 0;
async function makeCustomer(overrides = {}) {
seq += 1;
const ins = await db('customer_accounts').insert({
email: `c866-${seq}@example.com`,
display_name: `C866 ${seq}`,
password_hash: 'x',
preferred_language: 'de',
is_active: 1,
billing_cadence: 'per_event',
created_at: new Date(),
...overrides,
}).returning('id');
return unwrapId(ins);
}
async function makeDoc(customerId, overrides = {}) {
const ins = await db('inbound_documents').insert({
source: 'upload', status: 'categorized', parse_status: 'parsed', parse_method: 'none',
supplier_name: 'ACME AG', currency: 'CHF', total_amount_minor: 10000,
invoice_date: '2026-06-01', disposition: 'rebill', customer_account_id: customerId,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
...overrides,
}).returning('id');
return unwrapId(ins);
}
async function makeInvoice(customerId, status, number) {
const ins = await db('invoices').insert({
invoice_number: number,
customer_account_id: customerId,
status,
currency: 'CHF',
issue_date: '2026-06-01', due_date: '2026-07-01',
vat_rate: 0, net_amount_minor: 10000, vat_amount_minor: 0, total_amount_minor: 10000,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return unwrapId(ins);
}
describe('listCustomerRebills', () => {
it('derives open / sent / paid and open→cost==rebilled for passthrough, +markup for rebill', async () => {
const customerId = await makeCustomer();
// Open re-bill (10% markup): rebilled = 11000.
await makeDoc(customerId, { total_amount_minor: 10000, markup_type: 'percent', markup_percent: 10 });
// Open passthrough: no markup, rebilled == cost.
await makeDoc(customerId, { disposition: 'durchlaufend', total_amount_minor: 5000, markup_type: 'none' });
// Sent (on a 'sent' invoice).
const sentInv = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'sent', 'R-2026-0001');
await makeDoc(customerId, { total_amount_minor: 8000, markup_type: 'none', billed_invoice_id: sentInv });
// Paid.
const paidInv = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'paid', 'R-2026-0002');
await makeDoc(customerId, { total_amount_minor: 8000, markup_type: 'none', billed_invoice_id: paidInv });
// Cancelled cover → drops back to 'open', no invoice link surfaced.
const cancInv = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'cancelled', 'R-2026-0003');
await makeDoc(customerId, { total_amount_minor: 8000, markup_type: 'none', billed_invoice_id: cancInv });
const items = await expenseService.listCustomerRebills(customerId);
const byStatus = (s) => items.filter((r) => r.status === s);
expect(items).toHaveLength(5);
expect(byStatus('open')).toHaveLength(3); // 2 genuinely-open + 1 cancelled-cover
expect(byStatus('sent')).toHaveLength(1);
expect(byStatus('paid')).toHaveLength(1);
const rebill = items.find((r) => r.mode === 'rebill' && r.costMinor === 10000);
expect(rebill.rebilledMinor).toBe(11000);
const passthrough = items.find((r) => r.mode === 'passthrough');
expect(passthrough.rebilledMinor).toBe(passthrough.costMinor);
const sent = byStatus('sent')[0];
expect(sent.invoiceNumber).toBe('R-2026-0001');
expect(sent.invoiceId).toBe(sentInv);
const cancelledCover = items.find((r) => r.status === 'open' && r.invoiceNumber === null && r.costMinor === 8000);
expect(cancelledCover).toBeDefined(); // cancelled cover isn't shown as a live invoice link
});
});
describe('storno releases the re-bill linkage (#866 review)', () => {
it("clears billed_invoice_id so a Storno'd cover returns to the billable pool", async () => {
const invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
const customerId = await makeCustomer();
const invId = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'sent', 'R-2026-9000');
const lineIns = await db('invoice_line_items').insert({
invoice_id: invId, position: 1, quantity: 1, description: 'Rebill',
unit_price_minor: 8000, discount_percent: 0, line_total_minor: 8000,
}).returning('id');
const lineId = unwrapId(lineIns);
const docId = await makeDoc(customerId, {
total_amount_minor: 8000, markup_type: 'none', billed_invoice_id: invId, billed_invoice_line_item_id: lineId,
});
// Storno claims a fresh number from document_sequences; the other tests
// seed explicit R-2026-000x numbers without advancing it, so push the
// counter past them to avoid a number collision (a test artifact — real
// invoices always claim through the sequence).
await db('document_sequences').insert({ kind: 'invoice', year: 2026, current_value: 9000, created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date() })
.onConflict(['kind', 'year']).ignore();
await db('document_sequences').where({ kind: 'invoice', year: 2026 }).update({ current_value: 9000 });
// Storno the covering invoice (the issued-cancel path).
await db.transaction(async (trx) => invoiceService.createStorno(invId, adminId, trx));
const doc = await db('inbound_documents').where({ id: docId }).first();
expect(doc.billed_invoice_id).toBeNull();
expect(doc.billed_invoice_line_item_id).toBeNull();
// It now surfaces as a genuinely-open item AND the pending pool picks it up.
const items = await expenseService.listCustomerRebills(customerId);
const row = items.find((r) => r.id === docId);
expect(row.status).toBe('open');
expect(row.invoiceId).toBeNull();
const pending = await db('inbound_documents')
.where({ customer_account_id: customerId }).whereNull('billed_invoice_id')
.whereIn('disposition', ['rebill', 'durchlaufend']).where('status', 'categorized');
expect(pending.map((p) => p.id)).toContain(docId);
});
});
describe('collectRebillProofAttachments', () => {
const businessDocs = () => path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'business-docs', 'inbound', '2026');
async function enableIncoming() {
const existing = await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'incomingInvoices' }).first();
if (existing) await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'incomingInvoices' }).update({ value: 1 });
else await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'incomingInvoices', value: 1 });
flagCache.invalidateFeatureFlagCache();
}
function writeProof(name) {
fs.mkdirSync(businessDocs(), { recursive: true });
const p = path.join(businessDocs(), name);
fs.writeFileSync(p, '%PDF-1.4\n% test proof\n');
return p;
}
it('honours explicit selection, names Beleg-<inv#>, and marks a missing file', async () => {
await enableIncoming();
const customerId = await makeCustomer();
const invId = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'scheduled', 'R-2026-1000');
const invoice = await db('invoices').where({ id: invId }).first();
const good1 = await makeDoc(customerId, { billed_invoice_id: invId, file_path: writeProof('p1.pdf') });
const good2 = await makeDoc(customerId, { billed_invoice_id: invId, file_path: writeProof('p2.pdf') });
const missing = await makeDoc(customerId, { billed_invoice_id: invId, file_path: path.join(businessDocs(), 'nope.pdf') });
// Select the two good proofs → two attachments, suffixed because >1.
const both = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, null, [good1, good2]);
expect(both.map((a) => a.filename).sort()).toEqual(['Beleg-R-2026-1000-1.pdf', 'Beleg-R-2026-1000-2.pdf']);
// Select exactly one → single, unsuffixed.
const one = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, null, [good1]);
expect(one).toHaveLength(1);
expect(one[0].filename).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-1000.pdf');
// Select the missing-file doc → no attachment, but a marker is persisted.
const none = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, null, [missing]);
expect(none).toHaveLength(0);
const markerRow = await db('inbound_documents').where({ id: missing }).first('proof_attach_error');
expect(markerRow.proof_attach_error).toBeTruthy();
// A successful attach clears any prior marker.
await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, null, [good1]);
const cleared = await db('inbound_documents').where({ id: good1 }).first('proof_attach_error');
expect(cleared.proof_attach_error).toBeNull();
});
it('resolves the all-or-none default from the per-customer override then global', async () => {
await enableIncoming();
const customerId = await makeCustomer();
const invId = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'scheduled', 'R-2026-2000');
const invoice = await db('invoices').where({ id: invId }).first();
await makeDoc(customerId, { billed_invoice_id: invId, file_path: writeProof('d1.pdf') });
// Global default off, no override → none.
const off = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, { rebill_attach_proof: null }, undefined);
expect(off).toHaveLength(0);
// Per-customer override ON → all, regardless of the (off) global.
const on = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, { rebill_attach_proof: true }, undefined);
expect(on).toHaveLength(1);
// Global ON (no override) → all.
await db('app_settings').insert({ setting_key: 'accounting_rebill_attach_proof', setting_value: JSON.stringify(true), setting_type: 'accounting' });
const globalOn = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, { rebill_attach_proof: null }, undefined);
expect(globalOn).toHaveLength(1);
// Override OFF beats global ON.
const overrideOff = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, { rebill_attach_proof: false }, undefined);
expect(overrideOff).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('attaches nothing when the incoming-invoices flag is off', async () => {
const existing = await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'incomingInvoices' }).first();
if (existing) await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'incomingInvoices' }).update({ value: 0 });
else await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'incomingInvoices', value: 0 });
flagCache.invalidateFeatureFlagCache();
const customerId = await makeCustomer();
const invId = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'scheduled', 'R-2026-3000');
const invoice = await db('invoices').where({ id: invId }).first();
const doc = await makeDoc(customerId, { billed_invoice_id: invId, file_path: writeProof('f1.pdf') });
const res = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, { rebill_attach_proof: true }, [doc]);
expect(res).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
});
@@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
/**
* scripts/regenerate-thumbnails.js against external photos (#1148).
*
* The same defect #1129 fixed in the admin route, still standing in the CLI
* fallback: the script resolved every source as
* `storage/events/active/<photo.path>` and fs.access'd it. External and
* reference rows do not live there — their originals sit under
* `events.external_path` — so every one failed the check and was counted as an
* error. On an install where all photos are external the script did nothing at
* all, while reporting one error per photo.
*
* Driven against a REAL file on a REAL external mount with the real
* imageProcessor, not a mock: the whole point is that the source resolves off
* the mount, and a mocked ensureThumbnail would assert nothing about that.
*
* Responsive tiers (#1095/#1109) do not exist on this branch, so the tier
* backfill in the main twin has nothing to port. Everything else does.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const sharp = require('sharp');
const { execFile } = require('child_process');
describe('regenerate-thumbnails script (#1148)', () => {
let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let regenerateThumbnails;
let eventId; let externalPhotoId; let videoPhotoId; let watcherVideoId; let repairPhotoId;
let vanishingPhotoId;
let externalRoot;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-script-'));
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'test.db');
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
// External sources are sandboxed under EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT. Rows carry a
// path relative to that root (#1163), so the 'wedding/' prefix on each
// external_relpath below is the event folder, not decoration.
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
externalRoot = path.join(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, 'wedding');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
await fs.promises.mkdir(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
await fs.promises.mkdir(externalRoot, { recursive: true });
jest.resetModules();
({ db, cleanup } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
// A real image on the external mount — never under events/active.
await sharp({
create: { width: 1200, height: 800, channels: 3, background: { r: 10, g: 90, b: 160 } },
}).jpeg().toFile(path.join(externalRoot, 'shot.jpg'));
const [ev] = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'regen-script-event',
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Regen Script',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: '/gallery/regen-script-event/share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
source_mode: 'reference',
external_path: 'wedding',
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = typeof ev === 'object' ? ev.id : ev;
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'shot.jpg',
// `path` is what the old script joined onto events/active. Left
// populated on purpose: the fix must ignore it for an external row.
path: 'regen-script-event/shot.jpg',
type: 'individual',
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: 'wedding/shot.jpg',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
externalPhotoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
const [v] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'clip.mp4',
path: 'regen-script-event/clip.mp4',
type: 'individual',
media_type: 'video',
mime_type: 'video/mp4',
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: 'wedding/clip.mp4',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
videoPhotoId = typeof v === 'object' ? v.id : v;
// How fileWatcher.processNewPhoto actually writes a video: `type` and
// `mime_type` set, media_type left to its 'image' default. A media_type-only
// filter lets this through and hands the container to Sharp.
//
// The file has to EXIST, otherwise the row fails resolution and looks
// skipped for the wrong reason — the bug is Sharp being handed a video, not
// a missing source. Real MP4 header bytes, no image in sight.
await fs.promises.writeFile(
path.join(externalRoot, 'watched.mp4'),
Buffer.from('00000018667479706d70343200000000', 'hex')
);
const [wv] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'watched.mp4',
path: 'regen-script-event/watched.mp4',
type: 'video',
mime_type: 'video/mp4',
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: 'wedding/watched.mp4',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
watcherVideoId = typeof wv === 'object' ? wv.id : wv;
expect((await db('photos').where('id', watcherVideoId).first()).media_type).not.toBe('video');
// A photo whose thumbnail_path points at something that is no longer there.
await sharp({
create: { width: 900, height: 600, channels: 3, background: { r: 200, g: 40, b: 40 } },
}).jpeg().toFile(path.join(externalRoot, 'repair.jpg'));
const [rp] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'repair.jpg',
path: 'regen-script-event/repair.jpg',
type: 'individual',
thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_ext_missing_repair.jpg',
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: 'wedding/repair.jpg',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
repairPhotoId = typeof rp === 'object' ? rp.id : rp;
// A photo whose source is not on the mount at all — an unavailable mount,
// which is the failure an operator most needs to hear about.
const [vp] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'missing.jpg',
path: 'regen-script-event/missing.jpg',
type: 'individual',
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: 'missing.jpg',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
vanishingPhotoId = typeof vp === 'object' ? vp.id : vp;
({ regenerateThumbnails } = require('../../scripts/regenerate-thumbnails'));
}, 180000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
it('builds a thumbnail for an external photo instead of erroring on events/active', async () => {
// The location the old script computed and fs.access'd. Nothing is there,
// which is the whole defect — it is not where an external original lives.
// (The old script cannot be driven from a test directly: it had no export
// and ran on require, calling process.exit. Making it importable is part
// of this fix.)
const legacyPath = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', 'regen-script-event/shot.jpg');
expect(fs.existsSync(legacyPath)).toBe(false);
const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
// The old script reported an error for this photo and wrote nothing.
// The unresolvable row fails; the external photo and the repair row build.
expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
expect(result.successCount).toBe(2);
const row = await db('photos').where('id', externalPhotoId).first();
expect(row.thumbnail_path).toBeTruthy();
const onDisk = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, row.thumbnail_path);
expect(fs.existsSync(onDisk)).toBe(true);
// Named per-photo so two events referencing one NAS basename cannot
// clobber each other — the property ensureThumbnail owns and the reason
// the script must not build this name itself.
expect(path.basename(row.thumbnail_path)).toContain(`ext${externalPhotoId}_`);
});
it('leaves videos alone', async () => {
// A video thumbnail is a poster frame from videoProcessor; handing the
// container to Sharp produced one error per video row.
const row = await db('photos').where('id', videoPhotoId).first();
expect(row.thumbnail_path).toBeFalsy();
});
it('leaves a watcher-imported video alone, which carries no media_type', async () => {
// fileWatcher writes type + mime_type and lets media_type default to
// 'image', so filtering on media_type alone still fed these to Sharp. The
// signal is errorCount: the images are already done by now, so the only
// NEW thing that could fail this run is a video reaching Sharp. One error
// is the deliberately unresolvable row; two would be the video.
const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
const row = await db('photos').where('id', watcherVideoId).first();
expect(row.thumbnail_path).toBeFalsy();
});
it('is idempotent — a second run skips instead of rebuilding', async () => {
const before = await db('photos').where('id', externalPhotoId).first();
const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
expect(result.successCount).toBe(0);
expect(result.skipCount).toBe(2);
const after = await db('photos').where('id', externalPhotoId).first();
expect(after.thumbnail_path).toBe(before.thumbnail_path);
});
it('counts a repaired thumbnail as generated, not skipped', async () => {
// Both images are valid at this point. Destroy ONE thumbnail object while
// leaving thumbnail_path pointing at it — the corrupt/missing case.
const row = await db('photos').where('id', repairPhotoId).first();
const onDisk = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, row.thumbnail_path);
await fs.promises.rm(onDisk);
const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
// On local and external storage the rebuilt key is identical, so inferring
// "skipped" from an unchanged path reports this repair as already valid —
// the one number an operator running this is actually reading.
expect(result.successCount).toBe(1);
expect(result.skipCount).toBe(1);
expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
expect(fs.existsSync(onDisk)).toBe(true);
});
/** Run the CLI the way cron does, and hand back its exit status. */
const runCli = (args = []) => new Promise((resolve) => {
execFile(
process.execPath,
[path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'regenerate-thumbnails.js'), ...args],
{ env: { ...process.env }, cwd: path.join(__dirname, '..', '..') },
(error, stdout, stderr) => resolve({ code: error?.code ?? 0, stdout, stderr })
);
});
it('exits nonzero when a photo could not be built', async () => {
// Exit status is the only thing a cron job reads, and `missing.jpg` has no
// source on the mount.
const failed = await runCli([String(eventId)]);
expect(failed.code).toBe(1);
expect(failed.stderr).toContain('completed with failures');
}, 120000);
it('exits zero when every photo resolves', async () => {
// Drop the unresolvable row: a clean run must not cry wolf at automation.
await db('photos').where('id', vanishingPhotoId).del();
const ok = await runCli([String(eventId)]);
expect(ok.code).toBe(0);
expect(ok.stdout).toContain('Script completed successfully');
}, 120000);
});
@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
/**
* Reveal mode integration tests (#838).
*
* Pins the contract:
* - effective visibility is computed at request time (isGalleryHidden):
* reveal_at in the past opens the gate even before the scheduler stamps
* - /photos returns the event shell with photos: [] + hidden_until_reveal
* for plain guests; slideshow / client / admin-preview see everything
* - image + download endpoints 403 with GALLERY_HIDDEN for plain guests
* - the guest upload route is NOT gated (uploading while hidden is the point)
* - the scheduler stamps revealed_at for due events, exactly once
* - POST /events/:id/reveal stamps revealed_at (idempotent, 400 when the
* mode is off); re-enabling reveal_mode clears revealed_at (re-hide)
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'reveal-test-secret';
const SLUG = 'reveal-test-event';
describe('Reveal mode (#838)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let eventId;
let photoIds;
let adminToken;
const { isGalleryHidden } = require('../../src/utils/revealMode');
const galleryToken = (extra = {}) => jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Reveal Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'reveal-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
allow_user_uploads: 1,
reveal_mode: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
photoIds = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
const p = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: `photo-${i}.jpg`,
path: `events/reveal/${i}.jpg`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
photoIds.push(p[0]?.id ?? p[0]);
}
// Super admin for the admin routes.
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'reveal-admin',
email: 'reveal-admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('RevealAdmin123', 4),
role_id: superRole.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
adminToken = jwt.sign(
{ id: rootId, username: 'reveal-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
app.use('/api/images', require('../../src/routes/protectedImages'));
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/galleryFeedback'));
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('effective visibility math (isGalleryHidden)', () => {
const base = { reveal_mode: true, revealed_at: null, reveal_at: null };
it('is hidden while armed and unrevealed, visible otherwise', () => {
expect(isGalleryHidden({ ...base })).toBe(true);
expect(isGalleryHidden({ ...base, reveal_mode: false })).toBe(false);
expect(isGalleryHidden({ ...base, revealed_at: new Date() })).toBe(false);
// reveal_at in the past opens the gate WITHOUT any stamp — time-exact.
expect(isGalleryHidden({ ...base, reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000) })).toBe(false);
expect(isGalleryHidden({ ...base, reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000) })).toBe(true);
// SQLite 0/1 booleans
expect(isGalleryHidden({ reveal_mode: 1, revealed_at: null, reveal_at: null })).toBe(true);
expect(isGalleryHidden({ reveal_mode: 0, revealed_at: null, reveal_at: null })).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('gallery routes while hidden', () => {
it('/photos gives plain guests the shell with no photos and the flag', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.photos).toEqual([]);
expect(res.body.categories).toEqual([]);
expect(res.body.event.event_name).toBe('Reveal Test');
});
it('/photos serves the slideshow token everything (surprise beamer)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken({ accessLevel: 'slideshow' })}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('/photos serves client access everything (host review)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken({ accessLevel: 'client' })}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('/photos serves the admin preview everything (new transport: ?admin_preview=1 + admin cookie, even with a coexisting gallery session)', async () => {
// #868/#981: reveal-mode hiding is bypassed for an admin preview via the
// new transport (explicit flag + httpOnly admin_token cookie), NOT the
// retired ?preview=<jwt>. The coexisting gallery Bearer must not shadow it.
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos?admin_preview=1`)
.set('Cookie', [`admin_token=${adminToken}`])
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('image and download endpoints 403 with GALLERY_HIDDEN for plain guests', async () => {
for (const url of [
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/thumbnail/${photoIds[0]}`,
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}`,
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoIds[0]}`,
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`,
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/stats`,
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/hero/${photoIds[0]}`,
]) {
const res = await request(app).get(url).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(`${url}:${res.status}`).toBe(`${url}:403`);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
}
});
it('image endpoints are NOT reveal-blocked for the slideshow token', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/thumbnail/${photoIds[0]}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken({ accessLevel: 'slideshow' })}`);
// The seeded file doesn't exist on disk, so anything but the reveal
// gate's 403 is fine here.
expect(res.body.code).not.toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
});
it('/info exposes the effective hidden state without auth', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/info`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(true);
});
it('the guest upload route is not gated', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${eventId}/upload`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.send({});
// Fails later for other reasons (no multipart body) — but never on the
// reveal gate.
expect(res.body.code).not.toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
});
it('legacy protected-image routes are reveal-gated for plain guests', async () => {
for (const [method, url] of [
['get', `/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}/view`],
['post', `/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}/generate-secure-token`],
['post', `/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}/generate-url`],
]) {
const res = await request(app)[method](url).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(`${url}:${res.status}`).toBe(`${url}:403`);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
}
});
it('feedback endpoints are reveal-gated; my-feedback degrades to empty', async () => {
// Feedback must be enabled for the routes to get past their own gate.
await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
event_id: eventId, feedback_enabled: 1, allow_likes: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(), updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
const getRes = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos/${photoIds[0]}/feedback`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(getRes.status).toBe(403);
expect(getRes.body.code).toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
const postRes = await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos/${photoIds[0]}/feedback`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.send({ feedback_type: 'like' });
expect(postRes.status).toBe(403);
expect(postRes.body.code).toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
const mine = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/my-feedback`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(mine.status).toBe(200);
expect(mine.body).toEqual([]);
});
it('secure-image token minting is reveal-gated for plain guests', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/generate-token`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.send({ photoId: photoIds[0] });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
});
it('customer-portal tokens (via:customer, no accessLevel) bypass reveal mode', async () => {
const acct = await db('customer_accounts').insert({
email: 'portal-customer@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const customerId = acct[0]?.id ?? acct[0];
await db('event_customer_assignments').insert({
event_id: eventId,
customer_account_id: customerId,
});
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken({ via: 'customer', customerId })}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('a reveal_at in the past opens the gate without any stamp', async () => {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000).toISOString() });
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: null });
});
});
describe('scheduler and admin reveal', () => {
it('the scheduler stamps revealed_at for due events exactly once', async () => {
const revealAt = new Date(Date.now() - 5 * 60_000);
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: revealAt.toISOString(), revealed_at: null });
const { checkScheduledReveals } = require('../../src/services/revealScheduler');
await checkScheduledReveals();
const asMs = (v) => new Date(v).getTime();
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(row.revealed_at).not.toBeNull();
expect(asMs(row.revealed_at)).toBe(revealAt.getTime());
expect(row.reveal_at).toBeNull(); // schedule consumed, like "Reveal now"
// Second pass no-ops (revealed_at already set).
await checkScheduledReveals();
const again = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(asMs(again.revealed_at)).toBe(revealAt.getTime());
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: null, revealed_at: null });
});
it('POST /:id/reveal stamps revealed_at, clears the schedule, and is idempotent', async () => {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() + 3600_000).toISOString() });
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/reveal`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.revealed_at).toBeTruthy();
// "Reveal now" consumes the pending schedule.
const cleared = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(cleared.reveal_at).toBeNull();
const first = res.body.revealed_at;
const res2 = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/reveal`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
expect(res2.body.revealed_at).toBe(first);
// Guests see photos now.
const gallery = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(gallery.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(gallery.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('re-enabling reveal_mode clears revealed_at (re-hide)', async () => {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_mode: 0 });
const res = await request(app)
.put(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({ reveal_mode: true });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(row.revealed_at).toBeNull();
const gallery = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(gallery.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(true);
});
it('scheduling a FUTURE reveal on a revealed gallery re-arms hiding', async () => {
// State: revealed (previous tests). Saving a future schedule re-hides.
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ revealed_at: new Date().toISOString() });
const res = await request(app)
.put(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({ reveal_mode: true, reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() + 3600_000).toISOString() });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(row.revealed_at).toBeNull();
const gallery = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(gallery.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(true);
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: null });
});
it('re-arming without a schedule clears a stale PAST reveal_at', async () => {
// Legacy/partial-API state: revealed with the old past schedule still
// stored. {reveal_mode:false} then {reveal_mode:true} without
// reveal_at must re-hide, not instantly re-open via the stale date.
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({
reveal_mode: 0,
revealed_at: new Date().toISOString(),
reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() - 3600_000).toISOString(),
});
const res = await request(app)
.put(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({ reveal_mode: true });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(row.revealed_at).toBeNull();
expect(row.reveal_at).toBeNull();
const gallery = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(gallery.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(true);
expect(gallery.body.photos).toEqual([]);
});
it('POST /:id/reveal 400s while reveal mode is off', async () => {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_mode: 0, revealed_at: null });
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/reveal`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_mode: 1 });
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
/**
* SQLite epoch-timestamp normalization (#485 follow-up).
*
* On SQLite, timestamp columns written with a raw `new Date()` through knex
* hold epoch-millisecond numbers. Postgres returns ISO strings, so frontend
* code written against Postgres calls parseISO() and crashes on native
* (SQLite) installs — the exact class fixed for admin Users in #485, which
* listed api tokens / photos / activity as an out-of-scope follow-up.
