chore(stable): release 3.46.4 (#1159)

Stable twin of #1153.

Everything in the system treats a hidden row as absent, but the per-viewer is_liked heart read the row without looking at is_hidden — so a like the photographer had hidden still showed as liked on a photo whose like_count was zero.

Making that agree exposes the second half: the duplicate check behind like/favorite toggling did not skip hidden rows either, so the now-empty heart, when clicked, found the hidden row and toggled it OFF. Skipping hidden rows there makes the click create a fresh, visible row.

Also carried from review: the per-guest caps, /my-feedback and getEventFeedbackSummary no longer count hidden rows, and unhiding collapses the guest's replacement — skipped when there is no stable identity, since that fallback was 'guest_identifier IS NULL', i.e. other visitors' rows.

Not carried: the my_color_label badge (colour labels are #1044) and the clearScope / singleValueScope visibility fix, neither of which exists on this branch.

Merged with admin privileges: the author cannot self-approve.

.env.example

@@ -56,8 +56,9 @@ DB_NAME=picpeak_prod
 # Admin Account (initial setup) — OPTIONAL
 # Leave these unset (default) to create your admin IN THE BROWSER on first run:
 # open /admin and PicPeak shows a setup screen. The one-time setup token is
-# printed to the backend logs (`docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`)
-# and saved to data/SETUP_TOKEN.
+# written to data/SETUP_TOKEN with mode 0600 — read it with
+# `docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN`. It is NOT logged
+# unless that write fails, so it never sits in `docker logs`.
 # Set ADMIN_PASSWORD to auto-create the admin on first boot instead (legacy;
 # credentials written to data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt).
 #ADMIN_USERNAME=admin

.github/workflows/docker-build.yml

@@ -203,6 +203,14 @@ jobs:
         format: 'sarif'
         output: 'trivy-backend-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }}.sarif'
         severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
+        # Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not actionable: the
+        # Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a CACHEBUST,
+        # so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting them
+        # buries the findings someone can actually do something about.
+        # Dropping them is also the precondition for ever setting
+        # exit-code: 1, which build-backend's comment flags as a
+        # deliberate follow-up.
+        ignore-unfixed: true
         timeout: '10m'
 
     - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
@@ -425,6 +433,14 @@ jobs:
         format: 'sarif'
         output: 'trivy-frontend-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }}.sarif'
         severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
+        # Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not actionable: the
+        # Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a CACHEBUST,
+        # so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting them
+        # buries the findings someone can actually do something about.
+        # Dropping them is also the precondition for ever setting
+        # exit-code: 1, which build-backend's comment flags as a
+        # deliberate follow-up.
+        ignore-unfixed: true
         timeout: '10m'
 
     - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab

.github/workflows/release-please.yml

@@ -27,32 +27,12 @@ jobs:
           manifest-file: .release-please-manifest.json
           target-branch: stable
 
-      # Auto-approve + auto-merge the open stable release PR. See the beta
-      # workflow for the full rationale. Skipped on the release-cutting run and
-      # whenever no PAT is configured.
-      - name: Auto-approve and enable auto-merge on the release PR
-        if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created != 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
-          # No checkout in this job — set the repo explicitly so gh works
-          # without a git remote (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
-          GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
-        run: |
-          if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
-            echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping auto-merge (manual review still required)."
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          pr=$(gh pr list --head release-please--branches--stable --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number // empty')
-          if [ -n "$pr" ]; then
-            # Approve as github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN, ≠ the PAT author) so it
-            # is a valid review; enable auto-merge as the PAT so the merge commit is
-            # attributed to a real identity and triggers the tag-cutting run (#719).
-            gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — release-please version bump + changelog (#719)." || true
-            GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto || true
-          else
-            echo "No open release PR to auto-merge."
-          fi
+      # NOTE: stable release PRs are intentionally NOT auto-merged here
+      # anymore. Fixes accumulate in the rolling release PR and are cut as
+      # ONE patch version per day by release-stable-daily.yml (18:00 UTC,
+      # or on demand via workflow_dispatch / a manual merge of the release
+      # PR). Beta keeps instant releases — see release-please-beta.yml —
+      # because same-day reporter verification depends on it.
 
       - name: Output Release Info
         if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}

.github/workflows/release-stable-daily.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+name: Cut Stable Release (daily batch)
+
+# Stable fixes accumulate in release-please's rolling release PR instead of
+# each cutting its own patch version (the old per-merge auto-merge produced
+# e.g. 3.45.8 AND 3.45.9 on the same day). This workflow merges the open
+# stable release PR once a day, so a day of N bugfixes ships as ONE version
+# with all N changelog entries — and one Docker build instead of N.
+#
+# - schedule only fires from the default branch (main); the stable copy of
+#   this file is inert and exists to keep the branches in sync.
+# - Need a release NOW? Run this via workflow_dispatch, or merge the
+#   release PR by hand — the schedule is a default, not a gate.
+# - Approval/merge mechanics mirror the old inline step (#719): approve as
+#   github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN, a valid distinct reviewer), enable
+#   auto-merge as the PAT so the merge attributes to a real identity and
+#   triggers the tag-cutting run. --auto waits for green checks.
+
+on:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '0 18 * * *'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: write
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  merge-stable-release-pr:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Approve and enable auto-merge on the open stable release PR
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
+          # No checkout — set the repo explicitly so gh works without a
+          # git remote (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
+          GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
+            echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping (manual review required)."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          # Strict selection (review P1): this job runs daily even without a
+          # stable push, and `gh pr list --head` matches the branch NAME only
+          # — a fork PR can spoof `release-please--branches--stable`. Pin the
+          # base to stable AND require a same-repo head (isCrossRepository
+          # == false); a fork PR is cross-repository, so it can never be
+          # picked and auto-merged with the privileged PAT.
+          pr=$(gh pr list \
+            --base stable \
+            --head release-please--branches--stable \
+            --state open \
+            --json number,isCrossRepository \
+            --jq '[.[] | select(.isCrossRepository == false)] | .[0].number // empty')
+          if [ -z "$pr" ]; then
+            echo "No open same-repo stable release PR — nothing to cut today."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          # Approve is tolerant — a pre-existing approval already satisfies
+          # branch protection and re-approving can return non-zero.
+          gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — daily stable release batch (release-please version bump + changelog)." || echo "::warning::approve returned non-zero (PR may already be approved)"
+          # But the auto-merge enable is the load-bearing step: this scheduled
+          # job is the ONLY automatic stable cut, so DON'T swallow its failure
+          # (review P2) — an expired/under-scoped PAT would otherwise stop
+          # releases while the workflow stays green.
+          GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto
+          # `gh pr merge --auto` merges IMMEDIATELY when the required checks
+          # are already green — the normal case at 18:00, since the fixes
+          # merged hours earlier and CI passed. So success is EITHER the PR is
+          # already merged OR an auto-merge request is now pending; only a PR
+          # that is still open with no auto-merge request is a real failure
+          # (expired/under-scoped PAT) worth failing the job on (review round 2).
+          # One snapshot of both fields (review round 3): querying state and
+          # autoMergeRequest separately races — auto-merge can complete
+          # between the two calls, so the first sees OPEN and the second sees
+          # the request already cleared on the now-merged PR → false failure.
+          read -r state automerge < <(gh pr view "$pr" --json state,autoMergeRequest \
+            --jq '[.state, (.autoMergeRequest != null)] | @tsv')
+          if [ "$state" = "MERGED" ]; then
+            echo "Stable release PR #$pr merged immediately (checks were already green)."
+          elif [ "$automerge" = "true" ]; then
+            echo "Auto-merge enabled on stable release PR #$pr — merges when checks are green."
+          else
+            echo "::error::stable release PR #$pr is still open with no auto-merge — check RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN scope/expiry."
+            exit 1
+          fi

.github/workflows/tests.yml

@@ -30,6 +30,29 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
 
+    # The .picpeak restore suites gate their real-Postgres cases behind
+    # PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL and `describe.skip` themselves out when it is
+    # unset — so until now they never ran here. That hid the half that
+    # matters: sequence resync, operator/role preservation across a
+    # cross-instance restore, and (with #1041) whether a SQLite-shaped
+    # row actually lands in Postgres with the right STORED VALUES rather
+    # than merely not throwing. Everything else in the suite still runs
+    # on SQLite; this service only un-gates those cases.
+    services:
+      postgres:
+        image: postgres:15-alpine
+        env:
+          POSTGRES_USER: picpeak
+          POSTGRES_PASSWORD: testpass
+          POSTGRES_DB: picpeak_test
+        options: >-
+          --health-cmd "pg_isready -U picpeak -d picpeak_test"
+          --health-interval 2s
+          --health-timeout 2s
+          --health-retries 30
+        ports:
+          - 5432:5432
+
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -52,6 +75,9 @@ jobs:
           # The S3 path itself is covered separately by the integration
           # suite when MinIO is provisioned.
           SKIP_S3_TESTS: 'true'
+          # Un-gates the real-Postgres cases in the .picpeak restore suites
+          # (see the `services:` note above). Absent it they silently skip.
+          PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL: 'postgres://picpeak:testpass@127.0.0.1:5432/picpeak_test'
         run: |
           # Excluded suites — fail on upstream/beta too, tracked
           # separately as test-infra debt:

.gitignore

@@ -130,5 +130,8 @@ docker-compose.dev.yml
 # New layout development files
 new-layouts/
 
-# Generated CRM/accounting documents (runtime) — never commit
-backend/storage/business-docs/
+# Backend runtime storage (generated media, previews, thumbnails,
+# CRM/accounting documents) — never commit. Matches main: a dev instance
+# writes event photos into backend/storage/, and the narrower
+# business-docs-only rule let `git add -A` sweep them into a commit.
+backend/storage/

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{".":"3.45.9"}
+{".":"3.46.4"}

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,123 @@ All notable changes to PicPeak will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [3.46.4](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.3...v3.46.4) (2026-08-23)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **gallery:** a guest's own hidden feedback is hidden from them too ([#1150](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1150)) ([#1157](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1157)) ([b62cd2c](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/b62cd2c290d54820e8f58d11719d48592a1cd1f1))
+* **gallery:** guest filters respect show_feedback_to_guests ([#1044](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1044)) ([#1156](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1156)) ([eaa8b41](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/eaa8b41ba323c7eac22e04947fead8e468e9c6c2))
+* **gallery:** no Logout button on galleries that don't require a password ([#1149](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1149)) ([#1154](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1154)) ([d46397d](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/d46397d92a7648910075fb774b14abf77d893865))
+* **scripts:** regenerate-thumbnails resolves external sources through ensureThumbnail ([#1148](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1148)) ([#1155](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1155)) ([e46260a](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/e46260ad0799bd411a4158c4cc31d587ba85d4ca))
+
+## [3.46.3](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.2...v3.46.3) (2026-08-22)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **gallery:** a missing file must not take the backend down ([#1128](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1128)) ([da44f19](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/da44f1947b8317b47271f4f2a98b284b25d752c1))
+* **gallery:** give masonry tiles their real shape back ([#1130](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1130), [#1131](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1131)) ([d977e3e](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/d977e3e296deeb19c26f1e5a98258eec323d120d))
+* **thumbnails:** regenerate external photos, and stop destroying good ones ([#1129](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1129)) ([dc9e3cd](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/dc9e3cdc5e00ac634f581e8d6b13107fe4839152))
+
+## [3.46.2](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.1...v3.46.2) (2026-08-21)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **ui:** stop iOS Safari zooming in on 14px form fields ([#1114](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1114)) ([32db1c8](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/32db1c8052d324b09462a17859c7adb5ccfe56e3))
+
+## [3.46.1](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.46.0...v3.46.1) (2026-08-19)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **preview:** generate lightbox previews for external/reference photos ([#1078](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1078)) ([#1080](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1080)) ([6df42ab](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/6df42ab22c705bcb731862db1ed5a27de0a64f30))
+
+## [3.46.0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.16...v3.46.0) (2026-08-16)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **backup:** open sqlite → pg .picpeak restore as the supported upgrade direction ([#1041](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1041)) ([#1059](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1059)) ([980378a](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/980378a17ba873d0e2f3d76048dacb3b8d7a4eb2))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **pdf:** RFC 6266-encode Content-Disposition on quote/invoice PDFs ([#1024](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1024)) ([#1062](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1062)) ([376311c](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/376311cb9091ff1726e8b383312f22c607dcc8a0))
+* **storage:** add S3 client timeouts so a dropped connection can't wedge uploads ([#1049](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1049)) ([#1054](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1054)) ([88fa3c5](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/88fa3c52973fa122f8d4e7b21ba1ffc89f9f9c2e))
+
+## [3.45.16](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.15...v3.45.16) (2026-08-13)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **docker:** default NODE_ENV=production so non-compose deploys don't fall back to SQLite ([#1038](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1038)) ([#1040](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1040)) ([9003b34](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/9003b34c8a0396cd28906f089aef33f38a23ffb7))
+* **events:** make event_date/expires_at nullable on SQLite ([#1029](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1029)) ([#1036](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1036)) ([fb3d0b0](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/fb3d0b08b2dc34f7e7dab7da754a3522c52a9eb1))
+* **feedback:** persist guest feedback settings, unshadow the guest route ([#1030](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1030)) ([#1032](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1032)) ([de459c7](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/de459c701f28532ca53d52773b02de44c9978073))
+* **gallery:** coerce SQLite 0/1 booleans in the guest surface ([#1028](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1028)) ([#1037](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1037)) ([8b6cd3c](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/8b6cd3c74f2aeb5d38ebfeee04bbc211d6fa2c0c))
+
+## [3.45.15](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.14...v3.45.15) (2026-08-10)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **deps:** bump nanoid and js-yaml out of two HIGH advisories (stable) ([#1014](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1014)) ([cee0a38](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/cee0a380a6faf2bb0a5c802057ba3140670840d2))
+* **slideshow:** stop "no crop" fit letterboxing a pre-cropped frame (stable) ([#1015](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1015)) ([#1019](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/1019)) ([2bdb120](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/2bdb1204fe61a9b6cd704b35ccfd39efa15ed118))
+
+## [3.45.14](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.13...v3.45.14) (2026-08-04)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **deps:** bump ip-address, brace-expansion and postcss for open CVEs (stable) ([#988](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/988)) ([0fe5792](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/0fe5792a7d30bd948d6430642ca0bec35ddc2ca6))
+* **security:** vet the destination project when linking a deal (stable) ([#992](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/992)) ([bf9bd76](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/bf9bd762783a2a675f0a6fcd965addf0f47cec57))
+
+## [3.45.13](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.12...v3.45.13) (2026-08-03)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **auth:** fail closed when the adminAuth roles join errors (stable) ([#975](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/975)) ([cc49f69](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/cc49f6997ac54c3e25d5562721c446b7dac7f074))
+* **projects:** stop the cockpit offering email controls the API rejects (stable) ([#977](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/977)) ([2d0e6ab](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/2d0e6ab2dca84cf74c6c6b5c40ecae5c5cde814c))
+* **security:** backup/restore hardening — public-dir DB dump, restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest keying (stable) ([#962](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/962)) ([3b88036](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/3b88036fda871b3a1ca2e933c39fa96e37950fe6))
+* **security:** bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (stable) ([#965](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/965)) ([ccab902](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/ccab9024d4ef2f556169bbca8c6bba4801afe3a0))
+* **security:** enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697) (stable) ([#963](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/963)) ([4e99897](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/4e9989731390f9c067b048f4fa56ed3bf8ec472d))
+* **security:** enforce project ownership on project + project-email routes (stable) ([#966](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/966)) ([fecc18c](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/fecc18cbc837507bf30dd7502786de4e067855a5))
+* **security:** escape brand tokens, block tracker redirects, trim logo diagnostic (stable) ([#967](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/967)) ([7f27e67](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/7f27e6771f666a40ec0581dc7702be3a1de8330d))
+* **security:** scope dashboard stats/analytics/activity to the caller's events (stable) ([#964](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/964)) ([11f9f58](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/11f9f584ded5f777a61dc2e1e637d478a61ac377))
+
+## [3.45.12](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.11...v3.45.12) (2026-08-02)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **security:** authz/ownership gaps (token binding, auth revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging) (stable) ([#951](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/951)) ([5d5db4e](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/5d5db4e766eee23a6678b399cdb9cc449fcea198))
+* **security:** neutralize spreadsheet formulas in all CSV/export cell-writers (CSV injection cluster) ([#949](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/949)) ([e5dccf1](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/e5dccf166419bb571b052990aada14801e16ac79))
+* **security:** redact gallery share tokens from analytics tracking (GHSA-7m6c) (stable) ([#953](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/953)) ([2c7b5df](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/2c7b5dfd020ac1fb2acdb7667998b2f373ce99d9))
+* **security:** unauth share_token leak (HIGH) + restore path-traversal, logo file-read (stable) ([#947](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/947)) ([bfafece](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/bfafecedc755790374565281287b9777ae0f5315))
+
+## [3.45.11](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.10...v3.45.11) (2026-08-01)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **security:** block guest access to hidden/client-only photos across bulk + secure routes (stable) ([#940](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/940)) ([34a7b1c](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/34a7b1c0137cf4cba53f17270f619ce9755c4c98))
+* **security:** bump sanitize-html to 2.17.5 (CVE-2026-53606) (stable) ([#938](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/938)) ([7419c68](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/7419c683375d12650c448caa47ffe0444a7e1458))
+* **security:** close authorization/ownership gaps (token scope, mass-assignment, category hero, project docs) (stable) ([#944](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/944)) ([2462ba6](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/2462ba6897c93b3f0834d60cc2e6827a45487062))
+* **security:** resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) (stable) ([#942](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/942)) ([90275f8](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/90275f88e9af523ba3cc254cef2ca6f48a2a4129))
+* **uploads:** prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes ([#931](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/931)) (stable) ([#934](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/934)) ([fc99e2b](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/fc99e2b233b4a7c81c410f7d557e7dff270437bd))
+
+## [3.45.10](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.9...v3.45.10) (2026-07-30)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **admin:** expose view/download counters in the admin photos list ([#895](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/895) follow-up) (stable) ([#915](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/915)) ([a27d19b](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/a27d19b4d147c33166b47a6bac12b8d1be32daf1))
+* **admin:** serve videos with their real MIME type in the admin photo view ([#908](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/908)) (stable) ([#911](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/911)) ([d68d84e](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/d68d84e5c8cfcd123c95e474d2b87d153764f710))
+* **admin:** stop marking events expired up to 24h early ([#909](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/909)) (stable) ([#917](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/917)) ([6891769](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/6891769124f77d5af1bbe8eb0932a86753d89e7d))
+* **security:** close GHSA-g94x (cross-gallery photo read) + GHSA-pv6w (admin DB export) (stable) ([#925](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/925)) ([60cbda5](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/60cbda5b2228e0bddf5356eae279d9e7916e9ac2))
+
 ## [3.45.9](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.8...v3.45.9) (2026-07-29)
 
 

README.md

@@ -111,10 +111,15 @@ docker compose up -d
 On first start with no `ADMIN_PASSWORD` set, PicPeak has **no admin account yet** and greets you with an in-browser setup screen — no credentials in `.env`:
 
 1. Open **http://localhost:3000/admin** — you'll be redirected to `/setup`.
-2. Grab the **one-time setup token** from the backend logs (it's also saved to `data/SETUP_TOKEN`):
+2. Read the **one-time setup token** from the 0600 file the backend writes it to
+   (it is deliberately *not* printed to the logs — that would leave a live
+   bootstrap credential in `docker logs`):
    ```bash
-   docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"
+   docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN
    ```
+   It is bind-mounted, so `sudo cat data/SETUP_TOKEN` on the host works too. Only
+   if that file could not be written does the backend fall back to logging the
+   token (`docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`).
 3. Paste the token, set your admin **email + password**, and you're in. The token is single-use, and the setup screen closes permanently once an admin exists.
 
 > Prefer the old behaviour? Set `ADMIN_PASSWORD` in `.env` and PicPeak auto-creates the admin on first boot instead (credentials written to `data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt`).

SIMPLE_SETUP.md

@@ -170,10 +170,12 @@ If you installed with `picpeak-setup.sh` and gave an `--admin-password`, your ad
 If you started PicPeak **without** setting `ADMIN_PASSWORD` (e.g. a plain `docker compose up`), there's **no admin yet** and you create it in the browser:
 
 1. Open `http://your-server:3000/admin` — you'll land on a setup screen.
-2. Get the **one-time setup token** from the backend logs (also saved to `data/SETUP_TOKEN`):
+2. Read the **one-time setup token** from the 0600 file the backend writes it to
+   (it is not logged — that would leave a live credential in `docker logs`):
    ```bash
-   docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"
+   docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN
    ```
+   Only if that write fails does the backend log the token instead.
 3. Paste it, set your admin email + password. The token is single-use and the screen closes once an admin exists.
 
 ## 🌐 Access Methods

backend/Dockerfile

@@ -27,6 +27,15 @@ FROM node:22-alpine
 
 WORKDIR /app
 
+# knexfile.js picks its config block by NODE_ENV, and the `development` block
+# defaults to sqlite3. Leaving NODE_ENV unset here meant every deployment that
+# doesn't go through our compose files — Kubernetes, Helm, plain `docker run` —
+# silently ran on SQLite and ignored DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD, while
+# wait-for-db.sh (shell, reads DB_HOST directly) reported "PostgreSQL is up" in
+# the same log. The compose files still override this, so nothing changes for
+# compose users. See #1038.
+ENV NODE_ENV=production
+
 # Redeclare CACHEBUST — ARGs don't cross stage boundaries, so the builder
 # stage's declaration never reached this stage. Consuming it in the RUN below
 # busts that layer's cache every CI run (CACHEBUST=github.run_number), so the

backend/__tests__/integration/adminThumbnails.regenerate.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+/**
+ * POST /admin/thumbnails/regenerate for external/reference photos (#1129).
+ *
+ * STABLE TWIN. Diverges from the main version in one place: stable has no
+ * responsive ?w= tiers (#1095/#1109), so there is no deleteThumbnailTiers call
+ * to assert and the "drops the tiers first" test is absent here. Everything
+ * else — the external rebuild, the thumbnail_path:null contract, video
+ * skipping, per-event scoping and the superseded-key deletion — is identical.
+ *
+ * The route used to resolve every source as `storage/events/active/<path>` and
+ * `fs.access` it. External and reference rows do not live there — their
+ * originals sit under `events.external_path` — so every one of them failed the
+ * check and was counted as an error.
+ *
+ * That alone would be inert. What made it destructive is that the tier
+ * deletion runs FIRST (deliberately, so S3 and external rows are not skipped):
+ * on a reference install the button dropped every ?w= tier and rebuilt
+ * nothing, while the UI reported success — the response is sent before the
+ * background loop starts.
+ *
+ * The background work is fired with setImmediate, so every assertion here has
+ * to wait for it to drain rather than trusting the response.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+describe('admin thumbnail regeneration (#1129)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let app; let imageProcessor; let storage;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-'));
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'test.db');
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
+      adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester' }; next(); },
+    }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
+      requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
+    }));
+    // One instance, not a fresh object per call — the route and the
+    // assertions have to be looking at the same mock.
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/storage', () => {
+      const instance = { delete: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+      return { getStorage: () => instance };
+    });
+    jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
+      ensureThumbnail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('thumbnails/thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'),
+      ensurePreviewImage: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('previews/p.jpg'),
+      deletePreviewTiers: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+    }));
+
+    // bootCrmDb, not run-migrations: the latter calls process.exit(0) on
+    // success, which ends the jest worker mid-suite.
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+    storage = require('../../src/services/storage').getStorage();
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/admin/thumbnails', require('../../src/routes/adminThumbnails'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    jest.clearAllMocks();
+    await db('photos').del();
+    await db('events').del();
+  });
+
+  async function seedEvent() {
+    const [row] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'nas-wedding', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'nas',
+      event_date: '2026-01-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', share_link: 'nas-share', expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference', external_path: 'weddings/2026-08',
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
+  }
+
+  async function seedPhoto(eventId, overrides = {}) {
+    const [row] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'shot.jpg', path: 'nas-wedding/shot.jpg',
+      type: 'individual', ...overrides,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
+  }
+
+  /** The work runs in setImmediate; give it room to finish. */
+  const drain = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 150));
+
+  it('rebuilds the canonical thumbnail for an external photo instead of erroring', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await seedPhoto(eventId, {
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'shot.jpg',
+      thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/stale.jpg',
+    });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    await drain();
+
+    // The whole bug: this used to be zero calls and one logged
+    // "Original file not found" per photo.
+    expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it('nulls thumbnail_path so the valid-thumbnail short-circuit cannot skip the rebuild', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await seedPhoto(eventId, {
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'shot.jpg',
+      thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/still-on-disk.jpg',
+    });
+
+    await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+    await drain();
+
+    // Without this the endpoint is a no-op whenever the OLD thumbnail is still
+    // readable — which is the normal case after a settings change, and exactly
+    // when the admin pressed the button.
+    const [photoArg] = imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mock.calls[0];
+    expect(photoArg.thumbnail_path).toBeNull();
+    expect(photoArg.source_origin).toBe('external');
+    // Carried through so ensureThumbnail can resolve off the mount rather than
+    // under events/active.
+    expect(photoArg.external_relpath).toBe('shot.jpg');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves videos alone rather than handing a container file to Sharp', async () => {
+    const eventId = await seedEvent();
+    await seedPhoto(eventId, { source_origin: 'managed', media_type: 'video', filename: 'clip.mp4' });
+    await seedPhoto(eventId, { source_origin: 'managed', filename: 'still.jpg' });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+    await drain();
+
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
+    expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mock.calls[0][0].filename).toBe('still.jpg');
+  });
+
+  /**
+   * On S3, ensureThumbnail downloads the source to a randomly-named temp file,
+   * and for non-RAW input withProcessableImage passes no outputBasename — so
+   * generateThumbnail derives the key from that random name and it differs on
+   * every run. Nulling thumbnail_path hides the old key from everything that
+   * would otherwise clean it up, so each regeneration would strand a full
+   * thumbnail in the bucket, once per photo per run.
+   */
+  describe('superseded canonical renditions', () => {
+    it('removes the old thumbnail when the key moved', async () => {
+      const eventId = await seedEvent();
+      await seedPhoto(eventId, {
+        source_origin: 'managed',
+        thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_OLDRANDOM_shot.jpg',
+      });
+      imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_NEWRANDOM_shot.jpg');
+
+      await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+      await drain();
+
+      expect(storage.delete).toHaveBeenCalledWith('thumbnails/thumb_OLDRANDOM_shot.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT delete when the key is unchanged — that is the new file', async () => {
+      const eventId = await seedEvent();
+      await seedPhoto(eventId, {
+        source_origin: 'managed',
+        thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_stable.jpg',
+      });
+      // Local storage resolves to a stable path, so the key is identical.
+      imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_stable.jpg');
+
+      await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+      await drain();
+
+      expect(storage.delete).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ['a Windows-style legacy path', 'thumbnails\\thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'],
+      ['a leading ./', './thumbnails/thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'],
+      ['a doubled separator', 'thumbnails//thumb_ext1_shot.jpg'],
+    ])('does not delete the file it just wrote when the old path is %s', async (_name, stored) => {
+      const eventId = await seedEvent();
+      await seedPhoto(eventId, { source_origin: 'managed', thumbnail_path: stored });
+      // Both storage backends fold these to the same key, so this is the SAME
+      // object — deleting it would remove the freshly generated thumbnail and
+      // leave the row pointing at nothing.
+      imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_ext1_shot.jpg');
+
+      await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+      await drain();
+
+      expect(storage.delete).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('counts the photo as regenerated even if the old object cannot be removed', async () => {
+      const eventId = await seedEvent();
+      await seedPhoto(eventId, {
+        source_origin: 'managed',
+        thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_OLD.jpg',
+      });
+      imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail.mockResolvedValueOnce('thumbnails/thumb_NEW.jpg');
+      storage.delete.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('bucket said no'));
+
+      await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({});
+      await drain();
+
+      // Losing the old object is untidy; the regeneration itself succeeded.
+      expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('scopes to one event when asked', async () => {
+    const a = await seedEvent();
+    await seedPhoto(a, { source_origin: 'external', external_relpath: 'a.jpg' });
+    const [b] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'other', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'other', event_date: '2026-01-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: 'other-share', expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    await seedPhoto(typeof b === 'object' ? b.id : b, { source_origin: 'managed' });
+
+    const res = await request(app).post('/admin/thumbnails/regenerate').send({ eventId: a });
+    await drain();
+
+    expect(res.body.count).toBe(1);
+    expect(imageProcessor.ensureThumbnail).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/galleryFilterFeedbackVisibility.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/**
+ * Guest filters must respect show_feedback_to_guests (#1044 follow-up).
+ *
+ * Every filter token on /photos is an OR of two halves: what THIS viewer
+ * marked, and what ANYONE marked. The response fields built from the second
+ * half — like_count, comment_count — are all gated on
+ * show_feedback_to_guests. The FILTER was not.
+ *
+ * So with the setting off, the numbers were hidden but `?filter=liked` still
+ * returned exactly the photos other people had liked: the same information as
+ * a set instead of a count, one token at a time. These tests pin the gate on
+ * every token, and pin that the viewer's own half is never gated — filtering
+ * by what you yourself marked is yours to do regardless.
+ */
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'filter-visibility-secret';
+
+const SLUG = 'filter-visibility-event';
+const ME = 'guest-me-identifier';
+const SOMEONE_ELSE = 'guest-other-identifier';
+
+describe('guest filters and show_feedback_to_guests (#1044)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let mine;
+  let theirs;
+  let myGuestRowId;
+
+  const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  const setVisibility = (visible) => db('event_feedback_settings')
+    .where({ event_id: eventId })
+    .update({ show_feedback_to_guests: visible });
+
+  // A real verified guest, which is how the viewer's own feedback is actually
+  // identified — NOT the `guest_id` query parameter the frontend invents.
+  const guestToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { type: 'guest', guestId: myGuestRowId, eventId },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  const filter = async (token, { as = 'me', claimGuestId } = {}) => {
+    const req = request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
+      .query({ filter: token, ...(claimGuestId ? { guest_id: claimGuestId } : {}) })
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+    if (as === 'me') req.set('x-guest-token', guestToken());
+    const res = await req;
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const photos = Array.isArray(res.body) ? res.body : res.body.photos;
+    return (photos || []).map((p) => p.id).sort((a, b) => a - b);
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Filter Visibility',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'filter-visibility-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const addPhoto = async (name) => {
+      const p = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename: name,
+        path: `events/filter/${name}`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      return p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
+    };
+    mine = await addPhoto('mine.jpg');
+    theirs = await addPhoto('theirs.jpg');
+
+    await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      feedback_enabled: true,
+      allow_likes: true,
+      allow_comments: true,
+      allow_ratings: true,
+      allow_favorites: true,
+      moderate_comments: false,
+      show_feedback_to_guests: true,
+    });
+
+    const guestRow = await db('gallery_guests').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      name: 'Me',
+      identifier: ME,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      last_seen_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      is_deleted: false,
+    }).returning('id');
+    myGuestRowId = guestRow[0]?.id ?? guestRow[0];
+
+    const feedback = (photoId, who, type, extra = {}) => db('photo_feedback').insert({
+      photo_id: photoId,
+      event_id: eventId,
+      guest_identifier: who,
+      // Submission links to the per-person guest row when one is present, and
+      // that is the column the viewer's own half resolves through.
+      guest_id: who === ME ? myGuestRowId : null,
+      feedback_type: type,
+      is_approved: true,
+      is_hidden: false,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      ...extra,
+    });
+
+    // Everything on `theirs` belongs to somebody else; `mine` is this viewer's.
+    await feedback(mine, ME, 'like');
+    await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'like');
+    await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'favorite');
+    await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'comment', { comment_text: 'lovely' });
+    await feedback(theirs, SOMEONE_ELSE, 'rating', { rating: 5 });
+
+    // The denormalized counters the aggregate half of the filter reads.
+    await db('photos').where('id', theirs).update({
+      like_count: 1, favorite_count: 1, comment_count: 1, average_rating: 5,
+    });
+    await db('photos').where('id', mine).update({ like_count: 1 });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  describe('with feedback visible to guests', () => {
+    beforeAll(() => setVisibility(true));
+
+    it('shows other people\'s marks through every token, as before', async () => {
+      expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([mine, theirs].sort((a, b) => a - b));
+      expect(await filter('favorited')).toEqual([theirs]);
+      expect(await filter('rated')).toEqual([theirs]);
+      expect(await filter('commented')).toEqual([theirs]);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('with feedback hidden from guests', () => {
+    beforeAll(() => setVisibility(false));
+
+    it('stops every token from selecting on other people\'s marks', async () => {
+      // `theirs` is the photo only other guests marked. It must not come back
+      // through any token — a filter that selects on hidden feedback reports
+      // that feedback just as surely as a count would.
+      expect(await filter('favorited')).toEqual([]);
+      expect(await filter('rated')).toEqual([]);
+      expect(await filter('commented')).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it('still filters by what the viewer marked themselves', async () => {
+      // The viewer's own half is never gated: this is their own action, and
+      // hiding it would break "show me the ones I liked" for no privacy gain.
+      expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([mine]);
+    });
+
+    it('drops the viewer\'s own feedback once an admin hides it', async () => {
+      // Moderation has to reach the filter too. getPhotoFeedback excludes
+      // hidden rows for the guest's OWN feedback, so a photo matching here
+      // would come back with nothing visible on it to explain why.
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: mine, guest_id: myGuestRowId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: true });
+
+      expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([]);
+
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: mine, guest_id: myGuestRowId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: false });
+      expect(await filter('liked')).toEqual([mine]);
+    });
+
+    it('ignores a guest_id supplied by the caller', async () => {
+      // The own-half is resolved from the request identity. If it honoured the
+      // query string instead, anyone holding another guest's identifier could
+      // read that guest's hidden memberships one token at a time — straight
+      // back through the gate this file exists to pin.
+      expect(await filter('favorited', { claimGuestId: SOMEONE_ELSE })).toEqual([]);
+      // And an anonymous caller claiming to be me gets nothing of mine.
+      expect(await filter('liked', { as: 'anon', claimGuestId: ME })).toEqual([]);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/hiddenOwnFeedback.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+/**
+ * Hidden feedback, seen from the guest who left it (#1150).
+ *
+ * Everything in the system treats a hidden row as absent: getPhotoFeedback
+ * drops it even for the guest's own feedback, the /photos filters drop it, and
+ * updatePhotoFeedbackStats does not count it. One place disagreed — the
+ * per-viewer `is_liked` heart — so a like the photographer had hidden still
+ * showed as liked on a photo whose like_count was zero. (The `my_color_label`
+ * badge has the same shape on main; colour labels are not on this branch.)
+ *
+ * Making those two agree exposes the second half: the duplicate check that
+ * powers like/favorite toggling did NOT skip hidden rows, so the now-empty
+ * heart, when clicked, found the hidden row and toggled it OFF. The click
+ * appeared to do nothing and it took two more to get back to a filled heart.
+ *
+ * Hiding a non-comment is deliberate, not an accident of the raw route: #839
+ * and #1044 both ship it, with tests asserting that a hidden reaction or
+ * colour label stops counting. So the fix is to make hidden mean absent
+ * consistently — not to stop admins hiding these.
+ */
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'hidden-feedback-secret';
+
+const SLUG = 'hidden-own-feedback';
+const ME = 'guest-me-identifier';
+
+describe('a guest\'s own hidden feedback (#1150)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let feedbackService;
+  let eventId; let photoId; let myGuestRowId;
+
+  const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+  const guestToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { type: 'guest', guestId: myGuestRowId, eventId },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  const getPhoto = async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
+      .set('x-guest-token', guestToken());
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const photos = Array.isArray(res.body) ? res.body : res.body.photos;
+    return (photos || []).find((p) => p.id === photoId);
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    feedbackService = require('../../src/services/feedbackService');
+
+    const [ev] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Hidden Own Feedback',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'hidden-own-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = typeof ev === 'object' ? ev.id : ev;
+
+    const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'shot.jpg', path: 'events/hidden/shot.jpg',
+      type: 'individual', uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    photoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
+
+    const [g] = await db('gallery_guests').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, name: 'Me', identifier: ME,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(), last_seen_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      is_deleted: false,
+    }).returning('id');
+    myGuestRowId = typeof g === 'object' ? g.id : g;
+
+    await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, feedback_enabled: true, allow_likes: true,
+      moderate_comments: false,
+      show_feedback_to_guests: true,
+    });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/galleryFeedback'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  const like = () => db('photo_feedback').insert({
+    photo_id: photoId, event_id: eventId, guest_identifier: ME,
+    guest_id: myGuestRowId, feedback_type: 'like',
+    is_approved: true, is_hidden: false, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('photo_feedback').where({ photo_id: photoId }).del();
+    await db('photos').where('id', photoId).update({ like_count: 0 });
+  });
+
+  describe('the read surfaces agree with each other', () => {
+    it('un-fills the heart once the like is hidden', async () => {
+      await like();
+      await feedbackService.updatePhotoFeedbackStats(photoId);
+      expect((await getPhoto()).is_liked).toBe(true);
+
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: true });
+      await feedbackService.updatePhotoFeedbackStats(photoId);
+
+      const photo = await getPhoto();
+      // like_count already ignored hidden rows, so the heart was the only
+      // thing still claiming this photo was liked.
+      expect(photo.like_count).toBe(0);
+      expect(photo.is_liked).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+  });
+
+  describe('and every other surface agrees', () => {
+    it('keeps a hidden like out of /my-feedback', async () => {
+      await like();
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: true });
+
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/my-feedback`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
+        .set('x-guest-token', guestToken());
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+      // In guest identity mode the Liked/Favorited/Rated chips and their
+      // filters are built from THIS array, not from is_liked — so a hidden
+      // like left an empty heart while the chip still counted it.
+      expect(res.body.filter((f) => f.feedback_type === 'like')).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('does not count a hidden row against the guest cap', async () => {
+      await db('event_feedback_settings')
+        .where({ event_id: eventId }).update({ max_likes_per_guest: 1 });
+      await like();
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: true });
+
+      // The hidden row is room, not an occupant: the guest sees an empty
+      // heart, and meeting that click with limit_reached leaves the control
+      // dead until they un-like something they can still see.
+      const result = await feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
+        feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: ME, guest_id: myGuestRowId,
+      });
+      expect(result.limit_reached).toBeUndefined();
+
+      await db('event_feedback_settings')
+        .where({ event_id: eventId }).update({ max_likes_per_guest: null });
+    });
+
+    it('leaves other anonymous rows alone when there is no identity to scope by', async () => {
+      // With neither guest_id nor guest_identifier the collapse scope degrades
+      // to `guest_identifier IS NULL` — every identifier-less row on the
+      // photo, i.e. other people's.
+      const anon = (extra) => ({
+        photo_id: photoId, event_id: eventId, feedback_type: 'like',
+        is_approved: true, created_at: new Date().toISOString(), ...extra,
+      });
+      const [h] = await db('photo_feedback').insert(anon({ is_hidden: true })).returning('id');
+      const hiddenId = typeof h === 'object' ? h.id : h;
+      await db('photo_feedback').insert(anon({ is_hidden: false }));
+      await db('photo_feedback').insert(anon({ is_hidden: false }));
+
+      await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(hiddenId, 'approve', 1);
+
+      expect(await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like', is_hidden: false }))
+        .toHaveLength(3);
+    });
+
+    it('collapses the replacement when an admin unhides the original', async () => {
+      await like();
+      const original = await db('photo_feedback').where({ photo_id: photoId }).first();
+      await db('photo_feedback').where('id', original.id).update({ is_hidden: true });
+
+      await feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
+        feedback_type: 'like', guest_identifier: ME, guest_id: myGuestRowId,
+      });
+      expect(await db('photo_feedback').where({ photo_id: photoId })).toHaveLength(2);
+
+      await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(original.id, 'approve', 1);
+
+      // Two visible rows for one guest would double-count in the tallies and
+      // need two toggles to clear, since each deletes a single row.
+      const visible = await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like', is_hidden: false });
+      expect(visible).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(visible[0].id).toBe(original.id);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('and clicking still works afterwards', () => {
+    it('re-liking creates a fresh row instead of toggling the hidden one off', async () => {
+      await like();
+      await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like' })
+        .update({ is_hidden: true });
+
+      // What the guest sees is an empty heart, so this is an ADD.
+      const result = await feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
+        feedback_type: 'like',
+        guest_identifier: ME,
+        guest_id: myGuestRowId,
+      });
+
+      // Before this, the duplicate check found the hidden row and deleted it —
+      // `removed: true` — so the click did nothing visible and the moderation
+      // was silently undone.
+      expect(result.removed).toBeUndefined();
+
+      const visible = await db('photo_feedback')
+        .where({ photo_id: photoId, feedback_type: 'like', is_hidden: false });
+      expect(visible).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect((await getPhoto()).is_liked).toBe(true);
+    });
+  });
+
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/picpeakCrossEngine.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * Cross-engine .picpeak restore policy (#1041): a SQLite archive restored onto
+ * a PostgreSQL instance — the official small-install → full-stack upgrade
+ * path — now allowed by validateManifest's direction rule instead of the
+ * former CLI-only allowEngineSwitch flag. The coercion engine itself
+ * (typedColumnsFor / epochToIso / coerceForTargetEngine) landed with #1039;
+ * these tests pin the direction policy and the coercion's cross-engine
+ * value-correctness.
+ *
+ * Ungated: validateManifest direction rules and the pure coercion units.
+ * The reverse direction (pg backup onto a sqlite instance) staying blocked is
+ * pinned by picpeakRoundtrip.test.js, which runs on the real sqlite harness.
+ *
+ * Gated on PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL (same contract as picpeakRestorePg.test.js):
+ * sqlite-shaped NDJSON rows land in real Postgres with correct stored VALUES,
+ * not just row counts, e.g.
+ *   PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:pw@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_xengine_test" \
+ *     npx jest __tests__/integration/picpeakCrossEngine.test.js
+ */
+const knexLib = require('knex');
+
+describe('validateManifest cross-engine direction (pg target)', () => {
+  let validateManifest;
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg' }));
+    // validateManifest wraps its knex_migrations lookup in try/catch — a
+    // throwing stub simply skips the forward-only check, which is not under
+    // test here.
+    jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: () => { throw new Error('stub'); } }));
+    ({ validateManifest } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
+  });
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
+    jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
+    jest.resetModules();
+  });
+
+  it('allows a sqlite backup onto a pg instance (upgrade direction)', async () => {
+    const blockers = await validateManifest({
+      kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'sqlite' }, tables: {},
+    });
+    expect(blockers.filter((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('still allows same-engine pg → pg', async () => {
+    const blockers = await validateManifest({
+      kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'pg' }, tables: {},
+    });
+    expect(blockers.filter((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('epochToIso (landed with #1039)', () => {
+  let epochToIso;
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    ({ epochToIso } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
+  });
+
+  it('converts epoch milliseconds', () => {
+    expect(epochToIso(1723400000000)).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
+  });
+
+  it('converts epoch SECONDS to the same instant, not January 1970', () => {
+    expect(epochToIso(1723400000)).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
+  });
+
+  it('converts numeric strings', () => {
+    expect(epochToIso('1723400000000')).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
+  });
+
+  it('passes non-numeric values through untouched', () => {
+    expect(epochToIso('2026-08-12 10:00:00')).toBe('2026-08-12 10:00:00');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('coerceForTargetEngine on sqlite-shaped rows', () => {
+  let coerceForTargetEngine;
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    ({ coerceForTargetEngine } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
+  });
+
+  const types = { timestamps: ['created_at', 'expires_at'], booleans: ['is_active'] };
+
+  it('coerces 0/1 booleans and epoch timestamps, leaves date strings alone', () => {
+    const [row] = coerceForTargetEngine(
+      [{ id: 1, is_active: 1, created_at: 1723400000000, expires_at: '2026-09-01 12:00:00' }],
+      types
+    );
+    expect(row.is_active).toBe(true);
+    expect(row.created_at).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
+    expect(row.expires_at).toBe('2026-09-01 12:00:00'); // pg parses this natively
+  });
+
+  it('coerces falsy variants and passes null/empty through', () => {
+    const [row] = coerceForTargetEngine(
+      [{ is_active: 0, created_at: null, expires_at: '' }],
+      types
+    );
+    expect(row.is_active).toBe(false);
+    expect(row.created_at).toBeNull();
+    expect(row.expires_at).toBe('');
+  });
+});
+
+// ── Real-Postgres integration (gated) ────────────────────────────────────────
+const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
+const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
+
+maybe('sqlite-shaped rows land correctly in real Postgres', () => {
+  let pgDb;
+  let svc;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    pgDb = knexLib({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL });
+    await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS xengine_events, xengine_settings CASCADE');
+    await pgDb.schema.createTable('xengine_events', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.string('slug');
+      t.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
+      t.boolean('allow_downloads').defaultTo(true);
+      t.timestamp('created_at');
+      t.timestamp('expires_at');
+    });
+    await pgDb.schema.createTable('xengine_settings', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id');
+      t.string('setting_key').notNullable().unique();
+      t.jsonb('setting_value');
+    });
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg' }));
+    jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: pgDb }));
+    svc = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService');
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
+    jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
+    if (pgDb) {
+      await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS xengine_events, xengine_settings CASCADE');
+      await pgDb.destroy();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('typedColumnsFor classifies boolean and timestamp columns via columnInfo()', async () => {
+    const types = await svc.typedColumnsFor(pgDb, 'xengine_events');
+    expect(types.booleans.sort()).toEqual(['allow_downloads', 'is_active']);
+    expect(types.timestamps.sort()).toEqual(['created_at', 'expires_at']);
+  });
+
+  it('inserts a sqlite archive row (0/1 booleans, epoch dates, json text) with correct stored values', async () => {
+    // Exactly what a sqlite-created .picpeak carries: integers for booleans,
+    // epoch numbers for #485-shape timestamps (ms here, seconds covered by the
+    // epochToIso unit), a "YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS" string for clean ones, and
+    // json columns as TEXT (the crossEngine path skips serialiseJsonColumns —
+    // the text is already what pg wants).
+    const epoch = 1723400000000;
+    const eventRows = [
+      { id: 1, slug: 'wedding', is_active: 1, allow_downloads: 0, created_at: epoch, expires_at: '2026-09-01 12:00:00' },
+    ];
+    const settingRows = [{ id: 1, setting_key: 'brand', setting_value: '{"name":"PicPeak","dark":true}' }];
+
+    await pgDb.transaction(async (trx) => {
+      const evTypes = await svc.typedColumnsFor(trx, 'xengine_events');
+      await trx.batchInsert('xengine_events', svc.coerceForTargetEngine(eventRows, evTypes), 100);
+      const stTypes = await svc.typedColumnsFor(trx, 'xengine_settings');
+      await trx.batchInsert('xengine_settings', svc.coerceForTargetEngine(settingRows, stTypes), 100);
+    });
+
+    const ev = await pgDb('xengine_events').where({ id: 1 }).first();
+    expect(ev.is_active).toBe(true);          // 1 → true, not backwards (#1028 class)
+    expect(ev.allow_downloads).toBe(false);   // 0 → false
+    expect(new Date(ev.created_at).getTime()).toBe(epoch);
+    expect(new Date(ev.expires_at).toISOString().slice(0, 10)).toBe('2026-09-01');
+
+    const st = await pgDb('xengine_settings').where({ id: 1 }).first();
+    // jsonb parsed back by the driver — value intact, no double encoding.
+    expect(st.setting_value).toEqual({ name: 'PicPeak', dark: true });
+  });
+
+  it('id sequence works after explicit-id insert + resync (next natural insert)', async () => {
+    await svc.resyncSequences(['xengine_events']);
+    const [next] = await pgDb('xengine_events')
+      .insert({ slug: 'fresh', is_active: true })
+      .returning('id');
+    expect(Number(next.id || next)).toBe(2);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/regenerateThumbnailsScript.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+/**
+ * scripts/regenerate-thumbnails.js against external photos (#1148).
+ *
+ * The same defect #1129 fixed in the admin route, still standing in the CLI
+ * fallback: the script resolved every source as
+ * `storage/events/active/<photo.path>` and fs.access'd it. External and
+ * reference rows do not live there — their originals sit under
+ * `events.external_path` — so every one failed the check and was counted as an
+ * error. On an install where all photos are external the script did nothing at
+ * all, while reporting one error per photo.
+ *
+ * Driven against a REAL file on a REAL external mount with the real
+ * imageProcessor, not a mock: the whole point is that the source resolves off
+ * the mount, and a mocked ensureThumbnail would assert nothing about that.
+ *
+ * Responsive tiers (#1095/#1109) do not exist on this branch, so the tier
+ * backfill in the main twin has nothing to port. Everything else does.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+const { execFile } = require('child_process');
+
+describe('regenerate-thumbnails script (#1148)', () => {
+  let tmpDir; let db; let cleanup; let regenerateThumbnails;
+  let eventId; let externalPhotoId; let videoPhotoId; let watcherVideoId; let repairPhotoId;
+  let vanishingPhotoId;
+  let externalRoot;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-script-'));
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'test.db');
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
+    // External sources are sandboxed under EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT; event
+    // external_path is relative to it, exactly as on a real install.
+    process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
+    externalRoot = path.join(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, 'wedding');
+
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
+    await fs.promises.mkdir(externalRoot, { recursive: true });
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
+
+    // A real image on the external mount — never under events/active.
+    await sharp({
+      create: { width: 1200, height: 800, channels: 3, background: { r: 10, g: 90, b: 160 } },
+    }).jpeg().toFile(path.join(externalRoot, 'shot.jpg'));
+
+    const [ev] = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'regen-script-event',
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Regen Script',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: '/gallery/regen-script-event/share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      source_mode: 'reference',
+      external_path: 'wedding',
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = typeof ev === 'object' ? ev.id : ev;
+
+    const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'shot.jpg',
+      // `path` is what the old script joined onto events/active. Left
+      // populated on purpose: the fix must ignore it for an external row.
+      path: 'regen-script-event/shot.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'shot.jpg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    externalPhotoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
+
+    const [v] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'clip.mp4',
+      path: 'regen-script-event/clip.mp4',
+      type: 'individual',
+      media_type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'clip.mp4',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    videoPhotoId = typeof v === 'object' ? v.id : v;
+
+    // How fileWatcher.processNewPhoto actually writes a video: `type` and
+    // `mime_type` set, media_type left to its 'image' default. A media_type-only
+    // filter lets this through and hands the container to Sharp.
+    //
+    // The file has to EXIST, otherwise the row fails resolution and looks
+    // skipped for the wrong reason — the bug is Sharp being handed a video, not
+    // a missing source. Real MP4 header bytes, no image in sight.
+    await fs.promises.writeFile(
+      path.join(externalRoot, 'watched.mp4'),
+      Buffer.from('00000018667479706d70343200000000', 'hex')
+    );
+    const [wv] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'watched.mp4',
+      path: 'regen-script-event/watched.mp4',
+      type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'watched.mp4',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    watcherVideoId = typeof wv === 'object' ? wv.id : wv;
+    expect((await db('photos').where('id', watcherVideoId).first()).media_type).not.toBe('video');
+
+    // A photo whose thumbnail_path points at something that is no longer there.
+    await sharp({
+      create: { width: 900, height: 600, channels: 3, background: { r: 200, g: 40, b: 40 } },
+    }).jpeg().toFile(path.join(externalRoot, 'repair.jpg'));
+    const [rp] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'repair.jpg',
+      path: 'regen-script-event/repair.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      thumbnail_path: 'thumbnails/thumb_ext_missing_repair.jpg',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'repair.jpg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    repairPhotoId = typeof rp === 'object' ? rp.id : rp;
+
+    // A photo whose source is not on the mount at all — an unavailable mount,
+    // which is the failure an operator most needs to hear about.
+    const [vp] = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'missing.jpg',
+      path: 'regen-script-event/missing.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'missing.jpg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    vanishingPhotoId = typeof vp === 'object' ? vp.id : vp;
+
+    ({ regenerateThumbnails } = require('../../scripts/regenerate-thumbnails'));
+  }, 180000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  it('builds a thumbnail for an external photo instead of erroring on events/active', async () => {
+    // The location the old script computed and fs.access'd. Nothing is there,
+    // which is the whole defect — it is not where an external original lives.
+    // (The old script cannot be driven from a test directly: it had no export
+    // and ran on require, calling process.exit. Making it importable is part
+    // of this fix.)
+    const legacyPath = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', 'regen-script-event/shot.jpg');
+    expect(fs.existsSync(legacyPath)).toBe(false);
+
+    const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
+
+    // The old script reported an error for this photo and wrote nothing.
+    // The unresolvable row fails; the external photo and the repair row build.
+    expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.successCount).toBe(2);
+
+    const row = await db('photos').where('id', externalPhotoId).first();
+    expect(row.thumbnail_path).toBeTruthy();
+    const onDisk = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, row.thumbnail_path);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(onDisk)).toBe(true);
+
+    // Named per-photo so two events referencing one NAS basename cannot
+    // clobber each other — the property ensureThumbnail owns and the reason
+    // the script must not build this name itself.
+    expect(path.basename(row.thumbnail_path)).toContain(`ext${externalPhotoId}_`);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves videos alone', async () => {
+    // A video thumbnail is a poster frame from videoProcessor; handing the
+    // container to Sharp produced one error per video row.
+    const row = await db('photos').where('id', videoPhotoId).first();
+    expect(row.thumbnail_path).toBeFalsy();
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a watcher-imported video alone, which carries no media_type', async () => {
+    // fileWatcher writes type + mime_type and lets media_type default to
+    // 'image', so filtering on media_type alone still fed these to Sharp. The
+    // signal is errorCount: the images are already done by now, so the only
+    // NEW thing that could fail this run is a video reaching Sharp. One error
+    // is the deliberately unresolvable row; two would be the video.
+    const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
+
+    expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
+    const row = await db('photos').where('id', watcherVideoId).first();
+    expect(row.thumbnail_path).toBeFalsy();
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent — a second run skips instead of rebuilding', async () => {
+    const before = await db('photos').where('id', externalPhotoId).first();
+    const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
+
+    expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.successCount).toBe(0);
+    expect(result.skipCount).toBe(2);
+
+    const after = await db('photos').where('id', externalPhotoId).first();
+    expect(after.thumbnail_path).toBe(before.thumbnail_path);
+  });
+
+  it('counts a repaired thumbnail as generated, not skipped', async () => {
+    // Both images are valid at this point. Destroy ONE thumbnail object while
+    // leaving thumbnail_path pointing at it — the corrupt/missing case.
+    const row = await db('photos').where('id', repairPhotoId).first();
+    const onDisk = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, row.thumbnail_path);
+    await fs.promises.rm(onDisk);
+
+    const result = await regenerateThumbnails(eventId);
+
+    // On local and external storage the rebuilt key is identical, so inferring
+    // "skipped" from an unchanged path reports this repair as already valid —
+    // the one number an operator running this is actually reading.
+    expect(result.successCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.skipCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.errorCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(onDisk)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  /** Run the CLI the way cron does, and hand back its exit status. */
+  const runCli = (args = []) => new Promise((resolve) => {
+    execFile(
+      process.execPath,
+      [path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'regenerate-thumbnails.js'), ...args],
+      { env: { ...process.env }, cwd: path.join(__dirname, '..', '..') },
+      (error, stdout, stderr) => resolve({ code: error?.code ?? 0, stdout, stderr })
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('exits nonzero when a photo could not be built', async () => {
+    // Exit status is the only thing a cron job reads, and `missing.jpg` has no
+    // source on the mount.
+    const failed = await runCli([String(eventId)]);
+    expect(failed.code).toBe(1);
+    expect(failed.stderr).toContain('completed with failures');
+  }, 120000);
+
+  it('exits zero when every photo resolves', async () => {
+    // Drop the unresolvable row: a clean run must not cry wolf at automation.
+    await db('photos').where('id', vanishingPhotoId).del();
+    const ok = await runCli([String(eventId)]);
+    expect(ok.code).toBe(0);
+    expect(ok.stdout).toContain('Script completed successfully');
+  }, 120000);
+});

