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Author SHA1 Message Date
Paul Nothaft c01d8d8d2e chore(stable): release 3.45.14 (#990)
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2026-08-04 21:26:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft bf9bd76278 fix(security): vet the destination project when linking a deal (stable) (#992)
Backport of #991. stable carried the identical code path and the same missing
guards.

A scoped admin could point a quote or contract at a project they do not own —
the quote/contract create+update paths pass a body-supplied projectId with no
ownership check, and linkDealToProject's lineage guard is skipped when the deal
has no event yet. On an ownerless project this escalated to a read once the
quote converted to an event.

Vetted at the service choke point, ahead of both the null-deal early return and
the customer check. 404 PROJECT_NOT_FOUND throughout. super_admin unaffected.
2026-08-04 16:36:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0fe5792a7d fix(deps): bump ip-address, brace-expansion and postcss for open CVEs (stable) (#988)
Backport of #987. stable carried the same vulnerable versions.

  brace-expansion  5.0.8  -> 5.0.9   CVE-2026-69152 (high)
  ip-address       10.2.0 -> 10.4.0  CVE-2026-69192 (high), CVE-2026-54272,
                                     CVE-2026-69198 (medium) — SSRF and
                                     trust-boundary bypasses
  postcss          8.5.18 -> 8.5.23  CVE-2026-69153 (medium)

Lockfile holds exactly one entry per package, all at or above the fixed
version; the image installs via npm ci --omit=dev.
2026-08-04 14:36:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3f7364be8e chore(stable): release 3.45.13 (#972)
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Build and Push Docker Images / merge-frontend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
2026-08-03 21:26:03 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2d0e6ab2dc fix(projects): stop the cockpit offering email controls the API rejects (stable) (#977)
Closes #969 on stable. Backport of #976.

The cockpit's email feed rendered preview/resend/cancel/retry/send-now for every mail regardless of role or permission, producing 404s (CRM document mail has no event_id; project ownership does not imply event ownership) and 403s (preview needs events.view, the write actions need email.send).

getProjectOverview now stamps each email with an authoritative canAct, mirroring filterOwnedEventIds; created_by is selected only for that check and stripped before the response. A missing canAct reads as false.
2026-08-03 14:49:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cc49f6997a fix(auth): fail closed when the adminAuth roles join errors (stable) (#975)
Closes #968 on stable. Backport of #974.

The roles-join fallback in adminAuth fabricated role_name='super_admin' on ANY database error, so a transient fault silently granted super_admin for its duration. Gate it on isMissingRolesSchema(), moved to utils/dbErrors.js and shared with apiTokenAuth, with the predicate tightened to trust SQLSTATE 42P01/42703 on Postgres and exact driver phrasing on SQLite.
2026-08-03 14:48:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fecc18cbc8 fix(security): enforce project ownership on project + project-email routes (stable) (#966)
* fix(security): enforce project ownership (GHSA-wrg5, GHSA-93x4)

Project routes authorized on generic events.view / events.edit with NO
ownership check, so an editor-like admin could enumerate, read, update and
aggregate projects belonging to other admins' events. The project email
endpoints keyed on an email_queue id alone — any admin with events.view /
email.send could preview, resend, cancel or retry ANY queued mail by walking
ids.

The earlier 'needs a migration, deferred' assessment was wrong in one
direction and right in another: ownership IS derivable transitively via
events.project_id -> events.created_by, but only for projects that already
have a linked event. A brand-new EMPTY project has no derivable owner, which
is exactly where the create -> attach flow starts. So migration 167 adds
projects.created_by (backfilled from the single linked event owner, skipping
ambiguous multi-owner projects) and createProject finally persists the adminId
it was already being passed.

- ownedProjectIds(): union of the stored owner and the transitive path, so
  pre-167 rows and new empty projects both resolve. Reads created_by
  defensively so an instance that hasn't run 167 falls back to the transitive
  rule instead of throwing.
- requireProjectOwnership on detail/update/attach-event/attach-quote/
  attach-contract/overview; list filtered by an id allowlist (empty array
  means 'owns nothing' and must return no rows, hence null-vs-[] care).
- POST /:id/events also validates the INCOMING eventId — owning the project
  is not enough, or an editor could pull a foreign event in and read its
  rolled-up documents via /:id/overview.
- Queued-email routes scoped via email_queue.event_id. CRM document mail has
  event_id NULL and no ownable parent here, so a scoped caller is denied
  rather than guessed into access. 404 (not 403) so it isn't an id oracle.

Note: adminEmail.js:315/332 let any email.view/edit admin archive or delete
any email_queue row — the same class, pre-existing and outside these two
advisories. Left untouched and reported rather than silently widened.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — make the stored project owner authoritative (GHSA-wrg5)

The first predicate union'd 'any linked event I can see' with the stored
owner, which opened two holes:

- A project owned by admin B containing ONE legacy ownerless event became
  readable by every admin — and /:id/overview aggregates B's other events,
  invoices and emails, so a single legacy event exposed the whole project.
- Migration 167 deliberately leaves multi-owner (ambiguous) projects NULL
  rather than guessing an owner. A NULL owner was then treated as
  'everyone's', so exactly those mixed projects became globally accessible.

Now: the stored created_by wins outright, and a project without a usable
stored owner only derives access when EVERY linked event is accessible (and at
least one exists). A created_by pointing at a hard-deleted admin degrades to
'no usable owner' so the project falls back to its events instead of being
locked away — no ON DELETE SET NULL migration needed. A project with neither a
usable owner nor linked events stays super_admin-only: failing closed beats
failing open, and a super_admin can reassign it.

Also returns a knex SUBQUERY rather than a materialised id list, so a large
project count can't hit the driver's bind-parameter limit.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — enforce deal-lineage ownership on project attach (GHSA-wrg5)

requireProjectOwnership vets only the DESTINATION project, while attaching a
quote or contract cascades through linkDealToProject — which re-points every
event the deal produced into that project. An editor could therefore create an
empty project of their own, attach another admin's quote, and pull that admin's
events (plus the invoices, emails and gallery that roll up with them) into a
project they own and can read via /:id/overview. The single-customer guard did
not stand in the way: an unassigned project ADOPTS the deal's customer rather
than rejecting it.

linkDealToProject now refuses to move lineage events the actor cannot own, and
assignDocument cascades BEFORE stamping the document so a refused attach leaves
nothing half-applied (the old order committed the foreign document into the
caller's project and only then declined the cascade). The quote/contract
create+update paths, which reach the same cascade with an arbitrary project_id,
thread their adminId through as well; isSuperAdmin() resolves the role for them
and fails closed when it cannot.

Events are the only ownership signal a deal carries — quotes and contracts have
no created_by in this schema — so a lineage that produced no event still cannot
be attributed. That is a property of the CRM model, noted in the code.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 688e318850db1b5f4ea2a4ae3c0fcf0fc137620d)

* docs(security): drop the stale ownership JSDoc left by the rebase (GHSA-wrg5)

Rebasing onto stable (which had gained scopeEventsQuery from #963) replayed the
round-1 doc block above round-2's replacement, leaving a comment that describes
the ORIGINAL union rule — "a project is the caller's when … it has at least one
linked event they own" — directly above the code that deliberately no longer
does that. That union is the hole round 2 closed; a comment asserting it is
worse than none.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:24:41 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7f27e6771f fix(security): escape brand tokens, block tracker redirects, trim logo diagnostic (stable) (#967)
* fix(security): escape brand tokens, block tracker redirects, trim logo diagnostic (GHSA-j347, mw76, 29vm)

GHSA-j347 — buildCachedPayload sanitizes the operator's HTML and THEN runs
applyBrandTokens over the result with a plain String.replace, so any markup in
a token value reached the public origin unfiltered. The default templates
interpolate tokens into text AND into quoted attributes
(<img src="{{brand_logo_url}}" alt="{{company_name}} logo">,
href="mailto:{{support_email}}"), so a value could close the attribute and
inject. Token values are now HTML-escaped on substitution, mirroring
galleryOgService's escapeHtml. sanitizeBrandUrl's case-sensitive literal
'javascript:' check (which 'JavaScript:' walked straight past) is replaced by
an http/https scheme allowlist; relative logo paths are unaffected.

Writer is settings.edit (super_admin only) and the CSP blocks inline script,
so this is defence-in-depth — but sanitize-then-substitute is a real ordering
bug regardless.

GHSA-mw76 — the SSRF decline STANDS: self-hosted operators legitimately point
analytics at private addresses, so connection-time IP blocking would break real
deployments. Fixed only the narrow leak: undici strips
Authorization/Cookie/Proxy-Authorization/Host across a cross-origin redirect,
but umamiAdapter sends a CUSTOM x-umami-api-key header, which would be replayed
verbatim to the redirect target. Both adapters now use redirect: 'error'.

GHSA-29vm — the logo diagnostic echoed absolute storage roots, process.cwd()
and absolute candidate paths. It now reports candidates relative to
<STORAGE>/<CWD_STORAGE>, which answers the same 'which candidate existed'
question. It also still advertised the raw-absolute candidate that GHSA-c7x5
removed from resolveLogoFile, so it was misreporting what the resolver tries —
aligned with the real candidate list.

publicSiteService.test.js expectation updated: an '&' in a company name is now
emitted as '&amp;'. Renders identically; the raw payload string differs.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — stop the remaining logo-path disclosure, mirror the resolver (GHSA-29vm)

- sources[].value was still echoed verbatim. branding_logo_path is stored
  ABSOLUTE by multer, so relativising only resolvedTo and the candidate paths
  left the filesystem layout going out anyway. It is now relativised too.
- Round 1 dropped the raw-absolute candidate on the grounds that GHSA-c7x5
  removed it from resolveLogoFile — but the c7x5 follow-up RE-ADDED it (kept,
  subject to the containment filter, so a legitimate multer path still
  resolves). The diagnostic therefore reported every candidate as missing for
  a contained absolute logo while resolvedTo named the file. It now mirrors the
  resolver, containment filter included.

One deliberate cosmetic divergence, commented in place: for an absolute value
the resolver also tries path.join(root, value-minus-leading-slash), which can
never exist and would re-embed the absolute path this endpoint must stop
echoing. Omitted; every candidate that can actually match is still shown.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — mirror the resolver for root-relative logo paths (GHSA-29vm)

The logo diagnostic skipped the `<STORAGE>/<value>` candidates whenever
path.isAbsolute(value) was true. That test cannot distinguish a multer disk
path from a root-relative URL such as `/custom/logo.png`, and for the URL form
resolveLogoFile.generateCandidates() does try `<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png` and
can resolve it — so the endpoint reported "no source candidate exists" about a
logo that renders fine, and collapsed the configured value to its basename.

The stripped joins are now built unconditionally, exactly as the resolver does.
Disclosure stays closed: every candidate still passes the containment filter and
redact() rewrites survivors to `<STORAGE>/…`, never an absolute host path.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 093480a753ff3d4b6ed48dd9f1108f975c8e0d47)

* fix(security): gate the logo stripped-joins on containment, not isAbsolute (GHSA-29vm)

The previous commit dropped the isAbsolute() gate entirely and regressed
logoDiagnostic's own disclosure assertion: for a genuine multer disk path,
path.join(root, value-minus-leading-slash) yields
`<STORAGE>/tmp/…/storage/custom/logo.png`, and redact() only rewrites the
LEADING root — so the inner absolute path went straight back into the payload.

The right discriminator is not "is this absolute" (which cannot separate a disk
path from a root-relative URL) but "does the value already resolve inside a
storage root". If it does, it is a real disk path, the raw candidate already
covers it, and the stripped join is the double-prefixed junk that can never
exist. If it does not — the `/custom/logo.png` URL form — the stripped join is
exactly what resolveLogoFile resolves, and is shown.

Covered by a new case asserting both halves: the candidate appears for the URL
form, and the payload still contains neither the storage root nor cwd.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit c6b95d3cd1cb28e5c2828d29d4d63fadad981dcf)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:55 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 4e99897313 fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697) (stable) (#963)
* fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697)

Migration 081 documents the intent — 'the token's effective permissions are
the intersection of the user's role permissions and the token's own scope
flags' — but it was never implemented.

- apiTokenAuth selected only id/username/email/role_id, so req.admin.roleName
  was undefined. Every ownership helper keys on roleName, so the v1 surface
  could not tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer. Now joins roles and
  emits the same req.admin shape adminAuth does, including the
  roles-table-missing upgrade fallback.
- No v1 route applied any ownership predicate: GET /events listed every event
  on the instance, and GET /events/:id/share-link returned ANY event's
  share_token — the gallery access credential, same class as GHSA-rh8r.
  List is now scoped via a new scopeEventsQuery helper; the three :id routes
  (detail, photo upload, share-link) use the existing requireEventOwnership.

Not a breaking change: tokens are minted by super_admins, who bypass
ownership. It closes the case where a token's owner is later demoted —
userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlived the
demotion with full read of every gallery's share token.

events.category.test.js stubbed apiTokenAuth without roleName; giving the
stub super_admin keeps requireEventOwnership from issuing a DB query and
desyncing that suite's sequenced dbMock.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — intersect v1 token scopes with role permissions (GHSA-9697)

Ownership scoping alone left half the documented control missing. Migration
081 defines a token's effective permissions as the INTERSECTION of the owner's
role permissions and the token's scope flags; requireApiScope only ever checked
the scope half. A token minted while its owner was super_admin therefore kept
write access after the owner was demoted to viewer — userManagementService
never touches api_tokens, so the token outlives the demotion, and ownership
scoping does not help because the demoted owner still owns their events.

Adds requirePermission to all six v1 routes (events.create on create,
events.view on the reads, photos.upload on upload). It keys on req.admin.id,
which apiTokenAuth already populates.

The two existing v1 suites mock the database, so a real permission lookup
500s — they now mock the permissions middleware as pass-through, matching how
they already mock apiTokenAuth. Those suites cover route logic; the
intersection is pinned by the new v1TokenPermissions suite.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — fail closed on the roles-join fallback (GHSA-9697)

The round-2 fix loaded the token owner's role so the v1 ownership checks could
tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer, and mirrored adminAuth's
roles-table-missing fallback. That fallback assigns role_name = 'super_admin',
and the catch around it was unconditional — so ANY failure of the joined query
(connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout) elevated the token owner to
super_admin as long as the simpler fallback query then succeeded. A restricted
owner could ride that into listing, reading and share-tokening every event on
the instance, which is the exact hole GHSA-9697 closes.

The fallback is now reached only for an error that genuinely names a missing
roles table/column (PG 42P01/42703 or the SQLite/MySQL wording); anything else
propagates to the 500 handler.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 53d1e5d1b3148a7f4067308b08fcdf8ddab0a39f)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:52 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ccab9024d4 fix(security): bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (stable) (#965)
* fix(security): bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (GHSA-2qf9, pgmp, r794)

GHSA-2qf9 — emailIntakeService downloaded, parsed and persisted every message
with no size, attachment-count or attachment-byte limit, reachable
unauthenticated by anyone who can email the operator's mailbox:
- fetch the envelope with `size` (same cheap pass) and refuse an oversized
  message BEFORE downloading its source;
- cap attachment count and cumulative attachment bytes;
- limits env-overridable, defaults generous for real supplier invoices.

The teeth were in the dedup key. received_emails.message_id is varchar(512)
UNIQUE, and the failure path wrote `err-<uid>-<Date.now()>`, which can never
match the envelope-derived messageId the dedup pass compares against — so an
oversized (or overlong-Message-ID) mail was re-downloaded every poll forever,
and an OOM-kill/restart just resumed the loop. Size-skips are now recorded
under the REAL message id, and overlong ids collapse to a stable sha256 key
that always fits the column.

GHSA-pgmp / r794 — new sanitizeForLog() util (key-name deny-set, recursive,
cycle-safe) applied to the three request-body log sites in adminEvents/crud.js,
plus sanitizeValidationErrors() because express-validator's errors.array()
embeds the SUBMITTED value per field — a rejected plaintext password was still
logged. Scope is wider than filed: the update path also logged
client_password_hash and a LIVE client_share_token bearer credential.

Also: the one-time setup token was logged at warn AND printed to stdout on
every first boot, putting a live first-admin credential in combined.log,
security.log and `docker logs`. It is now written to the 0600 token file and
only surfaced when that write fails — the last-resort path it existed for. (stable)

* fix(security): codex round 3 — repair the first-run token recovery flow (GHSA-r794)

Two regressions from keeping the setup token out of the logs.

1. server.js decided whether to print the token by calling existsSync() on the
   candidate path. That answers a different question than "did the write
   succeed": a stale, read-only or directory-shaped SETUP_TOKEN reports as
   present, so the banner suppressed the live token and pointed the operator at
   content that is not it — leaving the current token only in combined.log
   under default production logging. setupService now records the path the
   write actually produced and exposes it via writtenSetupTokenFile().

2. The setup screen, its EN/DE strings, README, SIMPLE_SETUP and .env.example
   all still told first-time users to run
   `docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`. On the normal path
   that command now returns a path banner and no credential, so the documented
   browser-first onboarding could not be completed. They now point at
   `docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN`, with the log
   fallback described as what it is — the failure path.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 9a54b6f0231c3285df4c4865eb846e63e1ed0dda)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 11f9f584de fix(security): scope dashboard stats/analytics/activity to the caller's events (stable) (#964)
* fix(security): scope dashboard endpoints to the caller's events (GHSA-c2jj, gqx7, jhcf)

/dashboard/stats, /analytics and /activity are gated only by analytics.view,
which the editor role holds — but the events LIST restricts editors to their
own rows (adminEvents/crud.js: roleName === 'editor' -> created_by =
admin.id). So an editor saw instance-wide totals, and via /analytics
topGalleries other admins' gallery NAMES and SLUGS (the public gallery URL
component), for events invisible to them everywhere else.

- stats: all 10 aggregates scoped (events by id, photos/access_logs by
  event_id).
- analytics: all 8 series/aggregates scoped, including topGalleries. The
  external tracker device breakdown reports instance-wide data with no event
  filter, so a scoped caller falls through to the access_logs heuristic
  instead, which IS scoped.
- activity: feed scoped. activity_logs.event_id is nullable and the join is a
  leftJoin, so system-level rows (logins, settings changes) are deliberately
  excluded for a scoped caller — those are precisely the cross-admin actions
  the advisory is about.

Scoping keys on 'editor' to mirror the events list exactly, so the admin
role's dashboard is unchanged. filterOwnedEventIds uses the broader
'!== super_admin' rule; the two conventions disagree in this codebase and
matching the list is the no-regression choice.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — fix activity misattribution, scope via subquery (GHSA-jhcf, c2jj, gqx7)

- expenseService passed adminId as logActivity's THIRD positional parameter,
  which is eventId — so admin ids were being written into
  activity_logs.event_id. The /activity scoping filter trusts that column, and
  admin/event id sequences overlap, so a foreign admin's expense metadata could
  surface under an editor's event. All 11 calls now pass null for eventId and
  the admin as the actor, which is what they meant.
- Dashboard scoping now uses a SUBQUERY instead of pluck()+whereIn. An editor
  owning more events than the driver's bind-parameter limit (~999 SQLite,
  65535 Postgres) would have turned all three endpoints into 500s once each id
  became a placeholder; below the limit it still re-sent the full list for each
  of the ~10 aggregates per request.

Note: two billInboundNow() calls also end in ', adminId)' but have an unrelated
signature — verified untouched.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — correct legacy accounting activity rows (GHSA-jhcf)

expenseService called logActivity(type, metadata, adminId), but logActivity's
third positional parameter is eventId. Every expense / incoming-invoice entry
therefore stored the ACTING ADMIN'S ID in activity_logs.event_id.

Round 2 scoped the activity feed with
`WHERE activity_logs.event_id IN (SELECT id FROM events WHERE created_by = me)`,
which does nothing about the rows already on disk. Admin ids and event ids are
small integers from the same range, so on any upgraded instance an editor who
owns the event whose id happens to equal another admin's id is served that
admin's accounting activity, verbatim metadata included — GHSA-jhcf, still
live. Migration 168 re-attributes those rows (event_id holds exactly the actor
id that was lost) and then clears event_id so the scope predicate can no longer
match them. All ten activity types are emitted by expenseService and nothing
else, so no row with a genuine event_id is touched.

Also: the round-2 rewrite passed `{ type: 'admin', id: adminId }`
unconditionally, which stored actor_type='admin' with a null id for the
automated mailbox intake (emailIntakeService calls recordInboundDocument with
no adminId). adminActor() restores 'system' attribution for those.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 459e9e42434defd0dc7b87246e4d894dd47dcc56)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:46 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3b88036fda fix(security): backup/restore hardening — public-dir DB dump, restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest keying (stable) (#962)
* fix(security): stop caller-chosen database backup destination (GHSA-jw8m)

POST /api/admin/database-backup/backup forwarded req.body straight into
databaseBackupService.backup(), which merges options over config:
  const { destinationPath = '/backup/database', ... } = { ...config, ...options }

destinationPath is not a persistable setting — the /config allowlist only
accepts database_backup_* keys — so the request body was its only source.
The built-in `admin` role holds backup.create but neither settings.edit nor
backup.restore, so it could aim a full DB dump (admin bcrypt hashes, gallery
password hashes, encrypted SMTP creds) at the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
(server.js mounts it with no auth middleware) and then fetch it
unauthenticated. Filed low; it is a privilege escalation to unauthenticated
disclosure.

Forward only the real knobs, and only when present so absent keys can't
override config defaults via spread.

* fix(security): backup/restore hardening — restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest checksum keying (GHSA-fw4c, h652, hgp8)

- adminRestore /validate + /start: constrain caller-supplied source and
  manifestPath to the operator-configured backup roots — the SAME set the
  restore wizard discovers from — so disaster recovery from a rescued mount
  still works, with RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS as an escape hatch (GHSA-fw4c).
- restoreService.decompressFile: bound the EXPANDED size and abort the
  pipeline when exceeded; default 50 GB, RESTORE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES
  overrides (GHSA-h652).
- backupManifest: BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY upgrades new manifests to a keyed
  HMAC (GHSA-hgp8). Deliberately opt-in and verify-if-present — the key
  cannot live in the database because the database is inside the backup, so
  a mandatory HMAC would lock operators out of the exact disaster-recovery
  case this exists for.

Also fixes a pre-existing bug found while testing hgp8: the checksum passed
Object.keys().sort() as JSON.stringify's second argument, which is an array
REPLACER (a property allowlist applied at every depth), not a key sorter. All
nested keys — path, size, per-file checksum — were dropped before hashing, so
the file list sat outside the integrity check entirely and a manifest path
could be rewritten to ../../etc/passwd without disturbing the digest. Now
hashes a recursively-canonicalized copy, with the legacy serialization
accepted on validation so existing backups stay restorable.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — unbreak the restore wizard, share checksum verification, guard downgrades

- adminRestore: `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE ('local'|'s3'|'upload'),
  not a path — restoreService branches on those literals. The containment
  check treated it as a path, so path.resolve('local') fell outside the
  backup roots and BOTH /validate and /start returned 400, blocking every
  normal restore. Type tokens are now excluded from the path check.
- backupManifest: extracted verifyManifestChecksum() as the single source of
  truth for the legacy/keyed fallbacks. restoreService.performPreRestoreValidation
  recomputed the digest itself with the default canonical+keyed settings,
  which rejected EVERY backup written before this batch. It now delegates.
- backupManifest: guard the algorithm downgrade — with a key configured, an
  attacker able to rewrite the backup store could strip checksum_algorithm,
  edit the manifest and recompute a plain SHA-256 that verified. Opt-in via
  BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED so pre-key backups keep restoring by default.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — close two manifest-verification fail-opens (GHSA-hgp8)

verifyManifestChecksum returned valid for a manifest with no
verification.total_checksum at all, and restoreService only called it when
that field was present. Deleting the field was therefore a complete bypass of
the keying work: no digest check, no downgrade guard, no
BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED. Every manifest this codebase writes stamps the
field, so an absent one now fails validation, and the call site invokes the
verifier unconditionally.

Second fail-open: the strict-mode rejection of an unkeyed manifest was gated on
`&& key`, so with BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED=true and no BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY
configured a plain SHA-256 manifest sailed through. Strict mode is a statement
about the operator's manifests, not about the host — it is exactly the fresh
disaster-recovery box that lacks the secret. The rejection no longer depends on
a key being present.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 292a5b784acd7f47099aa234c1c2ea00050fca97)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0c73bf2cdc chore(stable): release 3.45.12 (#955)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
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2026-08-02 20:25:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2c7b5dfd02 fix(security): redact gallery share tokens from analytics tracking (GHSA-7m6c) (stable) (#953)
* fix(security): redact gallery share tokens from analytics page-view tracking (GHSA-7m6c)

* fix(security): codex round-1 — actually disable raw auto-tracking (GHSA-7m6c)

The previous patch was inert: App.tsx passed autoTrack:true (so Umami's
data-auto-track=false was never set) and the sanitized trackPageView had no
caller (useAnalytics sits outside <Router>), so the raw token URL still hit
the collector.

- Umami: drop autoTrack:true → data-auto-track=false; page views now come
  from a sanitized manual tracker.
- Rybbit: its initial-load auto pageview can't be intercepted client-side, so
  use native data-mask-patterns=['/gallery/**'] to strip the token on every
  auto-tracked view; skip manual tracking for it to avoid double counting.
- Mount <AnalyticsRouteTracker/> INSIDE <Router> so manual tracking runs.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:39:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5d5db4e766 fix(security): authz/ownership gaps (token binding, auth revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging) (stable) (#951)
* fix(security): close authz/ownership gaps (secure-download binding, photo-auth+logout revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging)

* fix(security): codex round-1 — complete admin-token invalidation + preserve foreign assignments

- photoAuth: mirror adminAuth's active-admin lookup + iat<password_changed_at
  check in the admin branch, so a deactivated admin or a pre-password-change
  token can no longer fetch every photo (GHSA-x55x was only revoke+cutoff).
- adminAuth logout: revoke req.token (the token adminAuth authenticated with,
  cookie OR header) instead of header-only, and clear the auth cookie — a
  cookie-based logout previously left the JWT live (GHSA-cjqh).
- adminCustomers PUT /:id/events: preserve the customer's existing
  assignments to events the caller does NOT own, so a restricted admin can't
  revoke another admin's customer-event links via full-list replacement.

* fix(security): codex round-2 — don't 403 legit restricted-admin assignment edits

The Manage-galleries dialog submits the full initial assignment list, so a
restricted admin editing a customer that already has a foreign assignment hit
the denied.length 403 before the preservation logic ran. Reject only
NEWLY-supplied foreign/nonexistent ids; retain foreign ids the customer is
already assigned to (they can't be added or removed by a non-owner).

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:39:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e5dccf1664 fix(security): neutralize spreadsheet formulas in all CSV/export cell-writers (CSV injection cluster) (#949)
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:38:55 +02:00
Paul Nothaft bfafecedc7 fix(security): unauth share_token leak (HIGH) + restore path-traversal, logo file-read (stable) (#947)
* fix(security): stop unauth share_token leak + block restore path-traversal, logo-path file read, branding path keys

* test: update resolveLogoFile for the c7x5 containment (reject outside-storage absolute paths, keep inside)

* fix(security): codex round-1 — escape LIKE wildcards in share-link resolve, keep in-storage absolute logos, guard restore verification

- shareLinkService: escape %/_ in the link_partial LIKE fallback so an
  anonymous /resolve/____… wildcard can't match an arbitrary share_link and
  leak its bearer token (reopened GHSA-rh8r). Explicit ESCAPE for SQLite.
- resolveLogoFile: re-add the raw absolute candidate but keep it subject to
  the storage-root containment filter (GHSA-c7x5) so legit in-storage
  absolute logos resolve while /etc/passwd stays rejected.
- restoreService: apply the same pathEscapes guard in post-restore
  verification so a skipped traversal entry isn't fs.access'd/hashed.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 08:38:47 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2c5a094c5c chore(stable): release 3.45.11 (#936)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
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2026-08-01 17:38:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2462ba6897 fix(security): close authorization/ownership gaps (token scope, mass-assignment, category hero, project docs) (stable) (#944)
* fix(security): close authorization/ownership gaps (token scope, mass-assignment, category hero, project docs)

* fix(security): block archive columns in event mass-assignment per review

* fix(security): comprehensive event mass-assignment denylist + deal-cascade cross-domain permission gate (codex r2)

* fix(security): case-insensitive complete event denylist + project_id + empty-update no-op (codex r3)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 90275f88e9 fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) (stable) (#942)
* fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster)

* fix(security): harden SSRF fix per review (rsync backup path, S3 config-save, webhook transient-DNS retry)

* fix(security): S3 endpoint validation on any endpoint update + no-connect on unresolved webhook host (codex r2)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:51 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 34a7b1c013 fix(security): block guest access to hidden/client-only photos across bulk + secure routes (stable) (#940)
* fix(security): block guest access to hidden/client-only photos across bulk + secure routes

* fix(security): harden hidden-photo fix per review (stale ZIP cache, legacy token mint, SQLite bool, client rebuild)

* fix(security): invalidate ZIP cache on photo visibility/category change (codex r2)

* fix(security): recheck photo visibility at signed/secure serve time (TOCTOU) + invalidate ZIP on client visibility change (codex r3)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:46 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7419c68337 fix(security): bump sanitize-html to 2.17.5 (CVE-2026-53606) (stable) (#938)
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 17:36:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft fc99e2b233 fix(uploads): prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes (#931) (stable) (#934)
* fix(uploads): prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes (#931)

* test: pin the suffixed photo filename format in the NFD pipeline suite (#931)

* chore(deps): promote p-limit to a direct dependency for the watermark limiter (#931)

* test: make the suffix-uniqueness check deterministic-in-practice (#931)

* fix(uploads): widen the anti-collision suffix to 48 bits (#931)

* fix(uploads): hide staging files from list() + share one watermark limiter process-wide (#931)

* fix(uploads): reclaim orphaned staging files + revalidate watermark settings in queued jobs (#931)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-01 12:29:23 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 7974b9c6d7 chore(stable): release 3.45.10 (#923)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-backend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
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2026-07-30 21:20:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 60cbda5b22 fix(security): close GHSA-g94x (cross-gallery photo read) + GHSA-pv6w (admin DB export) (stable) (#925)
* fix(security): close two access-control advisories (GHSA-g94x, GHSA-pv6w) (stable)

GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f (HIGH) — the secure-image VIEW route
(/secure-images/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token) validated only the token
signature and took the gallery/photo from the URL, so a token minted on
any PUBLIC gallery read every other gallery's photos with no password
(its download sibling has verifyGalleryAccess; the view route can't —
it serves via <img src> with no header). Bind the token to its scope
instead: the URL photoId must equal the token's minted photoId (photos
belong to exactly one gallery, and minting is gallery-scoped), and the
gallery embedded in the token's sessionId must equal the URL gallery.

GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v (MEDIUM) — GET /admin/backup/picpeak/export dumps
every table unredacted (bcrypt hashes, 2FA, SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/webhook/S3
secrets) and was gated only by backup.create, which the built-in admin
role holds. Gate it behind super_admin, matching the restore side
(backup.restore, already admin-denied) and the masked config APIs.

Regression tests pin both: cross-gallery token reads 403 (photo and
gallery checks), backup export 403 for admin / passes for super_admin.

Stable port of #924. secureImages on stable has no reveal-mode block, so
only the token-binding checks are added; the backup export gate is
identical.

* fix(security): review follow-ups on the export gate (GHSA-pv6w)

- test: place the mocked export in its own mkdtemp dir. The route
  recursively deletes path.dirname(filePath) after download, so a stub
  in bare os.tmpdir() made the super_admin test wipe the whole temp
  root — other jest workers' DB files included (latent CI flake).
- ui: hide PicpeakExportCard from non-super_admins. The role keeps
  settings.view + backup.create, so after the gate its Download button
  always 403'd with a generic toast; gate the card on role super_admin
  to match the endpoint.

* fix(security): keep the token-mismatch audit values within varchar(20) (GHSA-g94x review)

image_access_logs.access_type is varchar(20) (migration 038), but
'token_gallery_mismatch' is 22 chars — on Postgres the audit write
threw value-too-long and logImageAccess swallowed it, so the security
event went unrecorded (the 403 still fired; log is best-effort). Shorten
to 'photo_mismatch' / 'gallery_mismatch' (14/16).

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 14:24:34 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a27d19b4d1 fix(admin): expose view/download counters in the admin photos list (#895 follow-up) (stable) (#915)
* fix(admin): expose view/download counters in the admin photos list (#895 follow-up) (stable)

st-ivan's re-test after #904: statistics panel and event summary now
agree, but the per-image Engagement column still shows 0. Root cause:
the admin photos LIST endpoint maps rows to an explicit response object
that includes like/comment/rating/favorite counts but never included
view_count or download_count — the grid reads photo.view_count ?? 0,
so the column showed 0 regardless of what the DB counted. This mapper,
not stale data, is also why per-image downloads always displayed 0 in
the original report.