*
* Pins:
* - gallery /photos serializes uploaded_at / captured_at as ISO strings
* even when the row holds an epoch number (pre-fix archive restores)
* - the api-tokens list serializes created_at / expires_at / last_used_at /
* revoked_at as ISO strings for epoch-stored rows
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'epoch-test-secret';
const SLUG = 'epoch-test-event';
const ISO_RE = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}/;
describe('SQLite epoch timestamp normalization', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let eventId;
let adminToken;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Epoch Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'epoch-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
// The pre-fix corruption shape: epoch numbers in timestamp columns.
await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'restored.jpg',
path: 'events/epoch/restored.jpg',
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: Date.now() - 3600_000,
captured_at: Date.now() - 7200_000,
});
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'epoch-admin',
email: 'epoch-admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('EpochAdmin123', 4),
role_id: superRole.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
adminToken = jwt.sign(
{ id: rootId, username: 'epoch-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
await db('api_tokens').insert({
name: 'epoch-token',
hashed_token: 'x'.repeat(64),
preview: 'pk_test…abcd',
scopes: JSON.stringify(['events:read']),
created_by: rootId,
created_at: Date.now() - 86400_000,
last_used_at: Date.now() - 3600_000,
revoked_at: Date.now() - 60_000,
});
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
app.use('/api/admin/api-tokens', require('../../src/routes/adminApiTokens'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
it('gallery /photos serializes epoch-stored uploaded_at/captured_at as ISO strings', async () => {
const galleryToken = jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(1);
const photo = res.body.photos[0];
expect(typeof photo.uploaded_at).toBe('string');
expect(photo.uploaded_at).toMatch(ISO_RE);
expect(photo.captured_at).toMatch(ISO_RE);
});
it('api-tokens list serializes epoch-stored timestamps as ISO strings', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/api-tokens')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const token = res.body.find((t) => t.name === 'epoch-token');
expect(token).toBeTruthy();
for (const field of ['created_at', 'last_used_at', 'revoked_at']) {
expect(`${field}:${typeof token[field]}`).toBe(`${field}:string`);
expect(token[field]).toMatch(ISO_RE);
}
});
});
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff', () => ({ isTokenBeforeCutoff: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() }));
// The joined query throws whatever the test stages; the role-less fallback
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
/**
* #868 — the admin gallery-preview gate. isAdminPreview must fail CLOSED: it
* grants the draft/password bypass only for an explicit `?admin_preview=1` flag
* AND a verified admin JWT (type 'admin', issuer 'picpeak-auth') read from the
* httpOnly admin_token cookie or a Bearer header — never from the URL, never for
* a guest/gallery token.
*/
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-preview-test-secret';
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { isAdminPreview } = require('../../src/middleware/gallery');
// Read the secret at call time — a jest setup file can set JWT_SECRET after this
// module loads, and isAdminPreview verifies against the live value.
const adminToken = () => jwt.sign({ type: 'admin', id: 1 }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId: 1 }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
function req({ flag, cookie, bearer } = {}) {
return {
query: flag === undefined ? {} : { admin_preview: flag },
cookies: cookie ? { admin_token: cookie } : {},
headers: bearer ? { authorization: `Bearer ${bearer}` } : {},
};
}
describe('isAdminPreview (#868) fails closed', () => {
it('false without the explicit flag, even with a valid admin cookie (plain link stays guest-identical)', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ cookie: adminToken() }))).toBe(false);
});
it('false with the flag but no session token', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1' }))).toBe(false);
});
it('true with the flag + a valid admin cookie', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', cookie: adminToken() }))).toBe(true);
});
it('true with the flag + a valid admin Bearer header', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', bearer: adminToken() }))).toBe(true);
});
it('false for a gallery (guest) token — must be type admin', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', cookie: galleryToken() }))).toBe(false);
});
it('true from the admin cookie even when a gallery Bearer is also present (#981 coexisting session)', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', cookie: adminToken(), bearer: galleryToken() }))).toBe(true);
});
it('false when only a gallery Bearer is present — a gallery header can never satisfy it (#981)', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', bearer: galleryToken() }))).toBe(false);
});
it('false on a tampered token', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', cookie: `${adminToken()}x` }))).toBe(false);
});
it('false on the wrong issuer', () => {
const t = jwt.sign({ type: 'admin' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'not-picpeak' });
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', cookie: t }))).toBe(false);
});
it('false when the flag is anything other than exactly "1"', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: 'true', cookie: adminToken() }))).toBe(false);
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '0', cookie: adminToken() }))).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
/**
* Repairing the bundled templates' fixed image height (#1131).
*
* The risk in a migration that rewrites user-visible CSS is doing too much,
* so most of what is pinned here is what it must NOT touch: the other pixel
* heights inside the very same templates (a 1px divider, an 8px scrollbar),
* and any rule a user wrote themselves.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const migration = require('../../migrations/core/175_fix_css_template_photo_height');
const ELEGANT_DARK = `
.photo-card {
border-radius: 12px;
}
.photo-card img {
width: 100%;
height: 200px;
object-fit: cover;
transition: transform 0.3s ease;
}
`;
const LIQUID_GLASS_DARK = `
.gallery-page::after {
content: '';
height: 1px;
background: linear-gradient(90deg, transparent, #fff, transparent);
}
.photo-card img {
width: 100%;
height: 240px;
object-fit: cover;
filter: brightness(0.9);
}
.gallery-page ::-webkit-scrollbar {
width: 8px;
height: 8px;
}
@media (max-width: 640px) {
.photo-card img {
height: 180px;
}
}
`;
describe('migration 175 — CSS template image height (#1131)', () => {
let knex; let tmpDir;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig175-'));
knex = require('knex')({
client: 'sqlite3',
connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
useNullAsDefault: true,
});
await knex.schema.createTable('css_templates', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.string('name');
t.text('css_content');
});
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (knex) await knex.destroy();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(async () => { await knex('css_templates').del(); });
const contentOf = async (name) =>
(await knex('css_templates').where({ name }).first()).css_content;
it('relaxes the default template so the layouts h-full can win', async () => {
await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Elegant Dark', css_content: ELEGANT_DARK });
await migration.up(knex);
const css = await contentOf('Elegant Dark');
expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
expect(css).not.toContain('height: 200px');
// Everything else about the rule survives.
expect(css).toContain('object-fit: cover');
expect(css).toContain('transition: transform 0.3s ease');
});
it('fixes both the base rule and the mobile override of the dark glass template', async () => {
await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Liquid Glass Dark', css_content: LIQUID_GLASS_DARK });
await migration.up(knex);
const css = await contentOf('Liquid Glass Dark');
expect(css).not.toContain('height: 240px');
expect(css).not.toContain('height: 180px');
expect(css.match(/height: 100%/g)).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('leaves the divider and the scrollbar alone', async () => {
await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Liquid Glass Dark', css_content: LIQUID_GLASS_DARK });
await migration.up(knex);
// The whole reason this matches full rule bodies rather than every
// `height: <n>px`: these are in the same stylesheet and are correct.
const css = await contentOf('Liquid Glass Dark');
expect(css).toContain('height: 1px');
expect(css).toContain('width: 8px');
expect(css).toContain('height: 8px');
});
/**
* The case that forced the scope wider. `sanitizeCSS` strips control
* characters, so any template ever saved through the editor — including a
* save that only changed its name — has had every newline REMOVED. An
* exact-text migration finds nothing on those installs, is recorded as
* applied, and leaves them broken permanently.
*/
it('fixes a template that has been through the editor, newlines and all', async () => {
const { sanitizeCSS } = require('../../src/utils/cssSanitizer');
const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(ELEGANT_DARK);
// Precondition: the sanitizer really did flatten it.
expect(sanitized).not.toContain('\n');
expect(sanitized).toContain('height: 200px');
await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Saved Once', css_content: sanitized });
await migration.up(knex);
const css = await contentOf('Saved Once');
expect(css).not.toContain('200px');
expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
});
it('relaxes a user-authored fixed height too, but only on .photo-card img', async () => {
// Deliberately broader than the seeded text — see the migration header. A
// pixel height on the image cannot be right under any of the seven
// layouts, whoever wrote it; a height anywhere else is none of our
// business.
const mine = '.photo-card img {\n height: 220px;\n}\n.hero { height: 400px; }';
await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'My Own', css_content: mine });
await migration.up(knex);
const css = await contentOf('My Own');
expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
expect(css).not.toContain('220px');
expect(css).toContain('.hero { height: 400px; }');
});
it('does not rewrite other properties that merely end in -height', async () => {
// `line-height: 200px` contains `height: 200px` as a substring, so an
// unanchored pattern silently rewrites it — in a migration that cannot be
// undone.
const mine = [
'.photo-card img {',
' line-height: 200px;',
' max-height: 300px;',
' min-height: 14px;',
' --tile-height: 220px;',
' height: 200px;',
'}',
].join('\n');
await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Adjacent Props', css_content: mine });
await migration.up(knex);
const css = await contentOf('Adjacent Props');
expect(css).toContain('line-height: 200px');
expect(css).toContain('max-height: 300px');
expect(css).toContain('min-height: 14px');
expect(css).toContain('--tile-height: 220px');
// Only the real one moved.
expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
expect(css).not.toMatch(/(?<![\w-])height:\s*200px/);
});
it('handles a grouped selector list', async () => {
// Requiring `{` straight after `img` skipped these entirely — and the
// migration is still recorded as applied, so the template kept the bug.
const mine = '.photo-card img, .thumbnail img {\n height: 200px;\n}';
await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Grouped', css_content: mine });
await migration.up(knex);
const css = await contentOf('Grouped');
expect(css).toContain('.photo-card img, .thumbnail img {');
expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
expect(css).not.toContain('200px');
});
it('skips a nested rule rather than rewriting the wrong declaration', async () => {
// Valid nested CSS that passes the validator. A brace-greedy body would
// capture the inner block and rewrite the CAPTION's height, which cannot
// be undone. Leaving it untouched is the lesser evil.
const mine = '.photo-card img {\n & + .caption { height: 200px; }\n}';
await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Nested', css_content: mine });
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await contentOf('Nested')).toBe(mine);
});
it('leaves non-pixel heights on the image alone', async () => {
const mine = '.photo-card img { height: 50vh; }\n.photo-card img { height: auto; }';
await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Relative', css_content: mine });
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await contentOf('Relative')).toBe(mine);
});
it('is idempotent and safe on a row with no CSS', async () => {
await knex('css_templates').insert([
{ name: 'Elegant Dark', css_content: ELEGANT_DARK },
{ name: 'Empty', css_content: null },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const once = await contentOf('Elegant Dark');
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await contentOf('Elegant Dark')).toBe(once);
expect(await contentOf('Empty')).toBeNull();
});
it('no-ops when the table does not exist yet', async () => {
await knex.schema.dropTable('css_templates');
await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
await knex.schema.createTable('css_templates', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.string('name');
t.text('css_content');
});
});
});
@@ -1,546 +0,0 @@
/**
* One row per external file per event (#1162).
*
* The migration has two halves and they fail differently: the cleanup can take
* out the wrong row of a pair (losing a thumbnail, orphaning an event's hero),
* and the index can fail to be created at all — leaving an install that looks
* migrated and is still racing. Both are pinned here.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const migration = require('../../migrations/core/176_external_relpath_unique');
describe('migration 176 — unique (event_id, external_relpath) (#1162)', () => {
let knex; let tmpDir;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig186-'));
knex = require('knex')({
client: 'sqlite3',
connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
useNullAsDefault: true,
});
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (knex) await knex.destroy();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(async () => {
for (const table of [
'photos', 'events', 'photo_categories', 'photo_feedback',
'photo_admin_marks', 'photo_faces', 'image_access_logs', 'transfer_files',
]) {
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists(table);
}
await knex.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('hero_photo_id');
t.string('download_zip_path');
t.string('download_zip_generated_at');
});
await knex.schema.createTable('photo_categories', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('hero_photo_id');
});
await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('event_id');
t.string('external_relpath');
t.string('thumbnail_path');
t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
t.integer('feedback_count').defaultTo(0);
t.integer('like_count').defaultTo(0);
t.decimal('average_rating', 3, 2).defaultTo(0);
t.integer('favorite_count').defaultTo(0);
t.integer('reaction_count').defaultTo(0);
t.integer('color_label_count').defaultTo(0);
t.string('face_status');
t.integer('view_count').defaultTo(0);
t.integer('download_count').defaultTo(0);
t.integer('face_count');
t.string('face_started_at');
t.text('face_error');
});
// Declared exactly as the real schema declares them — CASCADE and all.
// The point of these tables here is that SQLite does NOT enforce any of
// it (PicPeak never sets `PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON`), so a bare delete of
// the photo row leaves every one of them dangling.
await knex.schema.createTable('photo_feedback', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('photo_id').references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.integer('event_id');
t.string('feedback_type');
t.text('comment_text');
t.string('guest_identifier');
// Per-person guest identity (migration 078). Nullable: galleries without
// guest identity leave it NULL and fall back to guest_identifier.
t.integer('guest_id');
t.integer('rating');
t.boolean('is_hidden').defaultTo(false);
t.boolean('is_approved').defaultTo(true);
});
await knex.schema.createTable('photo_admin_marks', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('photo_id').notNullable().references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.integer('event_id');
t.integer('admin_id');
t.integer('rating');
// Independently writable alongside rating, per photoAdminMarksService.
t.string('color_label', 16);
t.unique(['photo_id', 'admin_id'], 'photo_admin_marks_photo_admin_uniq');
});
await knex.schema.createTable('photo_faces', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('photo_id').references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.integer('event_id');
// purgePhotoFaces rebuilds the people that lose members, so the cluster
// link and the vectors recomputeCentroid reads have to be here for this
// to exercise the real path rather than a stub.
t.integer('person_id');
t.binary('embedding');
t.float('det_score');
});
await knex.schema.createTable('image_access_logs', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('photo_id');
});
await knex.schema.createTable('transfer_files', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('transfer_id');
t.integer('photo_id');
t.unique(['transfer_id', 'photo_id'], 'transfer_files_unique');
});
});
/** Two duplicate rows for the same file: id 1 survives, id 2 is doomed. */
const seedPair = async () => {
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
};
const rows = () => knex('photos').orderBy('id', 'asc').select('*');
it('collapses a duplicated pair to one row and leaves distinct paths alone', async () => {
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't1', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't2', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/y.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't3', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const after = await rows();
expect(after.map((r) => r.external_relpath)).toEqual(['a/x.jpg', 'a/y.jpg']);
// Lowest id survives when both sides are equally complete.
expect(after[0].id).toBe(1);
});
it('does not collapse the same path across different events', async () => {
// The constraint is per event. Two events referencing the same NAS folder
// is a supported setup, and treating those as duplicates would delete one
// event's entire library.
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 2, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
});
it('never touches managed rows, however many carry NULL', async () => {
// Every managed photo has external_relpath NULL. Grouping on it without
// the NOT NULL filter would make them all one enormous "duplicate" group
// and delete the entire library bar one row.
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 3 });
});
it('keeps the row that has a thumbnail, not merely the lowest id', async () => {
// An import killed mid-flight leaves rows without a thumbnail. Dropping
// the completed one would blank a tile in the grid for no reason.
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: null, source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 'thumb.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const after = await rows();
expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
expect(after[0].thumbnail_path).toBe('thumb.jpg');
});
it('repoints a hero that pointed at the row being removed', async () => {
// events.hero_photo_id is ON DELETE SET NULL, so without this the cleanup
// silently strips the event's hero image — a visible regression caused
// entirely by the fix.
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, hero_photo_id: 2 });
await knex('photo_categories').insert({ id: 1, hero_photo_id: 2 });
await migration.up(knex);
expect((await knex('events').where({ id: 1 }).first()).hero_photo_id).toBe(1);
expect((await knex('photo_categories').where({ id: 1 }).first()).hero_photo_id).toBe(1);
});
it('leaves a hero that pointed at the survivor untouched', async () => {
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', thumbnail_path: 't', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, hero_photo_id: 1 });
await migration.up(knex);
expect((await knex('events').where({ id: 1 }).first()).hero_photo_id).toBe(1);
});
it('makes a second insert of the same path impossible afterwards', async () => {
// The whole point. Without this the route is still racing, and the
// migration is recorded as applied.
await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
await migration.up(knex);
await expect(
knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' })
).rejects.toThrow(/unique/i);
});
it('still admits managed rows once the index exists', async () => {
await migration.up(knex);
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
]);
expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
});
it('leaves nothing dangling behind the deleted row', async () => {
// SQLite never enforces the ON DELETE CASCADE these tables declare, so a
// bare delete strands biometric embeddings, feedback and marks pointing at
// a photo id that no longer exists — on every SQLite install.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_faces').insert({ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1 });
await knex('image_access_logs').insert({ photo_id: 2 });
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await knex('photo_faces').where('photo_id', 2).first()).toBeUndefined();
expect(await knex('image_access_logs').where('photo_id', 2).first()).toBeUndefined();
});
it('does not carry the duplicate\'s faces over to the survivor', async () => {
// Both rows were scanned independently, so the survivor already holds its
// own embeddings. Moving these would fabricate a second copy of every face
// and split the person clusters built from them.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_faces').insert([{ photo_id: 1, event_id: 1 }, { photo_id: 2, event_id: 1 }]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await knex('photo_faces').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
});
it('moves a guest comment to the survivor rather than deleting it', async () => {
// The duplicates were separate tiles in the grid, so a guest could have
// commented on either. Silently dropping that inside a fix for silent data
// loss would be its own bug.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_feedback').insert({
photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'comment',
comment_text: 'lovely shot', guest_identifier: 'guest-a',
});
await migration.up(knex);
const rows = await knex('photo_feedback');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].photo_id).toBe(1);
expect(rows[0].comment_text).toBe('lovely shot');
});
it('keeps both comments when the same guest commented on both tiles', async () => {
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
{ photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'comment', comment_text: 'one', guest_identifier: 'g' },
{ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'comment', comment_text: 'two', guest_identifier: 'g' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const rows = await knex('photo_feedback').orderBy('id');
expect(rows.map((r) => r.comment_text)).toEqual(['one', 'two']);
expect(rows.every((r) => r.photo_id === 1)).toBe(true);
});
it('does not double-count a like the same guest left on both tiles', async () => {
// Unlike comments, a like is a per-guest toggle: moving it would show two
// likes from one person.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
{ photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g' },
{ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await knex('photo_feedback').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
});
it('moves a like from a guest the survivor has never seen', async () => {
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_feedback').insert({
photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'other',
});
await migration.up(knex);
const rows = await knex('photo_feedback');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].photo_id).toBe(1);
});
it('moves an admin mark, and drops it when that admin already marked the survivor', async () => {
// photo_admin_marks is UNIQUE(photo_id, admin_id), so a blind move would
// throw and abort the migration.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_admin_marks').insert([
{ photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: 5 },
{ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: 2 },
{ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, admin_id: 9, rating: 4 },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const rows = await knex('photo_admin_marks').orderBy('admin_id');
expect(rows.map((r) => [r.admin_id, r.rating])).toEqual([[7, 5], [9, 4]]);
expect(rows.every((r) => r.photo_id === 1)).toBe(true);
});
it('respects the transfer_files uniqueness when moving membership', async () => {
await seedPair();
await knex('transfer_files').insert([
{ transfer_id: 3, photo_id: 1 },
{ transfer_id: 3, photo_id: 2 },
{ transfer_id: 4, photo_id: 2 },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const rows = await knex('transfer_files').orderBy('transfer_id');
expect(rows.map((r) => r.transfer_id)).toEqual([3, 4]);
expect(rows.every((r) => r.photo_id === 1)).toBe(true);
});
it('recomputes the survivor\'s feedback totals after reparenting rows', async () => {
// photos carries denormalized counters (migration 033). A survivor that
// now OWNS the feedback but still renders zero is the visible half of
// getting this wrong.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
{ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g1' },
{ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'rating', rating: 4, guest_identifier: 'g1' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const survivor = await knex('photos').where('id', 1).first();
expect(survivor.like_count).toBe(1);
expect(Number(survivor.average_rating)).toBe(4);
expect(survivor.feedback_count).toBe(1);
});
it('keeps two people who share a device apart', async () => {
// guest_identifier is per-device; guest_id is per-person (migration 078),
// and feedbackService scopes by guest_id when it is present. Keying on the
// identifier alone would read these as one person and delete a rating.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
{ photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'rating', rating: 5, guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 10 },
{ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'rating', rating: 2, guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 11 },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const rows = await knex('photo_feedback').orderBy('guest_id');
expect(rows.map((r) => [r.guest_id, r.rating])).toEqual([[10, 5], [11, 2]]);
});
it('still dedupes one person voting on both tiles', async () => {
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
{ photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 10 },
{ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'shared', guest_id: 10 },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await knex('photo_feedback').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 1 });
});
it('still clears face rows on a branch that has no face feature', async () => {
// DIVERGES FROM MAIN, deliberately. Face recognition (#1090) is main-only:
// there is no faceProcessor on this branch, so purgePhotoFaces cannot be
// called and there are no event_people counts or centroids to reconcile.
// What still matters is the half that is not optional — the rows must not
// dangle, because SQLite never enforces the CASCADE that would remove
// them. The service reaches for purgePhotoFaces, finds nothing, and falls
// back to a plain delete; this pins that fallback.
//
// If faces are ever backported, main's version of this test comes with
// them.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_faces').insert({ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, person_id: 5 });
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await knex('photo_faces').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 0 });
});
it('keeps a hidden moderation record from swallowing the visible replacement', async () => {
// feedbackService lets both coexist and counts only the visible one.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_feedback').insert([
{ photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g', is_hidden: true },
{ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: 'g', is_hidden: false },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await knex('photo_feedback').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
});
it('merges the independent halves of one admin\'s mark', async () => {
// rating and color_label are written independently, so the same admin can
// have rated one tile and coloured the other.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_admin_marks').insert([
{ photo_id: 1, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: 5, color_label: null },
{ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1, admin_id: 7, rating: null, color_label: 'red' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const rows = await knex('photo_admin_marks');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect([rows[0].rating, rows[0].color_label]).toEqual([5, 'red']);
});
it('requeues the survivor when the duplicate held the only scan', async () => {
// Otherwise the sole embeddings go with the purge and nothing re-queues:
// the photo just silently stops having a face.
await seedPair();
await knex('photo_faces').insert({ photo_id: 2, event_id: 1 });
await migration.up(knex);
expect((await knex('photos').where('id', 1).first()).face_status).toBe('pending');
});
it('carries the duplicate\'s views and downloads over', async () => {
await seedPair();
await knex('photos').where('id', 1).update({ view_count: 2, download_count: 1 });
await knex('photos').where('id', 2).update({ view_count: 5, download_count: 3 });
await migration.up(knex);
const survivor = await knex('photos').where('id', 1).first();
expect([survivor.view_count, survivor.download_count]).toEqual([7, 4]);
});
it('fails loudly rather than recording itself applied without the index', async () => {
// Swallowing a failed CREATE INDEX would leave the install permanently
// racy — the in-flight guard only covers one process — with nothing to
// trigger a retry. Driven through the helper the migration calls, against
// a table that still holds duplicates — i.e. what it would face if the
// dedupe above had not achieved uniqueness.
await seedPair();
const { createExternalRelpathIndex } = require('../../src/services/externalPhotoDedupe');
await expect(createExternalRelpathIndex(knex)).rejects.toThrow(/unique/i);
});
it('invalidates the pre-built download zip for the affected event', async () => {
// The cached archive still contains the rows just removed, and every
// ordinary photo-deletion path invalidates it for exactly that reason.
// getZipInfo treats a cleared record as a miss and rebuilds on request.
await seedPair();
await knex('events').insert({
id: 1, download_zip_path: 'events/active/x/.download-cache/all.zip',
download_zip_generated_at: '2026-01-01',
});
await migration.up(knex);
const ev = await knex('events').where('id', 1).first();
expect(ev.download_zip_path).toBeNull();
expect(ev.download_zip_generated_at).toBeNull();
});
it('leaves an untouched event\'s zip alone', async () => {
await seedPair();
await knex('events').insert([
{ id: 1, download_zip_path: 'a.zip', download_zip_generated_at: '2026-01-01' },
{ id: 2, download_zip_path: 'b.zip', download_zip_generated_at: '2026-01-01' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect((await knex('events').where('id', 2).first()).download_zip_path).toBe('b.zip');
});
it('is idempotent', async () => {
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const once = await rows();
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await rows()).toEqual(once);
});
it('rolls back to an unconstrained table', async () => {
await migration.up(knex);
await migration.down(knex);
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
});
it('no-ops before 041 has added the column', async () => {
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => { t.increments('id').primary(); });
await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -1,364 +0,0 @@
/**
* Folding the event's base path into every external row (#1163).
*
* Two things can go wrong and both are silent, which is why they are pinned
* here rather than left to review: folding a path that was ALREADY folded
* (every original moves), and "repairing" a healthy install because the media
* root happened to be unmounted when the migration ran (every original moves).
*
* The repair itself is driven against a real temp directory tree, because the
* whole mechanism is "is this file actually there" and a mocked fs would only
* be testing the mock.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
describe('migration 177 — external_relpath from the media root (#1163)', () => {
let knex; let tmpDir; let mediaRoot; let migration;
/** Writes `bytes` bytes and returns the size, so fixtures can record it the
* way an import would have. */
const touch = async (rel, bytes = 8) => {
const full = path.join(mediaRoot, rel);
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
await fs.promises.writeFile(full, Buffer.alloc(bytes));
return bytes;
};
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig187-'));
mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
// The service caches the root on first call, so it must not have been
// resolved before EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT was set above.
jest.resetModules();
migration = require('../../migrations/core/177_external_relpath_from_root');
knex = require('knex')({
client: 'sqlite3',
connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
useNullAsDefault: true,
});
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (knex) await knex.destroy();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
delete process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT;
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('events');
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('app_settings');
await knex.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.string('external_path');
});
await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('event_id');
t.string('external_relpath');
t.integer('size_bytes');
t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
});
await knex.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.string('setting_key');
t.text('setting_value');
t.string('setting_type');
t.string('updated_at');
});
await fs.promises.rm(mediaRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
await fs.promises.mkdir(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
});
const relpaths = async () =>
(await knex('photos').orderBy('id', 'asc').select('external_relpath'))
.map((r) => r.external_relpath);
it('folds the base path into every row of a healthy event', async () => {
await touch('Trip/Leknes/a.jpg');
await touch('Trip/Leknes/b.jpg');
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/b.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Leknes/a.jpg', 'Trip/Leknes/b.jpg']);
});
it('repairs rows an earlier import had rebased', async () => {
// The reported shape: a parent imported first, a child imported second, so
// events.external_path is the child and the parent's rows resolve into a
// path that does not exist.
const oldSize = await touch('Trip/Leknes/old.jpg', 11); // from the first import
const newSize = await touch('Trip/Sub/new.jpg', 22); // from the second
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/old.jpg', size_bytes: oldSize, source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'new.jpg', size_bytes: newSize, source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
// The old row is placed where the file actually is; the new one keeps
// resolving exactly where it resolved before.
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Leknes/old.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/new.jpg']);
});
it('refuses an ancestor whose file is a different size', async () => {
// The dangerous case: the row's own file was simply deleted, and an
// UNRELATED file one directory up happens to share its name. Adopting it
// would make downloads serve the wrong original — worse than a dead link.
await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 999);
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
await knex('photos').insert({
event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: 42, source_origin: 'external',
});
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/photo.jpg']);
});
it('refuses an ancestor when the row records no size to check against', async () => {
// Nothing to verify provenance with, so the row stays where it resolves
// today rather than adopting a same-named stranger.
await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 100);
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
await knex('photos').insert({
event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: null, source_origin: 'external',
});
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/photo.jpg']);
});
it('leaves nothing folded when a rewrite fails partway', async () => {
// Without a transaction, a crash between the first event's UPDATE and the
// marker leaves mixed formats behind — and the next run folds the already
// folded rows a second time, putting every original one directory deeper.
await touch('A/one.jpg');
await touch('B/two.jpg');
await knex('events').insert([
{ id: 1, external_path: 'A' },
{ id: 2, external_path: 'B' },
]);
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'one.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 2, external_relpath: 'two.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
// app_settings is written last, in the same transaction as the rewrites.