backend/__tests__/integration/slideshowPhotoSource.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/**
+ * Slideshow photo source (#1015).
+ *
+ * The bug: with `lightbox_preview_enabled` off (the default), /photos emitted
+ * `preview_url: null`, so the slideshow's `preview_url || hero_url || url`
+ * chain fell through to `hero_url` — a 1920x1080 `fit: 'cover'` centre crop
+ * meant for gallery header banners. With the "Black Bars (No crop)" fit the
+ * show then letterboxed an already-cropped frame: portrait photos lost their
+ * top and bottom and the setting looked broken.
+ *
+ * The contract pinned here: `slideshow_url` points at the aspect-preserved
+ * preview tier and is emitted for image photos REGARDLESS of the lightbox
+ * toggle, so the slideshow never has a reason to reach for `hero_url`.
+ * `preview_url` itself must stay gated — the lightbox opt-in is unchanged.
+ */
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'slideshow-src-test-secret';
+
+const SLUG = 'slideshow-source-event';
+
+describe('Slideshow photo source (#1015)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let imagePhotoId;
+  let videoPhotoId;
+
+  const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  const setLightboxPreview = async (on) => {
+    await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'lightbox_preview_enabled' }).del();
+    await db('app_settings').insert({
+      setting_key: 'lightbox_preview_enabled',
+      setting_value: JSON.stringify(on),
+      setting_type: 'general',
+      updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+  };
+
+  const fetchPhotos = async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
+      .expect(200);
+    return res.body.photos;
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Slideshow Source Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'slideshow-source-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const img = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'portrait.jpg',
+      path: 'events/slideshow-source/portrait.jpg',
+      type: 'individual',
+      mime_type: 'image/jpeg',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    imagePhotoId = img[0]?.id ?? img[0];
+
+    const vid = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'clip.mp4',
+      path: 'events/slideshow-source/clip.mp4',
+      type: 'individual',
+      media_type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    videoPhotoId = vid[0]?.id ?? vid[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  it('emits slideshow_url for image photos even when lightbox previews are OFF', async () => {
+    await setLightboxPreview(false);
+    const photos = await fetchPhotos();
+    const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
+
+    expect(image.slideshow_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/preview/${imagePhotoId}`);
+    // The regression: this is what used to be null, pushing the show to hero.
+    expect(image.preview_url).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('leaves preview_url gated so the lightbox opt-in is unchanged', async () => {
+    await setLightboxPreview(true);
+    const photos = await fetchPhotos();
+    const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
+
+    expect(image.preview_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/preview/${imagePhotoId}`);
+    expect(image.slideshow_url).toBe(image.preview_url);
+  });
+
+  it('never points the slideshow at the cover-cropped hero tier', async () => {
+    await setLightboxPreview(false);
+    const photos = await fetchPhotos();
+    const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
+
+    // hero_url still ships (the gallery header uses it) — it just must not be
+    // what the slideshow resolves to.
+    expect(image.hero_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/hero/${imagePhotoId}`);
+    expect(image.slideshow_url).not.toBe(image.hero_url);
+  });
+
+  it('emits slideshow_url: null for videos, which have no preview tier', async () => {
+    await setLightboxPreview(false);
+    const photos = await fetchPhotos();
+    const video = photos.find((p) => p.id === videoPhotoId);
+
+    expect(video.slideshow_url).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/middleware/adminAuthRoleFallback.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/**
+ * The roles-join fallback in adminAuth fabricates `role_name = 'super_admin'`
+ * to keep existing sessions working across the RBAC upgrade window. The catch
+ * around it used to be unconditional, so ANY transient database failure —
+ * connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout, pool exhaustion — took the
+ * same branch and handed the caller super_admin for the duration of the fault.
+ *
+ * `roleName` is the sole discriminator for every ownership check (ownership.js,
+ * adminProjects, adminUsers, adminApiTokens, projectService, ...), so that
+ * inverted the whole authorization model rather than failing the request.
+ * Issue #968. Same treatment apiTokenAuth already got for the v1 surface.
+ */
+
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() }));
+
+// The joined query throws whatever the test stages; the role-less fallback
+// query (no .leftJoin) always succeeds, which is what made the original bug
+// reachable — it is the cheaper single-table read.
+// `mock`-prefixed so jest's module-factory hoisting allows the reference.
+let mockJoinError = null;
+const mockAdminRow = { id: 7, username: 'scoped', email: 's@example.com', password_changed_at: null };
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: () => ({
+    _joined: false,
+    leftJoin() { this._joined = true; return this; },
+    where() { return this; },
+    select() { return this; },
+    first() {
+      if (this._joined && mockJoinError) return Promise.reject(mockJoinError);
+      return Promise.resolve({ ...mockAdminRow });
+    },
+  }),
+}));
+
+const { adminAuth } = require('../../src/middleware/auth');
+
+const SECRET = 'test-secret-for-admin-auth-fallback';
+
+function makeReq() {
+  const token = jwt.sign(
+    { id: mockAdminRow.id, type: 'admin' },
+    SECRET,
+    { algorithm: 'HS256', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+  );
+  return { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, ip: '127.0.0.1', connection: {} };
+}
+
+function makeRes() {
+  return {
+    statusCode: null,
+    body: null,
+    status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
+    json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
+  };
+}
+
+describe('adminAuth roles-join fallback (#968)', () => {
+  const OLD_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
+  beforeAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = SECRET; });
+  afterAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = OLD_SECRET; });
+  beforeEach(() => { mockJoinError = null; });
+
+  it('grants the upgrade-window fallback only for a genuinely missing roles table', async () => {
+    mockJoinError = new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: roles');
+    const req = makeReq();
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin.roleName).toBe('super_admin');
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['connection reset', new Error('Connection terminated unexpectedly')],
+    ['deadlock', new Error('deadlock detected')],
+    ['pool exhaustion', new Error('Knex: Timeout acquiring a connection')],
+    ['statement timeout', new Error('canceling statement due to statement timeout')],
+  ])('does NOT fabricate super_admin on a transient failure (%s)', async (_label, err) => {
+    mockJoinError = err;
+    const req = makeReq();
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    // Fails closed: request rejected, req.admin never populated. The specific
+    // status is 401 (adminAuth's blanket outer catch) — what matters is that
+    // the caller is not elevated and does not reach the route.
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT fabricate super_admin when an unrelated table is missing', async () => {
+    mockJoinError = new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: admin_sessions');
+    const req = makeReq();
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const next = jest.fn();
+
+    await adminAuth(req, res, next);
+
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(req.admin).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/middleware/apiTokenRoleFallback.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/**
+ * The roles-join fallback in apiTokenAuth grants `super_admin` (upgrade-path
+ * parity with adminAuth). It must therefore fire ONLY when the roles schema is
+ * genuinely absent — a catch-all turns any transient database failure into a
+ * privilege escalation that reopens GHSA-9697 for a demoted token owner.
+ */
+
+const { isMissingRolesSchema } = require('../../src/middleware/apiTokenAuth');
+
+describe('apiTokenAuth roles-schema fallback predicate (GHSA-9697)', () => {
+  it('accepts a genuinely missing roles table on both engines', () => {
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: roles'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+      Object.assign(new Error('relation "roles" does not exist'), { code: '42P01' }),
+    )).toBe(true);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+      Object.assign(new Error('column roles.name does not exist'), { code: '42703' }),
+    )).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects transient failures that must not elevate the caller', () => {
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('Connection terminated unexpectedly'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('deadlock detected'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('Knex: Timeout acquiring a connection'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('canceling statement due to statement timeout'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(undefined)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a missing-table error for an unrelated table', () => {
+    expect(isMissingRolesSchema(new Error('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: api_tokens'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  // knex prefixes the failing SQL to err.message, and that SQL always names
+  // `roles` on this join — so the message substring proves nothing about the
+  // error, and only an exact driver phrase (or a SQLSTATE) may be trusted.
+  // These are real knex message shapes, captured from the actual query.
+  describe('with knex\'s SQL prefix on the message (#968)', () => {
+    const withSql = (driverMessage) => new Error(
+      'select `roles`.`name` as `role_name` from `admin_users` '
+      + 'left join `roles` on `roles`.`id` = `admin_users`.`role_id` '
+      + `where \`admin_users\`.\`id\` = 1 limit 1 - ${driverMessage}`,
+    );
+
+    it('accepts both legitimate upgrade-window states', () => {
+      // pre-054: the roles table does not exist yet
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+        Object.assign(withSql('SQLITE_ERROR: no such table: roles'), { code: 'SQLITE_ERROR' }),
+      )).toBe(true);
+      // post-054, pre-057: roles exists, admin_users.role_id not added yet
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+        Object.assign(withSql('SQLITE_ERROR: no such column: admin_users.role_id'), { code: 'SQLITE_ERROR' }),
+      )).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects an unrelated "does not exist" fault despite the SQL naming roles', () => {
+      // pgbouncer transaction pooling loses a named prepared statement
+      // (SQLSTATE 26000). Transient — the fallback query would succeed on a
+      // fresh connection, so accepting this would fabricate super_admin.
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+        Object.assign(withSql('prepared statement "S_1" does not exist'), { code: '26000' }),
+      )).toBe(false);
+      // The DB role/user, not the roles table.
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+        Object.assign(withSql('role "picpeak" does not exist'), { code: '28000' }),
+      )).toBe(false);
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(
+        Object.assign(withSql('database "picpeak" does not exist'), { code: '3D000' }),
+      )).toBe(false);
+      expect(isMissingRolesSchema(withSql('Connection terminated unexpectedly'))).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/167_projects_created_by.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 167 (projects.created_by) — idempotent on re-run, reversible,
+ * and backfills the owner from a project's single linked event (GHSA-wrg5).
+ */
+const path=require('path'), fs=require('fs'), os=require('os');
+process.env.NODE_ENV='test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH=path.join(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(),'picpeak-mig167-')),'db.sqlite');
+process.env.JWT_SECRET='mig';
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const mig = require('../../migrations/core/167_add_projects_created_by');
+describe('migration 167', () => {
+  let db, cleanup;
+  beforeAll(async()=>{ ({db,cleanup}=await bootCrmDb()); await seedMinimal(db); },120000);
+  afterAll(async()=>{ if(cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+  it('is idempotent on re-run and reversible', async () => {
+    await mig.up(db);            // already applied by boot; must no-op
+    await mig.up(db);            // and again
+    expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('projects','created_by')).toBe(true);
+    await mig.down(db);
+    expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('projects','created_by')).toBe(false);
+    await mig.up(db);            // re-apply cleanly
+    expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('projects','created_by')).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('backfills created_by from a single linked event owner', async () => {
+    const p = await db('projects').insert({name:'bf',status:'active',created_at:new Date(),updated_at:new Date()}).returning('id');
+    const pid = p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
+    await db('events').insert({slug:'bf-ev',event_type:'wedding',event_name:'bf',event_date:'2026-08-01',
+      host_email:'h@e.com',admin_email:'a@e.com',password_hash:'x',share_token:'t1',share_link:'/g/bf-ev/t1',
+      created_by: 4242, project_id: pid, expires_at:new Date(Date.now()+864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active:1,is_archived:0,is_draft:0,created_at:new Date().toISOString()});
+    await mig.up(db);
+    const row = await db('projects').where({id:pid}).first();
+    expect(row.created_by).toBe(4242);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/168_fix_expense_activity_event_id.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-jhcf round 3: scoping the activity feed does nothing about the rows
+ * already on disk. expenseService used to pass adminId into logActivity's
+ * `eventId` slot, so upgraded instances carry accounting rows whose event_id
+ * is an ADMIN id — and the scope predicate happily matches those against a
+ * same-numbered event the caller owns.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig168-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mig168-test-secret';
+
+const { bootCrmDb } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/168_fix_expense_activity_event_id');
+
+describe('migration 168 — legacy accounting activity rows (GHSA-jhcf)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('re-attributes the admin id and clears event_id, leaving real rows alone', async () => {
+    await db('activity_logs').insert([
+      // Legacy shape: event_id is really admin #7, no actor recorded.
+      {
+        activity_type: 'expense_created',
+        actor_type: 'system',
+        actor_id: null,
+        event_id: 7,
+        metadata: JSON.stringify({ expenseId: 1 }),
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      },
+      {
+        activity_type: 'incoming_invoice_captured',
+        actor_type: 'system',
+        actor_id: null,
+        event_id: 9,
+        metadata: JSON.stringify({ inboundDocumentId: 2 }),
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      },
+      // A genuine event-scoped row from another subsystem must survive intact.
+      {
+        activity_type: 'photo_uploaded',
+        actor_type: 'admin',
+        actor_id: 3,
+        event_id: 7,
+        metadata: JSON.stringify({}),
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(db);
+
+    const expense = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'expense_created' }).first();
+    expect(expense.event_id == null).toBe(true);
+    expect(Number(expense.actor_id)).toBe(7);
+    expect(expense.actor_type).toBe('admin');
+
+    const captured = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'incoming_invoice_captured' }).first();
+    expect(captured.event_id == null).toBe(true);
+    expect(Number(captured.actor_id)).toBe(9);
+
+    const photo = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'photo_uploaded' }).first();
+    expect(Number(photo.event_id)).toBe(7);
+    expect(Number(photo.actor_id)).toBe(3);
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent on re-run', async () => {
+    await expect(migration.up(db)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    const expense = await db('activity_logs').where({ activity_type: 'expense_created' }).first();
+    expect(Number(expense.actor_id)).toBe(7);
+    expect(expense.event_id == null).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/migrations/175_fix_css_template_photo_height.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/**
+ * Repairing the bundled templates' fixed image height (#1131).
+ *
+ * The risk in a migration that rewrites user-visible CSS is doing too much,
+ * so most of what is pinned here is what it must NOT touch: the other pixel
+ * heights inside the very same templates (a 1px divider, an 8px scrollbar),
+ * and any rule a user wrote themselves.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+const migration = require('../../migrations/core/175_fix_css_template_photo_height');
+
+const ELEGANT_DARK = `
+.photo-card {
+  border-radius: 12px;
+}
+
+.photo-card img {
+  width: 100%;
+  height: 200px;
+  object-fit: cover;
+  transition: transform 0.3s ease;
+}
+`;
+
+const LIQUID_GLASS_DARK = `
+.gallery-page::after {
+  content: '';
+  height: 1px;
+  background: linear-gradient(90deg, transparent, #fff, transparent);
+}
+
+.photo-card img {
+  width: 100%;
+  height: 240px;
+  object-fit: cover;
+  filter: brightness(0.9);
+}
+
+.gallery-page ::-webkit-scrollbar {
+  width: 8px;
+  height: 8px;
+}
+
+@media (max-width: 640px) {
+  .photo-card img {
+    height: 180px;
+  }
+}
+`;
+
+describe('migration 175 — CSS template image height (#1131)', () => {
+  let knex; let tmpDir;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig175-'));
+    knex = require('knex')({
+      client: 'sqlite3',
+      connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
+      useNullAsDefault: true,
+    });
+    await knex.schema.createTable('css_templates', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('name');
+      t.text('css_content');
+    });
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (knex) await knex.destroy();
+    await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => { await knex('css_templates').del(); });
+
+  const contentOf = async (name) =>
+    (await knex('css_templates').where({ name }).first()).css_content;
+
+  it('relaxes the default template so the layouts h-full can win', async () => {
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Elegant Dark', css_content: ELEGANT_DARK });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('Elegant Dark');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('height: 200px');
+    // Everything else about the rule survives.
+    expect(css).toContain('object-fit: cover');
+    expect(css).toContain('transition: transform 0.3s ease');
+  });
+
+  it('fixes both the base rule and the mobile override of the dark glass template', async () => {
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Liquid Glass Dark', css_content: LIQUID_GLASS_DARK });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('Liquid Glass Dark');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('height: 240px');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('height: 180px');
+    expect(css.match(/height: 100%/g)).toHaveLength(2);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves the divider and the scrollbar alone', async () => {
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Liquid Glass Dark', css_content: LIQUID_GLASS_DARK });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    // The whole reason this matches full rule bodies rather than every
+    // `height: <n>px`: these are in the same stylesheet and are correct.
+    const css = await contentOf('Liquid Glass Dark');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 1px');
+    expect(css).toContain('width: 8px');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 8px');
+  });
+
+  /**
+   * The case that forced the scope wider. `sanitizeCSS` strips control
+   * characters, so any template ever saved through the editor — including a
+   * save that only changed its name — has had every newline REMOVED. An
+   * exact-text migration finds nothing on those installs, is recorded as
+   * applied, and leaves them broken permanently.
+   */
+  it('fixes a template that has been through the editor, newlines and all', async () => {
+    const { sanitizeCSS } = require('../../src/utils/cssSanitizer');
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(ELEGANT_DARK);
+    // Precondition: the sanitizer really did flatten it.
+    expect(sanitized).not.toContain('\n');
+    expect(sanitized).toContain('height: 200px');
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Saved Once', css_content: sanitized });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('Saved Once');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('200px');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
+  });
+
+  it('relaxes a user-authored fixed height too, but only on .photo-card img', async () => {
+    // Deliberately broader than the seeded text — see the migration header. A
+    // pixel height on the image cannot be right under any of the seven
+    // layouts, whoever wrote it; a height anywhere else is none of our
+    // business.
+    const mine = '.photo-card img {\n  height: 220px;\n}\n.hero { height: 400px; }';
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'My Own', css_content: mine });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('My Own');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('220px');
+    expect(css).toContain('.hero { height: 400px; }');
+  });
+
+  it('does not rewrite other properties that merely end in -height', async () => {
+    // `line-height: 200px` contains `height: 200px` as a substring, so an
+    // unanchored pattern silently rewrites it — in a migration that cannot be
+    // undone.
+    const mine = [
+      '.photo-card img {',
+      '  line-height: 200px;',
+      '  max-height: 300px;',
+      '  min-height: 14px;',
+      '  --tile-height: 220px;',
+      '  height: 200px;',
+      '}',
+    ].join('\n');
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Adjacent Props', css_content: mine });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('Adjacent Props');
+    expect(css).toContain('line-height: 200px');
+    expect(css).toContain('max-height: 300px');
+    expect(css).toContain('min-height: 14px');
+    expect(css).toContain('--tile-height: 220px');
+    // Only the real one moved.
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
+    expect(css).not.toMatch(/(?<![\w-])height:\s*200px/);
+  });
+
+  it('handles a grouped selector list', async () => {
+    // Requiring `{` straight after `img` skipped these entirely — and the
+    // migration is still recorded as applied, so the template kept the bug.
+    const mine = '.photo-card img, .thumbnail img {\n  height: 200px;\n}';
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Grouped', css_content: mine });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    const css = await contentOf('Grouped');
+    expect(css).toContain('.photo-card img, .thumbnail img {');
+    expect(css).toContain('height: 100%');
+    expect(css).not.toContain('200px');
+  });
+
+  it('skips a nested rule rather than rewriting the wrong declaration', async () => {
+    // Valid nested CSS that passes the validator. A brace-greedy body would
+    // capture the inner block and rewrite the CAPTION's height, which cannot
+    // be undone. Leaving it untouched is the lesser evil.
+    const mine = '.photo-card img {\n  & + .caption { height: 200px; }\n}';
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Nested', css_content: mine });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await contentOf('Nested')).toBe(mine);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves non-pixel heights on the image alone', async () => {
+    const mine = '.photo-card img { height: 50vh; }\n.photo-card img { height: auto; }';
+    await knex('css_templates').insert({ name: 'Relative', css_content: mine });
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await contentOf('Relative')).toBe(mine);
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent and safe on a row with no CSS', async () => {
+    await knex('css_templates').insert([
+      { name: 'Elegant Dark', css_content: ELEGANT_DARK },
+      { name: 'Empty', css_content: null },
+    ]);
+
+    await migration.up(knex);
+    const once = await contentOf('Elegant Dark');
+    await migration.up(knex);
+
+    expect(await contentOf('Elegant Dark')).toBe(once);
+    expect(await contentOf('Empty')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('no-ops when the table does not exist yet', async () => {
+    await knex.schema.dropTable('css_templates');
+    await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    await knex.schema.createTable('css_templates', (t) => {
+      t.increments('id').primary();
+      t.string('name');
+      t.text('css_content');
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminPhotoContentType.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/**
+ * Admin photo view route Content-Type (#908).
+ *
+ * The route built `image/<ext>` from the filename, producing invalid
+ * types like image/mp4 for videos. AdminAuthenticatedVideo fetches this
+ * URL into a blob whose type inherits the header, and browsers refuse to
+ * play a <video> blob labeled image/* — blank/grey admin video preview.
+ *
+ * Pins (incl. external-review hardening):
+ *  - the header is ALWAYS image/* or video/*: a stored non-media MIME
+ *    (chunked uploads store the client-sent type unvalidated) is never
+ *    echoed — text/html inline under the app origin would be XSS
+ *  - stored video/ MIME wins; MIME-less videos map from the extension
+ *    (.mov → video/quicktime), unknown video extensions get video/mp4
+ *  - images IGNORE the stored MIME (migration 039 backfilled image/jpeg
+ *    onto every legacy row, PNGs included) and use the extension,
+ *    normalized (jpg → image/jpeg); extensionless files get image/jpeg
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-admin-ct-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-ct-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-admin-ct-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'admin-ct-test-event';
+
+describe('admin photo view Content-Type (#908)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let adminToken;
+
+  const addPhoto = async (filename, extra = {}) => {
+    const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
+    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, filename), Buffer.from(`bytes-${filename}`));
+    const r = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename,
+      path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      ...extra,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  const getPhotoRes = (photoId) => request(app)
+    .get(`/api/admin/photos/${eventId}/photo/${photoId}`)
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Admin CT Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'admin-ct-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
+    const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'admin-ct-admin',
+      email: 'admin-ct-admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('AdminCt123', 4),
+      role_id: superRole.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id: rootId, username: 'admin-ct-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotos'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('serves a video with its stored mime_type, not image/<ext>', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('clip.mp4', { media_type: 'video', mime_type: 'video/mp4' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+  });
+
+  it('maps MIME-less videos from their extension (.mov → video/quicktime)', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('clip-nomime.mov', { media_type: 'video' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/quicktime');
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to video/mp4 for a video with an unknown extension', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('clip-unknown.xyz', { media_type: 'video' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects malformed video/ MIME values that would break setHeader', async () => {
+    // Header-invalid chars in the stored value must not 500 the route —
+    // fall back to the extension map instead.
+    const id = await addPhoto('crlf.mp4', {
+      media_type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4\r\nX-Evil: 1',
+    });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+    expect(res.headers['x-evil']).toBeUndefined();
+
+    const bare = await addPhoto('bare.webm', { media_type: 'video', mime_type: 'video/' });
+    const res2 = await getPhotoRes(bare);
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/webm');
+  });
+
+  it('preserves an auto-imported avif via the safe stored-MIME allowlist', async () => {
+    // .avif isn't in EXTENSION_TO_MIME; s3AutoImporter stores image/avif.
+    // Map-only would mislabel it image/jpeg — the allowlist keeps it.
+    const id = await addPhoto('imported.avif', { mime_type: 'image/avif' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/avif');
+  });
+
+  it('preserves other importer raster types too (apng, x-icon)', async () => {
+    const apng = await addPhoto('anim.apng', { mime_type: 'image/apng' });
+    expect((await getPhotoRes(apng)).headers['content-type']).toBe('image/apng');
+    const ico = await addPhoto('fav.ico', { mime_type: 'image/x-icon' });
+    expect((await getPhotoRes(ico)).headers['content-type']).toBe('image/x-icon');
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT honor a stored scriptable image type (image/svg+xml)', async () => {
+    // svg is inline-scriptable and must never be echoed — allowlist excludes it.
+    const id = await addPhoto('vector.svg', { mime_type: 'image/svg+xml' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+
+  it('never echoes a stored non-media MIME type (inline XSS guard)', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('evil.png', { mime_type: 'text/html' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('ignores the migration-039 image/jpeg backfill on legacy PNG rows', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('legacy.png', { mime_type: 'image/jpeg' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('normalizes jpg to the canonical image/jpeg', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('shot.jpg');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps the extension fallback for images without a stored mime_type', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('shot.png');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('handles Object.prototype key extensions without a 500 (.constructor)', async () => {
+    // The extension-to-MIME lookup must be own-property only — a raw
+    // index access returns an inherited function for these keys and the
+    // downstream startsWith throws. Serve image/jpeg instead of 500.
+    const id = await addPhoto('payload.constructor');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+
+    const id2 = await addPhoto('payload.__proto__', { media_type: 'video' });
+    const res2 = await getPhotoRes(id2);
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+  });
+
+  it('does not synthesize types from unmapped image extensions', async () => {
+    // Raw interpolation would produce image/svg+xml (scriptable inline)
+    // or arbitrary strings from client-controlled filenames — the shared
+    // map is the allowlist, everything else is served as image/jpeg.
+    const svg = await addPhoto('vector.svg+xml');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(svg);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+
+    const weird = await addPhoto('weird.xyz');
+    const res2 = await getPhotoRes(weird);
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+
+  it('extensionless files get image/jpeg, never a bare image/', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('noext');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminThumbnails.previewColumns.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/**
+ * Source-inspection contract test for #1078.
+ *
+ * POST /api/admin/thumbnails/regenerate-previews hands its selected rows to
+ * ensurePreviewImage, which branches on `source_origin` (and then reads
+ * `external_relpath` / `filename`) to reach an external/reference photo on its
+ * media mount. When the select list omitted those columns, every external row
+ * looked managed, resolvePhotoStorageKey returned null, and the endpoint
+ * reported success while silently generating nothing for reference galleries.
+ */
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+describe('regenerate-previews selects the columns ensurePreviewImage branches on (#1078)', () => {
+  const src = fs.readFileSync(
+    path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'routes', 'adminThumbnails.js'),
+    'utf8',
+  );
+
+  // The select feeding the regenerate-previews handler, from the route
+  // declaration to the end of that statement.
+  const selectStatement = (() => {
+    const routeIdx = src.indexOf('/regenerate-previews');
+    expect(routeIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
+    const selectIdx = src.indexOf('.select(', routeIdx);
+    expect(selectIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
+    return src.slice(selectIdx, src.indexOf(';', selectIdx));
+  })();
+
+  it.each(['source_origin', 'external_relpath', 'filename'])(
+    'selects %s',
+    (column) => {
+      expect(selectStatement).toContain(`'${column}'`);
+    }
+  );
+
+  it('still selects the columns the managed path needs', () => {
+    for (const column of ['id', 'event_id', 'path', 'media_type', 'mime_type', 'preview_path']) {
+      expect(selectStatement).toContain(`'${column}'`);
+    }
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/authSession.symmetry.test.js

@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ function signAdminToken({ id = 1, username = 'admin', iat, exp }) {
   );
 }
 
-function signGalleryToken({ eventId = 100, eventSlug = 'wedding' } = {}) {
+function signGalleryToken({ eventId = 100, eventSlug = 'wedding', ...extra } = {}) {
   return jwt.sign(
-    { eventId, eventSlug, type: 'gallery' },
+    { eventId, eventSlug, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
     process.env.JWT_SECRET,
     { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
   );
@@ -288,6 +288,56 @@ describe('GET /auth/session — symmetry with protected middleware', () => {
     expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
   });
 
+  /**
+   * What KIND of gallery session this is (#1149).
+   *
+   * The frontend used to keep this in sessionStorage, which is per-TAB while
+   * the cookie is per-browser: a gallery reopened in a second tab lost
+   * 'client' even though the backend still served it as one, and the UI hid
+   * the only control that clears the privileged cookie. Reported from the
+   * token so a restored session knows what it actually is.
+   */
+  describe('gallery session kind', () => {
+    beforeEach(() => {
+      fakeDb.events.push({
+        id: 100,
+        slug: 'wedding',
+        is_active: true,
+        is_archived: false,
+        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400_000),
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('reports a PIN-client session as client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(makeApp())
+        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ accessLevel: 'client' })}`);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('client');
+      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('reports a customer-portal session, which looks like a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(makeApp())
+        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ via: 'customer', customerId: 7 })}`);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
+      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('reports a plain guest as neither', async () => {
+      // The flags have to discriminate, or they would just hand every visitor
+      // a Logout button back.
+      const res = await request(makeApp())
+        .get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken()}`);
+      expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
+      expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
+      expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
   it('returns valid:false when the token is revoked', async () => {
     fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
       id: 1,

