chore(stable): release 3.45.12 (#955)

* fix(security): redact gallery share tokens from analytics page-view tracking (GHSA-7m6c)

* fix(security): codex round-1 — actually disable raw auto-tracking (GHSA-7m6c)

The previous patch was inert: App.tsx passed autoTrack:true (so Umami's
data-auto-track=false was never set) and the sanitized trackPageView had no
caller (useAnalytics sits outside <Router>), so the raw token URL still hit
the collector.

- Umami: drop autoTrack:true → data-auto-track=false; page views now come
  from a sanitized manual tracker.
- Rybbit: its initial-load auto pageview can't be intercepted client-side, so
  use native data-mask-patterns=['/gallery/**'] to strip the token on every
  auto-tracked view; skip manual tracking for it to avoid double counting.
- Mount <AnalyticsRouteTracker/> INSIDE <Router> so manual tracking runs.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>

.github/workflows/release-please.yml

@@ -27,32 +27,12 @@ jobs:
           manifest-file: .release-please-manifest.json
           target-branch: stable
 
-      # Auto-approve + auto-merge the open stable release PR. See the beta
-      # workflow for the full rationale. Skipped on the release-cutting run and
-      # whenever no PAT is configured.
-      - name: Auto-approve and enable auto-merge on the release PR
-        if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created != 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
-          # No checkout in this job — set the repo explicitly so gh works
-          # without a git remote (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
-          GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
-        run: |
-          if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
-            echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping auto-merge (manual review still required)."
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          pr=$(gh pr list --head release-please--branches--stable --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number // empty')
-          if [ -n "$pr" ]; then
-            # Approve as github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN, ≠ the PAT author) so it
-            # is a valid review; enable auto-merge as the PAT so the merge commit is
-            # attributed to a real identity and triggers the tag-cutting run (#719).
-            gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — release-please version bump + changelog (#719)." || true
-            GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto || true
-          else
-            echo "No open release PR to auto-merge."
-          fi
+      # NOTE: stable release PRs are intentionally NOT auto-merged here
+      # anymore. Fixes accumulate in the rolling release PR and are cut as
+      # ONE patch version per day by release-stable-daily.yml (18:00 UTC,
+      # or on demand via workflow_dispatch / a manual merge of the release
+      # PR). Beta keeps instant releases — see release-please-beta.yml —
+      # because same-day reporter verification depends on it.
 
       - name: Output Release Info
         if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}

.github/workflows/release-stable-daily.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+name: Cut Stable Release (daily batch)
+
+# Stable fixes accumulate in release-please's rolling release PR instead of
+# each cutting its own patch version (the old per-merge auto-merge produced
+# e.g. 3.45.8 AND 3.45.9 on the same day). This workflow merges the open
+# stable release PR once a day, so a day of N bugfixes ships as ONE version
+# with all N changelog entries — and one Docker build instead of N.
+#
+# - schedule only fires from the default branch (main); the stable copy of
+#   this file is inert and exists to keep the branches in sync.
+# - Need a release NOW? Run this via workflow_dispatch, or merge the
+#   release PR by hand — the schedule is a default, not a gate.
+# - Approval/merge mechanics mirror the old inline step (#719): approve as
+#   github-actions[bot] (GITHUB_TOKEN, a valid distinct reviewer), enable
+#   auto-merge as the PAT so the merge attributes to a real identity and
+#   triggers the tag-cutting run. --auto waits for green checks.
+
+on:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '0 18 * * *'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: write
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  merge-stable-release-pr:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Approve and enable auto-merge on the open stable release PR
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          RELEASE_PAT: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN }}
+          # No checkout — set the repo explicitly so gh works without a
+          # git remote (same pattern as whatsnew, 2a5f0a8).
+          GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "$RELEASE_PAT" ]; then
+            echo "RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN not set — skipping (manual review required)."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          # Strict selection (review P1): this job runs daily even without a
+          # stable push, and `gh pr list --head` matches the branch NAME only
+          # — a fork PR can spoof `release-please--branches--stable`. Pin the
+          # base to stable AND require a same-repo head (isCrossRepository
+          # == false); a fork PR is cross-repository, so it can never be
+          # picked and auto-merged with the privileged PAT.
+          pr=$(gh pr list \
+            --base stable \
+            --head release-please--branches--stable \
+            --state open \
+            --json number,isCrossRepository \
+            --jq '[.[] | select(.isCrossRepository == false)] | .[0].number // empty')
+          if [ -z "$pr" ]; then
+            echo "No open same-repo stable release PR — nothing to cut today."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          # Approve is tolerant — a pre-existing approval already satisfies
+          # branch protection and re-approving can return non-zero.
+          gh pr review "$pr" --approve --body "Automated approval — daily stable release batch (release-please version bump + changelog)." || echo "::warning::approve returned non-zero (PR may already be approved)"
+          # But the auto-merge enable is the load-bearing step: this scheduled
+          # job is the ONLY automatic stable cut, so DON'T swallow its failure
+          # (review P2) — an expired/under-scoped PAT would otherwise stop
+          # releases while the workflow stays green.
+          GH_TOKEN="$RELEASE_PAT" gh pr merge "$pr" --squash --auto
+          # `gh pr merge --auto` merges IMMEDIATELY when the required checks
+          # are already green — the normal case at 18:00, since the fixes
+          # merged hours earlier and CI passed. So success is EITHER the PR is
+          # already merged OR an auto-merge request is now pending; only a PR
+          # that is still open with no auto-merge request is a real failure
+          # (expired/under-scoped PAT) worth failing the job on (review round 2).
+          # One snapshot of both fields (review round 3): querying state and
+          # autoMergeRequest separately races — auto-merge can complete
+          # between the two calls, so the first sees OPEN and the second sees
+          # the request already cleared on the now-merged PR → false failure.
+          read -r state automerge < <(gh pr view "$pr" --json state,autoMergeRequest \
+            --jq '[.state, (.autoMergeRequest != null)] | @tsv')
+          if [ "$state" = "MERGED" ]; then
+            echo "Stable release PR #$pr merged immediately (checks were already green)."
+          elif [ "$automerge" = "true" ]; then
+            echo "Auto-merge enabled on stable release PR #$pr — merges when checks are green."
+          else
+            echo "::error::stable release PR #$pr is still open with no auto-merge — check RELEASE_PLEASE_TOKEN scope/expiry."
+            exit 1
+          fi

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{".":"3.45.3"}
+{".":"3.45.12"}

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,81 @@ All notable changes to PicPeak will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [3.45.12](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.11...v3.45.12) (2026-08-02)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **security:** authz/ownership gaps (token binding, auth revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging) (stable) ([#951](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/951)) ([5d5db4e](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/5d5db4e766eee23a6678b399cdb9cc449fcea198))
+* **security:** neutralize spreadsheet formulas in all CSV/export cell-writers (CSV injection cluster) ([#949](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/949)) ([e5dccf1](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/e5dccf166419bb571b052990aada14801e16ac79))
+* **security:** redact gallery share tokens from analytics tracking (GHSA-7m6c) (stable) ([#953](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/953)) ([2c7b5df](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/2c7b5dfd020ac1fb2acdb7667998b2f373ce99d9))
+* **security:** unauth share_token leak (HIGH) + restore path-traversal, logo file-read (stable) ([#947](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/947)) ([bfafece](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/bfafecedc755790374565281287b9777ae0f5315))
+
+## [3.45.11](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.10...v3.45.11) (2026-08-01)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **security:** block guest access to hidden/client-only photos across bulk + secure routes (stable) ([#940](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/940)) ([34a7b1c](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/34a7b1c0137cf4cba53f17270f619ce9755c4c98))
+* **security:** bump sanitize-html to 2.17.5 (CVE-2026-53606) (stable) ([#938](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/938)) ([7419c68](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/7419c683375d12650c448caa47ffe0444a7e1458))
+* **security:** close authorization/ownership gaps (token scope, mass-assignment, category hero, project docs) (stable) ([#944](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/944)) ([2462ba6](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/2462ba6897c93b3f0834d60cc2e6827a45487062))
+* **security:** resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) (stable) ([#942](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/942)) ([90275f8](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/90275f88e9af523ba3cc254cef2ca6f48a2a4129))
+* **uploads:** prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes ([#931](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/931)) (stable) ([#934](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/934)) ([fc99e2b](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/fc99e2b233b4a7c81c410f7d557e7dff270437bd))
+
+## [3.45.10](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.9...v3.45.10) (2026-07-30)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **admin:** expose view/download counters in the admin photos list ([#895](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/895) follow-up) (stable) ([#915](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/915)) ([a27d19b](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/a27d19b4d147c33166b47a6bac12b8d1be32daf1))
+* **admin:** serve videos with their real MIME type in the admin photo view ([#908](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/908)) (stable) ([#911](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/911)) ([d68d84e](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/d68d84e5c8cfcd123c95e474d2b87d153764f710))
+* **admin:** stop marking events expired up to 24h early ([#909](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/909)) (stable) ([#917](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/917)) ([6891769](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/6891769124f77d5af1bbe8eb0932a86753d89e7d))
+* **security:** close GHSA-g94x (cross-gallery photo read) + GHSA-pv6w (admin DB export) (stable) ([#925](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/925)) ([60cbda5](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/60cbda5b2228e0bddf5356eae279d9e7916e9ac2))
+
+## [3.45.9](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.8...v3.45.9) (2026-07-29)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **analytics:** make per-photo view/download counters actually count ([#895](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/895)) (stable) ([#905](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/905)) ([90b589a](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/90b589a88e4c56ccac6dba86c48a604f2abcc008))
+
+## [3.45.8](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.7...v3.45.8) (2026-07-29)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **tests:** raise jest timeouts to the 120s convention (stable) ([#902](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/902)) ([962f1d9](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/962f1d95868251ddeb01a5234c8d9bd1d57429e8))
+
+## [3.45.7](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.6...v3.45.7) (2026-07-27)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **security:** close 5 Trivy alerts — postcss/tar bumps + drop npm from the runtime image (stable) ([#879](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/879)) ([d868aac](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/d868aac70300149e77fb9568735b6481f88a644f))
+
+## [3.45.6](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.5...v3.45.6) (2026-07-27)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **backup:** make backup settings actually apply ([#871](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/871)) (stable) ([#875](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/875)) ([a27c705](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/a27c705e392ec1e6b8d8be945127de9ff11d5db0))
+
+## [3.45.5](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.4...v3.45.5) (2026-07-26)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **security:** bump backend deps to close all 14 open Trivy code-scanning alerts (stable) ([#870](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/870)) ([39696d4](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/39696d42fe22478aee1b8d777d8bcfd5ef986fe4))
+* **security:** read the password-complexity key the settings UI writes (stable) ([#844](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/844)) ([50f5ca1](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/50f5ca1d5bbe6f03397b3dc66ea8c3bea538466e))
+
+## [3.45.4](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.3...v3.45.4) (2026-07-17)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **events:** accept hero_logo_visible: null on create/update ([#822](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/822)) ([8978acd](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/8978acdb492f085fbe92186d9dbddfb35b07b676))
+* **events:** accept hero_logo_visible: null on create/update ([#822](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/822)) (stable) ([1cff576](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/commit/1cff576439bce06536f7d308d4ef6d52bdc9bb12))
+
 ## [3.45.3](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/compare/v3.45.2...v3.45.3) (2026-07-17)
 
 

backend/Dockerfile

@@ -37,14 +37,16 @@ ARG CACHEBUST=1
 # Upgrade all packages to fix security vulnerabilities (OpenSSL, libexpat, BusyBox CVEs)
 RUN echo "cachebust=${CACHEBUST}" && apk upgrade --no-cache
 
-# Upgrade the npm CLI in the final image so its bundled deps are patched
-# (sigstore 4.x, tar) — closes CVE-2026-48815 and the older @sigstore/core / tar
-# Trivy alerts. Safe here: only the CLI present in the image changes. Runtime
-# dependencies come from the builder stage (COPY --from=builder node_modules
-# below) and the entrypoint runs node, not npm — so npm 11's install behaviour
-# (the reason 10.x was pinned) never executes in this stage. npm 11 needs
-# Node >=22.9, satisfied by node:22-alpine.
-RUN npm install -g npm@11
+# Remove the npm CLI from the final image. Nothing runs npm here: the
+# entrypoint is node, runtime deps are COPY'd from the builder stage, and
+# wait-for-db.sh invokes the migration runners via node directly. npm's
+# bundled node_modules kept tripping Trivy (sigstore, tar 7.5.19,
+# brace-expansion 5.0.7 — even npm 12.0.1 still ships the vulnerable
+# copies), so shipping no npm ends that alert class instead of chasing
+# per-release patches. Note: `docker exec … npm run <script>` no longer
+# works in the container — use `node migrations/run-migrations-safe.js`
+# and friends instead.
+RUN rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm /usr/local/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npx
 
 # Install dumb-init for proper signal handling, postgresql-client for database
 # checks, ffmpeg for video upload support, and su-exec for the root → nodejs

backend/__tests__/integration/adminBackupCoverage.test.js

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
   requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
 }));
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('GET /api/admin/system-health/backup-coverage', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/adminBackupIntegrity.test.js

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
   requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
 }));
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('GET /api/admin/system-health/backup-integrity', () => {
   let cleanup;

backend/__tests__/integration/backupService.configurableWalker.test.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ const path = require('path');
 
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('backupService — configurable walker (backup_paths)', () => {
   let db;
@@ -177,4 +177,203 @@ describe('backupService — configurable walker (backup_paths)', () => {
     const filesOn = await backupService.getFilesToBackup(true);
     expect(filesOn.map((f) => f.relativePath)).toContain('events/archived/E3/legacy.jpg');
   });
+
+  // Issue #871 — the "What to Backup" checkboxes were stored but never read.
+  describe('UI opt-out toggles (issue #871)', () => {
+    it('unchecking Thumbnails excludes thumbnails/', async () => {
+      seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_thumbnails: false,
+      });
+      const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+      expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+      expect(rels).not.toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('unchecking Photos excludes events/active', async () => {
+      seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_photos: false,
+      });
+      const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+      expect(rels).toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      expect(rels).not.toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('defaults to including everything when the keys were never saved', async () => {
+      seedFile('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({});
+      const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+      expect(rels).toContain('thumbnails/E1/thumb.jpg');
+      expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it("accepts the UI's plural backup_include_archives for the archived gate", async () => {
+      seedFile('events/archived/E4/archived.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_archives: true,
+      });
+      expect(files.map((f) => f.relativePath)).toContain('events/archived/E4/archived.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('the UI plural key beats the migration-seeded singular key', async () => {
+      // Migration seeds backup_include_archived=true on every install; the
+      // form only ever writes the plural key, so unchecking Archives must
+      // win over the stale seeded value.
+      seedFile('events/archived/E5/archived.jpg');
+
+      const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+        backup_include_archived: true,   // seeded default
+        backup_include_archives: false,  // what the admin actually chose
+      });
+      expect(files.map((f) => f.relativePath)).not.toContain('events/archived/E5/archived.jpg');
+    });
+
+    it('rsync gets the de-selected paths and noise filters as --exclude args', async () => {
+      const excluded = await backupService.resolveExcludedBackupPaths({
+        backup_include_thumbnails: false,
+        backup_include_archives: false,
+      });
+      expect(excluded.map((r) => r.path)).toEqual(
+        expect.arrayContaining(['thumbnails', 'events/archived'])
+      );
+
+      const args = backupService.buildRsyncArgs(
+        { backup_rsync_host: 'backup.example.com', backup_rsync_path: '/srv/backups' },
+        excluded.map((r) => `/${r.path}/`)
+      );
+      const excludes = args
+        .map((a, i) => (a === '--exclude' ? args[i + 1] : null))
+        .filter(Boolean);
+      expect(excludes).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
+        '.nfs*',
+        '/thumbnails/',
+        '/events/archived/',
+      ]));
+    });
+
+    it('rows toggled off via include_in_default also become rsync excludes', async () => {
+      // The enabled-only loader hides these rows from the walker, but rsync
+      // syncs the whole storage root, so they must still appear as excludes.
+      await db('backup_paths').where('path', 'previews').update({
+        include_in_default: false,
+      });
+
+      const excluded = await backupService.resolveExcludedBackupPaths({});
+      expect(excluded.map((r) => r.path)).toContain('previews');
+    });
+  });
+
+  // Issue #871 — .nfs* silly-rename artifacts were uploaded to S3.
+  it('never backs up filesystem noise (.nfs*, .DS_Store)', async () => {
+    seedFile('thumbnails/E1/.nfs000000000000006600000008');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/.DS_Store');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+
+    const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({});
+    const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    expect(rels.some((r) => r.includes('.nfs'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(rels.some((r) => r.includes('.DS_Store'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('the walker honors backup_exclude_patterns (previously rsync-only)', async () => {
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/scratch.tmp');
+
+    const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+      backup_exclude_patterns: ['*.tmp'],
+    });
+    const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/photo.jpg');
+    expect(rels).not.toContain('events/active/E1/scratch.tmp');
+  });
+
+  it('glob patterns are literal outside the star (.nfs* must not eat anfs-…)', async () => {
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/anfs-photo.jpg');
+    seedFile('events/active/E1/notes-tmp');
+
+    const files = await backupService.getFilesToBackup({
+      backup_exclude_patterns: ['*.tmp'],
+    });
+    const rels = files.map((f) => f.relativePath);
+
+    // '.nfs*' used to compile to /^.nfs.*$/ whose dot matched any char;
+    // '*.tmp' used to compile to /^.*.tmp$/ which also matched 'notes-tmp'.
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/anfs-photo.jpg');
+    expect(rels).toContain('events/active/E1/notes-tmp');
+  });
+
+  // Issue #871 — weekly schedules silently ran daily, and the dashboard's
+  // "next backup" was a hardcoded "tomorrow 02:00".
+  describe('schedule resolution + next run (issue #871)', () => {
+    it('a named label beats the stray default cron the UI used to send', () => {
+      expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({
+        backup_schedule: 'weekly',
+        backup_schedule_cron: '0 3 * * *', // old UI default, sent unconditionally
+      })).toBe('0 3 * * 0');
+    });
+
+    it('custom schedules use the cron field', () => {
+      expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({
+        backup_schedule: 'custom',
+        backup_schedule_cron: '15 5 * * 2',
+      })).toBe('15 5 * * 2');
+    });
+
+    it('falls back to the default daily cron', () => {
+      expect(backupService.resolveScheduleCron({})).toBe('0 2 * * *');
+    });
+
+    it('getNextScheduledRun is null when backups are disabled', () => {
+      expect(backupService.getNextScheduledRun(null)).toBeNull();
+      expect(backupService.getNextScheduledRun({ backup_enabled: false })).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('getNextScheduledRun returns the real next weekly fire time', () => {
+      const iso = backupService.getNextScheduledRun({
+        backup_enabled: true,
+        backup_schedule: 'weekly',
+        backup_schedule_cron: '0 3 * * *',
+      });
+      const next = new Date(iso);
+      expect(Number.isNaN(next.getTime())).toBe(false);
+      expect(next.getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
+      expect(next.getDay()).toBe(0);   // Sunday
+      expect(next.getHours()).toBe(3); // 03:00
+    });
+  });
+
+  // Issue #871 — "Backup Size: 167.6 TB": file_size_bytes is a bigInteger
+  // column, node-postgres returns int8 as a string, and the S3 path did
+  // `backedUpSize += size` — string concatenation.
+  it('getDatabaseBackupInfo coerces file_size_bytes to a number', async () => {
+    await db('database_backup_runs').del();
+    await db('database_backup_runs').insert({
+      backup_type: 'full',
+      status: 'completed',
+      file_path: '/backups/db/dump.sql.gz',
+      // Simulate the PG int8-as-string driver behaviour (sqlite stores
+      // whatever it is handed, so the string round-trips).
+      file_size_bytes: '421988',
+      started_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      completed_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+
+    const info = await backupService.getDatabaseBackupInfo();
+    expect(typeof info.size).toBe('number');
+    expect(info.size).toBe(421988);
+  });
 });

backend/__tests__/integration/backupService.inlineDbDump.test.js

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/databaseBackup', () => ({
   DatabaseBackupService: class {},
 }));
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('backupService — inline DB dump + fail-loud guard', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/backupService.perPathStats.test.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ const path = require('path');
 
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('backupService — per-Stage-B-path statistics', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/backupService.smoke.test.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ const path = require('path');
 
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('backupService — config + file collection + manifest (smoke)', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/bookingCutover.test.js

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 const crypto = require('crypto');
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('booking cutover — draft invoices on hold', () => {
   let db; let cleanup; let adminId; let customerId; let quoteService;

backend/__tests__/integration/discountLineItems.test.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 // Service-level CRM calls cold-require heavy modules (pdfService,
 // nodemailer, etc.) on first use; the global 5 s per-test budget is
 // too tight for that. Bump it for this file only.
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('discount line items (negative unit_price_minor)', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/eventTypeRename.test.js

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
 // bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll.
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('event type slug rename cascade', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/galleryShortUrlRoute.test.js

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const request = require('supertest');
 
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(60000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db; let cleanup; let service; let app;
 

backend/__tests__/integration/galleryShortUrls.test.js

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  */
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(60000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db; let cleanup; let service; let adminId;
 

backend/__tests__/integration/incomingInvoiceRebill.test.js

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
 // Service-level CRM calls cold-require heavy modules (pdfService, nodemailer)
 // on first use; bump the budget for this file.
-jest.setTimeout(60000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('incoming-invoice categorise / re-bill chain', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/installFromBackupBoot.test.js

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/restoreService', () => ({
   },
 }));
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('installFromBackupBoot', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/integration/invoiceDunning.test.js

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 // bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll; under full-suite
 // parallel load on a small CI runner that can exceed the 5s default. Match the
 // other migration-heavy CRM suites (discountLineItems, incomingInvoiceRebill).
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db;
 let cleanup;

backend/__tests__/integration/picpeakExport.test.js

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
   ({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
   process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpDir; // isolate file collection to the temp dir
   ({ createPicpeak } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService'));
-}, 60000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => {
   await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/integration/picpeakRoundtrip.test.js

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
   ({ importFromPicpeak, validateManifest } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
   const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
   superAdminRoleId = role.id;
-}, 60000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => {
   await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/integration/resetAdminMfaCli.test.js

@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
 
 const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(60000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db;
 let cleanup;
 
 beforeAll(async () => {
   ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
-}, 60000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => {
   if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/integration/restoreService.pgBranch.test.js

@@ -183,22 +183,24 @@ describe('restoreService — PG branch scope contract (PR #596 review)', () => {
     expect(window).toMatch(/was_successful:\s*true/);
   });
 
-  it('npm run migrate:safe is invoked after the replay in restore()', () => {
+  it('the safe migration runner is invoked after the replay in restore()', () => {
     // Contract from PR #596 round 4: backups taken on older picpeak
     // versions must restore COMPLETELY on a newer image — even if new
     // migrations have been added since the backup was taken. The
-    // restore() flow shells out to `npm run migrate:safe` AFTER the
+    // restore() flow shells out to the safe migration runner AFTER the
     // operator-meta replay so the schema catches up to the running
     // code WITHIN the restore boundary (not on the next container
-    // restart).
+    // restart). Invoked as `node migrations/run-migrations-safe.js` —
+    // the runtime image ships no npm, so the former `npm run
+    // migrate:safe` would ENOENT into the non-fatal catch.
     //
     // Contract:
-    //   1. A `migrate:safe` shell-out exists somewhere in restoreService
+    //   1. A run-migrations-safe shell-out exists somewhere in restoreService
     //   2. It sits AFTER the replay drain — verification → replay →
     //      migrations is the documented order
     //   3. It does NOT sit inside performDatabaseRestore (must run
     //      against the reinit'd pool from the parent restore())
-    const migrateLine = findFirst(/['"]migrate:safe['"]/);
+    const migrateLine = findFirst(/run-migrations-safe\.js/);
     expect(migrateLine).toBeGreaterThan(0);
 
     const replayLine = findLast(/this\.preservedMetaSnapshot\.length\s*>\s*0/);

backend/__tests__/integration/setupService.test.js

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
   setupService = require('../../src/services/setupService');
   ({ getAppSetting, upsertAppSetting } = require('../../src/utils/appSettings'));
   app = buildRouteApp('/api/setup', require('../../src/routes/setup'));
-}, 60000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => {
   await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/integration/workflowEngine.test.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
 // bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll; under full-suite
 // parallel load on a small CI runner that can exceed the 5s default. Match the
 // other migration-heavy CRM suites (discountLineItems, incomingInvoiceRebill).
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db;
 let cleanup;

backend/__tests__/integration/workflowRoutes.test.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ const {
 // bootCrmDb runs the full core-migration set in beforeAll; under full-suite
 // parallel load on a small CI runner that can exceed the 5s default. Match the
 // other migration-heavy CRM suites (discountLineItems, incomingInvoiceRebill).
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db;
 let cleanup;

backend/__tests__/routes/adminCrmAuth.test.js

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ describe('admin CRM routes — auth + permission gate', () => {
     // Invalid: signed with a different secret. adminAuth must reject.
     const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
     invalidToken = jwt.sign({ id: adminId, type: 'admin' }, 'WRONG-SECRET', { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
-  }, 60000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
     if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/routes/adminEvents.smoke.test.js