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('app_settings_backup');
await knex.raw('CREATE TRIGGER fail_marker BEFORE INSERT ON app_settings '
+ "BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'boom'); END");
await expect(migration.up(knex)).rejects.toThrow(/boom/);
await knex.raw('DROP TRIGGER fail_marker');
// Every row still base-relative, and no marker — so a retry is correct.
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['one.jpg', 'two.jpg']);
expect(await knex('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'external_relpath_root_relative').first())
.toBeUndefined();
});
it('removes the losing row when two paths converge, instead of stranding it', async () => {
// Trip/Sub/c.jpg imported once via `Trip` (as `Sub/c.jpg`) and once via
// `Trip/Sub` (as `c.jpg`). Both fold to the same path. Skipping the loser
// would leave it base-relative under a root-only resolver — pointing at
// <root>/c.jpg — with the marker claiming the conversion is complete.
const size = await touch('Trip/Sub/c.jpg', 33);
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Sub/c.jpg', size_bytes: size, source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'c.jpg', size_bytes: size, source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
const rows = await knex('photos').select('external_relpath');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].external_relpath).toBe('Trip/Sub/c.jpg');
});
it('survives a final path that equals another row\'s current path', async () => {
// `photo.jpg` repairs to `Trip/photo.jpg` while the row already holding
// `Trip/photo.jpg` folds to `Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg`. Every FINAL value is
// distinct, but a one-pass rewrite collides halfway through — and on
// Postgres that 23505 is misread by the migration runner as "already
// applied", leaving everything unconverted.
const a = await touch('Trip/photo.jpg', 11);
const b = await touch('Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg', 22);
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'photo.jpg', size_bytes: a, source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/photo.jpg', size_bytes: b, source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/photo.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/Trip/photo.jpg']);
});
it('does not re-prefix a row inserted while the probe was running', async () => {
// Phase 1 runs outside the transaction and can take minutes on a cold
// mount. An import finishing in that window writes an already
// root-relative row, which a `where event_id` bulk update would prefix a
// second time with the stale base.
await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
const { foldExternalRelpaths } = require('../../src/services/externalRelpathFold');
const realStat = fs.promises.stat;
let injected = false;
jest.spyOn(fs.promises, 'access').mockImplementation(async (...args) => {
if (!injected) {
injected = true;
await knex('photos').insert({
event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/late.jpg', source_origin: 'external',
});
}
return realStat(args[0]).then(() => undefined);
});
await foldExternalRelpaths(knex);
fs.promises.access.mockRestore();
expect((await relpaths()).sort()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg', 'Trip/late.jpg']);
});
it('leaves a row it cannot place resolving where it resolves today', async () => {
// Never guess below current behaviour: a file that is genuinely gone must
// not have its path rewritten to some other file that happens to exist.
await touch('Trip/Sub/present.jpg');
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'present.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'vanished.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/present.jpg', 'Trip/Sub/vanished.jpg']);
});
it('folds without repairing when the media root is unmounted', async () => {
// An unmounted share leaves the mountpoint as an empty directory, so every
// file looks missing. Repairing off that signal would move every original
// on a perfectly healthy install.
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip/Sub' });
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Leknes/a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
// mediaRoot is empty — see beforeEach.
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Sub/Leknes/a.jpg']);
});
it('leaves managed rows alone', async () => {
await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: null, source_origin: 'managed' },
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual([null, 'Trip/a.jpg']);
});
it('leaves an event with no base path alone — its rows are already root-relative', async () => {
await touch('a.jpg');
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: null });
await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['a.jpg']);
});
it('folds each event with its own base', async () => {
await touch('A/one.jpg');
await touch('B/two.jpg');
await knex('events').insert([
{ id: 1, external_path: 'A' },
{ id: 2, external_path: 'B' },
]);
await knex('photos').insert([
{ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'one.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
{ event_id: 2, external_relpath: 'two.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['A/one.jpg', 'B/two.jpg']);
});
it('tolerates a base path with stray slashes', async () => {
await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: '/Trip/' });
await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
});
it('does not fold twice when run again', async () => {
// The failure this guards is total: every original on the install moves one
// directory deeper, and there is no undo.
await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
await migration.up(knex);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
});
it('does not fold twice when the base repeats in the relpath', async () => {
// The inference this migration deliberately does NOT use: `Trip/x.jpg`
// under base `Trip` already "starts with the base", but has not been
// folded — it is a subfolder that shares its parent's name.
await touch('Trip/Trip/x.jpg');
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/x.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/Trip/x.jpg']);
});
it('rollback does not clear the marker, so a re-run cannot double-fold', async () => {
await touch('Trip/a.jpg');
await knex('events').insert({ id: 1, external_path: 'Trip' });
await knex('photos').insert({ event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' });
await migration.up(knex);
await migration.down(knex);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await relpaths()).toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg']);
});
it('no-ops before 041 has added the column', async () => {
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => { t.increments('id').primary(); });
await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
/**
* Legacy preview keys must not survive the encoder change.
*
* The old generator kept the SOURCE basename verbatim while always writing
* JPEG, so a `.webp` upload produced `preview_shot.webp` holding a JPEG. The
* route now derives Content-Type from the key, and sets `nosniff` — so that
* legacy object would be announced as image/webp and render as a broken image.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const migration = require('../../migrations/core/178_reset_legacy_preview_paths');
describe('migration 178 — legacy preview keys (#1166 follow-up)', () => {
let knex; let tmpDir;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig188-'));
knex = require('knex')({
client: 'sqlite3',
connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
useNullAsDefault: true,
});
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (knex) await knex.destroy();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.string('preview_path');
t.string('thumbnail_path');
});
});
it('clears the mislabelled .webp keys that would render broken', async () => {
await knex('photos').insert({ preview_path: 'previews/preview_shot.webp' });
await migration.up(knex);
expect((await knex('photos').first()).preview_path).toBeNull();
});
it('clears .jpg keys too, because a byte-correct one can still be flattened', async () => {
// A legacy .jpg key is valid JPEG, but it may be a flattened rendition of a
// transparent or animated source, and nothing in the key says so. One lazy
// regeneration is cheaper than reasoning about which of them lied.
await knex('photos').insert([
{ preview_path: 'previews/preview_a.jpg' },
{ preview_path: 'previews/preview_b.png' },
]);
await migration.up(knex);
expect(await knex('photos').whereNotNull('preview_path').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 0 });
});
it('leaves thumbnails alone — they are a different cache', async () => {
await knex('photos').insert({ preview_path: 'previews/p.jpg', thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/t.jpg' });
await migration.up(knex);
expect((await knex('photos').first()).thumbnail_path).toBe('thumbnails/t.jpg');
});
it('is idempotent and safe with nothing to clear', async () => {
await migration.up(knex);
await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it('no-ops before 104 has added the column', async () => {
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => { t.increments('id').primary(); });
await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
/**
* HTTP tests for the gallery QR endpoints (#836):
* GET /api/admin/events/:id/qr (PNG / SVG)
* GET /api/admin/events/:id/qr-print (table-card / poster PDF)
* Same real-SQLite harness as adminEvents.smoke.test.js.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-events-qr-')), 'db.sqlite'
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-events-qr-test-secret';
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
async function insertEvent(db, adminId, over = {}) {
const base = {
slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'QR Test Wedding',
event_date: '2026-05-29',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_by: adminId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...over,
};
const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
}
describe('admin event QR endpoints', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let token;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
});
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
beforeEach(async () => { await db('events').del(); });
const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
it('401s without an admin token', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr`);
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('returns a PNG QR by default', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr`)).buffer();
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
// PNG magic bytes
expect(res.body.slice(0, 4)).toEqual(Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47]));
});
it('returns an SVG QR when requested', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
// supertest doesn't text-parse image/svg+xml — buffer and decode manually.
const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr?format=svg`)).buffer();
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/image\/svg\+xml/);
expect(Buffer.from(res.body).toString('utf8')).toContain('<svg');
});
it('sets attachment disposition with download=1', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr?download=1`)).buffer();
expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toMatch(/^attachment/);
});
// 30s: the print PDFs embed the full IBM Plex Sans TTFs (~200 KB each) —
// font parsing + subsetting exceeds jest's 5s default on slower CI runners.
it.each(['table-card', 'poster'])('renders the %s print PDF', async (template) => {
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await auth(
request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr-print?template=${template}&lang=de`)
).buffer();
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('application/pdf');
expect(res.body.slice(0, 4).toString()).toBe('%PDF');
}, 120000);
it('409s when the event has no share link', async () => {
// events.share_link is NOT NULL — an empty string is the closest real-world
// "no share link" shape (no token extractable from it either).
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { share_link: '', share_token: null });
const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr`));
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
});
it('404s for a non-existent event', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/events/999999/qr'));
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
@@ -201,6 +201,34 @@ describe('admin events CRUD endpoints (smoke)', () => {
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
// #894 — per-event password-page logo toggle: false hides, null
// restores the default (show).
it('stores login_logo_visible: false and clears it back to NULL', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const hide = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
login_logo_visible: false,
});
expect(hide.status).toBe(200);
let row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.login_logo_visible);
const clear = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
login_logo_visible: null,
});
expect(clear.status).toBe(200);
row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect(row.login_logo_visible).toBeNull();
// The string "false" passes isBoolean() validation — it must be
// parsed, not treated as a truthy string (would store 1 = show).
const hideStr = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
login_logo_visible: 'false',
});
expect(hideStr.status).toBe(200);
row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.login_logo_visible);
});
});
describe('DELETE /:id', () => {
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
/**
* Role-editor self-amplification guard (migration 175 / adminRoles).
*
* `roles.manage` must be a DELEGATION primitive, not root escalation: a
* non-super_admin holder can only grant permissions their OWN role already
* holds, and can't edit their own role. super_admin bypasses. Pins
* userManagementService.createRole / updateRole (assertActorMayGrant).
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-roleguard-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'roleguard-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-roleguard-storage-'));
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const svc = require('../../src/services/userManagementService');
const { clearPermissionCache } = require('../../src/middleware/permissions');
describe('role editor — self-amplification guard', () => {
let db; let cleanup;
let superId; let mgrRoleId; let mgrId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
({ adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
// A non-super role that CAN manage roles but only holds a couple of perms.
const mgrRole = await svc.createRole(
{ name: 'limited_mgr', permissions: ['roles.manage', 'events.view'] },
superId,
);
mgrRoleId = mgrRole.id;
const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'mgr', email: 'mgr@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
role_id: mgrRoleId, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
mgrId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
clearPermissionCache();
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('super_admin can grant any permission', async () => {
const r = await svc.createRole(
{ name: 'power_role', permissions: ['settings.banking', 'users.delete'] },
superId,
);
expect(r.permissions).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(['settings.banking', 'users.delete']));
});
it('non-super cannot grant a permission its own role lacks', async () => {
await expect(
svc.createRole({ name: 'sneaky', permissions: ['events.view', 'settings.banking'] }, mgrId),
).rejects.toThrow(/only grant permissions your own role/i);
});
it('non-super can create a role within its own permissions', async () => {
const r = await svc.createRole({ name: 'viewer_lite', permissions: ['events.view'] }, mgrId);
expect(r.permissions).toEqual(['events.view']);
});
it('non-super cannot edit its own role', async () => {
await expect(
svc.updateRole(mgrRoleId, { permissions: ['roles.manage', 'events.view'] }, mgrId),
).rejects.toThrow(/cannot edit your own role/i);
});
it('non-super cannot escalate another role beyond its own permissions', async () => {
const adminRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
await expect(
svc.updateRole(adminRole.id, { permissions: ['settings.banking'] }, mgrId),
).rejects.toThrow(/only grant permissions your own role/i);
});
it('the built-in team_photographer name is reserved', async () => {
await expect(
svc.createRole({ name: 'team_photographer', permissions: [] }, superId),
).rejects.toThrow(/reserved/i);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
/**
* Protected-key boundary on the generic settings writers (migration 175).
*
* A role with settings.edit but NOT settings.domains (the "office manager" this
* PR enables) must be able to save the General tab — which re-posts
* general_site_url on every save — as long as the URL is UNCHANGED, and must be
* 403'd only when it actually tries to change a protected key. Regression pin for
* the change-detection fix (the presence-only check over-fired on every save).
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-setkeys-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'setkeys-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-setkeys-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const {
bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken,
} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const svc = require('../../src/services/userManagementService');
const { clearPermissionCache } = require('../../src/middleware/permissions');
const STORED_URL = 'https://stored.example';
describe('settings protected-key boundary (/general)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
let superTok; let mgrTok;
const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
const readSiteUrl = async () => {
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'general_site_url' }).first();
return row ? JSON.parse(row.setting_value) : null;
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
const { adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db);
await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
// Office-manager role: settings.view + settings.edit, NOT settings.domains.
const mgrRole = await svc.createRole(
{ name: 'office_mgr', permissions: ['settings.view', 'settings.edit'] },
superId,
);
const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'office', email: 'office@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
role_id: mgrRole.id, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
mgrTok = mintAdminToken(ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0]);
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: 'general_site_url', setting_value: JSON.stringify(STORED_URL), setting_type: 'general',
});
clearPermissionCache();
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/admin/settings', require('../../src/routes/adminSettings'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('settings.edit role can save /general when general_site_url is unchanged', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/settings/general'), mgrTok)
.send({ general_site_url: STORED_URL, general_max_file_size_mb: 50 });
expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(await readSiteUrl()).toBe(STORED_URL);
});
it('settings.edit role is 403d when it actually changes general_site_url', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/settings/general'), mgrTok)
.send({ general_site_url: 'https://evil.example' });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('FORBIDDEN');
expect(res.body.keys.map((k) => k.key)).toContain('general_site_url');
expect(await readSiteUrl()).toBe(STORED_URL); // unchanged
});
it('super_admin can change general_site_url', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/settings/general'), superTok)
.send({ general_site_url: 'https://new.example' });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(await readSiteUrl()).toBe('https://new.example');
});
});
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
/**
* Source-inspection contract test for #1078.
*
* POST /api/admin/thumbnails/regenerate-previews hands its selected rows to
* ensurePreviewImage, which branches on `source_origin` (and then reads
* `external_relpath` / `filename`) to reach an external/reference photo on its
* media mount. When the select list omitted those columns, every external row
* looked managed, resolvePhotoStorageKey returned null, and the endpoint
* reported success while silently generating nothing for reference galleries.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
describe('regenerate-previews selects the columns ensurePreviewImage branches on (#1078)', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'routes', 'adminThumbnails.js'),
'utf8',
);
// The select feeding the regenerate-previews handler, from the route
// declaration to the end of that statement.
const selectStatement = (() => {
const routeIdx = src.indexOf('/regenerate-previews');
expect(routeIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
const selectIdx = src.indexOf('.select(', routeIdx);
expect(selectIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
return src.slice(selectIdx, src.indexOf(';', selectIdx));
})();
it.each(['source_origin', 'external_relpath', 'filename'])(
'selects %s',
(column) => {
expect(selectStatement).toContain(`'${column}'`);
}
);
it('still selects the columns the managed path needs', () => {
for (const column of ['id', 'event_id', 'path', 'media_type', 'mime_type', 'preview_path']) {
expect(selectStatement).toContain(`'${column}'`);
}
});
});
@@ -32,9 +32,17 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
if (table === 'admin_users') {
let rowFilter = () => true;
return {
// The session route joins roles for the adminUser payload (#798);
// fake rows carry no role fields, so the join is a pass-through.
leftJoin() {
return this;
},
where(criteria) {
rowFilter = (row) => {
return Object.entries(criteria).every(([k, v]) => {
return Object.entries(criteria).every(([rawKey, v]) => {
// Joined queries prefix columns ('admin_users.id') — the fake
// rows use bare names.
const k = rawKey.replace(/^admin_users\./, '');
if (k === 'is_active') return Boolean(row.is_active) === Boolean(v);
return row[k] === v;
});
@@ -50,7 +58,12 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
if (!row) return undefined;
if (!this._cols) return row;
const out = {};
for (const c of this._cols) out[c] = row[c];
for (const c of this._cols) {
// Support 'table.col' and 'table.col as alias' shapes.
const [source, alias] = c.split(/\s+as\s+/i);
const bare = source.includes('.') ? source.split('.').pop() : source;
out[alias || bare] = row[bare];
}
return out;
},
};
@@ -135,9 +148,9 @@ function signAdminToken({ id = 1, username = 'admin', iat, exp }) {
);
}
function signGalleryToken({ eventId = 100, eventSlug = 'wedding', ...extra } = {}) {
function signGalleryToken({ eventId = 100, eventSlug = 'wedding' } = {}) {
return jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
{ eventId, eventSlug, type: 'gallery' },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
@@ -288,56 +301,6 @@ describe('GET /auth/session — symmetry with protected middleware', () => {
expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
});
/**
* What KIND of gallery session this is (#1149).
*
* The frontend used to keep this in sessionStorage, which is per-TAB while
* the cookie is per-browser: a gallery reopened in a second tab lost
* 'client' even though the backend still served it as one, and the UI hid
* the only control that clears the privileged cookie. Reported from the
* token so a restored session knows what it actually is.
*/
describe('gallery session kind', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
fakeDb.events.push({
id: 100,
slug: 'wedding',
is_active: true,
is_archived: false,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400_000),
});
});
it('reports a PIN-client session as client', async () => {
const res = await request(makeApp())
.get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ accessLevel: 'client' })}`);
expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('client');
expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
});
it('reports a customer-portal session, which looks like a guest', async () => {
const res = await request(makeApp())
.get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ via: 'customer', customerId: 7 })}`);
expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(true);
});
it('reports a plain guest as neither', async () => {
// The flags have to discriminate, or they would just hand every visitor
// a Logout button back.
const res = await request(makeApp())
.get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken()}`);
expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
});
});
it('returns valid:false when the token is revoked', async () => {
fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
id: 1,
@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ describe('authorization / ownership gaps', () => {
}).returning('id');
adminId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'admin');
// Grant settings.edit to the admin role BEFORE any request populates the
// 60s permission cache, so the revoke test exercises the ownership check
// (404) rather than the missing-permission gate (403). This models a
// custom role that carries settings.edit the scenario GHSA-gprq needs.
await grantPermissionToRole('admin', 'settings.edit');
// Grant settings.integrations to the admin role BEFORE any request populates
// the 60s permission cache, so the revoke test exercises the ownership check
// (404) rather than the missing-permission gate (403). Migration 174 split
// API-token management out of the catch-all settings.edit into the dedicated
// settings.integrations perm; this models a custom role that carries it —
// the scenario GHSA-gprq needs.
await grantPermissionToRole('admin', 'settings.integrations');
adminTok = mintAdminToken(adminId);
app = express();
@@ -96,7 +98,7 @@ describe('authorization / ownership gaps', () => {
expect(res.body.find((t) => t.id === superTokenId)).toBeDefined();
});
it('a non-owner (with settings.edit) cannot revoke another admin\'s token', async () => {
it('a non-owner (with settings.integrations) cannot revoke another admin\'s token', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/api-tokens/${superTokenId}`), adminTok);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
const row = await db('api_tokens').where({ id: superTokenId }).first();
@@ -127,44 +127,7 @@ describe('dashboard scoping (GHSA-c2jj / gqx7 / jhcf)', () => {
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(Number(res.body.totalEvents)).toBe(1);
expect(Number(res.body.totalPhotos)).toBe(1);
// The catalogued original bytes — this is what carries the per-event
// scoping, and what `storageUsed` reported before #1164.
expect(Number(res.body.catalogedBytes)).toBe(1000);
});
it('/stats reports disk usage unscoped, because disk is not per-event', async () => {
// storageUsed is a measurement of the storage root (#1164), so it is the
// same number for every admin by design. Pinned so a future reviewer
// reading "everything on this endpoint is scoped" does not turn it into a
// sum of this editor's photos again — which is the bug that was fixed.
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.storageUsed).not.toBe(1000);
expect(res.body).toHaveProperty('storageBreakdown');
});
it('/stats reports the catalogued figure on an S3 backend, not a near-zero disk walk', async () => {
// STORAGE_PATH holds only incidental local files when objects live in a
// bucket, so walking it would report near-zero and drag the soft-limit
// recommendation with it.
const prev = process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND;
process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND = 's3';
try {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.storageUsed).toBeNull();
expect(res.body.storageMeasurement).toBe('catalog');
expect(Number(res.body.catalogedBytes)).toBe(1000);
} finally {
if (prev === undefined) delete process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND;
else process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND = prev;
}
expect(Number(res.body.storageUsed)).toBe(1000);
});
it('/analytics does not expose a foreign gallery name or slug', async () => {
@@ -10,9 +10,6 @@
* if (allow_downloads === false) → never fires, so ALL download endpoints
* kept serving with downloads switched off
*
* (The download-jobs route asserted on main is #858, which is beta-only —
* this branch covers the three download endpoints that exist here.)
*
* The harness runs on SQLite, so these assertions exercise the real engine
* values rather than a mock. Every test here fails on the unfixed code.
*/
@@ -126,6 +123,11 @@ describe('gallery flags survive SQLite 0/1 storage (#1028)', () => {
.send({ photo_ids: [photoId] });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
test('download-jobs is refused', async () => {
const res = await request(app).post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-jobs`).send({});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
});
describe('with downloads enabled (allow_downloads = 1)', () => {
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
/**
* "Date Taken" ordering across SQLite's storage classes (#1172).
*
* photos.captured_at does not hold one type on SQLite. Three writers put three
* different things in it:
*
* integer managed uploads — photoProcessor.js:441 hands knex a Date, which
* the sqlite3 binding stores as epoch milliseconds
* text external imports and the capture-date backfill, which write
* ISO-8601 ('2026-06-03T01:15:00.000Z')
* null no capture date, so the sort falls through to uploaded_at —
* itself text, in knex's 'YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS' shape
*
* A plain COALESCE over that mixture is not an ordering. SQLite sorts INTEGER
* before TEXT unconditionally, so every managed photo carrying EXIF came back
* ahead of every photo that did not, whatever the dates said. And among the
* text values 'T' (0x54) outranks the space (0x20), so a same-day ISO 01:15
* sorted behind a fallback 23:00.
*
* Both failures predate #1172 — the first needs only two managed photos — but
* the sort is what that issue is about, so they are fixed and pinned here.
* Every test below fails on the unfixed ORDER BY.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capsort-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'capsort-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-capsort-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const SLUG = 'capsort-gallery';
describe('capture-date ordering on SQLite (#1172)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId;
// Managed uploads store an epoch-millisecond INTEGER, because
// photoProcessor.js:441 hands knex a Date and the sqlite3 binding converts
// it. That conversion cannot be reproduced from inside jest — there the
// binding's type dispatch misses sandbox-created Dates and writes the string
// "[object Object]" instead (CLAUDE.md). Verified outside jest: a Date lands
// as {"c":1830211200000,"ty":"integer"}. So these tests write the integer
// production would have written, rather than a Date that jest mangles.
const managed = (iso) => new Date(iso).getTime();
const addPhoto = async (filename, capturedAt, uploadedAt) => {
const row = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename,
path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
type: 'individual',
captured_at: capturedAt,
uploaded_at: uploadedAt,
}).returning('id');
return row[0]?.id ?? row[0];
};
const orderedFilenames = async (order = 'asc') => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos?sort=capture_date&order=${order}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
return res.body.photos.map((p) => p.filename);
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const ev = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Capture Sort',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
share_token: 'capsort-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
require_password: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
beforeEach(async () => { await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).del(); });
test('the fixture really does put three storage classes in one column', async () => {
expect(['sqlite3', 'better-sqlite3']).toContain(db.client.config.client);
await addPhoto('m.jpg', managed('2026-06-03T01:15:00Z'), '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
await addPhoto('e.jpg', '2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
await addPhoto('n.jpg', null, '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
const rows = await db.raw('select filename, typeof(captured_at) as t from photos order by filename');
const byName = Object.fromEntries((rows.rows || rows).map((r) => [r.filename, r.t]));
// Exactly the mixture that made COALESCE meaningless.
expect(byName).toEqual({ 'm.jpg': 'integer', 'e.jpg': 'text', 'n.jpg': 'null' });
});
test('a managed EXIF date does not outrank an earlier one stored as text', async () => {
// The pre-existing failure, reachable with managed photos alone: integer
// beat text regardless of the dates, so this came back exactly reversed.
await addPhoto('managed-2027.jpg', managed('2027-12-31T00:00:00Z'), '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
await addPhoto('external-2020.jpg', '2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', '2026-01-01 00:00:00');
expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['external-2020.jpg', 'managed-2027.jpg']);
expect(await orderedFilenames('desc')).toEqual(['managed-2027.jpg', 'external-2020.jpg']);
});
test('a photo with no capture date sorts by its upload time, not ahead of everything', async () => {
await addPhoto('has-exif-2027.jpg', managed('2027-12-31T00:00:00Z'), '2027-12-31 00:00:00');
await addPhoto('no-exif-2020.jpg', null, '2020-01-01 00:00:00');
expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['no-exif-2020.jpg', 'has-exif-2027.jpg']);
});
test('an ISO capture time and a fallback upload time compare by clock, not by separator', async () => {
// Same day: 'T' vs ' ' decided this before, so 01:15 sorted after 23:00.
await addPhoto('iso-0115.jpg', '2026-06-03T01:15:00.000Z', '2026-06-03 05:00:00');
await addPhoto('fallback-2300.jpg', null, '2026-06-03 23:00:00');
expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['iso-0115.jpg', 'fallback-2300.jpg']);
});
test('an epoch-integer uploaded_at is compared as a date, not as its digits', async () => {
// uploaded_at is not always text either: a legacy archive restore leaves
// epoch milliseconds in it (a .picpeak restore from an install that stored them that way).