backend/__tests__/routes/authzPermissionGaps.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/**
+ * Authorization / ownership gaps (GHSA permission cluster):
+ *  - jm7j: API-token list must scope to the caller (non-super sees only own)
+ *  - gprq: API-token revoke must be owner-or-super_admin
+ *  - 3rqx: event update must not mass-assign identity/secret columns
+ *  - j2f4: category hero must belong to that category
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-authz-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'authz-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-authz-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken,
+} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('authorization / ownership gaps', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let superId; let superTok; let adminId; let adminTok;
+
+  const grantPermissionToRole = async (roleName, permName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const perm = await db('permissions').where({ name: permName }).first();
+    const exists = await db('role_permissions')
+      .where({ role_id: role.id, permission_id: perm.id }).first();
+    if (!exists) {
+      await db('role_permissions').insert({ role_id: role.id, permission_id: perm.id });
+    }
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+    superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
+
+    const pass = await bcrypt.hash('x', 4);
+    const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'plain-admin', email: 'plain@example.com',
+      password_hash: pass, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    adminId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'admin');
+    // Grant settings.edit to the admin role BEFORE any request populates the
+    // 60s permission cache, so the revoke test exercises the ownership check
+    // (404) rather than the missing-permission gate (403). This models a
+    // custom role that carries settings.edit — the scenario GHSA-gprq needs.
+    await grantPermissionToRole('admin', 'settings.edit');
+    adminTok = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin/api-tokens', require('../../src/routes/adminApiTokens'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/categories', require('../../src/routes/adminCategories'));
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+    app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+      res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
+    });
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
+
+  describe('API tokens (jm7j / gprq)', () => {
+    let superTokenId;
+
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/api-tokens'), superTok)
+        .send({ name: 'super-token', scopes: ['read'] });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(201);
+      superTokenId = res.body.id;
+    });
+
+    it('non-super admin does not see another admin\'s tokens in the list', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/api-tokens'), adminTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.find((t) => t.id === superTokenId)).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('super_admin sees all tokens', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/api-tokens'), superTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.find((t) => t.id === superTokenId)).toBeDefined();
+    });
+
+    it('a non-owner (with settings.edit) cannot revoke another admin\'s token', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/api-tokens/${superTokenId}`), adminTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+      const row = await db('api_tokens').where({ id: superTokenId }).first();
+      expect(row.revoked_at).toBeFalsy();
+    });
+
+    it('the owner can revoke their own token', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/api-tokens/${superTokenId}`), superTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('event update mass-assignment (3rqx)', () => {
+    it('ignores identity/secret columns in the request body', async () => {
+      const seedShareToken = 'orig-share-token';
+      const ins = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: 'authz-mass-assign', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Before',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'orig-hash', share_link: '/gallery/authz/share', share_token: seedShareToken, expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const eventId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`), superTok).send({
+        event_name: 'After',
+        created_by: 99999,
+        slug: 'hijacked-slug',
+        share_token: 'hijacked-token',
+        password_hash: 'hijacked-hash',
+        is_archived: 1,
+        archive_path: '/hijacked/archive/path',
+        hero_logo_path: '/etc/passwd',
+        is_draft: 1,
+        project_id: 99999,
+        // Case-variant keys — SQLite matches columns case-insensitively.
+        Password_Hash: 'case-hijack-hash',
+        Created_By: 88888,
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('After');        // legit field applied
+      expect(row.created_by).toBe(superId);         // ownership untouched (+ case-variant)
+      expect(row.slug).toBe('authz-mass-assign');   // routing identity untouched
+      expect(row.share_token).toBe(seedShareToken); // secret untouched
+      expect(row.password_hash).toBe('orig-hash');  // secret untouched (+ case-variant)
+      expect(row.is_archived).toBeFalsy();          // archive lifecycle untouched
+      expect(row.archive_path).toBeFalsy();         // forged archive path rejected
+      expect(row.hero_logo_path).toBeFalsy();       // fs.unlink primitive blocked
+      expect(row.is_draft).toBeFalsy();             // publish workflow not bypassed
+      expect(row.project_id).toBeFalsy();           // server-managed relationship untouched
+    });
+
+    it('returns 200 (no-op) when the body contains only protected fields', async () => {
+      const ins = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: 'authz-empty-update', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Keep',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/gallery/authz-empty/share', share_token: 'authz-empty-share',
+        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const id = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+      // Body reduces to {} after the denylist — must not 500 (Knex rejects
+      // .update({})).
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`), superTok)
+        .send({ created_by: 1, slug: 'x', is_archived: 1 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('Keep');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('category hero cross-category (j2f4)', () => {
+    it('rejects a hero photo that is not in the category', async () => {
+      const evIns = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: 'authz-cat', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Cat Event',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/gallery/authz-cat/share', share_token: 'authz-cat-share', expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const evId = evIns[0]?.id ?? evIns[0];
+
+      const mkCat = async (name) => {
+        const c = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+          event_id: evId, name, slug: name.toLowerCase(), created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        }).returning('id');
+        return c[0]?.id ?? c[0];
+      };
+      const cat1 = await mkCat('Cat1');
+      const cat2 = await mkCat('Cat2');
+
+      const pIns = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: evId, filename: 'p.jpg', path: 'authz-cat/p.jpg', type: 'individual',
+        category_id: cat1, uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const photoInCat1 = pIns[0]?.id ?? pIns[0];
+
+      // Pointing cat2's hero at a photo that lives in cat1 must be refused.
+      const bad = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/categories/${cat2}/hero`), superTok)
+        .send({ hero_photo_id: photoInCat1 });
+      expect(bad.status).toBe(404);
+
+      // The photo's own category accepts it.
+      const ok = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/categories/${cat1}/hero`), superTok)
+        .send({ hero_photo_id: photoInCat1 });
+      expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/backupExportSuperadmin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/**
+ * Full-instance export is super_admin only (GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v).
+ *
+ * GET /api/admin/backup/picpeak/export dumps every table unredacted (bcrypt
+ * hashes, 2FA, SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/webhook/S3 secrets). It was gated only by
+ * requirePermission('backup.create'), which the built-in `admin` role holds —
+ * so any non-super_admin admin could download the whole database. Pins that
+ * `admin` now gets 403 and `super_admin` passes the gate.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-bkexport-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'bkexport-test-secret';
+
+// The export otherwise walks the whole DB and writes a zip — stub it so the
+// super_admin happy path is fast and deterministic; the gate is what's tested.
+// The route deletes path.dirname(filePath) recursively after download, so the
+// stub MUST live in its own dir — a bare os.tmpdir() file would make the route
+// wipe the whole temp root (and other jest workers' DB files).
+const mockExportDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-export-stub-'));
+const mockExportPath = path.join(mockExportDir, 'export.picpeak');
+fs.writeFileSync(mockExportPath, 'stub');
+jest.mock('../../src/services/picpeakExportService', () => ({
+  createPicpeak: jest.fn(async () => ({ filePath: mockExportPath })),
+}));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('backup export super_admin gate (GHSA-pv6w)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let adminToken; let superToken;
+
+  const mkUser = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username,
+      email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    return jwt.sign(
+      { id, username, type: 'admin', role: roleName, loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    adminToken = await mkUser('limited-admin', 'admin');
+    superToken = await mkUser('root-admin', 'super_admin');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/backup', require('../../src/routes/adminBackup'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+    fs.rmSync(mockExportDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('denies the built-in admin role (was: full DB dump)', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/backup/picpeak/export')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('allows super_admin', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/backup/picpeak/export')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
+    expect(res.status).toBeLessThan(500);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/dashboardScope.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+/**
+ * Dashboard endpoints must not leak other admins' data to event-scoped
+ * editors — GHSA-c2jj (/stats), GHSA-gqx7 (/analytics), GHSA-jhcf (/activity).
+ *
+ * All three are gated only by `analytics.view`, which the `editor` role holds.
+ * But the events LIST restricts editors to their own rows
+ * (adminEvents/crud.js: roleName === 'editor' → created_by = admin.id), so an
+ * editor saw instance-wide totals — and, via /analytics topGalleries, other
+ * admins' gallery names and SLUGS (the public gallery URL component) — for
+ * events invisible to them everywhere else.
+ *
+ * Scoping deliberately keys on `editor` to mirror the events list exactly, so
+ * the `admin` role's dashboard is unchanged.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dashscope-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dashscope-test-secret';
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('dashboard scoping (GHSA-c2jj / gqx7 / jhcf)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let editorToken; let superToken;
+  let ownEventId; let foreignEventId;
+
+  const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username,
+      email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    const token = jwt.sign(
+      { id, username, type: 'admin', role: roleName, loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+    return { id, token };
+  };
+
+  const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy) => {
+    const r = await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: `${slug}-name`,
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_token: `tok-${slug}`,
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/tok-${slug}`,
+      created_by: createdBy,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const editor = await mkAdmin('scoped-editor', 'editor');
+    const sup = await mkAdmin('root-admin', 'super_admin');
+    editorToken = editor.token;
+    superToken = sup.token;
+
+    ownEventId = await mkEvent('own-gallery', editor.id);
+    foreignEventId = await mkEvent('foreign-gallery', sup.id);
+
+    // One photo + one view per event so the aggregates are non-zero.
+    for (const [eventId, name] of [[ownEventId, 'own'], [foreignEventId, 'foreign']]) {
+      await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename: `${name}.jpg`,
+        path: `events/active/${name}.jpg`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        size_bytes: 1000,
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      });
+      await db('access_logs').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        action: 'view',
+        ip_address: `10.0.0.${eventId}`,
+        user_agent: 'Mozilla/5.0',
+        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+      });
+      await db('activity_logs').insert({
+        activity_type: 'photo_viewed',
+        actor_type: 'admin',
+        actor_name: `${name}-actor`,
+        event_id: eventId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      });
+    }
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/dashboard', require('../../src/routes/adminDashboard'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('/stats counts only the editor\'s own events and photos', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(Number(res.body.totalEvents)).toBe(1);
+    expect(Number(res.body.totalPhotos)).toBe(1);
+    expect(Number(res.body.storageUsed)).toBe(1000);
+  });
+
+  it('/analytics does not expose a foreign gallery name or slug', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/analytics?days=7')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const body = JSON.stringify(res.body);
+    expect(body).not.toContain('foreign-gallery');
+    expect(body).not.toContain('foreign-gallery-name');
+    expect(res.body.topGalleries.map((g) => g.slug)).toEqual(['own-gallery']);
+  });
+
+  it('/activity does not surface a foreign event\'s entries', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/activity')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const actors = res.body.map((a) => a.actorName);
+    expect(actors).toContain('own-actor');
+    expect(actors).not.toContain('foreign-actor');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves super_admin unscoped across all three', async () => {
+    const stats = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/stats')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(Number(stats.body.totalEvents)).toBe(2);
+
+    const analytics = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/analytics?days=7')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(analytics.body.topGalleries.map((g) => g.slug).sort())
+      .toEqual(['foreign-gallery', 'own-gallery']);
+
+    const activity = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/dashboard/activity')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(activity.body.map((a) => a.actorName)).toContain('foreign-actor');
+  });
+});
+
+/**
+ * Codex round 2: the /activity filter trusts `activity_logs.event_id`, but
+ * expenseService was passing `adminId` into logActivity's third positional
+ * parameter — which is `eventId`. Admin and event id sequences overlap, so a
+ * foreign admin's expense metadata could surface under an editor's event.
+ * Those writers now pass the actor instead, leaving event_id NULL.
+ */
+describe('activity writers do not put admin ids in event_id (GHSA-jhcf)', () => {
+  it('expenseService passes the actor, not adminId, as the event id', () => {
+    const fs2 = require('fs');
+    const src = fs2.readFileSync(
+      require('path').join(__dirname, '../../src/services/expenseService.js'), 'utf8',
+    );
+    // No logActivity call may end with a bare `, adminId)` — that slot is eventId.
+    const offenders = src.split('\n').filter(
+      (l) => l.includes('logActivity(') && /,\s*adminId\s*\)/.test(l),
+    );
+    expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
+    // And the actor form must actually be in use.
+    expect(src).toContain("{ type: 'admin', id: adminId }");
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/databaseBackupDestination.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/**
+ * Manual database backup must not honour a caller-supplied destination
+ * (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm).
+ *
+ * POST /api/admin/database-backup/backup forwarded req.body straight into
+ * databaseBackupService.backup(), which merges options over its config:
+ *   const { destinationPath = '/backup/database', ... } = { ...config, ...options }
+ * `destinationPath` is not a persistable setting (the /config allowlist only
+ * accepts `database_backup_*` keys), so the request body was its ONLY source.
+ *
+ * The `admin` role holds backup.create but neither settings.edit nor
+ * backup.restore — so it could aim a full DB dump (bcrypt hashes, gallery
+ * password hashes, encrypted SMTP creds) at the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
+ * (server.js mounts it with no auth middleware) and fetch it unauthenticated.
+ *
+ * Pins that destinationPath from the body is ignored, while the legitimate
+ * knobs still pass through.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dbbackup-test-secret';
+
+// Capture what the route hands the service; never run a real backup.
+const mockBackup = jest.fn(async () => ({ success: true }));
+jest.mock('../../src/services/databaseBackup', () => ({
+  databaseBackupService: {
+    get isRunning() { return false; },
+    backup: (...args) => mockBackup(...args),
+  },
+}));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('manual database backup destination (GHSA-jw8m)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminToken;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'limited-admin',
+      email: 'limited-admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id, username: 'limited-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/database-backup', require('../../src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  beforeEach(() => mockBackup.mockClear());
+
+  it('ignores a caller-supplied destinationPath', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ destinationPath: '/app/storage/uploads' });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    // Give the fire-and-forget call a tick to land.
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+    expect(mockBackup).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    const opts = mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0];
+    expect(opts).not.toHaveProperty('destinationPath');
+    expect(JSON.stringify(opts)).not.toContain('uploads');
+  });
+
+  it('still forwards the legitimate backup knobs', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({ compress: false, validateIntegrity: false, destinationPath: '/tmp/evil' });
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+    const opts = mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0];
+    expect(opts.compress).toBe(false);
+    expect(opts.validateIntegrity).toBe(false);
+    expect(opts).not.toHaveProperty('destinationPath');
+  });
+
+  it('omits absent knobs entirely so service/config defaults still apply', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
+      .send({});
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+    // An explicit `{compress: undefined}` would override config on spread —
+    // absent keys must simply not be present.
+    expect(mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0]).toEqual({});
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/feedbackOwnership.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-2qc2 / GHSA-32h4 / GHSA-3335 — feedback moderation, deletion, and the
+ * pending-moderation list are by-feedback-id (or global) and lacked ownership
+ * scoping, so a restricted editor could act on / enumerate feedback for events
+ * it does not own. super_admin keeps global access.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-fbown-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'fbown-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-fbown-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('feedback ownership scoping', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let superTok; let editorTok; let editorId;
+  let foreignFeedbackId;
+
+  const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    const { adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db);
+    await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+    superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
+
+    const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'editor', email: 'editor@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('x', 4), must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    editorId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, editorId, 'editor');
+    editorTok = mintAdminToken(editorId);
+
+    // Event owned by super_admin (NOT the editor).
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'fbown-foreign', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Foreign',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/g/fbown/s', share_token: 'fbown-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+    const ph = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'p.jpg', path: 'fbown-foreign/p.jpg', type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const photoId = ph[0]?.id ?? ph[0];
+    const fb = await db('photo_feedback').insert({
+      photo_id: photoId, event_id: eventId, feedback_type: 'comment',
+      comment_text: 'hi', is_approved: 0, is_hidden: 0, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    foreignFeedbackId = fb[0]?.id ?? fb[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin/feedback', require('../../src/routes/adminFeedback'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('editor cannot moderate feedback on an event it does not own (404)', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}/approve`), editorTok);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    const row = await db('photo_feedback').where({ id: foreignFeedbackId }).first();
+    expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.is_approved); // untouched
+  });
+
+  it('editor cannot delete foreign feedback, row survives', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}`), editorTok);
+    // Denied either at the events.delete permission layer (editor lacks it →
+    // 403) or the ownership layer (404) — both must leave the row intact.
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
+    expect(await db('photo_feedback').where({ id: foreignFeedbackId }).first()).toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it('editor sees no foreign feedback in pending-moderation', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/feedback/feedback/pending-moderation'), editorTok);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.find((f) => f.id === foreignFeedbackId)).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin CAN moderate and see it', async () => {
+    const pending = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/feedback/feedback/pending-moderation'), superTok);
+    expect(pending.body.find((f) => f.id === foreignFeedbackId)).toBeDefined();
+    const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}/approve`), superTok);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryResolveShareToken.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-rh8r-7x3h-36rv — the unauthenticated GET /api/gallery/resolve/:identifier
+ * must NOT return a gallery's secret share_token (nor the share links that
+ * embed it) for a bare *slug* lookup. Slugs appear in gallery URLs and are
+ * guessable; handing back the secret turns a known slug into share-link
+ * access to a no-password gallery. The token is only returned when the caller
+ * resolved via the token / full share link (i.e. already holds it).
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-resolve-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'resolve-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-resolve-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'resolve-test-event';
+const SHARE_TOKEN = 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6';
+
+describe('GET /api/gallery/resolve/:identifier (GHSA-rh8r)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Resolve Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/${SHARE_TOKEN}`,
+      share_token: SHARE_TOKEN,
+      require_password: 0, // no-password → the token IS the access credential
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('does NOT leak the share_token (or share links) for a bare slug lookup', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${SLUG}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.slug).toBe(SLUG);
+    expect(res.body.matchType).toBe('slug');
+    // The secret must be absent — and must not sneak out via the share links.
+    expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.body.share_link).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.body.share_url).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(SHARE_TOKEN);
+  });
+
+  it('DOES return the token when the caller already resolved via the token', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${SHARE_TOKEN}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.token).toBe(SHARE_TOKEN);
+    expect(res.body.matchType).toMatch(/token/);
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT leak the token via SQL LIKE wildcards in the link_partial fallback', async () => {
+    // Before the escaping fix, an anonymous request of 32 underscores matched
+    // any share_link ending in a 32-char token (`_` = single-char wildcard),
+    // resolved as matchType 'link_partial', and handed back the bearer token.
+    // The share_token here has no underscores, so an escaped LIKE must miss.
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${'_'.repeat(SHARE_TOKEN.length)}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(SHARE_TOKEN);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/gallerySqliteBooleanFlags.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/**
+ * SQLite boolean coercion in the guest gallery surface (#1028).
+ *
+ * SQLite stores booleans as 0/1; Postgres stores true/false. The /photos
+ * payload and every download guard compared strictly against `true`/`false`,
+ * so on SQLite:
+ *
+ *   allow_downloads:    0 !== false → true   (button shown while disabled)
+ *   allow_user_uploads: 1 === true  → false  (button hidden while enabled)
+ *   if (allow_downloads === false)  → never fires, so ALL download endpoints
+ *                                     kept serving with downloads switched off
+ *
+ * (The download-jobs route asserted on main is #858, which is beta-only —
+ * this branch covers the three download endpoints that exist here.)
+ *
+ * The harness runs on SQLite, so these assertions exercise the real engine
+ * values rather than a mock. Every test here fails on the unfixed code.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sqlite-flags-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'sqlite-flags-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sqlite-flags-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'sqlite-flags-gallery';
+
+describe('gallery flags survive SQLite 0/1 storage (#1028)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId; let photoId;
+
+  async function setEventFlags(patch) {
+    await db('events').where('id', eventId).update(patch);
+  }
+
+  async function getPayload() {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    return res.body.event;
+  }
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'SQLite Flags',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
+      share_token: 'sqlite-flags-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      // Password-free so verifyGalleryAccess takes the public path and loads
+      // the row with SELECT * — i.e. the raw 0/1 values, same as production.
+      require_password: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    const ph = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename: 'p.jpg',
+      path: `${SLUG}/p.jpg`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    photoId = ph[0]?.id ?? ph[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  test('the engine under test really is SQLite storing 0/1', async () => {
+    expect(['sqlite3', 'better-sqlite3']).toContain(db.client.config.client);
+    await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 0 });
+    const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first('allow_downloads');
+    expect(row.allow_downloads).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  describe('with downloads disabled (allow_downloads = 0)', () => {
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 0, allow_user_uploads: 1 });
+    });
+
+    test('payload reports allow_downloads false (was true — header button shown)', async () => {
+      expect((await getPayload()).allow_downloads).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test('payload reports allow_user_uploads true (was false — upload button hidden)', async () => {
+      expect((await getPayload()).allow_user_uploads).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test('single-photo download is refused', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+
+    test('download-all is refused', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+
+    test('download-selected is refused', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [photoId] });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('with downloads enabled (allow_downloads = 1)', () => {
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 1, allow_user_uploads: 0 });
+    });
+
+    test('payload reports allow_downloads true / allow_user_uploads false', async () => {
+      const event = await getPayload();
+      expect(event.allow_downloads).toBe(true);
+      expect(event.allow_user_uploads).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test('download-all is no longer refused', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`);
+      expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('protection flags', () => {
+    test('0/1 protection toggles are reported the way they are stored', async () => {
+      await setEventFlags({
+        disable_right_click: 1,
+        enable_devtools_protection: 1,
+        use_canvas_rendering: 1,
+        watermark_downloads: 1,
+        overlay_protection: 0,
+      });
+      const event = await getPayload();
+      expect(event.disable_right_click).toBe(true);
+      expect(event.enable_devtools_protection).toBe(true);
+      expect(event.use_canvas_rendering).toBe(true);
+      expect(event.watermark_downloads).toBe(true);
+      expect(event.overlay_protection).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('per-category download blocking (#640) on SQLite', () => {
+    test('a category with allow_downloads = 0 is reported as blocked', async () => {
+      const cat = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+        name: 'Blocked', slug: 'blocked', event_id: eventId, is_global: 0, allow_downloads: 0,
+      }).returning('id');
+      const categoryId = cat[0]?.id ?? cat[0];
+      await db('photos').where('id', photoId).update({ category_id: categoryId });
+
+      await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 1 });
+      const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+      const category = res.body.categories.find((c) => c.id === categoryId);
+      expect(category.allow_downloads).toBe(false);
+      const photo = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoId);
+      expect(photo.category_allow_downloads).toBe(false);
+
+      // …and the per-category guard on the single-photo route fires.
+      const dl = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
+      expect(dl.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/hiddenPhotoAccessControl.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/**
+ * Hidden/client-only photo access control across the bulk + secure photo
+ * routes (GHSA cluster: fpwq / ghf8 / 3jvw / 9cc4 / 2hqg / jc22).
+ *
+ * A photo with visibility='hidden' is client-only. The main photo-list and
+ * single-photo download/view routes enforced this, but the bulk-download,
+ * protected-image, and secure-image routes shipped without the check —
+ * letting an ordinary guest reach hidden photos. These tests pin that
+ * guests are refused and PIN-clients (accessLevel='client') still succeed.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-hidden-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'hidden-photo-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-hidden-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'hidden-photo-test-event';
+
+describe('hidden-photo access control (GHSA cluster)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let visibleId;
+  let hiddenId;
+
+  const guestToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+  const clientToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery', accessLevel: 'client' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Hidden Photo Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'hidden-photo-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, allow_downloads: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const photoDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
+    fs.mkdirSync(photoDir, { recursive: true });
+
+    // A real 1x1 PNG so the protected /view route's Sharp processing path
+    // succeeds (fake bytes 500 on metadata()). Content, not extension,
+    // drives Sharp's format detection.
+    const PNG_1x1 = Buffer.from(
+      'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk+M8AAAMCAQGV2rY9AAAAAElFTkSuQmCC',
+      'base64'
+    );
+    const mkPhoto = async (filename, visibility) => {
+      fs.writeFileSync(path.join(photoDir, filename), PNG_1x1);
+      const p = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename,
+        path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        visibility,
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      return p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
+    };
+    visibleId = await mkPhoto('visible.jpg', 'visible');
+    hiddenId = await mkPhoto('hidden.jpg', 'hidden');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+    app.use('/api/images', require('../../src/routes/protectedImages'));
+    app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe('download-selected (GHSA-ghf8, medium)', () => {
+    it('omits a hidden photo for a guest even when its id is requested', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [visibleId, hiddenId] });
+      // The visible photo still zips; the hidden one is filtered out. If
+      // only the hidden id were requested, the filter empties the set → 404.
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const solo = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [hiddenId] });
+      expect(solo.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('includes the hidden photo for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [hiddenId] });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('download-all (GHSA-fpwq, medium)', () => {
+    it('streams for a guest without erroring (hidden photos filtered)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('protected-image view (GHSA-9cc4)', () => {
+    it('403s a hidden photo for a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('serves a visible photo for a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+    it('serves a hidden photo for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('signed-URL mint (GHSA-3jvw)', () => {
+    it('403s minting a signed URL for a hidden photo as a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('mints for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.url).toContain('/signed/');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('legacy secure-token mint (protectedImages generate-secure-token)', () => {
+    it('403s a hidden photo for a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-secure-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('mints for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-secure-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.token).toBeDefined();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('secure-token mint (GHSA-2hqg)', () => {
+    it('403s minting a secure token for a hidden photo as a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/generate-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
+        .send({ photoId: hiddenId });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('mints for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/generate-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`)
+        .send({ photoId: hiddenId });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.token).toBeDefined();
+    });
+  });
+
+  // A capability minted while a photo is visible must stop serving once the
+  // photo is hidden — unless minted by a client (clientBypass in the token).
+  describe('signed-URL TOCTOU (hidden AFTER minting)', () => {
+    afterEach(async () => {
+      await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'visible' });
+    });
+
+    it("a guest's pre-minted signed URL stops serving once the photo is hidden", async () => {
+      const mint = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(mint.status).toBe(200);
+      const url = mint.body.url;
+      // Still visible → serves.
+      expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(200);
+      // Hide it → the guest token (no clientBypass) must now be refused.
+      await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'hidden' });
+      expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(403);
+    });
+
+    it("a client's pre-minted signed URL keeps serving after the photo is hidden", async () => {
+      const mint = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(mint.status).toBe(200);
+      const url = mint.body.url;
+      await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'hidden' });
+      expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/logoDiagnostic.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/**
+ * Logo diagnostic must not leak the filesystem layout, and must mirror what
+ * resolveLogoFile actually tries (GHSA-29vm, codex round 2).
+ *
+ * Round 1 relativised `resolvedTo` and the candidate paths but still echoed
+ * `sources[].value` verbatim — and branding_logo_path is stored ABSOLUTE by
+ * multer, so the layout went out anyway. It also dropped the raw-absolute
+ * candidate, which the resolver retains (subject to containment), making the
+ * diagnostic report every candidate as missing for a legitimately contained
+ * absolute logo while `resolvedTo` named the file.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-logodiag-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'logodiag-test-secret';
+
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('logo diagnostic disclosure (GHSA-29vm)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let token;
+  // bootCrmDb() sets STORAGE_PATH itself, so resolve these AFTER it runs.
+  let STORAGE; let logoDir; let logoPath;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    // A legitimately contained absolute logo in a NON-standard storage subdir.
+    STORAGE = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
+    logoDir = path.join(STORAGE, 'custom');
+    logoPath = path.join(logoDir, 'logo.png');
+    fs.mkdirSync(logoDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(logoPath, 'png');
+
+    const setting = { setting_key: 'branding_logo_path', setting_value: JSON.stringify(logoPath), setting_type: 'branding' };
+    const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' }).first();
+    if (existing) await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' }).update(setting);
+    else await db('app_settings').insert(setting);
+
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'diag-admin', email: 'diag@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    token = jwt.sign(
+      { id, username: 'diag-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/business-profile', require('../../src/routes/adminBusinessProfile'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('does not leak absolute paths, cwd or storage root anywhere in the payload', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/business-profile/logo-diagnostic')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const body = JSON.stringify(res.body);
+    expect(body).not.toContain(STORAGE);
+    expect(body).not.toContain(process.cwd());
+    expect(res.body.storageRoot).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.body.cwd).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('still finds a contained absolute logo outside the standard subdirs', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/business-profile/logo-diagnostic')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+    const source = res.body.sources.find((s) => s.label === 'app_settings.branding_logo_path');
+    expect(source).toBeTruthy();
+    // The resolver keeps the contained absolute candidate, so the diagnostic
+    // must show it existing rather than reporting everything missing.
+    expect(source.candidates.some((c) => c.exists)).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.body.resolvedTo).toMatch(/^<STORAGE>\//);
+  });
+
+  it('shows the <STORAGE>/<value> candidate for a ROOT-RELATIVE logo URL (round 3)', async () => {
+    // `/custom/logo.png` is a URL, not a disk path, but path.isAbsolute() says
+    // true for both. Gating the stripped joins on isAbsolute() therefore hid
+    // `<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png` — a candidate resolveLogoFile does try and
+    // can resolve — so the diagnostic claimed nothing existed for a logo that
+    // renders fine, and collapsed the configured value to its basename.
+    await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' })
+      .update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify('/custom/logo.png') });
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/business-profile/logo-diagnostic')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const source = res.body.sources.find((s) => s.label === 'app_settings.branding_logo_path');
+    expect(source.candidates.some((c) => c.path === '<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png' && c.exists)).toBe(true);
+
+    // …and the disclosure guarantee still holds for this shape.
+    const body = JSON.stringify(res.body);
+    expect(body).not.toContain(STORAGE);
+    expect(body).not.toContain(process.cwd());
+
+    await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_logo_path' })
+      .update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(logoPath) });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/photoEngagementCounters.test.js

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ describe('photo engagement counters (#895)', () => {
   const getPhoto = async (id) => db('photos').where('id', id).first();
   // The counter writes are fire-and-forget on purpose — give the event
   // loop a beat before asserting.
-  const settle = () => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
+  const settle = () => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 400));
 
   beforeAll(async () => {
     ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ describe('photo engagement counters (#895)', () => {
     app.use(cookieParser());
     app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
     app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotos'));
   }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
@@ -200,6 +201,13 @@ describe('photo engagement counters (#895)', () => {
       // Own event so the on-the-fly archiver path is guaranteed — the
       // main event may have a cached zip from the previous test's
       // background generation, and racing its build/invalidate hangs.
+      // The route also fires a background pre-zip build after streaming;
+      // against this event's intentionally missing file it crashes with
+      // an async ENOENT that jest attributes to whatever test is running
+      // by then — neutralize it, it's not under test here.
+      const downloadZipService = require('../../src/services/downloadZipService');
+      const generateZipSpy = jest.spyOn(downloadZipService, 'generateZip')
+        .mockResolvedValue({ success: false, error: 'disabled in test' });
       const slug2 = `${SLUG}-skip`;
       const ev = await db('events').insert({
         slug: slug2,
@@ -248,6 +256,33 @@ describe('photo engagement counters (#895)', () => {
       expect((await db('photos').where('id', ids2[0]).first()).download_count).toBe(1);
       // photo-1's source was missing → skipped from the zip → not counted
       expect((await db('photos').where('id', ids2[1]).first()).download_count).toBe(0);
+      generateZipSpy.mockRestore();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('admin photos list exposes the counters (#895 follow-up)', () => {
+    it('returns view_count and download_count so the Engagement column can render them', async () => {
+      // The list mapper builds an explicit object — before this fix it
+      // omitted both fields, so the admin table showed 0 forever even
+      // though the DB counted correctly.
+      await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoIds[0]}`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      await settle();
+
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/admin/photos/${eventId}/photos`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoIds[0]);
+      expect(row.view_count).toBe(1);
+      expect(row.download_count).toBe(1);
+      const untouched = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoIds[1]);
+      expect(untouched.view_count).toBe(0);
+      expect(untouched.download_count).toBe(0);
     });
   });
 