@@ -180,6 +180,27 @@ describe('admin events CRUD endpoints (smoke)', () => {
       });
       expect(res.status).toBe(404);
     });
+
+    // #822 — hero_logo_visible/position are nullable (null = "inherit the global
+    // branding toggle"), but the validator used .optional() without
+    // { nullable: true }, so an explicit null was rejected with 400.
+    it('accepts hero_logo_visible: null and stores NULL (inherit)', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { hero_logo_visible: 1 });
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
+        hero_logo_visible: null,
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.hero_logo_visible).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('still rejects a non-boolean hero_logo_visible', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
+        hero_logo_visible: 'maybe',
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    });
   });
 
   describe('DELETE /:id', () => {

backend/__tests__/routes/adminMfa.test.js

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ const {
   bootCrmDb, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
 } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(60000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 let db;
 let cleanup;
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
   ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
   adminApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/auth', require('../../src/routes/adminAuth'));
   authApp = buildRouteApp('/api/auth', require('../../src/routes/auth'));
-}, 60000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => {
   if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/routes/adminPhotoContentType.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/**
+ * Admin photo view route Content-Type (#908).
+ *
+ * The route built `image/<ext>` from the filename, producing invalid
+ * types like image/mp4 for videos. AdminAuthenticatedVideo fetches this
+ * URL into a blob whose type inherits the header, and browsers refuse to
+ * play a <video> blob labeled image/* — blank/grey admin video preview.
+ *
+ * Pins (incl. external-review hardening):
+ *  - the header is ALWAYS image/* or video/*: a stored non-media MIME
+ *    (chunked uploads store the client-sent type unvalidated) is never
+ *    echoed — text/html inline under the app origin would be XSS
+ *  - stored video/ MIME wins; MIME-less videos map from the extension
+ *    (.mov → video/quicktime), unknown video extensions get video/mp4
+ *  - images IGNORE the stored MIME (migration 039 backfilled image/jpeg
+ *    onto every legacy row, PNGs included) and use the extension,
+ *    normalized (jpg → image/jpeg); extensionless files get image/jpeg
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-admin-ct-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-ct-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-admin-ct-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'admin-ct-test-event';
+
+describe('admin photo view Content-Type (#908)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let adminToken;
+
+  const addPhoto = async (filename, extra = {}) => {
+    const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
+    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, filename), Buffer.from(`bytes-${filename}`));
+    const r = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename,
+      path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      ...extra,
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  const getPhotoRes = (photoId) => request(app)
+    .get(`/api/admin/photos/${eventId}/photo/${photoId}`)
+    .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Admin CT Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'admin-ct-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
+    const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'admin-ct-admin',
+      email: 'admin-ct-admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('AdminCt123', 4),
+      role_id: superRole.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id: rootId, username: 'admin-ct-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotos'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('serves a video with its stored mime_type, not image/<ext>', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('clip.mp4', { media_type: 'video', mime_type: 'video/mp4' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+  });
+
+  it('maps MIME-less videos from their extension (.mov → video/quicktime)', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('clip-nomime.mov', { media_type: 'video' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/quicktime');
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to video/mp4 for a video with an unknown extension', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('clip-unknown.xyz', { media_type: 'video' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects malformed video/ MIME values that would break setHeader', async () => {
+    // Header-invalid chars in the stored value must not 500 the route —
+    // fall back to the extension map instead.
+    const id = await addPhoto('crlf.mp4', {
+      media_type: 'video',
+      mime_type: 'video/mp4\r\nX-Evil: 1',
+    });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+    expect(res.headers['x-evil']).toBeUndefined();
+
+    const bare = await addPhoto('bare.webm', { media_type: 'video', mime_type: 'video/' });
+    const res2 = await getPhotoRes(bare);
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/webm');
+  });
+
+  it('preserves an auto-imported avif via the safe stored-MIME allowlist', async () => {
+    // .avif isn't in EXTENSION_TO_MIME; s3AutoImporter stores image/avif.
+    // Map-only would mislabel it image/jpeg — the allowlist keeps it.
+    const id = await addPhoto('imported.avif', { mime_type: 'image/avif' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/avif');
+  });
+
+  it('preserves other importer raster types too (apng, x-icon)', async () => {
+    const apng = await addPhoto('anim.apng', { mime_type: 'image/apng' });
+    expect((await getPhotoRes(apng)).headers['content-type']).toBe('image/apng');
+    const ico = await addPhoto('fav.ico', { mime_type: 'image/x-icon' });
+    expect((await getPhotoRes(ico)).headers['content-type']).toBe('image/x-icon');
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT honor a stored scriptable image type (image/svg+xml)', async () => {
+    // svg is inline-scriptable and must never be echoed — allowlist excludes it.
+    const id = await addPhoto('vector.svg', { mime_type: 'image/svg+xml' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+
+  it('never echoes a stored non-media MIME type (inline XSS guard)', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('evil.png', { mime_type: 'text/html' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('ignores the migration-039 image/jpeg backfill on legacy PNG rows', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('legacy.png', { mime_type: 'image/jpeg' });
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('normalizes jpg to the canonical image/jpeg', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('shot.jpg');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps the extension fallback for images without a stored mime_type', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('shot.png');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('handles Object.prototype key extensions without a 500 (.constructor)', async () => {
+    // The extension-to-MIME lookup must be own-property only — a raw
+    // index access returns an inherited function for these keys and the
+    // downstream startsWith throws. Serve image/jpeg instead of 500.
+    const id = await addPhoto('payload.constructor');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+
+    const id2 = await addPhoto('payload.__proto__', { media_type: 'video' });
+    const res2 = await getPhotoRes(id2);
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+  });
+
+  it('does not synthesize types from unmapped image extensions', async () => {
+    // Raw interpolation would produce image/svg+xml (scriptable inline)
+    // or arbitrary strings from client-controlled filenames — the shared
+    // map is the allowlist, everything else is served as image/jpeg.
+    const svg = await addPhoto('vector.svg+xml');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(svg);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+
+    const weird = await addPhoto('weird.xyz');
+    const res2 = await getPhotoRes(weird);
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res2.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+
+  it('extensionless files get image/jpeg, never a bare image/', async () => {
+    const id = await addPhoto('noext');
+    const res = await getPhotoRes(id);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/jpeg');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/authzPermissionGaps.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/**
+ * Authorization / ownership gaps (GHSA permission cluster):
+ *  - jm7j: API-token list must scope to the caller (non-super sees only own)
+ *  - gprq: API-token revoke must be owner-or-super_admin
+ *  - 3rqx: event update must not mass-assign identity/secret columns
+ *  - j2f4: category hero must belong to that category
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-authz-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'authz-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-authz-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const {
+  bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken,
+} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('authorization / ownership gaps', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let superId; let superTok; let adminId; let adminTok;
+
+  const grantPermissionToRole = async (roleName, permName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const perm = await db('permissions').where({ name: permName }).first();
+    const exists = await db('role_permissions')
+      .where({ role_id: role.id, permission_id: perm.id }).first();
+    if (!exists) {
+      await db('role_permissions').insert({ role_id: role.id, permission_id: perm.id });
+    }
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db));
+    await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+    superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
+
+    const pass = await bcrypt.hash('x', 4);
+    const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'plain-admin', email: 'plain@example.com',
+      password_hash: pass, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    adminId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'admin');
+    // Grant settings.edit to the admin role BEFORE any request populates the
+    // 60s permission cache, so the revoke test exercises the ownership check
+    // (404) rather than the missing-permission gate (403). This models a
+    // custom role that carries settings.edit — the scenario GHSA-gprq needs.
+    await grantPermissionToRole('admin', 'settings.edit');
+    adminTok = mintAdminToken(adminId);
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin/api-tokens', require('../../src/routes/adminApiTokens'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/categories', require('../../src/routes/adminCategories'));
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+    app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+      res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
+    });
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
+
+  describe('API tokens (jm7j / gprq)', () => {
+    let superTokenId;
+
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/api-tokens'), superTok)
+        .send({ name: 'super-token', scopes: ['read'] });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(201);
+      superTokenId = res.body.id;
+    });
+
+    it('non-super admin does not see another admin\'s tokens in the list', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/api-tokens'), adminTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.find((t) => t.id === superTokenId)).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('super_admin sees all tokens', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/api-tokens'), superTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.find((t) => t.id === superTokenId)).toBeDefined();
+    });
+
+    it('a non-owner (with settings.edit) cannot revoke another admin\'s token', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/api-tokens/${superTokenId}`), adminTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+      const row = await db('api_tokens').where({ id: superTokenId }).first();
+      expect(row.revoked_at).toBeFalsy();
+    });
+
+    it('the owner can revoke their own token', async () => {
+      const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/api-tokens/${superTokenId}`), superTok);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('event update mass-assignment (3rqx)', () => {
+    it('ignores identity/secret columns in the request body', async () => {
+      const seedShareToken = 'orig-share-token';
+      const ins = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: 'authz-mass-assign', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Before',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'orig-hash', share_link: '/gallery/authz/share', share_token: seedShareToken, expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const eventId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`), superTok).send({
+        event_name: 'After',
+        created_by: 99999,
+        slug: 'hijacked-slug',
+        share_token: 'hijacked-token',
+        password_hash: 'hijacked-hash',
+        is_archived: 1,
+        archive_path: '/hijacked/archive/path',
+        hero_logo_path: '/etc/passwd',
+        is_draft: 1,
+        project_id: 99999,
+        // Case-variant keys — SQLite matches columns case-insensitively.
+        Password_Hash: 'case-hijack-hash',
+        Created_By: 88888,
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('After');        // legit field applied
+      expect(row.created_by).toBe(superId);         // ownership untouched (+ case-variant)
+      expect(row.slug).toBe('authz-mass-assign');   // routing identity untouched
+      expect(row.share_token).toBe(seedShareToken); // secret untouched
+      expect(row.password_hash).toBe('orig-hash');  // secret untouched (+ case-variant)
+      expect(row.is_archived).toBeFalsy();          // archive lifecycle untouched
+      expect(row.archive_path).toBeFalsy();         // forged archive path rejected
+      expect(row.hero_logo_path).toBeFalsy();       // fs.unlink primitive blocked
+      expect(row.is_draft).toBeFalsy();             // publish workflow not bypassed
+      expect(row.project_id).toBeFalsy();           // server-managed relationship untouched
+    });
+
+    it('returns 200 (no-op) when the body contains only protected fields', async () => {
+      const ins = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: 'authz-empty-update', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Keep',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/gallery/authz-empty/share', share_token: 'authz-empty-share',
+        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const id = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+      // Body reduces to {} after the denylist — must not 500 (Knex rejects
+      // .update({})).
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`), superTok)
+        .send({ created_by: 1, slug: 'x', is_archived: 1 });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('Keep');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('category hero cross-category (j2f4)', () => {
+    it('rejects a hero photo that is not in the category', async () => {
+      const evIns = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: 'authz-cat', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Cat Event',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/gallery/authz-cat/share', share_token: 'authz-cat-share', expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const evId = evIns[0]?.id ?? evIns[0];
+
+      const mkCat = async (name) => {
+        const c = await db('photo_categories').insert({
+          event_id: evId, name, slug: name.toLowerCase(), created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        }).returning('id');
+        return c[0]?.id ?? c[0];
+      };
+      const cat1 = await mkCat('Cat1');
+      const cat2 = await mkCat('Cat2');
+
+      const pIns = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: evId, filename: 'p.jpg', path: 'authz-cat/p.jpg', type: 'individual',
+        category_id: cat1, uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const photoInCat1 = pIns[0]?.id ?? pIns[0];
+
+      // Pointing cat2's hero at a photo that lives in cat1 must be refused.
+      const bad = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/categories/${cat2}/hero`), superTok)
+        .send({ hero_photo_id: photoInCat1 });
+      expect(bad.status).toBe(404);
+
+      // The photo's own category accepts it.
+      const ok = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/categories/${cat1}/hero`), superTok)
+        .send({ hero_photo_id: photoInCat1 });
+      expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/backupExportSuperadmin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/**
+ * Full-instance export is super_admin only (GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v).
+ *
+ * GET /api/admin/backup/picpeak/export dumps every table unredacted (bcrypt
+ * hashes, 2FA, SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/webhook/S3 secrets). It was gated only by
+ * requirePermission('backup.create'), which the built-in `admin` role holds —
+ * so any non-super_admin admin could download the whole database. Pins that
+ * `admin` now gets 403 and `super_admin` passes the gate.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-bkexport-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'bkexport-test-secret';
+
+// The export otherwise walks the whole DB and writes a zip — stub it so the
+// super_admin happy path is fast and deterministic; the gate is what's tested.
+// The route deletes path.dirname(filePath) recursively after download, so the
+// stub MUST live in its own dir — a bare os.tmpdir() file would make the route
+// wipe the whole temp root (and other jest workers' DB files).
+const mockExportDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-export-stub-'));
+const mockExportPath = path.join(mockExportDir, 'export.picpeak');
+fs.writeFileSync(mockExportPath, 'stub');
+jest.mock('../../src/services/picpeakExportService', () => ({
+  createPicpeak: jest.fn(async () => ({ filePath: mockExportPath })),
+}));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('backup export super_admin gate (GHSA-pv6w)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let adminToken; let superToken;
+
+  const mkUser = async (username, roleName) => {
+    const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
+    const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username,
+      email: `${username}@example.com`,
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
+      role_id: role.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+    return jwt.sign(
+      { id, username, type: 'admin', role: roleName, loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
+    );
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    adminToken = await mkUser('limited-admin', 'admin');
+    superToken = await mkUser('root-admin', 'super_admin');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/admin/backup', require('../../src/routes/adminBackup'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+    fs.rmSync(mockExportDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('denies the built-in admin role (was: full DB dump)', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/backup/picpeak/export')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('allows super_admin', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/admin/backup/picpeak/export')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superToken}`);
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
+    expect(res.status).toBeLessThan(500);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/feedbackOwnership.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-2qc2 / GHSA-32h4 / GHSA-3335 — feedback moderation, deletion, and the
+ * pending-moderation list are by-feedback-id (or global) and lacked ownership
+ * scoping, so a restricted editor could act on / enumerate feedback for events
+ * it does not own. super_admin keeps global access.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-fbown-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'fbown-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-fbown-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('feedback ownership scoping', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+  let superTok; let editorTok; let editorId;
+  let foreignFeedbackId;
+
+  const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    const { adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db);
+    await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
+    superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
+
+    const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'editor', email: 'editor@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('x', 4), must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    editorId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
+    await assignAdminRole(db, editorId, 'editor');
+    editorTok = mintAdminToken(editorId);
+
+    // Event owned by super_admin (NOT the editor).
+    const ev = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: 'fbown-foreign', event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'Foreign',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01', host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com',
+      password_hash: 'x', share_link: '/g/fbown/s', share_token: 'fbown-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, created_by: superId,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+    const ph = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId, filename: 'p.jpg', path: 'fbown-foreign/p.jpg', type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    const photoId = ph[0]?.id ?? ph[0];
+    const fb = await db('photo_feedback').insert({
+      photo_id: photoId, event_id: eventId, feedback_type: 'comment',
+      comment_text: 'hi', is_approved: 0, is_hidden: 0, created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    foreignFeedbackId = fb[0]?.id ?? fb[0];
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/admin/feedback', require('../../src/routes/adminFeedback'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('editor cannot moderate feedback on an event it does not own (404)', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}/approve`), editorTok);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    const row = await db('photo_feedback').where({ id: foreignFeedbackId }).first();
+    expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.is_approved); // untouched
+  });
+
+  it('editor cannot delete foreign feedback, row survives', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}`), editorTok);
+    // Denied either at the events.delete permission layer (editor lacks it →
+    // 403) or the ownership layer (404) — both must leave the row intact.
+    expect([403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
+    expect(await db('photo_feedback').where({ id: foreignFeedbackId }).first()).toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it('editor sees no foreign feedback in pending-moderation', async () => {
+    const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/feedback/feedback/pending-moderation'), editorTok);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.find((f) => f.id === foreignFeedbackId)).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('super_admin CAN moderate and see it', async () => {
+    const pending = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/feedback/feedback/pending-moderation'), superTok);
+    expect(pending.body.find((f) => f.id === foreignFeedbackId)).toBeDefined();
+    const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/feedback/feedback/${foreignFeedbackId}/approve`), superTok);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/galleryResolveShareToken.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-rh8r-7x3h-36rv — the unauthenticated GET /api/gallery/resolve/:identifier
+ * must NOT return a gallery's secret share_token (nor the share links that
+ * embed it) for a bare *slug* lookup. Slugs appear in gallery URLs and are
+ * guessable; handing back the secret turns a known slug into share-link
+ * access to a no-password gallery. The token is only returned when the caller
+ * resolved via the token / full share link (i.e. already holds it).
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-resolve-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'resolve-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-resolve-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'resolve-test-event';
+const SHARE_TOKEN = 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6';
+
+describe('GET /api/gallery/resolve/:identifier (GHSA-rh8r)', () => {
+  let db; let cleanup; let app;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Resolve Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/${SHARE_TOKEN}`,
+      share_token: SHARE_TOKEN,
+      require_password: 0, // no-password → the token IS the access credential
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('does NOT leak the share_token (or share links) for a bare slug lookup', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${SLUG}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.slug).toBe(SLUG);
+    expect(res.body.matchType).toBe('slug');
+    // The secret must be absent — and must not sneak out via the share links.
+    expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.body.share_link).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.body.share_url).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(SHARE_TOKEN);
+  });
+
+  it('DOES return the token when the caller already resolved via the token', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${SHARE_TOKEN}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.token).toBe(SHARE_TOKEN);
+    expect(res.body.matchType).toMatch(/token/);
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT leak the token via SQL LIKE wildcards in the link_partial fallback', async () => {
+    // Before the escaping fix, an anonymous request of 32 underscores matched
+    // any share_link ending in a 32-char token (`_` = single-char wildcard),
+    // resolved as matchType 'link_partial', and handed back the bearer token.
+    // The share_token here has no underscores, so an escaped LIKE must miss.
+    const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/resolve/${'_'.repeat(SHARE_TOKEN.length)}`);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(res.body.token).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain(SHARE_TOKEN);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/hiddenPhotoAccessControl.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/**
+ * Hidden/client-only photo access control across the bulk + secure photo
+ * routes (GHSA cluster: fpwq / ghf8 / 3jvw / 9cc4 / 2hqg / jc22).
+ *
+ * A photo with visibility='hidden' is client-only. The main photo-list and
+ * single-photo download/view routes enforced this, but the bulk-download,
+ * protected-image, and secure-image routes shipped without the check —
+ * letting an ordinary guest reach hidden photos. These tests pin that
+ * guests are refused and PIN-clients (accessLevel='client') still succeed.
+ */
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-hidden-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'hidden-photo-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-hidden-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'hidden-photo-test-event';
+
+describe('hidden-photo access control (GHSA cluster)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let visibleId;
+  let hiddenId;
+
+  const guestToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+  const clientToken = () => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery', accessLevel: 'client' },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Hidden Photo Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'hidden-photo-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0, allow_downloads: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const photoDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
+    fs.mkdirSync(photoDir, { recursive: true });
+
+    // A real 1x1 PNG so the protected /view route's Sharp processing path
+    // succeeds (fake bytes 500 on metadata()). Content, not extension,
+    // drives Sharp's format detection.
+    const PNG_1x1 = Buffer.from(
+      'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk+M8AAAMCAQGV2rY9AAAAAElFTkSuQmCC',
+      'base64'
+    );
+    const mkPhoto = async (filename, visibility) => {
+      fs.writeFileSync(path.join(photoDir, filename), PNG_1x1);
+      const p = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename,
+        path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        visibility,
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      return p[0]?.id ?? p[0];
+    };
+    visibleId = await mkPhoto('visible.jpg', 'visible');
+    hiddenId = await mkPhoto('hidden.jpg', 'hidden');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+    app.use('/api/images', require('../../src/routes/protectedImages'));
+    app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  describe('download-selected (GHSA-ghf8, medium)', () => {
+    it('omits a hidden photo for a guest even when its id is requested', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [visibleId, hiddenId] });
+      // The visible photo still zips; the hidden one is filtered out. If
+      // only the hidden id were requested, the filter empties the set → 404.
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const solo = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [hiddenId] });
+      expect(solo.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+
+    it('includes the hidden photo for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [hiddenId] });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('download-all (GHSA-fpwq, medium)', () => {
+    it('streams for a guest without erroring (hidden photos filtered)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('protected-image view (GHSA-9cc4)', () => {
+    it('403s a hidden photo for a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('serves a visible photo for a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+    it('serves a hidden photo for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('signed-URL mint (GHSA-3jvw)', () => {
+    it('403s minting a signed URL for a hidden photo as a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('mints for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.url).toContain('/signed/');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('legacy secure-token mint (protectedImages generate-secure-token)', () => {
+    it('403s a hidden photo for a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-secure-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('mints for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${hiddenId}/generate-secure-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.token).toBeDefined();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('secure-token mint (GHSA-2hqg)', () => {
+    it('403s minting a secure token for a hidden photo as a guest', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/generate-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
+        .send({ photoId: hiddenId });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+    it('mints for a client', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/generate-token`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`)
+        .send({ photoId: hiddenId });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.token).toBeDefined();
+    });
+  });
+
+  // A capability minted while a photo is visible must stop serving once the
+  // photo is hidden — unless minted by a client (clientBypass in the token).
+  describe('signed-URL TOCTOU (hidden AFTER minting)', () => {
+    afterEach(async () => {
+      await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'visible' });
+    });
+
+    it("a guest's pre-minted signed URL stops serving once the photo is hidden", async () => {
+      const mint = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`);
+      expect(mint.status).toBe(200);
+      const url = mint.body.url;
+      // Still visible → serves.
+      expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(200);
+      // Hide it → the guest token (no clientBypass) must now be refused.
+      await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'hidden' });
+      expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(403);
+    });
+
+    it("a client's pre-minted signed URL keeps serving after the photo is hidden", async () => {
+      const mint = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${visibleId}/generate-url`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${clientToken()}`);
+      expect(mint.status).toBe(200);
+      const url = mint.body.url;
+      await db('photos').where({ id: visibleId }).update({ visibility: 'hidden' });
+      expect((await request(app).get(url)).status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/photoEngagementCounters.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+/**
+ * Per-photo engagement counters (#895).
+ *
+ * Pins the contract that the admin EVENT > IMAGES table depends on:
+ *  - photos.view_count increments when the full-size photo is served
+ *    (it existed in the schema + admin UI but had NO writer at all)
+ *  - the slideshow kiosk never increments views (migration 138 design)
+ *  - single-photo downloads increment download_count (regression pin)
+ *  - zip downloads (download-all, download-selected) increment
+ *    download_count for the contained photos — previously they didn't,
+ *    so zip-heavy galleries showed 0 per-photo downloads forever
+ *  - the admin event-detail total_downloads counts singles AND zips
+ *    (it counted action='download' only, disagreeing with the dashboard)
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-engagement-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'engagement-test-secret';
+// Real files on disk so /photo and the zip routes actually stream bytes.
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-engagement-storage-'));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+
+const SLUG = 'engagement-test-event';
+
+describe('photo engagement counters (#895)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let eventId;
+  let photoIds;
+  let adminToken;
+
+  const galleryToken = (extra = {}) => jwt.sign(
+    { eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+    { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+  );
+
+  const getPhoto = async (id) => db('photos').where('id', id).first();
+  // The counter writes are fire-and-forget on purpose — give the event
+  // loop a beat before asserting.
+  const settle = () => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 400));
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+
+    const inserted = await db('events').insert({
+      slug: SLUG,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: 'Engagement Test',
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'host@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
+      share_token: 'engagement-test-share',
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      allow_downloads: 1,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
+
+    const photoDir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', SLUG);
+    fs.mkdirSync(photoDir, { recursive: true });
+
+    photoIds = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+      const filename = `photo-${i}.jpg`;
+      fs.writeFileSync(path.join(photoDir, filename), Buffer.from(`fake-jpeg-bytes-${i}`));
+      const p = await db('photos').insert({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        filename,
+        path: `${SLUG}/${filename}`,
+        type: 'individual',
+        uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      photoIds.push(p[0]?.id ?? p[0]);
+    }
+
+    const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
+    const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
+      username: 'engagement-admin',
+      email: 'engagement-admin@example.com',
+      password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('EngagementAdmin123', 4),
+      role_id: superRole.id,
+      is_active: 1,
+      created_at: new Date(),
+      updated_at: new Date(),
+    }).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
+    adminToken = jwt.sign(
+      { id: rootId, username: 'engagement-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
+      process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+    );
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use(cookieParser());
+    app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
+    app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('../../src/routes/adminPhotos'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('photos').where('event_id', eventId).update({ view_count: 0, download_count: 0 });
+    await db('access_logs').where('event_id', eventId).del();
+  });
+
+  describe('view_count via the view beacon (#895 — previously never written)', () => {
+    const beacon = (photoId, token = galleryToken()) => request(app)
+      .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoId}/view`)
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+    it('increments exactly the beaconed photo', async () => {
+      expect((await beacon(photoIds[0])).status).toBe(204);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(1);
+
+      expect((await beacon(photoIds[0])).status).toBe(204);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(2);
+      // Other photos untouched
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[1])).view_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('serving the image bytes does NOT count (preloads must not inflate)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      await settle();
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects the slideshow kiosk (migration 138 design)', async () => {
+      const res = await beacon(photoIds[0], galleryToken({ accessLevel: 'slideshow' }));
+      expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).view_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it("404s a photo that isn't in the event", async () => {
+      const res = await beacon(999999);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('download_count', () => {
+    it('single-photo download increments (regression pin)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoIds[0]}`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      await settle();
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).download_count).toBe(1);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[1])).download_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('download-selected increments exactly the selected photos (#895)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
+        .send({ photo_ids: [photoIds[0], photoIds[1]] });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      await settle();
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[0])).download_count).toBe(1);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[1])).download_count).toBe(1);
+      expect((await getPhoto(photoIds[2])).download_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('download-all increments every downloadable photo (#895)', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      await settle();
+      for (const id of photoIds) {
+        expect((await getPhoto(id)).download_count).toBe(1);
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('skipped archive entries do not count (missing source file)', async () => {
+      // Own event so the on-the-fly archiver path is guaranteed — the
+      // main event may have a cached zip from the previous test's
+      // background generation, and racing its build/invalidate hangs.
+      // The route also fires a background pre-zip build after streaming;
+      // against this event's intentionally missing file it crashes with
+      // an async ENOENT that jest attributes to whatever test is running
+      // by then — neutralize it, it's not under test here.
+      const downloadZipService = require('../../src/services/downloadZipService');
+      const generateZipSpy = jest.spyOn(downloadZipService, 'generateZip')
+        .mockResolvedValue({ success: false, error: 'disabled in test' });
+      const slug2 = `${SLUG}-skip`;
+      const ev = await db('events').insert({
+        slug: slug2,
+        event_type: 'wedding',
+        event_name: 'Engagement Skip Test',
+        event_date: '2026-08-01',
+        host_email: 'host@example.com',
+        admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
+        password_hash: 'x',
+        share_link: `/gallery/${slug2}/share`,
+        share_token: 'engagement-skip-share',
+        expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+        is_active: 1,
+        is_archived: 0,
+        is_draft: 0,
+        allow_downloads: 1,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      }).returning('id');
+      const eventId2 = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
+      const dir2 = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', slug2);
+      fs.mkdirSync(dir2, { recursive: true });
+      const ids2 = [];
+      for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        // Only photo 0 gets a real file — photo 1's source is missing.
+        if (i === 0) fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir2, `photo-${i}.jpg`), Buffer.from('skip-test-bytes'));
+        const p = await db('photos').insert({
+          event_id: eventId2,
+          filename: `photo-${i}.jpg`,
+          path: `${slug2}/photo-${i}.jpg`,
+          type: 'individual',
+          uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        }).returning('id');
+        ids2.push(p[0]?.id ?? p[0]);
+      }
+      const token2 = jwt.sign(
+        { eventId: eventId2, eventSlug: slug2, type: 'gallery' },
+        process.env.JWT_SECRET,
+        { expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
+      );
+
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${slug2}/download-all`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token2}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      await settle();
+      expect((await db('photos').where('id', ids2[0]).first()).download_count).toBe(1);
+      // photo-1's source was missing → skipped from the zip → not counted
+      expect((await db('photos').where('id', ids2[1]).first()).download_count).toBe(0);
+      generateZipSpy.mockRestore();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('admin photos list exposes the counters (#895 follow-up)', () => {
+    it('returns view_count and download_count so the Engagement column can render them', async () => {
+      // The list mapper builds an explicit object — before this fix it
+      // omitted both fields, so the admin table showed 0 forever even
+      // though the DB counted correctly.
+      await request(app)
+        .post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}/view`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoIds[0]}`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
+      await settle();
+
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/admin/photos/${eventId}/photos`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoIds[0]);
+      expect(row.view_count).toBe(1);
+      expect(row.download_count).toBe(1);
+      const untouched = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoIds[1]);
+      expect(untouched.view_count).toBe(0);
+      expect(untouched.download_count).toBe(0);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('admin event-detail total_downloads (#895 — one definition everywhere)', () => {
+    it('counts singles and every zip variant, one row each', async () => {
+      const row = (action) => ({
+        event_id: eventId,
+        ip_address: '127.0.0.1',
+        user_agent: 'jest',
+        action,
+      });
+      await db('access_logs').insert([
+        row('download'),
+        row('download_all'),
+        row('download_all_presigned'),
+        row('download_selected'),
+        row('view'), // not a download
+      ]);
+
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`)
+        .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.total_downloads).toBe(4);
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/publicContracts.test.js