// Reading that with substr() would have compared the string '1830297600000'
// against '2020-01-01 00:00:00', putting the 2028 row first.
await addPhoto('epoch-upload-2028.jpg', null, new Date('2028-01-01T00:00:00Z').getTime());
await addPhoto('captured-2020.jpg', managed('2020-01-01T00:00:00Z'), '2020-01-01 00:00:00');
const [row] = await db.raw('select typeof(uploaded_at) as t from photos where filename = \'epoch-upload-2028.jpg\'');
expect((row.t || row).toString()).toBe('integer');
expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual(['captured-2020.jpg', 'epoch-upload-2028.jpg']);
});
test('all three storage classes order together correctly', async () => {
await addPhoto('c-managed-2026-08.jpg', managed('2026-08-15T12:00:00Z'), '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
await addPhoto('a-external-2026-06.jpg', '2026-06-03T01:15:00.000Z', '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
await addPhoto('d-fallback-2026-09.jpg', null, '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
await addPhoto('b-managed-2026-07.jpg', managed('2026-07-04T09:30:00Z'), '2026-09-01 00:00:00');
expect(await orderedFilenames('asc')).toEqual([
'a-external-2026-06.jpg',
'b-managed-2026-07.jpg',
'c-managed-2026-08.jpg',
'd-fallback-2026-09.jpg',
]);
});
});
@@ -67,10 +67,11 @@ async function insertEvent(db, over = {}) {
describe('public Live Slideshow routes', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
// bootCrmDb runs the full migration set against a fresh SQLite file and the
// chain keeps growing via backports. Hook-argument timeouts OVERRIDE the
// 120s jest.config default (same trap as the jest.setTimeout pins) — keep
// this at 120000, matching the config.
// bootCrmDb runs the full migration set against a fresh SQLite file. The
// chain keeps growing, and a 30s pin here blocked the 3.97.0-beta.0
// release PR on a slow runner. Hook-argument timeouts OVERRIDE the 120s
// jest.config default (same trap as the jest.setTimeout pins raised in
// #860) — keep this at 120000, matching the config.
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
@@ -98,7 +99,12 @@ describe('public Live Slideshow routes', () => {
await setFlag(db, 'slideshow', true);
});
const stateUrl = (token = TOKEN) => `/api/gallery/${SLUG}/show/${token}/state`;
// QR overlay: supertest's Host is loopback, and a loopback base is now
// suppressed rather than encoded — the kiosk passes its reachable
// window.location.origin, so the QR tests do the same.
const KIOSK_ORIGIN = 'https://gallery.example.com';
const stateUrl = (token = TOKEN) => `/api/gallery/${SLUG}/show/${token}/state?origin=${encodeURIComponent(KIOSK_ORIGIN)}`;
const stateUrlNoOrigin = (token = TOKEN) => `/api/gallery/${SLUG}/show/${token}/state`;
describe('resolveSlideshow guards', () => {
it('200 + per-event display settings on a live link', async () => {
@@ -227,6 +233,58 @@ describe('public Live Slideshow routes', () => {
});
});
describe('slideshowSettings — QR overlay cascade (#837)', () => {
async function enableGlobalQr() {
await setSetting(db, 'slideshow_qr_enabled', true);
await setSetting(db, 'slideshow_qr_position', 'top-right');
await setSetting(db, 'slideshow_qr_opacity', 80);
await setSetting(db, 'slideshow_qr_size', 18);
}
it('inherits the global QR overlay when show_qr is NULL', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, { show_qr: null });
await enableGlobalQr();
const res = await request(app).get(stateUrl());
expect(res.body.qr).toMatchObject({
position: 'top-right',
opacity: 80,
size: 18,
});
// Share-link QR ships as a PNG data URI — no client QR lib needed.
expect(res.body.qr.data_url).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
});
it('is null by default (global off, no override)', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, { show_qr: null });
const res = await request(app).get(stateUrl());
expect(res.body.qr).toBeNull();
});
it('per-event OFF override hides the QR even when the global is on', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, { show_qr: 0 });
await enableGlobalQr();
const res = await request(app).get(stateUrl());
expect(res.body.qr).toBeNull();
});
it('per-event ON override shows the QR even when the global is off', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, { show_qr: 1 });
const res = await request(app).get(stateUrl());
expect(res.body.qr).not.toBeNull();
expect(res.body.qr.data_url).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
// Look falls back to the global defaults.
expect(res.body.qr.position).toBe('bottom-left');
});
it('suppresses the QR when no guest-reachable origin exists (loopback base, no kiosk origin)', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, { show_qr: 1 });
const res = await request(app).get(stateUrlNoOrigin());
// Encoding localhost would send scanning phones to THEIR localhost —
// no QR beats a broken QR (codex review of #848, confirmation round).
expect(res.body.qr).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('display-only token guards (#646 review concern 1)', () => {
// Mint a real slideshow JWT, then prove it is denied on the
// download / upload / feedback routes (display-only contract).
@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regression test: business documents must be written under STORAGE_PATH.
*
* quoteService.persistDocPdf, the invoice sending/reminder writers and the
* contract signature writers all built their target from
* `path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'business-docs', ...)`. Both compose
* files pin STORAGE_PATH=/app/storage and the image's WORKDIR is /app, so the
* two expressions name the same directory and the bug was invisible on a stock
* deployment. Point STORAGE_PATH anywhere else — a NAS mount, a second disk,
* the single-container image's /data volume — and quotes, invoices, Mahnungen
* and contract PDFs were written outside the configured storage root, so they
* were missed by backups and lost when the container was replaced.
*
* Rather than assert on internals, this drives the module boundary the fix
* changed: getStoragePath() is the one resolver, so a temporary STORAGE_PATH
* must be where the bytes land.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
describe('business documents honour STORAGE_PATH', () => {
let tmpRoot;
let originalStoragePath;
beforeEach(() => {
originalStoragePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-storage-'));
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpRoot;
jest.resetModules();
});
afterEach(() => {
if (originalStoragePath === undefined) delete process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
else process.env.STORAGE_PATH = originalStoragePath;
fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('getStoragePath is the resolver the writers share', () => {
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
expect(getStoragePath()).toBe(tmpRoot);
});
it('no business-document writer still targets process.cwd()/storage', () => {
// Whitespace is collapsed before matching on purpose. The first version of
// this test compared against the single-line literal and therefore missed
// persistSignatureImage(), whose identical path.join was simply spread over
// seven lines — it reported green while signature PNGs still wrote outside
// STORAGE_PATH. Formatting must not decide whether a bug is visible.
const writers = [
'src/services/quoteService.js',
'src/services/invoice/sending.js',
'src/services/invoice/reminders.js',
'src/services/contract/signatureAssets.js',
'src/routes/adminDev.js',
];
const offenders = writers.filter((rel) => {
const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../', rel), 'utf8');
return /process\.cwd\(\),'storage'/.test(source.replace(/\s+/g, ''));
});
expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
});
it('generated contract PDFs pass the containment check that serves them', () => {
// assertContractPdfPath guards the admin and public contract download
// routes. It listed only <cwd>/storage/business-docs/contract, so once the
// writers moved to STORAGE_PATH every freshly generated contract was
// refused with PATH_OUTSIDE_STORAGE — a worse failure than the bug being
// fixed. Both roots must be accepted.
const { assertContractPdfPath } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
// assertPathInside realpaths both the file and each root, so the guard only
// means anything against a filesystem that actually has them — write them.
const write = (...segments) => {
const p = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'business-docs', 'contract', ...segments);
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(p), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(p, 'bytes');
return p;
};
const generated = write('2026', 'C-2026-0001.pdf');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(generated)).not.toThrow();
// Signature PNGs live under the same root and are served by the same guard.
const signature = write('signatures', '7', 'customer-1.png');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(signature)).not.toThrow();
// And the guard still refuses a real file outside every allowed root.
const foreign = path.join(tmpRoot, 'outside.pdf');
fs.writeFileSync(foreign, 'bytes');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(foreign)).toThrow(/outside the storage roots/i);
});
it('the guard takes its root from the shared resolver, not its own fallback', () => {
// The regression this pins: the guard used to compute
// `STORAGE_PATH || <cwd>/storage` itself. That agrees with getStoragePath()
// only while STORAGE_PATH is set — unset, the shared resolver falls back
// module-relative to <repo>/storage while the guard fell back to
// <cwd>/storage, and the backend is normally started from backend/. Writers
// and guard then disagreed and contract downloads 403'd.
//
// Mocking the resolver is what makes this provable AND safe. If the guard
// consumes getStoragePath(), the mock moves its root; if it rolled its own
// expression, the mock would have no effect and the assertion fails. It
// also keeps every path inside the tmpdir — an earlier version of this test
// deleted `<resolved root>/business-docs` in cleanup, which with
// STORAGE_PATH unset resolves to a developer's real, gitignored
// <repo>/storage and would have destroyed local documents on `npm test`.
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/config/storage', () => ({ getStoragePath: () => tmpRoot }));
const { assertContractPdfPath } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
const root = path.join(tmpRoot, 'business-docs', 'contract', '2026');
fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
const generated = path.join(root, 'C-2026-0002.pdf');
fs.writeFileSync(generated, 'bytes');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(generated)).not.toThrow();
jest.dontMock('../../src/config/storage');
});
it('writes land under STORAGE_PATH, not the working directory', () => {
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
// Mirror what persistDocPdf does: derive the root, create it, write.
const root = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'business-docs', 'quote', '2026');
fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
const filePath = path.join(root, 'Q-2026-0001.pdf');
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, 'pdf-bytes');
expect(fs.existsSync(filePath)).toBe(true);
expect(filePath.startsWith(tmpRoot)).toBe(true);
// And crucially NOT beside the process working directory.
expect(filePath.startsWith(path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage'))).toBe(false);
});
it('the PDF font lookup consults the storage root before the legacy path', () => {
// A custom font under STORAGE_PATH/fonts used to be unreachable, so the
// document silently rendered with the built-in face instead.
const fontDir = path.join(tmpRoot, 'fonts');
fs.mkdirSync(fontDir, { recursive: true });
const fontPath = path.join(fontDir, 'Brand.ttf');
fs.writeFileSync(fontPath, 'ttf');
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
const raw = 'Brand.ttf';
const candidates = [
path.join(getStoragePath(), raw.replace(/^\/+/, '')),
path.join(getStoragePath(), 'fonts', path.basename(raw)),
path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'fonts', path.basename(raw)),
];
const found = candidates.find((p) => fs.existsSync(p));
expect(found).toBe(fontPath);
});
});
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
/**
* ensureHeroImage must work for external/reference photos (#1166 follow-up).
*
* resolvePhotoStorageKey returns null for external photos by design, and that
* null used to be handed straight to withLocalCopy, which throws — so the hero
* route caught it and redirected to the full ORIGINAL. #1078 fixed exactly
* this shape for ensurePreviewImage and nobody carried it across.
*
* It only became visible when the Story hero started asking for hero_url
* instead of photo.url: on a managed gallery that is a real saving, on a
* reference-mode gallery it quietly changed nothing.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const os = require('os');
const sharp = require('sharp');
const EXTERNAL_ROOT = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-hero-ext-${process.pid}`);
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = EXTERNAL_ROOT;
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
const state = { event: null, updates: [] };
const api = (table) => {
if (table === 'events') return { where: () => ({ first: async () => state.event }) };
if (table === 'photos') {
return { where: (criteria) => ({ update: async (values) => { state.updates.push({ criteria, values }); return 1; } }) };
}
throw new Error(`unexpected table in test: ${table}`);
};
api.__state = state;
return { db: api };
});
const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
const EVENT = { id: 7, slug: 'nas-wedding', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'weddings/2026-08' };
async function writeSourceJpeg(absPath, { width = 2400, height = 1600 } = {}) {
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(absPath), { recursive: true });
const buf = Buffer.alloc(width * height * 3);
for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) buf[i] = (i * 7) % 256;
await sharp(buf, { raw: { width, height, channels: 3 } }).jpeg({ quality: 90 }).toFile(absPath);
}
describe('ensureHeroImage — external sources', () => {
let storage; let storageRoot; let imageProcessor;
beforeAll(async () => {
storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-hero-store-'));
storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
await storage.init();
storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
await fs.mkdir(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path), { recursive: true });
}, 30000);
afterAll(async () => {
storageModule.resetStorage();
await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
await fs.rm(EXTERNAL_ROOT, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(() => { db.__state.event = EVENT; db.__state.updates = []; });
it.each(['external', 'reference'])('generates a hero for a %s photo off the mount', async (sourceOrigin) => {
const name = `${sourceOrigin}-hero.jpg`;
await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, name));
const photo = {
id: sourceOrigin === 'external' ? 301 : 302,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: sourceOrigin,
// Root-relative, as stored since #1163: external_relpath is resolved
// from EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, not from event.external_path. The base-
// relative form this fixture used to carry stopped resolving the moment
// that landed, and ensureHeroImage returned null.
external_relpath: path.join(EVENT.external_path, name),
filename: name,
hero_path: null,
};
const key = await imageProcessor.ensureHeroImage(photo);
// The regression: this returned null and the route redirected to the
// full original.
expect(key).toBeTruthy();
expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
// Per-photo basename, so two events sharing a NAS filename cannot clobber
// each other — same rule as the preview tier.
expect(key).toContain(`ext${photo.id}_`);
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([{ criteria: { id: photo.id }, values: { hero_path: key } }]);
});
it('returns null rather than throwing when the external source is gone', async () => {
const photo = {
id: 303, event_id: EVENT.id, source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: path.join(EVENT.external_path, 'not-on-the-mount.jpg'), filename: 'not-on-the-mount.jpg', hero_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensureHeroImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
});
it('returns null for a reference-mode row with no source_origin', async () => {
// Mode falls back to the event's, so resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null.
// That used to reach withLocalCopy and throw out of the function.
const photo = {
id: 304, event_id: EVENT.id, source_origin: null, external_relpath: null,
filename: 'orphan.jpg', path: 'nas-wedding/individual/orphan.jpg', hero_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensureHeroImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regression tests for #1078 — ensurePreviewImage must generate previews for
* external/reference photos, not silently fall back to the full-size original.
*
* resolvePhotoStorageKey returns null for external photos by design, and that
* null used to be handed straight to withLocalCopy, which throws. The lightbox
* preview route caught the throw and redirected to the original, so a gallery
* whose photos all live on an external mount paid full size on every open —
* the exact cost the preview tier (#492) exists to avoid.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const os = require('os');
const sharp = require('sharp');
// Must be set before externalMediaService is first required: it caches the
// resolved root on first call, and the dir has to exist to win over the
// container default.
const EXTERNAL_ROOT = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-ext-media-${process.pid}`);
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = EXTERNAL_ROOT;
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
const state = { event: null, updates: [] };
const api = (table) => {
if (table === 'events') {
return { where: () => ({ first: async () => state.event }) };
}
if (table === 'photos') {
return {
where: (criteria) => ({
update: async (values) => {
state.updates.push({ criteria, values });
return 1;
},
}),
};
}
throw new Error(`unexpected table in test: ${table}`);
};
api.__state = state;
return { db: api };
});
const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
const EVENT = {
id: 7,
slug: 'nas-wedding',
source_mode: 'reference',
external_path: 'weddings/2026-08-smith',
};
async function writeSourceJpeg(absPath, { width = 2400, height = 1600 } = {}) {
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(absPath), { recursive: true });
const buf = Buffer.alloc(width * height * 3);
for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) buf[i] = (i * 7) % 256;
await sharp(buf, { raw: { width, height, channels: 3 } }).jpeg({ quality: 90 }).toFile(absPath);
}
describe('ensurePreviewImage — external/reference sources (#1078)', () => {
let storage;
let storageRoot;
let imageProcessor;
beforeAll(async () => {
storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-preview-store-'));
storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
await storage.init();
storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
// Require AFTER the storage injection so the module sees it.
delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
await fs.mkdir(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path), { recursive: true });
}, 30000);
afterAll(async () => {
storageModule.resetStorage();
await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
await fs.rm(EXTERNAL_ROOT, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(() => {
db.__state.event = EVENT;
db.__state.updates = [];
});
it.each(['external', 'reference'])(
'generates a downscaled preview for a %s photo off the media mount',
async (sourceOrigin) => {
const name = `${sourceOrigin}-shot.jpg`;
await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, name));
const photo = {
id: sourceOrigin === 'external' ? 101 : 102,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: sourceOrigin,
// Relative to the media ROOT, not to event.external_path (#1163).
external_relpath: path.join(EVENT.external_path, name),
filename: name,
preview_path: null,
};
const key = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
// Per-photo basename so two events referencing the same NAS filename
// can't clobber each other's preview.
expect(key).toBe(`previews/preview_ext${photo.id}_${name}`);
expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
const meta = await sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key)).metadata();
expect(meta.format).toBe('jpeg');
// 2400x1600 capped at the 1920 long edge, aspect preserved.
expect(meta.width).toBe(1920);
expect(meta.height).toBe(1280);
// The generated key is persisted so the next open short-circuits.
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([
{ criteria: { id: photo.id }, values: { preview_path: key } },
]);
}
);
it('short-circuits on an existing valid preview instead of regenerating', async () => {
const name = 'already-previewed.jpg';
await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, name));
const photo = {
id: 103,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: path.join(EVENT.external_path, name),
filename: name,
preview_path: null,
};
const first = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
db.__state.updates = [];
const second = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage({ ...photo, preview_path: first });
expect(second).toBe(first);
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
});
it('returns null (never throws) when the external source is missing', async () => {
const photo = {
id: 104,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: 'not-on-the-mount.jpg',
filename: 'not-on-the-mount.jpg',
preview_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
});
it('returns null (never throws) for a row with no source_origin in a reference event', async () => {
// Mode falls back to event.source_mode = 'reference', so
// resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null. That used to reach withLocalCopy and
// throw out of ensurePreviewImage instead of honouring null-on-failure.
const photo = {
id: 105,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: null,
external_relpath: null,
filename: 'orphan.jpg',
path: 'nas-wedding/individual/orphan.jpg',
preview_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
});
it('branches on source_origin, so a row selected without it looks managed', async () => {
// Pins why the /regenerate-previews caller must select source_origin:
// an external row missing that column takes the managed path, where
// resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null and generation is skipped.
const name = 'column-starved.jpg';
await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, name));
const starved = {
id: 106,
event_id: EVENT.id,
external_relpath: path.join(EVENT.external_path, name),
preview_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(starved)).resolves.toBeNull();
await expect(
imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage({ ...starved, source_origin: 'external', filename: name })
).resolves.toBe(`previews/preview_ext106_${name}`);
});
it('still routes managed photos through the storage backend', async () => {
const sourceKey = 'events/active/managed-event/individual/managed.jpg';
const localSource = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-managed-${process.pid}.jpg`);
await writeSourceJpeg(localSource, { width: 800, height: 600 });
await storage.put(sourceKey, await fs.readFile(localSource), { contentType: 'image/jpeg' });
await fs.rm(localSource, { force: true });
db.__state.event = { id: 8, slug: 'managed-event', source_mode: 'managed' };
const photo = {
id: 201,
event_id: 8,
source_origin: 'managed',
path: 'managed-event/individual/managed.jpg',
filename: 'managed.jpg',
preview_path: null,
};
const key = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_managed.jpg');
expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
/**
* A pre-#1162 backup must still restore (#1162 review).
*
* `replaceAllTables` suspends FOREIGN KEY enforcement for the load — Postgres
* via `session_replication_role = replica`, SQLite via `defer_foreign_keys` —
* but neither of those suspends a UNIQUE index. An archive taken before
* migration 186 carries exactly the duplicate photo rows that migration
* removes, so the batchInsert would hit the new index and roll the entire
* restore back, after every table had already been emptied.
*
* These pin the drop → load → dedupe → recreate sequence the restore now
* performs, and the failure it exists to prevent.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const {
dedupeExternalPhotos,
createExternalRelpathIndex,
dropExternalRelpathIndex,
} = require('../../src/services/externalPhotoDedupe');
describe('restoring an archive that predates the unique index (#1162)', () => {
let knex; let tmpDir;
// What a pre-186 archive's photos.ndjson holds for a racing import: the same
// file twice, sub-millisecond apart.
const ARCHIVE_ROWS = [
{ id: 1, event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
{ id: 2, event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/a.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
{ id: 3, event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/b.jpg', source_origin: 'external' },
];
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restore-dedupe-'));
knex = require('knex')({
client: 'sqlite3',
connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
useNullAsDefault: true,
});
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (knex) await knex.destroy();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('photos');
await knex.schema.createTable('photos', (t) => {
t.integer('id').primary();
t.integer('event_id');
t.string('external_relpath');
t.string('thumbnail_path');
t.string('source_origin').defaultTo('managed');
});
await createExternalRelpathIndex(knex);
});
it('would abort the whole restore without the drop', async () => {
// The regression, stated directly: this is what the target instance does
// today when handed a legacy archive.
await expect(knex.batchInsert('photos', ARCHIVE_ROWS, 100)).rejects.toThrow(/unique/i);
});
it('loads, dedupes and comes back constrained', async () => {
await dropExternalRelpathIndex(knex);
await knex.batchInsert('photos', ARCHIVE_ROWS, 100);
const removed = await dedupeExternalPhotos(knex);
await createExternalRelpathIndex(knex);
expect(removed).toBe(1);
expect((await knex('photos').orderBy('id')).map((r) => r.external_relpath))
.toEqual(['Trip/a.jpg', 'Trip/b.jpg']);
// The target must not be left unprotected by the restore that dropped it.
await expect(
knex('photos').insert({ id: 9, event_id: 1, external_relpath: 'Trip/b.jpg', source_origin: 'external' })
).rejects.toThrow(/unique/i);
});
it('is a no-op for an archive that has no duplicates', async () => {
await dropExternalRelpathIndex(knex);
await knex.batchInsert('photos', ARCHIVE_ROWS.slice(1), 100);
expect(await dedupeExternalPhotos(knex)).toBe(0);
await expect(createExternalRelpathIndex(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
expect(await knex('photos').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 2 });
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
/**
* Regression tests for the file-watcher concurrency bound.
*
* chokidar fires 'add' once per file — with no ignoreInitial option the boot
* scan fires it for every existing file, and a bulk drop fires it for every
* new one at once. Unbounded handlers each run DB lookups plus a full sharp
* pipeline (sharp.concurrency(2) only caps libvips threads WITHIN one
* operation), which can OOM small hosts. Both 'add' and 'unlink' must go
* through the shared p-limit gate.
*
* Adapted from the filpgame fork (426ca491), extended to cover 'unlink'.
*/
const mockLimit = jest.fn((operation) => Promise.resolve().then(operation));
const mockPLimit = jest.fn(() => mockLimit);
const mockHandlers = {};
const mockWatcher = {
on: jest.fn((event, handler) => {
mockHandlers[event] = handler;
return mockWatcher;
}),
};
// Shared instances captured by the mock factories: jest.isolateModules re-runs
// each factory in a fresh registry, so the factories must return these same
// objects for the test to observe calls made inside the isolated module.
const mockLogger = { error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() };
// Chainable no-row query — enough for removePhoto's lookup/delete calls.
const mockDb = jest.fn(() => ({
where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
first: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
delete: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(0),
}));
jest.mock('p-limit', () => mockPLimit);
jest.mock('chokidar', () => ({
watch: jest.fn(() => mockWatcher),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: mockDb }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => mockLogger);
jest.mock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
generateThumbnail: jest.fn(),
generateVideoPlaceholder: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/videoProcessor', () => ({
isVideoMimeType: jest.fn(() => false),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/downloadZipService', () => ({ invalidate: jest.fn() }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/dbCompat', () => ({
formatBoolean: jest.fn((value) => value),
}));
const loadFileWatcher = () => {
let fileWatcher;
jest.isolateModules(() => {
fileWatcher = require('../../src/services/fileWatcher');
});
return fileWatcher;
};
describe('fileWatcher concurrency bound', () => {
const originalBackend = process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND;
const originalConcurrency = process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY;
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
Object.keys(mockHandlers).forEach((key) => delete mockHandlers[key]);
process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND = 'local';
delete process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY;
});
afterAll(() => {
if (originalBackend === undefined) delete process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND;
else process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND = originalBackend;
if (originalConcurrency === undefined) delete process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY;
else process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY = originalConcurrency;
});
it.each([
[undefined, 2], // default
['3', 3], // explicit
['0', 1], // floored to 1
['-4', 1], // floored to 1
['invalid', 2], // falls back to default
])('configures the limiter with FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY=%s as %i', (configured, expected) => {
if (configured === undefined) delete process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY;
else process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY = configured;
loadFileWatcher().startFileWatcher();
expect(mockPLimit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expected);
});
it('routes add events through the shared limiter', async () => {
loadFileWatcher().startFileWatcher();
expect(mockHandlers.add).toEqual(expect.any(Function));
mockHandlers.add('/outside-watch-root'); // early-returns inside processNewPhoto
expect(mockLimit).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(mockLimit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.any(Function));
await mockLimit.mock.results[0].value;
});
it('routes unlink events through the same limiter', async () => {
loadFileWatcher().startFileWatcher();
expect(mockHandlers.unlink).toEqual(expect.any(Function));
mockHandlers.unlink('/outside-watch-root'); // early-returns inside removePhoto
expect(mockLimit).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
await mockLimit.mock.results[0].value;
});
it('logs instead of rejecting when a queued handler throws', async () => {
loadFileWatcher().startFileWatcher();
const failure = new Error('boom');
mockLimit.mockImplementationOnce(() => Promise.reject(failure));
mockHandlers.add('/whatever');
await new Promise(process.nextTick);
expect(mockLogger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Error processing new photo:', failure);
});
});
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
/**
* The preview tier must not destroy what it is previewing.
*
* generatePreviewImage encoded JPEG unconditionally. JPEG has no alpha channel
* and no second frame, so a transparent PNG came back flattened onto a solid
* background and an animated GIF came back as its first frame — for every
* consumer of this tier, not just the lightbox: the slideshow (#1015), admin
* previews, and the face avatars that read it as a whole-frame rendition.