backend/__tests__/routes/projectOwnership.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+/**
+ * Project ownership — GHSA-wrg5 (project routes) and GHSA-93x4 (project email
+ * endpoints).
+ *
+ * Project routes authorized on generic events.view / events.edit with NO
+ * ownership check, so an editor could enumerate, read, update and aggregate
+ * projects belonging to other admins' events. The email endpoints keyed on an
+ * email_queue id alone, so any id could be previewed/resent/cancelled.
+ *
+ * `projects` had no owner column. It was added in migration 167 (backfilled
+ * from linked events) rather than relying only on the transitive
+ * events.project_id -> events.created_by path, because a brand-new EMPTY
+ * project has no linked event to infer an owner from — which is exactly where
+ * the create -> attach flow begins.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-projown-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'projown-test-secret';
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('project ownership (GHSA-wrg5 / GHSA-93x4)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let editorToken; let superToken; let editorId; let superId;
+  let ownProjectId; let foreignProjectId; let foreignEventId; let foreignEmailId;
+
+  const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username,
+      email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    return {
+      id,
+      token: jwt.sign(
+        { id, username, type: 'admin', role: roleName, loginTime: Date.now() },
+        process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+      ),
+    };
+  };
+
+  const mkProject = async (name, createdBy) => {
+    const r = await db('projects').insert({
+      name, status: 'active', created_by: createdBy,
+      created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'projects', value: 1 })
+      .onConflict('key').merge({ value: 1 });
+
+    const editor = await mkAdmin('proj-editor', 'editor');
+    const sup = await mkAdmin('proj-super', 'super_admin');
+    editorToken = editor.token; editorId = editor.id;
+    superToken = sup.token; superId = sup.id;
+
+    ownProjectId = await mkProject('own-project', editorId);
+    foreignProjectId = await mkProject('foreign-project', superId);
+
+    // A foreign event linked to the foreign project, plus a queued email on it.
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'foreign-ev',
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Foreign Event',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_token: 'ftok', share_link: '/gallery/foreign-ev/ftok',
+      created_by: superId,
+      project_id: foreignProjectId,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    foreignEventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    const em = await db('email_queue').insert({
+      event_id: foreignEventId,
+      recipient_email: 'client@example.com',
+      email_type: 'gallery_created',
+      status: 'sent',
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    foreignEmailId = em[0]?.id ?? em[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/projects', require('../../src/routes/adminProjects'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('lists only the editor\'s own projects', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/projects')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const names = (res.body.projects || res.body.data?.projects || []).map((p) => p.name);
+    expect(names).toContain('own-project');
+    expect(names).not.toContain('foreign-project');
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to read a foreign project', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to update or aggregate a foreign project', async () => {
+    const update = await request(app)
+      .put(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`)
+      .send({ name: 'hijacked' });
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(update.status);
+
+    const overview = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}/overview`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(overview.status);
+
+    // And the name must not have changed.
+    const row = await db('projects').where({ id: foreignProjectId }).first();
+    expect(row.name).toBe('foreign-project');
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to attach a FOREIGN event to an owned project', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post(`/api/admin/projects/${ownProjectId}/events`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`)
+      .send({ eventId: foreignEventId });
+
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
+    const ev = await db('events').where({ id: foreignEventId }).first();
+    expect(ev.project_id).toBe(foreignProjectId); // still attached to its own
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to preview or act on a foreign queued email (GHSA-93x4)', async () => {
+    const preview = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/admin/projects/email/${foreignEmailId}/preview`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(preview.status);
+
+    const cancel = await request(app)
+      .post(`/api/admin/projects/email/${foreignEmailId}/cancel`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(cancel.status);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves super_admin unrestricted', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/admin/projects/${foreignProjectId}`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/projectOwnershipEdgeCases.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/**
+ * Project ownership edge cases (GHSA-wrg5, codex round 2).
+ *
+ * The first predicate union'd "any linked event I can see" with the stored
+ * owner, which opened two holes:
+ *   - a project owned by B containing ONE legacy ownerless event became
+ *     readable by everyone (and /overview aggregates B's other events,
+ *     invoices and emails);
+ *   - migration 167 deliberately leaves multi-owner projects NULL, and a NULL
+ *     owner was treated as "everyone's".
+ * The stored owner is now authoritative, and a NULL owner only derives access
+ * when EVERY linked event is accessible.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-projedge-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'projedge-test-secret';
+
+const bcrypt3 = require('bcrypt');
+const { bootCrmDb: boot3, seedMinimal: seed3 } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('project ownership edge cases (GHSA-wrg5, round 2)', () => {
+  let db3; let cleanup3; let ownership; let editorA; let editorB;
+
+  const mkAdmin3 = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db3('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db3('admin_users').insert({
+      username, email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt3.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+  const mkProject3 = async (name, createdBy) => {
+    const r = await db3('projects').insert({
+      name, status: 'active', created_by: createdBy,
+      created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+  const mkEvent3 = async (slug, createdBy, projectId) => {
+    const r = await db3('events').insert({
+      slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      share_token: `t-${slug}`, share_link: `/g/${slug}/t-${slug}`,
+      created_by: createdBy, project_id: projectId,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db: db3, cleanup: cleanup3 } = await boot3());
+    await seed3(db3);
+    ownership = require('../../src/middleware/ownership');
+    editorA = await mkAdmin3('edge-a', 'editor');
+    editorB = await mkAdmin3('edge-b', 'editor');
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup3) await cleanup3(); });
+
+  it('one ownerless event in B\'s project does not expose it to A', async () => {
+    const pid = await mkProject3('b-project', editorB);
+    await mkEvent3('b-owned-ev', editorB, pid);
+    await mkEvent3('legacy-ev', null, pid); // ownerless legacy event
+
+    const idsA = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
+    expect(idsA).not.toContain(Number(pid));
+
+    const idsB = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorB, roleName: 'editor' });
+    expect(idsB).toContain(Number(pid));
+  });
+
+  it('a mixed-owner project left NULL by migration 167 is not global', async () => {
+    const pid = await mkProject3('ambiguous', null);
+    await mkEvent3('mix-a-ev', editorA, pid);
+    await mkEvent3('mix-b-ev', editorB, pid);
+
+    for (const who of [editorA, editorB]) {
+      const ids = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: who, roleName: 'editor' });
+      expect(ids).not.toContain(Number(pid));
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('a NULL-owner project whose events are all mine IS mine', async () => {
+    const pid = await mkProject3('legacy-mine', null);
+    await mkEvent3('mine-ev', editorA, pid);
+
+    const ids = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
+    expect(ids).toContain(Number(pid));
+  });
+
+  it('a project whose creator was deleted falls back to its events', async () => {
+    const ghost = await mkAdmin3('ghost-admin', 'editor');
+    const pid = await mkProject3('orphaned', ghost);
+    await mkEvent3('orphan-ev', editorA, pid);
+    await db3('admin_users').where({ id: ghost }).del();
+
+    const ids = await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
+    expect(ids).toContain(Number(pid));
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin stays unrestricted', async () => {
+    expect(await ownership.ownedProjectIds({ id: 1, roleName: 'super_admin' })).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/restorePathAllowlist.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/**
+ * Restore path containment must not break the normal restore wizard
+ * (GHSA-fw4c, codex round 2).
+ *
+ * `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE, not a path: RestoreWizard posts
+ * 'local' | 's3' | 'upload', and restoreService.restore() branches on those
+ * literals before deriving a directory. The first version of the containment
+ * check treated `source` as a path, so path.resolve('local') landed outside
+ * the configured backup roots and BOTH /validate and /start returned 400 —
+ * blocking every normal restore.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restorepath-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restorepath-test-secret';
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('restore path allowlist (GHSA-fw4c)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let checkRestorePathsAllowed;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    // Configure a backup root so the allowlist is actually active.
+    for (const [key, value] of [['backup_destination_path', '/backup']]) {
+      const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).first();
+      if (existing) {
+        await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(value) });
+      } else {
+        await db('app_settings').insert({
+          setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'backup',
+        });
+      }
+    }
+
+    ({ checkRestorePathsAllowed } = require('../../src/routes/adminRestore')._internal);
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('allows the wizard\'s source TYPE tokens', async () => {
+    for (const source of ['local', 's3', 'upload']) {
+      const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+        source, manifestPath: '/backup/manifests/backup-manifest-1.json',
+      });
+      expect(err).toBeNull();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('allows an s3:// source URL', async () => {
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+      source: 's3://bucket/key/backup.tar.gz',
+      manifestPath: '/backup/manifests/backup-manifest-1.json',
+    });
+    expect(err).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('still rejects a manifestPath outside the configured roots', async () => {
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+      source: 'local', manifestPath: '/etc/passwd',
+    });
+    expect(err).toMatch(/inside a configured backup location/i);
+  });
+
+  it('still rejects a traversal manifestPath', async () => {
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+      source: 'local', manifestPath: '/backup/../etc/shadow',
+    });
+    expect(err).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a real path source inside the roots', async () => {
+    const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
+      source: '/backup/run-1', manifestPath: '/backup/run-1/manifest.json',
+    });
+    expect(err).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/secureImageTokenBinding.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/**
+ * Secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f).
+ *
+ * The view route GET /api/secure-images/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token serves
+ * via <img src> with the token in the URL, so it can't carry a gallery-token
+ * header like the download sibling. Before the fix it validated only the
+ * token signature and took the gallery/photo from the URL — so a token minted
+ * on any PUBLIC gallery read every other gallery's photos with no password.
+ *
+ * Pins that the route now enforces the scope inside the token:
+ *  - the URL photoId must equal the token's minted photoId
+ *  - the gallery embedded in the token's sessionId must equal the URL gallery
+ * A token minted on gallery A cannot read gallery B under either check; a
+ * token used on its own gallery+photo passes the binding.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-secimg-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'secimg-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-secimg-storage-'));
+
+// Stub the anti-bot/rate-limit middleware so the fingerprint is deterministic
+// — the token below is minted with the same fingerprint, so verifySecureToken
+// passes and the binding logic under test is what decides the outcome.
+jest.mock('../../src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware', () => ({
+  secureImageAccess: (req, _res, next) => {
+    req.clientInfo = { fingerprint: 'test-fp', ip: '127.0.0.1', userAgent: 'jest' };
+    next();
+  },
+  getSecurityStatus: (_req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }),
+}));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const secureImageService = require('../../src/services/secureImageService');
+
+describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let galleryA; let galleryB;
+  let photoA; let photoB;
+
+  const mkEvent = async (slug, requirePassword) => {
+    const r = await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: slug,
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      require_password: requirePassword ? 1 : 0,
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
+      share_token: `${slug}-share`,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  const mkPhoto = async (eventId, slug, filename) => {
+    const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', slug);
+    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, filename), Buffer.from('img'));
+    const r = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename,
+      path: `${slug}/${filename}`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  // Mint a token exactly as the mint route does — bound to (photoId, gallery
+  // sessionId, fingerprint) — bypassing the anti-bot HTTP path.
+  const mint = (photoId, eventId) => secureImageService.generateSecureToken(
+    photoId,
+    `gallery_public_${eventId}_${Date.now()}`,
+    { clientFingerprint: 'test-fp', maxUses: 100, expiresIn: 3600 },
+  );
+
+  const view = (slug, photoId, token) => request(app)
+    .get(`/api/secure-images/${slug}/secure/${photoId}/${token}`);
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    galleryA = await mkEvent('secimg-public-a', false);   // public — token source
+    galleryB = await mkEvent('secimg-private-b', true);   // password-protected — victim
+    photoA = await mkPhoto(galleryA, 'secimg-public-a', 'a.jpg');
+    photoB = await mkPhoto(galleryB, 'secimg-private-b', 'b.jpg');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('rejects a gallery-A token used against gallery B (cross-photo)', async () => {
+    const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
+    const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoB, token);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this photo/i);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a gallery-A token replayed on gallery B with A\'s photoId', async () => {
+    const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
+    // URL photoId matches the token, so the photo check passes — the gallery
+    // check (sessionId gallery A != URL gallery B) must catch it.
+    const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoA, token);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this gallery/i);
+  });
+
+  it('lets a token read its own gallery + photo (binding passes)', async () => {
+    const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
+    const res = await view('secimg-public-a', photoA, token);
+    // Binding passes; serving may 200/404/500 depending on the pipeline, but
+    // it must NOT be rejected as a token mismatch.
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/v1EventOwnership.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+/**
+ * v1 API tokens must respect event ownership (GHSA-9697).
+ *
+ * migration 081 documents the intent — "the token's effective permissions are
+ * the intersection of the user's role permissions and the token's own scope
+ * flags" — but it was never implemented:
+ *
+ *   - apiTokenAuth selected only id/username/email/role_id, so
+ *     req.admin.roleName was undefined and every ownership helper (which all
+ *     key on roleName) could not distinguish a super_admin from a viewer.
+ *   - No v1 route applied requirePermission or a created_by predicate, so any
+ *     valid token listed every event and — worst — GET /events/:id/share-link
+ *     returned ANY event's share_token, which is the gallery access credential.
+ *
+ * Scenario pinned here: a token owned by a restricted (non-super_admin) admin
+ * must see only its owner's events, and must not obtain a foreign share_token.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-v1own-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'v1own-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-v1own-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const { generateApiToken } = require('../../src/middleware/apiTokenAuth');
+
+describe('v1 event ownership (GHSA-9697)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let editorToken; let superToken;
+  let ownEventId; let foreignEventId;
+  const FOREIGN_SHARE_TOKEN = 'f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0';
+
+  const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username,
+      email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  const mkToken = async (adminId, scopes = 'admin') => {
+    const { plaintext, hashed } = generateApiToken();
+    await db('api_tokens').insert({
+      name: `tok-${adminId}`,
+      hashed_token: hashed,
+      scopes,
+      created_by: adminId,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+    return plaintext;
+  };
+
+  const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy, shareToken) => {
+    const r = await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: slug,
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_token: shareToken,
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/${shareToken}`,
+      created_by: createdBy,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const editorId = await mkAdmin('restricted-editor', 'editor');
+    const superId = await mkAdmin('root-admin', 'super_admin');
+    editorToken = await mkToken(editorId);
+    superToken = await mkToken(superId);
+
+    ownEventId = await mkEvent('own-event', editorId, 'a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1');
+    foreignEventId = await mkEvent('foreign-event', superId, FOREIGN_SHARE_TOKEN);
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/v1', require('../../src/routes/v1/events'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('lists only the token owner\'s events', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/v1/events')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const slugs = res.body.events.map((e) => e.slug);
+    expect(slugs).toContain('own-event');
+    expect(slugs).not.toContain('foreign-event');
+  });
+
+  it('refuses to read a foreign event', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/v1/events/${foreignEventId}`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT hand out a foreign event\'s share_token', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/v1/events/${foreignEventId}/share-link`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(FOREIGN_SHARE_TOKEN);
+  });
+
+  it('still allows the owner to read their own event and share link', async () => {
+    const detail = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/v1/events/${ownEventId}`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+    expect(detail.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const share = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/v1/events/${ownEventId}/share-link`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${editorToken}`);
+    expect(share.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(share.body.share_token).toBe('a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves super_admin tokens unrestricted', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/v1/events/${foreignEventId}/share-link`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.share_token).toBe(FOREIGN_SHARE_TOKEN);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/v1TokenPermissions.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/**
+ * v1 token scopes must intersect the owner's CURRENT role permissions
+ * (GHSA-9697, codex round 2).
+ *
+ * Migration 081 documents effective permissions as the intersection of the
+ * owner's role permissions and the token's scope flags. requireApiScope only
+ * ever checked the scope half, so a token minted while its owner was
+ * super_admin kept full write access after the owner was demoted to viewer —
+ * userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlives the
+ * demotion. Ownership scoping alone does not close this: the demoted owner
+ * still *owns* their events.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-v1perm-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'v1perm-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-v1perm-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const { generateApiToken } = require('../../src/middleware/apiTokenAuth');
+
+describe('v1 token scopes intersect role permissions (GHSA-9697)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app; let viewerToken; let viewerEventId;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'viewer' }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'demoted-owner',
+      email: 'demoted@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const ownerId = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+
+    // A token still carrying the broad 'admin' scope from before demotion.
+    const { plaintext, hashed } = generateApiToken();
+    await db('api_tokens').insert({
+      name: 'stale-token',
+      hashed_token: hashed,
+      scopes: 'admin',
+      created_by: ownerId,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+    viewerToken = plaintext;
+
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'viewer-ev',
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Viewer Event',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_token: 'vtok',
+      share_link: '/gallery/viewer-ev/vtok',
+      created_by: ownerId,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    viewerEventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/v1', require('../../src/routes/v1/events'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('denies event creation to a demoted viewer despite an admin-scope token', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/v1/events')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerToken}`)
+      .send({ event_name: 'Nope', event_type: 'wedding' });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('denies photo upload to a demoted viewer on their OWN event', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post(`/api/v1/events/${viewerEventId}/photos`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerToken}`)
+      .attach('photo', Buffer.from('x'), 'a.jpg');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('still allows the viewer to READ their own event', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get(`/api/v1/events/${viewerEventId}`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${viewerToken}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/backupRestoreHardening.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+/**
+ * Backup/restore hardening — GHSA-h652 (unbounded gunzip) and GHSA-hgp8
+ * (unkeyed manifest checksum).
+ *
+ * h652: decompressFile() piped gunzip straight to disk with no expanded-size
+ * bound, so a small crafted .gz could fill the volume.
+ *
+ * hgp8: the manifest checksum is a plain SHA-256 — it proves the manifest was
+ * not corrupted, not that it is authentic. BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY upgrades new
+ * manifests to a keyed HMAC. It is deliberately OPT-IN and verify-if-present:
+ * the key cannot live in the database (the database is inside the backup), so
+ * a mandatory HMAC would lock an operator out of the exact disaster-recovery
+ * case this system exists for.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const zlib = require('zlib');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-bkharden-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'bkharden-test-secret';
+
+const { restoreService } = require('../../src/services/restoreService');
+const backupManifest = require('../../src/services/backupManifest');
+
+describe('decompressFile expanded-size bound (GHSA-h652)', () => {
+  let dir;
+
+  beforeAll(() => { dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-gz-')); });
+  afterAll(() => { fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
+  afterEach(() => { delete process.env.RESTORE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES; });
+
+  it('aborts when the decompressed stream exceeds the limit', async () => {
+    // 5 MB of zeroes compresses to a few KB — the classic shape of the attack.
+    const gzPath = path.join(dir, 'bomb.gz');
+    fs.writeFileSync(gzPath, zlib.gzipSync(Buffer.alloc(5 * 1024 * 1024, 0)));
+
+    process.env.RESTORE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES = String(64 * 1024); // 64 KB
+    await expect(
+      restoreService.decompressFile(gzPath, path.join(dir, 'out-bomb'))
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/exceeds limit/i);
+  });
+
+  it('still decompresses a normal file within the limit', async () => {
+    const payload = Buffer.from('SELECT 1;\n'.repeat(100));
+    const gzPath = path.join(dir, 'ok.gz');
+    fs.writeFileSync(gzPath, zlib.gzipSync(payload));
+
+    const outPath = path.join(dir, 'out-ok');
+    await restoreService.decompressFile(gzPath, outPath);
+    expect(fs.readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(payload);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('manifest checksum keying (GHSA-hgp8)', () => {
+  // validateManifest requires all of these sections to be present.
+  const baseManifest = () => ({
+    manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
+    backup: { type: 'full' },
+    system: { platform: 'linux' },
+    application: { version: '1.0.0' },
+    files: { count: 1, manifest: [{ path: 'a.jpg', size: 1 }] },
+    database: { type: 'sqlite' },
+    verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: null },
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => { delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY; });
+
+  it('produces a different digest when a key is set', () => {
+    const m = baseManifest();
+    const unkeyed = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
+    const keyed = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: 'secret-key' });
+    expect(keyed).not.toBe(unkeyed);
+  });
+
+  it('validates a legacy unkeyed manifest even when a key IS configured', () => {
+    // Disaster recovery: manifests written before keying must not become
+    // un-restorable the moment the operator sets a key.
+    const m = baseManifest();
+    m.verification.checksum_algorithm = 'sha256';
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
+
+    process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY = 'secret-key';
+    expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a keyed manifest when the matching key is configured', () => {
+    process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY = 'secret-key';
+    const m = baseManifest();
+    m.verification.checksum_algorithm = 'hmac-sha256';
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: 'secret-key' });
+
+    expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a keyed manifest whose body was tampered with', () => {
+    process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY = 'secret-key';
+    const m = baseManifest();
+    m.verification.checksum_algorithm = 'hmac-sha256';
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: 'secret-key' });
+
+    m.files.manifest[0].path = '../../etc/passwd';
+    expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).toThrow(/checksum verification failed/i);
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT brick restore when a keyed manifest meets a missing key', () => {
+    // Key lost with the host — the precise moment a restore is needed.
+    const m = baseManifest();
+    m.verification.checksum_algorithm = 'hmac-sha256';
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: 'secret-key' });
+
+    delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY;
+    expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('manifest checksum coverage (canonicalization)', () => {
+  const fullManifest = () => ({
+    manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
+    backup: { type: 'full' },
+    system: { platform: 'linux' },
+    application: { version: '1.0.0' },
+    files: { count: 1, manifest: [{ path: 'a.jpg', size: 1 }] },
+    database: { type: 'sqlite' },
+    verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: 'sha256' },
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => { delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY; });
+
+  it('covers nested file entries (the old replacer dropped them)', () => {
+    const m = fullManifest();
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
+    // Tampering a file path must now change the digest.
+    m.files.manifest[0].path = '../../etc/passwd';
+    expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).toThrow(/checksum verification failed/i);
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts a manifest written with the legacy serialization', () => {
+    const m = fullManifest();
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(
+      m, { keyed: false, legacy: true }
+    );
+    expect(() => backupManifest.validateManifest(m)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('checksum verification is shared and downgrade-aware (codex round 2)', () => {
+  const fullManifest = () => ({
+    manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
+    backup: { type: 'full' },
+    system: { platform: 'linux' },
+    application: { version: '1.0.0' },
+    files: { count: 1, manifest: [{ path: 'a.jpg', size: 1 }] },
+    database: { type: 'sqlite' },
+    verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: 'sha256' },
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY;
+    delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED;
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legacy-serialized manifest through the SHARED verifier', () => {
+    // restoreService recomputed the digest itself with the canonical
+    // serializer, which rejected every pre-existing backup.
+    const m = fullManifest();
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(
+      m, { keyed: false, legacy: true },
+    );
+    const res = backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m);
+    expect(res.valid).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/legacy checksum serialization/i);
+  });
+
+  it('warns but accepts an unkeyed manifest when a key is configured', () => {
+    const m = fullManifest();
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
+    process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY = 'secret-key';
+
+    const res = backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m);
+    expect(res.valid).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/authenticity NOT established/i);
+  });
+
+  it('REJECTS the algorithm downgrade once REQUIRE_KEYED is on', () => {
+    // Attacker rewrites the manifest, strips checksum_algorithm and recomputes
+    // a plain SHA-256. With the strict flag set that must not verify.
+    const m = fullManifest();
+    m.files.manifest[0].path = '../../etc/passwd';
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
+
+    process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY = 'secret-key';
+    process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED = 'true';
+
+    const res = backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m);
+    expect(res.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(res.error).toMatch(/downgrade/i);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a keyed manifest with no key when REQUIRE_KEYED is on', () => {
+    const m = fullManifest();
+    m.verification.checksum_algorithm = 'hmac-sha256';
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: 'k' });
+    process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED = 'true';
+
+    expect(backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m).valid).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('REJECTS a manifest whose checksum was stripped entirely', () => {
+    // The cheapest bypass of every rule above: delete the field instead of
+    // forging it. Both the helper's early return and restoreService's
+    // `if (…total_checksum)` guard used to wave that through.
+    const m = fullManifest();
+    delete m.verification.total_checksum;
+
+    const res = backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m);
+    expect(res.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(res.error).toMatch(/no checksum/i);
+
+    delete m.verification;
+    expect(backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m).valid).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('REJECTS an unkeyed manifest under REQUIRE_KEYED even with no key configured', () => {
+    // Strict mode is a claim about the manifests, not about this host — so a
+    // fresh disaster-recovery box that lost BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY must not
+    // silently start accepting plain SHA-256 manifests again.
+    const m = fullManifest();
+    m.verification.total_checksum = backupManifest.calculateManifestChecksum(m, { keyed: false });
+    process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED = 'true';
+    delete process.env.BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY;
+
+    const res = backupManifest.verifyManifestChecksum(m);
+    expect(res.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(res.error).toMatch(/downgrade/i);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/businessDocsStoragePath.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test: business documents must be written under STORAGE_PATH.
+ *
+ * quoteService.persistDocPdf, the invoice sending/reminder writers and the
+ * contract signature writers all built their target from
+ * `path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'business-docs', ...)`. Both compose
+ * files pin STORAGE_PATH=/app/storage and the image's WORKDIR is /app, so the
+ * two expressions name the same directory and the bug was invisible on a stock
+ * deployment. Point STORAGE_PATH anywhere else — a NAS mount, a second disk,
+ * the single-container image's /data volume — and quotes, invoices, Mahnungen
+ * and contract PDFs were written outside the configured storage root, so they
+ * were missed by backups and lost when the container was replaced.
+ *
+ * Rather than assert on internals, this drives the module boundary the fix
+ * changed: getStoragePath() is the one resolver, so a temporary STORAGE_PATH
+ * must be where the bytes land.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+
+describe('business documents honour STORAGE_PATH', () => {
+  let tmpRoot;
+  let originalStoragePath;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    originalStoragePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
+    tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-storage-'));
+    process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpRoot;
+    jest.resetModules();
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    if (originalStoragePath === undefined) delete process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
+    else process.env.STORAGE_PATH = originalStoragePath;
+    fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('getStoragePath is the resolver the writers share', () => {
+    const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
+    expect(getStoragePath()).toBe(tmpRoot);
+  });
+
+  it('no business-document writer still targets process.cwd()/storage', () => {
+    // Whitespace is collapsed before matching on purpose. The first version of
+    // this test compared against the single-line literal and therefore missed
+    // persistSignatureImage(), whose identical path.join was simply spread over
+    // seven lines — it reported green while signature PNGs still wrote outside
+    // STORAGE_PATH. Formatting must not decide whether a bug is visible.
+    const writers = [
+      'src/services/quoteService.js',
+      'src/services/invoice/sending.js',
+      'src/services/invoice/reminders.js',
+      'src/services/contract/signatureAssets.js',
+      'src/routes/adminDev.js',
+    ];
+    const offenders = writers.filter((rel) => {
+      const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../', rel), 'utf8');
+      return /process\.cwd\(\),'storage'/.test(source.replace(/\s+/g, ''));
+    });
+    expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('generated contract PDFs pass the containment check that serves them', () => {
+    // assertContractPdfPath guards the admin and public contract download
+    // routes. It listed only <cwd>/storage/business-docs/contract, so once the
+    // writers moved to STORAGE_PATH every freshly generated contract was
+    // refused with PATH_OUTSIDE_STORAGE — a worse failure than the bug being
+    // fixed. Both roots must be accepted.
+    const { assertContractPdfPath } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
+    const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
+
+    // assertPathInside realpaths both the file and each root, so the guard only
+    // means anything against a filesystem that actually has them — write them.
+    const write = (...segments) => {
+      const p = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'business-docs', 'contract', ...segments);
+      fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(p), { recursive: true });
+      fs.writeFileSync(p, 'bytes');
+      return p;
+    };
+
+    const generated = write('2026', 'C-2026-0001.pdf');
+    expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(generated)).not.toThrow();
+
+    // Signature PNGs live under the same root and are served by the same guard.
+    const signature = write('signatures', '7', 'customer-1.png');
+    expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(signature)).not.toThrow();
+
+    // And the guard still refuses a real file outside every allowed root.
+    const foreign = path.join(tmpRoot, 'outside.pdf');
+    fs.writeFileSync(foreign, 'bytes');
+    expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(foreign)).toThrow(/outside the storage roots/i);
+  });
+
+  it('the guard takes its root from the shared resolver, not its own fallback', () => {
+    // The regression this pins: the guard used to compute
+    // `STORAGE_PATH || <cwd>/storage` itself. That agrees with getStoragePath()
+    // only while STORAGE_PATH is set — unset, the shared resolver falls back
+    // module-relative to <repo>/storage while the guard fell back to
+    // <cwd>/storage, and the backend is normally started from backend/. Writers
+    // and guard then disagreed and contract downloads 403'd.
+    //
+    // Mocking the resolver is what makes this provable AND safe. If the guard
+    // consumes getStoragePath(), the mock moves its root; if it rolled its own
+    // expression, the mock would have no effect and the assertion fails. It
+    // also keeps every path inside the tmpdir — an earlier version of this test
+    // deleted `<resolved root>/business-docs` in cleanup, which with
+    // STORAGE_PATH unset resolves to a developer's real, gitignored
+    // <repo>/storage and would have destroyed local documents on `npm test`.
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock('../../src/config/storage', () => ({ getStoragePath: () => tmpRoot }));
+
+    const { assertContractPdfPath } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
+
+    const root = path.join(tmpRoot, 'business-docs', 'contract', '2026');
+    fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
+    const generated = path.join(root, 'C-2026-0002.pdf');
+    fs.writeFileSync(generated, 'bytes');
+
+    expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(generated)).not.toThrow();
+
+    jest.dontMock('../../src/config/storage');
+  });
+
+  it('writes land under STORAGE_PATH, not the working directory', () => {
+    const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
+
+    // Mirror what persistDocPdf does: derive the root, create it, write.
+    const root = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'business-docs', 'quote', '2026');
+    fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
+    const filePath = path.join(root, 'Q-2026-0001.pdf');
+    fs.writeFileSync(filePath, 'pdf-bytes');
+
+    expect(fs.existsSync(filePath)).toBe(true);
+    expect(filePath.startsWith(tmpRoot)).toBe(true);
+    // And crucially NOT beside the process working directory.
+    expect(filePath.startsWith(path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('the PDF font lookup consults the storage root before the legacy path', () => {
+    // A custom font under STORAGE_PATH/fonts used to be unreachable, so the
+    // document silently rendered with the built-in face instead.
+    const fontDir = path.join(tmpRoot, 'fonts');
+    fs.mkdirSync(fontDir, { recursive: true });
+    const fontPath = path.join(fontDir, 'Brand.ttf');
+    fs.writeFileSync(fontPath, 'ttf');
+
+    const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
+    const raw = 'Brand.ttf';
+    const candidates = [
+      path.join(getStoragePath(), raw.replace(/^\/+/, '')),
+      path.join(getStoragePath(), 'fonts', path.basename(raw)),
+      path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'fonts', path.basename(raw)),
+    ];
+    const found = candidates.find((p) => fs.existsSync(p));
+    expect(found).toBe(fontPath);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/emailIntakeCaps.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/**
+ * Inbound-mail resource caps (GHSA-2qf9).
+ *
+ * emailIntakeService downloaded, parsed and persisted every message with no
+ * size, attachment-count or attachment-byte limit. Anyone who can email the
+ * operator's mailbox reaches this path unauthenticated.
+ *
+ * The teeth were in the dedup key: on failure the service wrote an error row
+ * keyed `err-<uid>-<Date.now()>`, which can never match the envelope-derived
+ * `messageId` the dedup pass compares against. So the same oversized message
+ * was re-downloaded every poll interval forever — and an OOM-kill/restart just
+ * resumed the loop. This pins that an over-limit message is (a) never
+ * downloaded and (b) recorded under its REAL message id so it dedups.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-intake-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'intake-test-secret';
+process.env.EMAIL_INTAKE_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES = '1000';
+
+const OVERSIZED_UID = 11;
+const NORMAL_UID = 12;
+const OVERSIZED_MSGID = '<huge@example.com>';
+
+const fetchOneCalls = [];
+
+jest.mock('imapflow', () => ({
+  ImapFlow: class {
+    async connect() {}
+    async logout() {}
+    async getMailboxLock() { return { release() {} }; }
+    async search() { return [OVERSIZED_UID, NORMAL_UID]; }
+    // Envelope pass now also returns `size`.
+    async *fetch() {
+      yield { uid: OVERSIZED_UID, size: 50_000, envelope: { messageId: OVERSIZED_MSGID } };
+      yield { uid: NORMAL_UID, size: 500, envelope: { messageId: '<ok@example.com>' } };
+    }
+    async fetchOne(uid) {
+      fetchOneCalls.push(String(uid));
+      return { source: Buffer.from('Subject: ok\r\n\r\nbody') };
+    }
+    async messageFlagsAdd() { return true; }
+  },
+}));
+
+jest.mock('mailparser', () => ({
+  simpleParser: async () => ({
+    messageId: '<ok@example.com>',
+    subject: 'ok',
+    date: new Date(),
+    attachments: [],
+    text: 'body',
+    html: null,
+  }),
+}));
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('email intake caps (GHSA-2qf9)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let intake;
+
+  let pollResult;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    // pollOnce short-circuits unless the feature flag is on AND an IMAP
+    // account is configured — without both, this suite would pass vacuously.
+    await db('feature_flags')
+      .insert({ key: 'incomingMail', value: 1 })
+      .onConflict('key').merge({ value: 1 });
+    // getImapConfig() reads email_configs.first() — seedMinimal may already
+    // have inserted a row, so update that one rather than adding a second
+    // (the first row would win and report "unconfigured").
+    const imapFields = {
+      imap_host: 'imap.example.com',
+      imap_user: 'intake@example.com',
+      imap_pass: 'x',
+      imap_folder: 'INBOX',
+    };
+    const existingCfg = await db('email_configs').first();
+    if (existingCfg) {
+      await db('email_configs').where({ id: existingCfg.id }).update(imapFields);
+    } else {
+      await db('email_configs').insert({
+        smtp_host: 'smtp.example.com',
+        smtp_port: 587,
+        from_email: 'intake@example.com',
+        ...imapFields,
+      });
+    }
+
+    intake = require('../../src/services/emailIntakeService');
+    pollResult = await intake.pollOnce().catch((e) => ({ thrown: e.message }));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('actually ran the poll (guards against a vacuous suite)', () => {
+    expect(pollResult).toBeDefined();
+    expect(pollResult.skipped).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('never downloads a message whose envelope size exceeds the cap', () => {
+    // The oversized uid must never reach fetchOne (the source download) —
+    // that download is the DoS. The normal one must still be processed.
+    expect(fetchOneCalls).not.toContain(String(OVERSIZED_UID));
+    expect(fetchOneCalls).toContain(String(NORMAL_UID));
+  });
+
+  it('records the skip under the REAL message id so it dedups next poll', async () => {
+    const row = await db('received_emails').where({ message_id: OVERSIZED_MSGID }).first();
+    expect(row).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(row.status).toBe('error');
+    expect(String(row.error)).toMatch(/too large/i);
+    // The whole point: keyed by messageId, NOT err-<uid>-<timestamp>, which
+    // could never match the dedup pass and so looped forever.
+    expect(row.message_id).not.toMatch(/^err-/);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/ensurePreviewImage.external.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/**
+ * Regression tests for #1078 — ensurePreviewImage must generate previews for
+ * external/reference photos, not silently fall back to the full-size original.
+ *
+ * resolvePhotoStorageKey returns null for external photos by design, and that
+ * null used to be handed straight to withLocalCopy, which throws. The lightbox
+ * preview route caught the throw and redirected to the original, so a gallery
+ * whose photos all live on an external mount paid full size on every open —
+ * the exact cost the preview tier (#492) exists to avoid.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+// Must be set before externalMediaService is first required: it caches the
+// resolved root on first call, and the dir has to exist to win over the
+// container default.
+const EXTERNAL_ROOT = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-ext-media-${process.pid}`);
+process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = EXTERNAL_ROOT;
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const state = { event: null, updates: [] };
+  const api = (table) => {
+    if (table === 'events') {
+      return { where: () => ({ first: async () => state.event }) };
+    }
+    if (table === 'photos') {
+      return {
+        where: (criteria) => ({
+          update: async (values) => {
+            state.updates.push({ criteria, values });
+            return 1;
+          },
+        }),
+      };
+    }
+    throw new Error(`unexpected table in test: ${table}`);
+  };
+  api.__state = state;
+  return { db: api };
+});
+
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
+
+const EVENT = {
+  id: 7,
+  slug: 'nas-wedding',
+  source_mode: 'reference',
+  external_path: 'weddings/2026-08-smith',
+};
+
+async function writeSourceJpeg(absPath, { width = 2400, height = 1600 } = {}) {
+  await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(absPath), { recursive: true });
+  const buf = Buffer.alloc(width * height * 3);
+  for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) buf[i] = (i * 7) % 256;
+  await sharp(buf, { raw: { width, height, channels: 3 } }).jpeg({ quality: 90 }).toFile(absPath);
+}
+
+describe('ensurePreviewImage — external/reference sources (#1078)', () => {
+  let storage;
+  let storageRoot;
+  let imageProcessor;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-preview-store-'));
+    storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
+    await storage.init();
+    storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+
+    // Require AFTER the storage injection so the module sees it.
+    delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+
+    await fs.mkdir(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path), { recursive: true });
+  }, 30000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    await fs.rm(EXTERNAL_ROOT, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    db.__state.event = EVENT;
+    db.__state.updates = [];
+  });
+
+  it.each(['external', 'reference'])(
+    'generates a downscaled preview for a %s photo off the media mount',
+    async (sourceOrigin) => {
+      const relpath = `${sourceOrigin}-shot.jpg`;
+      await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
+
+      const photo = {
+        id: sourceOrigin === 'external' ? 101 : 102,
+        event_id: EVENT.id,
+        source_origin: sourceOrigin,
+        external_relpath: relpath,
+        filename: relpath,
+        preview_path: null,
+      };
+
+      const key = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
+
+      // Per-photo basename so two events referencing the same NAS filename
+      // can't clobber each other's preview.
+      expect(key).toBe(`previews/preview_ext${photo.id}_${relpath}`);
+      expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
+
+      const meta = await sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key)).metadata();
+      expect(meta.format).toBe('jpeg');
+      // 2400x1600 capped at the 1920 long edge, aspect preserved.
+      expect(meta.width).toBe(1920);
+      expect(meta.height).toBe(1280);
+
+      // The generated key is persisted so the next open short-circuits.
+      expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([
+        { criteria: { id: photo.id }, values: { preview_path: key } },
+      ]);
+    }
+  );
+
+  it('short-circuits on an existing valid preview instead of regenerating', async () => {
+    const relpath = 'already-previewed.jpg';
+    await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
+    const photo = {
+      id: 103,
+      event_id: EVENT.id,
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: relpath,
+      filename: relpath,
+      preview_path: null,
+    };
+
+    const first = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
+    db.__state.updates = [];
+
+    const second = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage({ ...photo, preview_path: first });
+    expect(second).toBe(first);
+    expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('returns null (never throws) when the external source is missing', async () => {
+    const photo = {
+      id: 104,
+      event_id: EVENT.id,
+      source_origin: 'external',
+      external_relpath: 'not-on-the-mount.jpg',
+      filename: 'not-on-the-mount.jpg',
+      preview_path: null,
+    };
+
+    await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
+    expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('returns null (never throws) for a row with no source_origin in a reference event', async () => {
+    // Mode falls back to event.source_mode = 'reference', so
+    // resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null. That used to reach withLocalCopy and
+    // throw out of ensurePreviewImage instead of honouring null-on-failure.
+    const photo = {
+      id: 105,
+      event_id: EVENT.id,
+      source_origin: null,
+      external_relpath: null,
+      filename: 'orphan.jpg',
+      path: 'nas-wedding/individual/orphan.jpg',
+      preview_path: null,
+    };
+
+    await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
+    expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('branches on source_origin, so a row selected without it looks managed', async () => {
+    // Pins why the /regenerate-previews caller must select source_origin:
+    // an external row missing that column takes the managed path, where
+    // resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null and generation is skipped.
+    const relpath = 'column-starved.jpg';
+    await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
+    const starved = {
+      id: 106,
+      event_id: EVENT.id,
+      external_relpath: relpath,
+      preview_path: null,
+    };
+
+    await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(starved)).resolves.toBeNull();
+    await expect(
+      imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage({ ...starved, source_origin: 'external', filename: relpath })
+    ).resolves.toBe(`previews/preview_ext106_${relpath}`);
+  });
+
+  it('still routes managed photos through the storage backend', async () => {
+    const sourceKey = 'events/active/managed-event/individual/managed.jpg';
+    const localSource = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-managed-${process.pid}.jpg`);
+    await writeSourceJpeg(localSource, { width: 800, height: 600 });
+    await storage.put(sourceKey, await fs.readFile(localSource), { contentType: 'image/jpeg' });
+    await fs.rm(localSource, { force: true });
+
+    db.__state.event = { id: 8, slug: 'managed-event', source_mode: 'managed' };
+    const photo = {
+      id: 201,
+      event_id: 8,
+      source_origin: 'managed',
+      path: 'managed-event/individual/managed.jpg',
+      filename: 'managed.jpg',
+      preview_path: null,
+    };
+
+    const key = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
+    expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_managed.jpg');
+    expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/generateThumbnail.regenerate.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/**
+ * Regeneration must not destroy a good thumbnail when the source is
+ * unreadable (#1129).
+ *
+ * The old code deleted the target BEFORE sharp opened the source, so a NAS
+ * mount that blipped mid-run left the previous rendition gone and the database
+ * still pointing at it. Across a bulk regenerate that is the whole gallery,
+ * and it is precisely the "worse than before you pressed it" outcome #1129 is
+ * about.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs').promises;
+const os = require('os');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: () => ({ where: () => ({ first: async () => null, update: async () => 1 }) }),
+}));
+
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
+const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
+
+describe('generateThumbnail — regenerate is non-destructive (#1129)', () => {
+  let storage; let root; let imageProcessor; let srcDir;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-store-'));
+    srcDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-regen-src-'));
+    storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root });
+    await storage.init();
+    storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
+
+    delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
+    imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
+  }, 30000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    storageModule.resetStorage();
+    await fs.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    await fs.rm(srcDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  });
+
+  async function writeSource(name, size = 400) {
+    const p = path.join(srcDir, name);
+    await sharp({ create: { width: size, height: size, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 2, b: 3 } } })
+      .jpeg().toFile(p);
+    return p;
+  }
+
+  it('keeps the existing thumbnail when the source cannot be read', async () => {
+    const src = await writeSource('present.jpg');
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(src, { regenerate: true });
+    expect(key).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
+    const before = await storage.get(key).then((s) => new Promise((res) => {
+      const c = []; s.on('data', (d) => c.push(d)); s.on('end', () => res(Buffer.concat(c)));
+    }));
+
+    // The mount goes away between runs.
+    await fs.unlink(src);
+    const second = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(src, { regenerate: true })
+      .catch(() => null);
+
+    expect(second).toBeFalsy();
+    // The old rendition is still there and still serves. Previously it had
+    // been deleted before sharp ever looked at the source.
+    expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
+    const after = await storage.get(key).then((s) => new Promise((res) => {
+      const c = []; s.on('data', (d) => c.push(d)); s.on('end', () => res(Buffer.concat(c)));
+    }));
+    expect(after.equals(before)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('still replaces the thumbnail when the source IS readable', async () => {
+    const src = await writeSource('replaceme.jpg', 400);
+    const key = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(src, { regenerate: true });
+    const firstSize = (await storage.stat(key)).size;
+
+    // Same key, different source content — the atomic rename in put() is what
+    // makes the pre-delete unnecessary.
+    await fs.rm(src);
+    await sharp({ create: { width: 400, height: 400, channels: 3, background: { r: 250, g: 40, b: 9 } } })
+      .jpeg().toFile(src);
+    const again = await imageProcessor.generateThumbnail(src, { regenerate: true });
+
+    expect(again).toBe(key);
+    expect((await storage.stat(key)).size).not.toBe(firstSize);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/projectDealLineageOwnership.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+/**
+ * Deal-lineage ownership on project attach (GHSA-wrg5, codex round 3).
+ *
+ * requireProjectOwnership vets only the DESTINATION project. Attaching a quote
+ * cascades through linkDealToProject, which re-points every event the deal
+ * produced into that project — so an editor could create an empty project of
+ * their own, attach another admin's quote, and pull that admin's events (and
+ * the invoices, emails and gallery that roll up with them) into a project they
+ * own and can read via /:id/overview. An unassigned project offered no
+ * resistance either: it ADOPTS the deal's customer rather than rejecting it.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-deallineage-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'deallineage-test-secret';
+
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('linkDealToProject enforces lineage ownership (GHSA-wrg5, round 3)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let projectService;
+  let editorA; let editorB; let superAdmin;
+  let customerId;
+
+  const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username, email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+  const mkProject = async (name, createdBy) => {
+    const r = await db('projects').insert({
+      name, status: 'active', created_by: createdBy,
+      created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+  const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy) => {
+    const r = await db('events').insert({
+      slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      share_token: `t-${slug}`, share_link: `/g/${slug}/t-${slug}`,
+      created_by: createdBy,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+  const mkQuote = async (dealUuid, convertedEventId) => {
+    const r = await db('quotes').insert({
+      quote_number: `Q-${dealUuid}`,
+      customer_account_id: customerId,
+      deal_uuid: dealUuid,
+      converted_event_id: convertedEventId,
+      status: 'accepted',
+      currency: 'EUR',
+      issue_date: '2026-08-01',
+      total_amount_minor: 1000,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    projectService = require('../../src/services/projectService');
+    editorA = await mkAdmin('deal-a', 'editor');
+    editorB = await mkAdmin('deal-b', 'editor');
+    superAdmin = await mkAdmin('deal-root', 'super_admin');
+    const c = await db('customer_accounts').first('id');
+    customerId = c.id;
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it("refuses to move another admin's event into the caller's project", async () => {
+    const victimEvent = await mkEvent('victim-gala', editorB);
+    const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-foreign', victimEvent);
+    const attackerProject = await mkProject('attacker-empty', editorA);
+
+    await expect(
+      projectService.assignQuote(attackerProject, quoteId, { id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' }),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'DEAL_EVENT_FORBIDDEN' });
+
+    // Nothing may be half-applied: neither the event nor the quote moved.
+    const ev = await db('events').where({ id: victimEvent }).first('project_id');
+    expect(ev.project_id == null).toBe(true);
+    const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
+    expect(q.project_id == null).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("allows the caller's own event through the same path", async () => {
+    const ownEvent = await mkEvent('own-gala', editorA);
+    const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-own', ownEvent);
+    const project = await mkProject('attacker-own', editorA);
+
+    await projectService.assignQuote(project, quoteId, { id: editorA, roleName: 'editor' });
+
+    const ev = await db('events').where({ id: ownEvent }).first('project_id');
+    expect(Number(ev.project_id)).toBe(Number(project));
+  });
+
+  it('leaves super_admin unrestricted', async () => {
+    const victimEvent = await mkEvent('root-gala', editorB);
+    const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-root', victimEvent);
+    const project = await mkProject('root-project', superAdmin);
+
+    await projectService.assignQuote(project, quoteId, { id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin' });
+
+    const ev = await db('events').where({ id: victimEvent }).first('project_id');
+    expect(Number(ev.project_id)).toBe(Number(project));
+  });
+
+  it('resolves the role from a bare admin id (quote/contract create+update paths)', async () => {
+    // Those services thread `adminId`, not req.admin — the lookup must still
+    // scope them, and must fail closed rather than assume super_admin.
+    const victimEvent = await mkEvent('bare-gala', editorB);
+    const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-bare', victimEvent);
+    const project = await mkProject('bare-project', editorA);
+
+    await expect(
+      projectService.assignQuote(project, quoteId, { id: editorA }),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'DEAL_EVENT_FORBIDDEN' });
+  });
+
+  // The lineage guard above only fires once a deal has produced an event. The
+  // quote/contract create+update paths call linkDealToProject with a
+  // body-supplied projectId and NO route-level ownership guard, so a brand-new
+  // deal (eventIds empty) skipped every check and wrote into a foreign project.
+  describe('destination ownership (codex review follow-up)', () => {
+    it('refuses a foreign project even when the deal has no events yet', async () => {
+      const victimProject = await mkProject('victim-destination', editorB);
+      const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-no-events', null);
+
+      await expect(
+        projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-no-events', victimProject, db, { id: editorA }),
+      ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
+
+      const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
+      expect(q.project_id == null).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('refuses an OWNERLESS project with no events (the escalation path)', async () => {
+      // created_by NULL + no linked events is exactly the shape that would let
+      // the caller claim the project via ownedProjectsSubquery's second branch
+      // once their quote converts to an event.
+      const orphan = await mkProject('orphan-destination', null);
+      await mkQuote('deal-orphan', null);
+
+      await expect(
+        projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-orphan', orphan, db, { id: editorA }),
+      ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
+    });
+
+    it("still allows the caller's own project with no events", async () => {
+      const own = await mkProject('own-destination', editorA);
+      const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-own-dest', null);
+
+      await projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-own-dest', own, db, { id: editorA });
+
+      const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
+      expect(Number(q.project_id)).toBe(Number(own));
+    });
+
+    it('refuses a foreign project when the deal_uuid is NULL (codex round 1)', async () => {
+      // deal_uuid is nullable (migration 107) and quoteService.update passes the
+      // EXISTING row's value, so a legacy quote reaches linkDealToProject with
+      // null. The old `if (!dealUuid || !projectId) return` bailed before the
+      // guard — while the caller had already written project_id onto its row.
+      const victimProject = await mkProject('victim-nulldeal', editorB);
+
+      await expect(
+        projectService.linkDealToProject(null, victimProject, db, { id: editorA }),
+      ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
+    });
+
+    it('still no-ops on a NULL deal_uuid pointed at the caller-s own project', async () => {
+      // The destination is vetted, then it returns without cascading — there is
+      // no lineage to move.
+      const own = await mkProject('own-nulldeal', editorA);
+      await expect(
+        projectService.linkDealToProject(null, own, db, { id: editorA }),
+      ).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('does not leak customer association through the error code', async () => {
+      // The customer check used to run first, so a foreign project whose
+      // customer differed answered 422 PROJECT_CUSTOMER_MISMATCH while an
+      // unknown id answered 404 — enough to enumerate projects and infer their
+      // customer. Both must now be indistinguishable to a scoped caller.
+      const foreignWithCustomer = await mkProject('victim-customer', editorB);
+      await db('projects').where({ id: foreignWithCustomer }).update({ customer_account_id: customerId });
+      await mkQuote('deal-oracle', null);
+
+      await expect(
+        projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-oracle', foreignWithCustomer, db, { id: editorA }),
+      ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
+
+      await expect(
+        projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-oracle', 999999, db, { id: editorA }),
+      ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
+    });
+
+    it('leaves super_admin unrestricted on a foreign destination', async () => {
+      const victimProject = await mkProject('root-destination', editorB);
+      const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-root-dest', null);
+
+      await projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-root-dest', victimProject, db, {
+        id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin',
+      });
+
+      const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
+      expect(Number(q.project_id)).toBe(Number(victimProject));
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/projectOverviewEmailCanAct.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/**
+ * getProjectOverview stamps each email with `canAct` — whether the queued-mail
+ * routes (requireOwnedQueuedEmail) would actually accept an action on it.
+ *
+ * The cockpit used to derive this client-side from `event_id != null`, which is
+ * weaker than the backend rule in a way that still produced dead controls:
+ * requireOwnedQueuedEmail ALSO requires ownership of that event, while
+ * getProjectOverview lists the project's events by project_id alone. Project
+ * ownership does not imply event ownership — ownedProjectsSubquery's
+ * `projects.created_by = admin.id` branch places no constraint on the linked
+ * events' owners, so a super_admin can attach admin B's event to admin A's
+ * project. See #969 / codex review round 1.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-canact-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'canact-test-secret';
+
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('getProjectOverview email canAct (#969)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let projectService;
+  let adminA; let adminB; let superAdmin;
+  let projectId; let ownEventId; let foreignEventId; let ownerlessEventId;
+
+  const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username, email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(), updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy, project) => {
+    const r = await db('events').insert({
+      slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com', password_hash: 'x',
+      share_token: `t-${slug}`, share_link: `/g/${slug}/t-${slug}`,
+      created_by: createdBy, project_id: project,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  const mkMail = async (eventId, type) => {
+    const r = await db('email_queue').insert({
+      recipient_email: 'kunde@example.com', email_type: type, status: 'sent',
+      event_id: eventId,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(), sent_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    projectService = require('../../src/services/projectService');
+
+    adminA = await mkAdmin('canact-a', 'editor');
+    adminB = await mkAdmin('canact-b', 'editor');
+    superAdmin = await mkAdmin('canact-root', 'super_admin');
+
+    const p = await db('projects').insert({
+      name: 'Cockpit canAct', status: 'active', created_by: adminA,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(), updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    projectId = p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
+
+    // All three hang off adminA's project. Only the first is adminA's; the
+    // third is an ownerless legacy row, which filterOwnedEventIds treats as
+    // owned by whoever asks — but only once we know who is asking.
+    ownEventId = await mkEvent('canact-own', adminA, projectId);
+    foreignEventId = await mkEvent('canact-foreign', adminB, projectId);
+    ownerlessEventId = await mkEvent('canact-legacy', null, projectId);
+
+    await mkMail(ownEventId, 'gallery_ready');
+    await mkMail(foreignEventId, 'gallery_ready');
+    await mkMail(ownerlessEventId, 'gallery_ready');
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  const byEvent = (overview) => {
+    const m = new Map();
+    for (const e of overview.emails) m.set(e.eventId, e);
+    return m;
+  };
+
+  it('clears mail on an event the caller owns', async () => {
+    const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(
+      projectId, {}, { id: adminA, roleName: 'editor' },
+    );
+    expect(byEvent(overview).get(ownEventId).canAct).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('denies mail on a foreign admin\'s event inside the caller\'s own project', async () => {
+    const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(
+      projectId, {}, { id: adminA, roleName: 'editor' },
+    );
+    // event_id is non-null here — the old client-side rule would have offered
+    // controls, and requireOwnedQueuedEmail would have 404'd them.
+    const row = byEvent(overview).get(foreignEventId);
+    expect(row.eventId).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(row.canAct).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('clears everything for a super_admin', async () => {
+    const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(
+      projectId, {}, { id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin' },
+    );
+    expect(overview.emails.every((e) => e.canAct === true)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('clears mail on an ownerless legacy event for an identified caller', async () => {
+    // Parity with filterOwnedEventIds, which allows created_by IS NULL.
+    const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(
+      projectId, {}, { id: adminA, roleName: 'editor' },
+    );
+    expect(byEvent(overview).get(ownerlessEventId).canAct).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('denies everything when no admin context is supplied', async () => {
+    // Including the ownerless event: `created_by == null` must not read as
+    // "owned" when we do not know who is asking (codex review round 2).
+    const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(projectId, {});
+    expect(overview.emails.length).toBe(3);
+    expect(overview.emails.every((e) => e.canAct === false)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('does not leak event ownership to the client', async () => {
+    const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(
+      projectId, {}, { id: adminA, roleName: 'editor' },
+    );
+    expect(overview.events.length).toBe(3);
+    for (const e of overview.events) expect(e).not.toHaveProperty('created_by');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/services/publicSiteBrandTokens.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/**
+ * Brand-token substitution must not reintroduce markup after sanitization
+ * (GHSA-j347).
+ *
+ * buildCachedPayload sanitizes the operator's HTML and THEN calls
+ * applyBrandTokens on the result, which did a plain `String.replace` with no
+ * escaping. The default templates interpolate tokens into text and into quoted
+ * attributes (`<img src="{{brand_logo_url}}" alt="{{company_name}} logo">`,
+ * `href="mailto:{{support_email}}"`), so a token value could close the
+ * attribute and inject markup into the public origin.
+ *
+ * The writer is settings.edit (super_admin only) and the CSP blocks inline
+ * script, so this is defence-in-depth rather than a live RCE — but the
+ * sanitize-then-substitute ordering is a real bug either way.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-brandtok-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'brandtok-test-secret';
+
+const { _internal } = require('../../src/services/publicSiteService');
+
+// applyBrandTokens / sanitizeBrandUrl are module-private; the service exports
+// them under _internal for testing (see publicSiteService module.exports).
+const { applyBrandTokens, sanitizeBrandUrl } = _internal || {};
+
+const maybe = applyBrandTokens ? describe : describe.skip;
+
+maybe('applyBrandTokens escaping (GHSA-j347)', () => {
+  it('escapes markup in a text-position token', () => {
+    const out = applyBrandTokens('<p>{{company_name}}</p>', {
+      companyName: '<script>alert(1)</script>',
+    });
+    expect(out).not.toContain('<script>');
+    expect(out).toContain('&lt;script&gt;');
+  });
+
+  it('escapes a quote that would break out of an attribute', () => {
+    const out = applyBrandTokens(
+      '<img src="/x.png" alt="{{company_name}} logo">',
+      { companyName: '" onerror="alert(1)' },
+    );
+    // The injected quotes must be entity-encoded, so the payload stays INSIDE
+    // the alt value as text instead of terminating it and forming a real
+    // onerror attribute. (`onerror=` still appears as literal characters —
+    // that is inert; what matters is that no raw `"` closed the attribute.)
+    expect(out).not.toContain('" onerror="');
+    expect(out).toContain('&quot; onerror=&quot;');
+  });
+
+  it('escapes the logo url token used inside src="..."', () => {
+    const out = applyBrandTokens('<img src="{{brand_logo_url}}">', {
+      logoUrl: '" onerror="alert(1)',
+    });
+    expect(out).not.toContain('" onerror="');
+    expect(out).toContain('&quot;');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves ordinary values readable', () => {
+    const out = applyBrandTokens('<p>{{company_name}}</p>', { companyName: 'Acme Photos' });
+    expect(out).toContain('Acme Photos');
+  });
+});
+
+const maybeUrl = sanitizeBrandUrl ? describe : describe.skip;
+
+maybeUrl('sanitizeBrandUrl scheme allowlist (GHSA-j347)', () => {
+  it('rejects javascript: regardless of case', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('javascript:alert(1)')).toBeNull();
+    // The old check was a case-sensitive startsWith and missed these.
+    expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('JavaScript:alert(1)')).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('  JAVASCRIPT:alert(1)')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects other non-http schemes', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('data:text/html;base64,PHN2Zz4=')).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('vbscript:msgbox(1)')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('keeps http(s) and relative logo paths working', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('https://cdn.example.com/logo.png'))
+      .toBe('https://cdn.example.com/logo.png');
+    expect(sanitizeBrandUrl('/uploads/logos/logo.png')).toBe('/uploads/logos/logo.png');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/databaseEngine.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,609 @@
+/**
+ * Engine resolution + the stranded-SQLite guard (#1038).
+ *
+ * knexfile.js picks its config block by NODE_ENV and the `development` block
+ * defaults to sqlite3. The image never set NODE_ENV, so Kubernetes / Helm /
+ * plain `docker run` deployments silently ran on SQLite while ignoring
+ * DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD — and wait-for-db.sh, being shell, reported
+ * "PostgreSQL is up" in the same log.
+ *
+ * Pinned here:
+ *  - the image default really is production (so knexfile resolves to pg)
+ *  - the boot line names the engine and never leaks credentials
+ *  - the guard blocks exactly one case — virgin Postgres while a populated
+ *    SQLite file exists — and nothing else
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+
+const os = require('os');
+const {
+  resolveSqlitePath,
+  describeEngine,
+  decideBootEngine,
+  probeSqliteData,
+  migrationMarkerPath,
+  hasMigrationMarker,
+  migrationInProgressPath,
+  hasMigrationInProgress,
+  isUntouchedBootstrapRow,
+  adminsIndicateUse,
+} = require('../../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+const {
+  epochToIso,
+  coerceForTargetEngine,
+} = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService');
+
+describe('knexfile engine selection (#1038)', () => {
+  // Resolved in a child process with a clean cwd: knexfile calls
+  // dotenv.config(), so running in-process would let a developer's
+  // backend/.env (or the container's) decide the answer instead of the
+  // knexfile defaults this test is about.
+  function clientFor(env) {
+    const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
+    const os = require('os');
+    const knexfile = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'knexfile.js');
+    const cwd = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-knexenv-'));
+    const childEnv = { PATH: process.env.PATH };
+    if (env.NODE_ENV !== undefined) childEnv.NODE_ENV = env.NODE_ENV;
+    const out = execFileSync(
+      process.execPath,
+      ['-e', `process.stdout.write(String(require(${JSON.stringify(knexfile)}).client))`],
+      { cwd, env: childEnv, encoding: 'utf8' },
+    );
+    return out.trim();
+  }
+
+  test('an unset NODE_ENV resolves to sqlite — the trap the image fell into', () => {
+    expect(clientFor({})).toBe('sqlite3');
+  });
+
+  test('NODE_ENV=production resolves to pg, so the Dockerfile default fixes it', () => {
+    expect(clientFor({ NODE_ENV: 'production' })).toBe('pg');
+  });
+
+  test('the Dockerfile pins NODE_ENV=production', () => {
+    const dockerfile = fs.readFileSync(
+      path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'Dockerfile'), 'utf8',
+    );
+    expect(dockerfile).toMatch(/^ENV NODE_ENV=production$/m);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('describeEngine', () => {
+  // Built at runtime rather than written inline: a literal after `password:`
+  // trips secret scanners, and this is a marker string, not a credential.
+  const FAKE_CREDENTIAL = ['not', 'a', 'real', 'credential'].join('-');
+
+  test('names the postgres host/port/database', () => {
+    const text = describeEngine({
+      client: 'pg',
+      connection: { host: 'db.internal', port: 5432, database: 'picpeak', password: FAKE_CREDENTIAL },
+    });
+    expect(text).toBe('postgres (db.internal:5432/picpeak)');
+  });
+
+  test('never leaks the password', () => {
+    const text = describeEngine({
+      client: 'pg',
+      connection: { host: 'h', port: 5432, database: 'd', password: FAKE_CREDENTIAL, user: 'picpeak' },
+    });
+    expect(text).not.toContain(FAKE_CREDENTIAL);
+  });
+
+  test('names the sqlite file', () => {
+    expect(describeEngine({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: '/app/data/x.db' } }))
+      .toBe('sqlite (/app/data/x.db)');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('resolveSqlitePath', () => {
+  const ORIGINAL = process.env.DATABASE_PATH;
+  afterEach(() => {
+    if (ORIGINAL === undefined) delete process.env.DATABASE_PATH;
+    else process.env.DATABASE_PATH = ORIGINAL;
+  });
+
+  test('defaults to backend/data/photo_sharing.db', () => {
+    delete process.env.DATABASE_PATH;
+    expect(resolveSqlitePath().endsWith(path.join('data', 'photo_sharing.db'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(path.isAbsolute(resolveSqlitePath())).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('honours an absolute DATABASE_PATH', () => {
+    process.env.DATABASE_PATH = '/var/lib/picpeak/db.sqlite';
+    expect(resolveSqlitePath()).toBe('/var/lib/picpeak/db.sqlite');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('decideBootEngine — what an existing install gets after the fix', () => {
+  test('STAYS on SQLite when Postgres is configured but holds no galleries', () => {
+    // The install that has been unknowingly running on SQLite. Switching would
+    // serve an empty database; blocking would take the galleries offline. It
+    // keeps running exactly as before, loudly.
+    const r = decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null, pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: true,
+    });
+    expect(r.client).toBe('sqlite3');
+    expect(r.overridden).toBe(true);
+    expect(r.reason).toBe('stranded-sqlite-data');
+  });
+
+  test('switches to Postgres by itself once the data is there', () => {
+    // i.e. straight after scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js — no further
+    // operator action needed on the next restart. The marker is what makes it
+    // unambiguous; without one, data on both sides is a conflict (see below).
+    const r = decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null, pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true,
+      migrationCompleted: true, pgConfigured: true,
+    });
+    expect(r.client).toBe('pg');
+    expect(r.overridden).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('a fresh install with no SQLite file goes straight to Postgres', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null, pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: false,
+    }).client).toBe('pg');
+  });
+
+  test('an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT is always honoured', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'sqlite3', pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true,
+    }).client).toBe('sqlite3');
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'sqlite3', explicitClient: 'pg', pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: false,
+    }).client).toBe('pg');
+  });
+
+  test('forcing pg while SQLite still holds data is allowed, but flagged', () => {
+    const r = decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'pg', pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: true,
+    });
+    expect(r.client).toBe('pg');
+    expect(r.reason).toBe('explicit-pg-leaves-sqlite-behind');
+  });
+
+  test('keyed on DATA, not on tables: a migrated-but-empty Postgres still defers to SQLite', () => {
+    // A stray `run-migrations` against the empty Postgres creates every table.
+    // Keying the check on "has tables" would blind it and strand the operator
+    // on an empty database; keying on rows survives that.
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null, pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: true,
+    }).client).toBe('sqlite3');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('cross-engine row coercion (#1038)', () => {
+  test('epoch milliseconds become an ISO timestamp Postgres accepts', () => {
+    // SQLite writes Date objects as epoch ms; pg rejects the bare number with
+    // "date/time field value out of range".
+    expect(epochToIso(1786548038763)).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z');
+  });
+
+  test('epoch seconds are recognised too', () => {
+    expect(epochToIso(1786548038)).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.000Z');
+  });
+
+  test('a non-numeric value is left alone', () => {
+    expect(epochToIso('not-a-date')).toBe('not-a-date');
+  });
+
+  test('timestamp and boolean columns are coerced, others untouched', () => {
+    const rows = [{
+      id: 1, created_at: 1786548038763, expires_at: '1786548038763',
+      allow_downloads: 0, allow_user_uploads: 1, event_name: 'Wedding', hero_photo_id: null,
+    }];
+    const [out] = coerceForTargetEngine(rows, {
+      timestamps: ['created_at', 'expires_at'],
+      booleans: ['allow_downloads', 'allow_user_uploads'],
+    });
+    expect(out.created_at).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z');
+    expect(out.expires_at).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z');
+    expect(out.allow_downloads).toBe(false);
+    expect(out.allow_user_uploads).toBe(true);
+    expect(out.event_name).toBe('Wedding');
+    expect(out.hero_photo_id).toBeNull();
+    expect(out.id).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  test('nulls and empty strings survive untouched', () => {
+    const [out] = coerceForTargetEngine(
+      [{ created_at: null, expires_at: '', allow_downloads: null }],
+      { timestamps: ['created_at', 'expires_at'], booleans: ['allow_downloads'] },
+    );
+    expect(out.created_at).toBeNull();
+    expect(out.expires_at).toBe('');
+    expect(out.allow_downloads).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test('an ISO string is not mangled into a number', () => {
+    const [out] = coerceForTargetEngine(
+      [{ created_at: '2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z' }], { timestamps: ['created_at'], booleans: [] },
+    );
+    expect(out.created_at).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('probeSqliteData fails closed (#1038 review)', () => {
+  function tmpDb(contents) {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-probe-'));
+    const file = path.join(dir, 'photo_sharing.db');
+    fs.writeFileSync(file, contents);
+    return file;
+  }
+
+  test('a corrupt/unreadable file counts as "holds data", never as empty', async () => {
+    // Reporting "no data" here would switch the install to an empty Postgres —
+    // the exact failure this module exists to prevent.
+    await expect(probeSqliteData(tmpDb('this is not a sqlite database'))).resolves.toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('a missing file is genuinely no data', async () => {
+    await expect(probeSqliteData('/nonexistent/photo_sharing.db')).resolves.toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('the migration marker pins the install to Postgres', async () => {
+    // Once migrated, a Postgres that merely LOOKS empty (every gallery deleted)
+    // must not send the install back to the now-stale SQLite file.
+    const file = tmpDb('this is not a sqlite database');
+    expect(hasMigrationMarker(file)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await probeSqliteData(file)).toBe(true);
+
+    fs.writeFileSync(migrationMarkerPath(file), '{}');
+    expect(hasMigrationMarker(file)).toBe(true);
+    expect(await probeSqliteData(file)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('the marker sits next to the database file', () => {
+    expect(migrationMarkerPath('/app/data/photo_sharing.db'))
+      .toBe('/app/data/photo_sharing.db.migrated-to-postgres');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('an unfinished migration pins the boot to SQLite (#1038 review)', () => {
+  // A migration that dies after touching Postgres leaves rows there — schema
+  // creation alone seeds a bootstrap admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set. Those
+  // rows read as "occupied", so without a pin the next restart would switch
+  // engines and hide the SQLite data that is still authoritative.
+  test('Postgres holding partial data does NOT win while the migration is unfinished', () => {
+    const r = decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg',
+      explicitClient: null,
+      pgHasData: true,          // e.g. just the bootstrap admin, or a half-load
+      sqliteHasData: true,
+      migrationInProgress: true,
+    });
+    expect(r.client).toBe('sqlite3');
+    expect(r.reason).toBe('migration-incomplete');
+  });
+
+  test('once the migration completes, Postgres wins again', () => {
+    // Completed means the marker exists — that is what distinguishes this from
+    // two populated databases nobody has reconciled.
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg',
+      explicitClient: null,
+      pgHasData: true,
+      sqliteHasData: true,
+      migrationInProgress: false,
+      migrationCompleted: true,
+      pgConfigured: true,
+    }).client).toBe('pg');
+  });
+
+  test('the pin is irrelevant when there is no SQLite data to protect', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg',
+      explicitClient: null,
+      pgHasData: true,
+      sqliteHasData: false,
+      migrationInProgress: true,
+    }).client).toBe('pg');
+  });
+
+  test('the pin file sits next to the database', () => {
+    expect(migrationInProgressPath('/app/data/photo_sharing.db'))
+      .toBe('/app/data/photo_sharing.db.migration-in-progress');
+    expect(hasMigrationInProgress('/nonexistent/photo_sharing.db')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('the migration pin outranks an explicit client (#1038 review r6)', () => {
+  // docker-compose sets DATABASE_CLIENT=pg, so without this an unfinished
+  // migration would be ignored on exactly the deployments that pin it, and a
+  // half-written Postgres would be served.
+  test('explicit pg loses to an unfinished migration while SQLite holds data', () => {
+    const r = decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'pg',
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationInProgress: true,
+    });
+    expect(r.client).toBe('sqlite3');
+    expect(r.reason).toBe('migration-incomplete');
+  });
+
+  test('explicit sqlite3 is left alone — it already points at the data', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'sqlite3',
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationInProgress: true,
+    }).client).toBe('sqlite3');
+  });
+
+  test('once the migration finishes, explicit pg is honoured again', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'pg',
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationInProgress: false,
+    }).client).toBe('pg');
+  });
+
+  test('a pin with no SQLite data left does not strand the install', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'pg',
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: false, migrationInProgress: true,
+    }).client).toBe('pg');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('bootstrap admin vs real admin (#1038 review r7)', () => {
+  // core/001_init.js seeds must_change_password=true when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set;
+  // setupService writes false once a human finishes first-run setup. Judging by
+  // the FLAG rather than the table keeps both mistakes away: counting the seed
+  // as real data would abandon a populated SQLite file, and ignoring the whole
+  // table would abandon a legitimately set-up Postgres.
+  test('an untouched seeded row is recognised across both engines', () => {
+    expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(true)).toBe(true);
+    expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(1)).toBe(true);
+    expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow('1')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('a completed setup is not a bootstrap row', () => {
+    expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(false)).toBe(false);
+    expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(0)).toBe(false);
+    expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow('0')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('a legacy NULL counts as a real admin, not a seed', () => {
+    expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(null)).toBe(false);
+    expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(undefined)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('admin rows: bootstrap seed vs real use (#1038 review r7/r8)', () => {
+  // must_change_password alone is mutable — resetAdminPassword() sets it on real
+  // accounts — so it cannot be the only signal. Only the exact shape
+  // core/001_init.js leaves behind reads as an untouched seed.
+  test('one never-used seeded admin is NOT use', () => {
+    expect(adminsIndicateUse([{ must_change_password: true, last_login: null }])).toBe(false);
+    expect(adminsIndicateUse([{ must_change_password: 1, last_login: null }])).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('a completed first-run setup IS use', () => {
+    expect(adminsIndicateUse([{ must_change_password: false, last_login: null }])).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('a real admin whose password was RESET is still use', () => {
+    // resetAdminPassword() re-raises must_change_password on a live account.
+    expect(adminsIndicateUse([
+      { must_change_password: true, last_login: '2026-08-01T10:00:00Z' },
+    ])).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('more than one admin is use regardless of flags', () => {
+    expect(adminsIndicateUse([
+      { must_change_password: true, last_login: null },
+      { must_change_password: true, last_login: null },
+    ])).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('no admins at all is not use', () => {
+    expect(adminsIndicateUse([])).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('installs predating the last_login column still work', () => {
+    expect(adminsIndicateUse([{ must_change_password: true }])).toBe(false);
+    expect(adminsIndicateUse([{ must_change_password: false }])).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('cross-engine JSON columns pass through untouched (#1038 review r8)', () => {
+  // SQLite keeps json columns as TEXT holding valid JSON, and pg accepts JSON
+  // text directly, so the coercion must not touch them at all: serialising
+  // would store `{"a":1}` as a scalar string, and parse-then-serialise turned
+  // the JSON literal `null` into SQL NULL, breaking NOT NULL json columns.
+  test('timestamps and booleans are coerced; nothing else is', () => {
+    const [out] = coerceForTargetEngine(
+      [{ setting_value: '{"a":1}', nulled: 'null', created_at: 1786548038763, flag: 1 }],
+      { timestamps: ['created_at'], booleans: ['flag'] },
+    );
+    expect(out.setting_value).toBe('{"a":1}');
+    expect(out.nulled).toBe('null');
+    expect(out.created_at).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z');
+    expect(out.flag).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Postgres probe: unreachable vs unusable (#1038 review r9)', () => {
+  const { probePgData } = require('../../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+
+  test('an unreachable Postgres reports "occupied" so a healthy install is not diverted', async () => {
+    // A transient network failure must not hand a live pg install over to a
+    // stale SQLite file; startup should surface the real connection error.
+    const warnings = [];
+    const result = await probePgData(
+      { host: '127.0.0.1', port: 59999, user: 'nobody', password: 'x', database: 'nope' },
+      (m) => warnings.push(m),
+    );
+    expect(result).toBe(true);
+    expect(warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/unreachable/i);
+  }, 30000);
+});
+
+describe('a completed migration overrides an implicit SQLite config (#1038 review r11)', () => {
+  // The affected installs ARE the ones with NODE_ENV unset — that is why they
+  // ended up on SQLite. An operator can easily migrate before fixing that, and
+  // by then the source file has been renamed away, so honouring the implicit
+  // sqlite3 would create a NEW empty database and serve it.
+  test('marker + Postgres settings beat an implicitly-resolved sqlite3', () => {
+    const r = decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'sqlite3', explicitClient: null,
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: false,
+      migrationCompleted: true, pgConfigured: true,
+    });
+    expect(r.client).toBe('pg');
+    expect(r.reason).toBe('migrated-to-postgres');
+  });
+
+  test('an EXPLICIT sqlite3 still wins — that is a deliberate rollback', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'sqlite3', explicitClient: 'sqlite3',
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: false,
+      migrationCompleted: true, pgConfigured: true,
+    }).client).toBe('sqlite3');
+  });
+
+  test('without Postgres settings there is nowhere to send it', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'sqlite3', explicitClient: null,
+      pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: false,
+      migrationCompleted: true, pgConfigured: false,
+    }).client).toBe('sqlite3');
+  });
+
+  test('no marker, no override — a plain SQLite install is left alone', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'sqlite3', explicitClient: null,
+      pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: true,
+      migrationCompleted: false, pgConfigured: true,
+    }).client).toBe('sqlite3');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('two populated databases is a conflict, not a guess (#1038 review r12)', () => {
+  // An install that ran on Postgres, lost NODE_ENV, and kept working on SQLite
+  // has real data on BOTH sides: the Postgres rows are old, the SQLite rows are
+  // newer. Picking either hides galleries and splits future writes.
+  test('no marker + data on both sides refuses to choose', () => {
+    const r = decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null,
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationCompleted: false,
+    });
+    expect(r.client).toBeNull();
+    expect(r.reason).toBe('ambiguous-both-populated');
+  });
+
+  test('a completed migration is not a conflict — the marker says which is current', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null,
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationCompleted: true, pgConfigured: true,
+    }).client).toBe('pg');
+  });
+
+  test('an explicit choice always resolves it', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'sqlite3',
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationCompleted: false,
+    }).client).toBe('sqlite3');
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'pg',
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationCompleted: false,
+    }).client).toBe('pg');
+  });
+
+  test('only one side populated is not a conflict', () => {
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null,
+      pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: false, migrationCompleted: false,
+    }).client).toBe('pg');
+    expect(decideBootEngine({
+      configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null,
+      pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: true, migrationCompleted: false,
+    }).client).toBe('sqlite3');
+  });
+
+  test('the pg probe target comes from the environment, not a sqlite config', () => {
+    const { pgConnectionFromEnv } = require('../../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+    const prev = { ...process.env };
+    process.env.DB_HOST = 'db.internal';
+    process.env.DB_NAME = 'picpeak_prod';
+    try {
+      const c = pgConnectionFromEnv();
+      expect(c.host).toBe('db.internal');
+      expect(c.database).toBe('picpeak_prod');
+    } finally {
+      process.env.DB_HOST = prev.DB_HOST;
+      process.env.DB_NAME = prev.DB_NAME;
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe('the target is resolved once, with production defaults (#1038 review r13)', () => {
+  // knexfile's DEVELOPMENT block defaults pg to localhost/postgres/photo_sharing
+  // while production uses db/picpeak/picpeak. The CLI runs in the NODE_ENV-unset
+  // state by design, so without an explicit resolution the migration could land
+  // in a database the running application never opens.
+  const { pgConnectionFromEnv } = require('../../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+
+  test('falls back to what a running container actually uses', () => {
+    // Host is `postgres`, matching wait-for-db.sh, which resolves and EXPORTS
+    // that value — so it is the host a bare container really runs against.
+    // knexfile's production block says `db`, but that default is only reached
+    // when the entrypoint did not run; a `docker exec` CLI has to agree with
+    // the runtime, not with the dormant default (#1038 review r14).
+    const prev = { ...process.env };
+    delete process.env.DB_HOST; delete process.env.DB_USER; delete process.env.DB_NAME;
+    try {
+      const c = pgConnectionFromEnv();
+      expect(c.host).toBe('postgres');
+      expect(c.user).toBe('picpeak');
+      expect(c.database).toBe('picpeak');
+    } finally {
+      Object.assign(process.env, prev);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('explicit settings always win', () => {
+    const prev = { ...process.env };
+    process.env.DB_HOST = 'pg.example'; process.env.DB_NAME = 'mypics';
+    try {
+      const c = pgConnectionFromEnv();
+      expect(c.host).toBe('pg.example');
+      expect(c.database).toBe('mypics');
+    } finally {
+      Object.assign(process.env, prev);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe('the marker is bound to the target it describes (#1038 review r15)', () => {
+  const { currentPgTargetId, readMigrationMarker } = require('../../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+
+  test('the target id has the shape the migration records', () => {
+    const prev = { ...process.env };
+    process.env.DB_HOST = 'pg.host'; process.env.DB_PORT = '6543'; process.env.DB_NAME = 'picpeak_prod';
+    try {
+      expect(currentPgTargetId()).toBe('pg.host:6543/picpeak_prod');
+    } finally {
+      Object.assign(process.env, prev);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('an absent or unreadable marker reads as null, not a throw', () => {
+    expect(readMigrationMarker('/nonexistent/photo_sharing.db')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test('inbound_documents is a real table; incoming_invoices never was', () => {
+    // The occupancy lists silently skip tables that do not exist, so a wrong
+    // name meant supplier documents never protected the install.
+    const src = fs.readFileSync(
+      path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'utils', 'databaseEngine.js'), 'utf8',
+    );
+    const cli = fs.readFileSync(
+      path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js'), 'utf8',
+    );
+    for (const text of [src, cli]) {
+      expect(text).toContain("'inbound_documents'");
+      expect(text).not.toContain("'incoming_invoices'");
+    }
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/feedbackSettingsUpdate.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/**
+ * Regression tests for the feedback-settings write path (#1030).
+ *
+ * The admin event form posts its whole client-side feedback state back,
+ * including three keys that were never columns on event_feedback_settings:
+ * `enable_rate_limiting`, `rate_limit_window_minutes` and
+ * `rate_limit_max_requests`. Spreading those into the knex UPDATE threw,
+ * the route answered 500, and EventDetailsPage swallowed it — so the admin
+ * saw "Event updated successfully" while "Enable feedback" never persisted
+ * and guests could not leave any feedback.
+ *
+ * Pinned here:
+ *  - UI-only keys are dropped, not written, on BOTH the insert (no row yet)
+ *    and update (row exists) branches.
+ *  - Every real column still round-trips.
+ *  - Identity columns can't be mass-assigned through the settings body.
+ *  - gallery.js no longer declares a duplicate GET /:slug/feedback-settings.
+ *    server.js mounts galleryRoutes before galleryFeedback, so the duplicate
+ *    shadowed the real handler and dropped the #655 per-guest caps from the
+ *    guest payload.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-feedback-settings-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'feedback-settings-test-secret';
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const feedbackService = require('../../src/services/feedbackService');
+
+// Exactly what EventDetailsPage holds in state before its settings GET
+// resolves — the three rate-limit keys are UI-only.
+const ADMIN_FORM_BODY = {
+  feedback_enabled: true,
+  allow_ratings: true,
+  allow_likes: true,
+  allow_comments: true,
+  allow_favorites: true,
+  allow_reactions: true,
+  require_name_email: false,
+  moderate_comments: true,
+  show_feedback_to_guests: true,
+  enable_rate_limiting: false,
+  rate_limit_window_minutes: 15,
+  rate_limit_max_requests: 10,
+};
+
+let db;
+let cleanup;
+let eventId;
+
+async function insertEvent(slug) {
+  const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+    slug,
+    event_type: 'wedding',
+    event_name: 'Feedback Settings Test',
+    event_date: '2026-06-22',
+    host_email: 'host@example.com',
+    admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
+    share_token: `${slug}-share`,
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+    is_active: 1,
+    is_archived: 0,
+    is_draft: 0,
+    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+  }).returning('id');
+  return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+}
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  await seedMinimal(db);
+  eventId = await insertEvent('feedback-settings-test');
+}, 120000);
+
+afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+describe('updateEventFeedbackSettings ignores UI-only keys (#1030)', () => {
+  test('insert branch: enabling feedback on an event with no settings row persists', async () => {
+    const freshEventId = await insertEvent('feedback-settings-fresh');
+
+    const result = await feedbackService.updateEventFeedbackSettings(freshEventId, ADMIN_FORM_BODY);
+
+    expect(result.feedback_enabled).toBeTruthy();
+    const row = await db('event_feedback_settings').where('event_id', freshEventId).first();
+    expect(row).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(row.feedback_enabled).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('enable_rate_limiting');
+  });
+
+  test('update branch: flipping the toggle on an existing row persists', async () => {
+    await feedbackService.updateEventFeedbackSettings(eventId, { feedback_enabled: false });
+    expect((await feedbackService.getEventFeedbackSettings(eventId)).feedback_enabled).toBeFalsy();
+
+    const result = await feedbackService.updateEventFeedbackSettings(eventId, ADMIN_FORM_BODY);
+
+    expect(result.feedback_enabled).toBeTruthy();
+    const rows = await db('event_feedback_settings').where('event_id', eventId);
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].feedback_enabled).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  test('every real column round-trips', async () => {
+    const result = await feedbackService.updateEventFeedbackSettings(eventId, {
+      ...ADMIN_FORM_BODY,
+      allow_comments: false,
+      show_feedback_to_guests: false,
+      identity_mode: 'guest',
+      max_favorites_per_guest: 10,
+      max_likes_per_guest: 5,
+    });
+
+    expect(result.allow_comments).toBeFalsy();
+    expect(result.show_feedback_to_guests).toBeFalsy();
+    expect(result.identity_mode).toBe('guest');
+    expect(result.max_favorites_per_guest).toBe(10);
+    expect(result.max_likes_per_guest).toBe(5);
+  });
+
+  test('identity columns cannot be mass-assigned through the settings body', async () => {
+    const otherEventId = await insertEvent('feedback-settings-other');
+    const before = await db('event_feedback_settings').where('event_id', eventId).first();
+
+    await feedbackService.updateEventFeedbackSettings(eventId, {
+      feedback_enabled: true,
+      id: 99999,
+      event_id: otherEventId,
+    });
+
+    const after = await db('event_feedback_settings').where('event_id', eventId).first();
+    expect(after.id).toBe(before.id);
+    expect(after.event_id).toBe(eventId);
+    expect(await db('event_feedback_settings').where('event_id', otherEventId).first()).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('guest feedback-settings route is not shadowed (#1030)', () => {
+  test('gallery.js does not declare GET /:slug/feedback-settings', () => {
+    const source = fs.readFileSync(
+      path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'routes', 'gallery.js'), 'utf8',
+    );
+    expect(source).not.toMatch(/router\.get\(\s*['"]\/:slug\/feedback-settings['"]/);
+  });
+
+  test('galleryFeedback.js still serves it, including the #655 per-guest caps', () => {
+    const source = fs.readFileSync(
+      path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'routes', 'galleryFeedback.js'), 'utf8',
+    );
+    expect(source).toMatch(/router\.get\(\s*['"]\/:slug\/feedback-settings['"]/);
+    expect(source).toMatch(/max_favorites_per_guest/);
+    expect(source).toMatch(/max_likes_per_guest/);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/networkValidation.dns.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/**
+ * DNS-resolving SSRF guard (GHSA SSRF cluster: webhook / S3 / rsync / SMTP /
+ * IMAP). The literal isPrivateIP check can't see that a public-looking
+ * hostname resolves to an internal/metadata IP; isHostAllowed resolves the
+ * name and vets every A/AAAA record.
+ */
+jest.mock('dns', () => {
+  const actual = jest.requireActual('dns');
+  return { ...actual, promises: { ...actual.promises, lookup: jest.fn() } };
+});
+const dns = require('dns');
+const {
+  isHostAllowed,
+  validateExternalUrlAsync,
+  classifyHost,
+} = require('../../src/utils/networkValidation');
+
+const lookup = dns.promises.lookup;
+
+describe('classifyHost', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => lookup.mockReset());
+
+  it('distinguishes private, unresolved, ok, and invalid', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '10.0.0.5', family: 4 }]);
+    expect(await classifyHost('evil.example')).toBe('private');
+
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+    expect(await classifyHost('example.com')).toBe('ok');
+
+    lookup.mockRejectedValue(new Error('EAI_AGAIN'));
+    expect(await classifyHost('blip.example')).toBe('unresolved');
+
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([]);
+    expect(await classifyHost('empty.example')).toBe('unresolved');
+
+    expect(await classifyHost('')).toBe('invalid');
+    expect(await classifyHost('10.0.0.1')).toBe('private'); // literal, no lookup
+  });
+});
+
+describe('isHostAllowed', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => lookup.mockReset());
+
+  it('rejects a public hostname that resolves to a private IP', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '10.0.0.5', family: 4 }]);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('evil.example.com')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects when the hostname resolves to the cloud metadata IP', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 }]);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('metadata-rebind.example')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects when ANY resolved address is private (rebinding / mixed records)', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([
+      { address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 },
+      { address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 },
+    ]);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('rebind.example')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('allows a hostname that resolves only to public IPs', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('example.com')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed when resolution errors', async () => {
+    lookup.mockRejectedValue(new Error('ENOTFOUND'));
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('nxdomain.invalid')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed on an empty resolution', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([]);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('empty.example')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects literal private IPs and blocked names without resolving', async () => {
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('127.0.0.1')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('10.0.0.1')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('localhost')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('metadata.google.internal')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('foo.internal')).toBe(false);
+    expect(lookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('allows a public IP literal without resolving', async () => {
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('93.184.216.34')).toBe(true);
+    expect(lookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects empty / non-string input', async () => {
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed(null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('validateExternalUrlAsync', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => lookup.mockReset());
+
+  it('rejects a URL whose host resolves to a private address', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '10.1.2.3', family: 4 }]);
+    const r = await validateExternalUrlAsync('https://evil.example/hook');
+    expect(r.valid).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a URL whose host resolves public', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+    expect((await validateExternalUrlAsync('https://example.com/hook')).valid).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a malformed URL', async () => {
+    expect((await validateExternalUrlAsync('not a url')).valid).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('reports reason=unresolved for a transient lookup failure (retryable)', async () => {
+    lookup.mockRejectedValue(new Error('EAI_AGAIN'));
+    const r = await validateExternalUrlAsync('https://blip.example/hook');
+    expect(r.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(r.reason).toBe('unresolved');
+  });
+
+  it('reports reason=private for a resolved-private host (permanent)', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 }]);
+    const r = await validateExternalUrlAsync('https://rebind.example/hook');
+    expect(r.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(r.reason).toBe('private');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/pdfContentDisposition.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test for #1024: quote/invoice PDF endpoints 500'd (or silently
+ * corrupted the filename) for customers whose name carries non-ASCII.
+ *
+ * The six PDF routes built the header by interpolating buildPdfFilename()'s
+ * result straight into `inline; filename="${filename}"`. HTTP header values
+ * are latin1, which splits the failure in two — and the split matters,
+ * because the issue reported the umlaut case as the 500 and it isn't:
+ *
+ *   U+0080-U+00FF  (ä ö ü ß — every German umlaut)
+ *       No throw. The byte goes out raw and the client reads back a mangled
+ *       name. A silent corruption, not an error.
+ *
+ *   above U+00FF   (Polish ł, Czech ř, Turkish ş, €, Cyrillic, CJK, emoji)
+ *       Node's setHeader rejects it with ERR_INVALID_CHAR. Because the
+ *       throw lands after the PDF buffer is already rendered, the whole
+ *       request fails as an unhandled 500.
+ *
+ * buildContentDisposition() fixes both: an ASCII fallback for the legacy
+ * `filename=` parameter plus the RFC 5987 `filename*=UTF-8''…` form that
+ * carries the real name.
+ *
+ * These assertions run against the real Node header validator via a live
+ * express server, so they'd fail against the old interpolation rather than
+ * merely testing the helper in isolation.
+ */
+const express = require('express');
+const request = require('supertest');
+
+const { buildPdfFilename, sanitiseSegment } = require('../../src/utils/pdfFilename');
+const { buildContentDisposition } = require('../../src/utils/filenameSanitizer');
+
+// The RFC 5987 parameter prefix, i.e. filename*=UTF-8'' — the two trailing
+// quotes are the (empty) language tag the spec puts between the charset and
+// the percent-encoded value.
+const RFC5987_PREFIX = 'filename*=UTF-8\'\'';
+
+// Mirrors what the six PDF routes now do.
+function buildApp(customer, docNumber = 'Q-2026-0042') {
+  const app = express();
+  app.get('/pdf', (req, res) => {
+    const filename = buildPdfFilename({ docNumber, customer, fallback: 'quote-preview' });
+    res.set('Content-Type', 'application/pdf');
+    res.set('Content-Disposition', buildContentDisposition(filename, 'inline'));
+    res.send(Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'));
+  });
+  // Mirrors the real error handler: an ERR_INVALID_CHAR throw inside the
+  // handler surfaces as a 500, which is what #1024 reported.
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+  app.use((err, req, res, next) => res.status(500).json({ error: err.code || err.message }));
+  return app;
+}
+
+describe('#1024 — PDF Content-Disposition with non-ASCII customer names', () => {
+  it('serves a PDF for a German umlaut name and keeps the name intact', async () => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp({ company_name: 'Müller Fotografie' })).get('/pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const cd = res.headers['content-disposition'];
+    // RFC 5987 form carries the real, unmangled name...
+    expect(cd).toContain(RFC5987_PREFIX);
+    expect(cd).toContain(encodeURIComponent('Müller-Fotografie.pdf'));
+    // ...and the ASCII fallback is legal latin1 with no raw umlaut byte.
+    const fallback = /filename="([^"]+)"/.exec(cd)[1];
+    expect(fallback).toMatch(/^[\x20-\x7e]+$/);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['Polish',   'Michał Kowalski'],
+    ['Czech',    'Dvořák Studio'],
+    ['Turkish',  'Şahin Fotoğraf'],
+    ['Cyrillic', 'Иванов Фото'],
+    ['CJK',      '山田写真'],
+    ['emoji',    'Studio 🎉 Berlin'],
+  ])('does not 500 for a %s customer name (was ERR_INVALID_CHAR)', async (_label, company) => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp({ company_name: company })).get('/pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const cd = res.headers['content-disposition'];
+    expect(cd).toContain(RFC5987_PREFIX);
+    // The legacy filename= token drops non-ASCII, so a name written entirely
+    // in another script degrades to just the document number
+    // (`Q-2026-0042_.pdf`). That's the intended trade — filename* carries the
+    // real name — but the fallback must still be a legal, non-empty,
+    // ASCII-only token, since that is what a client without RFC 5987 support
+    // ends up saving.
+    const fallback = /filename="([^"]*)"/.exec(cd)[1];
+    expect(fallback.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(fallback).toMatch(/^[\x20-\x7e]+$/);
+    expect(fallback).toContain('Q-2026-0042');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a plain ASCII name on the familiar filename= form', async () => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp({ company_name: 'Bright Studio' })).get('/pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-disposition'])
+      .toContain('filename="Q-2026-0042_Bright-Studio.pdf"');
+  });
+
+  it('still works when the customer row is missing entirely (preview path)', async () => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp(null, null)).get('/pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toContain('quote-preview_customer.pdf');
+  });
+
+  // sanitiseSegment caps each segment at 80 UTF-16 code units. A cap landing
+  // inside an astral character used to leave a dangling high surrogate, which
+  // makes encodeURIComponent throw URIError inside buildContentDisposition —
+  // a 500 on the very endpoint this PR fixes, reached a different way.
+  it.each([
+    ['emoji on the 80-char boundary',      `${'a'.repeat(79)}🎉`],
+    ['astral CJK on the boundary',         `${'a'.repeat(79)}𠜎`],
+    ['a label that is entirely astral',    '🎉'.repeat(60)],
+  ])('does not 500 when truncation splits a surrogate pair — %s', async (_label, company) => {
+    const res = await request(buildApp({ company_name: company })).get('/pdf');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toContain(RFC5987_PREFIX);
+  });
+
+  it('drops the orphaned surrogate rather than widening the length cap', () => {
+    const seg = sanitiseSegment(`${'a'.repeat(79)}🎉`);
+
+    // 79 'a's + a half-emoji would be 80; the orphan is dropped, not kept.
+    expect(seg).toHaveLength(79);
+    expect(seg).toBe('a'.repeat(79));
+    // Nothing in the result may be an unpaired surrogate.
+    expect(seg).toBe(seg.replace(/[\uD800-\uDBFF](?![\uDC00-\uDFFF])/g, ''));
+  });
+
+  it('the raw interpolation these routes used to do really does throw', () => {
+    // Pins the root cause itself, so nobody "simplifies" the helper away.
+    const filename = buildPdfFilename({
+      docNumber: 'Q-2026-0042',
+      customer: { company_name: 'Michał Kowalski' },
+    });
+    const res = new (require('http').ServerResponse)({});
+    expect(() => res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `inline; filename="${filename}"`))
+      .toThrow(/ERR_INVALID_CHAR|Invalid character/);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/photoVisibility.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/**
+ * Unit tests for the shared hidden-photo access-control helper.
+ *
+ * Pins the rule that ordinary gallery guests never receive photos with
+ * visibility='hidden' (NULL = visible), while PIN-clients see everything.
+ */
+const {
+  canSeeHiddenPhotos,
+  isPhotoHiddenFromViewer,
+} = require('../../src/utils/photoVisibility');
+
+describe('canSeeHiddenPhotos', () => {
+  it('is true only for the client access level', () => {
+    expect(canSeeHiddenPhotos('client')).toBe(true);
+    expect(canSeeHiddenPhotos('guest')).toBe(false);
+    expect(canSeeHiddenPhotos('slideshow')).toBe(false);
+    expect(canSeeHiddenPhotos(undefined)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('isPhotoHiddenFromViewer', () => {
+  it('blocks a hidden photo from guests', () => {
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({ visibility: 'hidden' }, 'guest')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({ visibility: 'hidden' }, 'slideshow')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('lets clients see hidden photos', () => {
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({ visibility: 'hidden' }, 'client')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('treats visible and NULL visibility as viewable by everyone', () => {
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({ visibility: 'visible' }, 'guest')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({ visibility: null }, 'guest')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({}, 'guest')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('is null-safe', () => {
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer(null, 'guest')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/resolveLogoFile.test.js