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ describe('publicContracts routes', () => {
     contractId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
 
     app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/contracts', require('../../src/routes/publicContracts'));
-  }, 60000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
     if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/routes/publicPaymentCheck.test.js

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ describe('publicPaymentCheck routes', () => {
     ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
     await seedMinimal(db);
     app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/payment-check', require('../../src/routes/publicPaymentCheck'));
-  }, 60000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
     if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/routes/publicQuotes.test.js

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ describe('publicQuotes routes', () => {
     quoteId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
 
     app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/quotes', require('../../src/routes/publicQuotes'));
-  }, 60000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
     if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/routes/secureImageTokenBinding.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/**
+ * Secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f).
+ *
+ * The view route GET /api/secure-images/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token serves
+ * via <img src> with the token in the URL, so it can't carry a gallery-token
+ * header like the download sibling. Before the fix it validated only the
+ * token signature and took the gallery/photo from the URL — so a token minted
+ * on any PUBLIC gallery read every other gallery's photos with no password.
+ *
+ * Pins that the route now enforces the scope inside the token:
+ *  - the URL photoId must equal the token's minted photoId
+ *  - the gallery embedded in the token's sessionId must equal the URL gallery
+ * A token minted on gallery A cannot read gallery B under either check; a
+ * token used on its own gallery+photo passes the binding.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
+  fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-secimg-')), 'db.sqlite',
+);
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'secimg-test-secret';
+process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-secimg-storage-'));
+
+// Stub the anti-bot/rate-limit middleware so the fingerprint is deterministic
+// — the token below is minted with the same fingerprint, so verifySecureToken
+// passes and the binding logic under test is what decides the outcome.
+jest.mock('../../src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware', () => ({
+  secureImageAccess: (req, _res, next) => {
+    req.clientInfo = { fingerprint: 'test-fp', ip: '127.0.0.1', userAgent: 'jest' };
+    next();
+  },
+  getSecurityStatus: (_req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }),
+}));
+
+const request = require('supertest');
+const express = require('express');
+
+const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
+const secureImageService = require('../../src/services/secureImageService');
+
+describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let app;
+  let galleryA; let galleryB;
+  let photoA; let photoB;
+
+  const mkEvent = async (slug, requirePassword) => {
+    const r = await db('events').insert({
+      slug,
+      event_type: 'wedding',
+      event_name: slug,
+      event_date: '2026-08-01',
+      host_email: 'h@example.com',
+      admin_email: 'a@example.com',
+      password_hash: 'x',
+      require_password: requirePassword ? 1 : 0,
+      share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
+      share_token: `${slug}-share`,
+      expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
+      is_active: 1,
+      is_archived: 0,
+      is_draft: 0,
+      created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  const mkPhoto = async (eventId, slug, filename) => {
+    const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', slug);
+    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, filename), Buffer.from('img'));
+    const r = await db('photos').insert({
+      event_id: eventId,
+      filename,
+      path: `${slug}/${filename}`,
+      type: 'individual',
+      uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+    }).returning('id');
+    return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
+  };
+
+  // Mint a token exactly as the mint route does — bound to (photoId, gallery
+  // sessionId, fingerprint) — bypassing the anti-bot HTTP path.
+  const mint = (photoId, eventId) => secureImageService.generateSecureToken(
+    photoId,
+    `gallery_public_${eventId}_${Date.now()}`,
+    { clientFingerprint: 'test-fp', maxUses: 100, expiresIn: 3600 },
+  );
+
+  const view = (slug, photoId, token) => request(app)
+    .get(`/api/secure-images/${slug}/secure/${photoId}/${token}`);
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    await seedMinimal(db);
+    galleryA = await mkEvent('secimg-public-a', false);   // public — token source
+    galleryB = await mkEvent('secimg-private-b', true);   // password-protected — victim
+    photoA = await mkPhoto(galleryA, 'secimg-public-a', 'a.jpg');
+    photoB = await mkPhoto(galleryB, 'secimg-private-b', 'b.jpg');
+
+    app = express();
+    app.use(express.json());
+    app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
+
+  it('rejects a gallery-A token used against gallery B (cross-photo)', async () => {
+    const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
+    const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoB, token);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this photo/i);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a gallery-A token replayed on gallery B with A\'s photoId', async () => {
+    const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
+    // URL photoId matches the token, so the photo check passes — the gallery
+    // check (sessionId gallery A != URL gallery B) must catch it.
+    const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoA, token);
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this gallery/i);
+  });
+
+  it('lets a token read its own gallery + photo (binding passes)', async () => {
+    const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
+    const res = await view('secimg-public-a', photoA, token);
+    // Binding passes; serving may 200/404/500 depending on the pipeline, but
+    // it must NOT be rejected as a token mismatch.
+    expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/slideshowAdmin.test.js

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ describe('admin Live Slideshow endpoints', () => {
     app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
       res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
     });
-  }, 30000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
 

backend/__tests__/routes/slideshowPublic.test.js

@@ -67,11 +67,10 @@ async function insertEvent(db, over = {}) {
 describe('public Live Slideshow routes', () => {
   let db; let cleanup; let app;
 
-  // bootCrmDb runs the full migration set against a fresh SQLite file, which
-  // takes <2s locally but has been observed to exceed Jest's default 5s
-  // `beforeAll` timeout on slower GitHub Actions runners (~5.4s — runner-to-
-  // runner I/O variance). Raise the hook timeout so this doesn't intermittently
-  // block PRs on CI; doesn't affect happy-path local runs.
+  // bootCrmDb runs the full migration set against a fresh SQLite file and the
+  // chain keeps growing via backports. Hook-argument timeouts OVERRIDE the
+  // 120s jest.config default (same trap as the jest.setTimeout pins) — keep
+  // this at 120000, matching the config.
   beforeAll(async () => {
     ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
     await seedMinimal(db);
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ describe('public Live Slideshow routes', () => {
     app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
       res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
     });
-  }, 30000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
 

backend/__tests__/services/backupIntegrityService.test.js

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ const crypto = require('crypto');
 
 const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
 
-jest.setTimeout(30000);
+jest.setTimeout(120000);
 
 describe('backupIntegrityService.verifyDocumentArtefacts', () => {
   let db;

backend/__tests__/services/trackerFactory.test.js

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ let db; let cleanup;
 
 beforeAll(async () => {
   ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
-}, 30000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
 

backend/__tests__/services/userManagementService.activateDelete.test.js

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ describe('userManagementService — activate + delete (#574 follow-up)', () => {
       is_active: 1, created_at: new Date(),
     }).returning('id');
     targetId = targetInsert[0]?.id ?? targetInsert[0];
-  }, 60000);
+  }, 120000);
 
   afterAll(async () => {
     if (cleanup) await cleanup();

backend/__tests__/utils/feedbackPerGuestLimit.test.js

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
     }).returning('id');
     photoIds.push(r[0]?.id ?? r[0]);
   }
-}, 30000);
+}, 120000);
 
 afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
 

backend/__tests__/utils/networkValidation.dns.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/**
+ * DNS-resolving SSRF guard (GHSA SSRF cluster: webhook / S3 / rsync / SMTP /
+ * IMAP). The literal isPrivateIP check can't see that a public-looking
+ * hostname resolves to an internal/metadata IP; isHostAllowed resolves the
+ * name and vets every A/AAAA record.
+ */
+jest.mock('dns', () => {
+  const actual = jest.requireActual('dns');
+  return { ...actual, promises: { ...actual.promises, lookup: jest.fn() } };
+});
+const dns = require('dns');
+const {
+  isHostAllowed,
+  validateExternalUrlAsync,
+  classifyHost,
+} = require('../../src/utils/networkValidation');
+
+const lookup = dns.promises.lookup;
+
+describe('classifyHost', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => lookup.mockReset());
+
+  it('distinguishes private, unresolved, ok, and invalid', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '10.0.0.5', family: 4 }]);
+    expect(await classifyHost('evil.example')).toBe('private');
+
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+    expect(await classifyHost('example.com')).toBe('ok');
+
+    lookup.mockRejectedValue(new Error('EAI_AGAIN'));
+    expect(await classifyHost('blip.example')).toBe('unresolved');
+
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([]);
+    expect(await classifyHost('empty.example')).toBe('unresolved');
+
+    expect(await classifyHost('')).toBe('invalid');
+    expect(await classifyHost('10.0.0.1')).toBe('private'); // literal, no lookup
+  });
+});
+
+describe('isHostAllowed', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => lookup.mockReset());
+
+  it('rejects a public hostname that resolves to a private IP', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '10.0.0.5', family: 4 }]);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('evil.example.com')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects when the hostname resolves to the cloud metadata IP', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 }]);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('metadata-rebind.example')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects when ANY resolved address is private (rebinding / mixed records)', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([
+      { address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 },
+      { address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 },
+    ]);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('rebind.example')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('allows a hostname that resolves only to public IPs', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('example.com')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed when resolution errors', async () => {
+    lookup.mockRejectedValue(new Error('ENOTFOUND'));
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('nxdomain.invalid')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed on an empty resolution', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([]);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('empty.example')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects literal private IPs and blocked names without resolving', async () => {
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('127.0.0.1')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('10.0.0.1')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('localhost')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('metadata.google.internal')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('foo.internal')).toBe(false);
+    expect(lookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('allows a public IP literal without resolving', async () => {
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('93.184.216.34')).toBe(true);
+    expect(lookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects empty / non-string input', async () => {
+    expect(await isHostAllowed('')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isHostAllowed(null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('validateExternalUrlAsync', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => lookup.mockReset());
+
+  it('rejects a URL whose host resolves to a private address', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '10.1.2.3', family: 4 }]);
+    const r = await validateExternalUrlAsync('https://evil.example/hook');
+    expect(r.valid).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a URL whose host resolves public', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]);
+    expect((await validateExternalUrlAsync('https://example.com/hook')).valid).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a malformed URL', async () => {
+    expect((await validateExternalUrlAsync('not a url')).valid).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('reports reason=unresolved for a transient lookup failure (retryable)', async () => {
+    lookup.mockRejectedValue(new Error('EAI_AGAIN'));
+    const r = await validateExternalUrlAsync('https://blip.example/hook');
+    expect(r.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(r.reason).toBe('unresolved');
+  });
+
+  it('reports reason=private for a resolved-private host (permanent)', async () => {
+    lookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 }]);
+    const r = await validateExternalUrlAsync('https://rebind.example/hook');
+    expect(r.valid).toBe(false);
+    expect(r.reason).toBe('private');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/passwordValidation.complexityKey.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/**
+ * Regression tests for the password-complexity setting read path.
+ *
+ * Bug 1 (key mismatch): the settings UI saves the admin's choice as
+ * `security_password_complexity` (useSettingsState.ts prefixes every
+ * security field with `security_`), but getPasswordComplexitySettings()
+ * queried `security_password_complexity_level` — a key nothing writes —
+ * so the configured level was silently ignored.
+ *
+ * Bug 2 (driver shape, codex review of #843): on SQLite the TEXT column
+ * returns the JSON-stringified value ('"very_strong"'), but on Postgres
+ * (production default) `setting_value` is a json column and comes back
+ * already decoded ('very_strong'). A bare JSON.parse throws on the
+ * decoded shape and the outer catch fell back to 'moderate' — the
+ * setting stayed unenforced on Postgres even with the right key.
+ */
+
+const mockQueriedKeys = [];
+let mockStoredValue;
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({
+  db: () => ({
+    where(_col, key) {
+      mockQueriedKeys.push(key);
+      return this;
+    },
+    first() {
+      return Promise.resolve(
+        mockQueriedKeys[mockQueriedKeys.length - 1] === 'security_password_complexity'
+          ? { setting_key: 'security_password_complexity', setting_value: mockStoredValue }
+          : undefined
+      );
+    },
+  }),
+  withRetry: (fn) => fn(),
+}));
+
+const { getPasswordComplexitySettings } = require('../../src/utils/passwordValidation');
+
+describe('getPasswordComplexitySettings', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => { mockQueriedKeys.length = 0; });
+
+  it('reads the key the settings UI actually writes (SQLite shape: JSON-stringified)', async () => {
+    mockStoredValue = JSON.stringify('very_strong'); // '"very_strong"'
+    const level = await getPasswordComplexitySettings();
+    expect(mockQueriedKeys).toContain('security_password_complexity');
+    expect(level).toBe('very_strong');
+  });
+
+  it('accepts the Postgres json-column shape (already decoded, no quotes)', async () => {
+    mockStoredValue = 'very_strong'; // pg driver auto-parses the json column
+    const level = await getPasswordComplexitySettings();
+    expect(level).toBe('very_strong');
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to moderate on an empty value', async () => {
+    mockStoredValue = '';
+    const level = await getPasswordComplexitySettings();
+    expect(level).toBe('moderate');
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/photoVisibility.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/**
+ * Unit tests for the shared hidden-photo access-control helper.
+ *
+ * Pins the rule that ordinary gallery guests never receive photos with
+ * visibility='hidden' (NULL = visible), while PIN-clients see everything.
+ */
+const {
+  canSeeHiddenPhotos,
+  isPhotoHiddenFromViewer,
+} = require('../../src/utils/photoVisibility');
+
+describe('canSeeHiddenPhotos', () => {
+  it('is true only for the client access level', () => {
+    expect(canSeeHiddenPhotos('client')).toBe(true);
+    expect(canSeeHiddenPhotos('guest')).toBe(false);
+    expect(canSeeHiddenPhotos('slideshow')).toBe(false);
+    expect(canSeeHiddenPhotos(undefined)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('isPhotoHiddenFromViewer', () => {
+  it('blocks a hidden photo from guests', () => {
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({ visibility: 'hidden' }, 'guest')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({ visibility: 'hidden' }, 'slideshow')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('lets clients see hidden photos', () => {
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({ visibility: 'hidden' }, 'client')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('treats visible and NULL visibility as viewable by everyone', () => {
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({ visibility: 'visible' }, 'guest')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({ visibility: null }, 'guest')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer({}, 'guest')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('is null-safe', () => {
+    expect(isPhotoHiddenFromViewer(null, 'guest')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/resolveLogoFile.test.js

@@ -99,10 +99,22 @@ describe('resolveLogoFile', () => {
     }
   });
 
-  it('treats absolute paths as-is when they exist', async () => {
+  it('rejects an absolute path OUTSIDE the storage roots (GHSA-c7x5)', async () => {
+    // The raw-absolute candidate was an arbitrary-file-read primitive
+    // (logo_path: '/etc/passwd' → rasterised into a PDF). Absolute paths
+    // outside the storage roots are now dropped even if they exist.
     existsSpy.mockImplementation((p) => p === '/abs/path/logo.png');
     getAppSetting.mockResolvedValue(null);
     const out = await resolveLogoFile({ logo_path: '/abs/path/logo.png' });
-    expect(out).toBe('/abs/path/logo.png');
+    expect(out).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('still accepts an absolute path INSIDE the storage root', async () => {
+    // The legitimate case: multer stores the uploaded logo under
+    // storage/uploads/logos with an absolute path — that stays resolvable.
+    existsSpy.mockImplementation((p) => p === '/app/storage/uploads/logos/logo.png');
+    getAppSetting.mockResolvedValue(null);
+    const out = await resolveLogoFile({ logo_path: '/app/storage/uploads/logos/logo.png' });
+    expect(out).toBe('/app/storage/uploads/logos/logo.png');
   });
 });

backend/jest.config.js

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 module.exports = {
   testEnvironment: 'node',
+  // bootCrmDb() runs EVERY core migration in beforeAll and the chain keeps
+  // growing (134 migrations and counting via backports). 120s matches the
+  // beta-branch convention from #860.
+  testTimeout: 120000,
   coverageDirectory: 'coverage',
   collectCoverageFrom: [
     'src/**/*.js',

backend/package.json

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 {
   "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.45.3",
+  "version": "3.45.12",
   "description": "Backend for PicPeak event photo sharing platform",
   "main": "server.js",
+  "engines": {
+    "node": "^20.19.0 || >=22"
+  },
   "scripts": {
     "start": "node server.js",
     "dev": "nodemon server.js",
@@ -18,11 +21,12 @@
     "@aws-sdk/lib-storage": "^3.850.0",
     "@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner": "^3.850.0",
     "archiver": "^5.3.1",
-    "axios": "1.16.0",
+    "axios": "1.18.1",
     "bcrypt": "6.0.0",
     "chokidar": "4.0.3",
     "cookie-parser": "^1.4.7",
     "cors": "^2.8.5",
+    "cron-parser": "^4.9.0",
     "dotenv": "^16.0.3",
     "exifr": "^7.1.3",
     "express": "^4.18.2",
@@ -47,19 +51,20 @@
     "node-stream-zip": "^1.15.0",
     "nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
     "otplib": "^12.0.1",
+    "p-limit": "^3.1.0",
     "pdf-lib": "^1.17.1",
     "pdfkit": "^0.17.2",
     "pg": "^8.16.3",
-    "postcss": "8.5.10",
+    "postcss": "8.5.18",
     "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
     "react-i18next": "^15.6.0",
-    "sanitize-html": "^2.17.0",
-    "sharp": "0.34.3",
+    "sanitize-html": "2.17.5",
+    "sharp": "0.35.3",
     "sqlite3": "^5.1.6",
     "swagger-jsdoc": "^6.2.8",
     "swagger-ui-express": "^5.0.1",
     "swissqrbill": "^4.3.0",
-    "tar": ">=7.5.16",
+    "tar": ">=7.5.21",
     "uuid": "^11.1.1",
     "winston": "^3.8.2",
     "zxcvbn": "^4.4.2"
@@ -79,8 +84,8 @@
     "js-yaml": "^4.2.0",
     "fast-xml-parser": ">=5.7.0",
     "qs": ">=6.15.2",
-    "tar": ">=7.5.16",
-    "brace-expansion": ">=5.0.6",
+    "tar": ">=7.5.21",
+    "brace-expansion": ">=5.0.7",
     "minimatch": ">=9.0.7",
     "path-to-regexp": "0.1.13",
     "lodash": ">=4.18.1",

backend/src/middleware/photoAuth.js

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
 const { getGalleryTokenFromRequest } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
+const { isTokenRevoked } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 
 async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
@@ -89,7 +90,33 @@ async function photoAuth(req, res, next) {
         
         // Check if it's an admin token (admins can view all photos)
         if (decoded.type === 'admin') {
-          // For both thumbnails and photos with admin token, allow access
+          // Enforce the same revocation / session-cutoff invalidation that
+          // adminAuth does — otherwise a validly-signed admin JWT keeps
+          // serving photos after logout, password change, or explicit
+          // revocation (GHSA-x55x).
+          if (await isTokenRevoked(decoded)) {
+            return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session expired' });
+          }
+          // adminAuth also (a) rejects tokens for a now-deactivated admin and
+          // (b) rejects any token minted before the admin's last password
+          // change. Token revocation alone doesn't cover those, so without
+          // these two checks a stale or pre-password-change admin token still
+          // fetches every photo.
+          const admin = await db('admin_users')
+            .where({ id: decoded.id, is_active: formatBoolean(true) })
+            .select('id', 'password_changed_at')
+            .first();
+          if (!admin) {
+            return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session expired' });
+          }
+          if (admin.password_changed_at) {
+            const passwordChangedSeconds = Math.floor(
+              new Date(admin.password_changed_at).getTime() / 1000
+            );
+            if (decoded.iat < passwordChangedSeconds) {
+              return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session expired' });
+            }
+          }
           return next();
         }
     } catch (err) {

backend/src/middleware/uploadValidation.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ async function validateUploadedFile(filePath) {
       let metadata;
       try {
         metadata = await sharp(filePath, {
-          failOnError: false, // Don't fail on recoverable errors
+          failOn: 'none', // Don't fail on recoverable errors
           limitInputPixels: 268402689 // ~16k x 16k max
         }).metadata();
       } catch (metadataError) {
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ async function validateUploadedFile(filePath) {
       // Additional check: verify we can actually decode a small portion of the image
       try {
         await sharp(filePath, {
-          failOnError: false,
+          failOn: 'none',
           limitInputPixels: 268402689
         })
         .resize(10, 10) // Try to resize to very small size

backend/src/routes/adminApiTokens.js

@@ -19,7 +19,10 @@ const router = express.Router();
 // the plaintext, never recoverable after creation.
 router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req, res) => {
   try {
-    const tokens = await db('api_tokens')
+    // Scope to the caller's own tokens unless super_admin — the previous
+    // query returned every admin's token metadata (name/preview/scopes/
+    // owner) to any settings.view holder (GHSA-jm7j).
+    const tokensQuery = db('api_tokens')
       .leftJoin('admin_users', 'admin_users.id', 'api_tokens.created_by')
       .select(
         'api_tokens.id',
@@ -33,6 +36,10 @@ router.get('/', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req, res)
         'admin_users.username as owner_username'
       )
       .orderBy('api_tokens.created_at', 'desc');
+    if (req.admin.roleName !== 'super_admin') {
+      tokensQuery.where('api_tokens.created_by', req.admin.id);
+    }
+    const tokens = await tokensQuery;
     res.json(tokens);
   } catch (error) {
     logger.error('Failed to list API tokens', { error: error.message });
@@ -101,6 +108,12 @@ router.delete('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), async (req,
     const { id } = req.params;
     const row = await db('api_tokens').where({ id }).first();
     if (!row) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Token not found' });
+    // Only the token's owner (or a super_admin) may revoke it — otherwise
+    // any settings.edit holder could revoke another admin's tokens
+    // (GHSA-gprq). 404 rather than 403 so a non-owner can't probe token ids.
+    if (req.admin.roleName !== 'super_admin' && row.created_by !== req.admin.id) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Token not found' });
+    }
     if (row.revoked_at) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Token already revoked' });
 
     await db('api_tokens').where({ id }).update({ revoked_at: new Date() });

backend/src/routes/adminAuth.js

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ const { endSession } = require('../middleware/sessionTimeout');
 const { validatePasswordStrength } = require('../utils/passwordGenerator');
 const { handleAsync, validateRequest, successResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { NotFoundError, ConflictError, ValidationError } = require('../utils/errors');
-const { setAdminAuthCookie } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
+const { setAdminAuthCookie, clearAdminAuthCookie } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
 const { IDENTITY_PRESERVING_NORMALIZE_EMAIL } = require('../utils/emailNormalization');
 const mfaService = require('../services/mfaService');
 const router = express.Router();
@@ -168,12 +168,21 @@ router.post('/change-password', [
 