Suite extended with a list-endpoint assertion (beacon + download, then
the admin list reflects 1/1 and untouched photos 0/0). The skip test now
neutralizes the route's background pre-zip build, whose async ENOENT
against the intentionally missing file could land mid-suite.

Includes the one-line chunkedUploadService unref from #911 so the test
suite can mount adminPhotos regardless of merge order (identical change,
merges cleanly either way).

* test: widen the fire-and-forget settle window (#895 follow-up)

The 100ms settle was marginal on loaded CI runners — the counter
increments are deliberately fire-and-forget, and the 909 PRs flaked on
exactly these assertions. 400ms keeps the suite fast while giving slow
runners room.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 12:15:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft d68d84e5c8 fix(admin): serve videos with their real MIME type in the admin photo view (#908) (stable) (#911)
* fix(admin): serve videos with their real MIME type in the admin photo view (#908) (stable)

The admin view route built Content-Type from the filename extension —
image/<ext> — which is invalid for videos (image/mp4). The admin player
fetches this URL into a blob that inherits the type, and browsers
refuse to play a <video> blob labeled image/*: blank/grey preview,
while download (which already uses photo.mime_type) worked fine.

Stored mime_type now wins; videos without one fall back to video/mp4,
images to the extension, and extensionless files to image/jpeg instead
of the equally invalid bare 'image/'.

Also unrefs chunkedUploadService's module-level hourly cleanup interval:
it kept Jest from exiting for any suite requiring adminPhotos (it's why
adminPhotos.reference sits on the CI ignore list). Production behavior
unchanged — the HTTP listener keeps the process alive.

New adminPhotoContentType suite pins all four MIME cases.

* fix(admin): harden admin photo Content-Type resolution (#908 review round)

External review findings, all verified:

- The header is now ALWAYS image/* or video/*. photos.mime_type is
  never echoed verbatim unless it is a video/ type — the chunked-upload
  path stores the client-sent MIME unvalidated, so a stored text/html
  served inline under the app origin was a same-origin XSS hazard.
- MIME-less videos map from the extension via the shared
  EXTENSION_TO_MIME (.mov → video/quicktime, .webm → video/webm)
  instead of a blanket video/mp4 that would mislabel them.
- Images ignore the stored MIME entirely: migration 039 backfilled
  image/jpeg onto every legacy row (PNGs included), so trusting it
  would regress previously-correct extension-derived types. Extension
  wins, normalized (jpg → image/jpeg).

Suite extended to 8 MIME cases including the XSS guard and the
039-backfill immunity.

* fix(admin): validate stored video MIME as a full header-safe token (#908 review round 2)

A prefix check let malformed client-stored values through:
'video/mp4\r\nX: y' makes res.setHeader throw ERR_INVALID_CHAR — a
permanent 500 for that photo — and a bare 'video/' is an invalid type.
Strict /^video\/[\w.+-]+$/ now gates the stored value; anything else
falls back to the extension map. Two new tests pin both shapes.

* fix(admin): map-only image Content-Type — no raw extension interpolation (#908 review round 3)

image/${ext} could synthesize image/svg+xml (scriptable when served
inline) or header-invalid values from client-controlled chunked-upload
filenames. The shared EXTENSION_TO_MIME map is now the allowlist on the
image side too; unmapped extensions serve as image/jpeg — browsers
sniff image bytes in img/blob contexts, so a mislabel is harmless where
an injected type is not.

* fix(admin): own-property lookup in the extension MIME map (#908 review round)

A client-controlled filename ending in .constructor / .__proto__ /
.toString made EXTENSION_TO_MIME[ext] return an inherited Object.prototype
member (truthy), and the downstream extMime.startsWith threw —
a permanent 500 on the admin view for that photo instead of the JPEG /
mp4 fallback. hasOwnProperty-gated now; test pins both a .constructor
image and a .__proto__ video.

* fix(admin): honor safe stored image MIME for auto-imported formats (#908 review round 2)

My previous round made the image side map-only to dodge the migration
039 image/jpeg backfill and image/svg+xml — but that regressed the S3
auto-importer (STORAGE_AUTO_IMPORT), which stores correct types for
avif/bmp/tiff/heic whose extensions aren't in EXTENSION_TO_MIME. Those
now served as image/jpeg (JPEG-labelled non-JPEG bytes).

Precedence is now mapped-extension (still corrects the 039 backfill on
PNGs) -> stored MIME IF in a safe raster allowlist (avif/bmp/tiff/heic
+ the mapped ones) -> image/jpeg. Allowlist, not a regex: image/svg+xml
stays excluded (scriptable inline). Tests pin avif preserved and svg
degraded to jpeg.

* fix(admin): allow any header-safe raster MIME, deny svg/xml (#908 review round 3)

The round-2 hand-listed Set kept missing formats the S3 auto-importer
stores (apng/ico/jxl beyond avif/bmp/tiff). Replace it with a regex:
honor image/<token> EXCEPT the scriptable svg / *+xml family. Covers
every current and future raster type in one rule while still blocking
inline-scriptable svg and header injection. Tests pin apng + x-icon
preserved, svg still degraded to jpeg.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 12:14:58 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6891769124 fix(admin): stop marking events expired up to 24h early (#909) (stable) (#917)
* fix(admin): stop marking events expired up to 24h early (#909) (stable)

differenceInDays truncates to whole days, so an event expiring in a few
hours returned 0 and three admin surfaces treated it as gone:

- EventsListPage: status chip said 'Expired' (days <= 0) while the
  public gallery — which compares real timestamps — correctly showed
  'expires in X hours'. This is the reporter's exact symptom.
- EventDetailsPage: same isExpired math on the detail view.
- AdminDashboard: the expiring-soon card showed '0 days left' on the
  final day.

Expired is now gated on the actual timestamp (expires_at <= now), and
the countdown chips use ceiling days so the last day reads '1 day
left' instead of flipping to Expired/0.

* fix(admin): drop already-expired events from the dashboard card (#909 review round)

The expiring-soon card ran Math.max(1, ceil(delta)), so an event that
expired while the dashboard sat open (its query isn't polled) showed
'1 day left' indefinitely from the stale cached row. Expired rows are
now filtered out before render; the delta is therefore always positive
and the clamp is gone.

* fix(admin): refresh expiry status live at the boundary (#909 review round 2)

Two review findings on the admin expiry surfaces:

- The dashboard 'expiring soon' card, list badges, and detail banner are
  all computed inline from Date.now() at render, so a page left open
  across an event's expiry kept showing 'active'/'1 day left' until an
  unrelated render — which for editor/viewer roles (no health poll)
  never happens.
- My round-1 client-side filter on the dashboard desynced the visible
  list from the cached total/stat ('no events expiring' beside 'view
  all N').

Both are fixed by new useExpiryRefresh: it fires once at the soonest
future expiry (setTimeout, overflow-guarded). The dashboard refetches
its expiring + stats queries — the backend already excludes expired
events, so rows/total/stats come back consistent (filter removed). The
list and detail pages bump a tick so the inline badges recompute. Hooks
are placed above the loading early-returns (rules-of-hooks is disabled
in eslint, so this was a latent crash otherwise).

* fix(admin): expiry-refresh precision + filtered refetch (#909 review round 3)

Three refinements to round-2's live-expiry work:

- useExpiryRefresh now re-arms past setTimeout's ~24.8-day overflow
  limit (capped wake-up that re-evaluates) instead of dropping the timer,
  so a page mounted for weeks still updates.
- The dashboard requests the expiring list ordered by expires_at asc, so
  the five shown rows ARE the soonest to expire — the timer schedules
  against the true next boundary even when >5 events are expiring
  (getEvents gains optional sortBy/sortOrder; backend already whitelists
  expires_at).
- EventsListPage refetches instead of only re-rendering at the boundary:
  under the 'expiring' filter the backend drops expired rows, so a plain
  tick would leave a stale 'Expired' row + total. refetch keeps rows and
  totals correct under every filter.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 12:14:54 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b32ba1ed6b ci: batch stable releases into one daily version (stable) (#920)
* ci: batch stable releases into one daily version (stable)

The stable release PR was auto-merged the instant it went green, so a
day with N bugfixes produced N patch releases (3.45.8 AND 3.45.9 on
2026-07-29 alone) — N upgrade notifications for stable users and N
full Docker build cycles.

Fixes now accumulate in release-please's rolling release PR and are
cut as ONE version per day by release-stable-daily.yml (18:00 UTC).
Approval/merge mechanics are unchanged from the inline step (#719):
approve as github-actions[bot], auto-merge as the PAT so the merge
triggers the tag-cutting run.

- Urgent fix? workflow_dispatch the daily job or merge the release PR
  by hand — the schedule is a default, not a gate.
- Beta is untouched: instant beta releases are load-bearing for
  same-day reporter verification.
- schedule only fires from the default branch; the stable copy of the
  new workflow is inert and exists to keep branches in sync.

* ci: harden the daily stable-release cut (review round) (stable)

Mirror of the #919 hardening — fork-PR head-name spoof (require
--base stable + same-repo head) and no longer swallowing the
auto-merge-enable failure on the sole automatic stable cut.

* ci: accept an immediately-merged release PR as success (review round 2) (stable)

Mirror of #919: MERGED state = success (the normal 18:00 case where
checks were already green and --auto merges immediately), pending
auto-merge = success, still-open-no-auto-merge = real failure.

* ci: read release-PR state + auto-merge in one snapshot (review round 3) (stable)

Mirror of #919 — collapse the two racing gh pr view calls into one.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-30 12:14:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f99357460f chore(stable): release 3.45.9 (#907)
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-backend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-backend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/amd64, ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / build-frontend (linux/arm64, ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Waiting to run
Build and Push Docker Images / merge-frontend (push) Blocked by required conditions
Build and Push Docker Images / summary (push) Blocked by required conditions
2026-07-29 16:02:51 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 90b589a88e fix(analytics): make per-photo view/download counters actually count (#895) (stable) (#905)
* fix(analytics): make per-photo view/download counters actually count (#895) (stable)

Three stacked defects behind 'per-image stats stay 0':

- photos.view_count had NO writer anywhere — the admin IMAGES table and
  photo viewer display it, so it was permanently 0. It now increments
  when the full-size photo or its preview tier is served, excluding the
  slideshow kiosk (migration 138 design) and follow-up video Range
  requests (seeks are not views). Fire-and-forget so analytics can
  never fail the byte-serving path.
- Zip downloads (download-all, presigned download-all,
  download-selected) never incremented per-photo download_count — only
  single-photo downloads did, so zip-heavy galleries showed 0 forever.
  The zip routes now bump exactly the photos that went into the archive
  (the prebuilt-zip path mirrors the archive builders' category filter).
- Every admin surface used a different definition of 'downloads', which
  is the reporter's 46 vs 45 vs 0: event details counted only
  action='download' (no zips at all), the dashboard counted
  download+download_all but silently EXCLUDED download_selected and
  download_all_presigned. All queries now share one action set:
  download, download_all, download_all_presigned, download_selected.

New photoEngagementCounters suite pins all of it (7 tests).

* fix(analytics): count views via an explicit lightbox beacon (#895 review round)

External review flagged that request-level view counting is wrong in
both directions: the lightbox preloads prev/next neighbours (3 fetches
per open) while a preloaded neighbour promoted by a swipe is never
re-fetched (#505 keeps the DOM node), and enhanced/maximum galleries
never hit /photo at all (bytes come from /api/secure-images).

- Views now count via POST /:slug/photo/:photoId/view, fired by the
  lightbox exactly when a photo becomes the visible slide; the
  serving-route increments are removed. Covers protected galleries and
  the preview tier uniformly; slideshow kiosk stays excluded.
- bumpEventDownloadCounts mirrors downloadZipService._build (ALL event
  photos) — the category filter mismatched the prebuilt zip's actual
  contents. (That the builder ignores per-category allow_downloads is a
  separate pre-existing issue.)
- Zip loops count only successfully appended entries, with a pre-append
  storage stat: a lazy stream's async error bypassed the per-photo
  catch and hung the whole response — pre-existing bug, now fixed.

Suite extended to 9 tests (beacon semantics, serve-does-not-count,
skipped-entry exclusion).

* fix(analytics): fire the view beacon from the premium lightbox too (#895 review round 2)

gallery-premium events use yet-another-react-lightbox inside
GalleryPremiumLayout instead of PhotoLightbox, so the layout never
counted views. yarl's on.view fires on open and on every slide change —
identical semantics to the PhotoLightbox beacon.

Also documents the accepted prebuilt-zip approximation: _build can skip
entries whose watermark step fails and still publish the archive;
counting those exactly would need a persisted zip manifest.

* perf(analytics): skip the per-entry zip preflight on S3 (#895 review round 3)

The pre-append source check exists for LocalFs's lazy createReadStream
(async error would kill the whole zip response). S3's get() awaits
GetObject and rejects inside the loop's try/catch on a missing key, so
a HEAD per entry was a redundant serial round trip — 500 extra HEADs
on a 500-photo zip.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 17:59:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1ad8ad5b68 chore(stable): release 3.45.8 (#903)
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2026-07-29 10:52:37 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 962f1d9586 fix(tests): raise jest timeouts to the 120s convention (stable) (#902)
Stable backport combining #860 (never reached stable) and #900:

- jest.config.js gains testTimeout: 120000 — stable still ran on Jest's
  5s default for anything unpinned, while its migration chain (134 core
  migrations via backports) is nearly as long as beta's.
- All 19 suite-level jest.setTimeout(30000/60000) pins raised to 120s;
  local pins override the config default (#860's rationale).
- All 15 hook-ARGUMENT timeout pins on migration-booting beforeAll
  hooks raised to 120s (#900's rationale — the 3.97.0-beta.0 release PR
  failed on exactly this class on the beta side).

Untouched: the three suites whose pinned hooks don't run migrations
(webhookDelivery, imageProcessor.storage, storageBackend) and
publicQuotes' 30s pin on the rate-limit lockout test.

No test logic changed.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-29 12:48:50 +02:00
Paul Nothaft a7885846ac chore(stable): release 3.45.7 (#881)
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2026-07-27 07:58:07 +00:00
Paul Nothaft d868aac703 fix(security): close 5 Trivy alerts — postcss/tar bumps + drop npm from the runtime image (stable) (#879)
* fix(security): close the 5 open Trivy alerts — dep bumps + drop npm from the runtime image

Backend deps:
- postcss 8.5.10 -> 8.5.18 (CVE-2026-45623, GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849; the pin
  exists to force sanitize-html's transitive copy onto a fixed version)
- tar pin/override >=7.5.16 -> >=7.5.21, resolves 7.5.22
  (GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m)

Runtime image:
- Remove the npm CLI from the final stage instead of upgrading it: npm's
  bundled node_modules ship tar 7.5.19 and brace-expansion 5.0.7 (no npm
  release bundles the fixed versions — checked 11.18.0 and 12.0.1), and
  npm never runs in production. wait-for-db.sh now invokes the migration
  runners via node directly. This ends the recurring npm-bundled-CVE
  alert class; the previous 'npm install -g npm@11' line was itself a
  patch for the last batch. (stable)

* fix(restore): run post-restore migrations via node — the image ships no npm

restoreService still shelled out to 'npm run migrate:safe' after a
restore; with npm removed from the runtime image that would ENOENT into
the non-fatal catch, silently leaving a restored older backup on a
schema behind the running code until the next container restart. Invoke
migrations/run-migrations-safe.js through node directly, matching
wait-for-db.sh. The PR #596 source-contract test now pins the new
invocation. (stable)
2026-07-27 09:54:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 577b7fa6ae chore(stable): release 3.45.6 (#877)
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2026-07-27 07:10:18 +00:00
Paul Nothaft a27c705e39 fix(backup): make backup settings actually apply (#871) (stable) (#875)
* fix(backup): make backup settings actually apply (#871) (stable)

- Wire the What-to-Backup toggles into the walker: honor
  backup_include_thumbnails / backup_include_photos (opt-out,
  default ON) and accept the UI's backup_include_archives spelling
  for the archived gate (the engine expected _archived, so the
  Archives checkbox silently never worked).
- Fix the 167.6 TB dashboard size: file_size_bytes is a bigint that
  node-postgres returns as a string, and the S3 path concatenated it
  onto the byte counter; coerce to Number at the source.
- Compute the real next scheduled run (cron-parser) and return it as
  nextBackup; the UI read a field the API never sent and rendered a
  hardcoded 'Not scheduled'. A named schedule label now beats the
  stray default cron the UI always sent, which silently turned
  weekly schedules into daily 03:00 runs.
- Never back up filesystem noise (.nfs* silly-renames, .DS_Store,
  Thumbs.db) and honor backup_exclude_patterns in the walker
  (previously rsync-only).
- Remove the compression/encryption toggles from the configuration
  UI: no backend implementation exists, and collecting an encryption
  passphrase while uploading plaintext is a false promise.

* fix(backup): close the review gaps in the settings wiring (stable)

- The UI's backup_include_archives now beats the migration-seeded
  backup_include_archived: every install has the singular key seeded
  true, so the alias-only-when-absent lookup made unchecking Archives
  a no-op.
- rsync destinations now receive the de-selected What-to-Backup paths
  and the noise filters as anchored --exclude args; previously rsync
  synced the whole storage root and the walker's selection only shaped
  the manifest, which then misreported what was actually transferred.
- Escape regex metacharacters in the walker's glob matcher: '.nfs*'
  compiled to /^.nfs.*$/ whose leading dot matched any character, so
  files like anfs-photo.jpg were silently dropped from backups.
- The Backup Coverage report now uses the same gate as the walker
  (new 'skipped-by-setting' status) instead of re-implementing it
  without the opt-out toggles and the archives alias.

* fix(backup): make the coverage diagnostics agree with the walker

- The coverage table shows the alias-aware flag value the gate actually
  used, instead of the seeded backup_include_archived shadowed by the
  UI's plural key (true next to a 'Gated off' badge).
- skipped-by-setting paths are now counted in the coverage summary
  (backend, TS contract, summary card, EN/DE locales) so the totals
  reconcile again when Photos or Thumbnails is unchecked.
- The form's thumbnail default now matches the backend's never-saved
  fallback (include): the checkbox no longer shows 'off' while
  thumbnails are being backed up, and saving an unrelated setting no
  longer flips the backup scope. (stable)

* fix(backup): keep custom crons, exclude disabled rows from rsync, normalize flag display

- Saving a named schedule no longer wipes the stored custom cron: the
  backend already prefers the label, so the cron field stays inert for
  named schedules and is preserved for switching back to Custom. A
  custom schedule now validates the 5-field expression before saving
  (the backend silently fell back to daily 02:00 on a blank value).
- resolveExcludedBackupPaths now also returns rows disabled via
  include_in_default, so rsync excludes them; the enabled-only loader
  hid them and rsync transferred their contents anyway.
- The coverage table normalizes flag values like the walker does —
  Boolean('false') displayed true beside a gated-off badge. (stable)
2026-07-27 09:06:50 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b0e9145bba chore(stable): release 3.45.5 (#873)
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2026-07-26 18:41:48 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 39696d42fe fix(security): bump backend deps to close all 14 open Trivy code-scanning alerts (stable) (#870)
* fix(security): bump backend deps to close all open Trivy code-scanning alerts (stable)

- axios 1.16.0 -> 1.18.1 (GHSA-gcfj-64vw-6mp9 high + 10 medium advisories)
- sharp 0.34.3 -> 0.35.3 (GHSA-f88m-g3jw-g9cj, inherited libvips CVEs)
- mailparser 3.9.9 -> 3.9.14 (pulls linkify-it 5.0.2, CVE-2026-59887)
- brace-expansion override >=5.0.6 -> >=5.0.7 (CVE-2026-13149)
- body-parser 1.20.4 -> 1.20.6 via lockfile refresh (CVE-2026-12590)

* fix(images): migrate removed sharp failOnError option and enforce Node >=20.9 (stable)

sharp 0.35 drops the deprecated failOnError constructor option, so
recoverably corrupt images would start failing upload validation and
thumbnail generation; use the failOn: 'none' equivalent instead.

sharp 0.35 also requires Node >=20.9: declare it in engines and make
picpeak-setup.sh compare the full version instead of only the major,
so native installs on Node 20.3-20.8 upgrade instead of breaking.

* fix(setup): align the Node floor with the whole dependency tree and gate native updates (stable)

html-to-text@10 needs Node >=20.19 and the glob/minimatch family excludes
Node 21, so declare engines as ^20.19.0 || >=22 and enforce the same range
in picpeak-setup.sh. Also run install_nodejs at the start of
update_native_installation so existing native installs on an old Node get
upgraded before the service is stopped, instead of restarting broken.

* fix(setup): make the update-path Node gate actually work (stable)

--update dispatches before detect_os, so install_nodejs saw an empty
PACKAGE_MANAGER, matched no install branch, and reported success on the
old runtime. Detect the OS on demand and re-verify the installed version
afterwards, failing loudly (before the service is stopped) when the
runtime still misses the engines range, e.g. a Node 21 that package
managers refuse to downgrade.
2026-07-26 20:38:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 50f5ca1d5b fix(security): read the password-complexity key the settings UI writes (stable) (#844)
* fix(security): read the password-complexity key the settings UI writes

The settings UI saves the admin's complexity choice as
security_password_complexity (useSettingsState.ts prefixes security_ to
password_complexity), but getPasswordComplexitySettings() queried
security_password_complexity_level — written by nothing — so the setting
was silently ignored and password validation always used the 'moderate'
default. Spotted in the filpgame fork (their main, 2026-07-14).

* fix(security): accept the Postgres json-column shape of the complexity value (codex review of #843)

On SQLite the TEXT column returns the JSON-stringified value
('"very_strong"'), but on Postgres (production default) setting_value
is a json column and arrives already decoded ('very_strong') — the bare
JSON.parse threw and the outer catch silently fell back to 'moderate'
again. Parse with fallback, mirroring getAppSetting's documented
pattern; test now covers both driver shapes + the empty-value default.
2026-07-19 20:04:35 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 11b6490e4c chore(stable): release 3.45.4 (#831)
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2026-07-17 19:43:45 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 1cff576439 Merge pull request #829 from PicPeak/fix/hero-logo-visible-null-validation-stable
fix(events): accept hero_logo_visible: null on create/update (#822) (stable)
2026-07-17 21:39:26 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8978acdb49 fix(events): accept hero_logo_visible: null on create/update (#822)
hero_logo_visible is nullable — null means "inherit the global
branding_logo_display_hero toggle" (#756, migration 152). But the create and
update validators used `.optional()` without `{ nullable: true }`, which only
skips `undefined`; an explicit `null` still ran `.isBoolean()` and failed with
HTTP 400 "Invalid value". Saving an event with `hero_logo_visible: null` (the
inherit state the frontend sends) was rejected on v3.45.2.

- Both routes: `body('hero_logo_visible').optional({ nullable: true }).isBoolean()`,
  matching the already-correct `hero_logo_size` rule next to it.
- Create handler: guard on `!= null` instead of `!== undefined` so an explicit
  null stores NULL (inherit) rather than being coerced to 0/false by
  formatBoolean on SQLite. The update handler already did `=== null ? null`.

Left hero_logo_position on plain `.optional()` on purpose: its column is NOT
NULL (no inherit migration) and its handler always resolves to a concrete value
via `|| brandingDefaults`, so null is genuinely invalid there — allowing it
would trade the 400 for a 500.

Adds smoke tests: PUT accepts hero_logo_visible: null and stores NULL; a
non-boolean value is still rejected.
2026-07-17 21:14:12 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 0d8123ed4a chore(stable): release 3.45.3 (#827)
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2026-07-17 19:08:55 +00:00
Paul Nothaft db1d28a75b Merge pull request #825 from PicPeak/fix/update-instructions-production-compose-stable
fix(update): target docker-compose.production.yml in dashboard update steps + gate mailhog (stable)
2026-07-17 21:03:21 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 64bcd0ab9f fix(update): target docker-compose.production.yml in dashboard update steps
Production installs use docker-compose.production.yml (the README's documented
path, pinned GHCR images, no dev services), but the dashboard's update
instructions emitted bare `docker compose pull` / `up -d`. Bare `docker compose`
operates on docker-compose.yml — a different, build-based stack — so a
production user who followed the steps:
  - never pulled/recreated their real containers (stayed on the old version,
    e.g. stuck on 3.44.0 after "updating" to 3.45.2), and
  - started the dev-only mailhog service that docker-compose.yml defines
    (reported restart-looping).

The backend runs inside a container and can't stat the host's compose files, but
docker-compose.production.yml passes PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL into the backend env
and docker-compose.yml does not. detectEnvironment() now derives
isProductionCompose from it, and the Docker update steps prepend
`-f docker-compose.production.yml` when set. The non-production branch keeps the
bare commands but the warning now tells users to add `-f docker-compose.production.yml`
if they installed with it.

Also gates the mailhog service in docker-compose.yml behind a `dev` compose
profile so a plain `docker compose up -d` never starts it (opt in with
`docker compose --profile dev up -d`). Nothing depends on it (SMTP_HOST comes
from .env), so gating is safe. Verified: `docker compose config` lists mailhog
only with `--profile dev`; production compose is unchanged.

Adds unit tests for the production-vs-default command generation.
2026-07-17 20:56:18 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1d48f59fe1 chore(stable): release 3.45.2 (#819)
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2026-07-17 07:34:35 +00:00
Paul Nothaft e37d1fac58 Merge pull request #818 from PicPeak/fix/legacy-events-router-bola-stable
fix(security): remove unguarded legacy /api/events router on stable (GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq)
2026-07-17 09:29:24 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9ee3ff45d0 fix(security): remove unguarded legacy /api/events router (GHSA-4j34-x562-5vfq)
The legacy gallery router mounted at /api/events exposed create/list/update/
delete/extend guarded by adminAuth ALONE — no requirePermission, no
requireEventOwnership. adminAuth only checks the token is a valid type:'admin'
session, which every back-office role holds, down to read-only `viewer`. So any
non-super-admin account could:
  - GET /api/events → every gallery's bcrypt password_hash, share_token, and
    client name/email (the list handler selects * and mapEventForApi keeps
    those columns),
  - PUT /api/events/:id → reset any gallery's password (full takeover),
  - DELETE /api/events/:id → delete any gallery,
all bypassing the per-photographer ownership isolation the canonical
/api/admin/events router enforces. Affects any instance with more than the
single super_admin.

Fix: remove the legacy router entirely (mount + require + src/routes/events.js).
It was a superseded duplicate of /api/admin/events and unused by the frontend
EXCEPT for one live route — POST /:id/extend (the "Extend expiration" UI action,
which hit /api/events/:id/extend via the api client's /api base). That route is
migrated to the canonical mount as POST /api/admin/events/:id/extend with the
same guards as every other gallery mutation (adminAuth + requirePermission
('events.edit') + requireEventOwnership), and the frontend is repointed to it.
Behaviour of the extend itself is unchanged (expires_at + reactivate).

Verified end-to-end on a booted instance: /api/events (all methods) now 404;
/api/admin/events/:id/extend returns 401 unauth, 200 for the owner, 403 for a
non-owning editor; the full login→create→extend flow works. Adds a regression
test pinning the router removal and the extend ownership check.
2026-07-17 09:18:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 5453152f1c chore(stable): release 3.45.1 (#815)
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2026-07-16 11:44:00 +00:00
Paul Nothaft b416baec5c Merge pull request #812 from PicPeak/fix/security-advisories-backend-stable
fix(security): close 4 open security advisories on stable (backup takeover, share-login bypass, ZIP slip, chunked-upload traversal)
2026-07-16 13:37:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 38ddd70c12 Merge pull request #809 from PicPeak/fix/docker-image-os-cves-stable
chore(security): close 21 frontend image CVEs on stable — nginx 1.30 base + apk cache-bust
2026-07-16 13:37:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b00a16159e fix(security): harden .picpeak restore operator-preservation (GHSA-qxfx follow-up)
The req.admin.id fix activated reinjectCurrentAdmin(); hardening its preservation
logic (found across Codex review rounds of #811):

- MFA hijack: reinject wrote back only password_hash/is_active/
  must_change_password, leaving a crafted backup's two_factor_* on the
  operator's row — it could strip or replace their second factor. The email-
  matched row is now updated with the operator's full AUTH set (login identity,
  password, and all two_factor_* columns). Relationship/audit FKs (role_id,
  created_by) are deliberately NOT forced from the snapshot: on a cross-instance
  restore those pre-restore ids may be absent from the backup and would dangle
  the FK (SQLite rolls back at commit); the restored row keeps its own valid
  values.

- Cross-instance restore rollback / FK safety: reinject matched only by email,
  so a backup shipping a different admin with the default `admin` username hit
  UNIQUE(username) and rolled the whole restore back; email and username could
  even collide on two different rows. Reconciliation is now non-destructive:
  the email-matching row is updated in place (id preserved → restored FKs like
  events.created_by stay valid); any different row holding the operator's
  username is RENAMED, not deleted (deletion would fire ON DELETE actions /
  dangle references); only when no row has the operator's email is a fresh row
  inserted, with created_by nulled and an explicit max(id)+1 id (batchInsert
  left the Postgres identity sequence unadvanced, so a sequence-based insert
  could collide).

- Stale session after restore: admin_users ids shift on restore, but the
  operator's live JWT is bound only to decoded.id (IP logged not enforced; the
  backup controls password_changed_at). The route now revokes the token (result
  checked and logged) and clears the admin cookie; the client redirects to a
  fresh login via a sessionInvalidated flag. Cookie clear is the unconditional
  guarantee.

Adds SQLite-backed reinject regression tests (in-place login/MFA restore with id
and FK columns preserved, username-only rename, email+username on different rows,
clean insert with created_by nulled) and the frontend redirect on
sessionInvalidated.

Deferred (design decisions / pre-existing, need a Postgres test env — see PR
discussion): global "invalidate all pre-restore sessions" cutoff; preserving the
operator's ROLE semantics across an RBAC-table replace; and resyncing Postgres
identity sequences after any restore (batchInsert leaves them behind max(id) —
pre-existing, affects every restored table).
2026-07-16 12:31:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft dcfcb67f9b fix(security): sanitize chunked-upload filename (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j)
The chunked video upload stored req.body.filename unmodified and later built
the merged path as path.join(tempDir, uploadMeta.filename). path.join does not
neutralise '../', so a filename like '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the
temp dir on merge and overwrote arbitrary files. Requires admin with
photos.upload.

Fix: path.basename() the client filename in initializeUpload() and reject
names that collapse to nothing. Adds a regression test.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft cde0b465a9 fix(security): reject ZIP-slip entries in archive/backup restore (GHSA-jfhw-fj23-fx6x)
node-stream-zip's extract(null, root) writes each entry to path.join(root,
entry.name) without neutralising '../', so a crafted archive entry named
'../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the target dir and overwrote arbitrary
files (logos, .env, route files → RCE on source deploys). Requires admin with
archives.restore.

Adds assertZipEntriesWithin() to utils/safePath.js — a lexical containment
check run on the entry list BEFORE extract() — and guards both extract sinks:
adminArchives.js (the reported route) and picpeakImportService.js (the sibling
.picpeak import, same sink). Adds unit tests for traversal, absolute-path, and
sibling-prefix entries.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 28f69e4bf3 fix(security): share-login must not bypass gallery password (GHSA-9hmx-68vc-qpqw)
POST /auth/gallery/share-login validated only the 128-bit share token and then
minted a full type:'gallery' access token regardless of require_password —
computing requiresPassword at the end only to echo it, never enforce it. Anyone
holding a gallery's share link could read and download every photo in a
password-protected gallery via a direct API call, no password needed.

Fix: compute requiresPassword before minting; for a password-protected gallery
return { requires_password: true } with NO token and NO cookie. The client then
goes through /gallery/verify, which does bcrypt.compare the password. The public
(no-password) auto-login path is unchanged. The frontend already falls through
to the password prompt when share-login returns no token/event.

Adds route regression test covering the bypass, the public path, and bad tokens.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 1cf82d81a7 fix(security): preserve current admin on .picpeak restore (GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f)
adminAuth populates req.admin, not req.user, so currentAdminId was always
undefined in the /api/admin/picpeak/import handler. reinjectCurrentAdmin()
then had no account to preserve and the admin_users table was fully replaced
by the uploaded backup — a crafted .picpeak let any admin with backup.restore
take over every admin account (critical). One-line fix: pass req.admin.id.