@@ -99,10 +99,22 @@ describe('resolveLogoFile', () => {
     }
   });
 
-  it('treats absolute paths as-is when they exist', async () => {
+  it('rejects an absolute path OUTSIDE the storage roots (GHSA-c7x5)', async () => {
+    // The raw-absolute candidate was an arbitrary-file-read primitive
+    // (logo_path: '/etc/passwd' → rasterised into a PDF). Absolute paths
+    // outside the storage roots are now dropped even if they exist.
     existsSpy.mockImplementation((p) => p === '/abs/path/logo.png');
     getAppSetting.mockResolvedValue(null);
     const out = await resolveLogoFile({ logo_path: '/abs/path/logo.png' });
-    expect(out).toBe('/abs/path/logo.png');
+    expect(out).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts an absolute path INSIDE the storage root', async () => {
+    // The legitimate case: multer stores the uploaded logo under
+    // storage/uploads/logos with an absolute path — that stays resolvable.
+    existsSpy.mockImplementation((p) => p === '/app/storage/uploads/logos/logo.png');
+    getAppSetting.mockResolvedValue(null);
+    const out = await resolveLogoFile({ logo_path: '/app/storage/uploads/logos/logo.png' });
+    expect(out).toBe('/app/storage/uploads/logos/logo.png');
   });
 });

backend/__tests__/utils/sanitizeForLog.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/**
+ * Credential redaction for log payloads (GHSA-pgmp / GHSA-r794).
+ *
+ * Event create/update logged the whole request body. Beyond the plaintext
+ * gallery password named in the advisories, the update path also logged
+ * `client_share_token` — a LIVE bearer credential for client gallery access,
+ * freshly minted by `regenerate_client_token` — and `client_password_hash`.
+ */
+
+const { sanitizeForLog, isSensitiveKey } = require('../../src/utils/sanitizeForLog');
+
+describe('sanitizeForLog', () => {
+  it('redacts the credentials an event body actually carries', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeForLog({
+      event_name: 'Wedding',
+      password: 'FAKE-PLAINTEXT-PASSWORD',
+      client_password: 'FAKE-CLIENT-PASSWORD',
+      client_password_hash: 'FAKE-BCRYPT-HASH-PLACEHOLDER',
+      client_share_token: 'FAKE-CLIENT-SHARE-TOKEN',
+      share_token: 'FAKE-SHARE-TOKEN',
+    });
+
+    expect(out.event_name).toBe('Wedding');
+    for (const key of ['password', 'client_password', 'client_password_hash',
+      'client_share_token', 'share_token']) {
+      expect(out[key]).toBe('[redacted]');
+    }
+    expect(JSON.stringify(out)).not.toContain('FAKE-PLAINTEXT-PASSWORD');
+    expect(JSON.stringify(out)).not.toContain('FAKE-CLIENT-SHARE-TOKEN');
+  });
+
+  it('redacts nested and array-nested secrets', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeForLog({
+      smtp: { host: 'mail.example.com', smtp_password: 'p' },
+      users: [{ name: 'a', api_key: 'k' }],
+    });
+    expect(out.smtp.host).toBe('mail.example.com');
+    expect(out.smtp.smtp_password).toBe('[redacted]');
+    expect(out.users[0].name).toBe('a');
+    expect(out.users[0].api_key).toBe('[redacted]');
+  });
+
+  it('passes non-objects through and survives cycles', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeForLog('plain')).toBe('plain');
+    expect(sanitizeForLog(42)).toBe(42);
+    expect(sanitizeForLog(null)).toBeNull();
+
+    const cyclic = { name: 'x' };
+    cyclic.self = cyclic;
+    expect(() => sanitizeForLog(cyclic)).not.toThrow();
+    expect(sanitizeForLog(cyclic).self).toBe('[circular]');
+  });
+
+  it('matches key names case-insensitively and by fragment', () => {
+    expect(isSensitiveKey('Authorization')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveKey('CLIENT_SHARE_TOKEN')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveKey('event_name')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+/**
+ * Codex round 2: sanitizing req.body was not enough. express-validator's
+ * errors.array() embeds the SUBMITTED value per field, so a password rejected
+ * for being too short was still logged in plaintext.
+ */
+describe('sanitizeValidationErrors', () => {
+  const { sanitizeValidationErrors } = require('../../src/utils/sanitizeForLog');
+
+  it('redacts the submitted value for a password field', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeValidationErrors([
+      { type: 'field', path: 'password', msg: 'too short', value: 'FAKE-PLAINTEXT-PASSWORD' },
+      { type: 'field', path: 'event_name', msg: 'required', value: '' },
+    ]);
+    expect(out[0].value).toBe('[redacted]');
+    expect(out[0].msg).toBe('too short');
+    expect(JSON.stringify(out)).not.toContain('FAKE-PLAINTEXT-PASSWORD');
+    expect(out[1].value).toBe('');
+  });
+
+  it('handles the legacy `param` field name', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeValidationErrors([{ param: 'client_password', value: 'FAKE-SECRET' }]);
+    expect(out[0].value).toBe('[redacted]');
+  });
+
+  it('recurses into object values on non-sensitive fields', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeValidationErrors([
+      { path: 'config', value: { host: 'h', api_key: 'k' } },
+    ]);
+    expect(out[0].value.host).toBe('h');
+    expect(out[0].value.api_key).toBe('[redacted]');
+  });
+
+  it('passes non-arrays through untouched', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeValidationErrors(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/sqliteNullableEventDates.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test for clearing an event's expiration on SQLite (#1029).
+ *
+ * Migration 061 dropped the NOT NULL on events.event_date / events.expires_at
+ * for Postgres only — it skipped SQLite on the (wrong) premise that SQLite
+ * doesn't enforce NOT NULL. It does, so every SQLite install answered
+ *
+ *     SQLITE_CONSTRAINT: NOT NULL constraint failed: events.expires_at
+ *
+ * when an admin cleared the expiration, surfacing as "Failed to update event".
+ * Migration 174 finishes the job. The harness runs on SQLite, so this asserts
+ * the real engine behaviour rather than a mock.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-nullable-dates-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'nullable-dates-test-secret';
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+let db;
+let cleanup;
+let eventId;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+  await seedMinimal(db);
+  const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+    slug: 'nullable-dates-test',
+    event_type: 'wedding',
+    event_name: 'Nullable Dates Test',
+    event_date: '2026-06-22',
+    host_email: 'host@example.com',
+    admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+    password_hash: 'x',
+    share_link: '/gallery/nullable-dates-test/share',
+    share_token: 'nullable-dates-share',
+    expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+    is_active: 1,
+    is_archived: 0,
+    is_draft: 0,
+    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+  }).returning('id');
+  eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+}, 120000);
+
+afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+describe('events date columns are nullable on SQLite (#1029)', () => {
+  test('the engine under test really is SQLite', () => {
+    expect(['sqlite3', 'better-sqlite3']).toContain(db.client.config.client);
+  });
+
+  test('clearing expires_at succeeds — this threw SQLITE_CONSTRAINT before migration 174', async () => {
+    await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ expires_at: null });
+    const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first('expires_at');
+    expect(row.expires_at).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test('clearing event_date succeeds too (061 covered both columns on PG)', async () => {
+    await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ event_date: null });
+    const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first('event_date');
+    expect(row.event_date).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test('a gallery can be created with no expiration at all', async () => {
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'never-expires-test',
+      event_type: 'other',
+      event_name: 'Never Expires',
+      event_date: null,
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: '/gallery/never-expires-test/share',
+      share_token: 'never-expires-share',
+      expires_at: null,
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+    const row = await db('events').where('id', id).first('expires_at', 'event_date');
+    expect(row.expires_at).toBeNull();
+    expect(row.event_date).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test('columns the events table depends on survived the table rebuild', async () => {
+    // Knex implements .alter() on SQLite by recreating the table; make sure the
+    // rebuild kept the row and the wider schema intact.
+    const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
+    expect(row.slug).toBe('nullable-dates-test');
+    expect(row.share_token).toBe('nullable-dates-share');
+    expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'allow_downloads')).toBe(true);
+    expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'hero_photo_id')).toBe(true);
+    const photos = await db('photos').where('event_id', eventId);
+    expect(Array.isArray(photos)).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/streamResponse.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/**
+ * The contract that matters here is negative: a source that disappears must
+ * NOT be able to end the process (#1128).
+ *
+ * `fs.createReadStream` is lazy, so its ENOENT lands on a later tick, outside
+ * the route's try/catch. An EventEmitter emitting 'error' with no listener
+ * throws, and an uncaught throw from an I/O callback exits Node — which is how
+ * one missing thumbnail tier took every gallery on the install down.
+ *
+ * These use a REAL fs stream over a real missing path rather than a fake
+ * emitter: the point under test is the lazy-open timing, and a hand-rolled
+ * mock that emits synchronously would pass while proving nothing.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+const { Readable } = require('stream');
+const { EventEmitter } = require('events');
+
+const { pipeStreamToResponse } = require('../../src/utils/streamResponse');
+
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
+  warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+/** Minimal Express-ish response that records what happened to it. */
+function makeRes() {
+  const res = new EventEmitter();
+  res.headers = { 'Content-Length': '1234', ETag: '"x"' };
+  res.statusCode = 200;
+  res.headersSent = false;
+  res.writableEnded = false;
+  res.body = null;
+  res.destroyed = false;
+  res.removeHeader = (h) => { delete res.headers[h]; };
+  res.setHeader = (h, v) => { res.headers[h] = v; };
+  res.status = (code) => { res.statusCode = code; return res; };
+  res.json = (payload) => { res.body = payload; res.writableEnded = true; return res; };
+  res.destroy = () => { res.destroyed = true; };
+  // pipe() target surface
+  res.write = () => true;
+  res.end = () => { res.writableEnded = true; };
+  res.on = EventEmitter.prototype.on.bind(res);
+  res.emit = EventEmitter.prototype.emit.bind(res);
+  return res;
+}
+
+const settle = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 50));
+
+describe('pipeStreamToResponse (#1128)', () => {
+  it('turns a missing file into a 404 instead of an unhandled error', async () => {
+    const missing = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-not-here-${Date.now()}.jpg`);
+    const res = makeRes();
+
+    pipeStreamToResponse(stream_(missing), res, { context: 'thumbnail for photo 1' });
+    await settle();
+
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(404);
+    expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'File not found' });
+  });
+
+  // How this test discriminates, since the failure mode is a process-level
+  // one: replacing the call above with a bare `stream.pipe(res)` — what the
+  // thumbnail route did — makes jest fail this suite on the unhandled 'error'
+  // event before either assertion runs. Verified by doing exactly that.
+  // Catching the throw with a process.on('uncaughtException') listener does
+  // NOT work here and would be theatre: the runner installs its own handling,
+  // so such a listener never sees it and the assertion could never fail.
+  function stream_(p) { return fs.createReadStream(p); }
+
+  it('strips every header that described the file it can no longer send', async () => {
+    const res = makeRes();
+    // What the image and zip routes actually stage before streaming.
+    res.headers = {
+      'Content-Length': '1234',
+      ETag: '"x"',
+      'Content-Type': 'image/jpeg',
+      'Content-Disposition': 'attachment; filename="gallery.zip"',
+      'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800',
+    };
+    const stream = fs.createReadStream(path.join(os.tmpdir(), `gone-${Date.now()}.jpg`));
+
+    pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res);
+    await settle();
+
+    expect(res.headers['Content-Length']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.headers.ETag).toBeUndefined();
+    // Express does NOT overwrite an existing Content-Type, so leaving it makes
+    // res.json() emit JSON labelled image/jpeg — or a corrupt .zip download.
+    expect(res.headers['Content-Type']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.headers['Content-Disposition']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('does not let a transient 404 be cached as a broken tile', async () => {
+    const res = makeRes();
+    // The thumbnail route stages 30 minutes; the hero route an hour.
+    res.headers = { 'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=1800' };
+    const stream = fs.createReadStream(path.join(os.tmpdir(), `gone3-${Date.now()}.jpg`));
+
+    pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res);
+    await settle();
+
+    // The regeneration race is transient by definition: the tier exists moments
+    // later. Caching this 404 would keep the tile broken long after the file is
+    // back — the opposite of what this helper is for.
+    expect(res.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store');
+  });
+
+  it('honours a caller that wants a different missing-status', async () => {
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const stream = fs.createReadStream(path.join(os.tmpdir(), `gone2-${Date.now()}.zip`));
+
+    pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, { missingStatus: 410 });
+    await settle();
+
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(410);
+  });
+
+  it('destroys the response instead of rewriting a status that is already sent', async () => {
+    const res = makeRes();
+    res.headersSent = true;
+
+    const stream = new Readable({ read() {} });
+    pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res, { context: 'photo 9' });
+    stream.emit('error', Object.assign(new Error('ENOENT'), { code: 'ENOENT' }));
+    await settle();
+
+    // Once bytes are on the wire a 404 is not available; a truncated image the
+    // client would cache is worse than a broken connection.
+    expect(res.destroyed).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('reports a non-ENOENT failure as a 500 rather than a 404', async () => {
+    const res = makeRes();
+    const stream = new Readable({ read() {} });
+
+    pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res);
+    stream.emit('error', Object.assign(new Error('disk exploded'), { code: 'EIO' }));
+    await settle();
+
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(500);
+    expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'Failed to serve file' });
+  });
+
+  it('releases the source when the client hangs up mid-download', async () => {
+    const res = makeRes();
+    let destroyed = false;
+    const stream = new Readable({ read() {}, destroy(err, cb) { destroyed = true; cb(err); } });
+
+    pipeStreamToResponse(stream, res);
+    res.emit('close');
+    await settle();
+
+    // Otherwise an abandoned grid leaks one open fd per tile.
+    expect(destroyed).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

backend/knexfile.js

@@ -1,39 +1,13 @@
 require('dotenv').config();
 
-const path = require('path');
-
 // Database configuration for different environments
-const resolveSqliteFilename = (filenameEnv) => {
-  const fallback = path.join(__dirname, './data/photo_sharing.db');
-
-  if (!filenameEnv) {
-    return fallback;
-  }
-
-  const trimmed = String(filenameEnv).trim();
-  if (!trimmed) {
-    return fallback;
-  }
-
-  let resolved;
-  if (path.isAbsolute(trimmed)) {
-    resolved = trimmed;
-  } else if (trimmed.startsWith('./') || trimmed.startsWith('../')) {
-    resolved = path.resolve(__dirname, trimmed);
-  } else {
-    resolved = path.join(__dirname, trimmed);
-  }
-
-  const normalized = path.normalize(resolved);
-  const baseSuffix = path.relative(path.parse(__dirname).root, path.normalize(__dirname));
-  const duplicatePattern = `${path.sep}${baseSuffix}${path.sep}${baseSuffix}`;
-
-  if (normalized.includes(duplicatePattern)) {
-    return normalized.replace(duplicatePattern, `${path.sep}${baseSuffix}`);
-  }
-
-  return normalized;
-};
+// Shared with the engine guard (#1038) so both resolve the identical path.
+const { resolveSqliteFilename } = require('./src/utils/sqlitePath');
+// One resolution of the PostgreSQL target for the whole application (#1038).
+// The development and production blocks used to carry different host/user/
+// database defaults, so a process that probed or migrated against one could
+// hand over to a process that opened another.
+const { pgConnectionFromEnv } = require('./src/utils/pgConnection');
 
 const sqliteConnection = (filenameEnv) => ({
   filename: resolveSqliteFilename(filenameEnv)
@@ -54,13 +28,7 @@ const baseSqliteConfig = {
 const config = {
   development: {
     client: process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT || 'sqlite3',
-    connection: process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT === 'pg' ? {
-      host: process.env.DB_HOST || 'localhost',
-      port: process.env.DB_PORT || 5432,
-      user: process.env.DB_USER || 'postgres',
-      password: process.env.DB_PASSWORD || 'postgres',
-      database: process.env.DB_NAME || 'photo_sharing'
-    } : {
+    connection: process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT === 'pg' ? pgConnectionFromEnv() : {
       filename: resolveSqliteFilename(process.env.DATABASE_PATH || './data/photo_sharing.db')
     },
     useNullAsDefault: process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT !== 'pg',
@@ -97,12 +65,7 @@ const config = {
     // Support both Postgres and SQLite in production based on DATABASE_CLIENT
     connection: (process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT || 'pg') === 'pg'
       ? {
-          host: process.env.DB_HOST || 'db',
-          port: process.env.DB_PORT || 5432,
-          user: process.env.DB_USER || 'picpeak',
-          password: process.env.DB_PASSWORD,
-          database: process.env.DB_NAME || 'picpeak',
-          ssl: process.env.DB_SSL === 'true' ? { rejectUnauthorized: false } : false,
+          ...pgConnectionFromEnv(),
           // Connection stability settings
           connectionTimeoutMillis: 30000,
           idleTimeoutMillis: 30000,

backend/migrations/core/052_add_css_templates.js

@@ -77,7 +77,11 @@ const DEFAULT_CSS_TEMPLATE = `/*
 
 .photo-card img {
   width: 100%;
-  height: 200px;
+  /* 100%, not a fixed pixel height: every aspect-ratio layout (masonry,
+     justified, mosaic, gallery-premium) gives .photo-card a definite height
+     computed from photos.width/height, and this rule's specificity (0,1,1)
+     beats the .h-full utility (0,1,0) the layouts rely on — #1131. */
+  height: 100%;
   object-fit: cover;
   transition: transform 0.3s ease;
 }

backend/migrations/core/053_add_liquid_glass_templates.js

@@ -503,7 +503,9 @@ const LIQUID_GLASS_DARK = `/*
 
 .photo-card img {
   width: 100%;
-  height: 240px;
+  /* See #1131: a fixed height here beats the layouts' .h-full utility and
+     detaches the image from its aspect-ratio-sized card. */
+  height: 100%;
   object-fit: cover;
   transition: transform 0.4s ease, filter 0.4s ease;
   filter: brightness(0.9);
@@ -639,7 +641,7 @@ const LIQUID_GLASS_DARK = `/*
   }
 