*
* Driven against real Sharp output, because the whole question is what is in
* the encoded bytes.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const os = require('os');
const sharp = require('sharp');
const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
/** A 2x2 GIF89a with two frames and a NETSCAPE loop block. */
const ANIMATED_GIF = Buffer.from([
0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38, 0x39, 0x61,
0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00,
0xF0, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
0x21, 0xFF, 0x0B, 0x4E, 0x45, 0x54, 0x53, 0x43, 0x41, 0x50, 0x45,
0x32, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x21, 0xF9, 0x04, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x2C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00,
0x02, 0x02, 0x44, 0x01, 0x00,
0x21, 0xF9, 0x04, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x2C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00,
0x02, 0x02, 0x4C, 0x01, 0x00,
0x3B,
]);
// No width-tier case here: the responsive `?w=` renditions (#1095) are
// main-only, so this branch has a single canonical preview per photo.
describe('generatePreviewImage encodes for the source (#1166 follow-up)', () => {
let storage; let storageRoot; let srcDir; let imageProcessor;
beforeAll(async () => {
storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-prevfmt-store-'));
srcDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-prevfmt-src-'));
storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
await storage.init();
storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
}, 30000);
afterAll(async () => {
storageModule.resetStorage();
await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
await fs.rm(srcDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
const outMeta = async (key) => sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key)).metadata();
it('keeps transparency, as WebP, for a PNG with alpha', async () => {
const src = path.join(srcDir, 'logo.png');
await sharp({
create: { width: 800, height: 600, channels: 4, background: { r: 0, g: 0, b: 0, alpha: 0 } },
}).png().toFile(src);
const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true });
expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_logo.webp');
const meta = await outMeta(key);
expect(meta.format).toBe('webp');
// The regression, stated directly: JPEG would have flattened this.
expect(meta.hasAlpha).toBe(true);
});
it('keeps every frame, as WebP, for an animated GIF', async () => {
const src = path.join(srcDir, 'wave.gif');
// Hand-assembled rather than produced by Sharp: writing a multi-page image
// needs pageHeight threaded through the pipeline, and a fixture that
// silently comes out single-page would make this test pass for the wrong
// reason. 2x2, two frames, black then white.
await fs.writeFile(src, ANIMATED_GIF);
// Precondition: the fixture really is animated.
expect((await sharp(src, { animated: true }).metadata()).pages).toBe(2);
const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true });
expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_wave.webp');
const meta = await sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key), { animated: true }).metadata();
expect(meta.format).toBe('webp');
// The regression, stated directly: JPEG kept only the first frame.
expect(meta.pages).toBe(2);
});
it('still writes plain JPEG for an ordinary photo', async () => {
// The common path must not pay for the two cases above: JPEG is smaller
// than WebP at the quality this tier uses, and every existing preview is
// one.
const src = path.join(srcDir, 'shot.jpg');
await sharp({ create: { width: 2400, height: 1600, channels: 3, background: { r: 90, g: 90, b: 90 } } })
.jpeg().toFile(src);
const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true });
expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_shot.jpg');
const meta = await outMeta(key);
expect(meta.format).toBe('jpeg');
// 2400x1600 capped at the 1920 long edge, aspect preserved — unchanged.
expect([meta.width, meta.height]).toEqual([1920, 1280]);
});
it('names the output for what it wrote, not for the source', async () => {
// A PNG source used to produce `preview_x.png` holding JPEG bytes. Harmless
// while the route hard-coded image/jpeg; wrong once the encoding varies,
// and the route now reads the extension.
const src = path.join(srcDir, 'opaque.png');
await sharp({ create: { width: 400, height: 400, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 2, b: 3 } } })
.png().toFile(src);
const key = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true });
expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_opaque.jpg');
expect((await outMeta(key)).format).toBe('jpeg');
});
it('returns null on an unreadable source instead of throwing', async () => {
const src = path.join(srcDir, 'not-an-image.jpg');
await fs.writeFile(src, 'plain text');
await expect(imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(src, { regenerate: true })).resolves.toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regeneration must not destroy a good thumbnail when the source is
* unreadable (#1129).
*
* The old code deleted the target BEFORE sharp opened the source, so a NAS
* mount that blipped mid-run left the previous rendition gone and the database
* still pointing at it. Across a bulk regenerate that is the whole gallery,
* and it is precisely the "worse than before you pressed it" outcome #1129 is
* about.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const os = require('os');
const sharp = require('sharp');
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
db: () => ({ where: () => ({ first: async () => null, update: async () => 1 }) }),
}));
const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
describe('generateThumbnail — regenerate is non-destructive (#1129)', () => {
let storage; let root; let imageProcessor; let srcDir;
beforeAll(async () => {
root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-store-'));
srcDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-src-'));
storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root });
await storage.init();
storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
}, 30000);
afterAll(async () => {
storageModule.resetStorage();
await fs.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
await fs.rm(srcDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
async function writeSource(name, size = 400) {
const p = path.join(srcDir, name);
await sharp({ create: { width: size, height: size, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 2, b: 3 } } })
.jpeg().toFile(p);
return p;
}
it('keeps the existing thumbnail when the source cannot be read', async () => {
const src = await writeSource('present.jpg');
const key = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(src, { regenerate: true });
expect(key).toBeTruthy();
expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
const before = await storage.get(key).then((s) => new Promise((res) => {
const c = []; s.on('data', (d) => c.push(d)); s.on('end', () => res(Buffer.concat(c)));
}));
// The mount goes away between runs.
await fs.unlink(src);
const second = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(src, { regenerate: true })
.catch(() => null);
expect(second).toBeFalsy();
// The old rendition is still there and still serves. Previously it had
// been deleted before sharp ever looked at the source.
expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
const after = await storage.get(key).then((s) => new Promise((res) => {
const c = []; s.on('data', (d) => c.push(d)); s.on('end', () => res(Buffer.concat(c)));
}));
expect(after.equals(before)).toBe(true);
});
it('still replaces the thumbnail when the source IS readable', async () => {
const src = await writeSource('replaceme.jpg', 400);
const key = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(src, { regenerate: true });
const firstSize = (await storage.stat(key)).size;
// Same key, different source content — the atomic rename in put() is what
// makes the pre-delete unnecessary.
await fs.rm(src);
await sharp({ create: { width: 400, height: 400, channels: 3, background: { r: 250, g: 40, b: 9 } } })
.jpeg().toFile(src);
const again = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(src, { regenerate: true });
expect(again).toBe(key);
expect((await storage.stat(key)).size).not.toBe(firstSize);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
/**
* Locks the process-wide Sharp memory guards. The file-watcher concurrency
* bound (FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY) assumes these caps stay in place — they
* limit libvips threads/cache WITHIN one operation while p-limit bounds the
* number of parallel pipelines. From the filpgame fork (426ca491).
*/
const mockSharp = jest.fn();
mockSharp.cache = jest.fn();
mockSharp.concurrency = jest.fn();
jest.mock('sharp', () => mockSharp);
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
error: jest.fn(),
warn: jest.fn(),
info: jest.fn(),
debug: jest.fn(),
}));
describe('imageProcessor Sharp configuration', () => {
it('disables the Sharp cache and caps libvips concurrency', () => {
jest.isolateModules(() => {
require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
});
expect(mockSharp.cache).toHaveBeenCalledWith(false);
expect(mockSharp.concurrency).toHaveBeenCalledWith(2);
});
});
@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
/**
* EXIF orientation in the gallery-facing generators (#1185).
*
* sharp decodes the pixels as stored, not as displayed. A photo whose
* Orientation tag is not 1 — routine for portrait shots on bodies that tag
* rather than rotate the sensor data — therefore resizes from the raw frame
* and comes out sideways. The generators then call `.withMetadata(false)`,
* which strips the tag from the output, so the browser has no hint left to
* correct it either: nothing downstream can recover it.
*
* The download path (`resizeToBox`) always got this right. These three did
* not, which is why the same photo looked correct on download and rotated in
* the gallery.
*
* Every assertion here fails on the unfixed generators.
*/
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const sharp = require('sharp');
// imageProcessor reads its thumbnail settings from app_settings, so without a
// db the require() alone hangs the run. Same shape the other generator tests
// use (ensureHeroImage.external.test.js).
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
const api = (table) => {
if (table === 'app_settings') {
return { where: () => ({ whereIn: () => [], first: async () => null }), whereIn: async () => [] };
}
if (table === 'events') return { where: () => ({ first: async () => null }) };
if (table === 'photos') return { where: () => ({ update: async () => 1, first: async () => null }) };
return { where: () => ({ first: async () => null }) };
};
return { db: api };
});
const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
describe('EXIF orientation in thumbnails, heroes and previews (#1185)', () => {
let tmpDir;
let imageProcessor;
let landscapeTaggedPortrait;
// 400x200 as stored, Orientation 6 (90° CW) — so it DISPLAYS as 200x400.
// This is exactly the shape the reporter's Sony bodies produce: the sensor
// data is landscape and the tag carries the rotation.
const W = 400;
const H = 200;
let storageRoot;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-orient-'));
storageRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
await fs.mkdir(storageRoot, { recursive: true });
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = storageRoot;
const storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
await storage.init();
storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
landscapeTaggedPortrait = path.join(tmpDir, 'portrait-tagged.jpg');
await sharp({
create: { width: W, height: H, channels: 3, background: { r: 120, g: 80, b: 40 } },
})
.withMetadata({ orientation: 6 })
.jpeg()
.toFile(landscapeTaggedPortrait);
delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
}, 60000);
afterAll(async () => {
await fs.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
test('the fixture really is stored landscape with a rotation tag', async () => {
const m = await sharp(landscapeTaggedPortrait).metadata();
expect(m.width).toBe(W);
expect(m.height).toBe(H);
expect(m.orientation).toBe(6);
});
test('orientedDimensions reports what a viewer sees, not what is stored', async () => {
const m = await sharp(landscapeTaggedPortrait).metadata();
// Swapped: this is what the grid needs to size a tile, and what the
// database should hold.
expect(imageProcessor.orientedDimensions(m)).toEqual({ width: H, height: W });
});
test('orientedDimensions leaves an untagged image alone', async () => {
const plain = path.join(tmpDir, 'plain.jpg');
await sharp({ create: { width: W, height: H, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 2, b: 3 } } })
.jpeg().toFile(plain);
const m = await sharp(plain).metadata();
expect(imageProcessor.orientedDimensions(m)).toEqual({ width: W, height: H });
});
test('orientedDimensions survives metadata it cannot use', () => {
expect(imageProcessor.orientedDimensions(null)).toEqual({ width: null, height: null });
expect(imageProcessor.orientedDimensions({})).toEqual({ width: null, height: null });
});
test('the thumbnail comes out portrait, not sideways', async () => {
const rel = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(landscapeTaggedPortrait, {
outputBasename: 'orient-thumb.jpg',
regenerate: true,
});
expect(rel).toBeTruthy();
const out = await sharp(path.join(storageRoot, rel)).metadata();
// Unfixed, this came back wider than tall — the raw frame, resized.
expect(out.height).toBeGreaterThan(out.width);
});
test('the preview tier comes out portrait too', async () => {
const rel = await imageProcessor.generatePreviewImage(landscapeTaggedPortrait, {
outputBasename: 'orient-preview.jpg',
});
expect(rel).toBeTruthy();
const out = await sharp(path.join(storageRoot, rel)).metadata();
expect(out.height).toBeGreaterThan(out.width);
});
test('the watermarked rendition is oriented too', async () => {
// gallery.js serves photos.watermark_path ahead of the original when
// branding watermarking is on, so this is the rendition a guest actually
// sees — and it went through its own sharp pipeline that nobody had
// rotated.
const watermarkService = require('../../src/services/watermarkService');
const buf = await watermarkService.applyWatermark(landscapeTaggedPortrait, {
enabled: true, position: 'bottom-right', opacity: 50, size: 15,
// companyName, not text — the SVG branch reads this one, and without it
// the service falls through without compositing anything.
companyName: 'PicPeak',
});
expect(Buffer.isBuffer(buf)).toBe(true);
const out = await sharp(buf).metadata();
// 400x200 stored, tagged 6 — so the watermarked output must be portrait.
expect(out.height).toBeGreaterThan(out.width);
});
test('the orientation tag is gone from the output, so nothing double-rotates', async () => {
// The pixels are corrected now, so a surviving tag would make a viewer
// rotate an already-rotated image. withMetadata(false) strips it; this
// pins that the two changes agree.
const rel = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(landscapeTaggedPortrait, {
outputBasename: 'orient-thumb-tag.jpg',
regenerate: true,
});
const out = await sharp(path.join(storageRoot, rel)).metadata();
expect(out.orientation === undefined || out.orientation === 1).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the RAW/DNG handling helpers (#821). The actual exiftool
* extraction can only be exercised in the built image (exiftool isn't a dev
* dependency), so these cover the gating logic: which files are treated as RAW,
* and that ordinary images pass through untouched (zero cost / no extraction).
*/
const path = require('path');
const { isRawFilename, withProcessableImage, RAW_EXTENSIONS } = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
describe('isRawFilename', () => {
it('recognises common RAW / DNG extensions', () => {
for (const ext of ['dng', 'cr2', 'cr3', 'nef', 'arw', 'raf', 'rw2', 'orf']) {
expect(isRawFilename(`IMG_1234.${ext}`)).toBe(true);
expect(isRawFilename(`IMG_1234.${ext.toUpperCase()}`)).toBe(true); // case-insensitive
}
});
it('does not treat ordinary images/videos as RAW', () => {
for (const name of ['photo.jpg', 'photo.jpeg', 'photo.png', 'photo.webp', 'clip.mp4', 'clip.mov', 'photo.heic']) {
expect(isRawFilename(name)).toBe(false);
}
});
it('is null/empty safe', () => {
expect(isRawFilename(null)).toBe(false);
expect(isRawFilename('')).toBe(false);
expect(isRawFilename('noextension')).toBe(false);
});
it('RAW_EXTENSIONS includes dng (Apple ProRAW)', () => {
expect(RAW_EXTENSIONS.has('dng')).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('withProcessableImage', () => {
it('passes ordinary images through with no extraction and a no-op cleanup', async () => {
const localPath = '/tmp/whatever/photo.jpg';
const proc = await withProcessableImage(localPath, 'photo.jpg');
expect(proc.path).toBe(localPath); // unchanged — sharp reads it directly
expect(proc.outputBasename).toBeUndefined(); // generators keep their default naming
await expect(Promise.resolve(proc.cleanup())).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it('routes RAW files to extraction (which fails cleanly without exiftool/preview)', async () => {
// In the dev sandbox exiftool isn't installed, so extraction throws — the
// caller turns that into a normal processing failure. In the built image
// (exiftool present) this instead returns the embedded JPEG preview.
await expect(withProcessableImage('/tmp/whatever/IMG_1234.dng', 'IMG_1234.dng')).rejects.toThrow();
});
});
@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
/**
* "Storage used" has to mean storage used (#1164).
*
* The tile summed photos.size_bytes, so on a reference-mode install it
* reported the size of files sitting on a NAS — the reporter's read ~80 GB
* against 21 GB of real local usage — while omitting everything PicPeak does
* write locally, including an 11.8 GB download-cache zip.
*
* These pin the measurement against a real directory tree, since the whole
* point is counting bytes that are actually there.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const {
measureLocalStorageUsage,
resetLocalStorageUsageCache,
} = require('../../src/services/localStorageUsage');
describe('localStorageUsage (#1164)', () => {
let root;
const write = async (rel, bytes) => {
const full = path.join(root, rel);
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
await fs.promises.writeFile(full, Buffer.alloc(bytes));
};
beforeEach(async () => {
root = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-usage-'));
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = root;
delete process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT;
jest.resetModules();
resetLocalStorageUsageCache();
});
afterEach(async () => {
await fs.promises.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
delete process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
delete process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT;
resetLocalStorageUsageCache();
});
it('counts every byte under the storage root', async () => {
await write(path.join('events', 'active', 'wed', 'individual', 'a.jpg'), 1000);
await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'a.jpg'), 100);
await write(path.join('previews', 'a.jpg'), 300);
const usage = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
expect(usage.total).toBe(1400);
expect(usage.files).toBe(3);
});
it('breaks the total down by what the bytes are', async () => {
// The specific complaint: the derived artefacts PicPeak writes were
// invisible, so "what is filling my disk" had no answer in the UI.
await write(path.join('events', 'active', 'wed', 'individual', 'a.jpg'), 1000);
await write(path.join('events', 'archived', 'old.zip'), 5000);
await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'a.jpg'), 100);
await write(path.join('previews', 'a.jpg'), 300);
await write(path.join('heroes', 'a.jpg'), 200);
await write(path.join('watermarks', 'a.jpg'), 700);
await write(path.join('uploads', 'logo.png'), 50);
const { breakdown } = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
expect(breakdown).toMatchObject({
originals: 1000,
archives: 5000,
thumbnails: 100,
previews: 300,
heroes: 200,
watermarks: 700,
uploads: 50,
});
});
it('files the download cache separately from the originals it sits among', async () => {
// `.download-cache` lives INSIDE the event directory, so the naive rule
// files an 11.8 GB zip as photography. It is the one bucket that is pure
// disposable cache and the one an admin most needs to see.
await write(path.join('events', 'active', 'wed', 'individual', 'a.jpg'), 1000);
await write(path.join('events', 'active', 'wed', '.download-cache', 'all.zip'), 9000);
const { breakdown, total } = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
expect(breakdown.downloadCache).toBe(9000);
expect(breakdown.originals).toBe(1000);
expect(total).toBe(10000);
});
it('counts orphans no database row knows about', async () => {
// A deleted event's leftovers and an interrupted import's thumbnails are
// real bytes on a real disk. Summing DB columns would miss them, which is
// half of why this walks instead.
await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'ext999_gone.jpg'), 777);
expect((await measureLocalStorageUsage()).total).toBe(777);
});
it('reports zero on a fresh install rather than failing', async () => {
const usage = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
expect(usage.total).toBe(0);
expect(usage.partial).toBe(false);
});
it('survives a storage root that does not exist', async () => {
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(root, 'nope');
resetLocalStorageUsageCache();
const usage = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
// ENOENT on the root is a fresh/misconfigured install, not a partial read.
expect(usage.total).toBe(0);
expect(usage.partial).toBe(false);
});
it('does not walk the media share bind-mounted under the storage root', async () => {
// The compose default puts EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT at <storage>/external-media,
// where the NAS is bind-mounted — a plain directory, not a symlink. Walking
// it would put every referenced original back into a figure that exists to
// leave them out, which is the over-count this measurement replaces.
await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'a.jpg'), 100);
await write(path.join('external-media', 'nas', 'huge.jpg'), 50000);
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = path.join(root, 'external-media');
jest.resetModules();
const svc = require('../../src/services/localStorageUsage');
svc.resetLocalStorageUsageCache();
const usage = await svc.measureLocalStorageUsage();
expect(usage.total).toBe(100);
expect(usage.excludedExternalRoot).toBe(path.join(root, 'external-media'));
});
it('still counts a directory that merely looks like the media share', async () => {
// Only the CONFIGURED root is skipped. An install whose media lives
// elsewhere keeps whatever is in this directory in the total, because
// those really are local bytes.
await write(path.join('external-media', 'leftover.jpg'), 700);
// The production shape: the share is mounted well outside the storage root.
const elsewhere = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-nas-elsewhere-'));
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = elsewhere;
jest.resetModules();
const svc = require('../../src/services/localStorageUsage');
svc.resetLocalStorageUsageCache();
const usage = await svc.measureLocalStorageUsage();
expect(usage.total).toBe(700);
expect(usage.excludedExternalRoot).toBeNull();
await fs.promises.rm(elsewhere, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('shares one walk between concurrent cold-cache callers', async () => {
// /dashboard/stats and /storage/info are routinely requested together, and
// the sidebar adds a third. Each starting its own full stat-per-file walk
// multiplies the cost on exactly the large libraries where it hurts.
await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'a.jpg'), 100);
const readdir = jest.spyOn(fs.promises, 'readdir');
const [a, b, c] = await Promise.all([
measureLocalStorageUsage(),
measureLocalStorageUsage(),
measureLocalStorageUsage(),
]);
expect([a.total, b.total, c.total]).toEqual([100, 100, 100]);
// One walk: the storage root plus its one subdirectory.
expect(readdir).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
readdir.mockRestore();
});
it('caches, and honours force', async () => {
await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'a.jpg'), 100);
expect((await measureLocalStorageUsage()).total).toBe(100);
await write(path.join('thumbnails', 'b.jpg'), 400);
// One stat per file is not free; the dashboard polls.
expect((await measureLocalStorageUsage()).total).toBe(100);
expect((await measureLocalStorageUsage({ force: true })).total).toBe(500);
});
it('does not follow a symlink out of the storage root', async () => {
// A link into EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT would add the NAS back into the local
// total — reinstating the exact confusion this replaces.
const outside = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-nas-'));
await fs.promises.writeFile(path.join(outside, 'huge.jpg'), Buffer.alloc(50000));
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(root, 'events'), { recursive: true });
await fs.promises.symlink(outside, path.join(root, 'events', 'nas'), 'dir');
const usage = await measureLocalStorageUsage();
expect(usage.total).toBe(0);
await fs.promises.rm(outside, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
/**
* Regression tests for logActivity calls inside transactions (#850 review
* find). createContract / updateContract / createStorno / reissueInvoice
* called logActivity() (and contract paths also adminActor()) from inside
* a knex transaction WITHOUT the trx executor. On single-connection SQLite
* the audit insert then waits on a second pool connection while the trx
* holds the only one — a 60s acquire-timeout stall per call, after which
* logActivity's catch swallows the failure and the audit row is silently
* lost. Postgres was unaffected.
*
* The observable fix: the activity_logs rows now exist, and the calls
* complete without waiting on the pool. The shrunken acquire timeout
* below makes any reintroduced deadlock fail the test quickly instead
* of appearing to pass after a long stall.
*/
const path = require('path');
const {
bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole,
} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
let db;
let cleanup;
let tmpDir;
let adminId;
let customerId;
let contractService;
let invoiceService;
const prevCwd = process.cwd();
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
// Business-doc artifacts land under process.cwd()/storage — isolate.
process.chdir(tmpDir);
// A reintroduced in-trx pool grab should fail fast (2s), not stall 60s.
db.client.pool.acquireTimeoutMillis = 2000;
// node-sqlite3 detects Date bindings via the NATIVE realm's Date —
// under jest's vm sandbox that check fails and Dates stringify to
// "[object Object]". Normalize to ISO strings on the client prototype
// (transaction clients are Object.create()d from it). Same shim as
// crmMintPaths.test.js.
const clientProto = Object.getPrototypeOf(db.client);
const origQuery = clientProto._query;
clientProto._query = function patchedQuery(connection, obj) {
if (obj && Array.isArray(obj.bindings)) {
obj.bindings = obj.bindings.map(
(b) => (b && typeof b === 'object' && typeof b.toISOString === 'function' ? b.toISOString() : b),
);
}
return origQuery.call(this, connection, obj);
};
({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
contractService = require('../../src/services/contractService');
invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
process.chdir(prevCwd);
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
test('createContract persists the contract_created audit row (was silently lost on SQLite)', async () => {
const contractId = await contractService.createContract({
customerAccountId: customerId,
title: 'Audit-Trail-Vertrag',
}, adminId);
const row = await db('activity_logs')
.where({ activity_type: 'contract_created' })
.orderBy('id', 'desc')
.first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(JSON.parse(row.metadata).contractId).toBe(contractId);
expect(row.actor_type).toBe('admin');
});
test('updateContract persists the contract_updated audit row', async () => {
const contractId = await contractService.createContract({
customerAccountId: customerId,
title: 'Vorher',
}, adminId);
await contractService.updateContract(contractId, { title: 'Nachher' }, adminId);
const row = await db('activity_logs')
.where({ activity_type: 'contract_updated' })
.orderBy('id', 'desc')
.first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(JSON.parse(row.metadata).contractId).toBe(contractId);
});
test('cancelInvoice (Storno mint) persists the invoice_cancelled_via_storno audit row', async () => {
const { invoiceIds } = await invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: customerId,
currency: 'CHF',
vatRate: 0,
lineItems: [
{ position: 1, quantity: 1, description: 'Coverage', unit_price_minor: 100000, discount_percent: 0 },
],
}, adminId);
const id = invoiceIds[0];
await db('invoices').where({ id }).update({ status: 'sent', sent_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date() });
const result = await invoiceService.cancelInvoice(id, adminId);
expect(result.cancelled).toBe(true);
const row = await db('activity_logs')
.where({ activity_type: 'invoice_cancelled_via_storno' })
.orderBy('id', 'desc')
.first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
const meta = JSON.parse(row.metadata);
expect(meta.invoiceId).toBe(id);
expect(meta.stornoId).toBe(result.stornoId);
});
test('reissueInvoice completes on SQLite and persists the invoice_reissued audit row', async () => {
const { invoiceIds } = await invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: customerId,
currency: 'CHF',
vatRate: 0,
lineItems: [
{ position: 1, quantity: 1, description: 'Album', unit_price_minor: 50000, discount_percent: 0 },
],
}, adminId);
const id = invoiceIds[0];
await db('invoices').where({ id }).update({ status: 'sent', sent_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date() });
// Pre-fix this stalled inside the wrapping transaction (createInvoice's
// global-connection reads vs. the single-connection pool) and aborted
// before the replacement existed — with the Storno already committed.
const result = await invoiceService.reissueInvoice(id, adminId);
expect(result.id).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(result.replaces).toBe(id);
const replacement = await db('invoices').where({ id: result.id }).first();
expect(replacement.replaces_invoice_id).toBe(id);
const row = await db('activity_logs')
.where({ activity_type: 'invoice_reissued' })
.orderBy('id', 'desc')
.first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(JSON.parse(row.metadata).newInvoiceId).toBe(result.id);
});
void path; // referenced for parity with sibling suites
@@ -234,3 +234,66 @@ describe('renderInvoiceToBuffer — Storno branch', () => {
expect(stornoBuf.length).toBeLessThan(invoiceBuf.length);
});
});
// VAT free-text note (#794) + multi-page page-number placement. Same
// constraint as the Storno tests: PDFKit Flate-compresses content streams,
// so we can't grep the note text — but the page-TREE objects are NOT
// compressed, so `/Type /Page` (not `/Pages`) is countable to assert
// pagination, and a byte-size delta proves the note actually rendered.
describe('renderInvoiceToBuffer — VAT note + multi-page footer (#794)', () => {
function baseCtx(overrides = {}) {
return {
locale: 'de', currency: 'CHF',
issuer: { companyName: 'AcmeCo' },
recipient: {
companyName: 'KundenCo', addressLine1: 'Strasse 1',
city: 'Bern', postalCode: '3000',
},
lineItems: [{
quantity: 1, description: 'Photo session',
unitPriceMinor: 30000, lineTotalMinor: 30000,
parentLineItemId: null, parentPosition: null,
}],
totals: {
netAmountMinor: 30000, vatRate: 0, vatAmountMinor: 0,
shippingAmountMinor: 0, totalAmountMinor: 30000,
},
doc: { invoiceNumber: 'R-2026-0042', issueDate: '2026-04-12' },
qrFormat: 'none',
paymentTerm: { netDays: 30 },
...overrides,
};
}
const pageCount = (buf) => (buf.toString('latin1').match(/\/Type\s*\/Page(?![s])/g) || []).length;
const VAT_NOTE = 'Gemäß § 6 Abs. 1 Z 27 UStG 1994 wird keine Umsatzsteuer berechnet (Kleinunternehmer).';
it('renders the VAT note on a single-page invoice (adds content, valid PDF)', async () => {
const withNote = await pdfService.renderInvoiceToBuffer(baseCtx({ vatNote: VAT_NOTE }));
const without = await pdfService.renderInvoiceToBuffer(baseCtx());
expect(withNote.slice(0, 4).toString('ascii')).toBe('%PDF');
expect(pageCount(withNote)).toBe(1);
expect(withNote.length).toBeGreaterThan(without.length);
});
it('paginates a long invoice (with the note) across multiple pages without a stray blank page', async () => {
const manyItems = Array.from({ length: 60 }, (_, i) => ({
quantity: 1, description: `Position ${i + 1} — fotografische Leistung`,
unitPriceMinor: 3225, lineTotalMinor: 3225,
parentLineItemId: null, parentPosition: null,
}));
const buf = await pdfService.renderInvoiceToBuffer(baseCtx({
lineItems: manyItems,
totals: {
netAmountMinor: 193500, vatRate: 0, vatAmountMinor: 0,
shippingAmountMinor: 0, totalAmountMinor: 193500,
},
vatNote: VAT_NOTE,
}));
expect(buf.slice(0, 4).toString('ascii')).toBe('%PDF');
const pages = pageCount(buf);
expect(pages).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
// 60 short rows fit in 23 pages; a stray blank page (the old margin
// bug) or a runaway loop would blow past this.