Closes GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f and its duplicate GHSA-pjp6-jcrj-3cr5.
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ae98e7ad74 chore(security): close 21 frontend image CVEs — nginx 1.30 base + apk cache-bust
The frontend image kept shipping vulnerable OS packages (nginx 1.28.3-r1,
curl/libcurl 8.19.0, c-ares 1.34.6) despite the apk upgrade line, for two
independent reasons:

1. The runtime stage's apk upgrade layer was cached indefinitely — the
   CACHEBUST build-arg CI passes (github.run_number) was only declared in
   the builder stage, and ARGs don't cross stage boundaries. Both
   Dockerfiles now redeclare CACHEBUST in the runtime stage and consume it
   in the apk RUN, so every build re-runs the upgrade and picks up current
   Alpine security updates.

2. nginx itself can never upgrade via apk on the nginx.org-based image:
   the bundled nginx-module-* packages pin the exact nginx version, so
   Alpine's patched 1.28.3-r4 is unreachable (verified empirically —
   apk add --upgrade nginx is a silent no-op). nginx fixes must come via
   the base tag, so bump to nginx:1.30-alpine (current stable, 1.30.4 on
   Alpine 3.24, same nginx.org conf.d layout — drop-in).

Verified: local image build scans clean with Trivy (0 OS findings, was 21);
container serves /health, SPA fallback, and BRAND_TITLE envsubst as non-root
nginx user.

Closes code-scanning alerts 371-374, 376-392 (nginx HTTP/2 & module CVEs,
curl CVE-2026-5773/-6276 + 6 medium, c-ares CVE-2026-33630).
2026-07-16 10:30:42 +02:00
Paul Nothaft caa9fe5d56 chore(stable): release 3.45.0 (#777)
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2026-07-09 11:22:46 +00:00
Paul Nothaft c6e61f64ba Merge pull request #775 from PicPeak/ci/release-please-target-stable-on-stable
ci(release): cut the real v3.45.0 stable (target-branch: stable)
2026-07-09 13:13:38 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3ec0451cbb ci(release): pin target-branch: stable so release-please cuts the real v3.45.0
Triggers the correct stable release from the stable branch (manifest
3.44.0 -> 3.45.0). Same fix as #774 (which fixes it on main for future
promotes); merging this to stable is what re-runs release-please
correctly for the promote that mis-fired as v2.7.0.
2026-07-09 11:40:44 +02:00
Paul Nothaft edac463ec3 Merge pull request #771 from PicPeak/release/3.83.0-merge-from-beta
chore(release): promote beta → stable (v3.83.0 line)
2026-07-08 20:42:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 2d3537f61c ci: run the Tests workflow on stable-targeted PRs (unblock this promote)
Same one-liner as #772 — adds stable to tests.yml push/pull_request
filters so the required backend/frontend checks report on this PR
instead of hanging on 'Expected — Waiting for status to be reported'.
2026-07-08 20:29:41 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 6025b3194d chore(release): align README/DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE with main (promote content) 2026-07-08 20:01:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8713ab7f60 chore(release): keep stable manifest (3.44.0) + CHANGELOG for release-please-stable 2026-07-08 20:00:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8994901e4a chore(release): promote beta → stable (v3.83.0 line)
Merge main (v3.83.0-beta.0) into stable to cut the next stable release.
Conflicts resolved toward main (the promoted code); stable release-control
files (manifest, CHANGELOG) restored separately.
2026-07-08 19:59:55 +02:00
Paul Nothaft b86669f1e1 Merge pull request #569 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.44.0
2026-05-27 21:51:33 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 80296282e8 chore(main): release 3.44.0 2026-05-27 19:50:15 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 5551c89bda Merge pull request #568 from the-luap/release/3.55.0-merge-from-beta
chore(release): promote beta → main as v3.55.0
2026-05-27 21:48:31 +02:00
Paul Nothaft dbde67c0fa Merge branch 'main' into release/3.55.0-merge-from-beta
Resolves 6 file conflicts arising from main carrying 7 weeks of
stable-channel work (security backports, release-please cuts, README
rewrite #281) that hadn't been forward-merged into beta.

Resolution per file:

- backend/package.json + package-lock.json — kept beta's version.
  Beta is the superset; it intentionally drops `handlebars` (PR #367
  removed the runtime require; the dep was the source of 2 criticals
  + 8 highs). Security-pinned versions (axios 1.15.2, nodemailer ^8,
  i18next-http-backend ^3.0.2, multer ^2.0.2, tar >=7.5.13) already
  match across both branches — no security regression.
- frontend/package.json + package-lock.json — kept beta's version.
  Superset of main (adds marked, @types/node, i18next-cli, memfs,
  i18n CLI scripts). Same security versions on both sides.
- README.md — kept main's version. PR #281 was an explicit cleanup
  ("shorter, cleaner, less AI-sounding"); beta had grown the file by
  326 lines ad-hoc during the freeze. Preserving the rewrite.
- CHANGELOG.md — kept main's version. Release-please regenerates from
  conventional commits on its next stable cut, so beta's accumulated
  entries will roll into the new v3.55.0 release block automatically.

Auto-merged files carrying main's session-invalidation fix (#245)
flowed cleanly into beta's versions — sessionTimeout.js, adminAuth.js,
and the test files all merged without conflict, meaning beta had
already absorbed equivalent changes by independent paths.

CI on the underlying merge state was green on PR #568 prior to this
resolution; will re-run automatically on push.
2026-05-27 21:45:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 067e460a4d Merge pull request #413 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.43.1
2026-05-07 20:09:30 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 3678193ae2 chore(main): release 3.43.1 2026-05-07 12:36:13 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 74eacbc78f Merge pull request #412 from the-luap/security/cve-backport-3.42.2
fix(security): backport 18 dependency CVE patches from beta (3.42.2 stable)
2026-05-07 14:35:47 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 37bf894412 fix(security): patch 18 dependency CVEs (axios + transitives + nodemailer + i18next-http-backend)
Closes the open Trivy code-scanning alerts for app-side dependencies.
The npm-bundled CVEs in /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm (picomatch,
brace-expansion, ip-address inside the Node image itself) are deferred
to a separate Node-base-image PR — they're build-environment-side and
need their own compatibility testing.

| Package | From | To | CVEs cleared |
|---|---|---|---|
| axios (backend + frontend) | 1.14.0 | 1.15.2 | CVE-2026-42264 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42043 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42035 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42033 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42044, CVE-2026-42042, CVE-2026-42041, CVE-2026-42040, CVE-2026-42039, CVE-2026-42038, CVE-2026-42037, CVE-2026-42036, CVE-2026-42034, CVE-2026-40175, CVE-2025-62718 |
| nodemailer (backend) | ^7.0.13 | ^8.0.5 | GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g, GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 |
| i18next-http-backend (frontend) | ^3.0.2 | ^3.0.5 | CVE-2026-41691 |
| uuid (backend) | ^11.1.0 | ^11.1.1 | CVE-2026-41907 |
| postcss (frontend, devDep) | ^8.4.21 | ^8.5.10 | CVE-2026-41305 |

For transitives whose direct parents haven't released a version that
picks up the patched range, pinned via npm overrides:

| Package | Min | CVE |
|---|---|---|
| follow-redirects (backend + frontend) | >=1.16.0 | GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 |
| fast-xml-parser (backend) | >=5.7.0 | CVE-2026-41650 |
| @tootallnate/once (backend) | >=3.0.1 | CVE-2026-3449 |
| ip-address (backend) | >=10.1.1 | CVE-2026-42338 |

PR #268 originally pinned axios to 1.14.0 to avoid a supply-chain
attack on a specific compromised version range. The 1.15.x series
are post-incident upstream releases — clean. Confirmed with the
maintainer before bumping.

* `npx tsc --noEmit` (frontend) — clean
* `npx vite build` (frontend) — clean (~4s, existing bundle-size
  warning, not new)
* Backend module-load smoke test — all critical modules load
  (`auth`, `adminAuth` middleware, `emailProcessor`, `recaptcha`,
  `storage`) with the new axios + nodemailer
* Lockfile re-verification — every targeted CVE now resolves to
  the patched version range

* npm-bundled CVEs inside `/usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm/` —
  picomatch CVE-2026-33671 (HIGH), CVE-2026-33672, brace-expansion
  CVE-2026-33750, ip-address (npm-internal) CVE-2026-42338. These
  live in the Node base image and require a Node base image bump
  with its own compatibility testing — separate PR.

Targeting `beta` so the bumps go through the normal release-please
flow before promotion to `main`.
2026-05-07 14:28:53 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 506b5c3dc4 Merge pull request #408 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 3.43.0
2026-05-07 13:00:20 +02:00
github-actions[bot] ab6db37326 chore(main): release 3.43.0 2026-05-07 10:59:36 +00:00
Paul Nothaft eb2ce290a7 Merge pull request #407 from the-luap/release/3.42.1-merge-from-beta
chore(release): promote beta → main as v3.42.1
2026-05-07 12:56:13 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 8a4c1a7c0a chore(release): promote beta → main as v3.42.1
Stable release promoting the entire `beta` channel to `main`. Brings
~300 commits of features, fixes, and infrastructure improvements that
have been baked on the beta channel since v2.6.5.

## Major themes since v2.6.5

* Multi-administrator support with RBAC (super admin / admin / editor)
* Async upload pipeline (background worker pool for sharp/ffmpeg/EXIF/
  watermark/webhooks; bytes-on-wire returns 202)
* Self-hosted webfonts (filesystem-driven scanner; replaces Google Fonts
  CDN; GDPR-compliant)
* 8-token CI palette + force color mode (full theming across admin and
  public site, with WCAG-safe contrast helpers)
* Native multi-arch Docker images (Apple Silicon + ARM64 Linux native)
* Native S3 storage backend (S3 + S3-compatible providers)
* Comprehensive video support (MP4/WebM/MOV upload, stream, play)
* Outbound webhooks for event/photo lifecycle (HMAC-signed)
* Gallery layout overhaul (decoupled header style, banner option,
  theme-aware skeletons, lazy-loaded folder tree picker)
* Multilingual email templates (EN/DE/NL/PT/RU translations table)
* Bulk operations (delete with password gate, archive)
* Photo dimensions backfill (true masonry layout)
* Customer client access (review area before guest share)
* Image security (devtools detection, watermarking, right-click,
  secure thumbnails)

## Notable bug fixes from beta

* `/auth/session` symmetry — three rounds of fixes (#350, #355, #363,
  #398) for the admin-login redirect-loop family
* Email template renderer: handle {{#if}} conditionals, fix CSS leak in
  plain-text fallback, gate publish-from-draft password placeholder,
  gate external_url in public response
* Caller/template variable drift across gallery_created,
  expiration_warning, archive_complete, gallery_expired
* Full-URL gallery_link in all email types (was path-only in 3 sites)
* ffmpeg/ffprobe via apk for Alpine compatibility (was glibc-bundled)
* Admin events search and counters not bounded to first 100 (#346)

## Conflict resolution notes

* `README.md` — kept main's leaner v2.6.5 rewrite (#281); added a
  Contributors section adapted from PR #393.
* `DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE.md` — beta version (more recent, includes External
  Media docs already backported to main).
* `CHANGELOG.md` — new 3.42.1 entry leads, beta's 3.x history follows,
  main's 2.x entries appended below a divider so the historical chain
  is preserved.
* `package.json` (backend + frontend) — beta's structure with version
  bumped from `3.42.1-beta.0` → `3.42.1`.
* `package-lock.json` (backend + frontend) — regenerated via
  `npm install --package-lock-only`.
* `.release-please-manifest.json` — bumped from `2.6.5` → `3.42.1` so
  the next release-please run on main starts from the correct base.

## Pre-flight checks

* Frontend `tsc --noEmit` — clean
* Frontend `vite build` — clean (~3.5s, 2.6 MB main chunk; existing
  warning about chunking, not new)
* Backend `npm test` — pre-existing failures in 6 integration suites
  (DB-fixture-dependent, not regressions)
* Frontend `vitest` — pre-existing failures in
  ThemeCustomizerEnhanced.test.tsx (missing QueryClientProvider after
  PR #390 added useQuery; not a regression of this merge)

The pre-existing test failures are tracked as separate follow-ups and
do not block this release promotion.
2026-05-07 12:47:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 4d3836fb2e Merge pull request #282 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 2.6.5
2026-04-08 13:18:17 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 75499992eb chore(main): release 2.6.5 2026-04-08 11:15:26 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 62643f241b Merge pull request #281 from the-luap/docs/readme-rewrite-main
docs: rewrite README — shorter, cleaner
2026-04-08 13:15:07 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 64f606152f docs: rewrite README — shorter, cleaner, less AI-sounding
Rewrote from 350 lines to ~130 lines. Removed emoji-heavy headings,
marketing fluff, redundant sections, and the AI disclosure. Collapsed
screenshots into details tags. Kept all essential info: demo, features,
quick start, comparison, tech stack, docs links.
2026-04-08 13:14:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft e2a698e892 Merge pull request #277 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 2.6.4
2026-04-08 09:39:15 +02:00
github-actions[bot] d1d71dba25 chore(main): release 2.6.4 2026-04-08 07:14:32 +00:00
Paul Nothaft bb81fa5f4b Merge pull request #276 from the-luap/fix/main-lockfile-sync
fix: sync backend package-lock.json for security deps
2026-04-08 09:14:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 03e19893b3 fix: sync backend package-lock.json with security dep updates
The lock file was not committed with PR #275, causing npm ci to fail
in Docker builds. Regenerate to match the updated package.json overrides.
2026-04-08 09:14:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 279314e4b7 Merge pull request #275 from the-luap/security/fix-dep-vulnerabilities-main
security: fix 20 dependency vulnerabilities (backport)
2026-04-08 09:05:56 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 730912a3f4 security: fix 20 dependency vulnerabilities (backport to main)
Same fixes as beta PR #274. Updates handlebars, nodemailer, tar,
fast-xml-parser, brace-expansion, path-to-regexp, and lodash to
address 20 GitHub code scanning alerts.
2026-04-08 09:05:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft ff9fb64e75 Merge pull request #273 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 2.6.3
2026-04-07 20:40:47 +02:00
github-actions[bot] 9cbbe74051 chore(main): release 2.6.3 2026-04-07 18:40:34 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 2e1c71c1ab Merge pull request #272 from the-luap/docs/external-media-library-270
docs: add External Media Library section to deployment guide (#270)
2026-04-07 20:40:11 +02:00
Paul Nothaft f6ca713a6e docs: add External Media Library section to deployment guide (#270)
Add the missing "External Media Library" chapter to DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE.md
that was referenced in the TOC but never written. Covers configuration,
Docker volume mounting, folder structure, usage workflow, limitations,
and troubleshooting.

Closes #270
2026-04-07 19:52:02 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 197cd8e1e0 Merge pull request #268 from the-luap/security/pin-axios-main
security: pin axios to 1.14.0 — supply chain attack prevention
2026-04-05 18:41:54 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 681b440381 security: pin axios to 1.14.0 to prevent supply chain attack
Axios versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 were compromised on March 31, 2026
with a RAT dropper attributed to North Korean threat actor. Pin to
exact 1.14.0 (latest safe release) to prevent resolution to compromised
versions. See https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/10604
2026-04-05 18:41:45 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 3daeac9e53 Merge pull request #246 from the-luap/release-please--branches--main
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chore(main): release 2.6.2
2026-03-16 22:37:56 +01:00
github-actions[bot] 7febba2d9c chore(main): release 2.6.2 2026-03-16 21:37:35 +00:00
Paul Nothaft 0a3a53763c Merge pull request #245 from the-luap/fix/security-session-invalidation-main
fix(security): token invalidation on password change, session timeout enforcement
2026-03-16 22:37:16 +01:00
Paul Nothaft 85a60a2dc7 fix(security): invalidate tokens on password change, enforce session timeout, fix role update
- Set password_changed_at when changing password via adminAuth route so
  existing JWT tokens are rejected by the auth middleware check
- Enforce session timeout on first request with unseen tokens by checking
  token iat against configured timeout (prevents bypass after server restart)
- Convert camelCase roleId/isActive to snake_case role_id/is_active in
  frontend updateUser service (fixes silent role update failures)