 // Logout
 router.post('/logout', adminAuth, handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
-  // Get token from header
-  const token = req.headers.authorization?.split(' ')[1];
+  // Use the token adminAuth actually authenticated with (req.token) — it may
+  // have come from the admin_token cookie, not the Authorization header. The
+  // old header-only read skipped revocation entirely for cookie-based logout,
+  // leaving the JWT valid until expiry while reporting a successful logout.
+  const token = req.token;
   if (token) {
-    // End the session
+    // End the in-memory session AND revoke the JWT (GHSA-cjqh) — the token
+    // is otherwise valid until expiry, so photoAuth/adminAuth would keep
+    // honouring it after logout. isTokenRevoked() checks this store.
     endSession(token);
+    const { revokeToken } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
+    await revokeToken(token, 'logout');
   }
+  // Clear the auth cookie so the browser stops sending the (now revoked) JWT.
+  clearAdminAuthCookie(res);
 
   // Log activity
   await logActivity('admin_logout',

backend/src/routes/adminBackup.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 const express = require('express');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
-const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
+const { requirePermission, requireSuperAdmin } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { clearAdminAuthCookie } = require('../utils/tokenUtils');
 const { revokeToken } = require('../utils/tokenRevocation');
 const { triggerManualBackup, getBackupStatus, cleanupOldBackupRuns, getBackupManifest, validateBackupManifest } = require('../services/backupService');
@@ -57,14 +57,33 @@ router.put('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req,
         }
         break;
       case 's3':
-        if (!updates.backup_s3_endpoint || !updates.backup_s3_bucket || 
+        if (!updates.backup_s3_endpoint || !updates.backup_s3_bucket ||
               !updates.backup_s3_access_key || !updates.backup_s3_secret_key) {
           return res.status(400).json({ error: 'S3 backup requires endpoint, bucket, and credentials' });
         }
         break;
       }
     }
-    
+
+    // SSRF: validate an S3 endpoint whenever one is supplied — NOT only when
+    // the payload also flips backup_destination_type to 's3'. The PUT
+    // persists every backup_* field independently, so with S3 already
+    // selected a caller could PATCH just backup_s3_endpoint to a
+    // private-resolving host; the management ops (manifest, bucket/file
+    // browse, cleanup, test-upload) then connect without going through
+    // testConnection. Prod-only; dev points at localhost MinIO deliberately.
+    if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'
+        && updates.backup_s3_endpoint && updates.backup_s3_endpoint !== '••••••••') {
+      const rawEndpoint = updates.backup_s3_endpoint;
+      const withProto = /^https?:\/\//.test(rawEndpoint) ? rawEndpoint : `https://${rawEndpoint}`;
+      let epHost = null;
+      try { epHost = new URL(withProto).hostname; } catch { epHost = null; }
+      const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+      if (!epHost || !(await isHostAllowed(epHost))) {
+        return res.status(400).json({ error: 'S3 endpoint resolves to a private or internal network address' });
+      }
+    }
+
     // Update settings
     for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(updates)) {
       if (key.startsWith('backup_')) {
@@ -139,7 +158,12 @@ router.post('/run', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, r
 // SECURITY: the file contains plaintext secrets (SMTP password, admin password
 // hashes, API keys). The download UI must warn before offering it. We surface
 // the flag as a response header too so the client can double-confirm.
-router.get('/picpeak/export', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
+// Full-instance export dumps every table unredacted — bcrypt password
+// hashes, 2FA columns, and all integration secrets (SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/
+// webhook/S3) in cleartext. The built-in `admin` role holds backup.create,
+// but is denied this data everywhere else (config APIs mask secrets as
+// ********). Gate the raw dump behind super_admin (GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v).
+router.get('/picpeak/export', adminAuth, requireSuperAdmin(), async (req, res) => {
   const fsSync = require('fs');
   try {
     const includePhotos = req.query.includePhotos === 'true' || req.query.includePhotos === '1';
@@ -351,9 +375,11 @@ router.post('/test-connection', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), a
         break;
       }
 
-      // SSRF protection: block connections to private/internal addresses
-      const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-      if (isPrivateIP(host)) {
+      // SSRF protection: resolve the host and block any private/internal
+      // address. ssh does its own DNS at connect time, so a literal-only
+      // check let a hostname resolving to an internal IP through (#GHSA-4jh8).
+      const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+      if (!(await isHostAllowed(host))) {
         res.json({ success: false, message: 'Host cannot be a private or internal network address' });
         break;
       }

backend/src/routes/adminCategories.js

@@ -141,8 +141,18 @@ router.put('/:id', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
         .trim()
     };
 
-    // Update hero_photo_id if provided (including null to clear it)
+    // Update hero_photo_id if provided (including null to clear it). A
+    // non-null hero must belong to this category (GHSA-j2f4) — the general
+    // update path previously wrote it with no membership check at all.
     if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(req.body, 'hero_photo_id')) {
+      if (hero_photo_id) {
+        const heroPhoto = await db('photos')
+          .where({ id: hero_photo_id, category_id: id })
+          .first();
+        if (!heroPhoto) {
+          return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found in this category' });
+        }
+      }
       updateData.hero_photo_id = hero_photo_id || null;
     }
 
@@ -192,11 +202,16 @@ router.put('/:id/hero', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.edit'), [
       return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Category not found' });
     }
 
-    // If hero_photo_id is provided, verify it belongs to a photo in this category
+    // If hero_photo_id is provided, verify the photo actually belongs to
+    // THIS category — checking existence alone let an admin point a
+    // category's hero at a photo from a different category or event
+    // (GHSA-j2f4).
     if (hero_photo_id) {
-      const photo = await db('photos').where('id', hero_photo_id).first();
+      const photo = await db('photos')
+        .where({ id: hero_photo_id, category_id: id })
+        .first();
       if (!photo) {
-        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found in this category' });
       }
     }
 

backend/src/routes/adminCustomers.js

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ const { body, param, query } = require('express-validator');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const { requireFeatureFlag } = require('../middleware/requireFeatureFlag');
+const { filterOwnedEventIds } = require('../middleware/ownership');
+const { db } = require('../database/db');
 
 // Hour-entry routes are gated by the hoursLogging master so a direct API hit
 // can't read/edit/delete/bill logged hours while the feature is off (the
@@ -528,9 +530,45 @@ router.put('/:id/events', [
   body('event_ids.*').isInt({ min: 1 }),
 ], handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
   validateRequest(req);
+  const customerId = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
+  const submitted = req.body.event_ids.map(Number);
+
+  // The customer's CURRENT assignments. The "Manage galleries" dialog submits
+  // the full initial list back — including any events owned by OTHER admins —
+  // so we need this to tell "retain an existing foreign assignment" apart from
+  // "newly grant a foreign event".
+  const existingEventIds = (await db('event_customer_assignments')
+    .where('customer_account_id', customerId)
+    .pluck('event_id')).map(Number);
+  const existingSet = new Set(existingEventIds);
+
+  // Events the caller may act on (GHSA-xr6x). A denied id is only acceptable
+  // when the customer ALREADY has that assignment (a foreign event the caller
+  // is merely keeping); a denied id that isn't already assigned is a fresh
+  // attempt to mint access to a foreign/nonexistent event → reject.
+  const { allowed } = await filterOwnedEventIds(req.admin, submitted);
+  const allowedSet = new Set(allowed.map(Number));
+  const illegalNew = submitted.filter((id) => !allowedSet.has(id) && !existingSet.has(id));
+  if (illegalNew.length) {
+    return res.status(403).json({ error: 'One or more events are not yours to assign' });
+  }
+
+  // setAssignmentsForCustomer replaces the FULL assignment list, deleting any
+  // existing row not in the submitted set. A restricted admin must not be able
+  // to revoke another admin's customer↔event links that way, so always retain
+  // the customer's existing assignments to events the caller does NOT own —
+  // regardless of whether the client echoed them back. super_admin owns
+  // everything, so nothing is force-preserved for them.
+  let finalEventIds = allowed.map(Number);
+  if (req.admin.roleName !== 'super_admin' && existingEventIds.length) {
+    const { allowed: ownedExisting } = await filterOwnedEventIds(req.admin, existingEventIds);
+    const ownedExistingSet = new Set(ownedExisting.map(Number));
+    const foreignExisting = existingEventIds.filter((id) => !ownedExistingSet.has(id));
+    finalEventIds = [...new Set([...finalEventIds, ...foreignExisting])];
+  }
   const result = await customerAccountsService.setAssignmentsForCustomer(
-    parseInt(req.params.id, 10),
-    req.body.event_ids,
+    customerId,
+    finalEventIds,
     req.admin.id,
   );
   successResponse(res, result);

backend/src/routes/adminDashboard.js

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
 
     // Get total downloads (last 30 days) - include both single and bulk downloads
     const totalDownloads = await db('access_logs')
-      .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all'])
+      .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all', 'download_all_presigned', 'download_selected'])
       .where('timestamp', '>=', thirtyDaysAgo.toISOString())
       .count('id as count')
       .first();
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ router.get('/stats', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (req,
       .first();
 
     const previousDownloads = await db('access_logs')
-      .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all'])
+      .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all', 'download_all_presigned', 'download_selected'])
       .where('timestamp', '>=', sixtyDaysAgo.toISOString())
       .where('timestamp', '<', thirtyDaysAgo.toISOString())
       .count('id as count')
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (
     // Get downloads per day - include both single and bulk downloads
     const downloadsData = await db('access_logs')
       .select(db.raw('DATE(timestamp) as date'), db.raw('COUNT(*) as count'))
-      .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all'])
+      .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all', 'download_all_presigned', 'download_selected'])
       .where('timestamp', '>=', startDateStr)
       .groupByRaw('DATE(timestamp)');
 
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (
       .select('events.id', 'events.event_name', 'events.slug')
       .select(db.raw('COUNT(CASE WHEN action = \'view\' THEN 1 END) as views'))
       .select(db.raw('COUNT(DISTINCT CASE WHEN action = \'view\' THEN ip_address END) as uniqueVisitors'))
-      .select(db.raw('COUNT(CASE WHEN action IN (\'download\', \'download_all\') THEN 1 END) as downloads'))
+      .select(db.raw('COUNT(CASE WHEN action IN (\'download\', \'download_all\', \'download_all_presigned\', \'download_selected\') THEN 1 END) as downloads'))
       .join('events', 'access_logs.event_id', 'events.id')
       .where('access_logs.timestamp', '>=', startDateStr)
       .groupBy('events.id', 'events.event_name', 'events.slug')
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ router.get('/analytics', adminAuth, requirePermission('analytics.view'), async (
       .first();
 
     const totalDownloadsCount = await db('access_logs')
-      .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all'])
+      .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all', 'download_all_presigned', 'download_selected'])
       .where('timestamp', '>=', startDateStr)
       .count('id as count')
       .first();

backend/src/routes/adminEmail.js

@@ -66,9 +66,11 @@ router.post('/config', [
       tls_reject_unauthorized
     } = req.body;
 
-    // Validate SMTP host is not a private/internal address (SSRF protection)
-    const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-    if (isPrivateIP(smtp_host)) {
+    // Validate SMTP host is not a private/internal address (SSRF protection).
+    // Resolves DNS so a public-looking hostname pointing at an internal IP
+    // is caught, not just literal private addresses (#GHSA-ch64).
+    const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+    if (!(await isHostAllowed(smtp_host))) {
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'SMTP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
     }
 
@@ -152,8 +154,8 @@ router.post('/incoming-config', [
     const errors = validationResult(req);
     if (!errors.isEmpty()) return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
     const { imap_host, imap_port, imap_secure, imap_user, imap_pass, imap_folder } = req.body;
-    const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-    if (isPrivateIP(imap_host)) {
+    const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+    if (!(await isHostAllowed(imap_host))) {
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
     }
     const existing = await db('email_configs').first();
@@ -183,8 +185,8 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/folders', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view
   try {
     const { imap_host, imap_port, imap_secure, imap_user, imap_pass } = req.body || {};
     if (imap_host) {
-      const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-      if (isPrivateIP(imap_host)) {
+      const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+      if (!(await isHostAllowed(imap_host))) {
         return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
       }
     }
@@ -205,8 +207,8 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/test', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'),
   try {
     const { imap_host, imap_port, imap_secure, imap_user, imap_pass, imap_folder } = req.body || {};
     if (imap_host) {
-      const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-      if (isPrivateIP(imap_host)) {
+      const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+      if (!(await isHostAllowed(imap_host))) {
         return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
       }
     }
@@ -385,11 +387,11 @@ router.post('/accounts', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.edit
     if (!b.account_key) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'account_key is required' });
     // SSRF guard — mirror /config + /incoming-config: neither the IMAP nor the
     // SMTP host may point at a private/internal address.
-    const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-    if (b.imap_host && isPrivateIP(b.imap_host)) {
+    const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+    if (b.imap_host && !(await isHostAllowed(b.imap_host))) {
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
     }
-    if (b.smtp_host && isPrivateIP(b.smtp_host)) {
+    if (b.smtp_host && !(await isHostAllowed(b.smtp_host))) {
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'SMTP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
     }
     const patch = {
@@ -434,8 +436,8 @@ router.post('/accounts', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.edit
 router.post('/accounts/test', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
   try {
     const b = req.body || {};
-    const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
-    if (b.imap_host && isPrivateIP(b.imap_host)) {
+    const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+    if (b.imap_host && !(await isHostAllowed(b.imap_host))) {
       return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
     }
     let pass = b.imap_pass;

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/crud.js

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     body('allow_presigned_download').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('css_template_id').optional({ nullable: true, checkFalsy: true }).isInt(),
     // Hero logo settings
-    body('hero_logo_visible').optional().isBoolean(),
+    body('hero_logo_visible').optional({ nullable: true }).isBoolean(),
     body('hero_logo_size').optional({ nullable: true }).isIn(['small', 'medium', 'large', 'xlarge']),
     body('hero_logo_position').optional().isIn(['top', 'center', 'bottom']),
     // Header style settings (decoupled from layout)
@@ -342,8 +342,10 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
       // hero_logo_visible: store NULL ("inherit") unless the admin explicitly
       // set it, so the global branding_logo_display_hero toggle keeps
       // controlling this gallery afterwards (#756). Only an explicit per-event
-      // choice overrides the global.
-      const effectiveHeroLogoVisible = req.body.hero_logo_visible !== undefined
+      // choice overrides the global. `!= null` treats an explicit null the same
+      // as omitted (both → inherit); otherwise formatBoolean(null) would coerce
+      // to 0/false on SQLite instead of NULL (the PUT handler already does this).
+      const effectiveHeroLogoVisible = req.body.hero_logo_visible != null
         ? formatBoolean(hero_logo_visible)
         : null;
       // NULL = inherit the global branding_logo_size (#756), resolved at read
@@ -769,9 +771,11 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         .where('action', 'view')
         .count('* as totalViews');
 
+      // One row per download event: singles AND zips (#895). Must stay in
+      // sync with adminDashboard's definition or the two surfaces disagree.
       const [{ totalDownloads }] = await db('access_logs')
         .where('event_id', id)
-        .where('action', 'download')
+        .whereIn('action', ['download', 'download_all', 'download_all_presigned', 'download_selected'])
         .count('* as totalDownloads');
 
       const [{ uniqueVisitors }] = await db('access_logs')
@@ -1224,7 +1228,7 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     }),
     body('css_template_id').optional({ nullable: true, checkFalsy: true }).isInt(),
     // Hero logo settings
-    body('hero_logo_visible').optional().isBoolean(),
+    body('hero_logo_visible').optional({ nullable: true }).isBoolean(),
     body('hero_logo_size').optional({ nullable: true }).isIn(['small', 'medium', 'large', 'xlarge']),
     body('hero_logo_position').optional().isIn(['top', 'center', 'bottom']),
     // Header style settings (decoupled from layout)
@@ -1265,6 +1269,52 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
 
       const { id } = req.params;
       const updates = { ...req.body };
+
+      // Strip identity/provenance/secret columns from the mass-assigned
+      // body (GHSA-3rqx). The handler spreads req.body straight into the
+      // events UPDATE, so without this an events.edit holder could rewrite
+      // ownership (created_by), routing identity (slug/share_link), the
+      // share/client tokens, or the password hashes directly. Plaintext
+      // `password`/`client_password` inputs are NOT stripped — those are the
+      // supported way to change credentials and get hashed below; the
+      // tokens are regenerated internally where needed.
+      // The handler spreads req.body straight into the events UPDATE, so any
+      // column an events.edit holder names is writable unless blocked here.
+      // This is a COMPLETE deny-set of every server-managed / permission-gated
+      // events column (enumerated from the schema); everything else is a
+      // legitimate edit-form field and passes through, including input-only
+      // keys (password/client_password) the handler transforms below. New
+      // server-managed columns MUST be added here. (codex review — GHSA-3rqx.)
+      const IMMUTABLE_EVENT_COLUMNS = [
+        // Identity / provenance
+        'id', 'created_by', 'created_at', 'updated_at', 'slug',
+        // Routing + share/client tokens (generated at create / internally)
+        'share_link', 'share_token', 'client_share_token', 'show_share_token',
+        // Secrets (set via the plaintext password/client_password inputs)
+        'password_hash', 'client_password_hash',
+        // Server-consumed file paths — e.g. DELETE /:id/logo fs.unlink()s
+        // hero_logo_path, so a forged value is an arbitrary-delete primitive.
+        'hero_logo_path', 'hero_logo_url', 'archive_path', 'download_zip_path',
+        // Server-managed timestamps
+        'download_zip_generated_at', 'archived_at', 'revealed_at', 'event_reminder_sent_at',
+        // Lifecycle — governed by dedicated permission-gated routes
+        // (events.archive/restore, publish, activate/deactivate), not events.edit.
+        'is_archived', 'is_draft', 'is_active',
+        // Relationships — managed by projectService.assignEvent + its
+        // customer-consistency checks, and events.edit ≠ quotes/contracts perms.
+        'project_id', 'quote_id',
+        // Legacy mirrors — rejected explicitly below in favour of customer_*.
+        'host_name', 'host_email',
+      ];
+      // Case-insensitive match: SQLite treats quoted identifiers
+      // case-insensitively, so a `{ "Password_Hash": ... }` key would
+      // otherwise survive a case-sensitive delete and still hit the real
+      // column (codex review).
+      const denied = new Set(IMMUTABLE_EVENT_COLUMNS.map((c) => c.toLowerCase()));
+      for (const key of Object.keys(updates)) {
+        if (denied.has(key.toLowerCase())) delete updates[key];
+      }
+
       const customerColumnsAvailable = await hasCustomerContactColumns();
 
       if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, 'host_name') || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, 'host_email')) {
@@ -1493,10 +1543,15 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         }
       }
 
-      // Update event
-      await db('events')
-        .where('id', id)
-        .update(updates);
+      // Update event. Skip the write when the denylist (or masked secrets)
+      // left nothing to change — Knex rejects .update({}) with an error,
+      // which would surface as a 500 for an otherwise-valid no-op request
+      // (e.g. a body of only protected fields). (codex review.)
+      if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
+        await db('events')
+          .where('id', id)
+          .update(updates);
+      }
 
       // Customer-account assignments (#354). Same skip semantics as POST:
       // ignore when the customer portal flag is off so stale tabs don't

backend/src/routes/adminFeedback.js

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 const express = require('express');
+const { neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula } = require('../utils/spreadsheetSafe');
 const router = express.Router();
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
@@ -164,6 +165,24 @@ router.get('/events/:eventId/feedback',
   }
 );
 
+// Ownership guard for by-feedback-id routes (GHSA-2qc2 / GHSA-32h4). These
+// take a :feedbackId (not :eventId), so requireEventOwnership can't apply —
+// resolve the feedback's event and enforce the same rule (super_admin sees
+// all; others need to own the event, or it's ownerless/legacy). Returns
+// false and sends a 404 (not 403 — don't leak which feedback ids exist)
+// when the caller may not act on it.
+async function assertOwnsFeedback(req, res, feedbackId) {
+  if (req.admin.roleName === 'super_admin') return true;
+  const fb = await db('photo_feedback').where('id', feedbackId).first('event_id');
+  if (!fb) { res.status(404).json({ error: 'Feedback not found' }); return false; }
+  const event = await db('events').where('id', fb.event_id).first('created_by');
+  if (event && event.created_by && event.created_by !== req.admin.id) {
+    res.status(404).json({ error: 'Feedback not found' });
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
 // Moderate feedback (approve/hide/reject)
 router.put('/feedback/:feedbackId/:action',
   adminAuth,
@@ -171,11 +190,12 @@ router.put('/feedback/:feedbackId/:action',
   async (req, res) => {
     try {
       const { feedbackId, action } = req.params;
-      
+
       if (!['approve', 'hide', 'reject'].includes(action)) {
         return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid action' });
       }
-      
+      if (!(await assertOwnsFeedback(req, res, feedbackId))) return;
+
       await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(feedbackId, action, req.admin.id);
       
       res.json({ success: true });
@@ -193,7 +213,8 @@ router.delete('/feedback/:feedbackId',
   async (req, res) => {
     try {
       const { feedbackId } = req.params;
-      
+      if (!(await assertOwnsFeedback(req, res, feedbackId))) return;
+
       await feedbackService.deleteFeedback(feedbackId, req.admin.id);
       
       res.json({ success: true });
@@ -347,7 +368,15 @@ router.get('/feedback/pending-moderation',
   requirePermission('events.view'),
   async (req, res) => {
     try {
-      const pending = await feedbackService.getPendingModeration();
+      // Scope to the caller's owned events unless super_admin (GHSA-3335).
+      let ownedEventIds = null;
+      if (req.admin.roleName !== 'super_admin') {
+        const rows = await db('events')
+          .where((q) => q.whereNull('created_by').orWhere('created_by', req.admin.id))
+          .select('id');
+        ownedEventIds = rows.map((r) => r.id);
+      }
+      const pending = await feedbackService.getPendingModeration(null, ownedEventIds);
       res.json(pending);
     } catch (error) {
       logger.error('Error getting pending moderation:', error);
@@ -450,11 +479,13 @@ function convertToCSV(data) {
       const value = row[header];
       if (value === null || value === undefined) return '';
       if (typeof value === 'boolean') return value ? 'yes' : 'no';
-      if (typeof value === 'string'
-        && (value.includes(',') || value.includes('"') || value.includes('\n') || value.includes('\r'))) {
-        return `"${value.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`;
+      // Formula-neutralize user-controlled cells (guest_name/comment_text)
+      // before quoting — quoting alone doesn't stop `=cmd()` (GHSA-3cw3).
+      const neutralized = neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula(value);
+      if (neutralized.includes(',') || neutralized.includes('"') || neutralized.includes('\n') || neutralized.includes('\r')) {
+        return `"${neutralized.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`;
       }
-      return value;
+      return neutralized;
     }).join(',');
   });
 

backend/src/routes/adminGuests.js

@@ -39,8 +39,13 @@ function serializeGuest(row) {
   };
 }
 
+const { neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula } = require('../utils/spreadsheetSafe');
+
 function escapeCsvCell(value) {
-  const str = value == null ? '' : String(value);
+  // Neutralize spreadsheet formulas FIRST (a `=cmd()` guest name executes on
+  // open — RFC-4180 quoting doesn't stop it), then quote-wrap (GHSA-wc99 /
+  // GHSA-f4fp).
+  const str = neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula(value);
   if (/[,"\n\r]/.test(str)) {
     return `"${str.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`;
   }

backend/src/routes/adminImageSecurity.js

@@ -502,6 +502,15 @@ router.get('/export', adminAuth, requirePermission('settings.view'), async (req,
 /**
  * Helper function to convert data to CSV
  */
+const { neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula } = require('../utils/spreadsheetSafe');
+
+function csvCell(value) {
+  // Formula-neutralize, then RFC-4180 quote (the previous join('') did
+  // neither — GHSA-37p4).
+  const s = neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula(value);
+  return /[,"\n\r]/.test(s) ? `"${s.replace(/"/g, '""')}"` : s;
+}
+
 function convertToCSV(data) {
   // Simplified CSV conversion for security logs
   const headers = ['timestamp', 'event_type', 'client_ip', 'details'];
@@ -511,8 +520,8 @@ function convertToCSV(data) {
     log.client_ip,
     JSON.stringify(log.details || {})
   ]);
-  
-  return [headers.join(','), ...rows.map(row => row.join(','))].join('\n');
+
+  return [headers.join(','), ...rows.map(row => row.map(csvCell).join(','))].join('\n');
 }
 
 module.exports = router;

backend/src/routes/adminPhotos.js

@@ -315,9 +315,10 @@ router.post('/:eventId/upload', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.upload'), r
     const crypto = require('crypto');
     const uploadId = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
 