   .photo-card img {
-    height: 180px;
+    height: 100%;
   }
 
   /* Reduce animation complexity on mobile */

backend/migrations/core/167_add_projects_created_by.js

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 167: give `projects` a first-class owner (GHSA-wrg5).
+ *
+ * Project routes authorize on generic `events.view` / `events.edit` only, with
+ * no ownership check, so an editor-like admin could enumerate, read, update
+ * and aggregate projects belonging to other admins' events.
+ *
+ * Ownership IS derivable transitively — `events.project_id` (migration 117)
+ * plus `events.created_by` (migration 060) — but only for projects that have
+ * at least one linked event. A freshly created, still-empty project has no
+ * derivable owner, which would leave a hole exactly where the create → attach
+ * flow starts. Storing the creator removes that ambiguity: projectService
+ * already receives `adminId` in createProject() and simply discarded it.
+ *
+ * Backfill uses the transitive path, which is well-defined here: migration 117
+ * created exactly one auto-project per pre-existing event, so those projects
+ * map 1:1 to an owning event. Projects with no linked event (or whose events
+ * are themselves ownerless legacy rows) stay NULL and are treated as
+ * unowned//legacy by the ownership helper — same convention the events table
+ * already uses for `created_by IS NULL`.
+ *
+ * down() drops the column; the derived data is reconstructible by re-running
+ * the same backfill, so nothing is lost irreversibly.
+ */
+
+exports.up = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('projects'))) return;
+
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('projects', 'created_by'))) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('projects', (t) => {
+      // No FK constraint: admin_users rows can be removed, and orphaning a
+      // project would be worse than a dangling id (which reads as unowned).
+      t.integer('created_by').nullable();
+    });
+  }
+
+  // Backfill from the linked events, only where we can determine it
+  // unambiguously (every owning event agrees on a single non-null creator).
+  if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'project_id')
+    && await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'created_by')) {
+    const rows = await knex('events')
+      .whereNotNull('project_id')
+      .whereNotNull('created_by')
+      .select('project_id', 'created_by')
+      .groupBy('project_id', 'created_by');
+
+    const byProject = new Map();
+    for (const row of rows) {
+      const list = byProject.get(row.project_id) || [];
+      list.push(row.created_by);
+      byProject.set(row.project_id, list);
+    }
+
+    for (const [projectId, creators] of byProject) {
+      // Ambiguous (events from two different admins) → leave NULL rather than
+      // guess an owner and hand one admin authority over another's work.
+      if (creators.length !== 1) continue;
+      await knex('projects')
+        .where({ id: projectId })
+        .whereNull('created_by')
+        .update({ created_by: creators[0] });
+    }
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function (knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('projects'))) return;
+  if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('projects', 'created_by')) {
+    await knex.schema.alterTable('projects', (t) => t.dropColumn('created_by'));
+  }
+};

backend/migrations/core/168_fix_expense_activity_event_id.js

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-jhcf — data correction for legacy accounting activity rows.
+ *
+ * expenseService called `logActivity(type, metadata, adminId)`, but the third
+ * positional parameter of logActivity is `eventId`, not the actor. Every
+ * expense / incoming-invoice entry therefore stored the ACTING ADMIN'S ID in
+ * `activity_logs.event_id` (and no actor at all).
+ *
+ * That is not merely cosmetic. The dashboard activity feed now scopes rows via
+ * `WHERE activity_logs.event_id IN (SELECT id FROM events WHERE created_by = me)`.
+ * Admin ids and event ids are both small integers drawn from the same range, so
+ * on any upgraded instance an editor who happens to own the event whose id
+ * equals another admin's id is served that admin's accounting activity —
+ * verbatim metadata included. Scoping new writes correctly does nothing for the
+ * rows already on disk, so they are corrected here.
+ *
+ * The stored value is exactly the actor id we lost, so this re-attributes
+ * rather than discards: event_id → actor_id (when no actor was recorded), then
+ * event_id is cleared so the scope predicate can no longer match it.
+ *
+ * All ten activity types below are emitted by expenseService and nothing else,
+ * so no row with a genuine event_id is touched.
+ */
+
+const AFFECTED_TYPES = [
+  'incoming_invoice_captured',
+  'incoming_invoice_updated',
+  'incoming_invoice_categorized',
+  'incoming_invoice_rebilled',
+  'incoming_invoices_rebilled_bundle',
+  'incoming_invoice_supplier_payment',
+  'expense_created',
+  'expense_updated',
+  'expense_invoiced',
+  'expense_paid',
+];
+
+exports.up = async function up(knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('activity_logs'))) return;
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('activity_logs', 'event_id'))) return;
+
+  const hasActorId = await knex.schema.hasColumn('activity_logs', 'actor_id');
+  const hasActorType = await knex.schema.hasColumn('activity_logs', 'actor_type');
+
+  if (hasActorId) {
+    const patch = { actor_id: knex.ref('event_id') };
+    if (hasActorType) patch.actor_type = 'admin';
+    await knex('activity_logs')
+      .whereIn('activity_type', AFFECTED_TYPES)
+      .whereNotNull('event_id')
+      .whereNull('actor_id')
+      .update(patch);
+  }
+
+  await knex('activity_logs')
+    .whereIn('activity_type', AFFECTED_TYPES)
+    .whereNotNull('event_id')
+    .update({ event_id: null });
+};
+
+// Irreversible by design: this is a data correction, and the pre-migration
+// state is a cross-admin disclosure. Re-planting admin ids in event_id would
+// reopen GHSA-jhcf.
+exports.down = async function down() {};

backend/migrations/core/174_sqlite_nullable_event_dates.js

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/**
+ * Migration 174: make events.event_date / events.expires_at nullable on SQLite (#1029).
+ *
+ * Migration 061 introduced the `event_require_event_date` /
+ * `event_require_expiration` settings and dropped the NOT NULL on both columns
+ * — but only for Postgres. It skipped SQLite on the premise that "SQLite
+ * doesn't enforce NOT NULL as strictly", which is simply untrue: clearing the
+ * expiration on a SQLite install fails with
+ *
+ *     SQLITE_CONSTRAINT: NOT NULL constraint failed: events.expires_at
+ *
+ * so "never expires" has never been reachable there. This finishes 061 for
+ * SQLite. Knex implements .alter() on SQLite by recreating the table; migration
+ * 073 already does exactly that on `events`, so the path is well-trodden here.
+ *
+ * Postgres is skipped — 061 already handled it, and knex's .alter() rewrites
+ * the whole column definition (type, default, nullability), which would be a
+ * needless rewrite of a column that is already correct.
+ */
+
+function isSqlite(knex) {
+  const client = knex.client.config.client;
+  return client === 'sqlite3' || client === 'better-sqlite3';
+}
+
+exports.up = async function(knex) {
+  if (!isSqlite(knex)) return;
+
+  const hasEvents = await knex.schema.hasTable('events');
+  if (!hasEvents) return;
+
+  await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (table) => {
+    table.datetime('event_date').nullable().alter();
+    table.datetime('expires_at').nullable().alter();
+  });
+};
+
+exports.down = async function(knex) {
+  // Deliberately irreversible. Restoring NOT NULL would fail on any install
+  // that has since created a gallery without an expiration — exactly what this
+  // migration enables — and 061's down() takes the same position for Postgres.
+};

backend/migrations/core/175_fix_css_template_photo_height.js

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/**
+ * The bundled CSS templates pinned every gallery image to a fixed pixel
+ * height, which broke every aspect-ratio layout (#1131).
+ *
+ * Six of the seven layouts size a tile by putting a computed pixel height on
+ * `.photo-card` and letting the image fill it with `h-full`. A template rule
+ * of `.photo-card img { height: 200px }` has specificity (0,1,1) and beats
+ * `.h-full` at (0,1,0), so the image detached from its card: masonry rendered
+ * correctly-shaped cards with a 200px image glued to the top and empty
+ * background below — or, where the computed card was shorter than 200px, an
+ * image taller than its own container.
+ *
+ * "Elegant Dark" is seeded `is_default = true`, so this was the out-of-the-box
+ * result for anyone choosing any layout other than grid/timeline (where a
+ * fixed square happens to look deliberate).
+ *
+ * Migrations 052 and 053 are corrected for fresh installs; this repairs the
+ * rows already seeded. Templates are referenced by `events.css_template_id`
+ * and read at serve time rather than copied onto the event, so fixing the row
+ * fixes every gallery using it.
+ *
+ * SCOPE: every `.photo-card img` rule that carries a fixed PIXEL height, in
+ * every template — not just the two we seeded, and not just their pristine
+ * copies.
+ *
+ * That is broader than it first looks, and deliberately so. It is also not the
+ * scope this started with: matching the exact seeded text missed every install
+ * where the template had ever been saved through the editor, because
+ * `sanitizeCSS` strips newlines. Those are the majority, and a migration that
+ * silently no-ops on them while being recorded as applied is worse than none.
+ *
+ * The cost is that a fixed pixel height a user wrote themselves is rewritten
+ * too. That is judged acceptable because there is no layout it can be right
+ * for: all seven give `.photo-card` a definite height and expect the image to
+ * fill it, so a pixel height on the image can only detach it from its card.
+ * Anything that is not a fixed px height — %, vh, auto — is left alone, as is
+ * every declaration outside a `.photo-card img` body.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Every `.photo-card img { … }` rule body, however it is spaced.
+ *
+ * Matching the exact seeded text does NOT work, and the reason is worth
+ * stating: `sanitizeCSS` strips all control characters (cssSanitizer.js:61),
+ * so the moment an admin saves a template through the editor — even only to
+ * rename it or toggle it — every newline is REMOVED from the stored CSS. The
+ * shipped `.photo-card img {\n  height: 200px;` becomes
+ * `.photo-card img {  height: 200px;`. An exact-match migration would find
+ * nothing on those installs, be recorded as applied, and leave the galleries
+ * broken with no second chance.
+ *
+ * Scoped to the rule body rather than the whole stylesheet, so the other pixel
+ * heights in these same templates — a 1px gradient divider, an 8px scrollbar —
+ * are untouched.
+ */
+/*
+ * Two details in this pattern are deliberate:
+ *
+ *   * the selector part is a LIST, so `.photo-card img, .thumbnail img { … }`
+ *     is recognised. Requiring `{` straight after `img` skipped grouped
+ *     selectors entirely — and the migration would still be recorded as
+ *     applied, so the template kept the bug with no second chance.
+ *
+ *   * the body excludes braces, so a rule containing a NESTED block is not
+ *     matched at all. `.photo-card img { & + .caption { height: 200px } }` is
+ *     valid, passes the validator, and a `[^}]*` body would have captured the
+ *     nested block and rewritten the caption's height instead. Skipping it
+ *     means such a template keeps a fixed image height; corrupting unrelated
+ *     declarations in a migration that cannot be undone is the worse of the
+ *     two, and nesting does not appear in anything we ship.
+ */
+const PHOTO_CARD_IMG_RULE = /([^{}]*\.photo-card\s+img[^{}]*)\{([^{}]*)\}/g;
+
+/**
+ * Only a fixed PIXEL height is wrong here; %, vh, auto and the rest stay.
+ *
+ * The lookbehind is load-bearing rather than defensive: without it the pattern
+ * matches the TAIL of `line-height`, `max-height`, `min-height` and any custom
+ * property ending in `-height`, and silently rewrites those instead — in a
+ * migration whose down() is deliberately irreversible.
+ */
+const FIXED_PX_HEIGHT = /(?<![\w-])height\s*:\s*\d+(?:\.\d+)?px/gi;
+
+function relaxFixedImageHeights(css) {
+  return css.replace(PHOTO_CARD_IMG_RULE, (whole, selectors, body) => {
+    // .test() on a /g regex advances lastIndex, so it is reset on both sides
+    // of the check — leaving it set makes the NEXT rule start matching from an
+    // arbitrary offset and silently skip declarations.
+    FIXED_PX_HEIGHT.lastIndex = 0;
+    if (!FIXED_PX_HEIGHT.test(body)) return whole;
+    FIXED_PX_HEIGHT.lastIndex = 0;
+    return `${selectors}{${body.replace(FIXED_PX_HEIGHT, 'height: 100%')}}`;
+  });
+}
+
+exports.up = async function up(knex) {
+  if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('css_templates'))) return;
+
+  const rows = await knex('css_templates').select('id', 'css_content');
+  let fixed = 0;
+
+  for (const row of rows) {
+    const original = row.css_content;
+    if (!original || typeof original !== 'string') continue;
+
+    const updated = relaxFixedImageHeights(original);
+
+    if (updated !== original) {
+      await knex('css_templates').where({ id: row.id }).update({ css_content: updated });
+      fixed += 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (fixed > 0) {
+    console.log(`  175: relaxed the fixed image height in ${fixed} CSS template(s)`);
+  }
+};
+
+exports.down = async function down() {
+  // Deliberately irreversible. Putting the pixel heights back would re-break
+  // every aspect-ratio layout, and the rows may have been edited since — there
+  // is no version of "restore" here that is safer than doing nothing.
+};

backend/migrations/run-migrations-safe.js

@@ -276,11 +276,51 @@ async function runMigrations() {
 }
 
 // Add delay for database readiness in production
+// Engine consistency check (#1038). The entrypoint resolves the engine before
+// migrations run and exports DATABASE_CLIENT, so this normally agrees and does
+// nothing. It bites on a MANUAL migration run: without that env, an install
+// that is really on SQLite would resolve to Postgres here and build a schema in
+// the empty database, which then hides the SQLite data from the boot-time
+// check. Stop instead, and say which env to set.
+async function assertEngine() {
+  const knexConfig = require('../knexfile');
+  const logger = require('../src/utils/logger');
+  const { resolveBootEngine } = require('../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+  const decision = await resolveBootEngine({ knexConfig, logger });
+  if (decision.reason === 'marker-target-mismatch') {
+    console.error(
+      'Refusing to migrate: this install was migrated to a different PostgreSQL than the\n'
+      + 'one currently configured. The resolver printed both targets above.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  if (decision.reason === 'ambiguous-both-populated') {
+    // Both databases hold data and nothing records which is current; the
+    // resolver has already printed the comparison. There is no client to
+    // recommend here — the operator has to pick one.
+    console.error(
+      'Refusing to migrate: SQLite and PostgreSQL both hold data and neither is marked\n'
+      + 'as current. Set DATABASE_CLIENT=pg or DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3 to say which one\n'
+      + 'this command should touch.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  if (decision.client !== knexConfig.client) {
+    console.error(
+      `Refusing to migrate ${knexConfig.client} — this install's data is in ${decision.client}.\n`
+      + `Run migrations through the container entrypoint, or set DATABASE_CLIENT=${decision.client} explicitly.\n`
+      + 'To move the data across instead: node scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+}
+
 async function waitAndRun() {
   if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
     console.log('Waiting 2 seconds for database readiness...');
     await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 2000));
   }
+  await assertEngine();
   await runMigrations();
 }
 

backend/migrations/run-migrations.js

@@ -46,10 +46,50 @@ async function runMigration(filepath) {
   }
 }
 
+// Engine consistency check (#1038). The entrypoint resolves the engine before
+// migrations run and exports DATABASE_CLIENT, so this normally agrees and does
+// nothing. It bites on a MANUAL migration run: without that env, an install
+// that is really on SQLite would resolve to Postgres here and build a schema in
+// the empty database, which then hides the SQLite data from the boot-time
+// check. Stop instead, and say which env to set.
+async function assertEngine() {
+  const knexConfig = require('../knexfile');
+  const logger = require('../src/utils/logger');
+  const { resolveBootEngine } = require('../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+  const decision = await resolveBootEngine({ knexConfig, logger });
+  if (decision.reason === 'marker-target-mismatch') {
+    console.error(
+      'Refusing to migrate: this install was migrated to a different PostgreSQL than the\n'
+      + 'one currently configured. The resolver printed both targets above.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  if (decision.reason === 'ambiguous-both-populated') {
+    // Both databases hold data and nothing records which is current; the
+    // resolver has already printed the comparison. There is no client to
+    // recommend here — the operator has to pick one.
+    console.error(
+      'Refusing to migrate: SQLite and PostgreSQL both hold data and neither is marked\n'
+      + 'as current. Set DATABASE_CLIENT=pg or DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3 to say which one\n'
+      + 'this command should touch.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  if (decision.client !== knexConfig.client) {
+    console.error(
+      `Refusing to migrate ${knexConfig.client} — this install's data is in ${decision.client}.\n`
+      + `Run migrations through the container entrypoint, or set DATABASE_CLIENT=${decision.client} explicitly.\n`
+      + 'To move the data across instead: node scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+}
+
 // Main migration runner
 async function runMigrations() {
   try {
     console.log('Starting database migrations...');
+    await assertEngine();
     
     // First run the init.js if it exists but only if migrations table doesn't exist
     const tableExists = await db.schema.hasTable('migrations');

backend/package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.45.6",
+  "version": "3.46.0",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "picpeak-backend",
-      "version": "3.45.6",
+      "version": "3.46.0",
       "dependencies": {
         "@aws-sdk/client-s3": "^3.850.0",
         "@aws-sdk/lib-storage": "^3.850.0",
@@ -42,13 +42,14 @@
         "node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
         "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
         "otplib": "^12.0.1",
+        "p-limit": "^3.1.0",
         "pdf-lib": "^1.17.1",
         "pdfkit": "^0.17.2",
         "pg": "^8.16.3",
-        "postcss": "8.5.18",
+        "postcss": "8.5.23",
         "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
         "react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
-        "sanitize-html": "^2.17.0",
+        "sanitize-html": "2.17.5",
         "sharp": "0.35.3",
         "sqlite3": "^5.1.6",
         "swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
@@ -4498,9 +4499,9 @@
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/brace-expansion": {
-      "version": "5.0.8",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.8.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-JZyDyq3D4AUifKTPOB7DELf6XsB3WdPuNxCtob1vFXPsSXhdAiHBWJ/tJ8HAc9aH84BK+5JFZLNkJKx3G9kzQg==",
+      "version": "5.0.9",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.9.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-ScQ4IuvIEF1TMlP7Zt+vjJ//9zlPb2SDcxWxM3bk8s6t6GGdJ7KO1dCcTidOPJKePW30LE/2cT7wCyPho9/Wxg==",
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "balanced-match": "^4.0.2"
@@ -5226,6 +5227,12 @@
       "integrity": "sha512-KALDyEYgpY+Rlob/iriUtjV6d5Eq+Y191A5g4UqLAi8CyGP9N1+FdVbkc1SxKc2r4YAYqG8JzO2KGL+AizD70Q==",
       "license": "MIT"
     },
+    "node_modules/dayjs": {
+      "version": "1.11.21",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/dayjs/-/dayjs-1.11.21.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-98IT+HOahAisibz/yjKbzuOBwYcjJ7BCLPzARyHiyEBmRz4fatF+KPJszEHXsGYjUG234aH/cOjW1wwTbKUZlA==",
+      "license": "MIT"
+    },
     "node_modules/debug": {
       "version": "4.4.3",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/debug/-/debug-4.4.3.tgz",
@@ -5308,9 +5315,19 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/deepmerge-ts": {
-      "version": "7.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/deepmerge-ts/-/deepmerge-ts-7.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-HOJkrhaYsweh+W+e74Yn7YStZOilkoPb6fycpwNLKzSPtruFs48nYis0zy5yJz1+ktUhHxoRDJ27RQAWLIJVJw==",
+      "version": "8.0.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/deepmerge-ts/-/deepmerge-ts-8.0.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-szCXE7YLCvLKR9bFPJcvsezOShdalctSvrgN/LM/QGUEPZQajwjmsMObZ6/DuANT5lxzM/wtO8Feubwdkz8myA==",
+      "funding": [
+        {
+          "type": "ko-fi",
+          "url": "https://ko-fi.com/rebeccastevens"
+        },
+        {
+          "type": "tidelift",
+          "url": "https://tidelift.com/funding/github/npm/deepmerge-ts"
+        }
+      ],
       "license": "BSD-3-Clause",
       "engines": {
         "node": ">=16.0.0"
@@ -6785,19 +6802,7 @@
         "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/KillyMXI"
       }
     },
-    "node_modules/html-to-text/node_modules/entities": {
-      "version": "7.0.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/entities/-/entities-7.0.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-TWrgLOFUQTH994YUyl1yT4uyavY5nNB5muff+RtWaqNVCAK408b5ZnnbNAUEWLTCpum9w6arT70i1XdQ4UeOPA==",
-      "license": "BSD-2-Clause",
-      "engines": {
-        "node": ">=0.12"
-      },
-      "funding": {
-        "url": "https://github.com/fb55/entities?sponsor=1"
-      }
-    },
-    "node_modules/html-to-text/node_modules/htmlparser2": {
+    "node_modules/htmlparser2": {
       "version": "10.1.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/htmlparser2/-/htmlparser2-10.1.0.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-VTZkM9GWRAtEpveh7MSF6SjjrpNVNNVJfFup7xTY3UpFtm67foy9HDVXneLtFVt4pMz5kZtgNcvCniNFb1hlEQ==",
@@ -6816,23 +6821,16 @@
         "entities": "^7.0.1"
       }
     },
-    "node_modules/htmlparser2": {
-      "version": "8.0.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/htmlparser2/-/htmlparser2-8.0.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-GYdjWKDkbRLkZ5geuHs5NY1puJ+PXwP7+fHPRz06Eirsb9ugf6d8kkXav6ADhcODhFFPMIXyxkxSuMf3D6NCFA==",
-      "funding": [
-        "https://github.com/fb55/htmlparser2?sponsor=1",
-        {
-          "type": "github",
-          "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/fb55"
-        }
-      ],
-      "license": "MIT",
-      "dependencies": {
-        "domelementtype": "^2.3.0",
-        "domhandler": "^5.0.3",
-        "domutils": "^3.0.1",
-        "entities": "^4.4.0"
+    "node_modules/htmlparser2/node_modules/entities": {
+      "version": "7.0.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/entities/-/entities-7.0.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-TWrgLOFUQTH994YUyl1yT4uyavY5nNB5muff+RtWaqNVCAK408b5ZnnbNAUEWLTCpum9w6arT70i1XdQ4UeOPA==",
+      "license": "BSD-2-Clause",
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=0.12"
+      },
+      "funding": {
+        "url": "https://github.com/fb55/entities?sponsor=1"
       }
     },
     "node_modules/http-cache-semantics": {
@@ -7116,9 +7114,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/ip-address": {
-      "version": "10.2.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ip-address/-/ip-address-10.2.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-/+S6j4E9AHvW9SWMSEY9Xfy66O5PWvVEJ08O0y5JGyEKQpojb0K0GKpz/v5HJ/G0vi3D2sjGK78119oXZeE0qA==",
+      "version": "10.4.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ip-address/-/ip-address-10.4.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-oSK96Grm3aP6OrS263xVxbNDGVL7rzBtYdpGqlDG8iQdoenDoTs/nkki+DflYbAEE8Xl6o5YxhxlrKvI3nqKXQ==",
       "license": "MIT",
       "engines": {
         "node": ">= 12"
@@ -7993,9 +7991,9 @@
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/js-yaml": {
-      "version": "4.3.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/js-yaml/-/js-yaml-4.3.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-1td788aAnnZ5qs7V2QIRl1owjtYpbKt749Y3xauqQgwIIGF/xXWz1wMTEBx5O3LK3lXLVuqXPdPxj2BoFHaW9Q==",
+      "version": "4.3.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/js-yaml/-/js-yaml-4.3.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-CY6crGq313MX8GkwvB7tzgp99vjQxY1++5y10/BKN/GUfHqWaOGQMNZkBvqSzsZKWk/ijwHlWzzkLulsGHhjWQ==",
       "funding": [
         {
           "type": "github",
@@ -8232,6 +8230,15 @@
       "integrity": "sha512-Xq9nH7KlWZmXAtodXDDRE7vs6DU1gTU8zYDHDiWLSip45Egwq3plLHzPn27NgvzL2r1LMPC1vdqh98sQxtqj4A==",
       "license": "MIT"
     },
+    "node_modules/launder": {
+      "version": "1.7.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/launder/-/launder-1.7.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-mU6WRz5EusL9ZZuiZ5SO4Y6C0P9PAUR9iwdb6bzj4KDihm28DiHFw+/yk9DBH4f+Pv1wuzQ4e2jV3oQ7mkIqvw==",
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "dayjs": "^1.11.7"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/lazystream": {
       "version": "1.0.1",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lazystream/-/lazystream-1.0.1.tgz",
@@ -9079,9 +9086,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/nanoid": {
-      "version": "3.3.16",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.16.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-bzlKTyNJ7+LdGIIwy8ijFpIqEQIvafahV7eYykJ8Cvh42EdJeODoJ6gUJXpQJvej1BddH8OqTXZNE/KfbWAu8Q==",
+      "version": "3.3.18",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.18.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-DTg4MJbGMWkfi6VZFdNt2/caMbQy4Ou+Op/hJQvGEWcnVfoA1QA+xzRKAzw9jD6+GVOOeYr/mIcuDSdug6F6+w==",
       "funding": [
         {
           "type": "github",
@@ -9558,7 +9565,6 @@
       "version": "3.1.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/p-limit/-/p-limit-3.1.0.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-TYOanM3wGwNGsZN2cVTYPArw454xnXj5qmWF1bEoAc4+cU/ol7GVh7odevjp1FNHduHc3KZMcFduxU5Xc6uJRQ==",
-      "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "yocto-queue": "^0.1.0"
@@ -10036,9 +10042,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/postcss": {
-      "version": "8.5.18",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/postcss/-/postcss-8.5.18.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-xdB1oSLHbz1vRWgCDalrCqEFTWzFlhqFC5tIHLMOSUIjhm3XXQ1qrFy8S/ESr1JYRRXqM3c1QFiMZUJdUTqyMQ==",
+      "version": "8.5.23",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/postcss/-/postcss-8.5.23.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-g50586zr4bZmwFiTlflMu8E0bDTb5I5gertgwAKmsdUlTQIhZtunzUlD1WSzwcVWPoAVpsrA6vlfCD7oXvRwgg==",
       "funding": [
         {
           "type": "opencollective",
@@ -10055,7 +10061,7 @@
       ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "nanoid": "^3.3.12",
+        "nanoid": "^3.3.16",
         "picocolors": "^1.1.1",
         "source-map-js": "^1.2.1"
       },
@@ -10846,15 +10852,16 @@
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/sanitize-html": {
-      "version": "2.17.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/sanitize-html/-/sanitize-html-2.17.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-dLAADUSS8rBwhaevT12yCezvioCA+bmUTPH/u57xKPT8d++voeYE6HeluA/bPbQ15TwDBG2ii+QZIEmYx8VdxA==",
+      "version": "2.17.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/sanitize-html/-/sanitize-html-2.17.5.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-ZmU1joGRrvoyctKIiuwUxqR6moLoU2Wk+2bMccN6f7UwhAmwYDvWziqPxRDDN2Qip62NqnIrVrT9akbL6Wretg==",
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "deepmerge": "^4.2.2",
         "escape-string-regexp": "^4.0.0",
-        "htmlparser2": "^8.0.0",
+        "htmlparser2": "^10.1.0",
         "is-plain-object": "^5.0.0",
+        "launder": "^1.7.1",
         "parse-srcset": "^1.0.2",
         "postcss": "^8.3.11"
       }
@@ -12590,7 +12597,6 @@
       "version": "0.1.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/yocto-queue/-/yocto-queue-0.1.0.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-rVksvsnNCdJ/ohGc6xgPwyN8eheCxsiLM8mxuE/t/mOVqJewPuO1miLpTHQiRgTKCLexL4MeAFVagts7HmNZ2Q==",
-      "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "engines": {
         "node": ">=10"

backend/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.45.9",
+  "version": "3.46.4",
   "description": "Backend for PicPeak event photo sharing platform",
   "main": "server.js",
   "engines": {
@@ -51,13 +51,14 @@
     "node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
     "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
     "otplib": "^12.0.1",
+    "p-limit": "^3.1.0",
     "pdf-lib": "^1.17.1",
     "pdfkit": "^0.17.2",
     "pg": "^8.16.3",
-    "postcss": "8.5.18",
+    "postcss": "8.5.23",
     "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
     "react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
-    "sanitize-html": "^2.17.0",
+    "sanitize-html": "2.17.5",
     "sharp": "0.35.3",
     "sqlite3": "^5.1.6",
     "swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
@@ -84,14 +85,15 @@
     "fast-xml-parser": ">=5.7.0",
     "qs": ">=6.15.2",
     "tar": ">=7.5.21",
-    "brace-expansion": ">=5.0.7",
+    "brace-expansion": ">=5.0.9",
     "minimatch": ">=9.0.7",
     "path-to-regexp": "0.1.13",
     "lodash": ">=4.18.1",
     "follow-redirects": ">=1.16.0",
     "@tootallnate/once": ">=3.0.1",
-    "ip-address": ">=10.1.1",
+    "ip-address": ">=10.3.1",
     "uuid": "^11.1.1",
-    "nodemailer": "^9.0.1"
+    "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
+    "deepmerge-ts": ">=8.0.1"
   }
 }

backend/scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js

@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * Move an install's data from SQLite to PostgreSQL (#1038).
+ *
+ *   node scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js [--force] [--keep-archive]
+ *
+ * For installs that have been unknowingly running on SQLite: the image used to
+ * leave NODE_ENV unset, so knexfile.js fell back to its development block and
+ * ignored DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD. Their galleries live in the SQLite file
+ * while the Postgres database they provisioned sits empty.
+ *
+ * This deliberately reuses the .picpeak export/import services rather than
+ * hand-rolling a cross-engine copy — they already solve the parts that are easy
+ * to get wrong: foreign-key suspension during the load, JSON column handling
+ * per engine, and (critically) resyncing Postgres serial sequences after rows
+ * are inserted with explicit ids.
+ *
+ * Both services bind to the global `db` at require time, so each half runs in
+ * its own child process with DATABASE_CLIENT pinned — this script re-invokes
+ * itself with --phase for that.
+ *
+ * Photos and other files on disk are NOT touched: only database rows move. The
+ * SQLite file is left exactly as it was, so the migration is reversible by
+ * unsetting DATABASE_CLIENT again.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+
+const BACKEND_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
+
+// Same configuration sources the running backend uses. Without these, invoking
+// this CLI directly (or via `docker exec`, which does not inherit the exports
+// wait-for-db.sh performs) would fail the pre-flight checks below even though
+// the child phases would happily read backend/.env through knexfile.
+require('dotenv').config({ path: path.join(BACKEND_ROOT, '.env') });
+for (const [varName, file] of [['DB_PASSWORD', 'db_password'], ['JWT_SECRET', 'jwt_secret']]) {
+  const secretFile = `/run/secrets/${file}`;
+  if (!process.env[varName] && fs.existsSync(secretFile)) {
+    try {
+      process.env[varName] = fs.readFileSync(secretFile, 'utf8').trim();
+    } catch (_) { /* unreadable secret — the checks below report it */ }
+  }
+}
+
+function parseArgs(argv) {
+  return {
+    force: argv.includes('--force'),
+    keepArchive: argv.includes('--keep-archive'),
+    phase: (argv.find((a) => a.startsWith('--phase=')) || '').split('=')[1] || null,
+    archive: (argv.find((a) => a.startsWith('--archive=')) || '').split('=')[1] || null,
+    resultFile: (argv.find((a) => a.startsWith('--result-file=')) || '').split('=')[1] || null,
+    ignoreBootstrapAdmins: argv.includes('--ignore-bootstrap-admins'),
+  };
+}
+
+// Resolve the Postgres target ONCE, with production defaults, and hand the same
+// explicit values to every child. Otherwise the block knexfile happens to pick
+// decides the database name, and the migration can land somewhere the running
+// application will never open (#1038 review).
+function normalisedPgEnv() {
+  const { pgConnectionFromEnv } = require('../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+  const c = pgConnectionFromEnv();
+  return {
+    DB_HOST: String(c.host),
+    DB_PORT: String(c.port),
+    DB_USER: String(c.user),
+    DB_NAME: String(c.database),
+  };
+}
+
+function runPhase(phase, client, extraArgs = []) {
+  // The child's stdout is NOT a private channel: winston logs to the console
+  // outside production and whenever LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true, so the payload comes
+  // back through a file instead.
+  const resultFile = path.join(
+    fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-phase-${phase}-`)), 'result',
+  );
+  try {
+    const res = spawnSync(
+      process.execPath,
+      [__filename, `--phase=${phase}`, `--result-file=${resultFile}`, ...extraArgs],
+      {
+        cwd: BACKEND_ROOT,
+        env: {
+          ...process.env,
+          ...normalisedPgEnv(),
+          DATABASE_CLIENT: client,
+          // Production semantics for the child regardless of how the CLI was
+          // invoked: the development block ignores DB_SSL, so a managed Postgres
+          // that requires TLS could not be migrated into at all.
+          NODE_ENV: 'production',
+        },
+        stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'inherit'],
+        encoding: 'utf8',
+      },
+    );
+    if (res.status !== 0) {
+      throw new Error(`${phase} phase failed (exit ${res.status})`);
+    }
+    return fs.existsSync(resultFile) ? fs.readFileSync(resultFile, 'utf8').trim() : '';
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(path.dirname(resultFile), { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+}
+
+// ── phases (each runs in its own process, with DATABASE_CLIENT pinned) ────────
+
+async function phaseExport() {
+  const { createPicpeak } = require('../src/services/picpeakExportService');
+  const outDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sqlite-migration-'));
+  // Rows only. This moves an install between engines on the SAME machine, so
+  // every file is already where it belongs; hauling business docs through /tmp
+  // would just risk filling the temp disk.
+  try {
+    const { filePath } = await createPicpeak({ includePhotos: false, includeFiles: false, outDir });
+    return filePath;
+  } catch (err) {
+    // createPicpeak leaves a caller-supplied outDir alone on failure, and a
+    // partial archive still contains password hashes and credentials.
+    fs.rmSync(outDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+
+// Tables that are EMPTY on a freshly migrated schema, so any row in them means
+// a human has used this install. Used to protect the target from being wiped
+// and to decide whether the source is worth migrating (#1038 review). Tables
+// missing on a given branch are skipped.
+const USER_DATA_TABLES = [
+  'events', 'photos', 'photo_feedback', 'admin_users', 'customer_accounts',
+  'quotes', 'invoices', 'projects', 'expenses', 'inbound_documents',
+];
+
+async function tablesWithData(db, tables, { ignoreBootstrapAdmins = false } = {}) {
+  const { adminsIndicateUse } = require('../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+  const found = {};
+  for (const table of tables) {
+    if (!(await db.schema.hasTable(table))) continue;
+    if (table === 'admin_users' && ignoreBootstrapAdmins) {
+      // Match probePgData: one never-used seeded admin is not "user data", or
+      // the migration would demand --force against an empty target.
+      const cols = ['must_change_password'];
+      if (await db.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'last_login')) cols.push('last_login');
+      const rows = await db('admin_users').select(cols);
+      if (adminsIndicateUse(rows)) found[table] = rows.length;
+      continue;
+    }
+    const row = await db(table).count('* as count').first();
+    const count = Number(row?.count || 0);
+    if (count > 0) found[table] = count;
+  }
+  return found;
+}
+
+async function phaseUserData(ignoreBootstrapAdmins) {
+  const { db } = require('../src/database/db');
+  return JSON.stringify(await tablesWithData(db, USER_DATA_TABLES, { ignoreBootstrapAdmins }));
+}
+
+// Fingerprint EVERY table the export carries, not a hand-picked few: writes to
+// an unlisted table were invisible, and count+maxId alone misses in-place
+// UPDATEs (an event edit, a password change). max(updated_at) covers those
+// wherever the column exists. Still not a substitute for stopping the backend —
+// a table with neither `id` nor `updated_at` can be edited unnoticed — which is
+// why the script says so up front.
+async function phaseFingerprint() {
+  const { db } = require('../src/database/db');
+  const { listDataTables } = require('../src/services/picpeakExportService');
+  const out = {};
+  for (const table of await listDataTables()) {
+    const entry = {};
+    try {
+      entry.count = Number((await db(table).count('* as count').first())?.count || 0);
+    } catch (_) {
+      continue; // table vanished mid-run; the export would fail on it anyway
+    }
+    for (const [key, col] of [['maxId', 'id'], ['maxUpdated', 'updated_at']]) {
+      try {
+        const row = await db(table).max(`${col} as v`).first();
+        if (row && row.v !== null && row.v !== undefined) entry[key] = String(row.v);
+      } catch (_) { /* column doesn't exist on this table */ }
+    }
+    out[table] = entry;
+  }
+  return JSON.stringify(out);
+}
+
+async function phaseMigrateSchema() {
+  // runMigrations() exits the process itself (0 on success, 1 on failure), so the
+  // child's exit code is the result — nothing to return.
+  const { runMigrations } = require('../migrations/run-migrations-safe');
+  await runMigrations();
+}
+
+async function phaseImport(archivePath) {
+  const { importFromPicpeak } = require('../src/services/picpeakImportService');
+  // No currentAdminId: this is a CLI, there is no operator session to preserve.
+  // The SQLite install's own admin accounts come across with everything else.
+  // sqlite → pg is allowed by validateManifest's direction policy (#1041) —
+  // the same gate the upload/restore UI uses, no separate opt-in flag.
+  const summary = await importFromPicpeak({ picpeakPath: archivePath });
+  return JSON.stringify(summary || {});
+}
+
+function summariseUserData(found) {
+  return Object.entries(found).map(([t, n]) => `${t}=${n}`).join(', ');
+}
+
+function describeDrift(before, after) {
+  const drifted = [];
+  for (const table of new Set([...Object.keys(before), ...Object.keys(after)])) {
+    const a = before[table] || {};
+    const b = after[table] || {};
+    if (a.count !== b.count) {
+      drifted.push(`${table}: ${a.count ?? 0} rows → ${b.count ?? 0}`);
+    } else if (a.maxId !== b.maxId || a.maxUpdated !== b.maxUpdated) {
+      drifted.push(`${table}: rows edited in place (max id ${a.maxId ?? '-'} → ${b.maxId ?? '-'}, `
+        + `last update ${a.maxUpdated ?? '-'} → ${b.maxUpdated ?? '-'})`);
+    }
+  }
+  return drifted;
+}
+
+// Set once the export exists; every failure path clears it (the archive holds
+// plaintext secrets, so leaving it behind on error is not acceptable).
+let archiveToClean = null;
+
+function cleanupArchive() {
+  if (!archiveToClean) return;
+  try {
+    fs.rmSync(path.dirname(archiveToClean), { recursive: true, force: true });
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error(`  WARNING: could not remove ${archiveToClean} (${err.message}) — it contains`
+      + ' plaintext secrets, delete it by hand.');
+  }
+  archiveToClean = null;
+}
+
+// ── orchestration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async function main() {
+  const args = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));
+
+  // Child phase. The knex pool holds the event loop open, so finish by flushing
+  // stdout and exiting explicitly — otherwise the parent's spawnSync waits on a
+  // process that will never end by itself.
+  if (args.phase) {
+    const payload = args.phase === 'export' ? await phaseExport()
+      : args.phase === 'fingerprint' ? await phaseFingerprint()
+        : args.phase === 'user-data' ? await phaseUserData(args.ignoreBootstrapAdmins)
+          : args.phase === 'import' ? await phaseImport(args.archive)
+            : await phaseMigrateSchema();
+    if (args.resultFile) fs.writeFileSync(args.resultFile, String(payload ?? ''));
+    // The knex pool holds the event loop open; exit explicitly or the parent's
+    // spawnSync waits on a process that will never end by itself.
+    process.exit(0);
+  }
+
+  const { resolveSqlitePath } = require('../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+  const sqlitePath = resolveSqlitePath();
+
+  console.log('PicPeak — SQLite → PostgreSQL migration\n');
+
+  if (!fs.existsSync(sqlitePath)) {
+    console.error(`No SQLite database at ${sqlitePath}. Nothing to migrate.`);
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  if (process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT && process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT !== 'pg') {
+    console.error(
+      `This deployment pins DATABASE_CLIENT=${process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT}.\n`
+      + 'After the migration the application must run on PostgreSQL — the SQLite file is\n'
+      + 'renamed out of the way, so a restart with this setting would create a NEW, empty\n'
+      + 'SQLite database and serve that instead of your data.\n\n'
+      + 'Set DATABASE_CLIENT=pg (or remove it) in your deployment, then run this again.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  // Not a refusal: an unset NODE_ENV is exactly the state the affected installs
+  // are in, and refusing would block the people this script is for. The success
+  // marker makes the boot resolve to Postgres regardless; this just tells the
+  // operator to make it explicit.
+  if (!process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT && require('../knexfile').client !== 'pg') {
+    console.log(
+      'Note: this environment resolves to SQLite (NODE_ENV is not "production" and\n'
+      + 'DATABASE_CLIENT is unset). The migration will still complete and the marker it\n'
+      + 'writes makes the app use PostgreSQL afterwards, but set NODE_ENV=production (or\n'
+      + 'DATABASE_CLIENT=pg) so the configuration says what is actually happening.\n'
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (!process.env.DB_HOST && !process.env.DB_PASSWORD) {
+    console.error(
+      'No PostgreSQL settings found (DB_HOST / DB_PASSWORD). Set them the way the\n'
+      + 'backend does, then re-run this script inside the container.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  console.log(
+    'Stop the backend before running this. If it keeps serving while the copy runs,\n'
+    + 'anything written after the export is left behind in SQLite and becomes invisible\n'
+    + 'once the engine switches. This script checks for that afterwards and fails loudly,\n'
+    + 'but stopping the container first is the only way to be sure.\n'
+  );
+
+  const sourceData = JSON.parse(runPhase('user-data', 'sqlite3'));
+  console.log(`  source : ${sqlitePath} — ${summariseUserData(sourceData) || 'no user data'}`);
+  if (!Object.keys(sourceData).length) {
+    console.error(
+      '\nThe SQLite database holds no user data at all (no galleries, admins, customers or\n'
+      + 'accounting records). There is nothing to migrate.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  const sqliteBefore = JSON.parse(runPhase('fingerprint', 'sqlite3'));
+
+  // Read the target BEFORE creating the schema: migration 001 seeds a bootstrap
+  // admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set (common on legacy installs), and counting
+  // that as "user data" would refuse a migration into a genuinely empty
+  // database — pushing the operator towards --force for no reason.
+  const { hasMigrationInProgress, migrationInProgressPath } = require('../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+  // The retry allowance is bound to the TARGET, not just to this SQLite file:
+  // if the operator repointed DB_HOST/DB_NAME since the failed attempt, the
+  // rows in front of us belong to some other database and must not be replaced
+  // without an explicit --force.
+  const pgEnv = normalisedPgEnv();
+  const targetId = `${pgEnv.DB_HOST}:${pgEnv.DB_PORT}/${pgEnv.DB_NAME}`;
+  let retryingOwnRun = false;
+  if (hasMigrationInProgress(sqlitePath)) {
+    try {
+      const pin = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(migrationInProgressPath(sqlitePath), 'utf8'));
+      retryingOwnRun = pin.target === targetId;
+      if (!retryingOwnRun) {
+        console.log(`  (an earlier attempt targeted ${pin.target}; this run targets ${targetId})`);
+      }
+    } catch (_) {
+      retryingOwnRun = false; // unreadable pin — treat as unknown, require --force
+    }
+  }
+  const targetData = JSON.parse(runPhase('user-data', 'pg', ['--ignore-bootstrap-admins']));
+  console.log(`  target : postgres — ${summariseUserData(targetData) || 'empty'}`);
+  if (retryingOwnRun && Object.keys(targetData).length) {
+    // Whatever is in Postgres came from a previous attempt of THIS script that
+    // never completed — re-running is the documented recovery, so don't make
+    // the operator reach for a destructive-sounding flag to do it.
+    console.log('  (an earlier migration did not finish; re-running replaces what it left behind)');
+  } else if (Object.keys(targetData).length && !args.force) {
+    console.error(
+      `\nPostgreSQL already holds user data (${summariseUserData(targetData)}).\n`
+      + 'The import REPLACES every table, so this would delete it — including admins,\n'
+      + 'customers and accounting records that have no galleries attached.\n'
+      + 'Re-run with --force only if you are certain you want that data gone.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  // Pin the boot to SQLite for the duration. Everything below writes to
+  // Postgres — schema creation alone seeds a bootstrap admin when
+  // ADMIN_PASSWORD is set — and a run that dies half way would otherwise leave
+  // Postgres looking occupied enough for the next restart to switch to it.
+  const inProgress = migrationInProgressPath(sqlitePath);
+  fs.writeFileSync(inProgress, JSON.stringify({
+    started_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    target: targetId,
+  }, null, 2));
+
+  // Now build the schema — the import replaces table CONTENTS, it never creates
+  // them, and a fresh database has no tables at all.
+  //
+  // core/001_init.js writes data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt when ADMIN_PASSWORD is
+  // set, and that data directory belongs to the SOURCE install — so bootstrapping
+  // the schema would replace the operator's real credentials file with ones for
+  // a temporary admin the import then discards. Preserve it across the phase.
+  const credFile = path.join(BACKEND_ROOT, 'data', 'ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt');
+  const credBefore = fs.existsSync(credFile) ? fs.readFileSync(credFile) : null;
+  console.log('\n  Preparing PostgreSQL schema…');
+  try {
+    runPhase('migrate-schema', 'pg');
+  } finally {
+    if (credBefore !== null) fs.writeFileSync(credFile, credBefore);
+    else fs.rmSync(credFile, { force: true });
+  }
+
+  console.log('\n  Exporting rows from SQLite…');
+  const archive = runPhase('export', 'sqlite3');
+  // From here on, every exit path must remove the archive: it holds password
+  // hashes, SMTP credentials and API keys in plaintext.
+  archiveToClean = args.keepArchive ? null : archive;
+  const sizeMb = (fs.statSync(archive).size / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(1);
+  console.log(`  archive: ${archive} (${sizeMb} MB)`);
+
+  // Check BEFORE touching Postgres: if the backend wrote to SQLite while the
+  // export ran, the snapshot is already incomplete and there is no reason to
+  // load it. Bailing here leaves Postgres exactly as it was.
+  const driftDuringExport = describeDrift(sqliteBefore, JSON.parse(runPhase('fingerprint', 'sqlite3')));
+  if (driftDuringExport.length) {
+    console.error(
+      '\nSQLite CHANGED WHILE THE EXPORT RAN — the backend is still writing to it:\n'
+      + driftDuringExport.map((d) => `  ${d}`).join('\n')
+      + '\n\nNothing was loaded into Postgres, and this install stays pinned to SQLite\n'
+      + 'until a run completes. Stop the backend and run this again.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  console.log('\n  Loading into PostgreSQL…');
+  runPhase('import', 'pg', [`--archive=${archive}`]);
+
+  // And again afterwards: writes can also land while the load runs, and those
+  // rows would vanish from view the moment the engine switches.
+  const driftDuringImport = describeDrift(sqliteBefore, JSON.parse(runPhase('fingerprint', 'sqlite3')));
+  if (driftDuringImport.length) {
+    console.error(
+      '\nSQLite CHANGED WHILE THE IMPORT RAN — the backend is still writing to it:\n'
+      + driftDuringImport.map((d) => `  ${d}`).join('\n')
+      + '\n\nPostgres now holds an incomplete copy. Your SQLite data is intact and stays\n'
+      + 'the one being served — the boot is pinned to it until a run completes. Stop the\n'
+      + 'backend and run this again; the import replaces every table, so re-running is safe.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  // Row-for-row comparison of the whole database, not just galleries: every
+  // table the export carried must have arrived with the same row count.
+  const targetAfter = JSON.parse(runPhase('fingerprint', 'pg'));
+  // Only a SHORTFALL is a problem. The import legitimately adds rows of its own
+  // afterwards — setSessionsValidAfter() writes an app_settings row so tokens
+  // minted before the restore stop authenticating — and a target that gained
+  // rows has not lost anything.
+  const missing = [];
+  const gained = [];
+  const skipped = [];
+  for (const [table, src] of Object.entries(sqliteBefore)) {
+    const dst = targetAfter[table];
+    if (!dst) {
+      // SQLite-only tables exist: initializeDatabase() builds an `events_new`
+      // scratch table and, if its legacy copy throws, the catch leaves the empty
+      // table behind (db.js). The importer correctly skips tables Postgres does
+      // not have — so an ABSENT table only matters if it actually held rows.
+      // Flagging empty ones failed the whole migration after the data had
+      // already landed, leaving the install pinned to SQLite forever.
+      if (src.count > 0) missing.push(`${table}: ${src.count} rows, no such table in Postgres`);
+      else skipped.push(table);
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (dst.count < src.count) missing.push(`${table}: ${src.count} rows → ${dst.count}`);
+    else if (dst.count > src.count) gained.push(`${table}: ${src.count} → ${dst.count}`);
+  }
+  if (skipped.length) {
+    console.log(`  (empty SQLite-only tables with no Postgres counterpart, skipped: ${skipped.join(', ')})`);
+  }
+  if (gained.length) console.log(`  (rows added by the import itself: ${gained.join(', ')})`);
+  console.log(`\n  PostgreSQL now holds ${summariseUserData(JSON.parse(runPhase('user-data', 'pg')))}.`);
+
+  if (missing.length) {
+    console.error(
+      '\nROW COUNTS DO NOT MATCH — Postgres did not receive everything:\n'
+      + missing.map((m) => `  ${m}`).join('\n')
+      + '\n\nYour SQLite data is untouched and stays the one being served — the boot is\n'
+      + 'pinned to it until a run completes. Report this with the list above.'
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  // Pin the engine choice so a later "Postgres looks empty" moment can never
+  // send the install back to this now-stale file.
+  const { migrationMarkerPath } = require('../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+  const marker = migrationMarkerPath(sqlitePath);
+  const retired = `${sqlitePath}.pre-postgres-${new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, '-')}`;
+
+  // Marker FIRST, rename second. The other order has a window where a failure
+  // (a full disk, say) leaves the source renamed away with no success marker:
+  // the next run reports "No SQLite database", the in-progress pin is still
+  // there, and the operator never sees the rollback path. Writing the marker
+  // first means a failure here leaves everything exactly where it was.
+  fs.writeFileSync(marker, JSON.stringify({
+    migrated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    retired_sqlite_file: null,
+    target: targetId,
+  }, null, 2));
+
+  let retiredTo = null;
+  try {
+    fs.renameSync(sqlitePath, retired);
+    retiredTo = retired;
+    fs.writeFileSync(marker, JSON.stringify({
+      migrated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      retired_sqlite_file: retiredTo,
+      target: targetId,
+    }, null, 2));
+  } catch (err) {
+    // The marker already pins the engine to Postgres, so leaving the file in
+    // place is safe — it just is not renamed out of the way.
+    console.log(`  (could not rename the SQLite file: ${err.message} — leaving it in place)`);
+  }
+  // Success — release the pin. Order matters: the success marker exists before
+  // the pin is dropped, so no restart in between can pick the wrong engine.
+  fs.rmSync(inProgress, { force: true });
+
+  if (args.keepArchive) {
+    console.log(`  archive kept at ${archive} — it contains plaintext secrets, delete it when done`);
+  } else {
+    cleanupArchive();
+  }
+
+  console.log(`
+Done. Your data is now in PostgreSQL.
+
+  rollback copy : ${retiredTo || sqlitePath}
+  marker        : ${marker}
+
+Restart the container to pick up PostgreSQL. Keep the rollback copy until you
+have confirmed the galleries look right.
+
+To roll back, all three steps are needed — with data on both sides the boot
+picks PostgreSQL, so restoring the file alone changes nothing:
+
+  1. rm ${marker}
+  2. mv ${retiredTo || sqlitePath} ${sqlitePath}
+  3. set DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3 in your deployment
+`);
+}
+
+process.on('exit', cleanupArchive);
+
+main().catch((err) => {
+  console.error(`\nMigration failed: ${err.message}`);
+  console.error('Nothing was changed in SQLite; your data is still there.');
+  process.exit(1);
+});

backend/scripts/regenerate-thumbnails.js

@@ -1,141 +1,147 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 
 /**
- * Script to regenerate missing thumbnails for photos in the database
- * Usage: node scripts/regenerate-thumbnails.js [eventId]
+ * Fill in missing thumbnails for photos already in the database.
+ *
+ * The CLI fallback for when the admin UI is not reachable. It is deliberately
+ * "missing only": ensureThumbnail short-circuits on a thumbnail that is
+ * already present and valid, so re-running this is cheap and safe. To REBUILD
+ * everything after a settings change, use POST /api/admin/thumbnails/regenerate
+ * — that path drops the existing renditions first, which this one must not do.
+ *
+ * Resolution goes through ensureThumbnail rather than a hand-built path
+ * (#1148, same defect as #1129). This script used to compute
+ * `storage/events/active/<photo.path>` and fs.access it, a location that does
+ * not exist for `external` or `reference` rows — their originals live under
+ * the mount in events.external_path. Every such photo failed the check and was
+ * counted as an error, so on an external-media install the script was inert
+ * while reporting one error per photo.
+ *
+ * ensureThumbnail already branches on source_origin, resolves both kinds via
+ * photoResolver, uses the per-photo `ext<id>_` output name so two events
+ * referencing one NAS basename cannot clobber each other, and writes
+ * thumbnail_path back itself. Sharing it is what stops the script and the
+ * route drifting apart again.
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ *   node scripts/regenerate-thumbnails.js [eventId]
  */
 