Resolves GHSA-rqg3-47p5-vgwg
2026-03-16 22:36:52 +01:00
Paul Nothaft e74e73a3a0 Merge pull request #231 from the-luap/i18n/ru-missing-keys
i18n: add missing Russian translations for thumbnails and photo dimensions
2026-03-15 20:01:15 +01:00
432 changed files with 4116 additions and 45479 deletions
+1 -32
View File
@@ -5,10 +5,7 @@
.env.*
docker-compose*.yml
.DS_Store
# **/ so backend/node_modules and frontend/node_modules are excluded too —
# the root-context Dockerfile.aio COPYs those directories and must get its
# deps from its builder stages, never from the host checkout.
**/node_modules
node_modules
npm-debug.log
coverage
.nyc_output
@@ -21,31 +18,3 @@ storage/events/archived/*
storage/thumbnails/*
data/*.db
logs/*
# Dockerfile.aio builds from the REPOSITORY ROOT and Docker reads only this
# file — backend/.dockerignore is never consulted — so the unprefixed rules
# above miss backend/data, backend/logs and backend/storage. A checkout that has
# been used to run PicPeak would otherwise bake its database, photos, logs and
# SETUP_TOKEN into a published image layer.
# backend/data wholesale, not a suffix list. It holds only runtime state and is
# gitignored in full (.gitignore: `data/`), while suffix rules kept letting real
# secrets through: a used checkout here carries ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt alongside
# the database, plus -journal files and any DATABASE_PATH that does not end in
# .db. Any of those in a published layer is a credential leak.
backend/data
backend/logs
backend/storage
# Same root-context trap, one level deeper: the `.env`, `.env.*` and `data/*.db`
# rules above are unanchored only in appearance — Docker matches them against the
# path from the build context, so they catch `./.env` and never `backend/.env`.
# A checkout that has been used to run PicPeak locally keeps its JWT_SECRET,
# DB_PASSWORD and SMTP credentials there, and `COPY backend/ .` puts the file at
# /app/.env in the published layer. Match at any depth instead, the way
# **/node_modules above already does.
**/.env
**/.env.*
**/*.db
**/*.db-journal
**/*.sqlite*
frontend/dist
+13 -87
View File
@@ -10,14 +10,6 @@ NODE_ENV=production
# Generate one with: openssl rand -base64 64
#JWT_SECRET=your_very_long_random_jwt_secret_here
# OIDC SSO for admins (#798) — configured in the admin UI; only these two
# values live in the environment:
# Key encrypting the OIDC client secret at rest (defaults to JWT_SECRET).
#OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
# Break-glass: 'true' re-enables local password login even while the SSO
# settings disable it (recovery when the IdP is down or misconfigured).
#OIDC_BREAK_GLASS=false
# Auth cookie Secure flag
# unset - default: follows NODE_ENV (production=true, dev=false)
# true - always set Secure (HTTPS-only cookies; breaks plain-HTTP access)
@@ -73,32 +65,21 @@ DB_NAME=picpeak_prod
#ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@yourdomain.com
#ADMIN_PASSWORD=your_secure_admin_password_here
# Email Configuration — OPTIONAL, and normally left alone.
# SMTP is configured in the setup wizard / Settings -> Email and stored in the
# database (email_configs); that is what the mail queue actually sends with.
# These variables are a legacy path kept for config-as-code deployments: when
# SMTP_HOST is set, the initial migration seeds the database row from it.
# Developers running the `dev` compose profile want SMTP_HOST=mailhog here so
# that seed points at the mailhog container.
# Email Configuration
# For Gmail: use app-specific password
# For SendGrid: SMTP_USER=apikey, SMTP_PASS=your-api-key
#SMTP_HOST=smtp.gmail.com
#SMTP_PORT=587
#SMTP_SECURE=false
#SMTP_USER=your-email@gmail.com
#SMTP_PASS=your-app-specific-password
#EMAIL_FROM=noreply@yourdomain.com
SMTP_HOST=smtp.gmail.com
SMTP_PORT=587
SMTP_SECURE=false
SMTP_USER=your-email@gmail.com
SMTP_PASS=your-app-specific-password
EMAIL_FROM=noreply@yourdomain.com
# Application URLs — OPTIONAL. Leave unset for the normal install.
# The public origin is captured by the setup wizard (it proposes the address
# you opened the browser at) and stored as the `general_site_url` setting, so
# you can change it later in Settings -> General without touching this file.
# Setting FRONTEND_URL here OVERRIDES that setting and makes the field
# read-only in the admin UI - use it only for config-as-code deployments.
# Application URLs
# Use full origin with scheme, no trailing slash.
# Admin UI is served by the frontend at /admin.
#FRONTEND_URL=https://yourdomain.com
#ADMIN_URL=https://yourdomain.com
FRONTEND_URL=https://yourdomain.com
ADMIN_URL=https://yourdomain.com
# Static HTML title + description used for social link previews when the
# fetcher doesn't trigger the per-event OG endpoint — most notably the
@@ -111,10 +92,9 @@ BRAND_TITLE=PicPeak
BRAND_DESCRIPTION=Photo gallery shared with PicPeak.
# API URL for email assets (logos, images in notification emails)
# OPTIONAL: when unset this is derived from the resolved public origin + /api,
# so the wizard's answer covers it. Set it only for split-origin deployments
# where the API lives on a different host than the gallery.
#API_URL=https://yourdomain.com/api
# This must be the publicly accessible URL where email recipients can load images.
# If not set, defaults to http://localhost:3001 which will show broken images in emails.
API_URL=https://yourdomain.com/api
# Frontend API base
# For pre-built images and production behind a reverse proxy, keep '/api'.
@@ -127,11 +107,6 @@ VITE_API_URL=/api
# DB_PORT=5432
# REDIS_PORT=6379
# File watcher (watch-folder auto-import, local storage only)
# Max photos processed in parallel — raise on hosts with memory headroom,
# lower to 1 on very small hosts. Default: 2
# FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY=2
# Release Channel
# Options: 'stable' (default), 'beta', or specific version like 'v2.3.0'
# 'stable' uses the :stable tag (same as :latest on main)
@@ -235,55 +210,6 @@ LOGS=./logs
# attempts is exponential: 1m, 5m, 30m, 2h, 12h.
# WEBHOOK_MAX_ATTEMPTS=5
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Face recognition — "People in this gallery" (#1074, optional)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Requires the optional picpeak-ml sidecar container:
# docker compose --profile faces up -d
#
# NONE of these variables do anything until the `faces` feature flag is
# enabled in Admin → Settings, AND the per-event "Detect people in this
# gallery" toggle is switched on. Both default to OFF. With the flag off the
# backend never contacts the sidecar, so leaving these at their defaults on an
# install without the container is completely inert.
#
# Face embeddings are biometric data (GDPR Art. 9 special category in the EU).
# The photographer is the controller and needs a lawful basis for the people
# in their photos — see docs/feature-face-recognition.md before enabling.
#
# NOT AVAILABLE ON THE ALL-IN-ONE IMAGE. The single-container build sets
# PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER=true and the backend refuses to enable face
# recognition there regardless of these variables or the feature flag: that
# image runs the backend, frontend, database and every worker in one
# container, with no ML sidecar to talk to, and face detection would compete
# with image processing for the same CPU and memory. Use the standard
# multi-container deployment if you want this feature.
#
# FACE_ML_TOKEN (no default — REQUIRED to run the sidecar)
# Shared secret between the backend and the sidecar. The sidecar refuses to
# start without it rather than serving anonymously, so an accidentally
# published port is never a free face-detection API. Generate with:
# openssl rand -hex 32
# FACE_ML_TOKEN=
#
# FACE_ML_URL (default: http://picpeak-ml:8000)
# Defaults to the sidecar's compose service name, so the standard
# deployment needs no configuration here. Only change it if you run the
# sidecar outside the default compose network.
# FACE_ML_URL=http://picpeak-ml:8000
#
# FACE_PROCESSOR_CONCURRENCY (default: 1)
# Face-detection workers in the backend. Defaults to 1 deliberately: face
# scanning shares a host with Sharp image processing, which is the real
# memory pressure (see UPLOAD_PROCESSOR_CONCURRENCY). Raise only on hosts
# with headroom to spare.
# FACE_PROCESSOR_CONCURRENCY=1
#
# FACE_ORT_THREADS (default: 1)
# ONNX Runtime threads inside the sidecar. More threads mean faster
# per-photo inference and higher RSS.
# FACE_ORT_THREADS=1
# Note on FRONTEND_API_URL (documentation only):
# When using pre-built frontend images, runtime env vars cannot override the built JS.
# Do NOT rely on FRONTEND_API_URL in Compose. Instead, keep VITE_API_URL=/api and
-47
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@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
# picpeak — All-in-one
**picpeak** is an open-source, self-hosted **photo-sharing platform for photographers**, with an optional CRM / accounting suite. This image is the **all-in-one** build: the backend, the built web UI and SQLite in **one container, one process** — no compose file, no separate database, no reverse proxy to wire up.
- 📦 **Source, docs & issues:** https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak
- 🧩 **Multi-container images:** [`picpeak/backend`](https://hub.docker.com/r/picpeak/backend) + [`picpeak/frontend`](https://hub.docker.com/r/picpeak/frontend)
## Supported tags
- `latest` / `stable` — latest stable release
- `x.y.z` — a pinned release (**recommended for production**)
- `beta` / `main` — latest build from `main` (may be unstable)
- **Architectures:** `linux/amd64`, `linux/arm64` (x86 and ARM NAS)
## Quick start
docker run -d --name picpeak -p 3000:3000 \
-v picpeak:/data \
-e JWT_SECRET="$(openssl rand -base64 48)" \
picpeak/aio:stable
Then open **http://localhost:3000/admin** and complete the setup wizard. Read the one-time setup token with:
docker exec picpeak cat /data/db/SETUP_TOKEN
> 🔗 Share links need to know your address. The image defaults `FRONTEND_URL` to `http://localhost:3000`; pass `-e FRONTEND_URL=https://photos.example.com` (or set the site URL in Settings) before you send a gallery to a client.
## Ports & volumes
- Container port **3000** (HTTP; put your own TLS terminator in front for public use).
- **One volume: `/data`** — back it up and you have backed up the install.
- `/data/db``picpeak.db` and `SETUP_TOKEN`
- `/data/storage` — originals, thumbnails, archives
- `/data/logs`, `/data/backup`
## External Postgres
SQLite is this image's default, not its only option. Point it at an existing database exactly like the backend image:
-e DATABASE_CLIENT=pg -e DB_HOST=… -e DB_USER=… -e DB_PASSWORD=…
## How it differs from the compose stack
- **SQLite takes one writer at a time** — right for a home server, a NAS or a single studio; the compose stack with PostgreSQL is what scales.
- **No Redis** — background jobs run in-process.
- **Face recognition is unavailable** here. It needs the separate [`picpeak/ml`](https://hub.docker.com/r/picpeak/ml) sidecar, and a second image-processing pipeline competing with thumbnailing for one container's CPU would just make the install slow. Run the multi-container deployment for that feature.
You can move to the full stack later without reinstalling: take a `.picpeak` backup and restore it there.
## Docs
Volume layout, the external-Postgres variant, TLS, updates and the limits: **https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/single-container**
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@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
# picpeak — ML sidecar (face detection)
**picpeak** is an open-source, self-hosted **photo-sharing platform for photographers**. This image is the **optional face-detection sidecar**: it detects faces in one image and returns a bounding box, five landmarks, quality signals and a 512-d embedding per face.
**Nothing else.** No database, no volumes, no state, no egress, no model download at runtime. Clustering, person identity, thresholds and every privacy decision live in the picpeak backend, where the data already is — this service forgets each image the moment it answers.
If you don't run this container, the feature does not exist.
- 📦 **Source, docs & issues:** https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak
- 🧩 **Runs with:** [`picpeak/backend`](https://hub.docker.com/r/picpeak/backend) + [`picpeak/frontend`](https://hub.docker.com/r/picpeak/frontend)
## Supported tags
- `latest` / `stable` — latest stable release
- `x.y.z` — a pinned release (**recommended for production** — keep it on the **same** tag as the backend)
- `beta` / `main` — latest build from `main` (may be unstable)
- **Architectures:** `linux/amd64`, `linux/arm64`
> The sidecar's API contract is versioned with the backend that calls it, so `PICPEAK_CHANNEL` resolves the same string across all picpeak images.
## Turning it on
The maintained compose file already contains this service behind a profile — you do not write it by hand:
docker compose --profile faces up -d
Then two deliberate actions in the app, neither of which is installing this container:
1. Enable the **`faces`** feature flag in admin settings.
2. Enable **"Detect people in this gallery"** per event.
**Nothing in the backend touches this service while the flag is off**, so an install without this container never attempts a connection.
## Configuration
| | |
|---|---|
| `FACE_ML_TOKEN` | **Required.** The container **refuses to start** without it, so an accidentally published port is never a free face-detection API. Must match the backend's `FACE_ML_TOKEN`. |
| `FACE_ORT_THREADS` | ONNX Runtime threads (default `1`). |
Port **8000**, no volumes, no published ports needed — the backend reaches it on the compose network. `FACE_ML_URL` defaults to `http://picpeak-ml:8000` (the compose service name), so the standard deployment needs no URL configuration.
## API
All endpoints except `/health` require the `X-Face-ML-Token` header.
| | |
|---|---|
| `GET /health` | `{"status": "ok"}` — unauthenticated, used by the healthcheck |
| `GET /info` | `{detector, embedder, model_version, dim}` |
| `POST /faces` | multipart `image``{model_version, faces: [...]}` |
## Models
YuNet (detection) + FaceNet-512 (embedding), **both MIT**, baked into the image and verified by SHA-256 at build time — never downloaded at runtime, so airgapped installs work and a model cannot change under a running deployment. See [`ml/LICENSES.md`](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/blob/main/ml/LICENSES.md) for why these and not InsightFace's non-commercial weights.
## Not available on the all-in-one image
[`picpeak/aio`](https://hub.docker.com/r/picpeak/aio) sets `PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER=true` and the backend refuses to enable face recognition there — a second image-processing pipeline competing with thumbnailing for one small container's CPU would not fail loudly, it would just make the install slow. Run the multi-container deployment for this feature.
## Docs
**https://docs.picpeak.app** · sidecar internals, model conversion and the alignment/threshold contract: [`ml/README.md`](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/blob/main/ml/README.md)
+1 -9
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@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
# Docker Build and Push Workflow
This GitHub Actions workflow automatically builds and pushes Docker images for the backend, the frontend, the all-in-one image and the optional ML sidecar to GitHub Container Registry (ghcr.io). On the canonical org repo every one of them is mirrored to Docker Hub as `docker.io/picpeak/{backend,frontend,aio,ml}`; forks build the same images GHCR-only.
The **all-in-one image** (`<repo>/aio`, built from `Dockerfile.aio` at the repo root, #1042) bundles the backend and the built frontend into a single container with SQLite as the default engine — one `docker run`, no compose. It follows the same per-arch build → digest-merge → per-version tag scheme as the other two images, is mirrored to Docker Hub (`docker.io/picpeak/aio`) alongside GHCR on the canonical org repo, and every PR additionally runs a `smoke-aio` job that boots the image and asserts the SPA shell, brand-title rendering, immutable asset caching, and the SQLite engine resolution.
This GitHub Actions workflow automatically builds and pushes Docker images for both the backend and frontend to GitHub Container Registry (ghcr.io).
## Features
@@ -12,7 +10,6 @@ The **all-in-one image** (`<repo>/aio`, built from `Dockerfile.aio` at the repo
- 🔒 **Security scanning** with Trivy vulnerability scanner
- 💾 **Build caching** for faster subsequent builds
- 📊 **Build summaries** in GitHub Actions UI
- 📝 **Docker Hub pages** for `aio` and `ml` synced from `.github/dockerhub/*.md` on every `main` merge (`dockerhub-descriptions` job). `backend` and `frontend` pages are still hand-maintained in the Hub UI — add `.github/dockerhub/{backend,frontend}.md` with their current text before putting them under the same job.
## Authentication
@@ -55,11 +52,6 @@ docker pull ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:v1.0.0
# Pull for specific architecture
docker pull --platform linux/arm64 ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend:latest
# The same images on Docker Hub (identical tags, identical digests)
docker pull picpeak/backend:latest
docker pull picpeak/aio:stable
docker pull picpeak/ml:stable
```
### Using in Docker Compose
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@@ -28,41 +28,7 @@ permissions:
jobs:
backend:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# 20, not 10. This job normally finishes in ~3 minutes, but it is the only
# one that boots Postgres and runs the full integration suite, so it is the
# only one exposed to runner contention — observed spread has reached 9.2
# minutes, and a release PR (#1088) was cancelled at 10.3 with every test
# passing and jest still running. A cancelled job reads as a red X on a
# green branch, which costs a re-run and a diagnosis every time it happens.
#
# The cap is a runaway guard, not a performance budget; 20 leaves real
# headroom over the worst observed run while still killing a hung suite
# well inside the hour GitHub would otherwise allow. frontend and ml keep
# 10 — they take seconds and have never come close.
timeout-minutes: 20
# The .picpeak restore suites gate their real-Postgres cases behind
# PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL and `describe.skip` themselves out when it is
# unset — so until now they never ran here. That hid the half that
# matters: sequence resync, operator/role preservation across a
# cross-instance restore, and (with #1041) whether a SQLite-shaped
# row actually lands in Postgres with the right STORED VALUES rather
# than merely not throwing. Everything else in the suite still runs
# on SQLite; this service only un-gates those cases.
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:15-alpine
env:
POSTGRES_USER: picpeak
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: testpass
POSTGRES_DB: picpeak_test
options: >-
--health-cmd "pg_isready -U picpeak -d picpeak_test"
--health-interval 2s
--health-timeout 2s
--health-retries 30
ports:
- 5432:5432
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Checkout code
@@ -86,9 +52,6 @@ jobs:
# The S3 path itself is covered separately by the integration
# suite when MinIO is provisioned.
SKIP_S3_TESTS: 'true'
# Un-gates the real-Postgres cases in the .picpeak restore suites
# (see the `services:` note above). Absent it they silently skip.
PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL: 'postgres://picpeak:testpass@127.0.0.1:5432/picpeak_test'
run: |
# Excluded suites — fail on upstream/beta too, tracked
# separately as test-infra debt:
@@ -124,33 +87,3 @@ jobs:
- name: Run Vitest suite
working-directory: ./frontend
run: npm test -- --run
# Optional face-detection sidecar (#1074). Runs on every PR regardless of
# whether the feature is enabled anywhere — these tests need no model
# weights (they stub the pipeline out) and cover the auth boundary, the
# request guards and the alignment geometry, which is where a mistake is a
# security problem or a silent accuracy problem rather than a visible bug.
ml:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
# Matches ml/Dockerfile's base image, so a wheel that resolves here
# resolves in the image too.
python-version: '3.12'
cache: 'pip'
cache-dependency-path: ml/requirements.txt
- name: Install ml deps
working-directory: ./ml
run: pip install -r requirements.txt pytest httpx
- name: Run pytest suite
working-directory: ./ml
run: python -m pytest tests/ -q
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@@ -130,18 +130,5 @@ docker-compose.dev.yml
# New layout development files
new-layouts/
# Backend runtime storage (generated media, previews, thumbnails,
# CRM/accounting documents) — never commit
backend/storage/
# Python artifacts — the picpeak-ml sidecar (#1074) is the only Python in
# this tree, but bytecode and virtualenvs must never be committed.
__pycache__/
*.py[cod]
.pytest_cache/
ml/.venv/
ml/venv/
# Locally produced model weights. The image fetches these by pinned URL and
# SHA-256 at build time; a 90MB blob must not end up in git history.
ml/*.onnx
ml/*.h5
# Generated CRM/accounting documents (runtime) — never commit
backend/storage/business-docs/
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@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
{
".": "3.111.1-beta.0"
".": "3.83.0-beta.0"
}
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@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"3.44.0"}
{".":"3.45.14"}
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# All-in-one image (#1042): one container, one Node process.
#
# The backend serves the built frontend itself via server.js's SERVE_FRONTEND
# block (SPA fallback, OG crawler intercept, brand-title render, immutable
# asset caching) — no nginx, no supervisor, no bundled Postgres/Redis. SQLite
# is the explicit default engine; pointing DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD (+
# DATABASE_CLIENT=pg) at an external Postgres works exactly like the backend
# image. Build context is the REPO ROOT (both backend/ and frontend/ are
# needed): docker build -f Dockerfile.aio .
#
# KEEP IN SYNC: the runtime stage below mirrors backend/Dockerfile's
# production stage (base image, apk set, npm removal, nodejs user, fontconfig
# registration, directory layout, healthcheck, entrypoint). When
# backend/Dockerfile changes, change this file too — the aio smoke job in
# docker-build.yml catches boot-level drift, not package-level drift.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Frontend build — mirrors frontend/Dockerfile's builder stage
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM node:22-alpine AS frontend-builder
ARG CACHEBUST=1
WORKDIR /app
COPY frontend/package*.json ./
RUN npm ci --legacy-peer-deps
COPY frontend/ .
RUN npm run build
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Backend deps — mirrors backend/Dockerfile's builder stage
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM node:22-alpine AS backend-builder
ARG CACHEBUST=1
WORKDIR /app
COPY backend/package*.json ./
RUN npm ci --omit=dev
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Runtime — mirrors backend/Dockerfile's production stage + the frontend dist
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM node:22-alpine
ARG CACHEBUST=1
ARG BUILD_DATE
ARG VCS_REF
ARG VERSION
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak"
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.description="PicPeak all-in-one (backend + frontend, single container)"
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.licenses="MIT"
WORKDIR /app
# Explicit engine selection (#1038/#1042): SQLite is this image's DEFAULT
# engine — set explicitly, never inferred, and wait-for-db.sh skips its
# Postgres readiness wait for it. Point the container at an external Postgres
# by overriding DATABASE_CLIENT=pg and setting DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD,
# exactly like the backend image. The boot resolver still logs the engine and
# refuses the populated-both conflict.
# STORAGE_PATH: getStoragePath() falls back to path.join(__dirname,
# '../../../storage') — which resolves to the container-root `/storage` here,
# writable by root but EACCES for the nodejs user after the su-exec drop.
# Compose masks this by setting STORAGE_PATH=/app/storage; this image must
# pin the same path (it is the directory the Dockerfile creates and chowns).
ENV NODE_ENV=production \
DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3
# See backend/Dockerfile for the rationale of each of the following blocks.
RUN echo "cachebust=${CACHEBUST}" && apk upgrade --no-cache
RUN rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm /usr/local/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npx
# sqlite — DatabaseBackupService.createSQLiteBackup() SPAWNS the `sqlite3`
# CLI for `.backup` and PRAGMA integrity_check; the npm module does not
# ship that binary. backend/Dockerfile omits it because compose always runs
# Postgres — this image defaults to SQLite, so without it every database
# backup fails with ENOENT.
RUN apk add --no-cache dumb-init postgresql-client sqlite ffmpeg su-exec \
fontconfig ttf-dejavu ttf-liberation poppler-utils exiftool && \
fc-cache -f
RUN addgroup -g 1001 -S nodejs && adduser -S nodejs -u 1001
COPY --from=backend-builder --chown=nodejs:nodejs /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --chown=nodejs:nodejs backend/ .
RUN chmod -R a+r /app && chmod +x wait-for-db.sh
RUN printf '<?xml version="1.0"?>\n<!DOCTYPE fontconfig SYSTEM "fonts.dtd">\n<fontconfig>\n <dir>/app/assets/fonts</dir>\n</fontconfig>\n' > /etc/fonts/conf.d/99-picpeak-fonts.conf && \
fc-cache -f /app/assets/fonts
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# One volume, one layout (#1042 scope: "single data layout on one volume")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# /data/db picpeak.db (+ -wal/-shm) and SETUP_TOKEN
# /data/storage originals, thumbnails, archives
# /data/logs application logs
# /data/backup built-in backup output; /backup symlinks here
#
# `-v picpeak:/data` and nothing else to remember — back up /data and you have
# backed up the install. /backup is where migrations 029 + 030 seed the backup
# destinations, so it is symlinked in rather than left dangling.
ENV DATA_ROOT=/data \
DATA_DIR=/data/db \
DATABASE_PATH=/data/db/picpeak.db \
STORAGE_PATH=/data/storage \
LOG_DIR=/data/logs \
BACKUP_DIR=/data/backup
# FRONTEND_URL is deliberately NOT set here (#705). It used to default to
# http://localhost:3000 so share links would not come out relative, but a
# baked-in value OVERRIDES the general_site_url setting the setup wizard
# writes — so a single-container install could never configure its own public
# address, and the Settings field would show as env-pinned for everyone.
# getFrontendBaseUrl() now resolves the setting, then the origin the request
# arrived on, and getAbsoluteFrontendUrl() still ends at http://localhost:3000,
# so links stay absolute without pinning anything. Override with
# -e FRONTEND_URL=https://photos.example.com for config-as-code deployments.
# /app/storage is a second entrance to the same volume. The business-document
# writers (quoteService, invoice sending/reminders, contract signatures) build
# their paths from `path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', ...)` and never consult
# STORAGE_PATH. Compose hides that because it sets STORAGE_PATH=/app/storage
# with WORKDIR /app, so the two happen to be the same directory; here they are
# not, and /app is root-owned, so a quote or invoice PDF would fail to write as
# UID 1001 — and be lost with the container even if it succeeded. Teaching
# those services STORAGE_PATH is the real fix and belongs in its own change;
# the symlink restores the coincidence compose already relies on.
RUN mkdir -p /data/db /data/storage/events/active /data/storage/events/archived \
/data/storage/thumbnails /data/logs \
/data/backup/picpeak /data/backup/database && \
ln -s /data/backup /backup && \
ln -s /data/storage /app/storage && \
chown -R nodejs:nodejs /data
VOLUME ["/data"]
# The frontend bundle, served by server.js's SERVE_FRONTEND block. Explicit
# opt-in rather than the dist-exists autodetect, so the behavior is pinned
# even if the autodetect heuristic ever changes.
COPY --from=frontend-builder --chown=nodejs:nodejs /app/dist /app/frontend/dist
ENV SERVE_FRONTEND=true \
FRONTEND_DIR=/app/frontend/dist
# Marks this as the single-container build. The backend refuses to enable face
# recognition (#1074) when it sees this, on performance grounds: that feature
# needs a separate ML container this image does not contain, and it would add
# a second image-processing pipeline competing with Sharp for the CPU and
# memory of a container sized for one photographer plus guests browsing. The
# failure would not be loud — just a slow install that looks broken.
#
# An explicit marker rather than inferring it from SERVE_FRONTEND or the
# SQLite path: legitimate multi-container deployments do both of those, and
# none of them should lose the feature by accident.
ENV PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER=true
# No USER directive — same as backend/Dockerfile: the container starts as root
# so wait-for-db.sh can chown bind-mounted volumes to UID 1001, then drops
# privileges via su-exec (#484).
EXPOSE 3000
# Shell form so it resolves $PORT: a hard-coded 3000 marks an otherwise healthy
# container unhealthy forever the moment anyone overrides the port.
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=60s --retries=3 \
CMD wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider "http://localhost:${PORT:-3000}/health" || exit 1
ENTRYPOINT ["dumb-init", "--"]
# --max-http-header-size matches nginx's `large_client_header_buffers 4 32k`.
# Requests reach Node directly here, and its 16 KiB default would reject a guest
# carrying several per-gallery JWT cookies before Express ever saw them.
CMD ["./wait-for-db.sh", "node", "--max-http-header-size=32768", "server.js"]
+465 -131
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@@ -1,48 +1,90 @@
# 📸 PicPeak - Open Source Photo Sharing for Events
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **PicPeak has moved to its own GitHub organization.**
>
> - **Docker images** are now published at `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/{backend,frontend}`. The old path (`ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/...`) is no longer served — update your `docker-compose.yml`.
> - **Branches**: active development is now on `main` (was `beta`); the curated stable channel is now `stable` (was `main`). Existing PRs and clones auto-redirect via GitHub.
>
> See **[`docs/migration-to-org.md`](docs/migration-to-org.md)** for the one-line `docker-compose.yml` edit and full details.
<div align="center">
<img src="docs/picpeak-logo.png" alt="PicPeak Logo" width="300" />
# 📸 PicPeak
**Open-source, self-hosted photo sharing for events.**
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[Homepage](https://www.picpeak.app) · [Live Demo](https://demo.picpeak.app) · [Documentation](https://docs.picpeak.app) · [Support ☕](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap)
[Homepage](https://www.picpeak.app) · [Live Demo](https://demo.picpeak.app) · [Documentation](https://docs.picpeak.app) · [Support the project ](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap)
</div>
---
**PicPeak** is a powerful, self-hosted open-source alternative to commercial photo-sharing platforms like PicDrop.com and Scrapbook.de. Built for photographers and event organizers, it makes it simple to share beautiful, time-limited photo galleries with clients while keeping full control over your data and branding.
**PicPeak** is a powerful, self-hosted open-source alternative to commercial photo-sharing platforms like PicDrop.com and Scrapbook.de. Designed specifically for photographers and event organizers, PicPeak makes it simple to share beautiful, time-limited photo galleries with clients while maintaining full control over your data and branding.
![PicPeak Gallery Preview](docs/screenshot-gallery.png)
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **PicPeak has moved to its own GitHub organization.** Docker images are now at `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/{backend,frontend,aio,ml}` (and on Docker Hub as `picpeak/{backend,frontend,aio,ml}`) and active development is on `main`. The old `ghcr.io/the-luap/...` path still responds but its tags are **frozen** at 2026-05-27 — if updates never arrive, check your image path first. See **[`docs/migration-to-org.md`](docs/migration-to-org.md)** for the one-line `docker-compose.yml` edit.
## Contents
- [Live Demo](#-live-demo)
- [Quick Start](#-quick-start)
- [Why PicPeak?](#-why-picpeak)
- [Features](#-features)
- [Documentation](#-documentation)
- [Comparison](#-comparison-with-alternatives)
- [Tech Stack](#-tech-stack)
- [Contributing & Support](#-contributing)
- [License](#-license)
## 🎮 Live Demo
Try PicPeak without installing anything — [demo.picpeak.app](https://demo.picpeak.app) · [admin panel](https://demo.picpeak.app/admin)
Try PicPeak without installing anything:
| Email | Password |
| | |
|---|---|
| `demo@picpeak.app` | `Demo2026!` |
| **Demo URL** | [demo.picpeak.app](https://demo.picpeak.app) |
| **Admin Panel** | [demo.picpeak.app/admin](https://demo.picpeak.app/admin) |
| **Email** | `demo@picpeak.app` |
| **Password** | `Demo2026!` |
> The demo resets periodically. Uploaded content may be removed without notice.
## 🌟 Why Choose PicPeak?
Unlike expensive SaaS solutions, PicPeak gives you:
- **💰 No Monthly Fees** - One-time setup, unlimited galleries
- **🔒 Complete Data Control** - Your photos stay on your server
- **🎨 White-Label Ready** - Full branding customization
- **📱 Mobile-First Design** - Beautiful on all devices
- **🚀 Lightning Fast** - Optimized performance and caching
- **🌍 Multi-Language** - Built-in i18n support (EN, DE)
## ✨ Key Features
### For Photographers
- 📁 **Drag & Drop Upload** - Simply drop photos into folders
- 🔗 **External Media (Reference Mode)** - Browse and import from a readonly external folder library without copying originals
-**Auto-Expiring Galleries** - Set expiration dates (default: 30 days)
- 🔐 **Password Protection** - Secure client galleries
- 📧 **Automated Emails** - Creation confirmations and expiration warnings
- 📊 **Analytics Dashboard** - Track views, downloads, and engagement
- 📽️ **Live Slideshow** - A separate fullscreen "Diashow" link per event for projectors at live events — auto-picks-up new uploads while it runs, with transitions, a logo watermark, and image-fit/colour options ([guide](docs/live-slideshow.md))
- 🎨 **Custom Themes** - Match your brand perfectly
- 🌐 **Public Landing Page** - Publish a curated marketing page when guests visit your root URL
### For Clients
- 🖼️ **Beautiful Galleries** - Clean, modern interface
- 📱 **Mobile Optimized** - Swipe through photos on any device
- ⬇️ **Bulk Downloads** - Download all photos with one click
- 🔍 **Smart Search** - Find photos quickly
- 📤 **Guest Uploads** - Optional client photo uploads
- 🛡️ **Download Protection** - Advanced image protection with watermarking and right-click prevention
### Technical Excellence
- 🐳 **Docker Ready** - Deploy in minutes
- 🔄 **Auto-Processing** - Automatic thumbnail generation
- 🗂️ **Reference Library Support** - Point PicPeak at `EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT` to reference existing originals, index quickly, and generate thumbnails on demand
- 💾 **Smart Storage** - Automatic archiving of expired galleries
- 🛡️ **Security First** - JWT auth, rate limiting, CORS protection
- 📈 **Scalable** - From small studios to large agencies
### For Studios — CRM & Accounting (Beta · off by default)
- 📝 **Quotes → Contracts → Invoices** - One deal lineage; cancel-and-reissue (Storno) keeps issued invoices immutable
- ⏱️ **Hours Logging & Calendar** - Per-customer time tracking; admin calendar of events, logged hours, and pending quotes/contracts
- 🧾 **Inbound Supplier Invoices & Expenses** - Capture received invoices (upload/camera, rasterised server-side), categorise, and re-bill costs to clients
- 📊 **Tax Report & Accountant Export** - Period-scoped income/cost report with VAT breakdown; PDF/CSV plus a Treuhänder/Banana (Swiss/LI) journal export, scopable to income-only or cost-only
- 🌍 **VAT & Multi-currency** - Single VAT-code registry snapshotted onto each document; data-driven per-country rates
- ⚠️ **Verify locally** - Feature-flagged off by default. Seeded contracts, QR/IBAN and tax defaults are **examples only** — review your own legal **and tax** regulations first (see disclaimers below)
## 🚀 Quick Start
Get PicPeak running in under 5 minutes:
@@ -54,8 +96,8 @@ cd picpeak
# Copy the environment template — the defaults work out of the box.
# Machine secrets (JWT, DB, Redis) are auto-generated on first run, and the
# admin account is created in the browser. Edit .env only to customise
# (domain, SMTP, storage paths, …) — nothing is required.
# admin account is created in the browser (see below). Edit .env only to
# customise (domain, SMTP, storage paths, …) — nothing is required.
cp .env.example .env
# Start with Docker Compose
@@ -64,90 +106,293 @@ docker compose up -d
# Access at http://localhost:3000
```
On first start, open **http://localhost:3000/admin** and follow the in-browser setup to create your admin account. Full details — the one-time setup token, Docker file permissions, and ARM64 notes — are in **[First-run setup](https://docs.picpeak.app/getting-started/first-login)**.
### First run — create your admin account
> **Updating / release channels:** set `PICPEAK_CHANNEL` (`stable` default, or `beta`) in `.env`, then `docker compose pull && docker compose up -d`. See [RELEASING.md](RELEASING.md) for the promotion cadence.
On first start with no `ADMIN_PASSWORD` set, PicPeak has **no admin account yet** and greets you with an in-browser setup screen — no credentials in `.env`:
### Or: one container, no compose file
1. Open **http://localhost:3000/admin** — you'll be redirected to `/setup`.
2. Read the **one-time setup token** from the 0600 file the backend writes it to
(it is deliberately *not* printed to the logs — that would leave a live
bootstrap credential in `docker logs`):
```bash
docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN
```
It is bind-mounted, so `sudo cat data/SETUP_TOKEN` on the host works too. Only
if that file could not be written does the backend fall back to logging the
token (`docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`).
3. Paste the token, set your admin **email + password**, and you're in. The token is single-use, and the setup screen closes permanently once an admin exists.
For a home server, a NAS, or a single small studio, the all-in-one image runs the whole app as one process with SQLite — no compose file, no separate database, no reverse proxy to wire up:
> Prefer the old behaviour? Set `ADMIN_PASSWORD` in `.env` and PicPeak auto-creates the admin on first boot instead (credentials written to `data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt`).
Note on Docker file permissions
- The backend container starts as root, chowns bind-mounted host directories (`./storage`, `./data`, `./logs`) to UID 1001 (`nodejs`), then drops privileges via `su-exec` before running the app. No host-side setup needed for fresh installs.
- If you pin `user:` in a compose override (e.g. to map a specific host UID), the self-chown is skipped and you must pre-chown the host directories to that UID — see [docs.picpeak.app/deployment/docker#permissions](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/docker#permissions).
**ARM64 (aarch64) systems:** Pre-built images include native `linux/arm64`, no platform flags or emulation needed. If you're on an older image tag that's still amd64-only, see [docker-compose.amd64.override.yml](docker-compose.amd64.override.yml) for a transitional fallback.
## 🔄 Release Channels
PicPeak offers two release channels for different needs. Stable promotions are cut from a known-good beta point every 46 weeks — see [RELEASING.md](RELEASING.md) for the maintainer's promotion criteria and cadence policy.
### Stable Channel (Recommended)
- Production-ready releases
- Thoroughly tested before release
- Docker tags: `stable`, `latest`, or specific version like `v2.3.0`
### Beta Channel
- Early access to new features
- May contain bugs or incomplete functionality
- Docker tags: `beta` or specific version like `v2.3.0-beta.1`
### Switching Channels
Set the `PICPEAK_CHANNEL` environment variable in your `.env` file:
```bash
docker run -d --name picpeak -p 3000:3000 \
-v picpeak:/data \
-e JWT_SECRET="$(openssl rand -base64 48)" \
ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/aio:main
# For stable releases (default)
PICPEAK_CHANNEL=stable
# For beta releases
PICPEAK_CHANNEL=beta
# For a specific version
PICPEAK_CHANNEL=v2.3.0
```
Then open **http://localhost:3000/admin** and read the setup token with `docker exec picpeak cat /data/db/SETUP_TOKEN`.
Then update your containers:
`:main` is the active-development tag, and today it is the only one the all-in-one image has — `Dockerfile.aio` landed after the current stable release, so `:stable` and `:latest` first appear for this image once the aio build reaches the `stable` branch. Switch to `:stable` then, or pin a version tag (`3.107.4-beta.0`) if you would rather not track `main`.
```bash
docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.production.yml up -d
```
The compose stack above is still the right choice for anything busier — SQLite takes one writer at a time, and Postgres is what scales. You can move to it later without reinstalling: take a `.picpeak` backup and restore it into the full stack. See **[Single-container install](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/single-container)** for the volume layout, the external-Postgres variant, TLS, and the limits.
### Update Notifications
### Docker images
The admin dashboard automatically notifies you when updates are available for your channel. To disable update checks, set:
| | GHCR | Docker Hub |
|---|---|---|
| Backend | `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/backend` | [`picpeak/backend`](https://hub.docker.com/r/picpeak/backend) |
| Frontend | `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/frontend` | [`picpeak/frontend`](https://hub.docker.com/r/picpeak/frontend) |
| All-in-one | `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/aio` | [`picpeak/aio`](https://hub.docker.com/r/picpeak/aio) |
| ML sidecar (optional) | `ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/ml` | [`picpeak/ml`](https://hub.docker.com/r/picpeak/ml) |