expect(pages).toBeLessThanOrEqual(3);
});
});
@@ -71,24 +71,24 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => {
const mockExtractCaptureDate = jest.fn();
return {
generateThumbnail: mockGenerateThumbnail,
generateVideoPlaceholder: jest.fn(async (filename) => `thumbnails/thumb_${filename.replace(/\.[^.]+$/, '')}.jpg`),
extractCaptureDate: mockExtractCaptureDate,
// processPhoto routes stored dimensions through this to get the displayed
// ones (#1185). Mirrored rather than requireActual'd, because pulling the
// real module in here would drag its database dependency into the mock
// factory. Kept faithful to imageProcessor.orientedDimensions.
orientedDimensions: jest.fn((m) => {
if (!m || !m.width || !m.height) return { width: null, height: null };
const swap = m.orientation >= 5 && m.orientation <= 8;
return { width: swap ? m.height : m.width, height: swap ? m.width : m.height };
}),
withLocalCopy: jest.fn(async (key, fn) =>
fn(`/tmp/local-copy-${require('path').basename(key)}`)
),
// Pass-through for ordinary (non-RAW) images: returns the path unchanged
// with a no-op cleanup, matching the real helper's behaviour for jpg/png.
withProcessableImage: jest.fn(async (localPath) => ({
path: localPath,
outputBasename: undefined,
cleanup: () => {},
})),
};
});
jest.mock('../../src/services/videoProcessor', () => ({
processUploadedVideo: jest.fn(),
extractVideoMetadata: jest.fn(),
isVideoMimeType: (mime) => typeof mime === 'string' && mime.startsWith('video/'),
}));
@@ -214,6 +214,44 @@ describe('photoProcessor.processPhoto', () => {
expect(watermarkService.generateForPhoto).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('keeps a video complete with a placeholder thumbnail when ffmpeg fails', async () => {
dbModule.__setPhoto({
id: 203,
event_id: 9,
filename: 'drone-clip.mp4',
original_filename: 'drone.mp4',
mime_type: 'video/mp4',
media_type: 'video',
size_bytes: 12345,
captured_at: null,
});
dbModule.__setEvent({ id: 9, slug: 'wedding', event_name: 'Wedding' });
// ffmpeg thumbnail pipeline throws (e.g. unsupported pixel format)…
videoProcessor.processUploadedVideo.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('ffmpeg exited with code 1'));
// …but a plain probe still works.
videoProcessor.extractVideoMetadata.mockResolvedValueOnce({
duration: 42,
videoCodec: 'hevc',
audioCodec: 'aac',
width: 3840,
height: 2160,
});
const { processPhoto } = require('../../src/services/photoProcessor');
await processPhoto(203);
const finalUpdate = dbModule.__recorded().updateCalls.pop();
// The row must complete — 'failed' rows are invisible to guests.
expect(finalUpdate.data.processing_status).toBe('complete');
// Placeholder instead of NULL: a completed video without thumbnail would
// make the grid fetch the original video file for the tile (#845 review).
expect(finalUpdate.data.thumbnail_path).toBe('thumbnails/thumb_drone-clip.jpg');
expect(imageProcessor.generateVideoPlaceholder).toHaveBeenCalledWith('drone-clip.mp4');
expect(finalUpdate.data.duration).toBe(42);
expect(finalUpdate.data.video_codec).toBe('hevc');
});
it('throws when the photo row no longer exists', async () => {
dbModule.__setPhoto(null);
dbModule.__setEvent({ id: 1 });
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@ const path = require('path');
const mockPath = path;
jest.mock('../../src/services/externalMediaService', () => ({
resolveExternalPhotoPath: jest.fn((photo) => mockPath.join('/mock/external', photo.external_relpath || '')),
resolveExternalPath: jest.fn((event, relPath) => mockPath.join('/mock/external', event.external_path || '', relPath || '')),
}));
const { resolveExternalPhotoPath } = require('../../src/services/externalMediaService');
const { resolveExternalPath } = require('../../src/services/externalMediaService');
const { resolvePhotoFilePath } = require('../../src/services/photoResolver');
describe('resolvePhotoFilePath', () => {
@@ -46,34 +46,24 @@ describe('resolvePhotoFilePath', () => {
expect(result).toBe(path.join(backendRoot, 'storage', 'events/active', 'wedding-party', 'hero.jpg'));
});
it('resolves an external photo from the media root, ignoring the event', () => {
it('delegates external photos to external media resolver', () => {
const event = { slug: 'fashion-show', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'picsum-demo' };
const photo = { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'picsum-demo/individual/look-01.jpg' };
const photo = { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'individual/look-01.jpg' };
const result = resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo);
expect(resolveExternalPhotoPath).toHaveBeenCalledWith(photo);
expect(resolveExternalPath).toHaveBeenCalledWith(event, 'individual/look-01.jpg');
expect(result).toBe(path.join('/mock/external', 'picsum-demo', 'individual', 'look-01.jpg'));
});
it('does not move a photo when the event is repointed at another folder (#1163)', () => {
// The regression. Both events below hold the SAME row; only
// events.external_path differs, which is what a second import overwrites.
const photo = { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'Trip/Leknes/_DSC0818.JPG' };
const before = { slug: 'trip', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'Trip' };
const after = { slug: 'trip', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'Trip/Subfolder' };
it('deduplicates folder names when event external path already ends with segment', () => {
const event = { slug: 'fashion-show', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'picsum-demo/individual' };
const photo = { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'individual/look-02.jpg' };
expect(resolvePhotoFilePath(before, photo)).toBe(resolvePhotoFilePath(after, photo));
});
const result = resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo);
it('keeps a first segment that repeats the base path', () => {
// The old duplicate-leaf-segment normalisation stripped this, which is
// corruption once the relpath is root-relative: `Trip/Trip/x.jpg` is a real
// layout, and the file is not at `Trip/x.jpg`.
const event = { slug: 'trip', source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'Trip' };
const photo = { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'Trip/Trip/x.jpg' };
expect(resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo)).toBe(path.join('/mock/external', 'Trip', 'Trip', 'x.jpg'));
expect(resolveExternalPath).toHaveBeenCalledWith(event, 'look-02.jpg');
expect(result).toBe(path.join('/mock/external', 'picsum-demo/individual', 'look-02.jpg'));
});
it('falls back to managed storage when external metadata is missing', () => {
@@ -82,7 +72,7 @@ describe('resolvePhotoFilePath', () => {
const result = resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo);
expect(resolveExternalPhotoPath).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(resolveExternalPath).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(result).toBe(path.join(backendRoot, 'storage', 'events/active', 'fashion-show', 'new-upload.jpg'));
});
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
/**
* Tests for preserveOperatorRole — re-establishing the operator's authorization
* after a restore replaces the roles / permissions / role_permissions tables.
* Real in-memory SQLite so the joins and inserts behave as in production.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
let db;
let svc;
beforeEach(async () => {
db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
await db.schema.createTable('roles', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('name').notNullable().unique();
t.string('display_name');
t.integer('priority').defaultTo(0);
t.boolean('is_system').defaultTo(false);
});
await db.schema.createTable('permissions', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('name').notNullable().unique();
t.string('display_name');
t.string('category');
});
await db.schema.createTable('role_permissions', (t) => {
t.integer('role_id').notNullable();
t.integer('permission_id').notNullable();
t.primary(['role_id', 'permission_id']);
});
await db.schema.createTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('email');
t.integer('role_id');
});
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'sqlite3' }));
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db }));
svc = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService');
});
afterEach(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
await db.destroy();
});
test('captureOperatorRole returns the role + its permission names', async () => {
await db('roles').insert({ id: 1, name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'Super Admin', priority: 100 });
await db('permissions').insert([
{ id: 1, name: 'events.create', display_name: 'Create', category: 'events' },
{ id: 2, name: 'users.manage', display_name: 'Manage', category: 'users' },
]);
await db('role_permissions').insert([{ role_id: 1, permission_id: 1 }, { role_id: 1, permission_id: 2 }]);
const snap = await svc.captureOperatorRole(1);
expect(snap.role.name).toBe('super_admin');
expect(snap.permissions.sort()).toEqual(['events.create', 'users.manage']);
});
test('preserveOperatorRole binds to a restored role of the same NAME (ids remapped)', async () => {
const snapshot = { role: { name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'Super Admin', priority: 100, is_system: true }, permissions: ['events.create'] };
// Simulate post-restore RBAC where super_admin now has a DIFFERENT id.
await db('roles').insert({ id: 7, name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'Super Admin (restored)', priority: 100 });
await db('admin_users').insert({ id: 3, email: 'op@example.com', role_id: null });
await db.transaction((trx) => svc.preserveOperatorRole(trx, 3, snapshot));
const op = await db('admin_users').where({ id: 3 }).first();
expect(op.role_id).toBe(7); // bound to restored super_admin by name
expect(await db('roles').count({ c: '*' }).first()).toEqual({ c: 1 }); // no duplicate role created
});
test('preserveOperatorRole re-creates the role + grants when the backup omits it', async () => {
const snapshot = {
role: { name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'Super Admin', priority: 100, is_system: true },
permissions: ['events.create', 'users.manage', 'gone.permission'],
};
// Post-restore RBAC WITHOUT super_admin; only some permissions exist.
await db('roles').insert({ id: 2, name: 'viewer', display_name: 'Viewer', priority: 10 });
await db('permissions').insert([
{ id: 5, name: 'events.create', display_name: 'Create', category: 'events' },
{ id: 6, name: 'users.manage', display_name: 'Manage', category: 'users' },
]);
await db('admin_users').insert({ id: 3, email: 'op@example.com', role_id: null });
await db.transaction((trx) => svc.preserveOperatorRole(trx, 3, snapshot));
const recreated = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
expect(recreated).toBeTruthy(); // role re-created, not left missing
expect(recreated.id).toBe(3); // max(2)+1
const op = await db('admin_users').where({ id: 3 }).first();
expect(op.role_id).toBe(recreated.id); // operator not locked out / downgraded
const grants = await db('role_permissions').where({ role_id: recreated.id }).pluck('permission_id');
expect(grants.sort()).toEqual([5, 6]); // existing perms re-granted; 'gone.permission' skipped
});
test('preserveOperatorRole no-ops when the operator had no role', async () => {
await db('admin_users').insert({ id: 3, email: 'op@example.com', role_id: null });
await db.transaction((trx) => svc.preserveOperatorRole(trx, 3, null));
const op = await db('admin_users').where({ id: 3 }).first();
expect(op.role_id).toBeNull();
});
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
/**
* renderProofName — the configurable Beleg proof-attachment filename template.
* Pure function; no DB. Covers token substitution, the multi-proof index
* fallback, padding, and filesystem-safe sanitisation.
*/
const { renderProofName } = require('../../src/services/invoice/rebillProofs');
describe('renderProofName', () => {
const base = { invoiceNumber: 'R-2026-0042', supplierName: 'ACME AG', seq: 1, hasMulti: false, issueDate: '2026-08-03' };
it('defaults to Beleg-<invoice>.pdf', () => {
expect(renderProofName('Beleg-{INVOICE}', base)).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042.pdf');
expect(renderProofName('', base)).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042.pdf');
expect(renderProofName(null, base)).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042.pdf');
});
it('substitutes every token incl. padded SEQ and date parts', () => {
expect(renderProofName('{SUPPLIER}-{INVOICE}-{YEAR}{MONTH}-{SEQ:03d}', { ...base, seq: 7 }))
.toBe('ACME-AG-R-2026-0042-202608-007.pdf');
});
it('appends an index for multiple proofs only when the template has no {SEQ}', () => {
// No {SEQ} + multi → auto-suffixed with the index.
expect(renderProofName('Beleg-{INVOICE}', { ...base, seq: 2, hasMulti: true })).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042-2.pdf');
// Single proof → no suffix.
expect(renderProofName('Beleg-{INVOICE}', { ...base, seq: 1, hasMulti: false })).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042.pdf');
// Explicit {SEQ} → no double index even when multi.
expect(renderProofName('Beleg-{INVOICE}-{SEQ}', { ...base, seq: 2, hasMulti: true })).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042-2.pdf');
});
it('sanitises unsafe characters and slashes, and always ends in a single .pdf', () => {
expect(renderProofName('Beleg {INVOICE}', { ...base, invoiceNumber: '2026/0042' })).toBe('Beleg-2026-0042.pdf');
// Author-supplied extension is stripped and re-added (no double .pdf).
expect(renderProofName('{INVOICE}.pdf', base)).toBe('R-2026-0042.pdf');
// Falls back to 'Beleg' if the template renders empty after sanitising.
expect(renderProofName('{SUPPLIER}', { ...base, supplierName: '///' })).toBe('Beleg.pdf');
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
/**
* Ownership guards for PicTransfer (#998 review, tracked as #1005).
*
* A transfer bundles ORIGINAL files and hands them out over an unauthenticated
* token URL, so the two guards below are the only thing standing between a
* scoped admin and every other admin's originals:
*
* 1. filterOwnedPhotoIds — a scoped admin may only bundle photos from events
* they own. Without it, arbitrary photo ids in the create/add-files body
* became a public download link to anyone's originals.
* 2. listTransfers scoping + payload stripping — the list used to be unscoped
* AND to carry each row's download token, so any admin holding events.view
* could read another's token and fetch their originals without creating
* anything at all.
*
* Both were correct when merged. These tests exist so they stay that way: an
* untested guard does not survive refactoring, which #999 demonstrated when the
* same attribution fix landed in one component and was left stale in another.
* Each case below fails against the pre-fix behaviour, not merely passes
* against the current code.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-transferown-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'transferown-test-secret';
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('PicTransfer ownership guards (#998)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let transferService;
let editorA; let editorB; let superAdmin;
let eventA; let eventB; let eventOwnerless;
let photoA; let photoB; let photoOwnerless;
const asEditor = (id) => ({ id, roleName: 'editor' });
const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username, email: `${username}@example.com`,
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(), updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy) => {
const r = await db('events').insert({
slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com', password_hash: 'x',
share_token: `t-${slug}`, share_link: `/g/${slug}/t-${slug}`,
created_by: createdBy,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkPhoto = async (eventId, filename) => {
const r = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId, filename, path: `events/${eventId}/${filename}`,
type: 'individual', uploaded_at: Date.now(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkTransfer = async (title, createdBy) => {
const r = await db('transfers').insert({
token: `tok-${title}-${'0'.repeat(50)}`.slice(0, 64),
title, created_by: createdBy,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
download_count: 0, is_active: 1, grace_days: 7, allow_uploads: 0,
delivery_method: 'link',
created_at: new Date().toISOString(), updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
transferService = require('../../src/services/transferService');
editorA = await mkAdmin('xfer-a', 'editor');
editorB = await mkAdmin('xfer-b', 'editor');
superAdmin = await mkAdmin('xfer-root', 'super_admin');
eventA = await mkEvent('xfer-own', editorA);
eventB = await mkEvent('xfer-foreign', editorB);
eventOwnerless = await mkEvent('xfer-legacy', null);
photoA = await mkPhoto(eventA, 'own.jpg');
photoB = await mkPhoto(eventB, 'foreign.jpg');
photoOwnerless = await mkPhoto(eventOwnerless, 'legacy.jpg');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
describe('filterOwnedPhotoIds', () => {
it("drops photos from another admin's event", async () => {
// The exfiltration path: these ids would otherwise be bundled into a
// transfer and served over the public download token.
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(asEditor(editorA), [photoB]);
expect(owned).toEqual([]);
});
it("keeps photos from the caller's own event", async () => {
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(asEditor(editorA), [photoA]);
expect(owned).toEqual([photoA]);
});
it('keeps photos from an ownerless legacy event', async () => {
// Parity with filterOwnedEventIds, which treats created_by IS NULL as
// ownable by anyone — otherwise legacy events become unusable.
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(asEditor(editorA), [photoOwnerless]);
expect(owned).toEqual([photoOwnerless]);
});
it('keeps only the owned subset of a mixed request', async () => {
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(
asEditor(editorA), [photoA, photoB, photoOwnerless],
);
expect(owned.sort()).toEqual([photoA, photoOwnerless].sort());
expect(owned).not.toContain(photoB);
});
it('drops ids that do not exist', async () => {
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(asEditor(editorA), [999999]);
expect(owned).toEqual([]);
});
it('leaves super_admin unrestricted', async () => {
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(
{ id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin' }, [photoA, photoB, photoOwnerless],
);
expect(owned.sort()).toEqual([photoA, photoB, photoOwnerless].sort());
});
});
describe('addFiles gates on the same rule', () => {
it("refuses to attach another admin's photo", async () => {
// The guard has to sit in addFiles, not only at the route, because both
// createTransfer and POST /:id/files funnel through it.
const transferId = await mkTransfer('gate', editorA);
await transferService.addFiles(transferId, [photoA, photoB], asEditor(editorA));
const attached = await db('transfer_files')
.where({ transfer_id: transferId }).pluck('photo_id');
expect(attached).toContain(photoA);
expect(attached).not.toContain(photoB);
});
});
describe('listTransfers', () => {
let mineId; let theirsId;
beforeAll(async () => {
mineId = await mkTransfer('mine', editorA);
theirsId = await mkTransfer('theirs', editorB);
});
it("hides another admin's transfers from a scoped caller", async () => {
const rows = await transferService.listTransfers({ admin: asEditor(editorA) });
const ids = rows.map((r) => r.id);
expect(ids).toContain(mineId);
expect(ids).not.toContain(theirsId);
});
it('shows everything to super_admin', async () => {
const rows = await transferService.listTransfers({
admin: { id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin' },
});
const ids = rows.map((r) => r.id);
expect(ids).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([mineId, theirsId]));
});
it('never carries download or upload links in the list payload', async () => {
// Defence in depth on top of the scoping above, and the layer most likely
// to be undone by a "the list needs the link too" change. The token is a
// bearer credential for the originals — detail only.
const rows = await transferService.listTransfers({ admin: asEditor(editorA) });
expect(rows.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const row of rows) {
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('token');
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('upload_token');
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('download_url');
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('upload_url');
}
});
});
// The guard is a module-local middleware, so rather than stand up supertest
// just to prove Express ordering, assert the contract at the source — the
// same approach taken for the backup/restore contracts in #596. Ordering is
// the whole mechanism here: `router.use('/:id', …)` registered after the
// `/:id` routes would silently guard nothing while still looking present.
describe('requireTransferOwnership registration', () => {
const routerSrc = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, '../../src/routes/adminTransfers.js'), 'utf8',
);
it('mounts the ownership guard before every /:id route', () => {
const guardAt = routerSrc.indexOf("router.use('/:id', requireTransferOwnership)");
expect(guardAt).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
const idRoutes = [...routerSrc.matchAll(/^router\.(get|post|patch|delete)\('\/:id/gm)];
expect(idRoutes.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const m of idRoutes) {
expect(m.index).toBeGreaterThan(guardAt);
}
});
it('answers missing and foreign ids identically, so it is not an existence oracle', () => {
const guard = routerSrc.slice(
routerSrc.indexOf('async function requireTransferOwnership'),
routerSrc.indexOf('// List'),
);
// Both branches must 404. A 403 on foreign would confirm the row exists.
const notFounds = [...guard.matchAll(/status\(404\)/g)];
expect(notFounds.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
expect(guard).not.toMatch(/status\(403\)/);
expect(guard).toMatch(/roleName === 'super_admin'/);
});
});
describe('getTransferOwner (backs requireTransferOwnership)', () => {
it('reports the creator so the route guard can compare it', async () => {
const id = await mkTransfer('owned-lookup', editorB);
const owner = await transferService.getTransferOwner(id);
expect(Number(owner.created_by)).toBe(Number(editorB));
});
it('returns nothing for a missing id, so the guard 404s rather than throwing', async () => {
const owner = await transferService.getTransferOwner(999999);
expect(owner).toBeFalsy();
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the pure gating logic in transferService (PicTransfer, #997).
* These exercise the download/upload eligibility rules without touching the DB.
*/
const transferService = require('../../src/services/transferService');
const HOUR = 60 * 60 * 1000;
function make(overrides = {}) {
return {
id: 1,
title: 'T',
is_active: true,
deleted_at: null,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 24 * HOUR),
max_downloads: null,
download_count: 0,
allow_uploads: false,
upload_expires_at: null,
...overrides,
};
}
describe('transferService.downloadsRemaining', () => {
it('returns null (unlimited) when no cap or zero cap', () => {
expect(transferService.downloadsRemaining(make({ max_downloads: null }))).toBeNull();
expect(transferService.downloadsRemaining(make({ max_downloads: 0 }))).toBeNull();
});
it('returns the remaining count and never goes negative', () => {
expect(transferService.downloadsRemaining(make({ max_downloads: 5, download_count: 2 }))).toBe(3);
expect(transferService.downloadsRemaining(make({ max_downloads: 5, download_count: 9 }))).toBe(0);
});
});
describe('transferService.computeStatus', () => {
it('is deleted when deleted_at set, regardless of activity', () => {
expect(transferService.computeStatus(make({ deleted_at: new Date(), is_active: true }))).toBe('deleted');
});
it('is expired when inactive or past expiry', () => {
expect(transferService.computeStatus(make({ is_active: false }))).toBe('expired');
expect(transferService.computeStatus(make({ expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - HOUR) }))).toBe('expired');
});
it('is active within the window', () => {
expect(transferService.computeStatus(make())).toBe('active');
});
});
describe('transferService.assertDownloadable', () => {
it('allows a live, in-window, uncapped transfer', () => {
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(make()).ok).toBe(true);
});
it('404s a missing/deleted transfer', () => {
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(null)).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 404 });
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(make({ deleted_at: new Date() }))).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 404 });
});
it('410s when disabled or expired', () => {
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(make({ is_active: false }))).toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: 'TRANSFER_DISABLED', status: 410 });
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(make({ expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - HOUR) }))).toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: 'TRANSFER_EXPIRED', status: 410 });
});
it('410s when the download cap is reached', () => {
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(make({ max_downloads: 2, download_count: 2 })))
.toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: 'DOWNLOAD_LIMIT_REACHED', status: 410 });
});
});
describe('transferService.assertUploadable', () => {
it('403s when uploads are disabled', () => {
expect(transferService.assertUploadable(make({ allow_uploads: false }))).toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: 'UPLOADS_DISABLED', status: 403 });
});
it('allows when uploads enabled and not expired', () => {
expect(transferService.assertUploadable(make({ allow_uploads: true })).ok).toBe(true);
});
it('410s when the upload window has passed', () => {
expect(transferService.assertUploadable(make({ allow_uploads: true, upload_expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - HOUR) })))
.toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: 'UPLOAD_EXPIRED', status: 410 });
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
/**
* Pre-rename detection for the registry-move notice (#985).
*
* The in-app MigrationBanner shipped 2026-06-29, a month AFTER
* ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/* stopped receiving images on 2026-05-27. Anyone
* still pulling the retired path is therefore running a build that predates the
* banner and can never render it — the structural gap that keeps producing
* reports like #982. The update check is the one channel that still reaches
* them, so it carries the notice instead.
*
* The boundary is exact rather than heuristic: v3.44.0 shipped on the freeze
* date and v3.45.0 followed on 2026-07-09 to the org registry only, with
* nothing published in between.
*/
const { isPreRenameStable, REGISTRY_RENAME_STABLE_FLOOR } = require('../../src/services/updateCheckService');
describe('isPreRenameStable (#985)', () => {
it('pins the floor to the first org-registry-only stable release', () => {
expect(REGISTRY_RENAME_STABLE_FLOOR).toBe('3.45.0');
});
it('flags stable installs below the floor', () => {
// v3.44.0 is the last stable that reached the retired path.
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.44.0', 'stable')).toBe(true);
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.43.1', 'stable')).toBe(true);
expect(isPreRenameStable('2.6.5', 'stable')).toBe(true);
});
it('leaves stable installs at or above the floor alone', () => {
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.45.0', 'stable')).toBe(false);
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.45.13', 'stable')).toBe(false);
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.99.0', 'stable')).toBe(false);
});
it('never fires on the beta channel', () => {
// The beta boundary is inferred, not clean — 3.59.0-beta.0 landed two days
// after the freeze. A false positive would tell a correctly-configured
// operator their registry is retired, so beta is deliberately excluded even
// where the number looks old.