-    // Counter base — same approximation as before. Strict uniqueness is
-    // already enforced by the filename template + DB unique index, so a
-    // small race here just retries a counter on conflict (rare).
+    // Counter base — a per-request approximation (concurrent upload
+    // requests can compute the same base; there is NO unique index on
+    // photos.filename). Uniqueness of the final path comes from the
+    // random suffix inside generatePhotoFilename (#931).
     const existingCount = await db('photos')
       .where({ event_id: eventId, type: photoType })
       .count('id as count')
@@ -756,6 +757,16 @@ router.patch('/:eventId/photos/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.e
       .where({ id: photoId, event_id: eventId })
       .update(updateData);
 
+    // A visibility or category change alters which photos belong in the
+    // guest download bundle — drop the cached ZIP so it rebuilds fresh,
+    // otherwise a hide→unhide cycle can leave the stale cache omitting
+    // photos added in between (codex review).
+    if (updateData.visibility !== undefined
+        || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updateData, 'category_id')
+        || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updateData, 'type')) {
+      downloadZipService.invalidate(parseInt(eventId, 10));
+    }
+
     // Fetch and return the updated photo
     const updatedPhoto = await db('photos')
       .where({ id: photoId, event_id: eventId })
@@ -904,6 +915,14 @@ router.post('/:eventId/photos/bulk-update', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos
       .where('event_id', eventId)
       .update(updateData);
 
+    // Visibility/category changes alter the guest download bundle — drop the
+    // cached ZIP so it rebuilds fresh (codex review).
+    if (updateData.visibility !== undefined
+        || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updateData, 'category_id')
+        || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updateData, 'type')) {
+      downloadZipService.invalidate(parseInt(eventId, 10));
+    }
+
     res.json({ message: `${photoIds.length} photos updated successfully` });
   } catch (error) {
     errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update photos');
@@ -1091,7 +1110,13 @@ router.get('/:eventId/photos', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view'), requ
         average_rating: photo.average_rating || 0,
         comment_count: commentMap[photo.id] || 0,
         like_count: photo.like_count || 0,
-        favorite_count: photo.favorite_count || 0
+        favorite_count: photo.favorite_count || 0,
+        // Engagement counters (#895 follow-up): the grid reads these, but
+        // this explicit mapper never included them — so the Engagement
+        // column showed 0 regardless of what the DB counted. This, not
+        // stale data, was why per-image downloads always displayed 0.
+        view_count: photo.view_count || 0,
+        download_count: photo.download_count || 0
       }))
     });
   } catch (error) {
@@ -1126,7 +1151,65 @@ router.get('/:eventId/photo/:photoId', adminAuth, requirePermission('photos.view
     const event = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
     const storageKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(event, photo);
 
-    res.setHeader('Content-Type', `image/${path.extname(photo.filename).slice(1)}`);
+    // Content-Type resolution (#908 + external review). Invariant: the
+    // header is ALWAYS image/* or video/*.
+    //  - photos.mime_type is never echoed verbatim unless it is a video/
+    //    type: the chunked-upload path stores the client-sent MIME
+    //    unvalidated, so a stored text/html served inline under the app
+    //    origin would be a same-origin XSS gift.
+    //  - Images ignore the stored value entirely — migration 039
+    //    backfilled image/jpeg onto every legacy row (PNGs included), so
+    //    the extension is the more trustworthy signal; normalized via the
+    //    shared map (image/jpg → image/jpeg), jpeg fallback when unknown.
+    //  - Videos prefer a stored video/ type, then the extension map
+    //    (.mov → video/quicktime, .webm → video/webm, …), then video/mp4.
+    //    The old ext-derived image/<ext> (image/mp4) is what made the
+    //    admin player's blob unplayable (#908).
+    const { EXTENSION_TO_MIME } = require('../services/uploadSettings');
+    const ext = path.extname(photo.filename).slice(1).toLowerCase();
+    // Own-property lookup (review): a client-controlled filename ending in
+    // .constructor / .__proto__ / .toString would otherwise return an
+    // inherited Object.prototype member, and the extMime.startsWith below
+    // would throw — a permanent 500 for that photo instead of the fallback.
+    const extMime = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(EXTENSION_TO_MIME, ext)
+      ? EXTENSION_TO_MIME[ext]
+      : null;
+    // Full-token validation, not just a prefix check: the stored value is
+    // client-controlled, and header-invalid characters (video/mp4\r\nX: y)
+    // would make setHeader throw — a permanent 500 for that photo. Bare
+    // 'video/' is equally invalid; both fall back to the extension map.
+    const storedVideoMime = photo.mime_type && /^video\/[\w.+-]+$/.test(photo.mime_type)
+      ? photo.mime_type
+      : null;
+    // Honor a stored image MIME for any header-safe RASTER type (#908
+    // review): the S3 auto-importer accepts arbitrary image/* from
+    // mime-types and stores it (avif/bmp/tiff/heic/apng/ico/jxl/…), and a
+    // hand-listed allowlist kept missing formats. Allow image/<token> but
+    // NEVER the scriptable svg / *+xml family (image/svg+xml executes
+    // inline). The strict token + anchors also block header injection
+    // (image/x\r\nY:). Migration 039's blanket image/jpeg backfill on
+    // legacy rows is why the mapped extension still wins ahead of this.
+    const storedImageMime =
+      photo.mime_type &&
+      /^image\/[\w.+-]+$/.test(photo.mime_type) &&
+      !/^image\/svg|xml/i.test(photo.mime_type)
+        ? photo.mime_type
+        : null;
+    const isVideo = photo.media_type === 'video' ||
+      Boolean(storedVideoMime) ||
+      Boolean(extMime && extMime.startsWith('video/'));
+    // Never interpolate the raw extension on the image side: it would
+    // synthesize image/svg+xml (scriptable inline) or header-invalid values
+    // from client-controlled chunked-upload filenames. Precedence is
+    // mapped-extension (also corrects the 039 legacy-jpeg backfill on PNGs)
+    // -> safe stored raster MIME (auto-imported avif/bmp/tiff) -> image/jpeg.
+    // A stored type outside the allowlist degrades to image/jpeg; browsers
+    // sniff image bytes in <img>/blob contexts, so a mislabel is harmless
+    // where an injected type is not.
+    const contentType = isVideo
+      ? storedVideoMime || (extMime && extMime.startsWith('video/') ? extMime : null) || 'video/mp4'
+      : (extMime && extMime.startsWith('image/') ? extMime : null) || storedImageMime || 'image/jpeg';
+    res.setHeader('Content-Type', contentType);
     res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'private, max-age=3600');
     res.setHeader('Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy', 'cross-origin');
 

backend/src/routes/adminProjects.js

@@ -15,8 +15,31 @@ const { requirePermission, userHasAnyPermission } = require('../middleware/permi
 const { handleAsync, validateRequest, successResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const projectService = require('../services/projectService');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
+const { ForbiddenError } = require('../utils/errors');
 
 const router = express.Router();
+
+// A deal that spans both quotes and contracts cascades a project link across
+// BOTH tables (projectService.linkDealToProject). So attaching one document
+// must also require manage permission on the OTHER domain the cascade will
+// touch — otherwise quotes.manage alone could re-point a linked contract, and
+// vice versa (GHSA-v4vw / codex review). No-op when the deal touches only the
+// one domain, or on older instances without the deal_uuid column.
+async function assertCascadePermitted(req, docTable, docId, otherTable, otherPerm) {
+  let doc;
+  try {
+    doc = await db(docTable).where({ id: docId }).first('deal_uuid');
+  } catch { return; }
+  if (!doc || !doc.deal_uuid) return;
+  let linked;
+  try {
+    linked = await db(otherTable).where({ deal_uuid: doc.deal_uuid }).first('id');
+  } catch { return; }
+  if (!linked) return;
+  if (!(await userHasAnyPermission(req.admin.id, [otherPerm]))) {
+    throw new ForbiddenError(`This deal also links a ${otherTable.replace(/s$/, '')}; the ${otherPerm} permission is required`);
+  }
+}
 router.use(adminAuth);
 
 // Projects is feature-flagged like bills/quotes — when off, the whole cockpit
@@ -105,23 +128,30 @@ router.post('/:id/events',
 );
 
 // Attach a quote to the project (quotes carry no event_id — migration 121).
+// Requires quotes.manage in addition to events.edit — attaching a quote
+// mutates a separately-permissioned document domain (GHSA-v4vw).
 router.post('/:id/quotes',
-  requirePermission('events.edit'),
+  requirePermission(['events.edit', 'quotes.manage'], { requireAll: true }),
   [param('id').isInt({ min: 1 }), body('quoteId').isInt({ min: 1 })],
   handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
     validateRequest(req);
-    const result = await projectService.assignQuote(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), parseInt(req.body.quoteId, 10));
+    const quoteId = parseInt(req.body.quoteId, 10);
+    await assertCascadePermitted(req, 'quotes', quoteId, 'contracts', 'contracts.manage');
+    const result = await projectService.assignQuote(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), quoteId);
     return successResponse(res, result, 200, 'Quote attached to project');
   }),
 );
 
-// Attach a contract to the project.
+// Attach a contract to the project. Requires contracts.manage in addition
+// to events.edit (GHSA-v4vw).
 router.post('/:id/contracts',
-  requirePermission('events.edit'),
+  requirePermission(['events.edit', 'contracts.manage'], { requireAll: true }),
   [param('id').isInt({ min: 1 }), body('contractId').isInt({ min: 1 })],
   handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
     validateRequest(req);
-    const result = await projectService.assignContract(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), parseInt(req.body.contractId, 10));
+    const contractId = parseInt(req.body.contractId, 10);
+    await assertCascadePermitted(req, 'contracts', contractId, 'quotes', 'quotes.manage');
+    const result = await projectService.assignContract(parseInt(req.params.id, 10), contractId);
     return successResponse(res, result, 200, 'Contract attached to project');
   }),
 );

backend/src/routes/adminWebhooks.js

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ const { body, query, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
 const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
 const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
-const { validateExternalUrl } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+const { validateExternalUrlAsync } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
 const webhookService = require('../services/webhookService');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ router.post(
   requirePermission('settings.edit'),
   [
     body('name').isString().trim().isLength({ min: 1, max: 100 }),
-    body('url').isString().isLength({ max: 2048 }).custom((url) => {
+    body('url').isString().isLength({ max: 2048 }).custom(async (url) => {
       if (ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS) return true;
-      const check = validateExternalUrl(url);
+      const check = await validateExternalUrlAsync(url);
       if (!check.valid) throw new Error(check.error);
       return true;
     }),
@@ -160,9 +160,9 @@ router.put(
   requirePermission('settings.edit'),
   [
     body('name').optional().isString().trim().isLength({ min: 1, max: 100 }),
-    body('url').optional().isString().isLength({ max: 2048 }).custom((url) => {
+    body('url').optional().isString().isLength({ max: 2048 }).custom(async (url) => {
       if (ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS) return true;
-      const check = validateExternalUrl(url);
+      const check = await validateExternalUrlAsync(url);
       if (!check.valid) throw new Error(check.error);
       return true;
     }),

backend/src/routes/gallery.js

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ const { handleAsync, errorResponse } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
 const { NotFoundError } = require('../utils/errors');
 const { ensureThumbnail, ensureHeroImage, ensurePreviewImage, withLocalCopy } = require('../services/imageProcessor');
 const downloadZipService = require('../services/downloadZipService');
+const { applyPhotoVisibilityFilter, canSeeHiddenPhotos } = require('../utils/photoVisibility');
 const {
   getUseOriginalFilenames,
   pickRawDownloadName,
@@ -83,9 +84,20 @@ router.get('/resolve/:identifier', handleAsync(async (req, res) => {
   }
 
   const { event, matchType, shareToken } = result;
-  const linkVariants = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug: event.slug, shareToken });
   const requiresPassword = !(event.require_password === false || event.require_password === 0 || event.require_password === '0');
 
+  // The share_token is a bearer secret. Only return it (and the share
+  // links/URLs that embed it) when the caller already proved they hold it —
+  // i.e. they resolved via the token or the full share link. A bare *slug*
+  // lookup (slugs appear in gallery URLs and are guessable) must NOT hand
+  // back the secret, or an anonymous caller could turn a known slug into
+  // share-link access to a no-password gallery (GHSA-rh8r).
+  const callerHasToken = matchType !== 'slug';
+  if (!callerHasToken) {
+    return res.json({ slug: event.slug, matchType, requires_password: requiresPassword });
+  }
+
+  const linkVariants = await buildShareLinkVariants({ slug: event.slug, shareToken });
   res.json({
     slug: event.slug,
     token: shareToken,
@@ -784,6 +796,10 @@ router.patch('/:slug/photos/:photoId/visibility', verifyGalleryAccess, async (re
       .where({ id: photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
       .update({ visibility });
 
+    // A client hiding/showing a photo changes the guest download bundle —
+    // drop the cached ZIP so it rebuilds fresh (codex review).
+    downloadZipService.invalidate(req.event.id);
+
     res.json({ message: 'Photo visibility updated', visibility });
   } catch (error) {
     errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update photo visibility');
@@ -812,6 +828,10 @@ router.patch('/:slug/photos/visibility/bulk', verifyGalleryAccess, async (req, r
       .where('event_id', req.event.id)
       .update({ visibility });
 
+    // Client bulk hide/show alters the guest download bundle — invalidate
+    // the cached ZIP (codex review).
+    downloadZipService.invalidate(req.event.id);
+
     res.json({ message: `${count} photos updated`, visibility });
   } catch (error) {
     errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to update photo visibility');
@@ -933,6 +953,22 @@ router.get('/:slug/download/:photoId', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken,
 });
 
 // Download all photos as ZIP
+// Zip downloads count toward each contained photo's download_count (#895)
+// — previously only single-photo downloads did, so galleries whose guests
+// grab the zip showed 0 per-photo downloads forever. Used by the
+// pre-generated-zip branches only: it mirrors downloadZipService._build,
+// which zips EVERY event photo with no per-category allow_downloads
+// filter — the counter has to reflect what actually shipped. (That the
+// prebuilt zip ignores per-category download opt-outs is a separate,
+// pre-existing issue.) Known approximation: _build skips entries whose
+// WATERMARK step fails and still publishes the zip; counting those
+// would need a persisted archive manifest, which isn't worth it for
+// that tail case. Fire-and-forget at the call sites: counters must
+// never fail a download.
+async function bumpEventDownloadCounts(eventId) {
+  await db('photos').where('event_id', eventId).increment('download_count', 1);
+}
+
 router.get('/:slug/download-all', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, async (req, res) => {
   try {
     // Check if downloads are allowed for this event
@@ -940,8 +976,21 @@ router.get('/:slug/download-all', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, async
       return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Downloads are disabled for this gallery' });
     }
 
-    // Try to serve pre-generated zip (instant download with Content-Length)
-    const zipInfo = await downloadZipService.getZipInfo(req.event.id);
+    // Try to serve pre-generated zip (instant download with Content-Length).
+    // Guests may use the prebuilt cache ONLY when the event has no hidden
+    // photos: a cache built before a photo was hidden — or before this
+    // visibility-aware builder shipped — could otherwise still leak it, and
+    // getZipInfo only checks the DB pointer + file stat, not freshness. When
+    // hidden photos exist, guests fall through to the visibility-filtered
+    // stream below. PIN-clients always stream a full archive.
+    const isClient = canSeeHiddenPhotos(req.accessLevel);
+    const eventHasHidden = await db('photos')
+      .where({ event_id: req.event.id, visibility: 'hidden' })
+      .first()
+      .then(Boolean);
+    const zipInfo = (isClient || eventHasHidden)
+      ? null
+      : await downloadZipService.getZipInfo(req.event.id);
     if (zipInfo) {
       const storage = getStorage();
 
@@ -962,6 +1011,7 @@ router.get('/:slug/download-all', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, async
             user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
             action: 'download_all_presigned'
           }).catch(() => {});
+          bumpEventDownloadCounts(req.event.id).catch(() => {});
           res.redirect(302, url);
           return;
         } catch (err) {
@@ -985,26 +1035,35 @@ router.get('/:slug/download-all', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, async
         user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
         action: 'download_all'
       }).catch(() => {});
+      bumpEventDownloadCounts(req.event.id).catch(() => {});
       return;
     }
 
-    // Fallback: on-the-fly streaming (existing behavior)
-    // Also trigger background zip generation for next time
-    downloadZipService.generateZip(req.event.id).catch(err =>
-      logger.warn('Background zip generation failed', { eventId: req.event.id, error: err.message })
-    );
+    // Fallback: on-the-fly streaming (existing behavior). Only pre-build the
+    // guest cache when it will actually be served next time — a guest
+    // download of an event with no hidden photos. Client bypasses and
+    // hidden-photo events always stream, so rebuilding the guest archive on
+    // those requests is wasted I/O (codex review).
+    if (!isClient && !eventHasHidden) {
+      downloadZipService.generateZip(req.event.id).catch(err =>
+        logger.warn('Background zip generation failed', { eventId: req.event.id, error: err.message })
+      );
+    }
 
     // Fetch photos — exclude photos in categories that disabled downloads (#640).
     // Uncategorised photos are always included; categories without the column
     // (pre-migration-135) fall through the LEFT JOIN's null and are included.
-    const photos = await db('photos')
-      .leftJoin('photo_categories', 'photos.category_id', 'photo_categories.id')
-      .where('photos.event_id', req.event.id)
-      .where(function () {
-        this.whereNull('photos.category_id')
-          .orWhere('photo_categories.allow_downloads', true)
-          .orWhereNull('photo_categories.allow_downloads');
-      })
+    const photos = await applyPhotoVisibilityFilter(
+      db('photos')
+        .leftJoin('photo_categories', 'photos.category_id', 'photo_categories.id')
+        .where('photos.event_id', req.event.id)
+        .where(function () {
+          this.whereNull('photos.category_id')
+            .orWhere('photo_categories.allow_downloads', true)
+            .orWhereNull('photo_categories.allow_downloads');
+        }),
+      req.accessLevel
+    )
       .select('photos.*')
       .orderBy('photos.type', 'asc')
       .orderBy('photos.uploaded_at', 'desc');
@@ -1044,6 +1103,10 @@ router.get('/:slug/download-all', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, async
     // get a deterministic `_1` suffix before the entries hit the archive.
     const useOriginalBulk = await getUseOriginalFilenames();
     const bulkEntryNames = getZipEntryNames(photos, useOriginalBulk);
+    // Only photos whose append succeeded count as downloaded (#895) — the
+    // catch below deliberately skips missing/corrupt sources, and those
+    // never make it into the archive.
+    const appendedIds = [];
     for (let i = 0; i < photos.length; i += 1) {
       const photo = photos[i];
       const storageKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(req.event, photo);
@@ -1057,6 +1120,22 @@ router.get('/:slug/download-all', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, async
       }
 
       try {
+        // Verify the source exists BEFORE appending — but only for local
+        // sources: fs.createReadStream is lazy, so its error fires outside
+        // this try/catch and the archive 'error' handler then kills the
+        // whole response instead of skipping one photo (#895 review). S3's
+        // get() awaits GetObject and rejects right here on a missing key,
+        // so a preflight HEAD per entry would just be a redundant serial
+        // round trip (500-photo zip = 500 extra HEADs).
+        if (storageKey && storage.kind() === 'local') {
+          const srcStat = await storage.stat(storageKey);
+          if (!srcStat) {
+            throw new Error(`Photo missing in storage: ${storageKey}`);
+          }
+        } else if (!storageKey && !fs.existsSync(resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo))) {
+          throw new Error('Photo file missing on disk');
+        }
+
         if (shouldApplyWatermark && effectiveSettings) {
           // Watermark service operates on a local path. For managed photos in
           // S3 mode, materialize a tmp local copy first.
@@ -1076,9 +1155,9 @@ router.get('/:slug/download-all', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, async
           const stream = await storage.get(storageKey);
           archive.append(stream, { name: archiveName });
         } else {
-          const filePath = resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo);
-          archive.file(filePath, { name: archiveName });
+          archive.file(resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo), { name: archiveName });
         }
+        appendedIds.push(photo.id);
       } catch (err) {
         logger.warn('Skipping photo in bulk download due to error', {
           slug: req.params.slug,
@@ -1098,6 +1177,12 @@ router.get('/:slug/download-all', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken, async
       user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
       action: 'download_all'
     });
+    // Exactly the photos that made it into this archive (#895) — skipped
+    // (missing/corrupt) sources don't count.
+    if (appendedIds.length > 0) {
+      db('photos').whereIn('id', appendedIds)
+        .increment('download_count', 1).catch(() => {});
+    }
   } catch (error) {
     errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to create download archive');
   }
@@ -1128,15 +1213,18 @@ router.post('/:slug/download-selected', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken,
 
     // Fetch photos — exclude photos in categories that disabled downloads (#640).
     // Same LEFT JOIN pattern as the download-all endpoint.
-    const photos = await db('photos')
-      .leftJoin('photo_categories', 'photos.category_id', 'photo_categories.id')
-      .where('photos.event_id', req.event.id)
-      .whereIn('photos.id', photoIds)
-      .where(function () {
-        this.whereNull('photos.category_id')
-          .orWhere('photo_categories.allow_downloads', true)
-          .orWhereNull('photo_categories.allow_downloads');
-      })
+    const photos = await applyPhotoVisibilityFilter(
+      db('photos')
+        .leftJoin('photo_categories', 'photos.category_id', 'photo_categories.id')
+        .where('photos.event_id', req.event.id)
+        .whereIn('photos.id', photoIds)
+        .where(function () {
+          this.whereNull('photos.category_id')
+            .orWhere('photo_categories.allow_downloads', true)
+            .orWhereNull('photo_categories.allow_downloads');
+        }),
+      req.accessLevel
+    )
       .select('photos.*')
       .orderBy('photos.uploaded_at', 'desc');
 
@@ -1179,11 +1267,26 @@ router.post('/:slug/download-selected', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken,
     // #493: same display-name resolution as bulk download, with dedup.
     const useOriginalSelected = await getUseOriginalFilenames();
     const selectedEntryNames = getZipEntryNames(photos, useOriginalSelected);
+    // Only photos whose append succeeded count as downloaded (#895).
+    const appendedIds = [];
     for (let i = 0; i < photos.length; i += 1) {
       const photo = photos[i];
       const name = selectedEntryNames[i] || `photo-${photo.id}.jpg`;
       const storageKey = resolveSelectedKey(req.event, photo);
       try {
+        // Same pre-append source check as download-all (#895 review),
+        // local backend only: a lazy fs stream's async error would kill
+        // the response instead of skipping the photo; S3's get() rejects
+        // at the await below, so no redundant per-entry HEAD there.
+        if (storageKey && selectedStorage.kind() === 'local') {
+          const srcStat = await selectedStorage.stat(storageKey);
+          if (!srcStat) {
+            throw new Error(`Photo missing in storage: ${storageKey}`);
+          }
+        } else if (!storageKey && !fs.existsSync(resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo))) {
+          throw new Error('Photo file missing on disk');
+        }
+
         if (shouldApplyWatermark && effectiveSettings) {
           const buf = storageKey
             ? await withSelectedLocalCopy(storageKey, (lp) =>
@@ -1197,6 +1300,7 @@ router.post('/:slug/download-selected', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken,
         } else {
           archive.file(resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo), { name });
         }
+        appendedIds.push(photo.id);
       } catch (err) {
         logger.warn('Skipping selected photo due to error', {
           slug: req.params.slug,
@@ -1215,12 +1319,49 @@ router.post('/:slug/download-selected', verifyGalleryAccess, denySlideshowToken,
       user_agent: req.headers['user-agent'],
       action: 'download_selected'
     });
+    // Exactly the photos that made it into this archive (#895) — skipped
+    // (missing/corrupt) sources don't count.
+    if (appendedIds.length > 0) {
+      db('photos').whereIn('id', appendedIds)
+        .increment('download_count', 1).catch(() => {});
+    }
   } catch (error) {
     errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to download selected photos');
   }
 });
 