Both registries get the same digests and the same tags — `stable`/`latest`, a pinned `x.y.z`, and `beta`/`main` for the active development channel — for `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64`. Keep every image in one install on the **same** tag.
## 🌟 Why PicPeak?
Unlike expensive SaaS solutions, PicPeak gives you:
- **💰 No Monthly Fees** — one-time setup, unlimited galleries
- **🔒 Complete Data Control** — your photos stay on your server
- **🎨 White-Label Ready** — full branding customization
- **📱 Mobile-First Design** — beautiful on all devices
- **🌍 Multi-Language** — built-in i18n (EN, DE)
## ✨ Features
**For photographers** — drag & drop upload, auto-expiring & password-protected galleries, automated emails, an analytics dashboard, custom themes, a public landing page, and a [Live Slideshow](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/live-slideshow) projector view that auto-picks-up new uploads during live events.
**For clients** — clean mobile-optimized galleries, one-click bulk downloads, smart search, **People in this gallery** face grouping (opt-in per gallery, needs the optional [ML sidecar](ml/README.md)), optional guest uploads, and download protection (watermarking + right-click prevention).
**Technical** — Docker-ready, automatic thumbnail generation, external media reference mode, smart archiving of expired galleries, S3-compatible [storage backends](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/storage-backends), [webhooks](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/webhooks), and security-first defaults (JWT, rate limiting, CORS).
<details>
<summary><strong>🧾 For studios — CRM &amp; Accounting (Beta, off by default)</strong></summary>
- 📝 **Quotes → Contracts → Invoices** — one deal lineage; cancel-and-reissue (Storno) keeps issued invoices immutable
- ⏱️ **Hours Logging & Calendar** — per-customer time tracking; admin calendar of events, logged hours, and pending quotes/contracts
- 🧾 **Inbound Supplier Invoices & Expenses** — capture received invoices (upload/camera, rasterised server-side), categorise, and re-bill costs to clients
- 📊 **Tax Report & Accountant Export** — period-scoped income/cost report with VAT breakdown; PDF/CSV plus a Treuhänder/Banana (Swiss/LI) journal export
- 🌍 **VAT & Multi-currency** — single VAT-code registry snapshotted onto each document
</details>
> [!WARNING]
> **CRM & Accounting — examples only, verify locally.** Feature-flagged off by default. Seeded contract blocks are written by the maintainer, **not a lawyer**; QR-bills/SEPA payloads and every tax, VAT and Treuhänder/Banana figure are computed from your input and defaults and are **jurisdiction-specific guidance only**. Have your lawyer review contracts, scan a test QR with your bank's app, and verify all numbers with your accountant / Treuhänder / tax authority before customer-facing use. Read **[the CRM disclaimers](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm/disclaimers)** first.
```bash
UPDATE_CHECK_ENABLED=false
```
## 📖 Documentation
Full documentation lives at **[docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app)** — deployment, admin settings, API, branding, and more.
Full documentation lives at **[docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app)** — deployment, admin settings reference, API docs, webhooks, archive lifecycle, branding, and everything else. Some quick links:
| Topic | Link |
- 🚀 [**Deployment**](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment) - Docker, environment variables, reverse proxy, SSL
- ⚙️ [**Admin Settings**](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/admin-settings) - Every tab in the Settings panel
- 🎯 [**Creating Events**](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/creating-events) - Full event field reference
- 📽️ [**Live Slideshow**](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/live-slideshow) - Fullscreen projector view that auto-updates during live events
- 💾 [**Backup & Restore**](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/backup-restore) - Backup configuration, restore wizard, full disaster recovery
- 🔌 [**API Reference**](https://docs.picpeak.app/api) - REST endpoints, OpenAPI spec, webhooks
- 🪝 [**Webhooks**](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/webhooks) - Event payloads, signing, filters, templates
Project meta:
- 🤝 [**Contributing**](CONTRIBUTING.md) - How to contribute
- 📜 [**License**](LICENSE) - MIT License
- 🔒 [**Security**](SECURITY.md) - Security policies
- 📋 [**Code of Conduct**](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) - Community guidelines
## 🌐 Public Landing Page
Spotlight your studio with a customizable marketing page at `/`:
- Head to **Admin → CMS Pages** to enable the public landing page toggle.
- Edit the provided HTML template (rich sections, hero, testimonials) and optional CSS overrides.
- The preview renders in a sandboxed iframe so you can iterate safely before publishing.
- PicPeak sanitizes stored HTML and CSS server-side—scripts, iframes, and unsafe attributes are stripped automatically.
- Use **Reset to default** anytime to restore the bundled template.
- The backend caches the rendered landing page for 60 seconds by default; override with `PUBLIC_SITE_CACHE_TTL_MS` if you need a different TTL.
- When the landing page is disabled PicPeak continues to serve the admin SPA/login exactly as before.
## 🎯 Use Cases
Perfect for:
- 💒 **Wedding Photographers** - Share ceremony photos securely
- 🎂 **Event Photography** - Birthday parties, corporate events
- 📸 **Portrait Studios** - Client galleries with download limits
- 🏢 **Corporate Events** - Internal photo sharing with branding
- 🎓 **School Photography** - Secure parent access with expiration
- 📽️ **Live Events** - Put a [Live Slideshow](docs/live-slideshow.md) on the venue projector that updates as you shoot
## 🏗️ Tech Stack
- **Backend**: Node.js, Express, SQLite/PostgreSQL
- **Frontend**: React, Tailwind CSS, Framer Motion
- **Storage**: Local filesystem (default) or S3-compatible object store (AWS S3, MinIO, R2, B2, Wasabi, Spaces) — see [Storage Backends](#storage-backends)
- **Email**: SMTP with customizable templates
- **Analytics**: Privacy-focused with Umami integration
## 💾 Storage Backends
PicPeak supports two storage backends for photos, thumbnails, hero images, watermarks, and archive zips. Both are configured via environment variables; no code change is required to switch.
| Capability | `STORAGE_BACKEND=local` (default) | `STORAGE_BACKEND=s3` |
|---|---|---|
| Photo / thumbnail / hero storage | Local filesystem under `STORAGE_PATH` | Bucket on any S3-compatible service |
| Admin UI upload | ✅ | ✅ |
| Filesystem auto-import (chokidar watcher) | ✅ | ❌ — disabled (use the upload API) |
| Watermarks, fingerprinting, fragmentation | ✅ | ✅ (materialized to a tmp file just-in-time) |
| Bulk download zips (cached + on-the-fly) | ✅ | ✅ |
| Backups | ✅ | ✅ |
| External media reference mode (`EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT`) | ✅ (always local) | ✅ (still local — not migrated) |
### Switching to an S3-compatible backend
1. Provision a bucket and credentials. The minimum IAM policy is documented in `.env.example`.
2. Set `STORAGE_BACKEND=s3` plus `STORAGE_S3_BUCKET`, `STORAGE_S3_REGION`, `STORAGE_S3_ACCESS_KEY`, `STORAGE_S3_SECRET_KEY`. For non-AWS providers (MinIO, R2, B2, …) also set `STORAGE_S3_ENDPOINT`.
3. If you have existing local content, copy it first: `node backend/scripts/migrate-storage.js --dry-run` then `node backend/scripts/migrate-storage.js`. The script is idempotent and writes a failures CSV.
4. Restart the backend. The startup check pings the bucket and refuses to boot on misconfig.
Note: presigned-URL serving (zero-bandwidth direct downloads from S3) is intentionally **not** in v1 — every request still streams through the backend so watermarks, devtools-detection, and access logging keep working.
## 🔔 Webhooks
PicPeak POSTs event/photo lifecycle notifications to URLs you configure under **Settings → Webhooks**. Each delivery is signed `HMAC-SHA256` with a per-webhook secret in the `X-PicPeak-Signature` header so receivers can verify the request really came from your PicPeak instance.
### Event types
| Event | Fires when |
|---|---|
| 🚀 Deployment (Docker, env, reverse proxy, SSL) | [docs.picpeak.app/deployment](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment) |
| 📦 Single-container install (one `docker run`, SQLite) | [docs.picpeak.app/deployment/single-container](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/single-container) |
| ⚙️ Admin settings reference | [docs.picpeak.app/guides/admin-settings](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/admin-settings) |
| 🎯 Creating events | [docs.picpeak.app/guides/creating-events](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/creating-events) |
| 📽️ Live Slideshow | [docs.picpeak.app/features/live-slideshow](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/live-slideshow) |
| 💾 Backup & Restore | [docs.picpeak.app/guides/backup-restore](https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/backup-restore) |
| 🔌 API reference | [docs.picpeak.app/api](https://docs.picpeak.app/api) |
| 🪝 Webhooks | [docs.picpeak.app/features/webhooks](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/webhooks) |
| 💾 Storage backends (local / S3) | [docs.picpeak.app/features/storage-backends](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/storage-backends) |
| 💻 System requirements & tuning | [docs.picpeak.app/deployment/system-requirements](https://docs.picpeak.app/deployment/system-requirements) |
| 🧾 CRM & Accounting | [docs.picpeak.app/features/crm](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm) · [disclaimers](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm/disclaimers) |
| 🗺️ Roadmap | [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues) |
| `event.created` | Gallery created (admin or API) |
| `event.published` | Draft becomes live (`is_draft: true → false`) — also fires when an event is created with `is_draft=false` |
| `event.archived` | Bulk-archive, manual archive, or auto-archive on expiry |
| `event.expired` | Expiration checker marks the gallery inactive (fires before `event.archived` in the cascade) |
| `photo.uploaded` | Admin upload, API upload, guest upload, or auto-import |
| `photo.deleted` | Single delete, bulk delete (NOT fired per-photo when an event is archived — receivers infer from `event.archived` to avoid flooding) |
**Project meta:** [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) · [License](LICENSE) · [Security](SECURITY.md) · [Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)
### Payload shape
```json
{
"id": "delivery-uuid",
"type": "event.published",
"created_at": "2026-04-28T05:25:00.000Z",
"data": {
"event": { "id": 123, "slug": "wedding-smith", "share_url": "https://..." }
}
}
```
Also sent on every request:
- `X-PicPeak-Signature` — `HMAC-SHA256(secret, raw_body)` as hex
- `X-PicPeak-Event` — the event type (handy for routing without parsing the body)
- `X-PicPeak-Delivery` — UUID for idempotency on the receiver side
- `User-Agent: PicPeak-Webhooks/1.0`
### Verifying signatures
**Node.js**
```js
const crypto = require('crypto');
function verify(secret, rawBody, signature) {
const expected = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(rawBody).digest('hex');
const a = Buffer.from(expected, 'hex');
const b = Buffer.from(signature, 'hex');
if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b);
}
```
**Python**
```python
import hmac, hashlib
def verify(secret: str, raw_body: bytes, signature: str) -> bool:
expected = hmac.new(secret.encode(), raw_body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
return hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature)
```
**curl + openssl** (one-liner for a quick replay)
```sh
SIG=$(printf '%s' "$BODY" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$SECRET" | awk '{print $2}')
[ "$SIG" = "$RECEIVED_SIG" ] && echo OK || echo MISMATCH
```
### Retries + observability
- `2xx` → success, recorded with latency
- Non-`2xx` or network error → exponential backoff: `1m → 5m → 30m → 2h → 12h`, max 5 attempts
- After max attempts: status `failed`, surfaces in **Settings → Webhooks → Deliveries** with a "Replay" button
- Up to 5 deliveries in flight at once; one slow consumer can't block others (configurable via `WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_CONCURRENCY`)
- Response body truncated to 1KB before storage so chatty receivers don't bloat the audit log
The deliveries page (`/admin/webhooks/:id/deliveries`) shows every attempt with timestamp, status, HTTP code, latency, payload sent, signature, and response. Click "Send test event" to fire a synthetic delivery for any event type.
### SSRF protection
Webhook URLs are validated against the same private-IP blocklist used elsewhere in the app — loopback, private RFC1918 ranges, link-local, `.local`/`.internal` hostnames, cloud metadata endpoints. The check runs both at create time and per-delivery (DNS-rebinding mitigation).
For local development with a receiver on the same machine or docker network, set `WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=true`. Production deployments must leave this OFF.
## 💻 System Requirements
### Minimum Requirements
- **CPU**: 2 CPU cores
- **RAM**: **4 GB minimum** for a normal photo-upload workload — sharp/libvips
decodes the full uncompressed frame before resize, and the default two
worker loops at sharp-concurrency 2 can push peak RSS past 1.5 GB on a
batch of 20-MP+ photos. On a 2 GB VPS that's enough to OOM-kill the
backend mid-batch (surfaces as 503s on thumbnails — see [Low-memory
hosts](#low-memory-hosts) below for the recipe to run on 2 GB).
- **Storage**: 20GB minimum (plus photo storage needs)
- **OS**: Linux (Ubuntu 20.04+), macOS, or Windows with WSL2
- **Node.js**: v18.0.0 or higher
- **Database**: SQLite (included) or PostgreSQL 12+
### Docker Requirements (Recommended)
- **Docker**: v20.10.0+
- **Docker Compose**: v2.0.0+
### Low-memory hosts
Running on 2 GB RAM (e.g. an entry-level VPS) is workable but requires
tuning the upload-processor concurrency down. The backend auto-detects
total RAM at startup via `os.totalmem()` — on a host that reports < 3 GB,
it defaults `UPLOAD_PROCESSOR_CONCURRENCY` to **1** instead of 2 and logs
a one-shot warning. You can pin the value explicitly in `.env`:
```env
# Single worker loop — slower batch processing, lower peak RSS
UPLOAD_PROCESSOR_CONCURRENCY=1
```
The trade-off is throughput: a single worker processes one photo at a
time, so a 100-photo batch takes ~2× as long but won't OOM. **Health-check
note**: if the backend dies under memory pressure, the gallery serves
`503 Service Unavailable` on thumbnails until Docker's
`restart: unless-stopped` brings the container back. Persistent 503s
during/after an upload batch on a low-memory host are almost always this.
### Video Support Requirements
When enabling video uploads, consider these additional resources:
| Resource | Recommendation | Notes |
|----------|----------------|-------|
| **RAM** | 4GB+ recommended | FFmpeg processing requires more memory |
| **Storage** | Plan for 10-100x more | Videos are significantly larger than images |
| **CPU** | Additional cores help | Video thumbnail extraction is CPU-intensive |
| **Bandwidth** | Higher throughput | Video streaming requires more bandwidth |
**Technical Notes:**
- FFmpeg is bundled via npm (`@ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg`) - no system installation required
- Maximum upload size: **10GB per video file**
- Chunked upload support for files >100MB (resumable uploads)
- Supported formats: MP4, WebM, MOV, AVI
- Video thumbnails are automatically generated from the first few seconds
**For Nginx/Reverse Proxy:**
If using Nginx, increase the client max body size:
```nginx
client_max_body_size 10G;
proxy_read_timeout 3600;
proxy_send_timeout 3600;
```
## 🤝 Contributing
We love contributions! PicPeak is built by photographers, for photographers. Whether you're fixing bugs, adding features, or improving documentation, your help is welcome.
See our [Contributing Guide](CONTRIBUTING.md) for details.
## 📊 Comparison with Alternatives
@@ -164,79 +409,168 @@ Full documentation lives at **[docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app)** —
| Quotes / Contracts / Invoices | 🧪 Beta | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Incoming Invoices & Accounting | 🧪 Beta | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
<sub>*You bring your own server and, optionally, a domain. **Limited only by your server storage. ***Pixieset's "unlimited" is photos only; video is capped by plan. 🧪 Beta = built but feature-flagged off by default.</sub>
*You still bring your own server (own hardware or a VPS) and, if you want one, a domain.
**Limited only by your server storage.
***Pixieset's "unlimited" is photos only; video is capped by plan (roughly 010 h depending on tier).
🧪 Beta = built but feature-flagged off by default (see [Beta Features](#-beta-features-use-at-your-own-risk)).
## 🏗 Tech Stack
## 🛡 Security
- **Backend**: Node.js, Express, SQLite/PostgreSQL
- **Frontend**: React, Tailwind CSS, Framer Motion
- **Storage**: Local filesystem (default) or S3-compatible object store (AWS S3, MinIO, R2, B2, Wasabi, Spaces) — see [Storage Backends](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/storage-backends)
- **Email**: SMTP with customizable templates
- **Analytics**: Privacy-focused with Umami integration
- **External media**: point PicPeak at `EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT` to reference existing originals read-only, index quickly, and generate thumbnails on demand
PicPeak takes security seriously:
- 🔐 Password hashing with bcrypt
- 🎫 JWT-based authentication
- 🚦 Rate limiting on all endpoints
- 🛡️ CORS protection
- 📝 Activity logging
- 🔒 Secure file access
Found a security issue? Please open a [security issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security) on GitHub
## 📸 Screenshots
<details>
<summary>Click to see the admin dashboard, analytics, and event management</summary>
### 🎛️ **Admin Dashboard**
Get a complete overview of your photo galleries, analytics, and system status.
### 🎛️ Admin Dashboard
<img src="docs/screenshot-dashboard.png" alt="PicPeak Admin Dashboard" width="800" />
### 📊 Analytics & Insights
### 📊 **Analytics & Insights**
Track gallery performance, view statistics, and monitor user engagement.
<img src="docs/screenshot-analytics.png" alt="PicPeak Analytics Dashboard" width="800" />
### 📁 Event Management
### 📁 **Event Management**
Organize and manage your photo galleries with intuitive event management tools.
<img src="docs/screenshots-events.png" alt="PicPeak Events Management" width="800" />
### ✨ **Key Interface Highlights**
<details>
<summary>👆 Click to see more interface details</summary>
#### What makes PicPeak's interface special:
- **🎨 Clean Design**: Modern, photographer-friendly interface
- **📱 Responsive**: Perfect on desktop, tablet, and mobile
- **⚡ Fast Loading**: Optimized for quick photo browsing
- **🔒 Secure Access**: Password-protected galleries with expiration
- **📤 Easy Uploads**: Drag & drop functionality for effortless photo management
- **🎯 Client-Focused**: Intuitive gallery experience for your clients
</details>
## 🤝 Contributing
## 🗺️ Roadmap
We love contributions! PicPeak is built by photographers, for photographers — whether you're fixing bugs, adding features, or improving docs. See the [Contributing Guide](CONTRIBUTING.md) to get started.
We're constantly improving PicPeak and welcome contributions from our community! If you have ideas for new features or want to help implement existing ones, please open an issue or submit a pull request. Your contributions help make PicPeak better for everyone.
Found a security issue? Please open a [security issue](https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues/new?labels=security). See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the policy.
### 🚧 Beta Features (Use at your own risk)
These features are currently in beta testing and may have limited functionality or stability:
| Feature | Description | Status |
|---------|-------------|--------|
| **CRM & Accounting Module** | Quotes, contracts, invoices (+ Storno), hours logging, calendar, and tax report — plus inbound supplier-invoice capture, internal expenses, and a Treuhänder/Banana (Swiss/LI) accountant-journal export. Feature-flagged off by default. Seeded contract blocks, payment terms, IBAN / QR-bill and tax defaults are **examples only** and need legal / financial / **tax** review before customer-facing use. See [docs.picpeak.app/features/crm](https://docs.picpeak.app/features/crm). | 🧪 Beta |
| **Simple Deployment Script** | One-click deployment script for quick server setup with automated configuration and dependency installation | 🧪 Beta |
### 📋 Future Enhancements
| Feature | Description | Priority | Status |
|---------|-------------|----------|---------|
| **Backup & Restore** | Comprehensive backup system with S3/MinIO support, automated scheduling, and safe restore functionality | High | ✅ Implemented |
| **External Media Library (Reference Mode)** | Use an external folder library as a readonly source with import and ondemand thumbnail generation | High | ✅ Implemented |
| **Download Protection** | Advanced image protection system with canvas rendering, invisible watermarking, right-click prevention, and DevTools detection to protect photos from unauthorized downloads | High | ✅ Implemented |
| **Gallery Templates** | Multiple gallery layouts (grid, masonry, carousel, timeline, hero, mosaic) with custom CSS styling support. Includes starter templates like Apple Liquid Glass for complete visual customization | Medium | ✅ Implemented |
| **Face Recognition** | AI-powered face detection to help guests find their photos and create automatic person-based albums | Low | 🔄 Open |
| **Gallery Feedback** | Allow guests to like, rate, and comment on photos with admin notifications and moderation | Medium | ✅ Implemented |
| **Video Support** | Upload and display videos alongside photos in galleries with streaming support | Low | ✅ Implemented |
| **Multiple Administrators** | Support for multiple admin accounts with role-based permissions and activity tracking | Low | ✅ Implemented |
| **Filtering & Export Options** | Filter photos by likes, ratings, comments, or favorites. Search by filename. Sort by date, name, size, or rating. Export filtered selections as ZIP or generate Capture One/Lightroom-compatible file lists for professional workflows | Medium | ✅ Implemented |
**Status Legend:** ✅ Implemented | 🚧 In Progress | 🔄 Open | 📋 Planned
## ☕ Support the Project
PicPeak is free, open source, and self-hostable forever. If it saves you time or replaces a paid subscription, consider [buying me a coffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap) — it directly funds new features, bug fixes, and keeping the demo + docs running. You can also ⭐ star the repo, share it, file good bug reports, or open a PR.
PicPeak is free, open source, and self-hostable forever. If it saves you time or replaces a paid subscription, consider buying me a coffee — it directly funds the time spent on new features, bug fixes, and keeping the demo + docs running.
<p align="left">
<a href="https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap" target="_blank">
<img src="https://img.buymeacoffee.com/button-api/?text=Buy%20me%20a%20coffee&emoji=☕&slug=theluap&button_colour=FFDD00&font_colour=000000&font_family=Cookie&outline_colour=000000&coffee_colour=ffffff" alt="Buy Me A Coffee" />
</a>
</p>
Other ways to support without spending anything: ⭐ star the repo, share it with photographer friends, file good bug reports, or open a PR.
## 🙏 Acknowledgments
PicPeak is inspired by the best features of commercial platforms while remaining completely open source. It's developed with AI assistance, but human-tested end-to-end, security-audited, and human-reviewed for quality.
PicPeak is inspired by the best features of commercial platforms while remaining completely open source. Special thanks to all contributors who make this project possible.
### 👥 Contributors
A huge thank you to the people whose code, reports, and feedback have shaped PicPeak:
**[@the-luap](https://github.com/the-luap)** — creator and lead maintainer
- Gallery foundation (events, uploads, sharing, download protection, templates)
- Backup & restore, analytics, branding/theming
- The architecture every later feature builds on
**[@Luca-Timo](https://github.com/Luca-Timo)**
- Native Apple Silicon multi-arch images
- CRM & accounting suite (quotes/contracts/invoices)
- Hours logging & Treuhänder/Banana tax export
- Gallery header/banner decoupling
**[@Rekoo-PS](https://github.com/Rekoo-PS)** — bug reports & product feedback
- Login-loop fix, mobile-lightbox overhaul, bulk-delete workflow
- Also a [BuyMeACoffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap) supporter
- [**@the-luap**](https://github.com/the-luap) — creator and lead maintainer. Started the project and built PicPeak's foundation and the entire gallery experience (events, galleries, uploads, sharing, download protection, templates), plus backup & restore, analytics, system health, branding/theming, and WhatsApp notifications — and the architecture every later feature builds on.
- [**@Luca-Timo**](https://github.com/Luca-Timo) — native Apple Silicon multi-arch images, external-URL toggle for legal CMS pages, the lazy-loaded folder tree picker, the admin-email picker on event creation, the data-driven self-hosted webfont system, the gallery header/banner decoupling, several typed-API refactors, and the CRM + accounting suite (quotes/contracts/invoices, hours logging, calendar, tax report, inbound supplier-invoice capture, expenses, and the Treuhänder/Banana export). Consistently raises the bar with thoughtful PRs.
- [**@Rekoo-PS**](https://github.com/Rekoo-PS) — sharp-eyed bug reporter and product feedback. Filed the issues that drove the login-loop fix, the gallery-loading skeleton work, the redirection cleanup, the mobile-lightbox overhaul, the admin-events search-counter fix, the photo-count column, and the bulk-delete workflow. Also a [BuyMeACoffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/theluap) supporter — the kind of feedback loop that keeps the project useful for real deployments.
If you've contributed and aren't listed here, please open a PR — this list is meant to grow.
### 🤖 AI-Assisted Development
This project was generated with the assistance of AI technology, but has been:
- ✅ **Fully tested end-to-end** by human developers
- 🔒 **Security audited** with comprehensive security checks
- 👨‍💻 **Human-reviewed** for code quality and best practices
- 🧪 **Production-tested** in real-world scenarios
We believe in transparent development practices and the responsible use of AI as a tool to accelerate development while maintaining high standards of quality and security.
## ⚠️ CRM & Accounting disclaimers — examples only, verify locally
The CRM & accounting modules (contracts, invoices, QR-bills, the tax
report and the accountant exports) ship seeded content and computed
figures that are intended as a **starting point only**:
- **Contract blocks** (image rights, NDA, model release, cancellation,
jurisdiction, …) are written by the maintainer, **not by a lawyer**.
Every operator must have their lawyer review and adapt them before
sending any contract to a customer.
- **QR-bills and SEPA EPC payloads** are rendered from the data you
typed. Picpeak is open source — please scan a test invoice with your
bank's app to check the QR actually works. We are not responsible for
any mistakes that come from sending an invoice with bad data on it.
- **Tax, VAT & accounting figures** (the tax report, VAT-payable, the
per-rate breakdown, the Treuhänder / Banana export, etc.) are computed
from the data you enter and the defaults you configure. They are
**guidance only and jurisdiction-specific** — tax rules, VAT rates,
deduction schemes (e.g. the Liechtenstein 20 % Gewinnungskosten flat
rate) and filing duties differ by country and change over time. **Every
operator must check their own tax / VAT regulations and verify the
numbers with their accountant / Treuhänder / tax authority before
relying on any figure or export.** Picpeak makes no warranty that the
output is correct for your jurisdiction or situation.
Read [`docs/crm-disclaimers.md`](docs/crm-disclaimers.md) before
enabling the Contracts, Invoices or Accounting features.
## 📄 License
PicPeak is released under the [MIT License](LICENSE). Use it freely for personal or commercial projects.
## 🚀 Ready to Get Started?
1.**Star this repository** to show your support
2. 📖 Read the [docs at docs.picpeak.app](https://docs.picpeak.app)
3. 🐛 Report issues or request features
4. 🤝 Join our community and contribute!
---
<p align="center">
Made with ❤️ by photographers, for photographers
<br>
<a href="https://www.picpeak.app">Homepage</a> ·
<a href="https://demo.picpeak.app">Live Demo</a> ·
<a href="https://docs.picpeak.app">Documentation</a> ·
<a href="https://www.picpeak.app">Homepage</a>
<a href="https://demo.picpeak.app">Live Demo</a>
<a href="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak">GitHub</a>
<a href="https://docs.picpeak.app">Documentation</a> •
<a href="https://github.com/PicPeak/picpeak/issues">Support</a>
</p>
+4 -18
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@@ -52,19 +52,13 @@ The actual mechanics, in order:
- **`.release-please-manifest.json`** — keep `stable`'s; release-please owns this file.
- Any other auto-merged file — spot-check that the auto-merge produced something sensible, especially for security-sensitive files (`backend/src/middleware/`, `backend/src/utils/tokenUtils.js`).
5. **Pin the stable version to match `main` (number alignment — see Versioning).** Determine `X.Y.Z` = the `main` tip's **base** version (its `vX.Y.Z-beta.N`, dropping the `-beta.N` suffix), and add an empty commit on the release branch:
```bash
git commit --allow-empty -m "chore: release X.Y.Z" -m "Release-As: X.Y.Z"
```
The `Release-As:` footer forces release-please to cut exactly `X.Y.Z`. Without it, release-please computes the next MINOR from the *previous stable* tag (e.g. `3.45.0` → `3.46.0`) while `main` is already at `3.84.x`, so the stable number drifts ever further behind for the same code.
5. **Wait for CI on the PR.** All ten checks (the original eight plus `merge-backend` and `merge-frontend`) must be green. If anything fails, fix on the release branch (NOT on `main` — `main` has already moved on).
6. **Wait for CI on the PR.** All ten checks (the original eight plus `merge-backend` and `merge-frontend`) must be green. If anything fails, fix on the release branch (NOT on `main` — `main` has already moved on).
6. **Merge.** Standard merge commit, not squash — the PR's history (the individual feature commits) carries forward into `stable`'s log.
7. **Merge.** Standard merge commit, not squash — the PR's history (the individual feature commits) carries forward into `stable`'s log.
7. **release-please picks it up.** Within minutes, release-please will open a new `chore(stable): release X.Y.Z` PR proposing the stable release. Review the auto-generated CHANGELOG.md entries for accuracy, edit if needed, and merge. That merge creates the `vX.Y.Z` git tag, publishes Docker images on the `:stable` and `:latest` tags, and creates the GitHub Release page.
8. **release-please picks it up.** Within minutes, release-please will open a new `chore(stable): release X.Y.Z` PR proposing the stable release. Review the auto-generated CHANGELOG.md entries for accuracy, edit if needed, and merge. That merge creates the `vX.Y.Z` git tag, publishes Docker images on the `:stable` and `:latest` tags, and creates the GitHub Release page.
9. **Close the loop.** Bulk-close any `bug` issues that were fixed-but-not-closed and now appear in the released changelog. Reference the merge commit so reporters know which version contains the fix.
8. **Close the loop.** Bulk-close any `bug` issues that were fixed-but-not-closed and now appear in the released changelog. Reference the merge commit so reporters know which version contains the fix.
## Hotfix path (backport to current stable)
@@ -89,14 +83,6 @@ PicPeak follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/) with one project-spec
release-please derives all of this from conventional commit prefixes (`feat:`, `fix:`, `BREAKING CHANGE:`, etc.) automatically.
### Stable ↔ pre-release number alignment
The two channels run **independent** release-please counters: `main` bumps on every merge (racing ahead), while `stable` only bumps on a promotion. Left to itself, `stable` computes each promotion as the next MINOR from the *previous stable tag*, so the two drift far apart — e.g. `main` at `v3.83.x-beta.0` while `stable` sat at `v3.45.0` for the **same code**, which reads as "stable is 38 versions behind" when it isn't.
To keep the numbers legible, **a promotion sets the stable version to the current `main` base version** (the `X.Y.Z` of the `main` tip's `vX.Y.Z-beta.N`, minus the suffix). Promoting a `main` at `v3.84.2-beta.0` therefore cuts stable `v3.84.2`, and the stable number tracks `main` instead of lagging. This is forced with the `Release-As:` commit in step 5 of the cut procedure — the one-time catch-up jump (e.g. `3.45.0 → 3.84.x`) is expected and happens only on the first aligned promotion.
> **Release-engineering note (2026-07):** `release-please.yml` (the stable workflow) *must* keep `target-branch: stable`. Without it, release-please defaults to the repo's default branch (`main`), reads `main`'s stale `.release-please-manifest.json`, and cuts a wrong/regressed version — this is what produced a bogus `v2.7.0` once. If a promotion ever yields an unexpected version, check that first.
## Things that don't go through this process
- **Documentation-only changes** can land on either `stable` or `main` directly (no release cut needed); release-please will pick them up on the next regular release.
+3 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
node_modules
npm-debug.log
.env
storage
storage/events/active/*
storage/events/archived/*
storage/thumbnails/*
data/*.db
logs/*
coverage
-6
View File
@@ -106,12 +106,6 @@ ARCHIVE_PATH=/app/storage/events/archived
# EVENTS_PATH=./storage/events
# ARCHIVE_PATH=./storage/events/archived
# File watcher (auto-import from the events/active folder, local storage only)
# Max photos processed in parallel by the watcher. The boot scan and bulk
# folder drops fire one handler per file — this bound keeps thumbnail
# generation from exhausting memory on small hosts. Default: 2
# FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY=2
# Analytics Backend Configuration (OPTIONAL)
# Used for server-side tracking only
# Primary configuration should be done through Admin UI > Settings > Analytics
+2 -14
View File
@@ -27,15 +27,6 @@ FROM node:22-alpine
WORKDIR /app
# knexfile.js picks its config block by NODE_ENV, and the `development` block
# defaults to sqlite3. Leaving NODE_ENV unset here meant every deployment that
# doesn't go through our compose files — Kubernetes, Helm, plain `docker run` —
# silently ran on SQLite and ignored DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD, while
# wait-for-db.sh (shell, reads DB_HOST directly) reported "PostgreSQL is up" in
# the same log. The compose files still override this, so nothing changes for
# compose users. See #1038.
ENV NODE_ENV=production
# Redeclare CACHEBUST — ARGs don't cross stage boundaries, so the builder
# stage's declaration never reached this stage. Consuming it in the RUN below
# busts that layer's cache every CI run (CACHEBUST=github.run_number), so the
@@ -77,12 +68,9 @@ RUN rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm /usr/local/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npx
# PDFs to flat PNGs server-side so the admin UI NEVER renders a raw (possibly
# malicious) PDF. pdftoppm does not execute embedded JS or fetch remote
# resources, so it doubles as the SSRF/phone-home guard for untrusted inbound
# documents (see https://docs.picpeak.app/features/accounting/incoming-invoices).
# exiftool extracts the embedded full-res JPEG preview from RAW/DNG uploads
# (Apple ProRAW etc.) — sharp's libvips has no raw loader, so the pipeline
# thumbnails/displays that preview while keeping the original for download.
# documents (see docs/accounting-inbound-invoices.md).
RUN apk add --no-cache dumb-init postgresql-client ffmpeg su-exec \
fontconfig ttf-dejavu ttf-liberation poppler-utils exiftool && \
fontconfig ttf-dejavu ttf-liberation poppler-utils && \
fc-cache -f
# Create non-root user
+1 -4
View File
@@ -8,10 +8,7 @@ RUN apk upgrade --no-cache
# Install dumb-init for proper signal handling and ffmpeg for video uploads.
# Alpine's ffmpeg ships both ffmpeg + ffprobe built natively against musl;
# the npm-bundled binary doesn't run reliably on Alpine. Match production.
# exiftool: extract embedded JPEG previews from RAW/DNG uploads (#821) — kept in
# sync with the production Dockerfile so dev/native runtimes don't accept a DNG
# and then fail it with ENOENT.
RUN apk add --no-cache dumb-init ffmpeg exiftool
RUN apk add --no-cache dumb-init ffmpeg
# Copy package files
COPY package*.json ./
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
/**
* Backup credential exposure regression tests.
*
* The generic settings reads (GET /admin/settings, GET /admin/settings/:type)
* masked the recaptcha/umami/rybbit keys but returned backup_s3_secret_key
* and backup_rsync_ssh_key (an SSH PRIVATE KEY) in plaintext to any
* settings.view holder; GET /admin/backup/config returned them too. Both now
* mask, and PUT /admin/backup/config skips the mask sentinel so the edit
* form round-trips without clobbering stored credentials.
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.mock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => {
req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'test-admin' };
next();
},
}));
jest.mock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
requireSuperAdmin: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
describe('backup credential masking', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// Upsert: several backup_* keys are pre-seeded by the backup migrations.
const seed = [
{ setting_key: 'backup_destination_type', setting_value: JSON.stringify('s3'), setting_type: 'backup' },
{ setting_key: 'backup_s3_endpoint', setting_value: JSON.stringify('https://s3.example.com'), setting_type: 'backup' },
{ setting_key: 'backup_s3_bucket', setting_value: JSON.stringify('backups'), setting_type: 'backup' },
{ setting_key: 'backup_s3_access_key', setting_value: JSON.stringify('AKIAEXAMPLE'), setting_type: 'backup' },
{ setting_key: 'backup_s3_secret_key', setting_value: JSON.stringify('super-secret-s3-key'), setting_type: 'backup' },
{ setting_key: 'backup_rsync_ssh_key', setting_value: JSON.stringify('-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----abc'), setting_type: 'backup' },
];
for (const row of seed) {
await db('app_settings').insert(row).onConflict('setting_key').merge();
}
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/backup', require('../../src/routes/adminBackup'));
app.use('/api/admin/settings', require('../../src/routes/adminSettings'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
it('masks the credentials in GET /admin/backup/config', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/admin/backup/config').expect(200);
expect(res.body.backup_s3_secret_key).toBe('••••••••');
expect(res.body.backup_rsync_ssh_key).toBe('••••••••');
// Non-secret fields stay readable for the form.
expect(res.body.backup_s3_bucket).toBe('backups');
});
it('masks the credentials in the generic GET /admin/settings/:type read', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/admin/settings/backup').expect(200);
expect(res.body.backup_s3_secret_key).toBe('••••••••');
expect(res.body.backup_rsync_ssh_key).toBe('••••••••');
});
it('masks the credentials in the generic GET /admin/settings read', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/admin/settings').expect(200);
expect(res.body.backup_s3_secret_key).toBe('••••••••');
expect(res.body.backup_rsync_ssh_key).toBe('••••••••');
});
it('PUT /admin/backup/config keeps the stored secret when the sentinel round-trips', async () => {
await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/backup/config')
.send({
backup_destination_type: 's3',
backup_s3_endpoint: 'https://s3.example.com',
backup_s3_bucket: 'renamed-bucket',
backup_s3_access_key: 'AKIAEXAMPLE',
backup_s3_secret_key: '••••••••',
backup_rsync_ssh_key: '••••••••',
})
.expect(200);
const secret = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'backup_s3_secret_key' }).first();
expect(JSON.parse(secret.setting_value)).toBe('super-secret-s3-key');
const sshKey = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'backup_rsync_ssh_key' }).first();
expect(JSON.parse(sshKey.setting_value)).toBe('-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----abc');
const bucket = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'backup_s3_bucket' }).first();
expect(JSON.parse(bucket.setting_value)).toBe('renamed-bucket');
});
it('PUT /admin/backup/config stores a genuinely new secret', async () => {
await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/backup/config')
.send({ backup_s3_secret_key: 'rotated-s3-key' })
.expect(200);
const secret = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'backup_s3_secret_key' }).first();
expect(JSON.parse(secret.setting_value)).toBe('rotated-s3-key');
});
});
@@ -1,211 +0,0 @@
/**
* Layered per-event category ordering (#782).
*
* Two ordering layers, resolved per event:
* - GLOBAL default — photo_categories.display_order (migration 159),
* set via POST /reorder-global; applies everywhere.
* - PER-EVENT override — event_category_order (migration 160), set via
* POST /reorder; overrides the default for one gallery.
* - DELETE /reorder/:eventId clears an event's override.
*
* Verified against a real SQLite DB with the full core-migration set applied.
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const {
bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
} = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('category ordering (#782)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let token;
let app;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
const { adminId } = await seedMinimal(db);
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
app = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/categories', require('../../src/routes/adminCategories'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
const auth = (r) => r.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
async function insertEvent(slug) {
await db('events').insert({