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.44.0-beta.0', 'beta')).toBe(false);
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.58.0-beta.0', 'beta')).toBe(false);
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.99.0-beta.0', 'beta')).toBe(false);
});
it('does not fire on an unresolvable version', () => {
// getCurrentVersion() falls back to '0.0.0' when package.json is
// unreadable. That is a broken install, not a pre-rename one — claiming its
// registry is retired would send the operator down the wrong path.
expect(isPreRenameStable('0.0.0', 'stable')).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const {
EXTENSION_TO_MIME,
extensionsToMimeTypes,
} = require('../../src/services/uploadSettings');
const { validateFileType } = require('../../src/utils/fileSecurityUtils');
const RAW_AND_HEIF_TYPES = {
dng: 'image/x-adobe-dng',
heic: 'image/heic',
heif: 'image/heif',
};
function getFrontendExtensionMap() {
const source = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, '../../../frontend/src/utils/fileTypes.ts'),
'utf8'
);
const match = source.match(/const EXTENSION_TO_MIME[^=]*= \{([\s\S]*?)\n\};/);
if (!match) throw new Error('Could not find frontend EXTENSION_TO_MIME');
// Parse `key: 'mime',` entries — quoted keys and trailing `//` comments are
// tolerated; any other non-blank, non-comment line inside the map is a parse
// failure, so a syntax the parser can't read fails loudly instead of silently
// dropping the entry from the comparison.
const entries = [];
for (const line of match[1].split('\n')) {
const trimmed = line.trim();
if (trimmed === '' || trimmed.startsWith('//')) continue;
const entry = trimmed.match(/^'?(\w+)'?\s*:\s*'([^']+)'\s*,?\s*(?:\/\/.*)?$/);
if (!entry) throw new Error(`Unparsable EXTENSION_TO_MIME line in frontend fileTypes.ts: "${trimmed}"`);
entries.push([entry[1], entry[2]]);
}
return Object.fromEntries(entries);
}
describe('configured upload file types', () => {
test('supports configured DNG, HEIC, and HEIF uploads', () => {
expect(extensionsToMimeTypes('dng,heic,heif')).toEqual(Object.values(RAW_AND_HEIF_TYPES));
for (const [extension, mimeType] of Object.entries(RAW_AND_HEIF_TYPES)) {
expect(validateFileType(`image.${extension}`, mimeType, [mimeType])).toBe(true);
}
});
test('uses the same extension-to-MIME map as the frontend', () => {
expect(getFrontendExtensionMap()).toEqual(EXTENSION_TO_MIME);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the per-file upload size limit getter (general_max_file_size_mb),
* added so the admin's "Max File Size (MB)" setting applies to guest uploads
* (#613 follow-up — mat1990dj). Real in-memory SQLite app_settings so the
* read/parse/cache path runs exactly as in production.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
let db;
let svc;
beforeEach(async () => {
db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
await db.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('setting_key').notNullable().unique();
t.text('setting_value');
t.string('setting_type');
t.timestamp('updated_at');
});
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db }));
svc = require('../../src/services/uploadSettings');
svc.clearMaxFileSizeCache();
});
afterEach(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
await db.destroy();
});
async function setLimit(mb) {
await db('app_settings')
.insert({ setting_key: 'general_max_file_size_mb', setting_value: JSON.stringify(mb), setting_type: 'general', updated_at: new Date() })
.onConflict('setting_key').merge({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(mb) });
svc.clearMaxFileSizeCache();
}
test('defaults to 50MB when the setting is absent', async () => {
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(50);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeBytes()).toBe(50 * 1024 * 1024);
});
test('honours a configured value (e.g. 500MB video)', async () => {
await setLimit(500);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(500);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeBytes()).toBe(500 * 1024 * 1024);
});
test('clamps a nonsense value to the default and caps absurd values at the ceiling', async () => {
await setLimit(0);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(50); // 0 → default
await setLimit(99_999_999);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(svc.MAX_ALLOWED_FILE_SIZE_MB); // ceiling
});
test('caches for the TTL — a mid-window DB change is not seen until the cache is cleared', async () => {
await setLimit(200);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(200);
// change the DB but do NOT clear cache
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'general_max_file_size_mb' }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(300) });
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(200); // still cached
svc.clearMaxFileSizeCache();
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(300); // refreshed
});
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
/**
* Per-event banner overrides — end-to-end plumbing for BOTH banners.
*
* The promo banner (#440) shipped with per-event inherit/custom/off, but the
* override never actually reached a guest: GalleryView reads promo_mode from
* the /photos payload and /photos never sent it, so every gallery resolved to
* 'inherit'. Setting a gallery's promo banner to "Off" did nothing. The info
* banner (#932) mirrored that shape and inherited the same gaps.
*
* Four places dropped the fields. This pins all of them for both banners so
* the two stay in step:
*
* 1. GET /gallery/:slug/photos — must carry the columns
* 2. POST /admin/events — validators accepted them, insert dropped
* 3. POST /admin/events/:id/duplicate — copy promised, not delivered
* 4. PUT /admin/events/:id — partial update parked stale markdown
*
* The route-level normalisation is exercised directly against its own rules
* rather than through supertest: the intent is to pin the DATA contract, which
* is what silently broke.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-banner-plumbing-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'banner-plumbing-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
const baseEvent = (slug, extra = {}) => ({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: slug,
event_date: '2026-06-22',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
share_token: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...extra,
});
const insertEvent = async (slug, extra) => {
const [id] = await db('events').insert(baseEvent(slug, extra)).returning('id');
return id?.id ?? id;
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
// Mirrors the unified normalisation in adminEvents/crud.js.
function normalizeBannerUpdates(updates, stored) {
for (const field of ['promo', 'info']) {
const modeKey = `${field}_mode`;
const mdKey = `${field}_markdown`;
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, modeKey)
&& !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, mdKey)) continue;
const effectiveMode = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, modeKey)
? updates[modeKey]
: stored[modeKey];
if (effectiveMode !== 'custom') {
updates[mdKey] = null;
} else if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, mdKey)) {
const md = typeof updates[mdKey] === 'string' ? updates[mdKey].trim() : '';
updates[mdKey] = md || null;
}
}
return updates;
}
describe('partial update resolves the mode from the stored row', () => {
it.each(['promo', 'info'])(
'%s: markdown-only PUT on an inherit gallery does not park hidden text',
(field) => {
const stored = { promo_mode: 'inherit', info_mode: 'inherit' };
const updates = normalizeBannerUpdates({ [`${field}_markdown`]: 'hidden draft' }, stored);
// Previously stored the text; a later switch to 'custom' resurrected it.
expect(updates[`${field}_markdown`]).toBeNull();
},
);
it.each(['promo', 'info'])('%s: markdown-only PUT on an off gallery also clears', (field) => {
const stored = { promo_mode: 'off', info_mode: 'off' };
const updates = normalizeBannerUpdates({ [`${field}_markdown`]: 'hidden draft' }, stored);
expect(updates[`${field}_markdown`]).toBeNull();
});
it.each(['promo', 'info'])('%s: markdown-only PUT on a custom gallery is kept', (field) => {
const stored = { promo_mode: 'custom', info_mode: 'custom' };
const updates = normalizeBannerUpdates({ [`${field}_markdown`]: ' keep me ' }, stored);
expect(updates[`${field}_markdown`]).toBe('keep me');
});
it.each(['promo', 'info'])('%s: switching away from custom clears the copy', (field) => {
const stored = { promo_mode: 'custom', info_mode: 'custom' };
const updates = normalizeBannerUpdates(
{ [`${field}_mode`]: 'off', [`${field}_markdown`]: 'stale' }, stored,
);
expect(updates[`${field}_markdown`]).toBeNull();
});
it('leaves both banners alone when the request touches neither', () => {
const updates = normalizeBannerUpdates({ event_name: 'Renamed' }, { promo_mode: 'custom', info_mode: 'custom' });
expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, 'promo_markdown')).toBe(false);
expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, 'info_markdown')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('columns round-trip through the events table', () => {
it('stores and reads both banners independently', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent('banner-roundtrip', {
promo_mode: 'off',
info_mode: 'custom',
info_markdown: 'Use the menu button to filter.',
});
const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
// Independent slots — muting one must not touch the other.
expect(row.promo_mode).toBe('off');
expect(row.promo_markdown ?? null).toBeNull();
expect(row.info_mode).toBe('custom');
expect(row.info_markdown).toBe('Use the menu button to filter.');
});
it('duplicating drops markdown left over on a non-custom source', async () => {
// A row written before the PUT normalisation landed can hold text while
// its mode is inherit/off. Copying that verbatim would smuggle hidden copy
// into the duplicate and resurrect it on the next switch to 'custom'.
const sourceId = await insertEvent('banner-dup-stale', {
promo_mode: 'off',
promo_markdown: 'stale promo text',
info_mode: 'inherit',
info_markdown: 'stale info text',
});
const source = await db('events').where({ id: sourceId }).first();
const dupId = await insertEvent('banner-dup-stale-copy', {
promo_mode: source.promo_mode || 'inherit',
promo_markdown: source.promo_mode === 'custom' ? (source.promo_markdown || null) : null,
info_mode: source.info_mode || 'inherit',
info_markdown: source.info_mode === 'custom' ? (source.info_markdown || null) : null,
});
const dup = await db('events').where({ id: dupId }).first();
expect(dup.promo_mode).toBe('off');
expect(dup.promo_markdown).toBeNull();
expect(dup.info_mode).toBe('inherit');
expect(dup.info_markdown).toBeNull();
});
it('duplicating an event carries both banners across', async () => {
const sourceId = await insertEvent('banner-dup-source', {
promo_mode: 'custom',
promo_markdown: 'Book your next session',
info_mode: 'off',
});
const source = await db('events').where({ id: sourceId }).first();
// Mirrors the duplicate route's insert.
const dupId = await insertEvent('banner-dup-copy', {
promo_mode: source.promo_mode || 'inherit',
promo_markdown: source.promo_mode === 'custom' ? (source.promo_markdown || null) : null,
info_mode: source.info_mode || 'inherit',
info_markdown: source.info_mode === 'custom' ? (source.info_markdown || null) : null,
});
const dup = await db('events').where({ id: dupId }).first();
expect(dup.promo_mode).toBe('custom');
expect(dup.promo_markdown).toBe('Book your next session');
// The muted info banner must stay muted in the copy.
expect(dup.info_mode).toBe('off');
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
/**
* Unit tests for rating removal (#884).
*
* Pins the contract of `feedbackService.submitFeedback` for
* `feedback_type: 'rating'` with `rating: 0` ("clear my rating"):
* - An existing rating row is DELETED (not updated to 0 — a stored 0
* would drag the photo's average down and still count in totals).
* - Photo stats (average_rating) are recalculated after the delete.
* - Rating 0 with no existing rating is a no-op that never inserts a row.
* - Removal is guest-scoped: clearing guest A's rating leaves guest B's
* rating (and the resulting average) intact.
* - Regular re-rating (3 → 5) still updates in place.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-rating-removal-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'rating-removal-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const feedbackService = require('../../src/services/feedbackService');
const EVENT_SLUG = 'rating-removal-event';
const GUEST_A = 'guest-a-identifier';
const GUEST_B = 'guest-b-identifier';
let db;
let cleanup;
let eventId;
let photoId;
async function rate(rating, guestIdentifier = GUEST_A) {
return feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
feedback_type: 'rating',
rating,
ip_address: '127.0.0.1',
user_agent: 'jest',
}, guestIdentifier);
}
async function ratingRows(guestIdentifier) {
const q = db('photo_feedback').where({
photo_id: photoId,
feedback_type: 'rating',
});
if (guestIdentifier) q.where('guest_identifier', guestIdentifier);
return q.select('*');
}
async function photoAverage() {
const photo = await db('photos').where('id', photoId).first();
return Number(photo.average_rating);
}
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: EVENT_SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Rating Removal Test',
event_date: '2026-06-22',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${EVENT_SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'rating-removal-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
const r = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'photo-1.jpg',
path: 'events/rating-removal/1.jpg',
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
photoId = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('photo_feedback').where('event_id', eventId).del();
await db('photos').where('id', photoId).update({ average_rating: 0, feedback_count: 0 });
});
describe('rating removal (#884)', () => {
test('rating 0 deletes the existing rating row and resets the average', async () => {
const created = await rate(4);
expect(created.created).toBe(true);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(4);
const removed = await rate(0);
expect(removed.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(0);
});
test('rating 0 without an existing rating is a no-op (no 0-row inserted)', async () => {
const r = await rate(0);
expect(r.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await ratingRows()).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(0);
});
test('removal is guest-scoped: guest B keeps their rating and the average', async () => {
await rate(2, GUEST_A);
await rate(4, GUEST_B);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(3);
const removed = await rate(0, GUEST_A);
expect(removed.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_B)).toHaveLength(1);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(4);
});
test('numeric string "0" also clears (truthy-string bypass guard)', async () => {
await rate(4);
const removed = await rate('0');
expect(removed.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(0);
});
test('malformed rating input never clears an existing rating', async () => {
await rate(4);
for (const bad of [undefined, null, 'bad', NaN]) {
const r = await rate(bad);
expect(r.removed).toBeFalsy();
}
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(1);
});
test('clearing deletes racy duplicate rating rows, not just the first', async () => {
// Simulate the check-then-insert race: two rating rows for one guest.
const row = {
photo_id: photoId,
event_id: eventId,
feedback_type: 'rating',
guest_identifier: GUEST_A,
is_approved: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
};
await db('photo_feedback').insert({ ...row, rating: 3 });
await db('photo_feedback').insert({ ...row, rating: 5 });
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(2);
const removed = await rate(0);
expect(removed.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(0);
});
test('re-rating with a different value still updates in place', async () => {
await rate(3);
const updated = await rate(5);
expect(updated.updated).toBe(true);
const rows = await ratingRows(GUEST_A);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].rating).toBe(5);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(5);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
/**
* Emoji reactions (#839) — pins the contract of the `reaction` feedback type:
* - only emojis from the fixed curated set are accepted
* - one reaction per guest per photo: same emoji again toggles OFF,
* a different emoji SWITCHES the existing row (never a second row)
* - per-guest scoping mirrors likes: guest_id when present, else the
* device-hash guest_identifier — two token-guests on one device react
* independently
* - denormalized photos.reaction_count and the per-emoji tallies follow
* visibility: hidden-by-moderator reactions disappear from both
* - the long and pivoted exports carry the reaction
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-feedback-reactions-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'feedback-reactions-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const feedbackService = require('../../src/services/feedbackService');
const { REACTION_EMOJIS } = require('../../src/constants/reactions');
const EVENT_SLUG = 'reactions-test-event';
const GUEST_A = 'guest-a-identifier';
const GUEST_B = 'guest-b-identifier';
let db;
let cleanup;
let eventId;
let photoIds;
async function react(photoId, emoji, { guestIdentifier = GUEST_A, guestId = null } = {}) {
return feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
feedback_type: 'reaction',
reaction: emoji,
guest_id: guestId,
ip_address: '127.0.0.1',
user_agent: 'jest',
}, guestIdentifier);
}
async function reactionCountOf(photoId) {
const row = await db('photos').where('id', photoId).first();
return Number(row.reaction_count) || 0;
}
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: EVENT_SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Reactions Test',
event_date: '2026-07-20',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${EVENT_SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'reactions-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
photoIds = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
const photo = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: `photo-${i}.jpg`,
path: `events/reactions/${i}.jpg`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
photoIds.push(photo[0]?.id ?? photo[0]);
}
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('reaction submission (#839)', () => {
it('rejects emojis outside the curated set', async () => {
await expect(react(photoIds[0], '🦄')).rejects.toThrow('Invalid reaction');
await expect(react(photoIds[0], undefined)).rejects.toThrow('Invalid reaction');
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(0);
});
it('creates a reaction row and maintains the denormalized count', async () => {
const result = await react(photoIds[0], '❤️');
expect(result.created).toBe(true);
const row = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoIds[0], feedback_type: 'reaction' })
.first();
expect(row.reaction).toBe('❤️');
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(1);
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[0])).toEqual({ '❤️': 1 });
});
it('switches to another emoji in place — never a second row per guest', async () => {
const result = await react(photoIds[0], '🎉');
expect(result.updated).toBe(true);
const rows = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoIds[0], feedback_type: 'reaction' });
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].reaction).toBe('🎉');
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[0])).toEqual({ '🎉': 1 });
});
it('tallies different guests per emoji', async () => {
await react(photoIds[0], '🎉', { guestIdentifier: GUEST_B });
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[0])).toEqual({ '🎉': 2 });
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(2);
});
it('toggles off with the same emoji', async () => {
const result = await react(photoIds[0], '🎉');
expect(result.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[0])).toEqual({ '🎉': 1 }); // GUEST_B remains
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(1);
});
it('scopes per guest_id when present — two token-guests on one device stay independent', async () => {
const first = await react(photoIds[1], '😍', { guestIdentifier: GUEST_A, guestId: 101 });
const second = await react(photoIds[1], '👏', { guestIdentifier: GUEST_A, guestId: 102 });
expect(first.created).toBe(true);
expect(second.created).toBe(true); // NOT treated as guest 101's switch
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[1])).toEqual({ '😍': 1, '👏': 1 });
});
it('accepts every emoji of the curated set', async () => {
for (const emoji of REACTION_EMOJIS) {
const res = await react(photoIds[2], emoji, { guestIdentifier: `guest-${emoji}` });
expect(res.created).toBe(true);
}
const counts = await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[2]);
expect(Object.keys(counts)).toHaveLength(REACTION_EMOJIS.length);
});
it('hidden reactions leave both the per-emoji tallies and reaction_count', async () => {
const row = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoIds[0], feedback_type: 'reaction' })
.first();
await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(row.id, 'hide', 1);
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[0])).toEqual({});
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(0);
await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(row.id, 'approve', 1);
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(1);
});
it('toggle and switch collapse racy duplicate rows for the same guest', async () => {
// Simulate the check-then-insert race: two rows for one guest+photo.
const mk = (emoji) => ({
photo_id: photoIds[1], event_id: eventId, feedback_type: 'reaction',
reaction: emoji, guest_identifier: 'dup-guest', is_approved: true, is_hidden: false,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
});
await db('photo_feedback').insert([mk('❤️'), mk('❤️')]);
// Switching converges to exactly ONE row with the new emoji…
const switched = await react(photoIds[1], '🎉', { guestIdentifier: 'dup-guest' });
expect(switched.updated).toBe(true);
let rows = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoIds[1], feedback_type: 'reaction', guest_identifier: 'dup-guest' });
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].reaction).toBe('🎉');
// …and toggle-off removes the full guest-scoped set.
await db('photo_feedback').insert(mk('🎉'));
const removed = await react(photoIds[1], '🎉', { guestIdentifier: 'dup-guest' });
expect(removed.removed).toBe(true);
rows = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoIds[1], feedback_type: 'reaction', guest_identifier: 'dup-guest' });
expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('summary and exports carry reactions', async () => {
const summary = await feedbackService.getEventFeedbackSummary(eventId);
expect(Number(summary.stats.total_reactions)).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const longRows = await feedbackService.exportEventFeedback(eventId);
const longReaction = longRows.find((r) => r.feedback_type === 'reaction');
expect(longReaction.reaction).toBeTruthy();
const pivotRows = await feedbackService.exportEventFeedbackPivoted(eventId);
const pivotWithReaction = pivotRows.find((r) => r.reaction);
expect(REACTION_EMOJIS).toContain(pivotWithReaction.reaction);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
/**
* Gallery info banner (#932).
*
* A short note rendered ABOVE the photo grid — the reporter's case is an
* onboarding hint ("use the menu button to filter"), which is useless in the
* promo slot down by the footer because the guest has to scroll the whole
* gallery to reach it.
*
* Covers what the migration actually produces on a real engine (the harness
* runs SQLite) and the inherit/custom/off resolution the gallery render
* depends on. The resolution is duplicated here rather than imported because
* it lives in the React layer; the point is to pin the CONTRACT — which
* source wins for each mode — so a change on either side has to update this
* file deliberately.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-info-banner-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'info-banner-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('migration 176 — schema', () => {
it('adds events.info_mode defaulting to inherit', async () => {
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'info_mode')).toBe(true);
const [id] = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'info-default-test',
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Info Default Test',
event_date: '2026-06-22',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: '/gallery/info-default-test/share',
share_token: 'info-default-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const eventId = id?.id ?? id;
const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
// A gallery created before anyone configures the feature must inherit,
// so switching the global default on lights up every existing gallery.
expect(row.info_mode).toBe('inherit');
expect(row.info_markdown ?? null).toBeNull();
});
it('adds events.info_markdown as nullable text', async () => {
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'info_markdown')).toBe(true);
});
it('seeds branding_info_markdown empty, so upgrading shows no banner', async () => {
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_info_markdown' }).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe('');
expect(row.setting_type).toBe('branding');
});
});
// Mirrors GalleryLayout's resolution.
function resolveInfoBanner(event, brandingDefault) {
const mode = event.info_mode || 'inherit';
if (mode === 'off') return '';
if (mode === 'custom') {
const own = (event.info_markdown || '').trim();
return (own || brandingDefault || '').trim();
}
return (brandingDefault || '').trim();
}
describe('inherit / custom / off resolution', () => {
const GLOBAL = 'Use the menu button to filter.';
it('inherit renders the global default', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'inherit' }, GLOBAL)).toBe(GLOBAL);
});
it('a missing mode is treated as inherit (rows predating the migration)', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({}, GLOBAL)).toBe(GLOBAL);
});
it('custom renders the event copy instead of the global', () => {
const own = 'Proofs are watermarked until final delivery.';
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'custom', info_markdown: own }, GLOBAL)).toBe(own);
});
it('custom with blank copy falls back to the global rather than showing nothing', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'custom', info_markdown: ' ' }, GLOBAL)).toBe(GLOBAL);
});
it('off suppresses the banner even when a global default exists', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'off' }, GLOBAL)).toBe('');
});
it('off wins over the event own copy too', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'off', info_markdown: 'ignored' }, GLOBAL)).toBe('');
});
it('an empty global default means no banner anywhere — the upgrade state', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'inherit' }, '')).toBe('');
expect(resolveInfoBanner({}, undefined)).toBe('');
});
});
describe('per-event persistence', () => {
let eventId;
beforeAll(async () => {
const [id] = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'info-persist-test',
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Info Persist Test',
event_date: '2026-06-22',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: '/gallery/info-persist-test/share',
share_token: 'info-persist-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = id?.id ?? id;
});
it('stores a custom override', async () => {
await db('events').where({ id: eventId })
.update({ info_mode: 'custom', info_markdown: '**Heads up** — proofs only.' });
const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
expect(row.info_mode).toBe('custom');
expect(row.info_markdown).toBe('**Heads up** — proofs only.');
});
it('switching away from custom clears the stored copy', async () => {
// Matches the route's normalisation: mode != custom nulls the text so a
// later switch back to custom can't resurrect stale copy.
await db('events').where({ id: eventId })
.update({ info_mode: 'off', info_markdown: null });
const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
expect(row.info_mode).toBe('off');
expect(row.info_markdown).toBeNull();
});
it('the promo banner is untouched by info-banner changes', async () => {
const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
// Independent slots: the whole point of #932 is that an info hint at the
// top does not consume the marketing slot at the bottom.
expect(row.promo_mode).toBe('inherit');
expect(row.promo_markdown ?? null).toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the global session cutoff (utils/sessionCutoff.js). Uses a
* real in-memory SQLite `app_settings` table so the read/write/parse path is
* exercised exactly as in production.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
let db;
let cutoff;
beforeEach(async () => {
db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
await db.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('setting_key').notNullable().unique();
t.text('setting_value');
t.string('setting_type');
t.timestamp('updated_at');
});
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db }));
cutoff = require('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff');
cutoff._resetCache();
});
afterEach(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
await db.destroy();
});
test('no cutoff set → nothing is invalidated', async () => {
expect(await cutoff.getSessionsValidAfter()).toBe(0);
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff({ iat: 1000 })).toBe(false);
});
test('token issued before the cutoff is rejected, at/after is accepted', async () => {
await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(2000);
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff({ iat: 1999 })).toBe(true); // pre-restore session
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff({ iat: 2000 })).toBe(false); // same second → kept
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff({ iat: 2001 })).toBe(false); // post-restore login
});
test('setSessionsValidAfter upserts a single row and refreshes the cache', async () => {
await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(1000);
await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(3000);
const rows = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'security_sessions_valid_after');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
cutoff._resetCache();
expect(await cutoff.getSessionsValidAfter()).toBe(3000);
});
test('a token without iat is never treated as before the cutoff', async () => {
await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(2000);
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff({})).toBe(false);
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff(null)).toBe(false);
});
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
/**
* The contract that matters here is negative: a source that disappears must
* NOT be able to end the process (#1128).
*
* `fs.createReadStream` is lazy, so its ENOENT lands on a later tick, outside
* the route's try/catch. An EventEmitter emitting 'error' with no listener
* throws, and an uncaught throw from an I/O callback exits Node — which is how
* one missing thumbnail tier took every gallery on the install down.
*
* These use a REAL fs stream over a real missing path rather than a fake
* emitter: the point under test is the lazy-open timing, and a hand-rolled
* mock that emits synchronously would pass while proving nothing.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const { Readable } = require('stream');
const { EventEmitter } = require('events');
const { pipeStreamToResponse } = require('../../src/utils/streamResponse');
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
}));
/** Minimal Express-ish response that records what happened to it. */
function makeRes() {
const res = new EventEmitter();
res.headers = { 'Content-Length': '1234', ETag: '"x"' };
res.statusCode = 200;
res.headersSent = false;
res.writableEnded = false;
res.body = null;
res.destroyed = false;
res.removeHeader = (h) => { delete res.headers[h]; };
res.setHeader = (h, v) => { res.headers[h] = v; };
res.status = (code) => { res.statusCode = code; return res; };
res.json = (payload) => { res.body = payload; res.writableEnded = true; return res; };
res.destroy = () => { res.destroyed = true; };
// pipe() target surface
res.write = () => true;
res.end = () => { res.writableEnded = true; };
res.on = EventEmitter.prototype.on.bind(res);
res.emit = EventEmitter.prototype.emit.bind(res);
return res;
}
const settle = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 50));
describe('pipeStreamToResponse (#1128)', () => {
it('turns a missing file into a 404 instead of an unhandled error', async () => {
const missing = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-not-here-${Date.now()}.jpg`);
const res = makeRes();
pipeStreamToResponse(stream_(missing), res, { context: 'thumbnail for photo 1' });
await settle();
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(404);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'File not found' });
});
// How this test discriminates, since the failure mode is a process-level
// one: replacing the call above with a bare `stream.pipe(res)` — what the
// thumbnail route did — makes jest fail this suite on the unhandled 'error'
// event before either assertion runs. Verified by doing exactly that.
// Catching the throw with a process.on('uncaughtException') listener does
// NOT work here and would be theatre: the runner installs its own handling,
// so such a listener never sees it and the assertion could never fail.
function stream_(p) { return fs.createReadStream(p); }
it('strips every header that described the file it can no longer send', async () => {
const res = makeRes();
// What the image and zip routes actually stage before streaming.
res.headers = {
'Content-Length': '1234',
ETag: '"x"',
'Content-Type': 'image/jpeg',
'Content-Disposition': 'attachment; filename="gallery.zip"',
'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800',
};
const stream = fs.createReadStream(path.join(os.tmpdir(), `gone-${Date.now()}.jpg`));
pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res);
await settle();
expect(res.headers['Content-Length']).toBeUndefined();
expect(res.headers.ETag).toBeUndefined();
// Express does NOT overwrite an existing Content-Type, so leaving it makes
// res.json() emit JSON labelled image/jpeg — or a corrupt .zip download.
expect(res.headers['Content-Type']).toBeUndefined();
expect(res.headers['Content-Disposition']).toBeUndefined();
});
it('does not let a transient 404 be cached as a broken tile', async () => {
const res = makeRes();
// The thumbnail route stages 30 minutes; the hero route an hour.
res.headers = { 'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800' };
const stream = fs.createReadStream(path.join(os.tmpdir(), `gone3-${Date.now()}.jpg`));
pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res);
await settle();
// The regeneration race is transient by definition: the tier exists moments
// later. Caching this 404 would keep the tile broken long after the file is
// back — the opposite of what this helper is for.
expect(res.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store');
});
it('honours a caller that wants a different missing-status', async () => {
const res = makeRes();
const stream = fs.createReadStream(path.join(os.tmpdir(), `gone2-${Date.now()}.zip`));
pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, { missingStatus: 410 });
await settle();
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(410);
});
it('destroys the response instead of rewriting a status that is already sent', async () => {
const res = makeRes();
res.headersSent = true;
const stream = new Readable({ read() {} });
pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, { context: 'photo 9' });
stream.emit('error', Object.assign(new Error('ENOENT'), { code: 'ENOENT' }));
await settle();
// Once bytes are on the wire a 404 is not available; a truncated image the
// client would cache is worse than a broken connection.
expect(res.destroyed).toBe(true);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toBeNull();
});
it('reports a non-ENOENT failure as a 500 rather than a 404', async () => {
const res = makeRes();
const stream = new Readable({ read() {} });
pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res);
stream.emit('error', Object.assign(new Error('disk exploded'), { code: 'EIO' }));
await settle();
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(500);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'Failed to serve file' });
});
it('releases the source when the client hangs up mid-download', async () => {
const res = makeRes();
let destroyed = false;
const stream = new Readable({ read() {}, destroy(err, cb) { destroyed = true; cb(err); } });
pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res);
res.emit('close');
await settle();
// Otherwise an abandoned grid leaks one open fd per tile.
expect(destroyed).toBe(true);
});
});
Binary file not shown.