 
+// Explicit per-photo view beacon (#895). Counting views on the image-
+// serving routes is wrong in both directions: the lightbox preloads the
+// prev/next neighbours (three fetches per open), while a preloaded
+// neighbour that becomes the current slide is never re-fetched (#505
+// keeps the DOM node alive across the swipe) — so request-level counters
+// overcount preloads AND undercount swipe-throughs. Instead the lightbox
+// pings this endpoint exactly when a photo becomes the visible slide.
+// This also covers enhanced/maximum-protection galleries, whose bytes
+// are served by /api/secure-images and never pass the routes below.
+// The slideshow kiosk is excluded (denySlideshowToken; migration 138).
+router.post('/:slug/photo/:photoId/view',
+  verifyGalleryAccess,
+  denySlideshowToken,
+  async (req, res) => {
+    try {
+      const photo = await db('photos')
+        .where({ id: req.params.photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
+        .first('id', 'visibility');
+      if (!photo) {
+        return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
+      }
+      if (photo.visibility === 'hidden' && req.accessLevel !== 'client') {
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+      }
+      await db('photos').where('id', photo.id).increment('view_count', 1);
+      res.status(204).end();
+    } catch (error) {
+      errorResponse(res, error, 500, 'Failed to record view');
+    }
+  });
+
 // View single photo (with watermark if enabled)
 router.get('/:slug/photo/:photoId',
   verifyGalleryAccess,

backend/src/routes/protectedImages.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const secureImageService = require('../services/secureImageService');
 const { getStorage } = require('../services/storage');
 const { resolvePhotoStorageKey, resolvePhotoFilePath } = require('../services/photoResolver');
 const { withLocalCopy } = require('../services/imageProcessor');
+const { isPhotoHiddenFromViewer, canSeeHiddenPhotos } = require('../utils/photoVisibility');
 const crypto = require('crypto');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { timingSafeEqualStr } = require('../utils/timingSafe');
@@ -16,10 +17,14 @@ const router = express.Router();
 /**
  * Generate a signed URL token for image access
  */
-function generateImageToken(photoId, expiresIn = 3600) {
+function generateImageToken(photoId, expiresIn = 3600, clientBypass = false) {
   const secret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
   const expires = Date.now() + (expiresIn * 1000);
-  const data = `${photoId}:${expires}`;
+  // Third segment: whether the minter was a PIN-client, letting the serve
+  // route still deliver a photo hidden AFTER minting (TOCTOU) — a guest's
+  // token carries 0, so it stops working the moment the photo is hidden.
+  // Old two-segment tokens verify unchanged and read the flag as no-bypass.
+  const data = `${photoId}:${expires}:${clientBypass ? 1 : 0}`;
   const signature = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(data).digest('hex');
   return `${Buffer.from(data).toString('base64')}.${signature}`;
 }
@@ -32,20 +37,23 @@ function verifyImageToken(token) {
     const secret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
     const [data, signature] = token.split('.');
     const decoded = Buffer.from(data, 'base64').toString();
-    const [photoId, expires] = decoded.split(':');
-    
+    const [photoId, expires, clientFlag] = decoded.split(':');
+
     // Verify signature (constant-time — avoids leaking the HMAC byte-by-byte)
     const expectedSignature = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(decoded).digest('hex');
     if (!timingSafeEqualStr(signature, expectedSignature)) {
       return null;
     }
-    
+
     // Check expiration
     if (Date.now() > parseInt(expires)) {
       return null;
     }
-    
-    return { photoId: parseInt(photoId), expires: parseInt(expires) };
+    return {
+      photoId: parseInt(photoId),
+      expires: parseInt(expires),
+      clientBypass: clientFlag === '1',
+    };
   } catch (error) {
     return null;
   }
@@ -79,6 +87,12 @@ router.get('/:slug/photo/:photoId/view', verifyGalleryAccess, async (req, res) =
       return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
     }
 
+    // Block guest access to hidden/client-only photos (parity with the
+    // gallery single-photo routes).
+    if (isPhotoHiddenFromViewer(photo, req.accessLevel)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+    }
+
     // Check for suspicious activity
     const isSuspicious = await secureImageService.detectSuspiciousActivity(clientFingerprint, photoId);
     if (isSuspicious) {
@@ -191,15 +205,23 @@ router.post('/:slug/photo/:photoId/generate-secure-token', verifyGalleryAccess,
       return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
     }
 
+    // Don't mint a secure-image capability for a hidden/client-only photo
+    // when the caller isn't a client — the serve route is token-only.
+    if (isPhotoHiddenFromViewer(photo, req.accessLevel)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+    }
+
     // Create client fingerprint
     const clientFingerprint = secureImageService.createClientFingerprint(req);
-    
-    // Generate secure token
+
+    // Generate secure token. clientBypass lets a client's token keep serving
+    // a photo hidden after minting; a guest's stops at the serve route.
     const token = secureImageService.generateSecureToken(photoId, req.sessionID || 'anonymous', {
       expiresIn,
       maxUses: protectionLevel === 'maximum' ? 1 : 3,
       clientFingerprint,
-      protectionLevel
+      protectionLevel,
+      clientBypass: canSeeHiddenPhotos(req.accessLevel)
     });
     
     res.json({ 
@@ -233,9 +255,19 @@ router.post('/:slug/photo/:photoId/generate-url', verifyGalleryAccess, async (re
     if (!photo) {
       return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
     }
-    
-    // Generate signed token
-    const token = generateImageToken(photoId);
+
+    // Refuse to mint a signed URL for a hidden/client-only photo when the
+    // caller isn't a client. The signed-serve route below is token-only
+    // (no gallery auth), so the access decision has to happen here at mint
+    // time — mirroring how the reveal-bypass flag is baked into the token.
+    if (isPhotoHiddenFromViewer(photo, req.accessLevel)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+    }
+
+    // Generate signed token. The client-bypass flag lets a PIN-client's
+    // token keep serving a photo hidden after minting; a guest's token
+    // (clientBypass=0) stops the moment the photo is hidden.
+    const token = generateImageToken(photoId, 3600, canSeeHiddenPhotos(req.accessLevel));
     const signedUrl = `/api/images/${req.params.slug}/photo/${photoId}/signed/${token}`;
     
     res.json({ 
@@ -283,7 +315,14 @@ router.get('/:slug/photo/:photoId/signed/:token', async (req, res) => {
     if (!photo) {
       return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
     }
-    
+
+    // Recheck visibility at serve time (TOCTOU): a photo hidden AFTER the
+    // URL was minted must stop serving, unless the token was minted by a
+    // client (clientBypass) — mirroring the reveal-mode check above.
+    if (photo.visibility === 'hidden' && !tokenData.clientBypass) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+    }
+
     // Get watermark settings
     const watermarkSettings = await watermarkService.getWatermarkSettings();
 

backend/src/routes/secureImages.js

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ const {
   pickRawDownloadName,
 } = require('../services/downloadFilenameService');
 const { buildContentDisposition } = require('../utils/filenameSanitizer');
+const { isPhotoHiddenFromViewer, canSeeHiddenPhotos } = require('../utils/photoVisibility');
 
 const router = express.Router();
 
@@ -40,6 +41,12 @@ router.post('/:slug/generate-token', async (req, res, next) => {
       return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
     }
 
+    // Don't mint a secure-image capability for a hidden/client-only photo
+    // when the caller isn't a client (the token is reusable up to 3×).
+    if (isPhotoHiddenFromViewer(photo, req.accessLevel)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+    }
+
     // Create client fingerprint
     const clientFingerprint = secureImageService.createClientFingerprint(req);
     
@@ -51,7 +58,10 @@ router.post('/:slug/generate-token', async (req, res, next) => {
       expiresIn: protectionLevel === 'maximum' ? 180 : 300, // 3-5 minutes
       maxUses: accessType === 'download' ? 1 : 3,
       clientFingerprint,
-      protectionLevel
+      protectionLevel,
+      // TOCTOU: a client's token keeps serving a photo hidden after minting;
+      // a guest's stops the moment it's hidden (checked at the serve route).
+      clientBypass: canSeeHiddenPhotos(req.accessLevel)
     };
 
     const token = secureImageService.generateSecureToken(
@@ -137,6 +147,34 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token',
         return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Gallery not found' });
       }
 
+      // Bind the token to the gallery + photo it was minted for
+      // (GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f). This route serves via <img src> with the
+      // token in the URL, so it can't require verifyGalleryAccess like the
+      // download sibling does. Instead enforce the scope already inside the
+      // token: it is minted for one photoId (and photos belong to exactly
+      // one gallery), and its sessionId records the minting gallery's id.
+      // Without this, a token minted on any PUBLIC gallery reads every other
+      // gallery's photos with no password.
+      const tokenPhotoId = Number(tokenValidation.data?.photoId);
+      if (!Number.isInteger(tokenPhotoId) || tokenPhotoId !== Number(photoId)) {
+        await secureImageService.logImageAccess(
+          photoId, event.id, req.clientInfo, 'photo_mismatch'
+        );
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Token not valid for this photo' });
+      }
+      // Defense in depth: the sessionId embeds the gallery the token was
+      // minted for (`gallery_public_<id>_...` / `gallery_<id>_...`). Reject a
+      // token whose gallery is parseable and differs from this one.
+      const sessionEventId = Number(
+        (String(tokenValidation.data?.sessionId || '').match(/^gallery_(?:public_)?(\d+)_/) || [])[1]
+      );
+      if (Number.isInteger(sessionEventId) && sessionEventId !== Number(event.id)) {
+        await secureImageService.logImageAccess(
+          photoId, event.id, req.clientInfo, 'gallery_mismatch'
+        );
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Token not valid for this gallery' });
+      }
+
       // Verify photo exists and belongs to event  
       const photo = await db('photos')
         .where({ id: photoId, event_id: event.id })
@@ -146,6 +184,13 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token',
         return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
       }
 
+      // Recheck visibility at serve time (TOCTOU): a photo hidden AFTER the
+      // token was minted must stop serving, unless the token was minted by a
+      // client (clientBypass) — mirroring the reveal-mode check above.
+      if (photo.visibility === 'hidden' && !tokenValidation.data?.clientBypass) {
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+      }
+
       // Resolve photo through storage backend (managed) or fall back to local
       // path (external reference mode). secureImageService needs a local file,
       // so we materialize a tmp copy via withLocalCopy in S3 mode.
@@ -293,6 +338,14 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure-download/:photoId/:token',
         return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Invalid or expired token' });
       }
 
+      // Bind the token to the photo it was minted for (GHSA-crxv) — the
+      // /secure serve route does this, but secure-download did not, so a
+      // token minted for photo A could download photo B (incl. a hidden one).
+      const tokenPhotoId = Number(tokenValidation.data?.photoId);
+      if (!Number.isInteger(tokenPhotoId) || tokenPhotoId !== Number(photoId)) {
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Token not valid for this photo' });
+      }
+
       // Verify photo exists
       const photo = await db('photos')
         .where({ id: photoId, event_id: req.event.id })
@@ -302,6 +355,23 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure-download/:photoId/:token',
         return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo not found' });
       }
 
+      // Block guest access to hidden/client-only photos.
+      if (isPhotoHiddenFromViewer(photo, req.accessLevel)) {
+        return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Photo not available' });
+      }
+
+      // Per-category download opt-out (#640) — the regular single-photo
+      // download enforces this too; the secure path skipped it. SQLite
+      // returns the boolean as numeric 0, so check both forms.
+      if (photo.category_id) {
+        const cat = await db('photo_categories')
+          .where('id', photo.category_id)
+          .first('allow_downloads');
+        if (cat && (cat.allow_downloads === false || cat.allow_downloads === 0)) {
+          return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Downloads are disabled for this category' });
+        }
+      }
+
       // Resolve photo through storage backend (managed) or local disk (external).
       const storageKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(req.event, photo);
 

backend/src/services/archiveService.js

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 const archiver = require('archiver');
+const { neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula } = require('../utils/spreadsheetSafe');
 const fs = require('fs');
 const fsp = require('fs').promises;
 const path = require('path');
@@ -261,12 +262,13 @@ function convertToCSV(data) {
 
   const csvRows = data.map(row => {
     return headers.map(header => {
-      const value = row[header];
-      // Escape quotes and wrap in quotes if contains comma
-      if (typeof value === 'string' && (value.includes(',') || value.includes('"'))) {
+      // Formula-neutralize before quoting (guest_name/comment_text are
+      // user-controlled); the old check didn't even escape \n/\r (GHSA-q82f).
+      const value = neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula(row[header]);
+      if (value.includes(',') || value.includes('"') || value.includes('\n') || value.includes('\r')) {
         return `"${value.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`;
       }
-      return value || '';
+      return value;
     }).join(',');
   });
 

backend/src/services/backupCoverageService.js

@@ -212,17 +212,20 @@ async function buildConfiguredPathReport(configuredRows, config) {
     const includedInDefault = Boolean(row.include_in_default);
     let featureFlagValue = null;
     if (row.feature_flag) {
-      const v = config[row.feature_flag];
-      featureFlagValue = v === undefined ? null : Boolean(v);
+      // Alias-aware: show the value the gate actually used, not a seeded
+      // canonical key shadowed by the UI's spelling. Normalize like the
+      // walker does — Boolean('false') is true.
+      const v = backupService.effectiveFlagValue(row, config);
+      featureFlagValue = v === undefined || v === null ? null : backupService.normalizeBoolean(v);
     }
 
     let coverage;
     if (!includedInDefault) {
       coverage = 'skipped-by-toggle';
-    } else if (row.feature_flag && featureFlagValue !== true) {
-      // null (unset) and explicit false both gate the path off — matches
-      // the walker's normalizeBoolean semantics
-      coverage = 'skipped-by-feature-flag';
+    } else if (!backupService.backupPathIncluded(row, config)) {
+      // Same gate the walker uses — feature flags (incl. the UI's
+      // backup_include_archives alias) and the What-to-Backup opt-outs.
+      coverage = row.feature_flag ? 'skipped-by-feature-flag' : 'skipped-by-setting';
     } else if (!stat.exists) {
       coverage = 'missing-on-disk';
     } else {
@@ -313,6 +316,7 @@ async function getCoverageReport() {
     willScanCount:           paths.filter((p) => p.coverage === 'will-scan').length,
     skippedByToggleCount:    paths.filter((p) => p.coverage === 'skipped-by-toggle').length,
     skippedByFeatureFlagCount: paths.filter((p) => p.coverage === 'skipped-by-feature-flag').length,
+    skippedBySettingCount:   paths.filter((p) => p.coverage === 'skipped-by-setting').length,
     missingOnDiskCount:      paths.filter((p) => p.coverage === 'missing-on-disk').length,
     driftCount: unconfiguredOnDisk.length,
     tableMissingFallbackInUse: fallback,

backend/src/services/backupService.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const os = require('os');
 const { promisify } = require('util');
 
 const cron = require('node-cron');
+const cronParser = require('cron-parser');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const { queueEmail } = require('./emailProcessor');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
@@ -348,7 +349,10 @@ async function getDatabaseBackupInfoInternal() {
       return {
         type: recent.backup_type || 'unknown',
         backupFile: recent.file_path,
-        size: recent.file_size_bytes,
+        // file_size_bytes is a bigInteger column — node-postgres returns int8
+        // as a STRING, and `backedUpSize += size` then concatenates instead of
+        // adding (issue #871: "167.6 TB" dashboard size). Coerce at the source.
+        size: Number(recent.file_size_bytes) || 0,
         checksum: recent.checksum,
         hasChanged,
         backupTime: recent.completed_at,
@@ -389,7 +393,11 @@ async function scanDirectory(dirPath, fileList, basePath, excludePatterns = [])
 
       const isExcluded = excludePatterns.some(pattern => {
         if (pattern.includes('*')) {
-          const regex = new RegExp(`^${pattern.replace(/\*/g, '.*')}$`);
+          // Escape regex metacharacters before expanding the glob star — the
+          // raw replace turned '.nfs*' into /^.nfs.*$/ whose leading dot
+          // matched any character (e.g. 'anfs-photo.jpg' was excluded too).
+          const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&').replace(/\*/g, '.*');
+          const regex = new RegExp(`^${escaped}$`);
           return regex.test(entry.name);
         }
         return entry.name === pattern;
@@ -437,6 +445,26 @@ const LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS = [
   { path: 'business-docs',    feature_flag: null },
 ];
 
+// "What to Backup" opt-OUT toggles written by BackupConfiguration.tsx.
+// Default-ON semantics: only an explicit false excludes the path, so
+// installs that never saved the backup form keep backing up everything
+// (issue #871: unchecking Thumbnails had no effect because these keys
+// were stored but never read).
+const OPT_OUT_FLAGS = {
+  'events/active': 'backup_include_photos',
+  'thumbnails': 'backup_include_thumbnails',
+};
+
+// The UI "Archives" checkbox writes backup_include_archives (plural) while
+// the feature_flag rows use backup_include_archived — accept both.
+const FLAG_ALIASES = {
+  backup_include_archived: 'backup_include_archives',
+};
+
+// Filesystem noise that must never land in a backup: NFS silly-rename
+// artifacts (issue #871 showed .nfs* files uploaded to S3) and OS metadata.
+const DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_PATTERNS = ['.nfs*', '.DS_Store', 'Thumbs.db'];
+
 /**
  * Resolve the walker's target subdirectories from `backup_paths`.
  *
@@ -456,34 +484,84 @@ const LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS = [
  *                         Used to evaluate feature_flag gates.
  * @returns {Promise<Array<{ path: string, feature_flag: string|null }>>}
  */
-async function resolveBackupPaths(config) {
-  let rows;
+async function loadBackupPathRows({ includeDisabled = false } = {}) {
   try {
     if (!(await db.schema.hasTable('backup_paths'))) {
       logger.warn('backup_paths table missing — falling back to LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS');
-      rows = LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS;
-    } else {
-      rows = await db('backup_paths')
-        .where('include_in_default', formatBoolean(true))
-        .orderBy('display_order', 'asc')
-        .select('path', 'feature_flag');
-      if (!rows.length) {
-        logger.warn('backup_paths has no rows with include_in_default=true — falling back to LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS');
-        rows = LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS;
-      }
+      return LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS;
     }
+    let query = db('backup_paths')
+      .orderBy('display_order', 'asc')
+      .select('path', 'feature_flag', 'include_in_default');
+    if (!includeDisabled) {
+      query = query.where('include_in_default', formatBoolean(true));
+    }
+    const rows = await query;
+    if (!rows.filter((r) => normalizeBoolean(r.include_in_default)).length) {
+      logger.warn('backup_paths has no rows with include_in_default=true — falling back to LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS');
+      return LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS;
+    }
+    return rows;
   } catch (err) {
     logger.warn(`Failed to query backup_paths (${err.message}) — falling back to LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS`);
-    rows = LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS;
+    return LEGACY_BACKUP_PATHS;
   }
+}
 
-  // Apply feature_flag gating. A row with feature_flag='backup_include_archived'
-  // requires config.backup_include_archived to be truthy (same semantics as
-  // the historical `includeArchived` parameter).
+// Per-row gate. Applies the UI opt-out toggles first, then feature_flag
+// gating: a row with feature_flag='backup_include_archived' requires the
+// corresponding config key to be truthy (same semantics as the historical
+// `includeArchived` parameter).
+function backupPathIncluded(row, config) {
+  const optOutKey = OPT_OUT_FLAGS[row.path];
+  if (optOutKey && config) {
+    const optOutValue = config[optOutKey];
+    if (optOutValue !== undefined && optOutValue !== null && normalizeBoolean(optOutValue) === false) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!row.feature_flag) return true;
+  let flagValue;
+  if (config) {
+    // The alias (backup_include_archives) is what the current UI writes;
+    // the canonical singular key is seeded true by migration on every
+    // install, so the UI value must take precedence or the checkbox can
+    // never turn the flag off.
+    const alias = FLAG_ALIASES[row.feature_flag];
+    if (alias && config[alias] !== undefined && config[alias] !== null) {
+      flagValue = config[alias];
+    } else {
+      flagValue = config[row.feature_flag];
+    }
+  }
+  return normalizeBoolean(flagValue);
+}
+
+// The raw config value the gate actually consulted for a row's feature
+// flag (alias-aware) — the coverage report shows it next to the status,
+// so it must not display the shadowed seeded key.
+function effectiveFlagValue(row, config) {
+  if (!row.feature_flag || !config) return undefined;
+  const alias = FLAG_ALIASES[row.feature_flag];
+  if (alias && config[alias] !== undefined && config[alias] !== null) {
+    return config[alias];
+  }
+  return config[row.feature_flag];
+}
+
+async function resolveBackupPaths(config) {
+  return (await loadBackupPathRows()).filter((row) => backupPathIncluded(row, config));
+}
+
+// The rows the admin de-selected — the rsync destination needs them as
+// --exclude filters because it syncs the whole storage root rather than
+// the walker's file list. Includes rows with include_in_default=false,
+// which the enabled-only loader would otherwise hide from rsync entirely.
+async function resolveExcludedBackupPaths(config) {
+  const rows = await loadBackupPathRows({ includeDisabled: true });
   return rows.filter((row) => {
-    if (!row.feature_flag) return true;
-    const flagValue = config ? config[row.feature_flag] : undefined;
-    return normalizeBoolean(flagValue);
+    const disabled = row.include_in_default !== undefined && !normalizeBoolean(row.include_in_default);
+    return disabled || !backupPathIncluded(row, config);
   });
 }
 
@@ -574,6 +652,14 @@ async function getFilesToBackupInternal(configOrIncludeArchived = true) {
 
   const targets = await resolveBackupPaths(config);
 
+  // backup_exclude_patterns was only honored by the rsync destination
+  // (as --exclude args); the local/S3 walker ignored it. Merge it with
+  // the always-on noise filters here so every destination agrees.
+  const configuredExcludes = Array.isArray(config.backup_exclude_patterns)
+    ? config.backup_exclude_patterns
+    : [];
+  const excludePatterns = [...new Set([...DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_PATTERNS, ...configuredExcludes])];
+
   for (const target of targets) {
     // CRM document estate is special-cased in the comment block below
     // because it's the most expensive omission to recover from:
@@ -589,7 +675,7 @@ async function getFilesToBackupInternal(configOrIncludeArchived = true) {
     // those values refer to do not, leaving every CRM *_path column a
     // broken FK. scanDirectory short-circuits on ENOENT so installs
     // that never used CRM features won't error.
-    await scanDirectory(path.join(storagePath, target.path), files, storagePath);
+    await scanDirectory(path.join(storagePath, target.path), files, storagePath, excludePatterns);
   }
 
   return files;
@@ -686,7 +772,7 @@ function validateRsyncParam(value, label) {
   return value;
 }
 
-function buildRsyncArgs(config) {
+function buildRsyncArgs(config, extraExcludes = []) {
   const storagePath = getStoragePath();
   const host = validateRsyncParam(config.backup_rsync_host, 'host');
   const remotePath = validateRsyncParam(config.backup_rsync_path, 'remote path');
@@ -713,7 +799,14 @@ function buildRsyncArgs(config) {
     args.push('-e', `ssh -i ${sshKey} -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no`);
   }
 
-  const excludePatterns = config.backup_exclude_patterns || [];
+  // Same noise filters as the walker, plus the de-selected backup paths
+  // (extraExcludes) — rsync syncs the whole storage root, so this is the
+  // only place the What-to-Backup selection can take effect for rsync.
+  const excludePatterns = [...new Set([
+    ...DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_PATTERNS,
+    ...(Array.isArray(config.backup_exclude_patterns) ? config.backup_exclude_patterns : []),
+    ...extraExcludes,
+  ])];
   excludePatterns.forEach(pattern => args.push('--exclude', pattern));
 
   const source = `${storagePath}/`;
@@ -752,7 +845,19 @@ function parseRsyncStats(output) {
 
 async function performRsyncBackup(config, files) {
   const { spawnAsync } = require('../utils/safeExec');
-  const rsyncArgs = buildRsyncArgs(config);
+  // SSRF: the /test-connection route validates the host, but a scheduled or
+  // manual /run reaches here directly with the stored host. Resolve-and-vet
+  // it right before ssh/rsync does its own DNS at connect time, so a host
+  // that resolves to an internal address can't be reached (GHSA-4jh8).
+  const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+  if (!(await isHostAllowed(config.backup_rsync_host))) {
+    throw new Error('rsync host resolves to a private or internal network address');
+  }
+  // Anchored excludes for the de-selected What-to-Backup paths; rsync
+  // otherwise transfers the whole storage root regardless of the walker's
+  // file list (which only feeds manifests and file state).
+  const excludedPaths = await resolveExcludedBackupPaths(config);
+  const rsyncArgs = buildRsyncArgs(config, excludedPaths.map((row) => `/${row.path}/`));
   const { stdout } = await spawnAsync('rsync', rsyncArgs);
   const stats = parseRsyncStats(stdout);
 