event_type: 'wedding', password_hash: 'x',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 9e9).toISOString(),
is_active: true, is_archived: false, slug, share_link: slug,
event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-01-01',
});
return (await db('events').where({ slug }).first()).id;
}
async function insertCat(name, { is_global = false, event_id = null, display_order = 0 } = {}) {
const res = await db('photo_categories').insert({
name,
slug: name.toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, '-'),
is_global: is_global ? 1 : 0,
event_id,
display_order,
}).returning('id');
return res[0]?.id ?? res[0];
}
const getEvent = (eventId) => auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/categories/event/${eventId}`)).expect(200);
describe('migration 159 backfill', () => {
it('seeds display_order from alphabetical order, scoped per event', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent('backfill-ev');
await insertCat('Reception', { event_id: eventId });
await insertCat('Ceremony', { event_id: eventId });
await insertCat('Pre-Ceremony', { event_id: eventId });
// Re-run the migration: addColumn is guarded (no-op); the backfill loop
// re-runs and assigns per-scope alphabetical order — what an upgrade does.
await require('../../migrations/core/159_add_category_display_order').up(db);
const evCats = await db('photo_categories').where({ event_id: eventId }).orderBy('display_order', 'asc');
expect(evCats.map((c) => c.name)).toEqual(['Ceremony', 'Pre-Ceremony', 'Reception']);
expect(evCats.map((c) => c.display_order)).toEqual([1, 2, 3]);
});
});
describe('global default order (POST /reorder-global)', () => {
it('reverses the global order and every non-customised event follows it', async () => {
const before = (await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/categories/global')).expect(200)).body;
expect(before.length).toBeGreaterThan(1);
const reversedIds = before.map((c) => c.id).reverse();
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder-global'))
.send({ orderedIds: reversedIds })
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.map((c) => c.id)).toEqual(reversedIds);
// A fresh event (no override) shows globals in the new global order.
const eventId = await insertEvent('follows-global');
const globalsInEvent = (await getEvent(eventId)).body.filter((c) => c.is_global).map((c) => c.id);
expect(globalsInEvent).toEqual(reversedIds);
});
});
describe('per-event override (POST /reorder)', () => {
it('pins a custom order for one event without affecting another', async () => {
const eventA = await insertEvent('override-a');
const eventB = await insertEvent('override-b');
const a1 = await insertCat('A-Ceremony', { event_id: eventA });
const a2 = await insertCat('A-Reception', { event_id: eventA });
// Current resolved list for A (globals + A's two categories).
const listA = (await getEvent(eventA)).body;
// Put A-Reception first, then A-Ceremony, then the globals in their order.
const globalsA = listA.filter((c) => c.is_global).map((c) => c.id);
const desired = [a2, a1, ...globalsA];
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder'))
.send({ event_id: eventA, orderedIds: desired })
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.map((c) => c.id)).toEqual(desired);
// override_position is set on every row for a customised event.
expect(res.body.every((c) => c.override_position != null)).toBe(true);
// Event B is untouched — no override, follows the global default.
const listB = (await getEvent(eventB)).body;
expect(listB.every((c) => c.override_position == null)).toBe(true);
});
it('accepts global ids but rejects another events category', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent('scope-ev');
const own = await insertCat('Own', { event_id: eventId });
const global = (await db('photo_categories').where('is_global', 1).first()).id;
const foreign = await insertCat('Foreign', { event_id: await insertEvent('other-ev') });
// A global id is allowed (globals can be arranged per event).
await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder'))
.send({ event_id: eventId, orderedIds: [own, global] })
.expect(200);
// A foreign event's category is out of scope.
await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder'))
.send({ event_id: eventId, orderedIds: [own, foreign] })
.expect(400);
});
});
describe('reset (DELETE /reorder/:eventId)', () => {
it('clears the override and reverts to the global default', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent('reset-ev');
const c1 = await insertCat('R-One', { event_id: eventId });
const list = (await getEvent(eventId)).body;
const globals = list.filter((c) => c.is_global).map((c) => c.id);
await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder'))
.send({ event_id: eventId, orderedIds: [c1, ...globals] })
.expect(200);
expect((await getEvent(eventId)).body.some((c) => c.override_position != null)).toBe(true);
const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/categories/reorder/${eventId}`)).expect(200);
expect(res.body.every((c) => c.override_position == null)).toBe(true);
expect(await db('event_category_order').where({ event_id: eventId }).first()).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('event ownership (PR #790 review)', () => {
let limitedToken;
let foreignEventId;
beforeAll(async () => {
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
// A non-super_admin role that DOES hold settings.view + settings.edit —
// the exact case the review flagged (settings.edit is grantable).
const roleRes = await db('roles').insert({ name: 'gallery-mgr', display_name: 'Gallery Mgr' }).returning('id');
const roleId = roleRes[0]?.id ?? roleRes[0];
const permIds = await db('permissions').whereIn('name', ['settings.view', 'settings.edit']).pluck('id');
await db('role_permissions').insert(permIds.map((permission_id) => ({ role_id: roleId, permission_id })));
const a2 = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'limited', email: 'limited@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('x', 4), role_id: roleId,
must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
limitedToken = mintAdminToken(a2[0]?.id ?? a2[0]);
// An event owned by a DIFFERENT admin (the seeded super_admin).
const owner = (await db('admin_users').where({ username: 'tester' }).first()).id;
await db('events').insert({
event_type: 'wedding', password_hash: 'x',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 9e9).toISOString(),
is_active: true, is_archived: false, slug: 'owned-ev', share_link: 'owned-ev',
event_name: 'Owned', event_date: '2026-01-01', created_by: owner,
});
foreignEventId = (await db('events').where({ slug: 'owned-ev' }).first()).id;
});
const limitedAuth = (r) => r.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${limitedToken}`);
it('blocks a non-owner from reading, reordering or resetting another event', async () => {
await limitedAuth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/categories/event/${foreignEventId}`)).expect(403);
await limitedAuth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories/reorder'))
.send({ event_id: foreignEventId, orderedIds: [1] }).expect(403);
await limitedAuth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/categories/reorder/${foreignEventId}`)).expect(403);
});
});
describe('POST / (create) appends to the end of its scope', () => {
it('assigns display_order = max + 1 within the event', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent('append-ev');
await insertCat('First', { event_id: eventId, display_order: 1 });
await insertCat('Second', { event_id: eventId, display_order: 2 });
const res = await auth(request(app).post('/api/admin/categories'))
.send({ name: 'Third', is_global: false, event_id: eventId })
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.display_order).toBe(3);
});
});
});
@@ -1,413 +0,0 @@
/**
* CRM mint-and-send paths — integration tests (#587).
*
* Pins the three document "mint" flows end-to-end through the real
* HTTP → route → service → DB → email-queue → file pipeline:
*
* 1. POST /api/admin/quotes/:id/send (draft → sent + PDF + token + email)
* 2. POST /api/admin/invoices/:id/cancel (issued → cancelled + Storno row)
* — the issue spec named this /:id/storno; the real route is
* /:id/cancel (invoiceService.cancelInvoice → createStorno).
* 3. POST /api/admin/contracts/:id/countersign
* (signed_by_customer → fully_signed + stamped PDF + sha256 + email)
*
* Real SQLite with the full core-migration run (helpers/crmDb), real
* pdfkit/pdf-lib rendering — no mock-fs, no network.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const request = require('supertest');
const {
bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken, buildRouteApp,
} = require('./helpers/crmDb');
// Full migration run + cold-requiring pdfService/emailProcessor is slow
// under CI load; match the other CRM integration suites.
jest.setTimeout(120000);
const CUSTOMER_EMAIL = 'customer@example.com';
// 1x1 transparent PNG — smallest valid signature pad output.
const SIGNATURE_DATA_URL = 'data:image/png;base64,'
+ 'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNkYPhfDwAChwGA60e6kgAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==';
// SQLite round-trips dates inconsistently (epoch ms number, numeric
// string, or ISO string) — parse robustly before comparing.
const toMillis = (v) => {
if (typeof v === 'number') return v;
if (typeof v === 'string' && /^\d+$/.test(v)) return Number(v);
return Date.parse(v);
};
const sha256 = (buf) => crypto.createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest('hex');
// Count embedded image XObjects per page via pdf-lib — used to prove BOTH
// signature stamps (customer + admin) made it into the final PDF instead of
// only asserting file existence/hash (codex review of #850 round 2).
async function countImagesPerPage(pdfPath) {
const { PDFDocument, PDFName, PDFDict } = require('pdf-lib');
const doc = await PDFDocument.load(fs.readFileSync(pdfPath));
return doc.getPages().map((page) => {
const resources = page.node.Resources();
const xobjects = resources && resources.lookupMaybe(PDFName.of('XObject'), PDFDict);
if (!xobjects) return 0;
let images = 0;
for (const [, ref] of xobjects.entries()) {
const stream = page.doc.context.lookup(ref);
const subtype = stream && stream.dict && stream.dict.get(PDFName.of('Subtype'));
if (subtype && subtype.toString() === '/Image') images += 1;
}
return images;
});
}
let db;
let cleanup;
let tmpDir;
// Real (symlink-resolved) storage root — on macOS os.tmpdir() returns
// /var/... while the services persist under process.cwd() which
// resolves to /private/var/....
let storageRoot;
let adminId;
let customerId;
let token;
let quoteApp;
let invoiceApp;
let contractApp;
let quoteService;
let invoiceService;
let contractService;
const prevCwd = process.cwd();
const auth = { get Authorization() { return `Bearer ${token}`; } };
async function enableFlag(key) {
const updated = await db('feature_flags').where({ key }).update({ value: true });
if (!updated) await db('feature_flags').insert({ key, value: true });
}
// ----- per-path seed helpers -----------------------------------------
async function seedQuote() {
const id = await quoteService.createQuote({
customerAccountId: customerId,
currency: 'CHF',
vatRate: 0,
eventName: 'Testshooting',
lineItems: [
{ position: 1, quantity: 1, description: 'Photo package', unit_price_minor: 150000, discount_percent: 0 },
],
}, adminId);
return id;
}
async function seedIssuedInvoice(status = 'sent') {
const { invoiceIds } = await invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: customerId,
currency: 'CHF',
vatRate: 7.7,
lineItems: [
{ position: 1, quantity: 1, description: 'Wedding coverage', unit_price_minor: 200000, discount_percent: 0 },
],
}, adminId);
const id = invoiceIds[0];
// Fast-forward past the send step — Storno only applies to issued
// documents (sent/paid/overdue), and rendering+sending the original
// is covered by the quote path already.
await db('invoices').where({ id }).update({
status, sent_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
});
return db('invoices').where({ id }).first();
}
async function seedCustomerSignedContract() {
const id = await contractService.createContract({
customerAccountId: customerId,
title: 'Fotografie-Vertrag',
}, adminId);
// Real send + customer-sign flow (codex review of #850): a direct
// status UPDATE skipped the customer's signature asset and stamped
// PDF, so countersign exercised its unsigned-PDF fallback and a
// regression dropping the customer's signature would stay green.
const { token } = await contractService.sendContract(id, adminId);
await contractService.recordCustomerSignature({
token,
name: 'Custo Mer',
ip: '127.0.0.1',
signatureDataUrl: SIGNATURE_DATA_URL,
accepted: true,
});
return db('contracts').where({ id }).first();
}
// ----- suite ----------------------------------------------------------
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
// Business-doc PDFs (quotes/invoices/contracts) persist under
// `process.cwd()/storage/business-docs/...` — chdir into the temp dir
// so every test artifact lands isolated and gets cleaned up.
process.chdir(tmpDir);
storageRoot = path.join(fs.realpathSync(tmpDir), 'storage', 'business-docs');
// Fail-fast on the pre-existing logActivity-inside-transaction
// deadlock: createContract and createStorno call logActivity() from
// inside a knex transaction WITHOUT passing the trx as executor, so
// the audit insert tries to grab a second connection from the
// single-connection SQLite pool while the trx holds it. In
// production that stalls each call for the full 60 s acquire
// timeout (the error is then swallowed by logActivity's catch);
// here we shrink the timeout so the same swallowed failure costs
// 2 s instead of blowing the per-test budget. Behaviour under test
// is unchanged — the mint paths themselves never wait on this.
db.client.pool.acquireTimeoutMillis = 2000;
// node-sqlite3 detects Date bind params via `InstanceOf(global.Date)`
// against the NATIVE realm's Date — under jest's vm sandbox the
// service code's `new Date()` is a different constructor, the check
// fails, and the value stringifies to the literal "[object Object]"
// (the exact pathology helpers/crmDb.js documents for
// createPublicToken). Normalize Date bindings to ISO strings before
// they reach the driver so the real service inserts round-trip the
// same way they do outside jest.
// Patch on the prototype — knex mints transaction clients via
// Object.create(prototype), so an instance-level patch would miss
// every query issued inside a db.transaction().
const clientProto = Object.getPrototypeOf(db.client);
const origQuery = clientProto._query;
clientProto._query = function patchedQuery(connection, obj) {
if (obj && Array.isArray(obj.bindings)) {
obj.bindings = obj.bindings.map(
(b) => (b && typeof b === 'object' && typeof b.toISOString === 'function' ? b.toISOString() : b),
);
}
return origQuery.call(this, connection, obj);
};
({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
// CRM surfaces are feature-flagged; migration 107 seeds them OFF.
await enableFlag('quotes');
await enableFlag('bills');
await enableFlag('contracts');
quoteService = require('../../src/services/quoteService');
invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
contractService = require('../../src/services/contractService');
quoteApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/quotes', require('../../src/routes/adminQuotes'));
invoiceApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/invoices', require('../../src/routes/adminInvoices'));
contractApp = buildRouteApp('/api/admin/contracts', require('../../src/routes/adminContracts'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
process.chdir(prevCwd);
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('POST /api/admin/quotes/:id/send', () => {
test('draft quote: 200 → sent + sent_at + PDF on disk + action token + quote_sent email', async () => {
const quoteId = await seedQuote();
await db('email_queue').del();
const res = await request(quoteApp)
.post(`/api/admin/quotes/${quoteId}/send`)
.set(auth);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.sent).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.token).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
// DB state
const quote = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first();
expect(quote.status).toBe('sent');
expect(quote.sent_at).toBeTruthy();
// PDF persisted inside the isolated storage root
expect(quote.pdf_path).toBeTruthy();
expect(quote.pdf_path.startsWith(path.join(storageRoot, 'quote'))).toBe(true);
expect(fs.existsSync(quote.pdf_path)).toBe(true);
expect(fs.statSync(quote.pdf_path).size).toBeGreaterThan(0);
// Action token row: right quote, future expiry
const tokenRow = await db('quote_action_tokens').where({ token: res.body.token }).first();
expect(tokenRow).toBeTruthy();
expect(tokenRow.quote_id).toBe(quoteId);
expect(toMillis(tokenRow.expires_at)).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
// Email queued to the customer's primary address
const emails = await db('email_queue').where({ email_type: 'quote_sent' });
expect(emails).toHaveLength(1);
expect(emails[0].recipient_email).toBe(CUSTOMER_EMAIL);
const emailData = JSON.parse(emails[0].email_data);
expect(emailData.quote_number).toBe(quote.quote_number);
});
test('already-sent quote: 409 (spec said 400; service throws 409)', async () => {
const quoteId = await seedQuote();
await request(quoteApp).post(`/api/admin/quotes/${quoteId}/send`).set(auth).expect(200);
const res = await request(quoteApp)
.post(`/api/admin/quotes/${quoteId}/send`)
.set(auth);
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/cannot send a quote with status 'sent'/i);
});
});
describe('POST /api/admin/invoices/:id/cancel (Storno mint)', () => {
test('sent invoice: original cancelled, Storno row minted with negated totals + lineage', async () => {
const original = await seedIssuedInvoice('sent');
await db('email_queue').del();
const res = await request(invoiceApp)
.post(`/api/admin/invoices/${original.id}/cancel`)
.set(auth);
// Route responds via successResponse default — 200, not the 201
// the issue spec assumed.
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.cancelled).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.stornoId).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const storno = await db('invoices').where({ id: res.body.stornoId }).first();
expect(storno.kind).toBe('storno');
expect(storno.cancels_invoice_id).toBe(original.id);
expect(storno.deal_uuid).toBe(original.deal_uuid);
// Negated amounts
expect(storno.net_amount_minor).toBe(-original.net_amount_minor);
expect(storno.vat_amount_minor).toBe(-original.vat_amount_minor);
expect(storno.total_amount_minor).toBe(-original.total_amount_minor);
// Freshly sequenced number from the same series
expect(typeof storno.invoice_number).toBe('string');
expect(storno.invoice_number.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(storno.invoice_number).not.toBe(original.invoice_number);
// Line items snapshotted onto the Storno
const originalItems = await db('invoice_line_items').where({ invoice_id: original.id });
const stornoItems = await db('invoice_line_items').where({ invoice_id: storno.id });
expect(stornoItems).toHaveLength(originalItems.length);
// Original flipped + back-linked
const refreshed = await db('invoices').where({ id: original.id }).first();
expect(refreshed.status).toBe('cancelled');
expect(refreshed.cancellation_storno_id).toBe(storno.id);
// sendStorno side effects (codex review of #850): cancelInvoice
// swallows a sendStorno failure by design, so without these
// assertions a broken render/persist/queue leg would stay green.
const sentStorno = await db('invoices').where({ id: storno.id }).first();
expect(sentStorno.status).toBe('sent');
expect(sentStorno.pdf_path).toBeTruthy();
expect(fs.existsSync(sentStorno.pdf_path)).toBe(true);
const stornoEmails = await db('email_queue').where({ email_type: 'storno_issued' });
expect(stornoEmails.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
expect(stornoEmails[0].recipient_email).toBe(CUSTOMER_EMAIL);
});
test('paid invoice can be cancelled via Storno too (refund document leg)', async () => {
const original = await seedIssuedInvoice('paid');
const res = await request(invoiceApp)
.post(`/api/admin/invoices/${original.id}/cancel`)
.set(auth);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.stornoId).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const refreshed = await db('invoices').where({ id: original.id }).first();
expect(refreshed.status).toBe('cancelled');
});
test('already-cancelled invoice: 409 ALREADY_CANCELLED', async () => {
const original = await seedIssuedInvoice('sent');
await request(invoiceApp).post(`/api/admin/invoices/${original.id}/cancel`).set(auth).expect(200);
const res = await request(invoiceApp)
.post(`/api/admin/invoices/${original.id}/cancel`)
.set(auth);
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('ALREADY_CANCELLED');
});
});
describe('POST /api/admin/contracts/:id/countersign', () => {
test('customer-signed contract: 200 → fully_signed + stamped PDF + sha256 + signature asset + email with attachment', async () => {
const contract = await seedCustomerSignedContract();
await db('email_queue').del();
const res = await request(contractApp)
.post(`/api/admin/contracts/${contract.id}/countersign`)
.set(auth)
.send({ name: 'Admin Tester', signatureDataUrl: SIGNATURE_DATA_URL });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.status).toBe('fully_signed');
const row = await db('contracts').where({ id: contract.id }).first();
expect(row.status).toBe('fully_signed');
expect(row.signed_admin_name).toBe('Admin Tester');
expect(row.signed_by_admin_at).toBeTruthy();
// The customer's own signature (from the real sign flow in the seed)
// must survive countersigning — layered, not replaced.
expect(row.signed_customer_signature_path).toBeTruthy();
expect(fs.existsSync(row.signed_customer_signature_path)).toBe(true);
expect(row.signed_customer_name).toBe('Custo Mer');
// Admin signature image persisted under the storage root
expect(row.signed_admin_signature_path).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.signed_admin_signature_path.startsWith(
path.join(storageRoot, 'contract', 'signatures'),
)).toBe(true);
expect(fs.existsSync(row.signed_admin_signature_path)).toBe(true);
// Stamped, fully-signed PDF written and hashed. The issue spec
// called this `integrity_hash`; the real column is
// `signed_pdf_sha256` (plus `pdf_sha256` for the unsigned base).
expect(row.signed_pdf_render_failed_at).toBeFalsy();
expect(row.signed_pdf_path).toBeTruthy();
expect(fs.existsSync(row.signed_pdf_path)).toBe(true);
expect(row.signed_pdf_sha256).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
expect(sha256(fs.readFileSync(row.signed_pdf_path))).toBe(row.signed_pdf_sha256);
// BOTH stamps must be embedded in the final document — a regression
// stamping the admin onto the unsigned base PDF would keep every
// path/hash assertion above green (codex review of #850 round 2).
const imagesPerPage = await countImagesPerPage(row.signed_pdf_path);
const maxImagesOnAPage = Math.max(...imagesPerPage);
expect(maxImagesOnAPage).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
// contract_fully_signed email to the customer's primary address,
// carrying the signed PDF as attachment (plus the audit cert).
const emails = await db('email_queue').where({ email_type: 'contract_fully_signed' });
const customerCopy = emails.find((e) => e.recipient_email === CUSTOMER_EMAIL);
expect(customerCopy).toBeTruthy();
const emailData = JSON.parse(customerCopy.email_data);
expect(emailData.contract_number).toBe(contract.contract_number);
expect(Array.isArray(emailData.attachments)).toBe(true);
const pdfAttachment = emailData.attachments.find(
(a) => a.filename === `${contract.contract_number}-signed.pdf`,
);
expect(pdfAttachment).toBeTruthy();
expect(pdfAttachment.contentType).toBe('application/pdf');
expect(fs.existsSync(pdfAttachment.contentPath)).toBe(true);
});
test('draft contract: 409 — countersign requires sent/signed_by_customer', async () => {
const draftId = await contractService.createContract({
customerAccountId: customerId,
title: 'Noch nicht versendet',
}, adminId);
const res = await request(contractApp)
.post(`/api/admin/contracts/${draftId}/countersign`)
.set(auth)
.send({ name: 'Admin Tester' });
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/cannot counter-sign a contract with status 'draft'/i);
});
});
@@ -1,256 +0,0 @@
/**
* Download resolutions (#858).
*
* Pins the contracts that are easy to break later:
*
* - the global → per-event cascade, including NULL = inherit
* - the picker never offers a size ABOVE the standard (a photographer who
* lowers the standard is not silently handing out full-res), and 'Original'
* only reappears when the admin explicitly allows it
* - `fit: 'inside'` + no-upscaling resize semantics, which is exactly what
* the requester asked for on the issue
* - a guest-supplied resolution is validated against the policy rather than
* trusted
*/
const sharp = require('sharp');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
// Both modules under test pull in src/database/db.js transitively. bootCrmDb
// only works when it runs BEFORE the first require of db.js (it sets
// TEST_DATABASE_PATH, which knexfile reads at module-init time), so these are
// required lazily in beforeAll rather than at module scope — otherwise knex
// binds to the shared default SQLite file and every run after the first one
// fails with "table `migrations` already exists".
let resolveEventDownloadPolicy;
let pickRequestedResolution;
let parseResolution;
let invalidateDownloadGlobals;
let resizeToBox;
describe('Download resolutions (#858)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
const setGlobal = async (key, value) => {
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).del();
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: key,
setting_value: JSON.stringify(value),
setting_type: 'download',
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
invalidateDownloadGlobals();
};
const PRESETS = [
{ label: 'Large', width: 3000, height: 2000 },
{ label: 'Medium', width: 1500, height: 1000 },
{ label: 'Small', width: 800, height: 600 },
];
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
({
resolveEventDownloadPolicy,
pickRequestedResolution,
parseResolution,
invalidateDownloadGlobals,
} = require('../../src/utils/downloadResolutions'));
({ resizeToBox } = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await setGlobal('download_resolutions', PRESETS);
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', 'original');
await setGlobal('download_resolution_picker_enabled', false);
await setGlobal('download_allow_original', false);
});
describe('cascade', () => {
it('inherits the global standard when the event has no override', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({ download_standard_resolution: null });
expect(policy.standard).toBe('1500x1000');
expect(policy.standardBox).toEqual({ width: 1500, height: 1000 });
});
it('lets an event override the global standard', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({ download_standard_resolution: '800x600' });
expect(policy.standard).toBe('800x600');
});
it('treats a NULL picker flag as inherit and an explicit false as override', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_resolution_picker_enabled', true);
expect((await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({ download_resolution_picker_enabled: null })).pickerEnabled).toBe(true);
expect((await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({ download_resolution_picker_enabled: false })).pickerEnabled).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('choice list', () => {
it('never offers a size larger than the standard', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const { choices } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(choices.map((c) => c.id)).toEqual(['1500x1000', '800x600']);
// The regression that matters: 3000x2000 must not be reachable.
expect(choices.some((c) => c.id === '3000x2000')).toBe(false);
});
it('bounds EACH dimension, not the pixel area (codex review round 2)', async () => {
// 2000x700 is 1.4MP — under 1500x1000's 1.5MP — so an area comparison
// would offer it and hand back a 2000px-wide file despite a 1500px cap.
await setGlobal('download_resolutions', [
...PRESETS,
{ label: 'Wide', width: 2000, height: 700 },
]);
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const { choices } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(choices.some((c) => c.id === '2000x700')).toBe(false);
});
it('omits Original when the standard is capped and the admin has not allowed it', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const { choices } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(choices.some((c) => c.id === 'original')).toBe(false);
});
it('re-adds Original when the admin explicitly allows it', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
await setGlobal('download_allow_original', true);
const { choices } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(choices[0].id).toBe('original');
});
it('offers Original when the standard already is original', async () => {
const { choices } = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(choices[0].id).toBe('original');
expect(choices.map((c) => c.id)).toContain('3000x2000');
});
});
describe('request validation', () => {
it('falls back to the standard when nothing is requested', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(pickRequestedResolution(policy, undefined)).toBe('1500x1000');
});
it('refuses any explicit request while the picker is off', async () => {
const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
expect(policy.pickerEnabled).toBe(false);
expect(pickRequestedResolution(policy, '800x600')).toBeNull();
});
it('refuses a size that is not on the offered list', async () => {
await setGlobal('download_resolution_picker_enabled', true);
await setGlobal('download_standard_resolution', '1500x1000');
const policy = await resolveEventDownloadPolicy({});
// Above the standard → not offered → rejected rather than silently served.
expect(pickRequestedResolution(policy, '3000x2000')).toBeNull();
expect(pickRequestedResolution(policy, '9999x9999')).toBeNull();
expect(pickRequestedResolution(policy, '800x600')).toBe('800x600');
});
it('parses only well-formed resolution ids', () => {
expect(parseResolution('original')).toBeNull();
expect(parseResolution(null)).toBeNull();
expect(parseResolution('abc')).toBeNull();
expect(parseResolution('0x0')).toBeNull();
expect(parseResolution('1500x1000')).toEqual({ width: 1500, height: 1000 });
});
});
describe('job dedup identity (codex review round 1)', () => {
// The leak this pins: a PIN client's archive contains hidden photos. If the
// dedup key ignored the visibility scope, a guest asking for the same size
// would be handed the client's job token — and the delivery route only
// checked the event id.
let jobService;
beforeAll(() => {
jobService = require('../../src/services/downloadJobService');
});
it('separates client and guest archives of the same size and photo set', () => {
const guest = jobService.dedupKey(1, '1500x1000', [1, 2, 3], false, 'public');
const client = jobService.dedupKey(1, '1500x1000', [1, 2, 3], false, 'hidden');
expect(guest).not.toBe(client);
});
it('keys on the RESOLVED photo set, so a stale archive is not reused', () => {
const before = jobService.dedupKey(1, '1500x1000', [1, 2, 3], false, 'public');
const afterUpload = jobService.dedupKey(1, '1500x1000', [1, 2, 3, 4], false, 'public');
const afterHide = jobService.dedupKey(1, '1500x1000', [1, 2], false, 'public');
expect(new Set([before, afterUpload, afterHide]).size).toBe(3);
});
it('is order-independent for the same set', () => {
expect(jobService.dedupKey(1, 'original', [3, 1, 2], true, 'public'))
.toBe(jobService.dedupKey(1, 'original', [1, 2, 3], true, 'public'));
});
it('maps access levels onto the two visibility scopes', () => {
expect(jobService.visibilityScopeFor('client')).toBe('hidden');
expect(jobService.visibilityScopeFor('guest')).toBe('public');
expect(jobService.visibilityScopeFor(undefined)).toBe('public');
});
});
describe('resize semantics', () => {
const make = (w, h) => sharp({
create: { width: w, height: h, channels: 3, background: { r: 10, g: 100, b: 200 } },
}).jpeg().toBuffer();
const box = { width: 1500, height: 1000 };
it('fits a 3:2 photo exactly into a 3:2 box', async () => {
const out = await sharp(await resizeToBox(await make(6000, 4000), box)).metadata();
expect([out.width, out.height]).toEqual([1500, 1000]);
});
it('treats the box as an "up to" bound for other aspect ratios', async () => {
// Portrait: height is the binding edge, width comes out smaller.
const portrait = await sharp(await resizeToBox(await make(4000, 6000), box)).metadata();
expect(portrait.height).toBe(1000);
expect(portrait.width).toBeLessThan(1500);
const fourThree = await sharp(await resizeToBox(await make(4000, 3000), box)).metadata();
expect(fourThree.height).toBe(1000);
expect(fourThree.width).toBeLessThan(1500);
});
it('never upscales an image already smaller than the box', async () => {
const out = await sharp(await resizeToBox(await make(800, 600), box)).metadata();
expect([out.width, out.height]).toEqual([800, 600]);
});
it('passes the buffer through untouched for the original size', async () => {
const src = await make(4000, 3000);
expect(await resizeToBox(src, null)).toBe(src);
});
it('keeps the source format so the filename and mime type stay honest', async () => {
// A .gif re-encoded as JPEG would ship mislabelled bytes, since the
// download routes keep the original filename and mime type.
const gif = await sharp({
create: { width: 4000, height: 3000, channels: 3, background: { r: 1, g: 2, b: 3 } },
}).gif().toBuffer();
const out = await sharp(await resizeToBox(gif, box)).metadata();
expect(out.format).toBe('gif');
expect(out.width).toBe(1333);
});
it('returns the input rather than throwing on an undecodable source', async () => {
const junk = Buffer.from('not an image');
expect(await resizeToBox(junk, box)).toBe(junk);
});
});
});
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
/**
* Catalog-driven event-type defaults (#800 follow-up).
*
* The contract→event conversion used to hardcode `event_type: 'wedding'` and
* the v1 API validated against a fixed whitelist. Both now follow the live
* event_types catalog; these tests pin the shared resolver.
*/
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
describe('resolveDefaultEventType follows the catalog', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let eventTypeService;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// Require AFTER bootCrmDb so the service shares this db instance
// (see crmDb.js — a second knex pool on one SQLite file deadlocks).
eventTypeService = require('../../src/services/eventTypeService');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
it("prefers the 'other' catch-all while it is active", async () => {
expect(await eventTypeService.resolveDefaultEventType()).toBe('other');
});
it('falls over to the first active type when other is deactivated', async () => {
const other = await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: 'other' }).first();
await db('event_types').where({ id: other.id }).update({ is_active: 0 });
const resolved = await eventTypeService.resolveDefaultEventType();
expect(resolved).not.toBe('other');
expect(await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: resolved }).first()).toBeTruthy();
await db('event_types').where({ id: other.id }).update({ is_active: 1 });
});
it("returns the literal 'other' only for an empty catalog", async () => {
const rows = await db('event_types').select('*');
await db('event_types').del();
expect(await eventTypeService.resolveDefaultEventType()).toBe('other');
await db('event_types').insert(rows);
});
});
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
/**
* Setup-window event type deletion (#800).
*
* The first-run setup wizard may delete the seeded SYSTEM event types —
* but ONLY while the `setup_wizard_completed` flag is unset (migration 161
* seeds it false on a fresh install, true when an admin already exists).
* These tests pin the whole contract:
*
* - fresh install → flag false → system types deletable (in-use checks
* still apply), and the per-type reminder template goes with the type
* - reminder-template self-heal does NOT resurrect templates for slugs
* that no longer exist in the catalog
* - after markSetupWizardCompleted() → system deletion is refused again
*/
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
describe('event type deletion during the setup window (#800)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let eventTypeService;
let setupService;
let ensureEventReminderTemplatesSeeded;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// Require AFTER bootCrmDb so every service shares this db instance
// (see crmDb.js — a second knex pool on one SQLite file deadlocks).
eventTypeService = require('../../src/services/eventTypeService');
setupService = require('../../src/services/setupService');
({ ensureEventReminderTemplatesSeeded } = require('../../src/services/eventReminderTemplates'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
it('migration 161 seeds the flag false on a fresh (admin-less) install', async () => {
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_wizard_completed' }).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe(false);
expect(await setupService.isSetupWizardCompleted()).toBe(false);
});
it('refuses to delete a system type that events already use, even in the window', async () => {
const corporate = await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: 'corporate' }).first();
await db('events').insert({
slug: 'corporate-test-2026-01-01',
event_name: 'Test',
event_type: 'corporate',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: 'share-corporate-test',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000),
});
await expect(eventTypeService.deleteEventType(corporate.id))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'IN_USE' });
});
it('deletes an unused system type in the window, taking its reminder template along', async () => {
// Seed the per-type reminder templates first so there is something to clean up.
await ensureEventReminderTemplatesSeeded(db);
expect(await db('email_templates').where({ template_key: 'event_reminder_wedding' }).first()).toBeTruthy();
const wedding = await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: 'wedding' }).first();
expect(wedding.is_system).toBeTruthy();
const result = await eventTypeService.deleteEventType(wedding.id);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: 'wedding' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
expect(await db('email_templates').where({ template_key: 'event_reminder_wedding' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
// The deleted slug must NOT stay creatable through the legacy fallback —
// the live catalog is authoritative while it has rows.
expect(await eventTypeService.isValidEventType('wedding')).toBe(false);
expect(await eventTypeService.isValidEventType('birthday')).toBe(true);
});
it('does not resurrect reminder templates for deleted types on the next self-heal pass', async () => {
// The seeder caches success per process — reset the module to force a
// genuine second pass, exactly what a backend restart would run.
jest.resetModules();
const fresh = require('../../src/services/eventReminderTemplates');
await fresh.ensureEventReminderTemplatesSeeded(db);
expect(await db('email_templates').where({ template_key: 'event_reminder_wedding' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
// Types still in the catalog keep their templates.
expect(await db('email_templates').where({ template_key: 'event_reminder_birthday' }).first()).toBeTruthy();
expect(await db('email_templates').where({ template_key: 'event_reminder_default' }).first()).toBeTruthy();
});
it('re-locks system types once the wizard is marked complete', async () => {
await setupService.markSetupWizardCompleted();
expect(await setupService.isSetupWizardCompleted()).toBe(true);
const birthday = await db('event_types').where({ slug_prefix: 'birthday' }).first();
await expect(eventTypeService.deleteEventType(birthday.id))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'SYSTEM_TYPE' });
// Custom (non-system) types remain deletable as before.
const custom = await eventTypeService.createEventType({ name: 'Family', slug_prefix: 'family' });
const result = await eventTypeService.deleteEventType(custom.id);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
});
it('fails closed when the completion marker row is missing', async () => {
// A portable-backup restore can replace app_settings with a set that
// predates migration 161 (which will not rerun) — absence must mean
// "configured instance", never an open deletion window.
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_wizard_completed' }).del();
expect(await setupService.isSetupWizardCompleted()).toBe(true);
await setupService.markSetupWizardCompleted();
});
it('refuses to delete the last remaining event type', async () => {
// Reduce the catalog to a single custom type via direct db writes (the
// service paths are already covered above), then hit the guard.
const solo = await eventTypeService.createEventType({ name: 'Solo', slug_prefix: 'solo' });
await db('events').del();
await db('event_types').whereNot('id', solo.id).del();
await expect(eventTypeService.deleteEventType(solo.id))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'LAST_TYPE' });
// Deactivating it would empty the ACTIVE catalog just the same.
await expect(eventTypeService.updateEventType(solo.id, { is_active: false }))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'LAST_ACTIVE' });
});
});
@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
/**
* Auto-category rule engine (#1074 phase 3).
*
* The rules themselves are simple enough to read. What needs testing is the
* promise around them: this engine may only ever fill an EMPTY category, and
* everything it touches must be reversible. A photographer's own assignment
* is a decision; this is a heuristic, and the heuristic never wins.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-autocat-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'autocat-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db; let cleanup; let engine;
async function seedEvent(slug) {
const [row] = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: slug,
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
face_recognition_enabled: true,
}).returning('id');
return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
}
/** A scanned photo with `faceCount` faces, each `faceSide` px square. */
async function addScannedPhoto(eventId, faceCount, { faceSide = 400, categoryId = null } = {}) {