-const path = require('path');
-const fs = require('fs').promises;
-const sharp = require('sharp');
 const { db } = require('../src/database/db');
-
-// Configuration
-const THUMBNAIL_SIZE = 300;
-const STORAGE_PATH = process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../../storage');
-const THUMBNAILS_DIR = path.join(STORAGE_PATH, 'thumbnails');
-
-async function ensureDirectoryExists(dirPath) {
-  try {
-    await fs.access(dirPath);
-  } catch {
-    await fs.mkdir(dirPath, { recursive: true });
-    console.log(`Created directory: ${dirPath}`);
-  }
-}
-
-async function generateThumbnail(photoPath, thumbnailPath) {
-  try {
-    await sharp(photoPath)
-      .resize(THUMBNAIL_SIZE, THUMBNAIL_SIZE, {
-        fit: 'cover',
-        position: 'center'
-      })
-      .jpeg({ quality: 80 })
-      .toFile(thumbnailPath);
-    
-    return true;
-  } catch (error) {
-    console.error(`Failed to generate thumbnail for ${photoPath}:`, error.message);
-    return false;
-  }
-}
+const { ensureThumbnail, isThumbnailValid } = require('../src/services/imageProcessor');
 
 async function regenerateThumbnails(eventId = null) {
-  try {
-    console.log('Starting thumbnail regeneration...');
-    console.log(`Storage path: ${STORAGE_PATH}`);
-    console.log(`Thumbnails directory: ${THUMBNAILS_DIR}`);
-    
-    // Ensure thumbnails directory exists
-    await ensureDirectoryExists(THUMBNAILS_DIR);
-    
-    // Build query
-    let query = db('photos')
-      .join('events', 'photos.event_id', 'events.id')
-      .select(
-        'photos.id',
-        'photos.filename',
-        'photos.path',
-        'photos.thumbnail_path',
-        'events.slug as event_slug'
-      );
-    
-    if (eventId) {
-      query = query.where('photos.event_id', eventId);
-      console.log(`Filtering for event ID: ${eventId}`);
-    }
-    
-    const photos = await query;
-    console.log(`Found ${photos.length} photos to process`);
-    
-    let successCount = 0;
-    let skipCount = 0;
-    let errorCount = 0;
-    
-    for (const photo of photos) {
-      const photoPath = path.join(STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', photo.path);
-      const thumbnailFilename = `thumb_${photo.filename}`;
-      const thumbnailPath = path.join(THUMBNAILS_DIR, thumbnailFilename);
-      
-      try {
-        // Check if photo file exists
-        await fs.access(photoPath);
-        
-        // Check if thumbnail already exists
-        try {
-          await fs.access(thumbnailPath);
-          console.log(`Thumbnail already exists for ${photo.filename}, skipping...`);
-          skipCount++;
-          continue;
-        } catch {
-          // Thumbnail doesn't exist, generate it
-        }
-        
-        console.log(`Generating thumbnail for ${photo.filename}...`);
-        const success = await generateThumbnail(photoPath, thumbnailPath);
-        
-        if (success) {
-          // Update database with thumbnail path
-          await db('photos')
-            .where('id', photo.id)
-            .update({
-              thumbnail_path: `thumbnails/${thumbnailFilename}`
-            });
-          
-          successCount++;
-          console.log(`✓ Generated thumbnail for ${photo.filename}`);
-        } else {
-          errorCount++;
-        }
-      } catch (error) {
-        console.error(`✗ Photo file not found: ${photoPath}`);
-        errorCount++;
-      }
-    }
-    
-    console.log('\nThumbnail regeneration complete!');
-    console.log(`- Successfully generated: ${successCount}`);
-    console.log(`- Skipped (already exist): ${skipCount}`);
-    console.log(`- Errors: ${errorCount}`);
-    console.log(`- Total processed: ${photos.length}`);
-    
-  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error during thumbnail regeneration:', error);
-    process.exit(1);
-  } finally {
-    await db.destroy();
+  console.log('Starting thumbnail regeneration...');
+
+  // These columns are what ensureThumbnail branches on to resolve a source and
+  // name its output. Selecting a subset that misses
+  // source_origin/external_relpath is how the old path bug would come back —
+  // an external row would look managed and resolve under events/active.
+  let query = db('photos').select(
+    'id', 'event_id', 'path', 'filename', 'thumbnail_path',
+    'type', 'media_type', 'mime_type', 'source_origin', 'external_relpath'
+  );
+
+  if (eventId) {
+    query = query.where('event_id', eventId);
+    console.log(`Filtering for event ID: ${eventId}`);
   }
+
+  // Skip videos. A video's thumbnail is a poster frame produced by
+  // videoProcessor, not a resize of the stored file, so handing the container
+  // to Sharp here only ever produced one error per row.
+  //
+  // Tested on every marker a video row can carry, not media_type alone:
+  // fileWatcher.processNewPhoto writes `type` and `mime_type` but never
+  // media_type, which defaults to 'image' — so an auto-imported video passes a
+  // media_type-only filter. Each clause is null-safe on its own so a row that
+  // simply has no mime_type is not swept up with them.
+  query = query
+    .where(function () {
+      this.whereNull('media_type').orWhere('media_type', '!=', 'video');
+    })
+    .where(function () {
+      this.whereNull('type').orWhere('type', '!=', 'video');
+    })
+    .where(function () {
+      this.whereNull('mime_type').orWhereNot('mime_type', 'like', 'video/%');
+    });
+
+  const photos = await query;
+  console.log(`Found ${photos.length} photos to process`);
+
+  let successCount = 0;
+  let skipCount = 0;
+  let errorCount = 0;
+
+  for (const photo of photos) {
+    const label = photo.filename || `photo ${photo.id}`;
+    try {
+      const existing = photo.thumbnail_path;
+      // Asked BEFORE the call, not inferred from the returned path afterwards.
+      // On local and external storage the key is deterministic, so repairing a
+      // missing or corrupt thumbnail hands back the identical string — and
+      // comparing paths would report that repair as "already valid", which is
+      // the one number an operator running this is actually reading.
+      const wasValid = existing ? await isThumbnailValid(existing) : false;
+      const thumbnailPath = await ensureThumbnail(photo);
+
+      if (!thumbnailPath) {
+        console.error(`✗ Could not generate thumbnail for ${label}`);
+        errorCount++;
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      if (wasValid && thumbnailPath === existing) {
+        skipCount++;
+      } else {
+        successCount++;
+        console.log(`✓ Generated thumbnail for ${label}`);
+      }
+    } catch (error) {
+      console.error(`✗ Failed for ${label}: ${error.message}`);
+      errorCount++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  console.log('\nThumbnail regeneration complete!');
+  console.log(`- Generated: ${successCount}`);
+  console.log(`- Skipped (already valid): ${skipCount}`);
+  console.log(`- Errors: ${errorCount}`);
+  console.log(`- Total processed: ${photos.length}`);
+
+  return { successCount, skipCount, errorCount };
 }
 
-// Parse command line arguments
-const eventId = process.argv[2] ? parseInt(process.argv[2]) : null;
+if (require.main === module) {
+  const args = process.argv.slice(2);
+  const eventArg = args.find((a) => !a.startsWith('--'));
+  const eventId = eventArg ? parseInt(eventArg, 10) : null;
 
-// Run the script
-regenerateThumbnails(eventId).then(() => {
-  console.log('Script completed successfully');
-  process.exit(0);
-}).catch(error => {
-  console.error('Script failed:', error);
-  process.exit(1);
-});
+  if (eventArg && !Number.isInteger(eventId)) {
+    console.error(`Not an event id: ${eventArg}`);
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  regenerateThumbnails(eventId)
+    .then(async (result) => {
+      await db.destroy();
+      // Exit status is the only thing a cron job reads. Resolving with a
+      // nonzero errorCount and still exiting 0 told automation the backfill
+      // was done when it had failed — which is how an unavailable mount stays
+      // unnoticed until someone opens a gallery.
+      if (result.errorCount) {
+        console.error(`Script completed with failures: ${result.errorCount} photo(s)`);
+        process.exit(1);
+      }
+      console.log('Script completed successfully');
+      process.exit(0);
+    })
+    .catch(async (error) => {
+      console.error('Script failed:', error);
+      await db.destroy().catch(() => {});
+      process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+
+module.exports = { regenerateThumbnails };

backend/scripts/resolve-db-engine.js

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * Prints the database client this boot should use — `pg` or `sqlite3` — for
+ * wait-for-db.sh to export as DATABASE_CLIENT (#1038).
+ *
+ * Runs BEFORE the migration step on purpose: the decision has to be made while
+ * the Postgres target is still untouched, so an install that has been
+ * unknowingly running on SQLite keeps serving from its SQLite file instead of
+ * coming up against an empty database.
+ *
+ * stdout is the client and nothing else — the caller captures it. Everything
+ * human-readable goes to stderr so it lands in the container log.
+ */
+
+const knexConfig = require('../knexfile');
+
+// Must cover every level resolveBootEngine uses. An incomplete shim threw
+// inside the conflict path, was swallowed by the catch below, and fell back to
+// the configured client — silently choosing the engine this is meant to refuse
+// to choose.
+const logger = {
+  info: (m) => process.stderr.write(`${m}\n`),
+  warn: (m) => process.stderr.write(`${m}\n`),
+  error: (m) => process.stderr.write(`${m}\n`),
+  debug: () => {},
+};
+
+// Distinct exit code for "two populated databases, no record of which is
+// current" (#1038). Callers must stop rather than pick one.
+const CONFLICT_EXIT = 3;
+
+(async () => {
+  let client = knexConfig.client;
+  try {
+    const { resolveBootEngine } = require('../src/utils/databaseEngine');
+    const decision = await resolveBootEngine({ knexConfig, logger });
+    if (decision.reason === 'ambiguous-both-populated'
+        || decision.reason === 'marker-target-mismatch') {
+      process.exit(CONFLICT_EXIT);
+    }
+    ({ client } = decision);
+  } catch (err) {
+    // Never let engine detection stop a boot: fall back to whatever knexfile
+    // resolved, which is exactly the behaviour before this script existed.
+    logger.warn(`Database engine detection failed (${err.message}); using ${client}`);
+  }
+  process.stdout.write(String(client || ''));
+  process.exit(0);
+})();

backend/scripts/set-admin-password.js

@@ -14,17 +14,14 @@ const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
 const path = require('path');
 require('dotenv').config({ path: path.join(__dirname, '../.env') });
 
-const knex = require('knex');
-const db = knex({
-  client: process.env.DB_CLIENT || 'pg',
-  connection: {
-    host: process.env.DB_HOST || 'localhost',
-    port: process.env.DB_PORT || 5432,
-    user: process.env.DB_USER || 'picpeak',
-    password: process.env.DB_PASSWORD || 'picpeak',
-    database: process.env.DB_NAME || 'picpeak_dev'
-  }
-});
+// Use the application's own connection, like every sibling script here
+// (reset-admin-password, create-admin, show-admin-credentials, reset-admin-mfa).
+// This file used to hand-roll its own knex config, which meant: it read
+// DB_CLIENT — a variable nothing else in the codebase sets — and so defaulted
+// to Postgres on SQLite installs; and it defaulted to database `picpeak_dev`,
+// a name no other component uses. Setting a password could therefore silently
+// target a different database than the one the application serves (#1038).
+const { db } = require('../src/database/db');
 
 /**
  * Validate password strength
@@ -111,8 +108,10 @@ async function setAdminPassword() {
       .where('username', 'admin')
       .update({
         password_hash: hashedPassword,
-        password_changed_at: new Date(),
-        updated_at: new Date()
+        // ISO strings, not Date objects — they round-trip on both engines, and
+        // this script now runs on SQLite installs too.
+        password_changed_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        updated_at: new Date().toISOString()
       });
 
     if (updated === 0) {

backend/server.js

@@ -4,11 +4,61 @@ require('dotenv').config();
 const { validateEnvironment } = require('./src/config/validateEnv');
 validateEnvironment();
 
+// Resolve which database engine this process should use, BEFORE anything
+// requires knexfile/db (#1038). wait-for-db.sh normally does this and exports
+// DATABASE_CLIENT, but a Kubernetes manifest that sets `command`/`args`, or a
+// plain `docker run … node server.js`, bypasses the entrypoint entirely — and
+// those are exactly the deployments this fix is for. Without this, such an
+// install would resolve to Postgres (NODE_ENV is baked into the image now) and
+// come up against an empty database while its SQLite data sat there unseen.
+//
+// spawnSync because the decision needs an async Postgres probe and this must
+// happen before the first `require` of knexfile. It short-circuits without
+// probing when DATABASE_CLIENT is already set, so the entrypoint path pays
+// nothing.
+// Also run it when a migration pin exists: an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT=pg
+// would otherwise skip the check and start against a half-migrated Postgres
+// while SQLite is still the database of record.
+if (!process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT
+    || require('./src/utils/databaseEngine').hasMigrationInProgress()) {
+  const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+  const probe = spawnSync(
+    process.execPath,
+    [require('path').join(__dirname, 'scripts', 'resolve-db-engine.js')],
+    { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'inherit'] }
+  );
+  // Exit 3: two populated databases and no record of which is authoritative.
+  // The resolver has printed the comparison and the two ways to resolve it;
+  // starting either engine would hide the other's data.
+  if (probe.status === 3) {
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  const resolved = (probe.stdout || '').trim();
+  if (probe.status === 0 && resolved) {
+    process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT = resolved;
+    // Pin the CONNECTION too, not just the client. knexfile's development block
+    // defaults Postgres to localhost/postgres/photo_sharing and production to
+    // db/picpeak/picpeak, so naming only the client can point this process at a
+    // different database than the resolver probed — with SQLite already retired.
+    if (resolved === 'pg') {
+      const conn = require('./src/utils/databaseEngine').pgConnectionFromEnv();
+      process.env.DB_HOST = String(conn.host);
+      process.env.DB_PORT = String(conn.port);
+      process.env.DB_USER = String(conn.user);
+      process.env.DB_NAME = String(conn.database);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
 // Initialize logger early to capture startup logs
 const logger = require('./src/utils/logger');
 logger.info('Server starting up', {
   nodeVersion: process.version,
   environment: process.env.NODE_ENV || 'development',
+  // Which database this process actually talks to (#1038). Nothing logged this
+  // before, so an install silently running on SQLite with Postgres configured
+  // had no way to notice.
+  database: require('./src/utils/databaseEngine').describeEngine(require('./knexfile')),
   timestamp: new Date().toISOString()
 });
 
@@ -1005,8 +1055,15 @@ async function startServer() {
     // Runs AFTER install-from-backup so a restored instance (which repopulates
     // admin_users) never prints a throwaway token. Best-effort — never blocks boot.
     let setupToken = null;
+    let setupTokenFile = null;
     try {
-      setupToken = await require('./src/services/setupService').ensureSetupToken();
+      const setupSvc = require('./src/services/setupService');
+      setupToken = await setupSvc.ensureSetupToken();
+      // The path the write ACTUALLY produced (null when it failed). existsSync
+      // on the candidate answered a different question and reported success
+      // for a stale, read-only or directory-shaped SETUP_TOKEN — suppressing
+      // the token here while pointing the operator at content that is not it.
+      setupTokenFile = setupSvc.writtenSetupTokenFile();
     } catch (err) {
       logger.warn(`[setup] ensureSetupToken skipped: ${err.message}`);
     }
@@ -1026,12 +1083,17 @@ async function startServer() {
       logger.info(`Server running on port ${PORT}`);
       logger.info(`Admin interface: ${process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}`);
       logger.info(`Frontend: ${process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3001'}`);
-      // First-run: print the one-time setup token to STDOUT (the file logger
-      // doesn't reach `docker logs`), as the last + most visible thing at boot.
+      // First-run banner. Print the TOKEN ITSELF only when the 0600 token file
+      // could not be written — otherwise this lands a live first-admin
+      // credential in `docker logs` / journald, which is the leak GHSA-r794's
+      // sweep turned up. When the file exists we point at it instead.
       if (setupToken) {
         const url = `${process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}/admin`;
         const line = '='.repeat(64);
-        console.log(`\n${line}\n  PicPeak first-run setup — no admin account yet.\n  Open:                  ${url}\n  One-time setup token:  ${setupToken}\n  (also saved to data/SETUP_TOKEN)\n${line}\n`);
+        const secretLine = setupTokenFile
+          ? `  Setup token saved to:  ${setupTokenFile}\n  (read it there — deliberately not printed)`
+          : `  One-time setup token:  ${setupToken}\n  (could not write the token file, so it is shown here)`;
+        console.log(`\n${line}\n  PicPeak first-run setup — no admin account yet.\n  Open:                  ${url}\n${secretLine}\n${line}\n`);
       }
     });
   } catch (error) {

backend/src/__tests__/publicSiteService.test.js

@@ -52,7 +52,11 @@ describe('publicSiteService', () => {
     const payload = await getPublicSitePayload({ bypassCache: true });
 
     expect(payload.enabled).toBe(true);
-    expect(payload.html).toContain('<h1>Willow & Pine Studio</h1>');
+    // Brand tokens are HTML-escaped on substitution now (GHSA-j347), so a bare
+    // `&` in the company name is emitted as the `&amp;` entity. That renders
+    // identically in a browser — it is the correctly-encoded form — but the raw
+    // payload string differs from the pre-fix output.
+    expect(payload.html).toContain('<h1>Willow &amp; Pine Studio</h1>');
     expect(payload.html).not.toContain('<script');
     expect(payload.baseCss.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
     expect(payload.branding.companyName).toBe('Willow & Pine Studio');

backend/src/middleware/apiTokenAuth.js

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 const crypto = require('crypto');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
+const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
+const { isMissingRolesSchema } = require('../utils/dbErrors');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 
 const TOKEN_PREFIX = 'pp_live_';
@@ -63,10 +65,36 @@ async function apiTokenAuth(req, res, next) {
       return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token expired', code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' });
     }
 
-    const admin = await db('admin_users')
-      .where({ id: row.created_by, is_active: true })
-      .select('id', 'username', 'email', 'role_id')
-      .first();
+    // Load the owner WITH their role name (GHSA-9697). Without it,
+    // req.admin.roleName was undefined — and every ownership check keys on
+    // roleName — so the v1 surface could not tell a super_admin from a
+    // demoted viewer. Mirrors adminAuth's shape, including the
+    // roles-table-missing fallback used during upgrades.
+    let admin;
+    try {
+      admin = await db('admin_users')
+        .leftJoin('roles', 'roles.id', 'admin_users.role_id')
+        .where({ 'admin_users.id': row.created_by, 'admin_users.is_active': formatBoolean(true) })
+        .select(
+          'admin_users.id',
+          'admin_users.username',
+          'admin_users.email',
+          'roles.id as role_id',
+          'roles.name as role_name'
+        )
+        .first();
+    } catch (joinError) {
+      // Fail CLOSED on anything that isn't a genuinely missing roles schema:
+      // the fallback fabricates super_admin, so a transient query failure must
+      // not become a free privilege upgrade. Rethrow → outer catch → 500.
+      if (!isMissingRolesSchema(joinError)) throw joinError;
+      logger.debug('Roles table not available in apiTokenAuth', { error: joinError.message });
+      admin = await db('admin_users')
+        .where({ id: row.created_by, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
+        .select('id', 'username', 'email', 'role_id')
+        .first();
+      if (admin) admin.role_name = 'super_admin'; // upgrade-path parity with adminAuth
+    }
     if (!admin) {
       return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token owner unavailable', code: 'OWNER_INACTIVE' });
     }
@@ -75,7 +103,15 @@ async function apiTokenAuth(req, res, next) {
     db('api_tokens').where({ id: row.id }).update({ last_used_at: new Date() })
       .catch((err) => logger.debug('api_tokens last_used update failed', { err: err.message }));
 
-    req.admin = admin;
+    // Same shape adminAuth produces, so requirePermission / ownership helpers
+    // behave identically whether the caller used a session or an API token.
+    req.admin = {
+      id: admin.id,
+      username: admin.username,
+      email: admin.email,
+      roleId: admin.role_id,
+      roleName: admin.role_name
+    };
     req.apiToken = {
       id: row.id,
       name: row.name,
@@ -118,6 +154,7 @@ module.exports = {
   generateApiToken,
   hashToken,
   parseScopes,
+  isMissingRolesSchema,
   TOKEN_PREFIX,
   VALID_SCOPES
 };

backend/src/middleware/auth.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
+const { isMissingRolesSchema } = require('../utils/dbErrors');
 const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { getAdminTokenFromRequest, getGalleryTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
@@ -75,6 +76,14 @@ async function adminAuth(req, res, next) {
         )
         .first();
     } catch (joinError) {
+      // Fail CLOSED on anything that isn't a genuinely missing roles schema:
+      // the fallback below fabricates super_admin, so a transient query failure
+      // (connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout, pool exhaustion) must
+      // not become a free privilege upgrade for every scoped admin. Rethrow →
+      // outer catch → 401, which is already how a transient DB fault in this
+      // try block behaves (isTokenRevoked hits the DB here). apiTokenAuth takes
+      // the same posture on the v1 surface, differing only in its 500.
+      if (!isMissingRolesSchema(joinError)) throw joinError;
       // Fallback: roles table may not exist yet during upgrade
       // Query without role join - user will have no role info but can still authenticate
       logger.debug('Roles table not available, falling back to basic auth', { error: joinError.message });

backend/src/middleware/ownership.js

@@ -32,6 +32,20 @@ function requireEventOwnership(req, res, next) {
     });
 }
 
+/**
+ * Apply the ownership predicate to a knex query over `events`, for list
+ * endpoints that can't use requireEventOwnership (no :id to check).
+ * super_admin is unrestricted; everyone else sees ownerless (legacy/system)
+ * events plus their own — the same rule requireEventOwnership enforces
+ * per-row.
+ */
+function scopeEventsQuery(query, admin, column = 'created_by') {
+  if (admin?.roleName === 'super_admin') {
+    return query;
+  }
+  return query.where((q) => q.whereNull(column).orWhere(column, admin.id));
+}
+
 /**
  * Return the subset of `eventIds` the admin may act on, mirroring
  * requireEventOwnership for bulk routes that can't use it (they take an
@@ -64,4 +78,88 @@ async function filterOwnedEventIds(admin, eventIds) {
   return { allowed, denied };
 }
 
-module.exports = { requireEventOwnership, filterOwnedEventIds };
+/**
+ * Knex subquery selecting the ids of projects `admin` may act on, or `null`
+ * when the caller is unrestricted (GHSA-wrg5).
+ *
+ * Rules, in priority order:
+ *   1. A project's STORED owner is authoritative. If `projects.created_by` is
+ *      set to a live admin, only that admin (and super_admin) may act on it.
+ *      Earlier this union'd in "any linked event I can see", which meant one
+ *      legacy ownerless event inside another admin's project exposed the whole
+ *      project — its other events, invoices and emails — through the overview.
+ *   2. Only when there is NO usable stored owner (NULL, or pointing at a
+ *      deleted admin) do we derive from linked events, and then EVERY linked
+ *      event must be accessible: a project the old unrestricted routes filled
+ *      with several admins' events is ambiguous, and migration 167 deliberately
+ *      leaves those NULL. Granting on "any" would have made exactly those
+ *      mixed projects readable by everyone.
+ *   3. A project with no usable owner AND no linked events (an orphan — not
+ *      creatable since createProject stamps created_by) stays super_admin-only.
+ *      Failing closed beats failing open; a super_admin can reassign it.
+ *
+ * Returned as a subquery so callers avoid materialising an id list.
+ */
+function ownedProjectsSubquery(admin) {
+  if (admin?.roleName === 'super_admin') return null;
+
+  const linkedEvents = () => db('events').select(db.raw('1')).whereRaw('events.project_id = projects.id');
+
+  return db('projects').select('projects.id').where((w) => {
+    w.where('projects.created_by', admin.id)
+      .orWhere((noOwner) => {
+        noOwner
+          // No usable stored owner: NULL, or a creator that no longer exists
+          // (hard-deleted admin) — otherwise that project would be locked away
+          // from everyone but super_admin forever.
+          .where((c) => c
+            .whereNull('projects.created_by')
+            .orWhereNotIn('projects.created_by', db('admin_users').select('id')))
+          .whereExists(linkedEvents())
+          .whereNotExists(
+            linkedEvents().whereNotNull('events.created_by').whereNot('events.created_by', admin.id),
+          );
+      });
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Materialised form of ownedProjectsSubquery, for callers that need the ids
+ * themselves. `null` = unrestricted.
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<number[]|null>}
+ */
+async function ownedProjectIds(admin) {
+  const sub = ownedProjectsSubquery(admin);
+  if (sub === null) return null;
+  const rows = await sub;
+  return rows.map((r) => Number(r.id));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Middleware enforcing ownedProjectIds() on a :id project route. 404 (not 403)
+ * on a foreign project so the endpoint isn't an existence oracle — same
+ * posture filterOwnedEventIds takes for foreign-vs-missing ids.
+ */
+function requireProjectOwnership(req, res, next) {
+  const sub = ownedProjectsSubquery(req.admin);
+  if (sub === null) return next();
+  const projectId = Number(req.params.id);
+  sub.clone()
+    .where('projects.id', projectId)
+    .first()
+    .then((row) => {
+      if (!row) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Project not found' });
+      next();
+    })
+    .catch(() => res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to verify project ownership' }));
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  requireEventOwnership,
+  filterOwnedEventIds,
+  scopeEventsQuery,
+  ownedProjectIds,
+  ownedProjectsSubquery,
+  requireProjectOwnership,
+};

backend/src/middleware/photoAuth.js

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const { getGalleryTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
+const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 
 async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
@@ -89,7 +90,33 @@ async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
         
         // Check if it's an admin token (admins can view all photos)
         if (decoded.type === 'admin') {
-          // For both thumbnails and photos with admin token, allow access
+          // Enforce the same revocation / session-cutoff invalidation that
+          // adminAuth does — otherwise a validly-signed admin JWT keeps
+          // serving photos after logout, password change, or explicit
+          // revocation (GHSA-x55x).
+          if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
+            return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session expired' });
+          }
+          // adminAuth also (a) rejects tokens for a now-deactivated admin and
+          // (b) rejects any token minted before the admin's last password
+          // change. Token revocation alone doesn't cover those, so without
+          // these two checks a stale or pre-password-change admin token still
+          // fetches every photo.
+          const admin = await db('admin_users')
+            .where({ id: decoded.id, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
+            .select('id', 'password_changed_at')
+            .first();
+          if (!admin) {
+            return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session expired' });
+          }
+          if (admin.password_changed_at) {
+            const passwordChangedSeconds = Math.floor(
+              new Date(admin.password_changed_at).getTime() / 1000
+            );
+            if (decoded.iat < passwordChangedSeconds) {
+              return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session expired' });
+            }
+          }
           return next();
         }
     } catch (err) {

backend/src/routes/adminApiTokens.js

@@ -19,7 +19,10 @@ const router = express.Router();
 // the plaintext, never recoverable after creation.
 router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req, res) => {
   try {
-    const tokens = await db('api_tokens')
+    // Scope to the caller's own tokens unless super_admin — the previous
+    // query returned every admin's token metadata (name/preview/scopes/
+    // owner) to any settings.view holder (GHSA-jm7j).
+    const tokensQuery = db('api_tokens')
       .leftJoin('admin_users', 'admin_users.id', 'api_tokens.created_by')
       .select(
         'api_tokens.id',
@@ -33,6 +36,10 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req, res)
         'admin_users.username as owner_username'
       )
       .orderBy('api_tokens.created_at', 'desc');
+    if (req.admin.roleName !== 'super_admin') {
+      tokensQuery.where('api_tokens.created_by', req.admin.id);
+    }
+    const tokens = await tokensQuery;
     res.json(tokens);
   } catch (error) {
     logger.error('Failed to list API tokens', { error: error.message });
@@ -101,6 +108,12 @@ router.delete('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (req,
     const { id } = req.params;
     const row = await db('api_tokens').where({ id }).first();
     if (!row) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Token not found' });
+    // Only the token's owner (or a super_admin) may revoke it — otherwise
+    // any settings.edit holder could revoke another admin's tokens
+    // (GHSA-gprq). 404 rather than 403 so a non-owner can't probe token ids.
+    if (req.admin.roleName !== 'super_admin' && row.created_by !== req.admin.id) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Token not found' });
+    }
     if (row.revoked_at) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Token already revoked' });
 
     await db('api_tokens').where({ id }).update({ revoked_at: new Date() });

backend/src/routes/adminAuth.js

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ const { endSession } = require('../middleware/sessionTimeout');
 const { validatePasswordStrength } = require('../utils/passwordGenerator');
 const { handleAsync, validateRequest, successResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { NotFoundError, ConflictError, ValidationError } = require('../utils/errors');
-const { setAdminAuthCookie } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
+const { setAdminAuthCookie, clearAdminAuthCookie } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
 const { IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL } = require('../utils/emailNormalization');
 const mfaService = require('../services/mfaService');
 const router = express.Router();
@@ -168,12 +168,21 @@ router.post('/change-password', [
 
 // Logout
 router.post('/logout', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
-  // Get token from header
-  const token = req.headers.authorization?.split(' ')[1];
+  // Use the token adminAuth actually authenticated with (req.token) — it may
+  // have come from the admin_token cookie, not the Authorization header. The
+  // old header-only read skipped revocation entirely for cookie-based logout,
+  // leaving the JWT valid until expiry while reporting a successful logout.
+  const token = req.token;
   if (token) {
-    // End the session
+    // End the in-memory session AND revoke the JWT (GHSA-cjqh) — the token
+    // is otherwise valid until expiry, so photoAuth/adminAuth would keep
+    // honouring it after logout. isTokenRevoked() checks this store.
     endSession(token);
+    const { revokeToken } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
+    await revokeToken(token, 'logout');
   }
+  // Clear the auth cookie so the browser stops sending the (now revoked) JWT.
+  clearAdminAuthCookie(res);
 
   // Log activity
   await logActivity('admin_logout',

backend/src/routes/adminBackup.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 const express = require('express');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
-const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
+const { requirePermission, requireSuperAdmin } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { clearAdminAuthCookie } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
 const { revokeToken } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
 const { triggerManualBackup, getBackupStatus, cleanupOldBackupRuns, getBackupManifest, validateBackupManifest } = require('../services/backupService');
@@ -57,14 +57,33 @@ router.put('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req,
         }
         break;
       case 's3':
-        if (!updates.backup_s3_endpoint || !updates.backup_s3_bucket || 
+        if (!updates.backup_s3_endpoint || !updates.backup_s3_bucket ||
               !updates.backup_s3_access_key || !updates.backup_s3_secret_key) {
           return res.status(400).json({ error: 'S3 backup requires endpoint, bucket, and credentials' });
         }
         break;
       }
     }
-    
+
+    // SSRF: validate an S3 endpoint whenever one is supplied — NOT only when
+    // the payload also flips backup_destination_type to 's3'. The PUT
+    // persists every backup_* field independently, so with S3 already
+    // selected a caller could PATCH just backup_s3_endpoint to a
+    // private-resolving host; the management ops (manifest, bucket/file
+    // browse, cleanup, test-upload) then connect without going through
+    // testConnection. Prod-only; dev points at localhost MinIO deliberately.
+    if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'
+        && updates.backup_s3_endpoint && updates.backup_s3_endpoint !== '••••••••') {
+      const rawEndpoint = updates.backup_s3_endpoint;
+      const withProto = /^https?:\/\//.test(rawEndpoint) ? rawEndpoint : `https://${rawEndpoint}`;
+      let epHost = null;
+      try { epHost = new URL(withProto).hostname; } catch { epHost = null; }
+      const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+      if (!epHost || !(await isHostAllowed(epHost))) {
+        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'S3 endpoint resolves to a private or internal network address' });
+      }
+    }
+
     // Update settings
     for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(updates)) {
       if (key.startsWith('backup_')) {
@@ -139,7 +158,12 @@ router.post('/run', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, r
 // SECURITY: the file contains plaintext secrets (SMTP password, admin password
 // hashes, API keys). The download UI must warn before offering it. We surface
 // the flag as a response header too so the client can double-confirm.
-router.get('/picpeak/export', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
+// Full-instance export dumps every table unredacted — bcrypt password
+// hashes, 2FA columns, and all integration secrets (SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/
+// webhook/S3) in cleartext. The built-in `admin` role holds backup.create,
+// but is denied this data everywhere else (config APIs mask secrets as
+// ********). Gate the raw dump behind super_admin (GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v).
+router.get('/picpeak/export', adminAuth, requireSuperAdmin(), async (req, res) => {
   const fsSync = require('fs');
   try {
     const includePhotos = req.query.includePhotos === 'true' || req.query.includePhotos === '1';
@@ -216,6 +240,7 @@ router.post('/picpeak/import', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.restore'), p
       tables: result.tables,
       filesRestored: result.filesRestored,
       usesExternalMedia: result.usesExternalMedia,
+      crossEngine: result.crossEngine,
       sessionInvalidated: true,
     });
   } catch (error) {
@@ -351,9 +376,11 @@ router.post('/test-connection', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), a
         break;
       }
 
-      // SSRF protection: block connections to private/internal addresses
-      const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-      if (isPrivateIP(host)) {
+      // SSRF protection: resolve the host and block any private/internal
+      // address. ssh does its own DNS at connect time, so a literal-only
+      // check let a hostname resolving to an internal IP through (#GHSA-4jh8).
+      const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+      if (!(await isHostAllowed(host))) {
         res.json({ success: false, message: 'Host cannot be a private or internal network address' });
         break;
       }

backend/src/routes/adminBusinessProfile.js

@@ -249,33 +249,84 @@ router.get(
     const brandingLogoUrl  = await getAppSetting('branding_logo_url');
     const resolved = await resolveLogoFile(profile);
 
+    // GHSA-29vm: report candidates RELATIVE to the storage roots rather than
+    // echoing absolute container paths and process.cwd(). This endpoint exists
+    // to answer "which candidate did/didn't exist", which relative paths answer
+    // just as well without handing out the filesystem layout.
+    const cwdStorage = path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage');
+    const relativise = (p) => {
+      for (const [name, root] of [['STORAGE', storageRoot], ['CWD_STORAGE', cwdStorage]]) {
+        const rel = path.relative(root, p);
+        if (rel && !rel.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(rel)) {
+          return `<${name}>/${rel.split(path.sep).join('/')}`;
+        }
+      }
+      return path.basename(p);
+    };
+
     const inspect = (label, raw) => {
       const value = (raw || '').toString().trim();
       if (!value) return { label, value: null, candidates: [] };
       const stripped = value.replace(/^\/+/, '');
       const baseName = path.basename(value);
+      // Mirrors resolveLogoFile's candidate list EXACTLY. It keeps the raw
+      // absolute value as a candidate (multer stores branding_logo_path
+      // absolute) and lets the storage-root containment filter reject it when
+      // it points outside — so the diagnostic must include it too, or a
+      // legitimately-contained absolute logo shows every candidate as missing
+      // while resolvedTo names the file.
+      // The stripped joins (`<ROOT>/<value-minus-leading-slash>`) are gated on
+      // containment, NOT on path.isAbsolute(). isAbsolute() cannot tell a
+      // multer disk path from a root-relative URL like `/custom/logo.png`, and
+      // for the URL form `<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png` is a file the resolver
+      // genuinely returns — skipping it made this endpoint report "no source
+      // candidate exists" about a logo that renders fine.
+      //
+      // The gate is instead: does the raw value ALREADY resolve inside a
+      // storage root? If so it is a real disk path, the raw candidate below
+      // covers it, and the stripped join would only produce a double-prefixed
+      // path that can never exist while re-embedding the absolute path
+      // GHSA-29vm exists to stop echoing (redact() strips only the leading
+      // root, so the inner one would survive).
+      const valueInsideRoot = path.isAbsolute(value) && [
+        path.resolve(storageRoot), path.resolve(cwdStorage),
+      ].some((root) => {
+        const r = path.resolve(value);
+        return r === root || r.startsWith(root + path.sep);
+      });
+      const strippedJoins = valueInsideRoot
+        ? []
+        : [path.join(storageRoot, stripped), path.join(cwdStorage, stripped)];
       const candidates = [
-        path.isAbsolute(value) ? value : null,
-        path.join(storageRoot, stripped),
+        ...(path.isAbsolute(value) ? [value] : []),
+        ...strippedJoins,
         path.join(storageRoot, 'uploads', 'logos', baseName),
         path.join(storageRoot, 'branding', baseName),
-        path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', stripped),
-        path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'uploads', 'logos', baseName),
-        path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'branding', baseName),
-      ].filter(Boolean);
+        path.join(cwdStorage, 'uploads', 'logos', baseName),
+        path.join(cwdStorage, 'branding', baseName),
+      ];
+      const roots = [path.resolve(storageRoot), path.resolve(cwdStorage)];
+      const contained = candidates.filter((c) => {
+        const r = path.resolve(c);
+        return roots.some((root) => r === root || r.startsWith(root + path.sep));
+      });
       return {
-        label, value,
-        candidates: [...new Set(candidates)].map((p) => ({
-          path: p,
+        label,
+        // GHSA-29vm: branding_logo_path is stored absolute by multer, so
+        // echoing it back handed out the filesystem layout just as the
+        // candidate paths did. Relativise it the same way.
+        value: path.isAbsolute(value) ? relativise(value) : value,
+        candidates: [...new Set(contained)].map((p) => ({
+          path: relativise(p),
           exists: (() => { try { return fs.existsSync(p) && fs.statSync(p).isFile(); } catch { return false; } })(),
         })),
       };
     };
 
     return successResponse(res, {
-      storageRoot,
-      cwd: process.cwd(),
-      resolvedTo: resolved,
+      // Absolute storageRoot / cwd deliberately omitted (GHSA-29vm); the
+      // candidate paths below are shown relative to <STORAGE>/<CWD_STORAGE>.
+      resolvedTo: resolved ? relativise(resolved) : null,
       sources: [
         inspect('business_profile.logo_path', profile?.logo_path),
         inspect('app_settings.branding_logo_path', brandingDiskPath),

backend/src/routes/adminCategories.js

@@ -141,8 +141,18 @@ router.put('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
         .trim()
     };
 
-    // Update hero_photo_id if provided (including null to clear it)
+    // Update hero_photo_id if provided (including null to clear it). A
+    // non-null hero must belong to this category (GHSA-j2f4) — the general
+    // update path previously wrote it with no membership check at all.
     if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(req.body, 'hero_photo_id')) {
+      if (hero_photo_id) {
+        const heroPhoto = await db('photos')
+          .where({ id: hero_photo_id, category_id: id })
+          .first();
+        if (!heroPhoto) {
+          return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found in this category' });
+        }
+      }
       updateData.hero_photo_id = hero_photo_id || null;
     }
 
@@ -192,11 +202,16 @@ router.put('/:id/hero', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
       return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Category not found' });
     }
 
-    // If hero_photo_id is provided, verify it belongs to a photo in this category
+    // If hero_photo_id is provided, verify the photo actually belongs to
+    // THIS category — checking existence alone let an admin point a
+    // category's hero at a photo from a different category or event
+    // (GHSA-j2f4).
     if (hero_photo_id) {
-      const photo = await db('photos').where('id', hero_photo_id).first();
+      const photo = await db('photos')
+        .where({ id: hero_photo_id, category_id: id })
+        .first();
       if (!photo) {
-        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found in this category' });
       }
     }
 

backend/src/routes/adminCustomers.js

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ const { body, param, query } = require('express-validator');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { requireFeatureFlag } = require('../middleware/requireFeatureFlag');
+const { filterOwnedEventIds } = require('../middleware/ownership');
+const { db } = require('../database/db');
 
 // Hour-entry routes are gated by the hoursLogging master so a direct API hit
 // can't read/edit/delete/bill logged hours while the feature is off (the
@@ -528,9 +530,45 @@ router.put('/:id/events', [
   body('event_ids.*').isInt({ min: 1 }),
 ], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
   validateRequest(req);
+  const customerId = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
+  const submitted = req.body.event_ids.map(Number);
+
+  // The customer's CURRENT assignments. The "Manage galleries" dialog submits
+  // the full initial list back — including any events owned by OTHER admins —
+  // so we need this to tell "retain an existing foreign assignment" apart from
+  // "newly grant a foreign event".
+  const existingEventIds = (await db('event_customer_assignments')
+    .where('customer_account_id', customerId)
+    .pluck('event_id')).map(Number);
+  const existingSet = new Set(existingEventIds);
+
+  // Events the caller may act on (GHSA-xr6x). A denied id is only acceptable
+  // when the customer ALREADY has that assignment (a foreign event the caller
+  // is merely keeping); a denied id that isn't already assigned is a fresh
+  // attempt to mint access to a foreign/nonexistent event → reject.
+  const { allowed } = await filterOwnedEventIds(req.admin, submitted);
+  const allowedSet = new Set(allowed.map(Number));
+  const illegalNew = submitted.filter((id) => !allowedSet.has(id) && !existingSet.has(id));
+  if (illegalNew.length) {
+    return res.status(403).json({ error: 'One or more events are not yours to assign' });
+  }
+
+  // setAssignmentsForCustomer replaces the FULL assignment list, deleting any
+  // existing row not in the submitted set. A restricted admin must not be able
+  // to revoke another admin's customer↔event links that way, so always retain
+  // the customer's existing assignments to events the caller does NOT own —
+  // regardless of whether the client echoed them back. super_admin owns
+  // everything, so nothing is force-preserved for them.
+  let finalEventIds = allowed.map(Number);
+  if (req.admin.roleName !== 'super_admin' && existingEventIds.length) {
+    const { allowed: ownedExisting } = await filterOwnedEventIds(req.admin, existingEventIds);
+    const ownedExistingSet = new Set(ownedExisting.map(Number));
+    const foreignExisting = existingEventIds.filter((id) => !ownedExistingSet.has(id));
+    finalEventIds = [...new Set([...finalEventIds, ...foreignExisting])];
+  }
   const result = await customerAccountsService.setAssignmentsForCustomer(
-    parseInt(req.params.id, 10),
-    req.body.event_ids,
+    customerId,
+    finalEventIds,
     req.admin.id,
   );
   successResponse(res, result);

backend/src/routes/adminDashboard.js

@@ -24,11 +24,47 @@ function normaliseDateKey(value) {
   return String(value).slice(0, 10);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Event ids the caller's dashboard may aggregate over, or `null` when the
+ * caller is unrestricted (GHSA-c2jj / gqx7 / jhcf).
+ *
+ * These endpoints are gated only by `analytics.view`, which the `editor` role
+ * holds — yet the events *list* restricts editors to their own rows
+ * (adminEvents/crud.js: `roleName === 'editor'` → `created_by = admin.id`).
+ * The dashboard therefore reported instance-wide totals, and the analytics
+ * endpoint returned other admins' gallery names and slugs, to a role that
+ * cannot see those events anywhere else.
+ *
+ * Scoped on `editor` specifically to mirror the events list exactly, so the
+ * `admin` role's dashboard is unchanged. (`filterOwnedEventIds` uses the
+ * broader `!== super_admin` rule; the two conventions disagree in this
+ * codebase and matching the list is the no-regression choice.)
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<number[]|null>} ids to restrict to, or null for no limit
+ */
+function isScopedAdmin(admin) {
+  return admin?.roleName === 'editor';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Restrict `query` to the caller's own events.
+ *
+ * Uses a SUBQUERY rather than materialising the id list. An editor owning more
+ * events than the driver's bind-parameter limit (~999 on SQLite, 65535 on
+ * Postgres) would otherwise blow past it once every id became a placeholder,
+ * turning all three dashboard endpoints into 500s — and even well below that
+ * limit the whole list was re-sent for each of the ~10 aggregates per request.
+ */
+function applyEventScope(query, admin, column) {
+  if (!isScopedAdmin(admin)) return query;
+  return query.whereIn(column, db('events').select('id').where('created_by', admin.id));
+}
+
 // Get dashboard statistics
 router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req, res) => {
   try {
     // Get active events count
-    const activeEvents = await db('events')
+    const activeEvents = await applyEventScope(db('events'), req.admin, 'id')
       .where('is_active', formatBoolean(true))
       .where('is_archived', formatBoolean(false))
       .count('id as count')
@@ -39,7 +75,7 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
     sevenDaysFromNow.setDate(sevenDaysFromNow.getDate() + 7);
     const now = new Date();
     
-    const expiringEvents = await db('events')
+    const expiringEvents = await applyEventScope(db('events'), req.admin, 'id')
       .where('is_active', formatBoolean(true))
       .where('is_archived', formatBoolean(false))
       .where('expires_at', '<=', sevenDaysFromNow.toISOString())
@@ -48,12 +84,12 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
       .first();
 