@@ -1175,6 +1280,50 @@ async function runBackupInternal(isManual = false) {
   }
 }
 
+// Two settings cooperate here:
+//   - backup_schedule           — UI label like "daily" / "weekly" / "custom"
+//   - backup_schedule_cron      — actual cron expression (custom schedules)
+// Older startup code read backup_schedule and crashed when it found a label
+// instead of a cron expression. Resolution order: explicit cron field, then
+// map known labels, then fall back to default.
+const NAMED_SCHEDULES = {
+  hourly: '0 * * * *',
+  daily: '0 2 * * *',
+  weekly: '0 3 * * 0',  // Sunday 03:00
+  monthly: '0 4 1 * *',
+};
+
+function resolveScheduleCron(config) {
+  const isCronExpression = (s) => typeof s === 'string' && /^\s*\S+(\s+\S+){4}\s*$/.test(s);
+  const readSetting = (key) => {
+    if (config && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config, key)) {
+      return String(config[key] ?? '').trim();
+    }
+    if (config?.__raw && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config.__raw, key)) {
+      return String(parseSettingValue(config.__raw[key]) ?? '').trim();
+    }
+    return '';
+  };
+
+  let schedule = '0 2 * * *';
+  const cronCandidate = readSetting('backup_schedule_cron');
+  const labelCandidate = readSetting('backup_schedule');
+  // A named label wins over the cron field: the UI always used to send its
+  // default cron ('0 3 * * *') alongside e.g. backup_schedule='weekly', which
+  // silently turned weekly schedules into daily ones (issue #871). The cron
+  // field only applies for 'custom' (or when no known label is set).
+  if (labelCandidate && labelCandidate.toLowerCase() !== 'custom' && NAMED_SCHEDULES[labelCandidate.toLowerCase()]) {
+    schedule = NAMED_SCHEDULES[labelCandidate.toLowerCase()];
+  } else if (cronCandidate && isCronExpression(cronCandidate)) {
+    schedule = cronCandidate;
+  } else if (labelCandidate && isCronExpression(labelCandidate)) {
+    // Back-compat: a deployment that wrote a cron expression directly into
+    // backup_schedule (no _cron field) still works.
+    schedule = labelCandidate;
+  }
+  return schedule;
+}
+
 async function startBackupService() {
   try {
     const config = await resolveConfigWithFallback();
@@ -1192,42 +1341,7 @@ async function startBackupService() {
       backupJob = null;
     }
 
-    // Two settings cooperate here:
-    //   - backup_schedule           — UI label like "daily" / "weekly" / "custom"
-    //   - backup_schedule_cron      — actual cron expression
-    // The frontend writes both (BackupConfiguration.jsx). Older startup code
-    // here read backup_schedule and crashed when it found a label instead of
-    // a cron expression. Resolution order: explicit cron field, then map known
-    // labels, then fall back to default.
-    const NAMED_SCHEDULES = {
-      hourly: '0 * * * *',
-      daily: '0 2 * * *',
-      weekly: '0 3 * * 0',  // Sunday 03:00
-      monthly: '0 4 1 * *',
-    };
-    const isCronExpression = (s) => typeof s === 'string' && /^\s*\S+(\s+\S+){4}\s*$/.test(s);
-    const readSetting = (key) => {
-      if (config && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config, key)) {
-        return String(config[key] ?? '').trim();
-      }
-      if (config?.__raw && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config.__raw, key)) {
-        return String(parseSettingValue(config.__raw[key]) ?? '').trim();
-      }
-      return '';
-    };
-
-    let schedule = '0 2 * * *';
-    const cronCandidate = readSetting('backup_schedule_cron');
-    const labelCandidate = readSetting('backup_schedule');
-    if (cronCandidate && isCronExpression(cronCandidate)) {
-      schedule = cronCandidate;
-    } else if (labelCandidate && NAMED_SCHEDULES[labelCandidate.toLowerCase()]) {
-      schedule = NAMED_SCHEDULES[labelCandidate.toLowerCase()];
-    } else if (labelCandidate && isCronExpression(labelCandidate)) {
-      // Back-compat: a deployment that wrote a cron expression directly into
-      // backup_schedule (no _cron field) still works.
-      schedule = labelCandidate;
-    }
+    const schedule = resolveScheduleCron(config);
 
     backupJob = cron.schedule(schedule, async () => {
       logger.info('Starting scheduled backup');
@@ -1319,6 +1433,8 @@ async function getBackupStatus(limit = 10) {
     // ago looked identical to a successful one. Same "silent failure
     // not surfaced" class Stage A was designed to fight.
     const lastSuccessful = runs.find(r => r.status === 'completed') || null;
+    const config = await getBackupConfigInternal();
+    const nextRun = getNextScheduledRun(config);
     // Detect zombie running rows (started >30min ago, never updated)
     // — these are processes that died without writing a completed_at.
     // Surface them so the admin can tell at a glance vs a live run.
@@ -1339,7 +1455,8 @@ async function getBackupStatus(limit = 10) {
       recentRuns: runs,
       recentBackups: runs, // Alias for frontend compatibility
       totalBackups: runs.filter(r => r.status === 'completed').length,
-      nextScheduledRun: getNextScheduledRun()
+      nextScheduledRun: nextRun,
+      nextBackup: nextRun // BackupManagement.tsx reads this name
     };
   } catch (error) {
     logger.error('Failed to get backup status:', error);
@@ -1351,12 +1468,19 @@ async function getBackupStatus(limit = 10) {
   }
 }
 
-function getNextScheduledRun() {
-  const now = new Date();
-  const next = new Date(now);
-  next.setDate(now.getDate() + 1);
-  next.setHours(2, 0, 0, 0);
-  return next.toISOString();
+function getNextScheduledRun(config) {
+  // null → the UI shows "Not scheduled". Only a real, enabled schedule
+  // produces a date (issue #871: this used to be a hardcoded "tomorrow
+  // 02:00" that ignored the configured schedule entirely).
+  if (!config || !normalizeBoolean(config.backup_enabled)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  try {
+    return cronParser.parseExpression(resolveScheduleCron(config)).next().toISOString();
+  } catch (error) {
+    logger.warn(`Could not compute next backup run: ${error.message}`);
+    return null;
+  }
 }
 
 async function cleanupOldBackupRuns(retentionDays = 30) {
@@ -1569,5 +1693,13 @@ service.getBackupStatus = getBackupStatus;
 service.cleanupOldBackupRuns = cleanupOldBackupRuns;
 service.getBackupManifest = getBackupManifest;
 service.validateBackupManifest = validateBackupManifest;
+service.resolveBackupPaths = resolveBackupPaths;
+service.resolveExcludedBackupPaths = resolveExcludedBackupPaths;
+service.backupPathIncluded = backupPathIncluded;
+service.effectiveFlagValue = effectiveFlagValue;
+service.normalizeBoolean = normalizeBoolean;
+service.buildRsyncArgs = buildRsyncArgs;
+service.resolveScheduleCron = resolveScheduleCron;
+service.getNextScheduledRun = getNextScheduledRun;
 
 module.exports = service;

backend/src/services/chunkedUploadService.js

@@ -281,8 +281,12 @@ async function cleanupExpiredUploads() {
   return expiredIds.length;
 }
 
-// Run cleanup every hour
-setInterval(cleanupExpiredUploads, 60 * 60 * 1000);
+// Run cleanup every hour. unref so this module-level housekeeping timer
+// never holds the process open on its own — in production the HTTP
+// listener keeps the loop alive, and in Jest this exact handle kept the
+// runner from exiting for every suite that requires adminPhotos (#908;
+// it is why adminPhotos.reference sits on the CI ignore list).
+setInterval(cleanupExpiredUploads, 60 * 60 * 1000).unref();
 
 module.exports = {
   initializeUpload,

backend/src/services/downloadZipService.js

@@ -112,8 +112,15 @@ class DownloadZipService {
       const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
       if (!event) return { success: false, error: 'Event not found' };
 
+      // The prebuilt zip is served to ordinary gallery guests (the
+      // download-all fast path), so it must exclude hidden/client-only
+      // photos — NULL visibility counts as visible (pre-migration rows).
+      // PIN-clients bypass this cache and stream a full archive instead.
       const photos = await db('photos')
         .where({ event_id: eventId })
+        .where(function () {
+          this.where('visibility', 'visible').orWhereNull('visibility');
+        })
         .select('*')
         .orderBy('type', 'asc')
         .orderBy('uploaded_at', 'desc');

backend/src/services/feedbackService.js

@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ class FeedbackService {
   /**
    * Get feedback requiring moderation
    */
-  async getPendingModeration(eventId = null) {
+  async getPendingModeration(eventId = null, ownedEventIds = null) {
     try {
       let query = db('photo_feedback')
         .join('photos', 'photo_feedback.photo_id', 'photos.id')
@@ -408,9 +408,13 @@ class FeedbackService {
         .where('photo_feedback.is_approved', false)
         .where('photo_feedback.is_hidden', false)
         .where('photo_feedback.feedback_type', 'comment');
-      
+
       if (eventId) {
         query = query.where('photo_feedback.event_id', eventId);
+      } else if (Array.isArray(ownedEventIds)) {
+        // Scope to the caller's owned events (GHSA-3335) — an empty set
+        // matches nothing, so a restricted admin sees only their own.
+        query = query.whereIn('photo_feedback.event_id', ownedEventIds.length ? ownedEventIds : [-1]);
       }
       
       const pending = await query

backend/src/services/imageProcessor.js

@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ async function generateThumbnail(imagePath, options = {}) {
     let sharpInstance = sharp(imagePath, {
       limitInputPixels: 268402689, // ~16k x 16k max
       sequentialRead: true,
-      failOnError: false
+      failOn: 'none'
     });
 
     // Strip EXIF/metadata from thumbnails (privacy: prevent GPS leak etc.)
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ async function generateHeroImage(imagePath, options = {}) {
     let sharpInstance = sharp(imagePath, {
       limitInputPixels: 268402689,
       sequentialRead: true,
-      failOnError: false
+      failOn: 'none'
     });
 
     // Strip EXIF/metadata from hero images (privacy: prevent GPS leak etc.)
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ async function generatePreviewImage(imagePath, options = {}) {
     let sharpInstance = sharp(imagePath, {
       limitInputPixels: 268402689, // ~16k x 16k max
       sequentialRead: true,
-      failOnError: false,
+      failOn: 'none',
     });
 
     // Strip EXIF — same privacy reasoning as thumbnails/heroes.

backend/src/services/photoExportService.js

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 const archiver = require('archiver');
 const { PassThrough } = require('stream');
 const { XmpGenerator } = require('./xmpGenerator');
+const { neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula } = require('../utils/spreadsheetSafe');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const path = require('path');
 const fs = require('fs').promises;
@@ -162,7 +163,10 @@ class PhotoExportService {
 
     const csvContent = [
       headers.join(','),
-      ...rows.map(row => row.map(cell => `"${String(cell).replace(/"/g, '""')}"`).join(','))
+      // Formula-neutralize each cell before quoting — filenames/categories
+      // are user-controlled, and quoting alone doesn't stop `=cmd()`
+      // execution (GHSA-5364).
+      ...rows.map(row => row.map(cell => `"${neutralizeSpreadsheetFormula(cell).replace(/"/g, '""')}"`).join(','))
     ].join('\n');
 
     return {

backend/src/services/photoProcessor.js

@@ -326,9 +326,11 @@ async function queueFilesForProcessing(files, options = {}) {
 
   if (fileList.length === 0) return { uploadId, photos: queued, errors };
 
-  // Counter base — same approximation the upload route used pre-async.
-  // Strict uniqueness is still enforced by the filename template; on a
-  // collision the worker would just fail one photo.
+  // Counter base — a per-request approximation (concurrent calls can
+  // compute the same base). Uniqueness of the final path comes from the
+  // random suffix inside generatePhotoFilename (#931) — before that
+  // suffix, a counter collision silently overwrote the first photo's
+  // bytes at its already-recorded path.
   const existingCount = await db('photos')
     .where({ event_id: eventId, type: photoType })
     .count('id as count')

backend/src/services/quoteService.js

@@ -1047,7 +1047,9 @@ async function sendQuote(id, adminId) {
   });
 
   try {
-    await logActivity('quote_sent', { quoteId: id, token }, null, `admin:${adminId}`);
+    // Do NOT log the raw bearer token — it grants quote actions and the
+    // activity log is readable later (GHSA-prch). The quoteId is the audit key.
+    await logActivity('quote_sent', { quoteId: id }, null, `admin:${adminId}`);
   } catch (_) {}
 
   // Fire the quote.sent workflow trigger (best-effort; emit is fail-closed when
@@ -1272,7 +1274,8 @@ async function recordResponse({ token, action, ip, tosAccepted }) {
   });
 
   try {
-    await logActivity(`quote_${newStatus}`, { quoteId: quote.id, token: tokenRow.token }, null, 'customer:public');
+    // Raw bearer token must not reach the activity log (GHSA-prch).
+    await logActivity(`quote_${newStatus}`, { quoteId: quote.id }, null, 'customer:public');
   } catch (_) {}
 
   // Defer the workflow emit until the 15-min toggle window locks — so accepting

backend/src/services/restoreService.js

@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ const backupManifest = require('./backupManifest');
 const S3StorageAdapter = require('./storage/s3Storage');
 const { queueEmail } = require('./emailProcessor');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
+
+// A manifest is attacker-influenceable (hand-crafted backup). Reject any
+// entry path that would resolve OUTSIDE its intended base directory
+// (traversal / absolute path) before any fs write. The target may not exist
+// yet, so resolve rather than realpath (GHSA-fm58).
+function pathEscapes(baseDir, candidate) {
+  const rel = path.relative(path.resolve(baseDir), path.resolve(candidate));
+  return !rel || rel === '..' || rel.startsWith('..' + path.sep) || path.isAbsolute(rel);
+}
 const { formatBytes } = require('../utils/formatBytes');
 const os = require('os');
 
@@ -298,7 +307,10 @@ class RestoreService {
         this.log('info', 'Applying post-restore migrations to restored database...');
         this.updateProgress('Applying any post-backup migrations...');
         const backendRoot = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..');
-        const { stderr } = await spawnAsync('npm', ['run', 'migrate:safe'], {
+        // Invoked via node directly — the runtime image ships no npm
+        // (see Dockerfile), and an ENOENT here would be swallowed by the
+        // non-fatal catch below, silently skipping post-restore migrations.
+        const { stderr } = await spawnAsync('node', ['migrations/run-migrations-safe.js'], {
           cwd: backendRoot,
           env: { ...process.env },
         });
@@ -768,7 +780,14 @@ class RestoreService {
         for (const file of filesToDownload) {
           const s3Key = path.posix.join(prefix, file.path);
           const localFilePath = path.join(localPath, file.path);
-          
+
+          // Containment guard (GHSA-fm58): reject a manifest path that would
+          // write outside the download staging dir.
+          if (pathEscapes(localPath, localFilePath)) {
+            this.log('error', `Refusing unsafe manifest path on download: ${file.path}`);
+            continue;
+          }
+
           await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(localFilePath), { recursive: true });
           
           try {
@@ -1201,6 +1220,14 @@ END $$;`
         const sourcePath = path.join(backupPath, file.path);
         const targetPath = path.join(storagePath, file.path);
 
+        // Containment guard (GHSA-fm58): a crafted manifest path like
+        // `../../etc/cron.d/x` would otherwise escape the storage root and
+        // overwrite arbitrary files. Skip any entry that escapes.
+        if (pathEscapes(backupPath, sourcePath) || pathEscapes(storagePath, targetPath)) {
+          errors.push(`Refusing unsafe manifest path: ${file.path}`);
+          continue;
+        }
+
         // Check if source file exists
         try {
           await fs.access(sourcePath);
@@ -1372,6 +1399,15 @@ END $$;`
 
         for (const file of filesToVerify) {
           const filePath = path.join(storagePath, file.path);
+          // Same containment guard as performFilesRestore: a traversal
+          // manifest entry (e.g. `../../etc/passwd`) was skipped during the
+          // restore, so it must not be fs.access'd/hashed here either —
+          // otherwise an existing outside file makes the skipped entry look
+          // "verified" (and we'd read an arbitrary file off disk).
+          if (pathEscapes(storagePath, filePath)) {
+            verification.errors.push(`Refusing unsafe manifest path on verification: ${file.path}`);
+            continue;
+          }
           try {
             await fs.access(filePath);
             

backend/src/services/secureImageService.js

@@ -21,7 +21,11 @@ class SecureImageService {
       expiresIn = 300, // 5 minutes default
       maxUses = 1,
       clientFingerprint = '',
-      protectionLevel = 'standard'
+      protectionLevel = 'standard',
+      // Whether the minter was a PIN-client — lets the serve route keep
+      // delivering a photo hidden AFTER minting (TOCTOU). A guest's token
+      // carries false, so it stops the moment the photo is hidden.
+      clientBypass = false
     } = options;
 
     const tokenData = {
@@ -32,6 +36,7 @@ class SecureImageService {
       maxUses,
       usedCount: 0,
       protectionLevel,
+      clientBypass,
       createdAt: Date.now()
     };
 

backend/src/services/shareLinkService.js

@@ -159,7 +159,16 @@ const resolveShareIdentifier = async (identifier) => {
     return { event, matchType: 'link', shareToken: getEventShareToken(event) };
   }
 
-  event = await baseQuery.clone().where('share_link', 'like', `%/${trimmed}`).first();
+  // GHSA-rh8r hardening: `trimmed` is attacker-controlled, so escape LIKE
+  // wildcards (`%`, `_`, and the escape char itself) before embedding it.
+  // Otherwise an anonymous `/resolve/________…________` (32 underscores)
+  // matches ANY share_link via single-char wildcards, resolves as
+  // matchType 'link_partial', and the /resolve route hands back the
+  // gallery's bearer token — reopening the very hole the token-withholding
+  // fix closed. Explicit ESCAPE clause because SQLite has no default LIKE
+  // escape character (Postgres defaults to backslash, but we set it for both).
+  const likeTail = `%/${trimmed.replace(/[\\%_]/g, (c) => `\\${c}`)}`;
+  event = await baseQuery.clone().whereRaw('share_link LIKE ? ESCAPE \'\\\'', [likeTail]).first();
   if (event) {
     return { event, matchType: 'link_partial', shareToken: getEventShareToken(event) };
   }

backend/src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage.js

@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ const crypto = require('crypto');
 
 const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
 
+// Staging files older than this are considered orphaned by a crash between
+// copy and rename, and are reclaimed during list() walks. Generous enough
+// that no legitimate in-flight copy (even multi-GB on slow NFS) hits it.
+const STAGING_RECLAIM_AGE_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
 /**
  * Filesystem-backed implementation of the StorageBackend interface.
  * All keys are relative to `root` (typically process.env.STORAGE_PATH).
@@ -67,8 +72,18 @@ class LocalFsStorage {
   async putFromFile(relPath, localPath, _options = {}) {
     const abs = this._resolve(relPath);
     await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
-    // copyFile is atomic from the destination's perspective on POSIX.
-    await fsp.copyFile(localPath, abs);
+    // copyFile truncates and rewrites the destination in place, so a
+    // concurrent reader (thumbnail/watermark generation, photo serving)
+    // can observe partial or foreign bytes mid-copy (#931). Copy to a
+    // sibling tmp file and rename, like put() above — rename IS atomic.
+    const tmp = `${abs}.tmp.${process.pid}.${crypto.randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`;
+    try {
+      await fsp.copyFile(localPath, tmp);
+      await fsp.rename(tmp, abs);
+    } catch (err) {
+      await fsp.unlink(tmp).catch(() => {});
+      throw err;
+    }
   }
 
   async get(relPath) {
@@ -126,6 +141,23 @@ class LocalFsStorage {
         throw err;
       }
       for (const ent of dirents) {
+        // Hide in-flight staging files (put/putFromFile write `<key>.tmp.<pid>.<hex>`
+        // siblings before the atomic rename). Without this filter a
+        // concurrent archive/backup listing could stream a partial tmp
+        // entry or fail when the rename wins the race (#931). Stale ones
+        // (a crash between copy and rename orphans them) are reclaimed
+        // here — hiding without reclaiming would let interrupted uploads
+        // accumulate invisible files until the volume fills.
+        if (/\.tmp\.\d+\.[0-9a-f]+$/.test(ent.name)) {
+          const childAbs = path.join(dir, ent.name);
+          try {
+            const st = await fsp.stat(childAbs);
+            if (Date.now() - st.mtimeMs > STAGING_RECLAIM_AGE_MS) {
+              await fsp.unlink(childAbs).catch(() => {});
+            }
+          } catch { /* vanished (rename/cleanup won the race) — fine */ }
+          continue;
+        }
         const childAbs = path.join(dir, ent.name);
         const childRel = relBase ? `${relBase}/${ent.name}` : ent.name;
         if (ent.isDirectory()) {

backend/src/services/storage/__tests__/localFsStorage.putFromFile.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/**
+ * #931 — LocalFsStorage.putFromFile must be atomic. The old implementation
+ * used fs.copyFile straight onto the destination, which truncates and
+ * rewrites in place: a concurrent reader (thumbnail/watermark generation,
+ * photo serving) could observe partial or foreign bytes mid-copy. The fix
+ * copies to a sibling tmp file and renames, like put() always did.
+ */
+const fs = require('fs');
+const fsp = require('fs/promises');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const LocalFsStorage = require('../LocalFsStorage');
+
+describe('LocalFsStorage.putFromFile', () => {
+  let root;
+  let srcDir;
+  let storage;
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    root = await fsp.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-lfs-root-'));
+    srcDir = await fsp.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-lfs-src-'));
+    storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root });
+  });
+
+  afterEach(async () => {
+    await fsp.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    await fsp.rm(srcDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('writes the source bytes to the destination key', async () => {
+    const src = path.join(srcDir, 'a.jpg');
+    await fsp.writeFile(src, Buffer.from('photo-a-bytes'));
+
+    await storage.putFromFile('events/active/ev/a.jpg', src);
+
+    const out = await fsp.readFile(path.join(root, 'events/active/ev/a.jpg'));
+    expect(out.toString()).toBe('photo-a-bytes');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves no tmp files behind after a successful write', async () => {
+    const src = path.join(srcDir, 'a.jpg');
+    await fsp.writeFile(src, Buffer.from('photo-a-bytes'));
+
+    await storage.putFromFile('events/active/ev/a.jpg', src);
+
+    const entries = await fsp.readdir(path.join(root, 'events/active/ev'));
+    expect(entries).toEqual(['a.jpg']);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves no tmp files behind when the source is missing', async () => {
+    await expect(
+      storage.putFromFile('events/active/ev/missing.jpg', path.join(srcDir, 'nope.jpg'))
+    ).rejects.toThrow();
+
+    const entries = await fsp.readdir(path.join(root, 'events/active/ev')).catch(() => []);
+    expect(entries.filter((e) => e.includes('.tmp.'))).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('hides in-flight staging files from list()', async () => {
+    const src = path.join(srcDir, 'a.jpg');
+    await fsp.writeFile(src, Buffer.from('photo-a-bytes'));
+    await storage.putFromFile('events/active/ev/a.jpg', src);
+
+    // Simulate a concurrent writer's staging file: archiveEvent lists
+    // this exact prefix and must never see (stream/delete) it.
+    await fsp.writeFile(
+      path.join(root, 'events/active/ev/b.jpg.tmp.12345.deadbeef'),
+      Buffer.from('partial')
+    );
+
+    const keys = (await storage.list('events/active/ev')).map((e) => e.key ?? e);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(keys)).toContain('a.jpg');
+    expect(JSON.stringify(keys)).not.toContain('.tmp.');
+  });
+
+  it('reclaims stale orphaned staging files during list()', async () => {
+    const dir = path.join(root, 'events/active/ev');
+    await fsp.mkdir(dir, { recursive: true });
+    const fresh = path.join(dir, 'f.jpg.tmp.111.aaaaaaaa');
+    const stale = path.join(dir, 's.jpg.tmp.222.bbbbbbbb');
+    await fsp.writeFile(fresh, Buffer.from('in-flight'));
+    await fsp.writeFile(stale, Buffer.from('orphaned'));
+    // Age the "stale" one past the reclaim threshold (1h).
+    const old = new Date(Date.now() - 2 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+    await fsp.utimes(stale, old, old);
+
+    await storage.list('events/active/ev');
+
+    // Fresh in-flight staging survives (a live copy may still rename it);
+    // the crash orphan is gone.
+    await expect(fsp.stat(fresh)).resolves.toBeDefined();
+    await expect(fsp.stat(stale)).rejects.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('never exposes a partially written destination (tmp+rename atomicity)', async () => {
+    // A large-ish payload so the copy is not a single instantaneous block.
+    const big = Buffer.alloc(8 * 1024 * 1024, 0xab);
+    const src = path.join(srcDir, 'big.bin');
+    await fsp.writeFile(src, big);
+
+    const key = 'events/active/ev/big.bin';
+    const dest = path.join(root, key);
+
+    // Poll the destination while the copy runs: it must either not exist
+    // yet or already have the full size — never an in-between truncated
+    // state (which is exactly what in-place copyFile produced).
+    const observed = [];
+    const poller = (async () => {
+      for (let i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
+        try {
+          const st = fs.statSync(dest);
+          observed.push(st.size);
+        } catch {
+          // not there yet — fine
+        }
+        await new Promise((r) => setImmediate(r));
+      }
+    })();
+
+    await storage.putFromFile(key, src);
+    await poller;
+
+    for (const size of observed) {
+      expect(size).toBe(big.length);
+    }
+    const out = await fsp.stat(dest);
+    expect(out.size).toBe(big.length);
+  });
+});

backend/src/services/storage/s3Storage.js

@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ class S3StorageAdapter extends stream.EventEmitter {
    */
   async testConnection() {
     try {
+      // Resolve-and-vet the custom endpoint before the network round-trip
+      // (the constructor's literal check can't catch a public-looking
+      // hostname that resolves to an internal IP). Prod-only, matching the
+      // constructor gate — dev points at localhost MinIO deliberately.
+      if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' && this.config.endpoint) {
+        const { isHostAllowed } = require('../../utils/networkValidation');
+        const { hostname } = new URL(
+          /^https?:\/\//.test(this.config.endpoint) ? this.config.endpoint : `https://${this.config.endpoint}`
+        );
+        if (!(await isHostAllowed(hostname))) {
+          throw new Error('S3 endpoint resolves to a private or internal network address');
+        }
+      }
       await this.s3Client.send(new HeadBucketCommand({ Bucket: this.bucket }));
       logger.info(`Successfully connected to S3 bucket: ${this.bucket}`);
       return true;

backend/src/services/watermarkGeneratorService.js

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  * - Tracking regeneration progress
  */
 