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: `${Math.random()}.jpg`,
path: '/tmp/x.jpg',
type: 'individual',
width: 1000,
height: 1000,
processing_status: 'complete',
face_status: 'done',
face_count: faceCount,
category_id: categoryId,
}).returning('id');
const photoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
for (let i = 0; i < faceCount; i++) {
await db('photo_faces').insert({
photo_id: photoId,
event_id: eventId,
bbox_x: 10, bbox_y: 10, bbox_w: faceSide, bbox_h: faceSide,
det_score: 0.95,
model_version: 'test-v1',
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
}
return photoId;
}
async function enable(on) {
const existing = await db('app_settings')
.where('setting_key', 'face_auto_categorize_enabled').first();
if (existing) {
await db('app_settings')
.where('setting_key', 'face_auto_categorize_enabled')
.update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(on) });
}
}
async function categoryOf(photoId) {
const photo = await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first();
if (!photo.category_id) return null;
const cat = await db('photo_categories').where({ id: photo.category_id }).first();
return cat?.slug ?? null;
}
describe('faceAutoCategories (#1074 phase 3)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
engine = require('../../src/services/faceAutoCategories');
await enable(true);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
describe('rules', () => {
it('sorts by face count, and by face size for portraits', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('rules');
// 400px face in a 1000x1000 frame = 16% of the frame, over the 8% floor.
const portrait = await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 1, { faceSide: 400 });
const details = await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 0);
const small = await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 3);
const group = await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 9);
await engine.categorizeEvent(eventId);
expect(await categoryOf(details)).toBe('details');
expect(await categoryOf(portrait)).toBe('portraits');
expect(await categoryOf(small)).toBe('small-groups');
expect(await categoryOf(group)).toBe('groups');
});
it('does not call a distant single face a portrait', async () => {
// One person in a wide landscape is not a portrait of them. 60px in a
// 1000x1000 frame is 0.36% — far below the 8% floor.
const eventId = await seedEvent('small-face');
const distant = await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 1, { faceSide: 60 });
await engine.categorizeEvent(eventId);
expect(await categoryOf(distant)).toBeNull();
});
it('ignores photos that have not been scanned', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('unscanned');
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId, filename: 'u.jpg', path: '/tmp/u.jpg', type: 'individual',
processing_status: 'complete', face_status: 'pending',
}).returning('id');
const photoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
await engine.categorizeEvent(eventId);
expect(await categoryOf(photoId)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('the promise', () => {
it('NEVER overwrites a category a person chose', async () => {
// The single most important behaviour in this file.
const eventId = await seedEvent('no-overwrite');
const [c] = await db('photo_categories').insert({
name: 'Ceremony', slug: 'ceremony', is_global: false, event_id: eventId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const ceremonyId = typeof c === 'object' ? c.id : c;
// 9 faces — the rules would call this "groups" if they were allowed to.
const claimed = await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 9, { categoryId: ceremonyId });
await engine.categorizeEvent(eventId);
expect(await categoryOf(claimed)).toBe('ceremony');
const row = await db('photos').where({ id: claimed }).first();
expect(row.auto_categorized).toBeFalsy();
});
it('marks only what it assigned, so undo is exact', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('undo');
const [c] = await db('photo_categories').insert({
name: 'Ceremony', slug: 'ceremony-2', is_global: false, event_id: eventId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const ceremonyId = typeof c === 'object' ? c.id : c;
const manual = await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 4, { categoryId: ceremonyId });
const auto = await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 4);
await engine.categorizeEvent(eventId);
expect(await categoryOf(auto)).toBe('small-groups');
const result = await engine.undoEvent(eventId);
expect(result.cleared).toBe(1);
// The automatic one is cleared...
expect(await categoryOf(auto)).toBeNull();
// ...and the photographer's own choice survives untouched.
expect(await categoryOf(manual)).toBe('ceremony-2');
});
it('is a no-op while the setting is off', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('disabled');
const photoId = await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 0);
await enable(false);
const result = await engine.categorizeEvent(eventId);
await enable(true);
expect(result.skipped).toBe(true);
expect(await categoryOf(photoId)).toBeNull();
});
it('is idempotent — a second run assigns nothing new', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('idempotent');
await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 0);
await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 7);
const first = await engine.categorizeEvent(eventId);
const second = await engine.categorizeEvent(eventId);
expect(first.assigned).toBe(2);
expect(second.assigned).toBe(0);
});
it('reuses one category per slug rather than creating duplicates', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('reuse');
await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 0);
await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 0);
await addScannedPhoto(eventId, 0);
await engine.categorizeEvent(eventId);
const details = await db('photo_categories')
.where({ slug: 'details' })
.where(function () { this.where('event_id', eventId).orWhere('is_global', true); });
expect(details).toHaveLength(1);
});
});
});
@@ -1,325 +0,0 @@
/**
* Clustering engine (#1074).
*
* Uses synthetic embeddings with known identities rather than real faces: the
* question here is whether the ALGORITHM groups vectors correctly, which is
* separable from whether the model produces good vectors. Model quality is
* the spike's job.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-faceclust-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'faceclust-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db; let cleanup; let clustering;
/** Deterministic unit vector for identity `id`, jittered by `variant`. */
function makeEmbedding(id, variant = 0, dim = 64) {
const vec = new Float32Array(dim);
for (let i = 0; i < dim; i++) {
vec[i] = Math.sin((i + 1) * (id + 1) * 0.7) + variant * 0.02 * Math.cos(i * 3.1);
}
let norm = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < dim; i++) norm += vec[i] * vec[i];
norm = Math.sqrt(norm);
for (let i = 0; i < dim; i++) vec[i] /= norm;
return vec;
}
async function seedEvent(slug) {
const [row] = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: slug,
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
}
async function insertFace(eventId, embedding, overrides = {}) {
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: `${Math.random()}.jpg`,
path: '/tmp/x.jpg',
type: 'individual',
}).returning('id');
const photoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
const row = {
photo_id: photoId,
event_id: eventId,
bbox_x: 0, bbox_y: 0, bbox_w: 200, bbox_h: 200,
det_score: 0.99,
embedding: clustering.packEmbedding(embedding),
model_version: 'test-v1',
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...overrides,
};
const [f] = await db('photo_faces').insert(row).returning('id');
return { ...row, id: typeof f === 'object' ? f.id : f };
}
describe('faceClustering (#1074)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
clustering = require('../../src/services/faceClustering');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
describe('embedding round-trip', () => {
it('survives pack/unpack through the BLOB column exactly', async () => {
const original = makeEmbedding(1);
const eventId = await seedEvent('roundtrip');
const face = await insertFace(eventId, original);
const stored = await db('photo_faces').where({ id: face.id }).first();
const restored = clustering.unpackEmbedding(stored.embedding);
expect(restored).toHaveLength(original.length);
for (let i = 0; i < original.length; i++) {
expect(restored[i]).toBeCloseTo(original[i], 6);
}
});
it('returns null for a corrupt blob rather than throwing', () => {
expect(clustering.unpackEmbedding(Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]))).toBeNull();
expect(clustering.unpackEmbedding(null)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('assignment', () => {
it('groups the same identity and separates different ones', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('grouping');
const faces = [];
// Three identities, four shots each, interleaved so assignment order
// is not conveniently grouped.
for (let variant = 0; variant < 4; variant++) {
for (const identity of [1, 2, 3]) {
faces.push(await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(identity, variant)));
}
}
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, faces);
const people = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId });
expect(people).toHaveLength(3);
// Every face of one identity must share a person id.
const rows = await db('photo_faces').where({ event_id: eventId }).select('id', 'person_id');
const byPerson = new Map();
for (const r of rows) {
byPerson.set(r.person_id, (byPerson.get(r.person_id) || 0) + 1);
}
expect([...byPerson.values()].sort()).toEqual([4, 4, 4]);
});
it('leaves low-quality faces unassigned instead of spawning junk people', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('quality-floor');
const good = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(5));
// Tiny bbox — below the 40px floor.
const tiny = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(6), { bbox_w: 12, bbox_h: 12 });
// Weak detection score.
const weak = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(7), { det_score: 0.2 });
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [good, tiny, weak]);
const rows = await db('photo_faces')
.whereIn('id', [good.id, tiny.id, weak.id])
.select('id', 'person_id');
const map = Object.fromEntries(rows.map((r) => [r.id, r.person_id]));
expect(map[good.id]).not.toBeNull();
// Still stored — they show in "this photo contains" — just unassigned.
expect(map[tiny.id]).toBeNull();
expect(map[weak.id]).toBeNull();
expect(await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId })).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('never mixes embedding spaces from different model versions', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('model-version');
const a = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(9), { model_version: 'v1' });
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [a]);
// Same vector, different model. Comparable numerically, meaningless
// semantically — it must NOT join the v1 cluster.
const b = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(9), { model_version: 'v2' });
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [b]);
const people = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId });
expect(people).toHaveLength(2);
});
});
describe('merge and split', () => {
it('merge moves every face and removes the source person', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('merge');
const f1 = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(11));
const f2 = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(21));
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [f1, f2]);
const people = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).orderBy('id');
expect(people).toHaveLength(2);
await clustering.mergePeople(eventId, [people[1].id], people[0].id);
expect(await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId })).toHaveLength(1);
const remaining = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
expect(remaining.face_count_total).toBe(2);
const orphaned = await db('photo_faces')
.where({ event_id: eventId }).whereNull('person_id');
expect(orphaned).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('split pulls the named faces into a new person', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('split');
const faces = [];
for (let v = 0; v < 4; v++) faces.push(await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(13, v)));
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, faces);
const person = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
expect(person.face_count_total).toBe(4);
const newId = await clustering.splitPerson(eventId, person.id, [faces[0].id, faces[1].id]);
expect(newId).toBeTruthy();
const original = await db('event_people').where({ id: person.id }).first();
const created = await db('event_people').where({ id: newId }).first();
expect(original.face_count_total).toBe(2);
expect(created.face_count_total).toBe(2);
});
it('deletes a person left with no faces rather than keeping a ghost', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('empty-person');
const f = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(15));
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [f]);
const person = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
await db('photo_faces').where({ id: f.id }).update({ person_id: null });
await clustering.recomputeCentroid(person.id);
expect(await db('event_people').where({ id: person.id }).first()).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('regressions from external review', () => {
it('merge carries a name and suppression onto the survivor', async () => {
// A merge used to move the faces and delete the source outright, so a
// photographer-entered name vanished and a person they had hidden came
// back guest-visible.
const eventId = await seedEvent('merge-metadata');
const a = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(61));
const b = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(62));
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [a, b]);
const [p1, p2] = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).orderBy('id');
// Target is unnamed and visible; the SOURCE carries the human state.
await db('event_people').where({ id: p2.id }).update({ label: 'Anna', is_hidden: true });
await clustering.mergePeople(eventId, [p2.id], p1.id);
const survivor = await db('event_people').where({ id: p1.id }).first();
expect(survivor.label).toBe('Anna');
expect(!!survivor.is_hidden).toBe(true);
});
it('recluster keeps hidden/ignored on people that were never named', async () => {
// The old query remembered only rows with a label, so a suppressed
// bystander came back visible after one "Re-group people".
const eventId = await seedEvent('recluster-suppression');
const faces = [];
for (let v = 0; v < 3; v++) faces.push(await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(71, v)));
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, faces);
const person = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
expect(person.label).toBeNull();
await db('event_people').where({ id: person.id }).update({ is_ignored: true });
await clustering.recluster(eventId);
const after = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId });
expect(after.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(after.every((p) => !!p.is_ignored)).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('recluster', () => {
it('re-derives clusters and preserves photographer-assigned names', async () => {
// This is the property that makes re-clustering safe to offer as a
// button: without it, one click silently discards every typed name.
const eventId = await seedEvent('recluster');
const faces = [];
for (let v = 0; v < 3; v++) {
faces.push(await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(31, v)));
faces.push(await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(32, v)));
}
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, faces);
const people = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).orderBy('id');
expect(people).toHaveLength(2);
await db('event_people').where({ id: people[0].id }).update({ label: 'Anna' });
await db('event_people').where({ id: people[1].id }).update({ label: 'Ben' });
const count = await clustering.recluster(eventId);
expect(count).toBe(2);
const after = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId });
const labels = after.map((p) => p.label).filter(Boolean).sort();
expect(labels).toEqual(['Anna', 'Ben']);
});
it('is stable across repeated runs', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('recluster-stable');
const faces = [];
for (let v = 0; v < 3; v++) {
for (const id of [41, 42]) faces.push(await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(id, v)));
}
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, faces);
const first = await clustering.recluster(eventId);
const second = await clustering.recluster(eventId);
expect(second).toBe(first);
});
});
describe('consolidate', () => {
it('refuses to merge two people the photographer named differently', async () => {
// A human assertion this heuristic does not get to overrule.
const eventId = await seedEvent('consolidate-labels');
const a = await insertFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(51));
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [a]);
const first = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
// A near-identical centroid that would otherwise merge.
const [inserted] = await db('event_people').insert({
event_id: eventId,
centroid: clustering.packEmbedding(makeEmbedding(51, 0.01)),
face_count_total: 1,
model_version: 'test-v1',
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const secondId = typeof inserted === 'object' ? inserted.id : inserted;
await db('event_people').where({ id: first.id }).update({ label: 'Anna' });
await db('event_people').where({ id: secondId }).update({ label: 'Ben' });
await clustering.consolidate(eventId);
expect(await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId })).toHaveLength(2);
});
});
});
@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
/**
* External imports are queued for face scanning, in the right order (#1090).
*
* Managed uploads are enqueued by photoProcessor, which writes face_status
* 'pending' once a photo is processed (photoProcessor.js:573 — "the only
* correct place to enqueue"). External media never goes through photoProcessor:
* adminExternalMedia inserts rows directly, so they stayed NULL and were only
* ever picked up by a manual Re-scan.
*
* The ordering matters as much as the enqueue. events.external_path is written
* only AFTER the whole import loop, so marking rows 'pending' as they are
* inserted publishes claimable work while the event still points at the old
* directory — or none at all, on a first import. The face worker polls
* continuously, would resolve those photos against the wrong path, and mark
* them permanently 'failed', a state only an explicit Re-scan clears.
*
* This drives the real route rather than re-implementing it, so removing the
* enqueue fails the first test and moving it back onto the insert fails the
* second.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
describe('external import queues faces (#1090)', () => {
let tmpDir; let db; let app; let mediaRoot;
// Recorded from inside the per-photo thumbnail call, i.e. mid-loop.
let pendingSeenDuringLoop = 0;
let externalPathDuringLoop;
// When set to an event id, the mocked thumbnail call turns detection on
// mid-loop, standing in for an admin flipping the toggle during an import.
let flipFacesOnDuringLoop = null;
// Stands in for a concurrent Re-scan completing a row mid-import.
let markDoneDuringLoop = false;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-extenq-'));
mediaRoot = path.join(tmpDir, 'media');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(mediaRoot, 'nas', 'individual'), { recursive: true });
for (const name of ['a.jpg', 'b.jpg', 'c.jpg']) {
await fs.promises.writeFile(path.join(mediaRoot, 'nas', 'individual', name), 'not-a-real-jpeg');
}
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'data', 'db.sqlite');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), { recursive: true });
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = mediaRoot;
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'extenq-secret';
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/auth', () => ({
adminAuth: (req, _res, next) => { req.admin = { id: 1, username: 'tester', roleName: 'admin' }; next(); },
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/permissions', () => ({
requirePermission: () => (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/middleware/ownership', () => ({
requireEventOwnership: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
// Runs once per photo, inside the import loop — the only hook that can
// observe the intermediate state the ordering bug would expose.
jest.doMock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
generateThumbnail: jest.fn(async () => {
const { db: liveDb } = require('../../src/database/db');
const rows = await liveDb('photos').where({ face_status: 'pending' });
pendingSeenDuringLoop += rows.length;
const ev = await liveDb('events').first();
externalPathDuringLoop = ev ? ev.external_path : undefined;
if (markDoneDuringLoop) {
const rows = await liveDb('photos').orderBy('id', 'asc').limit(1);
if (rows.length) {
await liveDb('photos').where({ id: rows[0].id }).update({ face_status: 'done' });
}
}
if (flipFacesOnDuringLoop) {
await liveDb('events').where({ id: flipFacesOnDuringLoop })
.update({ face_recognition_enabled: true });
}
return 'thumbnails/mock.jpg';
}),
ensureThumbnail: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.doMock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(),
}));
// bootCrmDb runs every migrations/core/*.up() directly — knex's Migrator
// deadlocks on 001_init's nested initializeDatabase() call.
({ db } = await require('./helpers/crmDb').bootCrmDb());
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('../../src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
}, 180000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (db) await db.destroy?.();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
async function seedEvent({ facesEnabled, flagOn }) {
await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'faces', value: flagOn })
.onConflict('key').merge()
.catch(async () => { await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'faces' }).update({ value: flagOn }); });
// The flag read is TTL-cached (requireFeatureFlag.js:26-34); production
// invalidates after every write, and so must this.
require('../../src/middleware/requireFeatureFlag').invalidateFeatureFlagCache();
await db('photos').del();
await db('events').del();
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `extenq-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'extenq',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `extenq-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
face_recognition_enabled: facesEnabled,
source_mode: 'reference',
}).returning('id');
pendingSeenDuringLoop = 0;
externalPathDuringLoop = undefined;
markDoneDuringLoop = false;
return typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
}
async function runImport(eventId) {
return request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/external-media/events/${eventId}/import-external`)
.send({ external_path: 'nas', recursive: true });
}
it('queues imported photos when detection is on', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent({ facesEnabled: true, flagOn: true });
const res = await runImport(eventId);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const photos = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId });
expect(photos.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
// The regression: these stayed NULL and waited for a manual Re-scan.
expect(photos.every((p) => p.face_status === 'pending')).toBe(true);
});
it('does not publish claimable rows before events.external_path is written', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent({ facesEnabled: true, flagOn: true });
await runImport(eventId);
// Observed from inside the loop: nothing is claimable yet. The event path
// is already committed (see the test above), so this is no longer load
// bearing for correctness — but keeping the enqueue at the end is what lets
// the feature setting be read after the loop, so the invariant stays.
expect(pendingSeenDuringLoop).toBe(0);
// ...and afterwards both are in place.
const ev = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
expect(ev.external_path).toBe('nas');
expect((await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId, face_status: 'pending' })).length)
.toBe((await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId })).length);
});
it('honours a toggle flipped DURING the import', async () => {
// The setting is read after the loop, not before: on a large library the
// loop runs for minutes, and the toggle endpoint only queues rows that
// already existed when it fired. Reading it up front would strand every
// photo imported after that moment at NULL forever.
const eventId = await seedEvent({ facesEnabled: false, flagOn: true });
flipFacesOnDuringLoop = eventId;
await runImport(eventId);
flipFacesOnDuringLoop = null;
const photos = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId });
expect(photos.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(photos.every((p) => p.face_status === 'pending')).toBe(true);
});
it('commits events.external_path before the first row is inserted', async () => {
// enqueueEvent accepts processing_status NULL (faceProcessor.js:243-246),
// which these inserts leave unset — so a toggle or Re-scan firing mid-import
// can queue partial rows. If the event still pointed at the old directory
// they would resolve against it and burn to 'failed'. Setting the path
// first also means a half-finished import leaves rows that still resolve,
// instead of rows stranded against the previous path.
const eventId = await seedEvent({ facesEnabled: true, flagOn: true });
await runImport(eventId);
// Sampled from inside the per-photo thumbnail call, i.e. while rows are
// still being inserted.
expect(externalPathDuringLoop).toBe('nas');
});
it('does not re-queue rows a concurrent scan already handled', async () => {
// Committing the event path before the loop means a toggle or Re-scan
// firing mid-import can now genuinely queue and even finish some of these
// rows. A blanket update at the end would drag 'done' rows back to
// 'pending' for a duplicate sidecar scan and knock 'processing' rows out
// from under the worker.
const eventId = await seedEvent({ facesEnabled: true, flagOn: true });
markDoneDuringLoop = true;
await runImport(eventId);
markDoneDuringLoop = false;
const done = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId, face_status: 'done' });
expect(done.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); // the concurrent scan's work survived
});
it('leaves face_status untouched when the per-event toggle is off', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent({ facesEnabled: false, flagOn: true });
await runImport(eventId);
const photos = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId });
expect(photos.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(photos.every((p) => p.face_status === null)).toBe(true);
});
it('leaves face_status untouched when the global flag is off', async () => {
// Installs without the feature must never accumulate face_status rows —
// the same invariant photoProcessor's guard protects.
const eventId = await seedEvent({ facesEnabled: true, flagOn: false });
await runImport(eventId);
const photos = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId });
expect(photos.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(photos.every((p) => p.face_status === null)).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
/**
* External / reference photos are scannable (#1090).
*
* faceProcessor used to short-circuit every photo with source_origin
* 'external' or 'reference' to 'skipped', because resolvePhotoStorageKey
* returns null for anything outside managed storage and ensurePreviewImage
* could not build a preview for it. #1078 removed that limitation —
* ensurePreviewImage now reads externals straight off the mount and writes
* the preview into managed storage — but the guard stayed, so the whole
* feature was a no-op on external-media installs. The reporter's gallery sat
* at 0/3230 with every row 'skipped' and no error.
*
* These pin both halves: the guard is gone, and a photo whose source is
* genuinely missing still fails rather than being quietly skipped — the blanket
* skip used to absorb that case too, so a real breakage looked like an
* unsupported one.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-faceext-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'faceext-test-secret';
// A real, existing media root. getExternalMediaRoot only honours the env var
// if the directory exists and caches it on first call, so this has to be set
// up before anything requires externalMediaService.
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = path.join(path.dirname(process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH), 'media');
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, 'share', 'individual'), { recursive: true });
// Non-empty on purpose: an empty directory is read as an unmounted share
// (faceTransientSource.test.js), so a "healthy storage, dead photo" fixture
// needs a sibling present or it defers instead of failing.
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, 'share', 'individual', 'sibling.jpg'), 'x');
const sharp = require('sharp');
let mockPreviewBuffer;
// Set per-test: what ensurePreviewImage returns for the photo under test.
let previewKeyResult; // eslint-disable-line prefer-const
const mockEnsurePreviewImage = jest.fn(async () => previewKeyResult);
const mockDetectFaces = jest.fn();
jest.mock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
...jest.requireActual('../../src/services/imageProcessor'),
ensurePreviewImage: (...args) => mockEnsurePreviewImage(...args),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/storage', () => ({
getStorage: () => ({ get: async () => mockPreviewBuffer }),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/faceClient', () => ({
detectFaces: (...args) => mockDetectFaces(...args),
SidecarUnavailableError: class extends Error {},
}));
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db; let cleanup; let faceProcessor;
async function seedPhoto({ sourceOrigin = 'managed', sourceMode = 'managed' } = {}) {
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `ext-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'ext',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `ext-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
face_recognition_enabled: true,
source_mode: sourceMode,
external_path: 'share',
}).returning('id');
const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'ext.jpg',
path: '/tmp/ext.jpg',
type: 'individual',
width: 1920,
height: 1440,
processing_status: 'complete',
face_status: 'processing',
source_origin: sourceOrigin,
external_relpath: sourceOrigin === 'managed' ? null : 'individual/ext.jpg',
}).returning('id');
return { eventId, photoId: typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p };
}
describe('face scanning of external/reference photos (#1090)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
mockPreviewBuffer = await sharp({
create: { width: 1920, height: 1440, channels: 3, background: { r: 20, g: 40, b: 80 } },
}).jpeg().toBuffer();
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'faces', value: true })
.onConflict('key').merge()
.catch(async () => { await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'faces' }).update({ value: true }); });
faceProcessor = require('../../src/services/faceProcessor');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
beforeEach(() => {
mockEnsurePreviewImage.mockClear();
mockDetectFaces.mockClear();
previewKeyResult = 'previews/preview_ext.jpg';
mockDetectFaces.mockResolvedValue({
model_version: 'test-v1',
faces: [{
bbox: [100, 100, 50, 50],
score: 0.99,
landmarks: [[0, 0], [0, 0], [0, 0], [0, 0], [0, 0]],
yaw: 0, pitch: 0, blur: 500,
embedding: Array.from({ length: 64 }, (_, i) => (i === 0 ? 1 : 0)),
}],
});
});
it.each(['external', 'reference'])('scans a %s photo instead of skipping it', async (origin) => {
const { photoId } = await seedPhoto({ sourceOrigin: origin, sourceMode: 'reference' });
const result = await faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(photoId);
// The regression: this used to return 'skipped' without ever building a
// preview or contacting the sidecar.
expect(result.status).not.toBe('skipped');
expect(mockEnsurePreviewImage).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockDetectFaces).toHaveBeenCalled();
const photo = await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first();
expect(photo.face_status).toBe('done');
expect(await db('photo_faces').where({ photo_id: photoId }).first()).toBeTruthy();
});
it('fails, not skips, when the external source is genuinely gone', async () => {
// A missing file is a property of that photo, so it should be visible as a
// failure the admin can act on — not silently absorbed the way the old
// blanket skip did.
//
// The containing directory exists here on purpose. An absent directory is
// a dropped mount, which defers rather than fails
// (faceTransientSource.test.js); this is the other case — healthy storage,
// dead photo.
previewKeyResult = null;
const { photoId } = await seedPhoto({ sourceOrigin: 'external', sourceMode: 'reference' });
const result = await faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(photoId);
expect(result.status).toBe('failed');
expect(mockDetectFaces).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
const photo = await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first();
expect(photo.face_status).toBe('failed');
expect(photo.face_error).toMatch(/preview/i);
});
});
@@ -1,415 +0,0 @@
/**
* Privacy and visibility guarantees for face recognition (#1074).
*
* These are the tests that matter most in this feature. Two of them cover
* defects that would be invisible in normal use:
*
* - The people strip is computed from face rows, which have no concept of
* photo visibility. Handing a guest a raw count leaks how many hidden
* photos someone appears in, and a cover face picked without scoping
* renders a crop of a photo the guest may not open.
*
* - Face embeddings are biometric data. They must not ride along in a
* .picpeak export, which gets handed to clients and moved between
* operators.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-faceprivacy-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'faceprivacy-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db; let cleanup; let clustering; let peopleService; let faceProcessor;
function makeEmbedding(id, variant = 0, dim = 64) {
const vec = new Float32Array(dim);
for (let i = 0; i < dim; i++) {
vec[i] = Math.sin((i + 1) * (id + 1) * 0.7) + variant * 0.02 * Math.cos(i * 3.1);
}
let norm = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < dim; i++) norm += vec[i] * vec[i];
norm = Math.sqrt(norm);
for (let i = 0; i < dim; i++) vec[i] /= norm;
return vec;
}
async function seedEvent(slug) {
const [row] = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: slug,
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
face_recognition_enabled: true,
}).returning('id');
return typeof row === 'object' ? row.id : row;
}
async function addPhotoWithFace(eventId, embedding, { visibility = 'visible', score = 0.99 } = {}) {
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: `${Math.random()}.jpg`,
path: '/tmp/x.jpg',
type: 'individual',
visibility,
processing_status: 'complete',
}).returning('id');
const photoId = typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p;
const row = {
photo_id: photoId,
event_id: eventId,
bbox_x: 0, bbox_y: 0, bbox_w: 200, bbox_h: 200,
det_score: score,
embedding: clustering.packEmbedding(embedding),
model_version: 'test-v1',
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
};
const [f] = await db('photo_faces').insert(row).returning('id');
return { photoId, face: { ...row, id: typeof f === 'object' ? f.id : f } };
}
describe('face privacy and visibility (#1074)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
clustering = require('../../src/services/faceClustering');
peopleService = require('../../src/services/facePeopleService');
faceProcessor = require('../../src/services/faceProcessor');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
describe('visibility scoping', () => {
it('counts only photos the audience can actually see', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('visibility-count');
const faces = [];
// Same person: 3 visible photos, 4 hidden ones.
for (let v = 0; v < 3; v++) {
faces.push((await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(1, v))).face);
}
for (let v = 3; v < 7; v++) {
faces.push((await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(1, v), { visibility: 'hidden' })).face);
}
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, faces);
const guestView = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: false, minClusterSize: 1 });
const clientView = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: true, minClusterSize: 1 });
expect(guestView).toHaveLength(1);
// The leak this test exists to prevent: 3, never 7.
expect(guestView[0].face_count).toBe(3);
expect(clientView[0].face_count).toBe(7);
});
it('never returns face_count_total to a guest', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('no-total-leak');
const { face } = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(2));
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [face]);
const [person] = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: false, minClusterSize: 1 });
expect(person).not.toHaveProperty('total_face_count');
expect(person).not.toHaveProperty('is_hidden');
});
it('picks a cover face from a photo the guest may open', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('cover-scoping');
// The BEST face (highest score) is in a hidden photo — a naive
// implementation would hand its crop to the guest.
const hidden = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(3, 0), {
visibility: 'hidden', score: 0.99,
});
const visible = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(3, 1), {
visibility: 'visible', score: 0.80,
});
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [hidden.face, visible.face]);
const [guestPerson] = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: false, minClusterSize: 1 });
expect(guestPerson.cover.photo_id).toBe(visible.photoId);
expect(guestPerson.cover.photo_id).not.toBe(hidden.photoId);
});
it('prefers the cover the photographer chose (#1096)', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('chosen-cover');
// The auto-pick would take the 0.99 face. The photographer picked the
// other one — without this the PATCH saved, the toast said so, and the
// avatar reverted on the very next read.
const best = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(9, 0), { score: 0.99 });
const chosen = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(9, 1), { score: 0.70 });
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [best.face, chosen.face]);
const [before] = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: true, minClusterSize: 1 });
expect(before.cover.photo_id).toBe(best.photoId);
// Clustering must not have written one: an automatic seed here would be
// indistinguishable from a real choice the moment listPeople honours it.
const seeded = await db('event_people').where({ id: before.id }).first();
expect(seeded.cover_face_id).toBeFalsy();
await db('event_people').where({ id: before.id }).update({ cover_face_id: chosen.face.id });
const [after] = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: true, minClusterSize: 1 });
expect(after.cover.photo_id).toBe(chosen.photoId);
});
it('carries a chosen cover through a merge', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('cover-merge');
const a = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(20, 0), { score: 0.90 });
const b = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(60, 0), { score: 0.95 });
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [a.face]);
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [b.face]);
const people = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).orderBy('id');
expect(people.length).toBeGreaterThan(1);
// The SOURCE carries the choice; the target has none.
await db('event_people').where({ id: people[1].id }).update({ cover_face_id: b.face.id });
await clustering.mergePeople(eventId, [people[1].id], people[0].id);
const target = await db('event_people').where({ id: people[0].id }).first();
expect(target.cover_face_id).toBe(b.face.id);
});
it('carries a chosen cover through a recluster', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('cover-recluster');
const faces = [];
for (let v = 0; v < 3; v++) {
faces.push((await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(21, v), { score: 0.9 - v * 0.1 })).face);
}
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, faces);
const [person] = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId });
// Pick the WORST-scoring face, so an automatic re-pick would differ.
const chosen = faces[2].id;
await db('event_people').where({ id: person.id }).update({ cover_face_id: chosen });
await clustering.recluster(eventId);
const after = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).whereNotNull('cover_face_id');
expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
expect(after[0].cover_face_id).toBe(chosen);
});
it('falls back to a visible face when the chosen cover is hidden from this audience', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('chosen-cover-hidden');
// Choosing a cover must never override the visibility scoping — that
// would hand a guest a crop of a photo they cannot open.
const hidden = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(10, 0), {
visibility: 'hidden', score: 0.99,
});
const visible = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(10, 1), { score: 0.70 });
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [hidden.face, visible.face]);
const [person] = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: true, minClusterSize: 1 });
await db('event_people').where({ id: person.id }).update({ cover_face_id: hidden.face.id });
const [guestView] = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: false, minClusterSize: 1 });