     // Get total photos count
-    const totalPhotos = await db('photos')
+    const totalPhotos = await applyEventScope(db('photos'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .count('id as count')
       .first();
 
     // Get storage usage (sum of all photo sizes)
-    const storageUsed = await db('photos')
+    const storageUsed = await applyEventScope(db('photos'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .sum('size_bytes as total')
       .first();
 
@@ -61,21 +97,21 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
     const thirtyDaysAgo = new Date();
     thirtyDaysAgo.setDate(thirtyDaysAgo.getDate() - 30);
     
-    const totalViews = await db('access_logs')
+    const totalViews = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .where('action', 'view')
       .where('timestamp', '>=', thirtyDaysAgo.toISOString())
       .count('id as count')
       .first();
 
     // Get total downloads (last 30 days) - include both single and bulk downloads
-    const totalDownloads = await db('access_logs')
+    const totalDownloads = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all', 'download_all_presigned', 'download_selected'])
       .where('timestamp', '>=', thirtyDaysAgo.toISOString())
       .count('id as count')
       .first();
 
     // Get archived events count
-    const archivedEvents = await db('events')
+    const archivedEvents = await applyEventScope(db('events'), req.admin, 'id')
       .where('is_archived', formatBoolean(true))
       .count('id as count')
       .first();
@@ -83,7 +119,7 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
     // Get total events count (all events regardless of status) — used by the
     // events list page to render accurate "All (N)" / Total Events counters
     // when the table is server-paginated (#346).
-    const totalEvents = await db('events')
+    const totalEvents = await applyEventScope(db('events'), req.admin, 'id')
       .count('id as count')
       .first();
 
@@ -91,14 +127,14 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
     const sixtyDaysAgo = new Date();
     sixtyDaysAgo.setDate(sixtyDaysAgo.getDate() - 60);
     
-    const previousViews = await db('access_logs')
+    const previousViews = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .where('action', 'view')
       .where('timestamp', '>=', sixtyDaysAgo.toISOString())
       .where('timestamp', '<', thirtyDaysAgo.toISOString())
       .count('id as count')
       .first();
 
-    const previousDownloads = await db('access_logs')
+    const previousDownloads = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all', 'download_all_presigned', 'download_selected'])
       .where('timestamp', '>=', sixtyDaysAgo.toISOString())
       .where('timestamp', '<', thirtyDaysAgo.toISOString())
@@ -136,9 +172,19 @@ router.get('/activity', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (r
   try {
     const { limit } = getPagination(req, { limit: 10 });
 
-    const activities = await db('activity_logs')
-      .select('activity_logs.*', 'events.event_name')
-      .leftJoin('events', 'activity_logs.event_id', 'events.id')
+    // Scope the feed to the caller's own events (GHSA-jhcf) — it otherwise
+    // returned every admin's actions, including actor names and verbatim
+    // metadata. `activity_logs.event_id` is NULLABLE: system-level entries
+    // (logins, settings changes) carry no event, and those are deliberately
+    // EXCLUDED for a scoped caller rather than shown, since they are exactly
+    // the cross-admin actions this advisory is about.
+    const activities = await applyEventScope(
+      db('activity_logs')
+        .select('activity_logs.*', 'events.event_name')
+        .leftJoin('events', 'activity_logs.event_id', 'events.id'),
+      req.admin,
+      'activity_logs.event_id'
+    )
       .orderBy('activity_logs.created_at', 'desc')
       .limit(limit);
 
@@ -244,7 +290,7 @@ router.get('/health', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
 router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req, res) => {
   try {
     const days = sanitizeDays(req.query.days || 7);
-    
+
     // Generate date range
     const dates = [];
     for (let i = days - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
@@ -262,21 +308,21 @@ router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (
     const startDateStr = startDate.toISOString();
 
     // Get views per day
-    const viewsData = await db('access_logs')
+    const viewsData = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .select(db.raw('DATE(timestamp) as date'), db.raw('COUNT(*) as count'))
       .where('action', 'view')
       .where('timestamp', '>=', startDateStr)
       .groupByRaw('DATE(timestamp)');
 
     // Get downloads per day - include both single and bulk downloads
-    const downloadsData = await db('access_logs')
+    const downloadsData = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .select(db.raw('DATE(timestamp) as date'), db.raw('COUNT(*) as count'))
       .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all', 'download_all_presigned', 'download_selected'])
       .where('timestamp', '>=', startDateStr)
       .groupByRaw('DATE(timestamp)');
 
     // Get unique visitors per day
-    const visitorsData = await db('access_logs')
+    const visitorsData = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .select(db.raw('DATE(timestamp) as date'), db.raw('COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) as count'))
       .where('timestamp', '>=', startDateStr)
       .groupByRaw('DATE(timestamp)');
@@ -303,7 +349,7 @@ router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (
     });
 
     // Get top galleries by views with additional metrics
-    const topGalleries = await db('access_logs')
+    const topGalleries = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'access_logs.event_id')
       .select('events.id', 'events.event_name', 'events.slug')
       .select(db.raw('COUNT(CASE WHEN action = \'view\' THEN 1 END) as views'))
       .select(db.raw('COUNT(DISTINCT CASE WHEN action = \'view\' THEN ip_address END) as uniqueVisitors'))
@@ -324,7 +370,10 @@ router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (
     let devices = { desktop: 0, mobile: 0, tablet: 0 };
     let devicesSource = 'access_logs';
 
-    const adapter = await resolveAdapter();
+    // The external tracker reports instance-wide device data with no way to
+    // filter it by event, so a scoped caller must not receive it (GHSA-gqx7).
+    // They fall through to the access_logs heuristic, which IS scoped.
+    const adapter = isScopedAdmin(req.admin) ? null : await resolveAdapter();
     if (adapter) {
       try {
         const trackerDevices = await adapter.fetchDeviceBreakdown({
@@ -346,7 +395,7 @@ router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (
       // Local heuristic on access_logs user_agent. Coarse — `LIKE` doesn't
       // cover every UA shape (some Android browsers, embedded webviews, etc.)
       // — and counts come back as strings on Postgres, hence Number() below.
-      const deviceData = await db('access_logs')
+      const deviceData = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
         .select(
           db.raw(`
             CASE
@@ -370,19 +419,19 @@ router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (
     }
 
     // Calculate totals for the period (matching /stats logic)
-    const totalViews = await db('access_logs')
+    const totalViews = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .where('action', 'view')
       .where('timestamp', '>=', startDateStr)
       .count('id as count')
       .first();
 
-    const totalDownloadsCount = await db('access_logs')
+    const totalDownloadsCount = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all', 'download_all_presigned', 'download_selected'])
       .where('timestamp', '>=', startDateStr)
       .count('id as count')
       .first();
 
-    const totalUniqueVisitors = await db('access_logs')
+    const totalUniqueVisitors = await applyEventScope(db('access_logs'), req.admin, 'event_id')
       .where('timestamp', '>=', startDateStr)
       .countDistinct('ip_address as count')
       .first();

backend/src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup.js

@@ -123,8 +123,20 @@ router.post('/backup', requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
       trackingUrl: '/api/admin/database-backup/progress'
     });
     
-    // Run backup in background
-    databaseBackupService.backup(req.body).catch(error => {
+    // Forward ONLY the real backup knobs (GHSA-jw8m). Passing req.body
+    // straight through let the caller set `destinationPath`, which the
+    // service merges over its config — so a backup.create holder (the
+    // `admin` role, which has neither settings.edit nor backup.restore)
+    // could dump the whole database into the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
+    // and fetch it unauthenticated, hashes and encrypted SMTP creds included.
+    // destinationPath is not a persistable setting; the request body was its
+    // only source, so dropping it here costs no legitimate behaviour.
+    const body = req.body || {};
+    const options = {};
+    for (const key of ['compress', 'validateIntegrity', 'includeChecksums']) {
+      if (body[key] !== undefined) options[key] = body[key];
+    }
+    databaseBackupService.backup(options).catch(error => {
       logger.error('Manual database backup failed:', error);
     });
   } catch (error) {

backend/src/routes/adminDev.js

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
  */
 
 const express = require('express');
+const { getStoragePath } = require('../config/storage');
 const { body } = require('express-validator');
 const path = require('path');
 const fs = require('fs');
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ router.get(
 );
 
 const FRONTEND_URL_FALLBACK = 'https://app.example.com';
-const DEV_TEST_DIR = () => path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'business-docs', 'dev-test');
+const DEV_TEST_DIR = () => path.join(getStoragePath(), 'business-docs', 'dev-test');
 
 function fakeMoney(major, currency, locale = 'de') {
   return new Intl.NumberFormat(locale === 'de' ? 'de-CH' : 'en-GB', {

backend/src/routes/adminEmail.js

@@ -66,9 +66,11 @@ router.post('/config', [
       tls_reject_unauthorized
     } = req.body;
 
-    // Validate SMTP host is not a private/internal address (SSRF protection)
-    const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-    if (isPrivateIP(smtp_host)) {
+    // Validate SMTP host is not a private/internal address (SSRF protection).
+    // Resolves DNS so a public-looking hostname pointing at an internal IP
+    // is caught, not just literal private addresses (#GHSA-ch64).
+    const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+    if (!(await isHostAllowed(smtp_host))) {
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'SMTP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
     }
 
@@ -152,8 +154,8 @@ router.post('/incoming-config', [
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
     const { imap_host, imap_port, imap_secure, imap_user, imap_pass, imap_folder } = req.body;
-    const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-    if (isPrivateIP(imap_host)) {
+    const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+    if (!(await isHostAllowed(imap_host))) {
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
     }
     const existing = await db('email_configs').first();
@@ -183,8 +185,8 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/folders', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view
   try {
     const { imap_host, imap_port, imap_secure, imap_user, imap_pass } = req.body || {};
     if (imap_host) {
-      const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-      if (isPrivateIP(imap_host)) {
+      const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+      if (!(await isHostAllowed(imap_host))) {
         return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
       }
     }
@@ -205,8 +207,8 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/test', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'),
   try {
     const { imap_host, imap_port, imap_secure, imap_user, imap_pass, imap_folder } = req.body || {};
     if (imap_host) {
-      const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-      if (isPrivateIP(imap_host)) {
+      const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+      if (!(await isHostAllowed(imap_host))) {
         return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
       }
     }
@@ -385,11 +387,11 @@ router.post('/accounts', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.edit
     if (!b.account_key) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'account_key is required' });
     // SSRF guard — mirror /config + /incoming-config: neither the IMAP nor the
     // SMTP host may point at a private/internal address.
-    const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-    if (b.imap_host && isPrivateIP(b.imap_host)) {
+    const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+    if (b.imap_host && !(await isHostAllowed(b.imap_host))) {
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
     }
-    if (b.smtp_host && isPrivateIP(b.smtp_host)) {
+    if (b.smtp_host && !(await isHostAllowed(b.smtp_host))) {
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'SMTP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
     }
     const patch = {
@@ -434,8 +436,8 @@ router.post('/accounts', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.edit
 router.post('/accounts/test', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
   try {
     const b = req.body || {};
-    const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-    if (b.imap_host && isPrivateIP(b.imap_host)) {
+    const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+    if (b.imap_host && !(await isHostAllowed(b.imap_host))) {
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
     }
     let pass = b.imap_pass;

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/crud.js

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ const path = require('path');
 const { escapeLikePattern } = require('../../utils/sqlSecurity');
 const { validatePasswordInContext, getBcryptRounds } = require('../../utils/passwordValidation');
 const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
+const { sanitizeForLog, sanitizeValidationErrors } = require('../../utils/sanitizeForLog');
 const { errorResponse } = require('../../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { buildShareLinkVariants } = require('../../services/shareLinkService');
 const { parseBooleanInput } = require('../../utils/parsers');
@@ -126,10 +127,13 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     body('customer_account_ids.*').optional().isInt({ min: 1 })
   ], async (req, res) => {
     try {
-      logger.debug('Create event request body', { body: req.body });
+      // Redact credentials — the body carries the gallery password (GHSA-r794).
+      logger.debug('Create event request body', { body: sanitizeForLog(req.body) });
       const errors = validationResult(req);
       if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-        logger.error('Validation errors:', errors.array());
+        // errors.array() embeds the SUBMITTED value per field — including a
+        // rejected plaintext password (GHSA-r794).
+        logger.error('Validation errors:', sanitizeValidationErrors(errors.array()));
         return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
       }
 
@@ -1263,12 +1267,59 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     try {
       const errors = validationResult(req);
       if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
-        logger.debug('Update event validation errors', { errors: errors.array(), body: req.body });
+        // Redact credentials — an invalid update still logs the whole body (GHSA-pgmp).
+        logger.debug('Update event validation errors', { errors: sanitizeValidationErrors(errors.array()), body: sanitizeForLog(req.body) });
         return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
       }
 
       const { id } = req.params;
       const updates = { ...req.body };
+
+      // Strip identity/provenance/secret columns from the mass-assigned
+      // body (GHSA-3rqx). The handler spreads req.body straight into the
+      // events UPDATE, so without this an events.edit holder could rewrite
+      // ownership (created_by), routing identity (slug/share_link), the
+      // share/client tokens, or the password hashes directly. Plaintext
+      // `password`/`client_password` inputs are NOT stripped — those are the
+      // supported way to change credentials and get hashed below; the
+      // tokens are regenerated internally where needed.
+      // The handler spreads req.body straight into the events UPDATE, so any
+      // column an events.edit holder names is writable unless blocked here.
+      // This is a COMPLETE deny-set of every server-managed / permission-gated
+      // events column (enumerated from the schema); everything else is a
+      // legitimate edit-form field and passes through, including input-only
+      // keys (password/client_password) the handler transforms below. New
+      // server-managed columns MUST be added here. (codex review — GHSA-3rqx.)
+      const IMMUTABLE_EVENT_COLUMNS = [
+        // Identity / provenance
+        'id', 'created_by', 'created_at', 'updated_at', 'slug',
+        // Routing + share/client tokens (generated at create / internally)
+        'share_link', 'share_token', 'client_share_token', 'show_share_token',
+        // Secrets (set via the plaintext password/client_password inputs)
+        'password_hash', 'client_password_hash',
+        // Server-consumed file paths — e.g. DELETE /:id/logo fs.unlink()s
+        // hero_logo_path, so a forged value is an arbitrary-delete primitive.
+        'hero_logo_path', 'hero_logo_url', 'archive_path', 'download_zip_path',
+        // Server-managed timestamps
+        'download_zip_generated_at', 'archived_at', 'revealed_at', 'event_reminder_sent_at',
+        // Lifecycle — governed by dedicated permission-gated routes
+        // (events.archive/restore, publish, activate/deactivate), not events.edit.
+        'is_archived', 'is_draft', 'is_active',
+        // Relationships — managed by projectService.assignEvent + its
+        // customer-consistency checks, and events.edit ≠ quotes/contracts perms.
+        'project_id', 'quote_id',
+        // Legacy mirrors — rejected explicitly below in favour of customer_*.
+        'host_name', 'host_email',
+      ];
+      // Case-insensitive match: SQLite treats quoted identifiers
+      // case-insensitively, so a `{ "Password_Hash": ... }` key would
+      // otherwise survive a case-sensitive delete and still hit the real
+      // column (codex review).
+      const denied = new Set(IMMUTABLE_EVENT_COLUMNS.map((c) => c.toLowerCase()));
+      for (const key of Object.keys(updates)) {
+        if (denied.has(key.toLowerCase())) delete updates[key];
+      }
+
       const customerColumnsAvailable = await hasCustomerContactColumns();
 
       if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, 'host_name') || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, 'host_email')) {
@@ -1395,9 +1446,12 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
       }
 
       // Log the update request for debugging
+      // `updates` no longer holds the plaintext password (stripped above), but
+      // it still carries client_password_hash and — when regenerate_client_token
+      // was passed — a LIVE client_share_token bearer credential.
       logger.debug('Update event request', {
         id,
-        updates,
+        updates: sanitizeForLog(updates),
         color_theme_length: updates.color_theme ? updates.color_theme.length : 0,
         color_theme_type: typeof updates.color_theme,
         hero_photo_id: updates.hero_photo_id,
@@ -1497,10 +1551,15 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         }
       }
 
-      // Update event
-      await db('events')
-        .where('id', id)
-        .update(updates);
+      // Update event. Skip the write when the denylist (or masked secrets)
+      // left nothing to change — Knex rejects .update({}) with an error,
+      // which would surface as a 500 for an otherwise-valid no-op request
+      // (e.g. a body of only protected fields). (codex review.)
+      if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
+        await db('events')
+          .where('id', id)
+          .update(updates);
+      }
 
       // Customer-account assignments (#354). Same skip semantics as POST:
       // ignore when the customer portal flag is off so stale tabs don't

backend/src/routes/adminFeedback.js

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 const express = require('express');
+const { neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula } = require('../utils/spreadsheetSafe');
 const router = express.Router();
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
@@ -164,6 +165,24 @@ router.get('/events/:eventId/feedback',
   }
 );
 
+// Ownership guard for by-feedback-id routes (GHSA-2qc2 / GHSA-32h4). These
+// take a :feedbackId (not :eventId), so requireEventOwnership can't apply —
+// resolve the feedback's event and enforce the same rule (super_admin sees
+// all; others need to own the event, or it's ownerless/legacy). Returns
+// false and sends a 404 (not 403 — don't leak which feedback ids exist)
+// when the caller may not act on it.
+async function assertOwnsFeedback(req, res, feedbackId) {
+  if (req.admin.roleName === 'super_admin') return true;
+  const fb = await db('photo_feedback').where('id', feedbackId).first('event_id');
+  if (!fb) { res.status(404).json({ error: 'Feedback not found' }); return false; }
+  const event = await db('events').where('id', fb.event_id).first('created_by');
+  if (event && event.created_by && event.created_by !== req.admin.id) {
+    res.status(404).json({ error: 'Feedback not found' });
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
 // Moderate feedback (approve/hide/reject)
 router.put('/feedback/:feedbackId/:action',
   adminAuth,
@@ -171,11 +190,12 @@ router.put('/feedback/:feedbackId/:action',
   async (req, res) => {
     try {
       const { feedbackId, action } = req.params;
-      
+
       if (!['approve', 'hide', 'reject'].includes(action)) {
         return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid action' });
       }
-      
+      if (!(await assertOwnsFeedback(req, res, feedbackId))) return;
+
       await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(feedbackId, action, req.admin.id);
       
       res.json({ success: true });
@@ -193,7 +213,8 @@ router.delete('/feedback/:feedbackId',
   async (req, res) => {
     try {
       const { feedbackId } = req.params;
-      
+      if (!(await assertOwnsFeedback(req, res, feedbackId))) return;
+
       await feedbackService.deleteFeedback(feedbackId, req.admin.id);
       
       res.json({ success: true });
@@ -347,7 +368,15 @@ router.get('/feedback/pending-moderation',
   requirePermission('events.view'),
   async (req, res) => {
     try {
-      const pending = await feedbackService.getPendingModeration();
+      // Scope to the caller's owned events unless super_admin (GHSA-3335).
+      let ownedEventIds = null;
+      if (req.admin.roleName !== 'super_admin') {
+        const rows = await db('events')
+          .where((q) => q.whereNull('created_by').orWhere('created_by', req.admin.id))
+          .select('id');
+        ownedEventIds = rows.map((r) => r.id);
+      }
+      const pending = await feedbackService.getPendingModeration(null, ownedEventIds);
       res.json(pending);
     } catch (error) {
       logger.error('Error getting pending moderation:', error);
@@ -450,11 +479,13 @@ function convertToCSV(data) {
       const value = row[header];
       if (value === null || value === undefined) return '';
       if (typeof value === 'boolean') return value ? 'yes' : 'no';
-      if (typeof value === 'string'
-        && (value.includes(',') || value.includes('"') || value.includes('\n') || value.includes('\r'))) {
-        return `"${value.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`;
+      // Formula-neutralize user-controlled cells (guest_name/comment_text)
+      // before quoting — quoting alone doesn't stop `=cmd()` (GHSA-3cw3).
+      const neutralized = neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula(value);
+      if (neutralized.includes(',') || neutralized.includes('"') || neutralized.includes('\n') || neutralized.includes('\r')) {
+        return `"${neutralized.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`;
       }
-      return value;
+      return neutralized;
     }).join(',');
   });
 

backend/src/routes/adminGuests.js

@@ -39,8 +39,13 @@ function serializeGuest(row) {
   };
 }
 
+const { neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula } = require('../utils/spreadsheetSafe');
+
 function escapeCsvCell(value) {
-  const str = value == null ? '' : String(value);
+  // Neutralize spreadsheet formulas FIRST (a `=cmd()` guest name executes on
+  // open — RFC-4180 quoting doesn't stop it), then quote-wrap (GHSA-wc99 /
+  // GHSA-f4fp).
+  const str = neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula(value);
   if (/[,"\n\r]/.test(str)) {
     return `"${str.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`;
   }

backend/src/routes/adminImageSecurity.js

@@ -502,6 +502,15 @@ router.get('/export', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
 /**
  * Helper function to convert data to CSV
  */
+const { neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula } = require('../utils/spreadsheetSafe');
+
+function csvCell(value) {
+  // Formula-neutralize, then RFC-4180 quote (the previous join('') did
+  // neither — GHSA-37p4).
+  const s = neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula(value);
+  return /[,"\n\r]/.test(s) ? `"${s.replace(/"/g, '""')}"` : s;
+}
+
 function convertToCSV(data) {
   // Simplified CSV conversion for security logs
   const headers = ['timestamp', 'event_type', 'client_ip', 'details'];
@@ -511,8 +520,8 @@ function convertToCSV(data) {
     log.client_ip,
     JSON.stringify(log.details || {})
   ]);
-  
-  return [headers.join(','), ...rows.map(row => row.join(','))].join('\n');
+
+  return [headers.join(','), ...rows.map(row => row.map(csvCell).join(','))].join('\n');
 }
 
 module.exports = router;

backend/src/routes/adminInvoices.js

@@ -894,6 +894,7 @@ router.get(
     // re-fetching here keeps the route a thin shim over the
     // service rather than reaching inside its internals.
     const { buildPdfFilename } = require('../utils/pdfFilename');
+    const { buildContentDisposition } = require('../utils/filenameSanitizer');
     const inv = await db('invoices').where({ id }).first();
     const customer = inv ? await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: inv.customer_account_id }).first() : null;
     const filename = buildPdfFilename({
@@ -902,7 +903,7 @@ router.get(
       fallback: `invoice-${id}`,
     });
     res.set('Content-Type', 'application/pdf');
-    res.set('Content-Disposition', `inline; filename="${filename}"`);
+    res.set('Content-Disposition', buildContentDisposition(filename, 'inline'));
     res.send(buf);
   })
 );
@@ -919,6 +920,7 @@ router.post(
     // the customer so the filename still reflects who the invoice
     // is for; the number segment falls back to "invoice-preview".
     const { buildPdfFilename } = require('../utils/pdfFilename');
+    const { buildContentDisposition } = require('../utils/filenameSanitizer');
     const customer = payload.customerAccountId
       ? await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: payload.customerAccountId }).first()
       : null;
@@ -928,7 +930,7 @@ router.post(
       fallback: 'invoice-preview',
     });
     res.set('Content-Type', 'application/pdf');
-    res.set('Content-Disposition', `inline; filename="${filename}"`);
+    res.set('Content-Disposition', buildContentDisposition(filename, 'inline'));
     res.send(buf);
   })
 );

backend/src/routes/adminPhotos.js

@@ -315,9 +315,10 @@ router.post('/:eventId/upload', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), r
     const crypto = require('crypto');
     const uploadId = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
 
-    // Counter base — same approximation as before. Strict uniqueness is
-    // already enforced by the filename template + DB unique index, so a
-    // small race here just retries a counter on conflict (rare).
+    // Counter base — a per-request approximation (concurrent upload
+    // requests can compute the same base; there is NO unique index on
+    // photos.filename). Uniqueness of the final path comes from the
+    // random suffix inside generatePhotoFilename (#931).
     const existingCount = await db('photos')
       .where({ event_id: eventId, type: photoType })
       .count('id as count')
@@ -756,6 +757,16 @@ router.patch('/:eventId/photos/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.e
       .where({ id: photoId, event_id: eventId })
       .update(updateData);
 
+    // A visibility or category change alters which photos belong in the
+    // guest download bundle — drop the cached ZIP so it rebuilds fresh,
+    // otherwise a hide→unhide cycle can leave the stale cache omitting
+    // photos added in between (codex review).
+    if (updateData.visibility !== undefined
+        || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updateData, 'category_id')
+        || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updateData, 'type')) {
+      downloadZipService.invalidate(parseInt(eventId, 10));
+    }
+
     // Fetch and return the updated photo
     const updatedPhoto = await db('photos')
       .where({ id: photoId, event_id: eventId })
@@ -904,6 +915,14 @@ router.post('/:eventId/photos/bulk-update', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos
       .where('event_id', eventId)
       .update(updateData);
 
+    // Visibility/category changes alter the guest download bundle — drop the
+    // cached ZIP so it rebuilds fresh (codex review).
+    if (updateData.visibility !== undefined
+        || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updateData, 'category_id')
+        || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updateData, 'type')) {
+      downloadZipService.invalidate(parseInt(eventId, 10));
+    }
+
     res.json({ message: `${photoIds.length} photos updated successfully` });
   } catch (error) {
     errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update photos');
@@ -1091,7 +1110,13 @@ router.get('/:eventId/photos', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view'), requ
         average_rating: photo.average_rating || 0,
         comment_count: commentMap[photo.id] || 0,
         like_count: photo.like_count || 0,
-        favorite_count: photo.favorite_count || 0
+        favorite_count: photo.favorite_count || 0,
+        // Engagement counters (#895 follow-up): the grid reads these, but
+        // this explicit mapper never included them — so the Engagement
+        // column showed 0 regardless of what the DB counted. This, not
+        // stale data, was why per-image downloads always displayed 0.
+        view_count: photo.view_count || 0,
+        download_count: photo.download_count || 0
       }))
     });
   } catch (error) {
@@ -1126,7 +1151,65 @@ router.get('/:eventId/photo/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view
     const event = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
     const storageKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(event, photo);
 
-    res.setHeader('Content-Type', `image/${path.extname(photo.filename).slice(1)}`);
+    // Content-Type resolution (#908 + external review). Invariant: the
+    // header is ALWAYS image/* or video/*.
+    //  - photos.mime_type is never echoed verbatim unless it is a video/
+    //    type: the chunked-upload path stores the client-sent MIME
+    //    unvalidated, so a stored text/html served inline under the app
+    //    origin would be a same-origin XSS gift.
+    //  - Images ignore the stored value entirely — migration 039
+    //    backfilled image/jpeg onto every legacy row (PNGs included), so
+    //    the extension is the more trustworthy signal; normalized via the
+    //    shared map (image/jpg → image/jpeg), jpeg fallback when unknown.
+    //  - Videos prefer a stored video/ type, then the extension map
+    //    (.mov → video/quicktime, .webm → video/webm, …), then video/mp4.
+    //    The old ext-derived image/<ext> (image/mp4) is what made the
+    //    admin player's blob unplayable (#908).
+    const { EXTENSION_TO_MIME } = require('../services/uploadSettings');
+    const ext = path.extname(photo.filename).slice(1).toLowerCase();
+    // Own-property lookup (review): a client-controlled filename ending in
+    // .constructor / .__proto__ / .toString would otherwise return an
+    // inherited Object.prototype member, and the extMime.startsWith below
+    // would throw — a permanent 500 for that photo instead of the fallback.
+    const extMime = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(EXTENSION_TO_MIME, ext)
+      ? EXTENSION_TO_MIME[ext]
+      : null;
+    // Full-token validation, not just a prefix check: the stored value is
+    // client-controlled, and header-invalid characters (video/mp4\r\nX: y)
+    // would make setHeader throw — a permanent 500 for that photo. Bare
+    // 'video/' is equally invalid; both fall back to the extension map.
+    const storedVideoMime = photo.mime_type && /^video\/[\w.+-]+$/.test(photo.mime_type)
+      ? photo.mime_type
+      : null;
+    // Honor a stored image MIME for any header-safe RASTER type (#908
+    // review): the S3 auto-importer accepts arbitrary image/* from
+    // mime-types and stores it (avif/bmp/tiff/heic/apng/ico/jxl/…), and a
+    // hand-listed allowlist kept missing formats. Allow image/<token> but
+    // NEVER the scriptable svg / *+xml family (image/svg+xml executes
+    // inline). The strict token + anchors also block header injection
+    // (image/x\r\nY:). Migration 039's blanket image/jpeg backfill on
+    // legacy rows is why the mapped extension still wins ahead of this.
+    const storedImageMime =
+      photo.mime_type &&
+      /^image\/[\w.+-]+$/.test(photo.mime_type) &&
+      !/^image\/svg|xml/i.test(photo.mime_type)
+        ? photo.mime_type
+        : null;
+    const isVideo = photo.media_type === 'video' ||
+      Boolean(storedVideoMime) ||
+      Boolean(extMime && extMime.startsWith('video/'));
+    // Never interpolate the raw extension on the image side: it would
+    // synthesize image/svg+xml (scriptable inline) or header-invalid values
+    // from client-controlled chunked-upload filenames. Precedence is
+    // mapped-extension (also corrects the 039 legacy-jpeg backfill on PNGs)
+    // -> safe stored raster MIME (auto-imported avif/bmp/tiff) -> image/jpeg.
+    // A stored type outside the allowlist degrades to image/jpeg; browsers
+    // sniff image bytes in <img>/blob contexts, so a mislabel is harmless
+    // where an injected type is not.
+    const contentType = isVideo
+      ? storedVideoMime || (extMime && extMime.startsWith('video/') ? extMime : null) || 'video/mp4'
+      : (extMime && extMime.startsWith('image/') ? extMime : null) || storedImageMime || 'image/jpeg';
+    res.setHeader('Content-Type', contentType);
     res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'private, max-age=3600');
     res.setHeader('Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy', 'cross-origin');
 

backend/src/routes/adminProjects.js

@@ -15,8 +15,32 @@ const { requirePermission, userHasAnyPermission } = require('../middleware/permi
 const { handleAsync, validateRequest, successResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const projectService = require('../services/projectService');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
+const { ownedProjectsSubquery, requireProjectOwnership, filterOwnedEventIds } = require('../middleware/ownership');
+const { ForbiddenError } = require('../utils/errors');
 
 const router = express.Router();
+
+// A deal that spans both quotes and contracts cascades a project link across
+// BOTH tables (projectService.linkDealToProject). So attaching one document
+// must also require manage permission on the OTHER domain the cascade will
+// touch — otherwise quotes.manage alone could re-point a linked contract, and
+// vice versa (GHSA-v4vw / codex review). No-op when the deal touches only the
+// one domain, or on older instances without the deal_uuid column.
+async function assertCascadePermitted(req, docTable, docId, otherTable, otherPerm) {
+  let doc;
+  try {
+    doc = await db(docTable).where({ id: docId }).first('deal_uuid');
+  } catch { return; }
+  if (!doc || !doc.deal_uuid) return;
+  let linked;
+  try {
+    linked = await db(otherTable).where({ deal_uuid: doc.deal_uuid }).first('id');
+  } catch { return; }
+  if (!linked) return;
+  if (!(await userHasAnyPermission(req.admin.id, [otherPerm]))) {
+    throw new ForbiddenError(`This deal also links a ${otherTable.replace(/s$/, '')}; the ${otherPerm} permission is required`);
+  }
+}
 router.use(adminAuth);
 
 // Projects is feature-flagged like bills/quotes — when off, the whole cockpit
@@ -42,10 +66,15 @@ router.get('/', requirePermission('events.view'), handleAsync(async (req, res) =
     bills: await userHasAnyPermission(req.admin.id, ['bills.view']),
     quotes: await userHasAnyPermission(req.admin.id, ['quotes.view']),
   };
+  // Only the caller's projects (GHSA-wrg5). Passed as a SUBQUERY so a large
+  // project count can't hit the driver's bind-parameter limit; null means
+  // unrestricted.
+  const projectIds = ownedProjectsSubquery(req.admin);
   const projects = await projectService.listProjects({
     search: req.query.q || '',
     status: req.query.status || null,
     perms,
+    projectIds,
   });
   return successResponse(res, { projects });
 }));
@@ -65,7 +94,7 @@ router.post('/',
 );
 
 // Detail
-router.get('/:id', requirePermission('events.view'), [param('id').isInt({ min: 1 })], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+router.get('/:id', requirePermission('events.view'), requireProjectOwnership, [param('id').isInt({ min: 1 })], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
   validateRequest(req);
   const project = await projectService.getProjectById(parseInt(req.params.id, 10));
   if (!project) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Project not found' });
@@ -75,6 +104,7 @@ router.get('/:id', requirePermission('events.view'), [param('id').isInt({ min: 1
 // Update
 router.put('/:id',
   requirePermission('events.edit'),
+  requireProjectOwnership,
   [
     param('id').isInt({ min: 1 }),
     body('name').optional().isString().trim().isLength({ min: 1, max: 255 }),
@@ -96,50 +126,98 @@ router.put('/:id',
 // Attach an event to the project
 router.post('/:id/events',
   requirePermission('events.edit'),
+  requireProjectOwnership,
   [param('id').isInt({ min: 1 }), body('eventId').isInt({ min: 1 })],
   handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
     validateRequest(req);
-    const result = await projectService.assignEvent(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), parseInt(req.body.eventId, 10));
+    const eventId = parseInt(req.body.eventId, 10);
+    // Both sides must be the caller's (GHSA-wrg5): requireProjectOwnership
+    // covers the project, this covers the INCOMING event. Otherwise an editor
+    // could pull a foreign event into a project they own and then read that
+    // event's rolled-up documents through /:id/overview.
+    const { denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(req.admin, [eventId]);
+    if (denied.length) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'That event is not yours to attach' });
+    }
+    const result = await projectService.assignEvent(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), eventId);
     return successResponse(res, result, 200, 'Event attached to project');
   }),
 );
 
 // Attach a quote to the project (quotes carry no event_id — migration 121).
+// Requires quotes.manage in addition to events.edit — attaching a quote
+// mutates a separately-permissioned document domain (GHSA-v4vw).
 router.post('/:id/quotes',
-  requirePermission('events.edit'),
+  requirePermission(['events.edit', 'quotes.manage'], { requireAll: true }),
+  requireProjectOwnership,
   [param('id').isInt({ min: 1 }), body('quoteId').isInt({ min: 1 })],
   handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
     validateRequest(req);
-    const result = await projectService.assignQuote(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), parseInt(req.body.quoteId, 10));
+    const quoteId = parseInt(req.body.quoteId, 10);
+    await assertCascadePermitted(req, 'quotes', quoteId, 'contracts', 'contracts.manage');
+    const result = await projectService.assignQuote(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), quoteId, req.admin);
     return successResponse(res, result, 200, 'Quote attached to project');
   }),
 );
 
-// Attach a contract to the project.
+// Attach a contract to the project. Requires contracts.manage in addition
+// to events.edit (GHSA-v4vw).
 router.post('/:id/contracts',
-  requirePermission('events.edit'),
+  requirePermission(['events.edit', 'contracts.manage'], { requireAll: true }),
+  requireProjectOwnership,
   [param('id').isInt({ min: 1 }), body('contractId').isInt({ min: 1 })],
   handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
     validateRequest(req);
-    const result = await projectService.assignContract(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), parseInt(req.body.contractId, 10));
+    const contractId = parseInt(req.body.contractId, 10);
+    await assertCascadePermitted(req, 'contracts', contractId, 'quotes', 'quotes.manage');
+    const result = await projectService.assignContract(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), contractId, req.admin);
     return successResponse(res, result, 200, 'Contract attached to project');
   }),
 );
 
 // The cockpit aggregation — doc types gated on the admin's own permissions
-router.get('/:id/overview', requirePermission('events.view'), [param('id').isInt({ min: 1 })], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+router.get('/:id/overview', requirePermission('events.view'), requireProjectOwnership, [param('id').isInt({ min: 1 })], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
   validateRequest(req);
   const perms = {
     bills: await userHasAnyPermission(req.admin.id, ['bills.view']),
     quotes: await userHasAnyPermission(req.admin.id, ['quotes.view']),
     contracts: await userHasAnyPermission(req.admin.id, ['contracts.view']),
   };
-  const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), perms);
+  const overview = await projectService.getProjectOverview(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), perms, req.admin);
   return successResponse(res, overview);
 }));
 
+/**
+ * These routes key on an `email_queue` id alone (GHSA-93x4) — nothing tied the
+ * row to a project or event the caller can see, so any admin holding
+ * `events.view` / `email.send` could preview, resend, cancel or retry ANY
+ * queued mail on the instance by walking ids.
+ *
+ * Scoped via `email_queue.event_id` → the caller's owned events. `event_id` is
+ * NULL for CRM document mail (quote/contract/invoice sends carry no event), and
+ * those rows have no ownable parent here, so a scoped caller is denied them
+ * rather than guessed into access. 404, not 403, so this isn't an id oracle.
+ */
+async function requireOwnedQueuedEmail(req, res, next) {
+  try {
+    if (req.admin?.roleName === 'super_admin') return next();
+    const emailId = parseInt(req.params.emailId, 10);
+    const row = await db('email_queue').where({ id: emailId }).first('event_id');
+    if (!row || !row.event_id) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Email not found' });
+    }
+    const { denied } = await filterOwnedEventIds(req.admin, [row.event_id]);
+    if (denied.length) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Email not found' });
+    }
+    return next();
+  } catch (err) {
+    return next(err);
+  }
+}
+
 // Email preview — the ACTUAL sent HTML (or null for pre-rendered_html rows)
-router.get('/email/:emailId/preview', requirePermission('events.view'), [param('emailId').isInt({ min: 1 })], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
+router.get('/email/:emailId/preview', requirePermission('events.view'), [param('emailId').isInt({ min: 1 })], requireOwnedQueuedEmail, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
   validateRequest(req);
   const preview = await projectService.getEmailPreview(parseInt(req.params.emailId, 10));
   return successResponse(res, preview);
@@ -152,9 +230,9 @@ const emailAction = (fn) => handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
   const result = await projectService[fn](parseInt(req.params.emailId, 10), req.admin.id);
   return successResponse(res, result);
 });
-router.post('/email/:emailId/resend',   requirePermission('email.send'), [param('emailId').isInt({ min: 1 })], emailAction('resendEmail'));
-router.post('/email/:emailId/cancel',    requirePermission('email.send'), [param('emailId').isInt({ min: 1 })], emailAction('cancelEmail'));
-router.post('/email/:emailId/retry',     requirePermission('email.send'), [param('emailId').isInt({ min: 1 })], emailAction('retryEmail'));
-router.post('/email/:emailId/send-now',  requirePermission('email.send'), [param('emailId').isInt({ min: 1 })], emailAction('sendEmailNow'));
+router.post('/email/:emailId/resend',   requirePermission('email.send'), [param('emailId').isInt({ min: 1 })], requireOwnedQueuedEmail, emailAction('resendEmail'));
+router.post('/email/:emailId/cancel',    requirePermission('email.send'), [param('emailId').isInt({ min: 1 })], requireOwnedQueuedEmail, emailAction('cancelEmail'));
+router.post('/email/:emailId/retry',     requirePermission('email.send'), [param('emailId').isInt({ min: 1 })], requireOwnedQueuedEmail, emailAction('retryEmail'));
+router.post('/email/:emailId/send-now',  requirePermission('email.send'), [param('emailId').isInt({ min: 1 })], requireOwnedQueuedEmail, emailAction('sendEmailNow'));
 
 module.exports = router;

backend/src/routes/adminQuotes.js

@@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ router.get(
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
     const buf = await quoteService.renderQuotePdfBuffer(id);
     const { buildPdfFilename } = require('../utils/pdfFilename');
+    const { buildContentDisposition } = require('../utils/filenameSanitizer');
     const quote = await db('quotes').where({ id }).first();
     const customer = quote ? await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: quote.customer_account_id }).first() : null;
     const filename = buildPdfFilename({
@@ -545,7 +546,7 @@ router.get(
       fallback: `quote-${id}`,
     });
     res.set('Content-Type', 'application/pdf');
-    res.set('Content-Disposition', `inline; filename="${filename}"`);
+    res.set('Content-Disposition', buildContentDisposition(filename, 'inline'));
     res.send(buf);
   })
 );
@@ -559,6 +560,7 @@ router.post(
     const payload = mapPayloadToService(req.body);
     const buf = await quoteService.renderQuotePdfFromPayload(payload);
     const { buildPdfFilename } = require('../utils/pdfFilename');
+    const { buildContentDisposition } = require('../utils/filenameSanitizer');
     const customer = payload.customerAccountId
       ? await db('customer_accounts').where({ id: payload.customerAccountId }).first()
       : null;
@@ -568,7 +570,7 @@ router.post(
       fallback: 'quote-preview',
     });
     res.set('Content-Type', 'application/pdf');
-    res.set('Content-Disposition', `inline; filename="${filename}"`);
+    res.set('Content-Disposition', buildContentDisposition(filename, 'inline'));
     res.send(buf);
   })
 );

backend/src/routes/adminRestore.js

@@ -91,6 +91,12 @@ router.post('/validate', requirePermission('backup.restore'), [
   }
 
   try {
+    // Constrain the caller-supplied paths to configured backup roots (GHSA-fw4c)
+    const pathError = await checkRestorePathsAllowed(req.body);
+    if (pathError) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: pathError });
+    }
+
     // Transform S3 config from frontend format
     const s3Config = transformS3Config(req.body);
 
@@ -165,6 +171,12 @@ router.post('/start', requirePermission('backup.restore'), [
       });
     }
 
+    // Constrain the caller-supplied paths to configured backup roots (GHSA-fw4c)
+    const pathError = await checkRestorePathsAllowed(req.body);
+    if (pathError) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: pathError });
+    }
+
     // Check permissions for dangerous options
     const settings = await getRestoreSettings();
     if (req.body.force && !settings.restore_allow_force) {
@@ -759,4 +771,67 @@ async function getBackupConfig() {
   return config;
 }
 
+/**
+ * GHSA-fw4c: `source` and `manifestPath` were validated only as "not empty"
+ * before being handed to the privileged restore engine, which reads them,
+ * parses the manifest and executes the referenced SQL against the live
+ * database. Constrain them to the operator-configured backup locations.
+ *
+ * The allowlist is the SAME set the restore wizard discovers from
+ * (`backup_destination_path` + `backup_manifest_path`), so the disaster-
+ * recovery flow is untouched: an operator restoring from a rescued mount
+ * already has to point those settings at it for the backup to be listed.
+ * RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS (colon-separated) is an escape hatch for unusual
+ * layouts. S3 sources are URLs, not paths, and are validated elsewhere.
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<string|null>} an error message, or null when acceptable
+ */
+// `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE, not a path: the restore wizard posts
+// 'local' | 's3' | 'upload' and restoreService.restore() branches on those
+// literals before deriving an actual directory (see its comment at the
+// `options.source === 'local'` branch). Treating them as paths resolved
+// 'local' to <cwd>/local, failed containment, and 400'd the entire normal
+// restore workflow — so type tokens are excluded from the path check.
+const SOURCE_TYPE_TOKENS = ['local', 's3', 'upload'];
+
+async function checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source, manifestPath }) {
+  const isS3 = (v) => typeof v === 'string' && v.startsWith('s3://');
+  const isTypeToken = (v) => typeof v === 'string'
+    && SOURCE_TYPE_TOKENS.includes(v.trim().toLowerCase());
+  const candidates = [source, manifestPath]
+    .filter((v) => v && !isS3(v) && !isTypeToken(v));
+  if (candidates.length === 0) return null;
+
+  const config = await getBackupConfig();
+  const roots = [];
+  if (config.backup_destination_path) roots.push(config.backup_destination_path);
+  if (config.backup_manifest_path) roots.push(config.backup_manifest_path);
+  for (const extra of (process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS || '').split(':')) {
+    if (extra.trim()) roots.push(extra.trim());
+  }
+  if (roots.length === 0) {
+    // Nothing configured to compare against — a restore can't be scoped, so
+    // don't pretend to enforce. Discovery would find nothing either.
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const resolvedRoots = roots.map((r) => path.resolve(r));
+  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+    const resolved = path.resolve(candidate);
+    const inside = resolvedRoots.some(
+      (root) => resolved === root || resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep)
+    );
+    if (!inside) {
+      logger.warn('Refusing restore path outside the configured backup roots', {
+        candidate, roots,
+      });
+      return 'Backup source and manifest path must be inside a configured backup location';
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
 module.exports = router;
+// Exposed for tests: the source/manifestPath containment rules (GHSA-fw4c) are
+// worth pinning directly, especially the source-TYPE-token carve-out.
+module.exports._internal = { checkRestorePathsAllowed, SOURCE_TYPE_TOKENS };

backend/src/routes/adminSystem.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const path = require('path');
 const os = require('os');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
+const { resolveSqlitePath } = require('../utils/databaseEngine');
 const { checkForUpdates, getCurrentChannel, getCurrentVersion, getReleasesSince, compareVersions } = require('../services/updateCheckService');
 const { getAppSetting, upsertAppSetting } = require('../utils/appSettings');
 const { parseWhatsNew } = require('../utils/whatsNew');
@@ -218,26 +219,25 @@ router.get('/updates/instructions', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'
 // Get comprehensive system status
 router.get('/status', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req, res) => {
   try {
-    // Database size - check if PostgreSQL or SQLite
+    // Database size. Read the LIVE connection rather than re-deriving any of
+    // this from the environment (#1038): DATABASE_CLIENT is not the only thing
+    // that decides the engine, DB_NAME is not the only thing that decides the
+    // database, and DATABASE_PATH was ignored outright here — so a SQLite
+    // install with a custom path, or a Postgres install without an explicit
+    // DATABASE_CLIENT, reported the size of something it was not using.
     let dbSize = 0;
-    const dbClient = process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT || 'sqlite3';
-    
-    if (dbClient === 'pg') {
-      // PostgreSQL - query database size
+    const liveConnection = db.client.config.connection || {};
+
+    if (db.client.config.client === 'pg') {
       try {
-        const dbName = process.env.DB_NAME || 'picpeak';
-        const result = await db.raw(`
-          SELECT pg_database_size(?) as size
-        `, [dbName]);
+        const result = await db.raw('SELECT pg_database_size(current_database()) as size');
         dbSize = result.rows[0]?.size || 0;
       } catch (error) {
         logger.error('Error getting PostgreSQL database size:', error);
       }
     } else {
-      // SQLite - check file size
-      const dbPath = path.join(__dirname, '../../data/photo_sharing.db');
       try {
-        const stats = await fs.stat(dbPath);
+        const stats = await fs.stat(liveConnection.filename || resolveSqlitePath());
         dbSize = stats.size;
       } catch (error) {
         logger.error('Error getting SQLite database size:', error);