+const pLimit = require('p-limit');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const watermarkService = require('./watermarkService');
 const { resolvePhotoStorageKey, resolvePhotoFilePath } = require('./photoResolver');
@@ -22,6 +23,13 @@ class WatermarkGeneratorService {
     this.batchSize = 10;
     // Concurrent processing limit
     this.concurrentLimit = 2;
+    // ONE process-wide limiter for every sharp pipeline this service
+    // spawns (#931). Per-invocation limiters would stack: overlapping
+    // regenerateAll/generateForEvent calls each brought their own cap,
+    // and the fire-and-forget generateForPhoto side-effect (one per
+    // uploaded photo) had no cap at all — a 363-photo bulk upload could
+    // decode 363 full-resolution images concurrently (#628 OOM class).
+    this.limit = pLimit(this.concurrentLimit);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -62,11 +70,21 @@ class WatermarkGeneratorService {
       // (external reference mode). watermarkService needs a local file path.
       const event = { slug: photo.slug, source_mode: photo.source_mode, external_path: photo.external_path };
       const storageKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(event, photo);
-      const result = storageKey
-        ? await withLocalCopy(storageKey, (lp) =>
-          watermarkService.generateAndSaveWatermark(photo, lp, settings)
-        )
-        : await watermarkService.generateAndSaveWatermark(photo, resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo), settings);
+      const result = await this.limit(async () => {
+        // Revalidate inside the limited slot: a long queue (bulk upload)
+        // can hold this job for minutes, during which an admin may disable
+        // watermarking — running with the captured settings would recreate
+        // files AFTER clearAllWatermarks() wiped them (#931 round 3).
+        const fresh = await watermarkService.getWatermarkSettings();
+        if (!fresh || !fresh.enabled) {
+          return { success: false, watermarkPath: null, error: 'Watermarking is disabled' };
+        }
+        return storageKey
+          ? withLocalCopy(storageKey, (lp) =>
+            watermarkService.generateAndSaveWatermark(photo, lp, fresh)
+          )
+          : watermarkService.generateAndSaveWatermark(photo, resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo), fresh);
+      });
 
       if (result.success) {
         // Update database with watermark path
@@ -122,7 +140,11 @@ class WatermarkGeneratorService {
         return { ...results, errors: ['Watermarking is disabled'] };
       }
 
-      // Process in batches
+      // Process in batches. processPhotoWatermark routes every sharp
+      // pipeline through the shared instance limiter — a bare Promise.all
+      // over the batch ran all 10 at once, decoding 10 full-resolution
+      // images simultaneously (#931; same OOM class as #628 in the
+      // thumbnail path).
       for (let i = 0; i < photos.length; i += this.batchSize) {
         const batch = photos.slice(i, i + this.batchSize);
 
@@ -168,11 +190,21 @@ class WatermarkGeneratorService {
     try {
       const event = { slug: photo.slug, source_mode: photo.source_mode, external_path: photo.external_path };
       const storageKey = resolvePhotoStorageKey(event, photo);
-      const result = storageKey
-        ? await withLocalCopy(storageKey, (lp) =>
-          watermarkService.generateAndSaveWatermark(photo, lp, settings)
-        )
-        : await watermarkService.generateAndSaveWatermark(photo, resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo), settings);
+      const result = await this.limit(async () => {
+        // Same revalidation as generateForPhoto: batch jobs queue for a
+        // long time, and a disable mid-run must not recreate files after
+        // clearAllWatermarks(). The batch's `settings` snapshot is still
+        // used for rendering; only the enabled gate is rechecked.
+        const fresh = await watermarkService.getWatermarkSettings();
+        if (!fresh || !fresh.enabled) {
+          return { success: false, watermarkPath: null, error: 'Watermarking is disabled' };
+        }
+        return storageKey
+          ? withLocalCopy(storageKey, (lp) =>
+            watermarkService.generateAndSaveWatermark(photo, lp, settings)
+          )
+          : watermarkService.generateAndSaveWatermark(photo, resolvePhotoFilePath(event, photo), settings);
+      });
 
       if (result.success) {
         await db('photos')
@@ -235,7 +267,8 @@ class WatermarkGeneratorService {
 
       logger.info(`Starting watermark regeneration for ${photos.length} photos`);
 
-      // Process in batches
+      // Process in batches, capped at concurrentLimit parallel sharp
+      // pipelines via the shared instance limiter (see generateForEvent).
       for (let i = 0; i < photos.length; i += this.batchSize) {
         // Check if job was cancelled
         if (!this.activeJobs.has(jobId)) {

backend/src/services/webhookDeliveryWorker.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ const axios = require('axios');
 const { db } = require('../database/db');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
 const { signPayload, renderTemplate } = require('./webhookService');
-const { validateExternalUrl } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
+const { validateExternalUrlAsync } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
 
 const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = parseInt(process.env.WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_INTERVAL_MS || '5000', 10);
 const CONCURRENCY = parseInt(process.env.WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_CONCURRENCY || '5', 10);
@@ -91,12 +91,24 @@ async function deliverOne(row) {
     return;
   }
 
-  // Re-validate URL per delivery — DNS-rebinding mitigation. Admin can opt
-  // out via WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=true for local-receiver dev runs.
+  // Re-validate URL per delivery — DNS-rebinding mitigation. Resolves the
+  // host and vets every A/AAAA record (a public-looking name that now
+  // resolves to an internal IP is rejected). Admin can opt out via
+  // WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=true for local-receiver dev runs.
   if (!allowPrivateUrls) {
-    const urlCheck = validateExternalUrl(webhook.url);
+    const urlCheck = await validateExternalUrlAsync(webhook.url);
     if (!urlCheck.valid) {
-      await markFailedFinal(row, `URL rejected: ${urlCheck.error}`);
+      // A transient lookup failure ('unresolved' — EAI_AGAIN, resolver
+      // briefly down) must NOT connect: falling through to axios would let
+      // an attacker SERVFAIL this preflight and answer axios's own lookup
+      // with a private/metadata IP, defeating the guard. Schedule the
+      // normal retry/backoff instead — no request is made. A confirmed
+      // policy rejection (resolves-to-private / malformed) is permanent.
+      if (urlCheck.reason === 'unresolved') {
+        await scheduleTransientRetry(row, webhook, 'URL host did not resolve — retrying');
+      } else {
+        await markFailedFinal(row, `URL rejected: ${urlCheck.error}`);
+      }
       return;
     }
   }
@@ -217,6 +229,36 @@ async function markFailedFinal(row, reason) {
   await db('webhooks').where({ id: row.webhook_id }).update({ last_failure_at: new Date() });
 }
 
+// Schedule the normal retry/backoff for a transient failure that must not
+// make a network request (e.g. the SSRF preflight lookup failed). Mirrors
+// the failure branch of the main delivery path: retry until MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+// then give up. No response fields — nothing was sent.
+async function scheduleTransientRetry(row, webhook, errorMsg) {
+  const newAttempt = row.attempt_count + 1;
+  if (newAttempt >= MAX_ATTEMPTS) {
+    await db('webhook_deliveries')
+      .where({ id: row.id })
+      .update({
+        status: 'failed',
+        last_error: errorMsg,
+        attempt_count: newAttempt,
+        completed_at: new Date(),
+        next_retry_at: null,
+      });
+  } else {
+    const backoff = BACKOFF_MS[Math.min(newAttempt - 1, BACKOFF_MS.length - 1)];
+    await db('webhook_deliveries')
+      .where({ id: row.id })
+      .update({
+        status: 'pending',
+        last_error: errorMsg,
+        attempt_count: newAttempt,
+        next_retry_at: new Date(Date.now() + backoff),
+      });
+  }
+  await db('webhooks').where({ id: webhook.id }).update({ last_failure_at: new Date() });
+}
+
 function stringifyBody(data) {
   if (data == null) return null;
   if (typeof data === 'string') return data;

backend/src/utils/__tests__/filenameSanitizer.test.js

@@ -89,23 +89,25 @@ describe('sanitizeFilename — edge cases', () => {
 });
 
 describe('generatePhotoFilename — composed name uses the NFD pipeline', () => {
-  it('round-trips Ägypten + individual → Agypten_individual_0050.jpg (#607)', () => {
+  // The trailing _[0-9a-f]{12} is the anti-collision suffix (#931) that
+  // keeps concurrent uploads from assigning the same final storage path.
+  it('round-trips Ägypten + individual → Agypten_individual_0050 (#607)', () => {
     expect(generatePhotoFilename('Ägypten', 'individual', 50, '.jpg'))
-      .toBe('Agypten_individual_0050.jpg');
+      .toMatch(/^Agypten_individual_0050_[0-9a-f]{12}\.jpg$/);
   });
 
   it('handles missing category by defaulting to "uncategorized"', () => {
     expect(generatePhotoFilename('Wedding', null, 1, '.jpg'))
-      .toBe('Wedding_uncategorized_0001.jpg');
+      .toMatch(/^Wedding_uncategorized_0001_[0-9a-f]{12}\.jpg$/);
   });
 
   it('zero-pads the counter to 4 digits', () => {
-    expect(generatePhotoFilename('e', 'c', 7, '.png')).toBe('e_c_0007.png');
-    expect(generatePhotoFilename('e', 'c', 1234, '.png')).toBe('e_c_1234.png');
-    // 5+ digit counters intentionally overflow the pad — pinned because
-    // the unique index in the photos table doesn't care about pad width,
-    // only string uniqueness.
-    expect(generatePhotoFilename('e', 'c', 99999, '.png')).toBe('e_c_99999.png');
+    expect(generatePhotoFilename('e', 'c', 7, '.png')).toMatch(/^e_c_0007_[0-9a-f]{12}\.png$/);
+    expect(generatePhotoFilename('e', 'c', 1234, '.png')).toMatch(/^e_c_1234_[0-9a-f]{12}\.png$/);
+    // 5+ digit counters intentionally overflow the pad — pad width never
+    // mattered for uniqueness (there is no unique index on filenames);
+    // the random suffix is what guarantees it.
+    expect(generatePhotoFilename('e', 'c', 99999, '.png')).toMatch(/^e_c_99999_[0-9a-f]{12}\.png$/);
   });
 });
 

backend/src/utils/filenameSanitizer.js

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 const path = require('path');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
 
 /**
  * Sanitize a string to be used as a filename component
@@ -59,8 +60,18 @@ function generatePhotoFilename(eventName, categoryName, counter, extension) {
   const sanitizedEvent = sanitizeFilename(eventName, 30);
   const sanitizedCategory = sanitizeFilename(categoryName || 'uncategorized', 20);
   const paddedCounter = String(counter).padStart(4, '0');
-  
-  return `${sanitizedEvent}_${sanitizedCategory}_${paddedCounter}${extension}`;
+  // Random suffix (#931): the counter base is `count(*)+1` computed per
+  // upload request, so two concurrent bulk-upload requests can assign the
+  // same counter to different photos. Since files are written to their
+  // final path before any row exists (and photos has no unique index on
+  // filename — one can't be added without a dedupe migration on installs
+  // that already carry historical duplicates), a collision silently
+  // overwrites the first photo's bytes at its recorded path — cross-photo
+  // contamination. 48 bits keep the collision odds negligible even for
+  // pathological concurrency (two simultaneous 2000-photo uploads: ~7e-12).
+  const suffix = crypto.randomBytes(6).toString('hex');
+
+  return `${sanitizedEvent}_${sanitizedCategory}_${paddedCounter}_${suffix}${extension}`;
 }
 
 /**

backend/src/utils/networkValidation.js

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 const { URL } = require('url');
 const net = require('net');
+const dns = require('dns').promises;
 
 /**
  * Check if a hostname or IP resolves to a private/internal network address.
@@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ function isPrivateIPv6(ip) {
 
 /**
  * Validate a URL string, rejecting private/internal targets.
+ *
+ * NOTE: literal-only. For a hostname (not an IP), this checks the string but
+ * NOT what it resolves to — `evil.example` with an A record of 10.0.0.5
+ * passes. Prefer isHostAllowed / validateExternalUrlAsync at any call site
+ * that then actually connects; kept for synchronous callers and fast checks.
  * @param {string} urlString - URL to validate
  * @returns {{ valid: boolean, error?: string }}
  */
@@ -177,4 +183,65 @@ function validateExternalUrl(urlString) {
   }
 }
 
-module.exports = { isPrivateIP, validateExternalUrl };
+/**
+ * Resolve a hostname and reject if it (or ANY of its A/AAAA records) points
+ * at a private/internal address. Closes the SSRF hole where a public-looking
+ * hostname resolves to an internal IP or the cloud metadata endpoint — the
+ * literal isPrivateIP check alone can't see that. Fails closed on resolution
+ * failure. IP literals are decided by isPrivateIP without a lookup.
+ *
+ * Residual: a determined attacker who controls DNS can still rebind between
+ * this check and the client's own resolution (TOCTOU). Fully closing that
+ * needs pinning the connection to the vetted IP, which the underlying
+ * clients (nodemailer/imap/ssh/aws-sdk) don't cleanly support; these actions
+ * are admin-only, so resolve-and-vet is the proportionate mitigation.
+ *
+ * @param {string} hostname
+ * @returns {Promise<boolean>} true when safe to connect
+ */
+async function classifyHost(hostname) {
+  if (!hostname || typeof hostname !== 'string') return 'invalid';
+  // Literal check first: IP literals, blocked names, .internal/.local/.localhost.
+  if (isPrivateIP(hostname)) return 'private';
+  // An IP literal is fully decided above — no name to resolve.
+  const bare = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');
+  if (net.isIP(bare)) return 'ok';
+  let addresses;
+  try {
+    addresses = await dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true });
+  } catch {
+    return 'unresolved'; // transient/NXDOMAIN — caller decides retry vs reject
+  }
+  if (!addresses.length) return 'unresolved';
+  return addresses.every((a) => !isPrivateIP(a.address)) ? 'ok' : 'private';
+}
+
+async function isHostAllowed(hostname) {
+  // Fail-closed boolean for save/test call sites: anything not clearly 'ok'
+  // (including a transient lookup failure) is rejected.
+  return (await classifyHost(hostname)) === 'ok';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Async, DNS-resolving counterpart to validateExternalUrl. Returns a `reason`
+ * so callers with retry semantics (e.g. the webhook worker) can distinguish a
+ * policy rejection ('private'/'invalid') from a transient lookup failure
+ * ('unresolved') that should be retried rather than permanently failed.
+ * @param {string} urlString
+ * @returns {Promise<{ valid: boolean, error?: string, reason: string }>}
+ */
+async function validateExternalUrlAsync(urlString) {
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(urlString);
+  } catch {
+    return { valid: false, error: 'Invalid URL format', reason: 'invalid' };
+  }
+  const reason = await classifyHost(parsed.hostname);
+  if (reason !== 'ok') {
+    return { valid: false, error: 'URL points to a private or internal network address', reason };
+  }
+  return { valid: true, reason: 'ok' };
+}
+
+module.exports = { isPrivateIP, validateExternalUrl, isHostAllowed, validateExternalUrlAsync, classifyHost };

backend/src/utils/passwordValidation.js

@@ -123,20 +123,32 @@ async function getPasswordComplexitySettings() {
     
     // Use retry wrapper to handle connection failures
     const settings = await withRetry(async () => {
+      // Key must match what the settings UI writes: `security_` prefix +
+      // `password_complexity` (useSettingsState.ts saveSecurityMutation).
+      // The old `security_password_complexity_level` key is written by
+      // nothing, so the admin's choice was silently ignored.
       return await db('app_settings')
-        .where('setting_key', 'security_password_complexity_level')
+        .where('setting_key', 'security_password_complexity')
         .first();
     });
     
     if (!settings || !settings.setting_value) {
       return 'moderate'; // Default
     }
-    
-    const value = typeof settings.setting_value === 'string' 
-      ? JSON.parse(settings.setting_value)
-      : settings.setting_value;
-    
-    return value;
+
+    // Parse with fallback, mirroring getAppSetting: on SQLite the TEXT
+    // column returns the JSON-stringified value ('"very_strong"'), but on
+    // Postgres the json column comes back already decoded ('very_strong')
+    // — a bare JSON.parse would throw there and the outer catch would
+    // silently fall back to 'moderate' again.
+    let value = settings.setting_value;
+    if (typeof value === 'string') {
+      try {
+        value = JSON.parse(value);
+      } catch (_) { /* already-decoded plain string — keep as-is */ }
+    }
+
+    return value || 'moderate';
   } catch (error) {
     logger.error('Failed to get password complexity settings:', error);
     return 'moderate'; // Default on error - ensures app continues working

backend/src/utils/photoVisibility.js

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/**
+ * Shared hidden-photo access control.
+ *
+ * PicPeak photos carry a `visibility` column: 'visible' (or NULL, for
+ * pre-migration rows) is shown to everyone; 'hidden' is client-only. A
+ * gallery viewer's `req.accessLevel` is 'client' for a PIN-client login and
+ * something else ('guest'/'slideshow'/…) for an ordinary guest.
+ *
+ * The main photo-list query and the single-photo download/view routes each
+ * enforced this inline, but several bulk/secure paths (download-all,
+ * download-selected, protected-image view, signed-URL mint, secure-token
+ * mint, secure-download) shipped without it — letting ordinary guests reach
+ * hidden/client-only photos. These helpers centralise the rule so every
+ * sink applies exactly the same predicate.
+ */
+
+// PIN-clients see hidden photos; everyone else does not.
+function canSeeHiddenPhotos(accessLevel) {
+  return accessLevel === 'client';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Append the guest visibility filter to a knex `photos` query. No-op for
+ * clients. NULL visibility is treated as visible (pre-migration default).
+ * The query must reference the table as `photos` (all call sites do).
+ */
+function applyPhotoVisibilityFilter(query, accessLevel) {
+  if (canSeeHiddenPhotos(accessLevel)) return query;
+  return query.where(function () {
+    this.where('photos.visibility', 'visible').orWhereNull('photos.visibility');
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Single-photo predicate: true when this photo must be blocked for a viewer
+ * at the given access level. Mirrors the inline guards in gallery.js.
+ */
+function isPhotoHiddenFromViewer(photo, accessLevel) {
+  return !!photo && photo.visibility === 'hidden' && !canSeeHiddenPhotos(accessLevel);
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  canSeeHiddenPhotos,
+  applyPhotoVisibilityFilter,
+  isPhotoHiddenFromViewer,
+};

backend/src/utils/resolveLogoFile.js

@@ -57,18 +57,34 @@ function generateCandidates(raw, storageRoot) {
   if (!value) return [];
   const stripped = value.replace(/^\/+/, '');
   const baseName = path.basename(value);
+  const cwdStorage = path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage');
   // Build candidate set; dedup at the end so we don't stat the same
   // file twice when the inputs overlap.
   const candidates = [
-    path.isAbsolute(value) ? value : null,
+    // Keep the raw absolute value as a candidate so a legitimate multer path
+    // (branding_logo_path is stored absolute) or an absolute logo inside a
+    // non-standard storage subdir still resolves. The containment filter
+    // below is what enforces safety — it drops this candidate when it points
+    // outside the storage roots, so `/etc/passwd` is still rejected.
+    ...(path.isAbsolute(value) ? [value] : []),
     path.join(storageRoot, stripped),
     path.join(storageRoot, 'uploads', 'logos', baseName),
     path.join(storageRoot, 'branding', baseName),
-    path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', stripped),
-    path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'uploads', 'logos', baseName),
-    path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'branding', baseName),
-  ].filter(Boolean);
-  return [...new Set(candidates)];
+    path.join(cwdStorage, stripped),
+    path.join(cwdStorage, 'uploads', 'logos', baseName),
+    path.join(cwdStorage, 'branding', baseName),
+  ];
+  // GHSA-c7x5: only read logo files INSIDE the storage roots. An admin-set
+  // logo_path of `/etc/passwd` was previously rasterised into a PDF; the
+  // filter below drops any candidate (including the raw absolute one and any
+  // `..`-escaping stripped path) that resolves outside the roots. baseName-
+  // based candidates are inherently contained.
+  const roots = [path.resolve(storageRoot), path.resolve(cwdStorage)];
+  const contained = candidates.filter((c) => {
+    const r = path.resolve(c);
+    return roots.some((root) => r === root || r.startsWith(root + path.sep));
+  });
+  return [...new Set(contained)];
 }
 
 function pickExisting(candidates) {

backend/wait-for-db.sh

@@ -120,12 +120,14 @@ echo "Ensuring storage directories exist..."
 STORAGE_BASE="${STORAGE_PATH:-/app/storage}"
 mkdir -p "$STORAGE_BASE/events/active" "$STORAGE_BASE/events/archived" "$STORAGE_BASE/thumbnails" 2>/dev/null || true
 
-# Run migrations (use safe runner in production)
+# Run migrations (use safe runner in production). Invoked via node directly —
+# the runtime image no longer ships npm (see Dockerfile: its bundled deps kept
+# tripping CVE scanners while npm itself never runs in production).
 echo "Running database migrations..."
 if [ "$NODE_ENV" = "production" ]; then
-  npm run migrate:safe
+  node migrations/run-migrations-safe.js
 else
-  npm run migrate
+  node migrations/run-migrations.js
 fi
 
 # Execute the main command

frontend/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "picpeak-frontend",
   "private": true,
-  "version": "3.45.3",
+  "version": "3.45.12",
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {
     "dev": "vite",

frontend/src/App.tsx

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { BrowserRouter as Router, Routes, Route, Navigate, useParams } from 'rea
 import { QueryClient, QueryClientProvider } from '@tanstack/react-query';
 import { ToastContainer } from 'react-toastify';
 import 'react-toastify/dist/ReactToastify.css';
-import { analyticsService } from './services/analytics.service';
+import { analyticsService, AnalyticsRouteTracker } from './services/analytics.service';
 
 import { GalleryAuthProvider, MaintenanceProvider } from './contexts';
 import { ThemeProvider } from './contexts/ThemeContext';
@@ -115,8 +115,10 @@ function AnalyticsBootstrap() {
         provider: 'rybbit',
         hostUrl: settings.rybbit_url,
         websiteId: settings.rybbit_website_id,
-        autoTrack: true,
         doNotTrack: true,
+        // Mask every /gallery/* path (they embed the share token) so Rybbit's
+        // auto-tracked page views never carry the secret (GHSA-7m6c).
+        maskPatterns: ['/gallery/**'],
       });
       return;
     }
@@ -138,7 +140,9 @@ function AnalyticsBootstrap() {
         provider: 'umami',
         hostUrl: settings.umami_url,
         websiteId: settings.umami_website_id,
-        autoTrack: true,
+        // autoTrack omitted → data-auto-track="false": Umami must NOT read the
+        // raw window.location (token leak). Page views come from the manual,
+        // sanitized AnalyticsRouteTracker instead (GHSA-7m6c).
         doNotTrack: true,
       });
       return;
@@ -151,7 +155,7 @@ function AnalyticsBootstrap() {
         provider: 'umami',
         hostUrl: envUmamiUrl,
         websiteId: envUmamiWebsiteId,
-        autoTrack: true,
+        // autoTrack omitted → data-auto-track="false" (see above, GHSA-7m6c).
         doNotTrack: true,
       });
     }
@@ -194,6 +198,7 @@ function App() {
               <DynamicFavicon />
               <RobotsMetaTags />
               <Router>
+                <AnalyticsRouteTracker />
                 <MaintenanceWrapper>
                   <SkipLink />
                   <Routes>