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+93
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
Copyright © 2017 IBM Corp. with Reserved Font Name "Plex"
This Font Software is licensed under the SIL Open Font License, Version 1.1.
This license is copied below, and is also available with a FAQ at: http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
-----------------------------------------------------------
SIL OPEN FONT LICENSE Version 1.1 - 26 February 2007
-----------------------------------------------------------
PREAMBLE
The goals of the Open Font License (OFL) are to stimulate worldwide
development of collaborative font projects, to support the font creation
efforts of academic and linguistic communities, and to provide a free and
open framework in which fonts may be shared and improved in partnership
with others.
The OFL allows the licensed fonts to be used, studied, modified and
redistributed freely as long as they are not sold by themselves. The
fonts, including any derivative works, can be bundled, embedded,
redistributed and/or sold with any software provided that any reserved
names are not used by derivative works. The fonts and derivatives,
however, cannot be released under any other type of license. The
requirement for fonts to remain under this license does not apply
to any document created using the fonts or their derivatives.
DEFINITIONS
"Font Software" refers to the set of files released by the Copyright
Holder(s) under this license and clearly marked as such. This may
include source files, build scripts and documentation.
"Reserved Font Name" refers to any names specified as such after the
copyright statement(s).
"Original Version" refers to the collection of Font Software components as
distributed by the Copyright Holder(s).
"Modified Version" refers to any derivative made by adding to, deleting,
or substituting -- in part or in whole -- any of the components of the
Original Version, by changing formats or by porting the Font Software to a
new environment.
"Author" refers to any designer, engineer, programmer, technical
writer or other person who contributed to the Font Software.
PERMISSION & CONDITIONS
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
a copy of the Font Software, to use, study, copy, merge, embed, modify,
redistribute, and sell modified and unmodified copies of the Font
Software, subject to the following conditions:
1) Neither the Font Software nor any of its individual components,
in Original or Modified Versions, may be sold by itself.
2) Original or Modified Versions of the Font Software may be bundled,
redistributed and/or sold with any software, provided that each copy
contains the above copyright notice and this license. These can be
included either as stand-alone text files, human-readable headers or
in the appropriate machine-readable metadata fields within text or
binary files as long as those fields can be easily viewed by the user.
3) No Modified Version of the Font Software may use the Reserved Font
Name(s) unless explicit written permission is granted by the corresponding
Copyright Holder. This restriction only applies to the primary font name as
presented to the users.
4) The name(s) of the Copyright Holder(s) or the Author(s) of the Font
Software shall not be used to promote, endorse or advertise any
Modified Version, except to acknowledge the contribution(s) of the
Copyright Holder(s) and the Author(s) or with their explicit written
permission.
5) The Font Software, modified or unmodified, in part or in whole,
must be distributed entirely under this license, and must not be
distributed under any other license. The requirement for fonts to
remain under this license does not apply to any document created
using the Font Software.
TERMINATION
This license becomes null and void if any of the above conditions are
not met.
DISCLAIMER
THE FONT SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT
OF COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR OTHER RIGHT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
COPYRIGHT HOLDER BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
FROM, OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE FONT SOFTWARE OR FROM
OTHER DEALINGS IN THE FONT SOFTWARE.
+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
module.exports = {
testEnvironment: 'node',
// bootCrmDb() runs EVERY core migration in beforeAll and the chain keeps
// growing (134 migrations and counting via backports). 120s matches the
// beta-branch convention from #860.
// bootCrmDb() runs EVERY core migration in beforeAll; the chain keeps
// growing (163-165 pushed several suites past jest's default on CI
// runners — the 3.94 release PR failed on exactly this). 120s matches
// the convention the newer suites already pin explicitly.
testTimeout: 120000,
coverageDirectory: 'coverage',
collectCoverageFrom: [
@@ -77,11 +77,7 @@ const DEFAULT_CSS_TEMPLATE = `/*
.photo-card img {
width: 100%;
/* 100%, not a fixed pixel height: every aspect-ratio layout (masonry,
justified, mosaic, gallery-premium) gives .photo-card a definite height
computed from photos.width/height, and this rule's specificity (0,1,1)
beats the .h-full utility (0,1,0) the layouts rely on — #1131. */
height: 100%;
height: 200px;
object-fit: cover;
transition: transform 0.3s ease;
}
@@ -503,9 +503,7 @@ const LIQUID_GLASS_DARK = `/*
.photo-card img {
width: 100%;
/* See #1131: a fixed height here beats the layouts' .h-full utility and
detaches the image from its aspect-ratio-sized card. */
height: 100%;
height: 240px;
object-fit: cover;
transition: transform 0.4s ease, filter 0.4s ease;
filter: brightness(0.9);
@@ -641,7 +639,7 @@ const LIQUID_GLASS_DARK = `/*
}
.photo-card img {
height: 100%;
height: 180px;
}
/* Reduce animation complexity on mobile */
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
/**
* Migration 158: per-event slideshow ordering + category filter (#202).
*
* - `show_order` — 'chronological' (default, upload order) | 'random'
* (client-side shuffle). Lets the Live Slideshow play
* photos in a varied order during an event.
* - `show_category_id`— optional FK into `photo_categories`. When set, the
* slideshow only shows photos in that category (NULL =
* all visible photos, the existing behaviour).
*
* Both additive + guarded. Defaults preserve today's behaviour (chronological,
* all photos), so existing slideshows are unchanged.
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
const hasOrder = await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'show_order');
if (!hasOrder) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.string('show_order', 20).defaultTo('chronological');
});
}
const hasCat = await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'show_category_id');
if (!hasCat) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.integer('show_category_id').nullable();
});
}
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
for (const col of ['show_order', 'show_category_id']) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', col)) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => t.dropColumn(col));
}
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
/**
* Migration 159: per-event category ordering (#782).
*
* Adds a `display_order` integer to `photo_categories` so photographers can
* arrange an event's categories in the flow of the day (Pre-Ceremony →
* Ceremony → Reception …) instead of the hard-coded AZ order. Mirrors the
* `display_order` column + reorder pattern already used by `event_types`.
*
* Preserve existing galleries: backfill `display_order` from the CURRENT
* (alphabetical) order, scoped — globals numbered together, event-specific
* numbered per event — so nothing reshuffles on upgrade. A custom order is
* opt-in via the admin reorder controls. See feedback: migrations should pin
* previously-implicit defaults onto existing rows.
*
* Backfill runs in JS (not a SQL window function) to stay portable across
* SQLite (dev) and Postgres (prod).
*
* Additive + hasColumn-guarded.
*/
async function addColumn(knex, table, column, builder) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn(table, column))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable(table, builder);
}
}
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('photo_categories'))) return;
await addColumn(knex, 'photo_categories', 'display_order', (t) => {
t.integer('display_order').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.index('display_order');
});
// Backfill from the current alphabetical order, per scope, so existing
// galleries render exactly as before until an admin reorders.
const cats = await knex('photo_categories')
.select('id', 'name', 'is_global', 'event_id')
.orderBy('name', 'asc');
const counters = {};
for (const c of cats) {
const scope = c.is_global ? 'global' : `event:${c.event_id}`;
counters[scope] = (counters[scope] || 0) + 1;
await knex('photo_categories')
.where('id', c.id)
.update({ display_order: counters[scope] });
}
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('photo_categories'))) return;
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('photo_categories', 'display_order')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('photo_categories', (t) =>
t.dropColumn('display_order')
);
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
/**
* Migration 160: per-event category order override (#782).
*
* Builds on migration 159 (photo_categories.display_order = the GLOBAL default
* order) by adding a per-event OVERRIDE layer. Global categories are shared
* across every event, so a single display_order can only express one order for
* them. This table lets a single gallery arrange its categories — globals AND
* event-specific, interleaved into the flow of the day — independently of the
* global default.
*
* Resolution (see adminCategories / gallery):
* 1. if the event has override rows -> use override.position;
* 2. else fall back to photo_categories.display_order (the global default);
* 3. else name.
*
* An event is either "using the default" (no rows here) or "customised" (a row
* per category it shows). No backfill: every existing event starts on the
* default order, so nothing reshuffles — a custom order is opt-in per event.
*
* Additive + hasTable-guarded.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('photo_categories'))) return;
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('event_category_order')) return;
await knex.schema.createTable('event_category_order', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('event_id').notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('events').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.integer('category_id').notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('photo_categories').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.integer('position').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
// At most one position per (event, category).
t.unique(['event_id', 'category_id']);
// Ordered reads are always scoped to one event.
t.index(['event_id', 'position']);
});
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('event_category_order')) {
await knex.schema.dropTable('event_category_order');
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
/**
* Migration 161: `setup_wizard_completed` app setting (#800).
*
* The setup wizard gains an event-types step that may rename or DELETE the
* seeded system event types. That is only safe on a pristine install, so the
* backend gates system-type deletion on this flag being unset (plus zero
* usage — see eventTypeService.deleteEventType).
*
* Backfill rule: any install that already has an admin account predates the
* wizard step (or already finished the wizard), so it is marked completed
* here — the deletion window never opens on existing setups. A genuinely
* fresh install runs this migration BEFORE its first admin is created, so
* the flag starts false and the wizard's finish call flips it to true.
*
* Idempotent: skips when the key already exists. Values are JSON-stringified
* to match getAppSetting's JSON.parse on read.
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('app_settings'))) return;
const existing = await knex('app_settings')
.where({ setting_key: 'setup_wizard_completed' })
.first();
if (existing) return;
let hasAdmin = false;
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('admin_users')) {
const row = await knex('admin_users').count({ c: '*' }).first();
hasAdmin = Number(row?.c || 0) > 0;
}
await knex('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: 'setup_wizard_completed',
setting_value: JSON.stringify(hasAdmin),
setting_type: 'boolean',
updated_at: new Date(),
});
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('app_settings'))) return;
await knex('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_wizard_completed' }).del();
};
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
/**
* Migration 162: OIDC identity binding for admin users (#798).
*
* - `auth_provider` — 'local' (default) or 'oidc'. Which authority owns the
* account's credentials.
* - `external_issuer` — the validated `iss` of the IdP that owns the subject.
* OIDC only guarantees `sub` uniqueness WITHIN an
* issuer, so bindings match on (iss, sub) — otherwise
* switching `oidc_issuer_url` could map a new
* provider's user onto an old provider's admin when
* their subjects collide.
* - `external_subject` — the IdP's stable subject identifier (OIDC `sub`).
* SSO logins match on (external_issuer,
* external_subject), NEVER on email alone —
* email-matching is an account-takeover vector with
* IdPs that don't verify addresses. Nullable: local
* accounts have neither.
*
* Composite unique index so one IdP identity can't map to two admin rows.
* Additive + guarded; existing rows keep working untouched ('local', NULL).
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'auth_provider'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.string('auth_provider', 20).notNullable().defaultTo('local');
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'external_issuer'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.string('external_issuer', 512).nullable();
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'external_subject'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.string('external_subject', 255).nullable();
t.unique(['external_issuer', 'external_subject'], {
indexName: 'admin_users_issuer_subject_unique',
});
});
}
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
for (const col of ['external_subject', 'external_issuer', 'auth_provider']) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', col)) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => t.dropColumn(col));
}
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
/**
* #837 — per-event override for the live-slideshow QR overlay.
* Mirrors show_watermark: NULL = inherit the global slideshow_qr_enabled
* setting, true/false force the overlay on/off for this event.
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'show_qr');
if (!has) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.boolean('show_qr').nullable().defaultTo(null);
});
}
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'show_qr');
if (has) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.dropColumn('show_qr');
});
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
/**
* Emoji reactions on photos (#839).
*
* - event_feedback_settings.allow_reactions: per-event toggle next to
* allow_likes / allow_ratings / allow_comments. Defaults TRUE for parity
* with the sibling toggles — the master feedback_enabled gate (default
* false, opt-in per event) still decides whether any feedback UI shows.
* - photo_feedback.reaction: the emoji value for feedback_type='reaction'
* rows (validated against the fixed set in constants/reactions.js).
* - photos.reaction_count: denormalized total, maintained by
* updatePhotoFeedbackStats alongside like_count / favorite_count.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
const hasAllowReactions = await knex.schema.hasColumn('event_feedback_settings', 'allow_reactions');
if (!hasAllowReactions) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('event_feedback_settings', (table) => {
table.boolean('allow_reactions').defaultTo(true);
});
}
const hasReaction = await knex.schema.hasColumn('photo_feedback', 'reaction');
if (!hasReaction) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('photo_feedback', (table) => {
// 16 chars: emoji are multi-byte/multi-codepoint (variation selectors),
// but well under 16 characters each.
table.string('reaction', 16);
});
}
const hasReactionCount = await knex.schema.hasColumn('photos', 'reaction_count');
if (!hasReactionCount) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('photos', (table) => {
table.integer('reaction_count').defaultTo(0);
});
}
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('photos', 'reaction_count')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('photos', (table) => {
table.dropColumn('reaction_count');
});
}
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('photo_feedback', 'reaction')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('photo_feedback', (table) => {
table.dropColumn('reaction');
});
}
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('event_feedback_settings', 'allow_reactions')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('event_feedback_settings', (table) => {
table.dropColumn('allow_reactions');
});
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
/**
* Reveal mode (#838): hide the gallery from guests until a manual or
* scheduled reveal — guests can still upload, the host/admin/slideshow see
* everything.
*
* - events.reveal_mode: the per-event toggle (only meaningful together with
* allow_user_uploads; off by default so nothing changes for existing events)
* - events.reveal_at: optional scheduled reveal time. Effective visibility is
* computed at REQUEST time (reveal_at <= now opens the gate even before the
* scheduler runs), the minutely scheduler only stamps revealed_at durably.
* - events.revealed_at: set by "Reveal now" or the scheduler; NULL while
* hidden. Re-enabling reveal_mode clears it (re-hide).
*/
// Each column guarded independently: a partially applied prior run (or a
// fork that added one of them) must not leave the others missing — the
// routes select all three.
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'reveal_mode'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (table) => {
table.boolean('reveal_mode').defaultTo(false);
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'reveal_at'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (table) => {
table.timestamp('reveal_at').nullable();
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'revealed_at'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (table) => {
table.timestamp('revealed_at').nullable();
});
}
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
for (const column of ['revealed_at', 'reveal_at', 'reveal_mode']) {
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', column)) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (table) => {
table.dropColumn(column);
});
}
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
/**
* Migration 166: per-event toggle to hide the branding logo on the
* gallery password page (#894).
*
* NULL (the default) keeps today's behaviour — the global branding logo is
* shown above the password form. Only an explicit `false` hides it for
* that gallery; the admin login page and other surfaces are unaffected.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'login_logo_visible')) return;
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.boolean('login_logo_visible').nullable();
});
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'login_logo_visible'))) return;
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.dropColumn('login_logo_visible');
});
};
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
/**
* Migration 169: re-bill proof-attachment support (issue #866).
*
* - inbound_documents.proof_attach_error : best-effort failure marker. When a
* re-billed supplier invoice's stored
* proof PDF is missing/unreadable at
* the moment the client invoice is
* issued, we DON'T silently drop it —
* we stamp the reason here so the
* re-bill row in CRM → Customer shows
* a recovery banner.
* - customer_accounts.rebill_attach_proof: per-customer tri-state override for
* "attach the supplier proof to the
* client-invoice email".
* NULL = inherit the global default
* true = always attach
* false = never attach
* The global default itself lives in
* app_settings (accounting_rebill_
* attach_proof, default off) and needs
* no seed row — an absent key coerces
* to false, exactly like
* accounting_require_proof.
*
* Additive + hasColumn-guarded so re-runs are safe.
*/
async function addColumn(knex, table, column, builder) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn(table, column))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable(table, builder);
}
}
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('inbound_documents')) {
await addColumn(knex, 'inbound_documents', 'proof_attach_error', (t) => t.text('proof_attach_error'));
}
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('customer_accounts')) {
// Nullable boolean = tri-state (NULL inherit / true on / false off).
await addColumn(knex, 'customer_accounts', 'rebill_attach_proof', (t) => t.boolean('rebill_attach_proof').nullable());
}
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('inbound_documents') && await knex.schema.hasColumn('inbound_documents', 'proof_attach_error')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('inbound_documents', (t) => t.dropColumn('proof_attach_error'));
}
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('customer_accounts') && await knex.schema.hasColumn('customer_accounts', 'rebill_attach_proof')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('customer_accounts', (t) => t.dropColumn('rebill_attach_proof'));
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
/**
* Migration 170: PicTransfer — cross-event file transfers (#997).
*
* Adds the tables that back the "send these files to someone" feature:
*
* transfers One share link. Bundles photos picked from ANY event,
* protected by a 64-hex recipient token. Optionally opens
* a 6-char upload token so the client can send files back
* (logos etc.). Disabled after `expires_at`; files are
* kept `grace_days` days past disable, then hard-deleted.
* transfer_files Join rows: which photos are in a transfer (cross-event).
* photo_id → photos CASCADE, so removing the underlying
* photo just drops it from the transfer; the reverse
* (deleting a transfer) never touches the source photos.
* transfer_uploads Files the client uploaded through the upload token.
* These have their own bytes on disk (uploads/transfers/…)
* and are what the retention sweep deletes.
* transfer_downloads Lightweight audit of recipient downloads (count + IP).
*
* Downloads always serve ORIGINAL files (never watermarked) — a transfer is a
* deliberate "here are your files" hand-off. Reuses the same original-file
* resolution + archiver streaming as the gallery download-all path.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('transfers'))) {
await knex.schema.createTable('transfers', (table) => {
table.increments('id').primary();
// Recipient download token — 64 hex chars = 32 bytes = 256 bits.
table.string('token', 64).notNullable().unique();
table.string('title', 255).notNullable().defaultTo('');
table.text('message');
table.integer('created_by').unsigned()
.references('id').inTable('admin_users').onDelete('SET NULL');
// Link is disabled once this passes (the "set time period" cap).
table.timestamp('expires_at').notNullable();
// Optional download cap. NULL or 0 = unlimited within the window.
table.integer('max_downloads');
table.integer('download_count').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
table.boolean('is_active').notNullable().defaultTo(true);
// When the link flipped inactive — starts the retention clock.
table.timestamp('disabled_at');
// Keep files this many days after disable, then hard-delete.
table.integer('grace_days').notNullable().defaultTo(7);
table.timestamp('admin_notified_at');
table.timestamp('deleted_at');
// Optional client-upload channel (6-char token).
table.boolean('allow_uploads').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
table.string('upload_token', 16).unique();
table.timestamp('upload_expires_at');
table.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
table.timestamp('updated_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
table.index(['is_active', 'expires_at'], 'transfers_active_expiry_idx');
table.index(['deleted_at'], 'transfers_deleted_idx');
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('transfer_files'))) {
await knex.schema.createTable('transfer_files', (table) => {
table.increments('id').primary();
table.integer('transfer_id').unsigned().notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('transfers').onDelete('CASCADE');
table.integer('photo_id').unsigned().notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
table.integer('sort_order').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
table.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
table.index(['transfer_id'], 'transfer_files_transfer_idx');
// A photo can only appear once per transfer.
table.unique(['transfer_id', 'photo_id'], 'transfer_files_unique');
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('transfer_uploads'))) {
await knex.schema.createTable('transfer_uploads', (table) => {
table.increments('id').primary();
table.integer('transfer_id').unsigned().notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('transfers').onDelete('CASCADE');
table.string('original_filename', 512).notNullable();
// Storage-relative key, e.g. uploads/transfers/{id}/{stored-name}.
table.string('stored_path', 1024).notNullable();
table.integer('size_bytes');
table.string('mime_type', 100);
table.string('uploader_ip', 45);
table.timestamp('uploaded_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
table.index(['transfer_id'], 'transfer_uploads_transfer_idx');
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('transfer_downloads'))) {
await knex.schema.createTable('transfer_downloads', (table) => {
table.increments('id').primary();
table.integer('transfer_id').unsigned().notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('transfers').onDelete('CASCADE');
table.string('kind', 20).notNullable().defaultTo('all'); // 'all' | 'single'
table.integer('photo_id').unsigned();
table.string('ip', 45);
table.timestamp('downloaded_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
table.index(['transfer_id'], 'transfer_downloads_transfer_idx');
});
}
// Defaults for the create-transfer form + retention/upload behaviour.
const settings = [
{ setting_key: 'transfer_default_expiry_days', setting_value: JSON.stringify(14), setting_type: 'number' },
{ setting_key: 'transfer_default_grace_days', setting_value: JSON.stringify(7), setting_type: 'number' },
{ setting_key: 'transfer_default_max_downloads', setting_value: JSON.stringify(0), setting_type: 'number' },
{ setting_key: 'transfer_max_upload_size_mb', setting_value: JSON.stringify(50), setting_type: 'number' },
{
setting_key: 'transfer_upload_allowed_mime',
setting_value: JSON.stringify([
'image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp', 'image/gif',
'image/tiff', 'application/pdf', 'application/zip',
]),
setting_type: 'general',
},
];
for (const s of settings) {
const exists = await knex('app_settings').where('setting_key', s.setting_key).first();
if (!exists) {
await knex('app_settings').insert({ ...s, updated_at: knex.fn.now() });
}
}
// Feature flag — PicTransfer is a strictly opt-in module like slideshow /
// workflows: the sidebar entry, the /admin/transfers area and every
// transfer route (admin + public) stay dark until an admin turns it on
// under Settings → Features. Default OFF; idempotent seed.
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('feature_flags')) {
const existingFlag = await knex('feature_flags').where({ key: 'transfers' }).first();
if (!existingFlag) {
await knex('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'transfers', value: false });
}
}
// Admin notification when a transfer link expires (EN + DE, matching the
// convention of the other admin-notification templates — see migration 087).
const existingTemplate = await knex('email_templates')
.where('template_key', 'transfer_link_expired')
.first();
if (!existingTemplate) {
await knex('email_templates').insert({
template_key: 'transfer_link_expired',
subject_en: 'A transfer link has expired — {{transfer_title}}',
subject_de: 'Ein Transfer-Link ist abgelaufen — {{transfer_title}}',
body_html_en: `
<h2>A transfer link has expired</h2>
<p>The following file transfer is no longer downloadable by its recipient:</p>
<div style="background-color: #f0f8ff; border-left: 4px solid #5C8762; padding: 20px; margin: 20px 0; border-radius: 4px;">
<p style="margin: 0;"><strong>Transfer:</strong> {{transfer_title}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Expired at:</strong> {{expiry_date}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Files included:</strong> {{file_count}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Client uploads received:</strong> {{upload_count}}</p>
</div>
<p>The files will be kept for {{grace_days}} more days (until {{delete_date}})
so you can re-share or retrieve anything you still need, then they are
automatically deleted.</p>
<p><a href="{{admin_url}}">Open PicTransfer in the admin area</a></p>
<p>Best regards,<br>
Your PicPeak Installation</p>`,
body_text_en: `A transfer link has expired
The following file transfer is no longer downloadable by its recipient:
Transfer: {{transfer_title}}
Expired at: {{expiry_date}}
Files included: {{file_count}}
Client uploads received: {{upload_count}}
The files will be kept for {{grace_days}} more days (until {{delete_date}}) so
you can re-share or retrieve anything you still need, then they are
automatically deleted.
Open PicTransfer in the admin area: {{admin_url}}
Best regards,
Your PicPeak Installation`,
body_html_de: `
<h2>Ein Transfer-Link ist abgelaufen</h2>
<p>Der folgende Datei-Transfer kann vom Empfänger nicht mehr heruntergeladen werden:</p>
<div style="background-color: #f0f8ff; border-left: 4px solid #5C8762; padding: 20px; margin: 20px 0; border-radius: 4px;">
<p style="margin: 0;"><strong>Transfer:</strong> {{transfer_title}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Abgelaufen am:</strong> {{expiry_date}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Enthaltene Dateien:</strong> {{file_count}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Empfangene Kunden-Uploads:</strong> {{upload_count}}</p>
</div>
<p>Die Dateien werden noch {{grace_days}} Tage aufbewahrt (bis {{delete_date}}),
damit Sie alles Benötigte erneut teilen oder abrufen können; danach werden sie
automatisch gelöscht.</p>
<p><a href="{{admin_url}}">PicTransfer im Admin-Bereich öffnen</a></p>
<p>Mit freundlichen Grüßen,<br>
Ihre PicPeak-Installation</p>`,
body_text_de: `Ein Transfer-Link ist abgelaufen
Der folgende Datei-Transfer kann vom Empfänger nicht mehr heruntergeladen werden:
Transfer: {{transfer_title}}
Abgelaufen am: {{expiry_date}}
Enthaltene Dateien: {{file_count}}
Empfangene Kunden-Uploads: {{upload_count}}
Die Dateien werden noch {{grace_days}} Tage aufbewahrt (bis {{delete_date}}),
danach werden sie automatisch gelöscht.
PicTransfer im Admin-Bereich öffnen: {{admin_url}}
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Ihre PicPeak-Installation`,
variables: JSON.stringify([
'transfer_title', 'expiry_date', 'file_count', 'upload_count',
'grace_days', 'delete_date', 'admin_url',
]),
});
}
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('feature_flags')) {
await knex('feature_flags').where({ key: 'transfers' }).del();
}
await knex('email_templates').where('template_key', 'transfer_link_expired').del();
await knex('app_settings')
.whereIn('setting_key', [
'transfer_default_expiry_days',
'transfer_default_grace_days',
'transfer_default_max_downloads',
'transfer_max_upload_size_mb',
'transfer_upload_allowed_mime',
])
.del();
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('transfer_downloads');
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('transfer_uploads');
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('transfer_files');
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('transfers');
};

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