expect(guestView.cover.photo_id).toBe(visible.photoId);
expect(guestView.cover.photo_id).not.toBe(hidden.photoId);
});
it('drops a person entirely when all their photos are hidden', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('all-hidden');
const faces = [];
for (let v = 0; v < 3; v++) {
faces.push((await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(4, v), { visibility: 'hidden' })).face);
}
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, faces);
const guestView = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: false, minClusterSize: 1 });
expect(guestView).toHaveLength(0);
const clientView = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: true, minClusterSize: 1 });
expect(clientView).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('omits hidden and ignored people from the guest response', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('hidden-people');
const a = (await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(5))).face;
const b = (await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(6))).face;
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [a, b]);
const people = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).orderBy('id');
await db('event_people').where({ id: people[0].id }).update({ is_hidden: true });
await db('event_people').where({ id: people[1].id }).update({ is_ignored: true });
const guestView = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: false, minClusterSize: 1 });
expect(guestView).toHaveLength(0);
const adminView = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: true, forAdmin: true });
expect(adminView).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('does not attach a hidden person to a photo a guest can see', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('person-ids-hidden');
const { photoId, face } = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(7));
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [face]);
const person = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
await db('event_people').where({ id: person.id }).update({ is_hidden: true });
const guestMap = await peopleService.getPersonIdsByPhoto(eventId, [photoId], { forAdmin: false });
expect(guestMap.get(photoId)).toBeUndefined();
const adminMap = await peopleService.getPersonIdsByPhoto(eventId, [photoId], { forAdmin: true });
expect(adminMap.get(photoId)).toEqual([person.id]);
});
it('respects the minimum cluster size so one-off bystanders stay out', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('min-cluster');
const solo = (await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(8))).face;
const crowd = [];
for (let v = 0; v < 4; v++) {
crowd.push((await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(9, v))).face);
}
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [solo, ...crowd]);
const people = await peopleService.listPeople(eventId, { isClient: false, minClusterSize: 3 });
expect(people).toHaveLength(1);
expect(people[0].face_count).toBe(4);
});
});
describe('erasure', () => {
it('purgeEvent removes every face row and resets the photos', async () => {
const eventId = await seedEvent('purge');
const faces = [];
for (let v = 0; v < 3; v++) {
faces.push((await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(10, v))).face);
}
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, faces);
await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).update({ face_status: 'done', face_count: 1 });
expect(await db('photo_faces').where({ event_id: eventId })).not.toHaveLength(0);
expect(await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId })).not.toHaveLength(0);
await faceProcessor.purgeEvent(eventId);
expect(await db('photo_faces').where({ event_id: eventId })).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId })).toHaveLength(0);
const photos = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId });
expect(photos.every((p) => p.face_status === null && p.face_count === null)).toBe(true);
});
it('purgePhotoFaces removes face rows WITHOUT relying on the FK cascade', async () => {
// The regression this guards: PicPeak does not enable
// `PRAGMA foreign_keys` on SQLite, so ON DELETE CASCADE never fires
// there and biometric embeddings outlived the photo. The pragma is
// explicitly OFF here so the assertion can only pass if the deletion
// path purges the rows itself.
await db.raw('PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF');
const eventId = await seedEvent('purge-no-cascade');
const faces = [];
for (let v = 0; v < 3; v++) {
faces.push((await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(20, v))).face);
}
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, faces);
const person = await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId }).first();
expect(person.face_count_total).toBe(3);
const victim = faces[0];
await faceProcessor.purgePhotoFaces(victim.photo_id);
expect(await db('photo_faces').where({ photo_id: victim.photo_id })).toHaveLength(0);
// …and the person it belonged to was rebuilt, not left with a stale count.
const after = await db('event_people').where({ id: person.id }).first();
expect(after.face_count_total).toBe(2);
});
it('purging the last face of a person removes the person too', async () => {
await db.raw('PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF');
const eventId = await seedEvent('purge-last-face');
const { face, photoId } = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(21));
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [face]);
expect(await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId })).toHaveLength(1);
await faceProcessor.purgePhotoFaces(photoId);
expect(await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId })).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('deleting an event removes its people and faces', async () => {
await db.raw('PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON');
const eventId = await seedEvent('event-delete');
const { face } = await addPhotoWithFace(eventId, makeEmbedding(11));
await clustering.assignFaces(eventId, [face]);
await db('photos').where({ event_id: eventId }).del();
await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).del();
expect(await db('photo_faces').where({ event_id: eventId })).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await db('event_people').where({ event_id: eventId })).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
describe('all-in-one image block (#1042 / PR #1068)', () => {
// Blocked for performance: the AIO image runs backend, frontend, SQLite
// and every worker in one container, with no ML sidecar to talk to. The
// failure there would not be loud — just a slow install that looks
// broken — so the gate is asserted rather than assumed.
const faceSettings = require('../../src/services/faceSettings');
afterEach(() => { delete process.env.PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER; });
it('reports the feature off regardless of the flag row', async () => {
process.env.PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER = 'true';
expect(faceSettings.isSingleContainerImage()).toBe(true);
// Even with the flag ON in the database.
await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'faces', value: true })
.onConflict('key').merge()
.catch(async () => {
await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'faces' }).update({ value: true });
});
expect(await faceSettings.isFeatureEnabled()).toBe(false);
});
it('refuses per-event detection too', async () => {
process.env.PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER = 'true';
const eventId = await seedEvent('aio-block');
const event = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
expect(event.face_recognition_enabled).toBeTruthy();
expect(await faceSettings.isEnabledForEvent(event)).toBe(false);
});
it('accepts only explicit truthy markers', () => {
for (const v of ['true', '1', 'yes', 'TRUE']) {
process.env.PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER = v;
expect(faceSettings.isSingleContainerImage()).toBe(true);
}
for (const v of ['false', '0', '', 'no']) {
process.env.PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER = v;
expect(faceSettings.isSingleContainerImage()).toBe(false);
}
delete process.env.PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER;
expect(faceSettings.isSingleContainerImage()).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('export and backup exclusion', () => {
it('excludes both face tables from .picpeak exports', () => {
const { EXCLUDED_TABLES } = require('../../src/services/picpeakExportService');
expect(EXCLUDED_TABLES.has('photo_faces')).toBe(true);
expect(EXCLUDED_TABLES.has('event_people')).toBe(true);
});
it('excludes both face tables from the database backup table list', async () => {
const databaseBackup = require('../../src/services/databaseBackup');
const service = databaseBackup.DatabaseBackupService
? new databaseBackup.DatabaseBackupService()
: databaseBackup;
if (typeof service.getTables !== 'function') return; // shape differs; covered by the export test
const tables = await service.getTables();
expect(tables).not.toContain('photo_faces');
expect(tables).not.toContain('event_people');
// Sanity: the filter didn't eat everything.
expect(tables).toContain('events');
});
});
});
@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
/**
* Bounding-box coordinate space (#1074).
*
* The sidecar reports boxes in the pixel space of the image it was HANDED —
* the ≤1920px preview — while every consumer (the strip's avatar crop, the
* admin manager, the auto-category portrait rule) compares them against
* photos.width/height, the ORIGINAL dimensions. faceProcessor scales once so
* everything downstream can assume original-image coordinates.
*
* This is the defect that survived longest in review, and it is invisible on
* any photo already under 1920px — the entire demo gallery was 750px, so the
* scale factor was always exactly 1.0 and the correction never ran. Verified
* by hand afterwards on a real 4000x3000 upload (stored box moved from
* 1493,204 to 3110,426 — a factor of 2.083, exactly 4000/1920). This test
* exists so that verification does not have to be repeated by hand.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-facescale-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'facescale-test-secret';
// A 1920x1440 JPEG standing in for the preview rendition. faceProcessor reads
// its dimensions with sharp to derive the scale, so it must be a real image.
const sharp = require('sharp');
let mockPreviewBuffer;
const mockSidecarBox = [1493, 204, 131, 161]; // what the sidecar sees on the preview
jest.mock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
...jest.requireActual('../../src/services/imageProcessor'),
ensurePreviewImage: jest.fn(async () => 'previews/preview_test.jpg'),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/storage', () => ({
getStorage: () => ({ get: async () => mockPreviewBuffer }),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/faceClient', () => ({
detectFaces: jest.fn(async () => ({
model_version: 'test-v1',
faces: [{
bbox: mockSidecarBox,
score: 0.99,
landmarks: [[0, 0], [0, 0], [0, 0], [0, 0], [0, 0]],
yaw: 0, pitch: 0, blur: 500,
embedding: Array.from({ length: 64 }, (_, i) => (i === 0 ? 1 : 0)),
}],
})),
SidecarUnavailableError: class extends Error {},
}));
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db; let cleanup; let faceProcessor;
async function seedPhoto(width, height) {
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `scale-${width}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'scale',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `scale-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
face_recognition_enabled: true,
}).returning('id');
const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'big.jpg',
path: '/tmp/big.jpg',
type: 'individual',
width,
height,
processing_status: 'complete',
face_status: 'processing',
}).returning('id');
return { eventId, photoId: typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p };
}
describe('face bbox coordinate space (#1074)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
mockPreviewBuffer = await sharp({
create: { width: 1920, height: 1440, channels: 3, background: { r: 20, g: 40, b: 80 } },
}).jpeg().toBuffer();
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
// The faces flag gates everything; turn it on for this suite.
await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'faces', value: true })
.onConflict('key').merge()
.catch(async () => { await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'faces' }).update({ value: true }); });
faceProcessor = require('../../src/services/faceProcessor');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('scales preview-space boxes into ORIGINAL image coordinates', async () => {
// 4000px original, 1920px preview -> every coordinate must grow by 4000/1920.
const { photoId } = await seedPhoto(4000, 3000);
await faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(photoId);
const face = await db('photo_faces').where({ photo_id: photoId }).first();
const scale = 4000 / 1920;
expect(face.bbox_x).toBeCloseTo(mockSidecarBox[0] * scale, 1);
expect(face.bbox_y).toBeCloseTo(mockSidecarBox[1] * scale, 1);
expect(face.bbox_w).toBeCloseTo(mockSidecarBox[2] * scale, 1);
expect(face.bbox_h).toBeCloseTo(mockSidecarBox[3] * scale, 1);
// The regression this guards: the raw preview-space value being stored.
expect(face.bbox_x).not.toBeCloseTo(mockSidecarBox[0], 1);
// And a sanity check that it lands inside the original frame.
expect(face.bbox_x + face.bbox_w).toBeLessThanOrEqual(4000);
});
it('leaves boxes untouched when the photo is already preview-sized', async () => {
// The case that hid the bug: no downscale, so scale is exactly 1 and the
// stored box equals what the sidecar reported.
const { photoId } = await seedPhoto(1920, 1440);
await faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(photoId);
const face = await db('photo_faces').where({ photo_id: photoId }).first();
expect(face.bbox_x).toBeCloseTo(mockSidecarBox[0], 1);
expect(face.bbox_w).toBeCloseTo(mockSidecarBox[2], 1);
});
it('falls back to unscaled rather than corrupting when width is unknown', async () => {
// Pre-dimension-migration rows have no width. Storing a box scaled by
// NaN/0 would be worse than storing an unscaled one.
const { photoId } = await seedPhoto(null, null);
await faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(photoId);
const face = await db('photo_faces').where({ photo_id: photoId }).first();
expect(Number.isFinite(face.bbox_x)).toBe(true);
expect(face.bbox_x).toBeCloseTo(mockSidecarBox[0], 1);
});
});
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
/**
* A deferred photo must not stall the queue.
*
* claimNextPhoto orders by id ascending, and the queue defaults to a single
* worker. So returning an unreachable photo to 'pending' — the obvious way to
* say "try again later" — makes that same row the oldest pending one forever:
* the worker reclaims it after every backoff and never reaches a higher id.
* One dead mount would stall face scanning for the entire install, including
* unrelated events and fresh uploads.
*
* The row is instead left parked in 'processing' with its face_started_at
* intact. It is not claimable, so the worker advances; the existing janitor
* returns it to 'pending' after STUCK_TIMEOUT_MS, which is the retry.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
const tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-defer-'));
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpRoot, 'db.sqlite');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'defer-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db; let cleanup; let faceQueue; let faceProcessor;
describe('deferred photos do not block the queue', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
faceQueue = require('../../src/services/faceQueue');
faceProcessor = require('../../src/services/faceProcessor');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
it('exports TransientSourceError for the queue to branch on', () => {
// The queue imports this from faceProcessor; if the export is dropped the
// instanceof check silently becomes false and every deferral turns back
// into a permanent failure.
expect(typeof faceProcessor.TransientSourceError).toBe('function');
expect(new faceProcessor.TransientSourceError(1, 'x'))
.toBeInstanceOf(Error);
});
it('does NOT return a deferred row to pending', () => {
// Source inspection, deliberately. workerLoop is an unexported infinite
// loop, so the branch cannot be driven directly, and asserting on database
// state alone does not distinguish the fix from the bug — a version that
// re-queues the row passes every state assertion in this file. What
// actually matters is that this one branch does not call releaseToPending,
// so that is what is pinned. Same approach as the contract tests added for
// #596.
const src = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'services', 'faceQueue.js'), 'utf8'
);
const marker = 'if (err instanceof TransientSourceError) {';
const start = src.indexOf(marker);
expect(start).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
// The branch body, up to its closing brace.
const body = src.slice(start, src.indexOf('\n }', start));
expect(body).not.toMatch(/releaseToPending/);
expect(body).toMatch(/continue/);
// And the sidecar branch, which SHOULD still release, so this test fails
// if the two branches are ever collapsed back together.
const sideStart = src.indexOf('if (err instanceof SidecarUnavailableError) {');
expect(sideStart).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
const sideBody = src.slice(sideStart, src.indexOf('\n }', sideStart));
expect(sideBody).toMatch(/releaseToPending/);
});
it('leaves a deferred row claimable-later, not claimable-now', async () => {
// A row parked in 'processing' is invisible to claimNextPhoto, which only
// ever selects face_status='pending' — that is what lets the worker move
// past it instead of spinning on it.
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `defer-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'defer',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `defer-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
face_recognition_enabled: true,
}).returning('id');
const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
const [stuck] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'stuck.jpg',
path: 'd/stuck.jpg',
type: 'individual',
processing_status: 'complete',
face_status: 'processing',
face_started_at: new Date().toISOString(),
source_origin: 'external',
}).returning('id');
const stuckId = typeof stuck === 'object' ? stuck.id : stuck;
const parked = await db('photos')
.where({ id: stuckId, face_status: 'pending' })
.first();
expect(parked).toBeUndefined(); // not claimable while parked
// The janitor's contract is what turns the park into a retry: it resets
// 'processing' rows whose face_started_at is older than the stuck timeout.
// Backdate past it and the row becomes claimable again.
const longAgo = new Date(Date.now() - 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).toISOString();
await db('photos').where({ id: stuckId }).update({ face_started_at: longAgo });
const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - 600000).toISOString();
const reset = await db('photos')
.where('face_status', 'processing')
.where('face_started_at', '<', cutoff)
.update({ face_status: 'pending', face_started_at: null });
expect(reset).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const after = await db('photos').where({ id: stuckId }).first();
expect(after.face_status).toBe('pending');
});
it('claimNextPhoto skips events inside their backoff window', async () => {
// The per-event cooldown is what stops the janitor handing a whole dead
// gallery back every sweep. Without the exclusion the worker walks all of
// it again — one slow stat per photo against a possibly hard-mounted
// share — before reaching any healthy event.
const mk = async (name) => {
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `cd-${name}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: name,
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `cd-${name}-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
face_recognition_enabled: true,
}).returning('id');
const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
const [p2] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: `${name}.jpg`,
path: `cd/${name}.jpg`,
type: 'individual',
processing_status: 'complete',
face_status: 'pending',
source_origin: 'external',
}).returning('id');
return { eventId, photoId: typeof p2 === 'object' ? p2.id : p2 };
};
await db('photos').del();
const dead = await mk('dead'); // lower id -> would win the FIFO
const healthy = await mk('healthy');
// Without exclusion the dead event's row is claimed first...
const first = await faceQueue.claimNextPhoto([]);
expect(first.id).toBe(dead.photoId);
await db('photos').where({ id: dead.photoId }).update({ face_status: 'pending' });
// ...and with it, the worker reaches the healthy event instead.
const second = await faceQueue.claimNextPhoto([dead.eventId]);
expect(second.id).toBe(healthy.photoId);
});
it('backoff spares managed rows in a mixed-source event', async () => {
// A reference event can hold managed uploads alongside imported external
// ones. Excluding the whole event id would leave those unscanned for as
// long as external rows keep renewing the cooldown — indefinitely, during
// a real outage — even though their local source is fine.
await db('photos').del();
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `mix-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'mix',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `mix-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
face_recognition_enabled: true,
source_mode: 'reference',
}).returning('id');
const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
const add = async (origin, name) => {
const [p2] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: name,
path: `mix/${name}`,
type: 'individual',
processing_status: 'complete',
face_status: 'pending',
source_origin: origin,
}).returning('id');
return typeof p2 === 'object' ? p2.id : p2;
};
await add('external', 'ext.jpg'); // lower id, would win the FIFO
const managedId = await add('managed', 'man.jpg');
// Event is in backoff: the external row is skipped, the managed one is not.
const claimed = await faceQueue.claimNextPhoto([eventId]);
expect(claimed).toBeTruthy();
expect(claimed.id).toBe(managedId);
});
it('startQueue is exported and does not throw on import', () => {
// faceQueue requires faceProcessor for TransientSourceError while
// faceProcessor is itself required by the routes — a circular require here
// would surface as an undefined export rather than a crash, so assert the
// module actually loaded something usable.
expect(faceQueue).toBeTruthy();
expect(Object.keys(faceQueue).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});
});
@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
/**
* A dropped mount defers a scan; a dead photo fails it.
*
* ensurePreviewImage returns null for both "this JPEG is corrupt" and "the
* NFS share is gone", and #1090 made that distinction matter: external
* libraries now reach this path, and network mounts drop far more often than
* local disks. Failing on an outage strands the photo — faceQueue only ever
* claims 'pending', and nothing re-queues a failure automatically, so a mount
* that blinked mid-scan would cost an entire gallery a manual Re-scan.
*
* The probe checks the containing DIRECTORY rather than the file, because that
* is what separates the two cases: a missing file inside a healthy directory
* is a broken photo, an unreachable directory is broken storage.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
const tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-transient-'));
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpRoot, 'db.sqlite');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'transient-test-secret';
// Created BEFORE anything requires externalMediaService: getExternalMediaRoot
// only honours the env var if the directory already exists, and caches the
// result on first call — set it later and every path silently resolves
// against a fallback root instead.
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = path.join(tmpRoot, 'media');
fs.mkdirSync(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, { recursive: true });
let previewKeyResult = null;
const mockEnsurePreviewImage = jest.fn(async () => previewKeyResult);
jest.mock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
...jest.requireActual('../../src/services/imageProcessor'),
ensurePreviewImage: (...args) => mockEnsurePreviewImage(...args),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/faceClient', () => ({
detectFaces: jest.fn(async () => ({ model_version: 'test-v1', faces: [] })),
SidecarUnavailableError: class extends Error {},
}));
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db; let cleanup; let faceProcessor;
async function seedExternalPhoto({ externalPath, relpath = 'individual/a.jpg' }) {
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `tr-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'tr',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `tr-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
face_recognition_enabled: true,
source_mode: 'reference',
external_path: externalPath,
}).returning('id');
const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'a.jpg',
path: 'tr/a.jpg',
type: 'individual',
width: 4000,
height: 3000,
processing_status: 'complete',
face_status: 'processing',
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: relpath,
}).returning('id');
return { eventId, photoId: typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p };
}
describe('transient source vs dead photo', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'faces', value: true })
.onConflict('key').merge()
.catch(async () => { await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'faces' }).update({ value: true }); });
faceProcessor = require('../../src/services/faceProcessor');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(() => {
previewKeyResult = null; // i.e. ensurePreviewImage could not build one
mockEnsurePreviewImage.mockClear();
});
it('defers, not fails, when the source directory is unreachable', async () => {
// Nothing was ever created under EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT for this path, so the
// directory does not resolve — the shape a dropped mount presents.
const { photoId } = await seedExternalPhoto({ externalPath: 'vanished-share' });
await expect(faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(photoId))
.rejects.toBeInstanceOf(faceProcessor.TransientSourceError);
// Critically: still claimable. A 'failed' here is what stranded the photo.
const photo = await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first();
expect(photo.face_status).not.toBe('failed');
});
it('defers when the event root survives an unmount but is empty', async () => {
// The common NFS/SMB shape: unmounting leaves the mountpoint behind as an
// ordinary empty directory, so fs.access succeeds on storage that is
// entirely gone. The EVENT ROOT is the thing that goes empty — the photo's
// own subdirectory vanishes with it.
const emptyRoot = path.join(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, 'unmounted');
await fs.promises.mkdir(emptyRoot, { recursive: true });
const { photoId } = await seedExternalPhoto({ externalPath: 'unmounted' });
await expect(faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(photoId))
.rejects.toBeInstanceOf(faceProcessor.TransientSourceError);
const photo = await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first();
expect(photo.face_status).not.toBe('failed');
});
it('fails when the directory is healthy but the file is gone', async () => {
// Directory exists, file does not — a genuinely broken photo, which should
// surface as a failure the admin can see rather than retry forever.
const live = path.join(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, 'live-share', 'individual');
await fs.promises.mkdir(live, { recursive: true });
// Non-empty: an empty directory is now read as an unmounted share, so the
// "healthy storage, dead photo" case needs a sibling file present.
await fs.promises.writeFile(path.join(live, 'sibling.jpg'), 'x');
const { photoId } = await seedExternalPhoto({ externalPath: 'live-share' });
const result = await faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(photoId);
expect(result.status).toBe('failed');
const photo = await db('photos').where({ id: photoId }).first();
expect(photo.face_status).toBe('failed');
expect(photo.face_error).toMatch(/preview/i);
});
it('fails a missing subdirectory rather than deferring the whole event', async () => {
// individual/ deleted while collages/ is fine. Probing only the photo's own
// directory reports ENOENT and would read as a mount-wide outage, deferring
// the event and starving every healthy sibling folder. The root is
// populated, so the mount is up and this is a broken path.
const root = path.join(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, 'partial');
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.join(root, 'collages'), { recursive: true });
await fs.promises.writeFile(path.join(root, 'collages', 'kept.jpg'), 'x');
const { photoId } = await seedExternalPhoto({ externalPath: 'partial' });
const result = await faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(photoId);
expect(result.status).toBe('failed');
});
it('defers a file that exists but cannot be read', async () => {
// EACCES / EIO / ESTALE on the file itself, with the mount up: a transient
// condition wearing a per-file disguise. Only ENOENT means genuinely gone.
const root = path.join(process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT, 'locked');
const dir = path.join(root, 'individual');
await fs.promises.mkdir(dir, { recursive: true });
const file = path.join(dir, 'a.jpg');
await fs.promises.writeFile(file, 'x');
await fs.promises.chmod(file, 0o000);
const { photoId } = await seedExternalPhoto({ externalPath: 'locked' });
try {
await expect(faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(photoId))
.rejects.toBeInstanceOf(faceProcessor.TransientSourceError);
} finally {
await fs.promises.chmod(file, 0o644).catch(() => {});
}
});
it('still fails managed photos without probing the mount', async () => {
// The probe is scoped to external/reference rows: a managed photo with no
// preview is broken, and there is no mount to blame.
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `tr-m-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'trm',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `tr-m-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
face_recognition_enabled: true,
}).returning('id');
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e,
filename: 'm.jpg',
path: 'trm/m.jpg',
type: 'individual',
width: 100,
height: 100,
processing_status: 'complete',
face_status: 'processing',
source_origin: 'managed',
}).returning('id');
const result = await faceProcessor.processPhotoFaces(typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p);
expect(result.status).toBe('failed');
});
});
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
/**
* Gallery password invisible-Unicode fallback (#654).
*
* Passwords relayed through chat apps (Instagram DMs especially) pick up
* invisible characters on copy-paste — zero-width space/joiners, word
* joiner, BOM, soft hyphen — which fail the byte-exact bcrypt compare and
* surface as "incorrect password" for a correct password. The verify route
* retries the compare with those characters stripped, in the SAME request,
* so the fallback costs no reCAPTCHA token and no failed-attempt quota.
*
* Pins the contract:
* - exact submitted bytes always win first, so stored passwords that
* legitimately contain these characters (e.g. ZWJ emoji sequences)
* keep working
* - paste artifacts (mid-string ZWSP, leading BOM, trailing space) are
* rescued by the sanitized fallback compare
* - the fallback never invents a match (missing ZWJ still 401s), and a
* rescued login records no failed attempt
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'sanitize-test-secret';
const PLAIN_SLUG = 'sanitize-plain-event';
const ZWJ_SLUG = 'sanitize-zwj-event';
const PLAIN_PASSWORD = 'wedding2026';
// Stored password legitimately containing a ZWJ emoji sequence.
const ZWJ_PASSWORD = 'Family\u{1F468}\u200D\u{1F469}Aa1';
describe('gallery/verify invisible-Unicode fallback (#654)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
const makeEvent = async (slug, password) => {
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: `Sanitize ${slug}`,
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash(password, 4),
share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
share_token: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
};
let plainEventId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
plainEventId = await makeEvent(PLAIN_SLUG, PLAIN_PASSWORD);
await makeEvent(ZWJ_SLUG, ZWJ_PASSWORD);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/auth', require('../../src/routes/auth'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
const verify = (slug, password) =>
request(app).post('/api/auth/gallery/verify').send({ slug, password });
it('accepts the exact password', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, PLAIN_PASSWORD);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('rescues a mid-string zero-width space from chat-app copy-paste', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, 'wedding\u200B2026');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('rescues leading BOM + trailing space paste artifacts', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, `\uFEFF${PLAIN_PASSWORD} `);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('records no login_fail for a rescued login (single-request fallback)', async () => {
await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, 'wedding\u200B2026').expect(200);
const failed = await db('access_logs')
.where({ event_id: plainEventId, action: 'login_fail' });
expect(failed).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('still accepts a stored password that legitimately contains a ZWJ', async () => {
const res = await verify(ZWJ_SLUG, ZWJ_PASSWORD);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('does not invent a match when the ZWJ is missing from the input', async () => {
const res = await verify(ZWJ_SLUG, 'Family\u{1F468}\u{1F469}Aa1');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('rejects a plain wrong password', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, 'not-the-password');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});
@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
/**
* Minimal in-process OIDC provider for integration tests (#798).
*
* Serves just enough of the spec for openid-client's full validation to
* pass: discovery, JWKS (RS256), authorization endpoint (immediate redirect,
* no login UI), and token endpoint (authorization_code + PKCE). Claims for
* the next login are scripted per test via `setNextUser()`.
*
* Runs on an ephemeral localhost port over plain http — the service allows
* that in NODE_ENV=test only.
*/
const http = require('http');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const { URL } = require('url');
function b64url(input) {
return Buffer.from(input).toString('base64url');
}
class MockOidcProvider {
constructor() {
const { publicKey, privateKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });
this.privateKey = privateKey;
this.publicJwk = publicKey.export({ format: 'jwk' });
this.publicJwk.kid = 'test-key-1';
this.publicJwk.alg = 'RS256';
this.publicJwk.use = 'sig';
this.clientId = 'picpeak-test';
this.clientSecret = 'test-client-secret';
this.codes = new Map(); // code -> { nonce, redirectUri, codeChallenge, user }
this.nextUser = { sub: 'user-1', email: 'sso@example.com', email_verified: true };
// Test hooks:
this.tamperNonce = false; // sign the ID token with a WRONG nonce
this.emailViaUserinfoOnly = false; // omit email from the ID token; serve it on /userinfo
this.advertiseEndSession = true; // include end_session_endpoint in discovery (#798 phase 3)
this.accessTokens = new Map(); // access_token -> user (for /userinfo)
this.server = null;
this.issuer = null;
}
setNextUser(user) {
this.nextUser = user;
}
signIdToken({ sub, nonce, extraClaims = {} }) {
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const header = { alg: 'RS256', kid: this.publicJwk.kid, typ: 'JWT' };
const payload = {
iss: this.issuer,
aud: this.clientId,
sub,
iat: now,
exp: now + 300,
nonce,
...extraClaims,
};
const signingInput = `${b64url(JSON.stringify(header))}.${b64url(JSON.stringify(payload))}`;
const signature = crypto.sign('RSA-SHA256', Buffer.from(signingInput), this.privateKey);
return `${signingInput}.${signature.toString('base64url')}`;
}
async start() {
this.server = http.createServer((req, res) => this.handle(req, res));
await new Promise((resolve) => this.server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
this.issuer = `http://127.0.0.1:${this.server.address().port}`;
return this.issuer;
}
async stop() {
if (this.server) await new Promise((resolve) => this.server.close(resolve));
}
handle(req, res) {
const url = new URL(req.url, this.issuer);
const json = (status, body) => {
res.writeHead(status, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify(body));
};
if (url.pathname === '/.well-known/openid-configuration') {
return json(200, {
issuer: this.issuer,
authorization_endpoint: `${this.issuer}/authorize`,
token_endpoint: `${this.issuer}/token`,
userinfo_endpoint: `${this.issuer}/userinfo`,
jwks_uri: `${this.issuer}/jwks`,
...(this.advertiseEndSession ? { end_session_endpoint: `${this.issuer}/logout` } : {}),
response_types_supported: ['code'],
subject_types_supported: ['public'],
id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ['RS256'],
code_challenge_methods_supported: ['S256'],
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ['client_secret_basic', 'client_secret_post'],
});
}
if (url.pathname === '/jwks') {
return json(200, { keys: [this.publicJwk] });
}
if (url.pathname === '/authorize') {
// "Log in" instantly: mint a code bound to this request's params and
// bounce back to the redirect_uri like a real IdP would.
const code = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url');
this.codes.set(code, {
nonce: url.searchParams.get('nonce'),
redirectUri: url.searchParams.get('redirect_uri'),
codeChallenge: url.searchParams.get('code_challenge'),
user: this.nextUser,
});
const back = new URL(url.searchParams.get('redirect_uri'));
back.searchParams.set('code', code);
back.searchParams.set('state', url.searchParams.get('state'));
res.writeHead(302, { location: back.href });
return res.end();
}
if (url.pathname === '/token' && req.method === 'POST') {
let body = '';
req.on('data', (c) => { body += c; });
req.on('end', () => {
const params = new URLSearchParams(body);
const stored = this.codes.get(params.get('code'));
if (!stored) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant' });
this.codes.delete(params.get('code'));
// PKCE check — S256(code_verifier) must match the challenge.
const verifier = params.get('code_verifier') || '';
const challenge = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(verifier).digest('base64url');
if (challenge !== stored.codeChallenge) {
return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'PKCE verification failed' });
}
const { sub, ...extraClaims } = stored.user;
// Spec-compliant providers may keep profile/email claims OFF the ID
// token and serve them from /userinfo only — this hook simulates that.
const idTokenClaims = this.emailViaUserinfoOnly ? {} : extraClaims;
const idToken = this.signIdToken({
sub,
nonce: this.tamperNonce ? 'tampered-nonce' : stored.nonce,
extraClaims: idTokenClaims,
});
const accessToken = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url');
this.accessTokens.set(accessToken, stored.user);
return json(200, {
access_token: accessToken,
token_type: 'Bearer',
expires_in: 300,
id_token: idToken,
});
});
return undefined;
}
if (url.pathname === '/userinfo') {
const auth = req.headers.authorization || '';
const user = this.accessTokens.get(auth.replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, ''));
if (!user) return json(401, { error: 'invalid_token' });
return json(200, { ...user });
}
return json(404, { error: 'not_found' });
}
}
module.exports = { MockOidcProvider };
@@ -1,284 +0,0 @@
/**
* OIDC logout-to-IdP integration tests (#798 phase 3).
*
* Same full-stack shape as oidcSso.test.js: real routes over a mock
* in-process IdP, genuine discovery/JWKS/PKCE via openid-client. Pins:
*
* - the SSO callback stores the raw ID token in the oidc_id_token cookie
* - /logout with that cookie + oidc_logout_from_idp=true returns the
* IdP end-session URL (id_token_hint, post_logout_redirect_uri,
* client_id) and clears the cookie
* - feature off → no ssoLogoutUrl even for an SSO session
* - no oidc_id_token cookie (local-password session) → no ssoLogoutUrl
* even with the feature on — local sessions never bounce to the IdP
* - IdP without an end_session_endpoint → no ssoLogoutUrl, logout still 200
* - settings surface: GET exposes the flag + post_logout_redirect_uri,
* PUT persists the flag
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
const { MockOidcProvider } = require('./helpers/mockOidcProvider');
describe('OIDC logout-to-IdP (#798 phase 3)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let idp;
let oidcService;
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'oidc-logout-test-secret';
process.env.FRONTEND_URL = 'http://localhost:5199';
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
idp = new MockOidcProvider();
const issuer = await idp.start();
oidcService = require('../../src/services/oidcService');
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_enabled: true,
oidc_issuer_url: issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp.clientSecret,
oidc_autoprovision: true,
oidc_default_role: 'viewer',
oidc_logout_from_idp: true,
});
const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/auth', authRouter);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (idp) await idp.stop();
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
/** Drive login → IdP → callback like a browser; returns the callback response. */
async function ssoRoundTrip() {
const loginRes = await request(app).get('/api/auth/admin/sso/login').expect(302);
const stateCookie = (loginRes.headers['set-cookie'] || [])
.find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_state='))
.split(';')[0];
const idpRes = await fetch(loginRes.headers.location, { redirect: 'manual' });
expect(idpRes.status).toBe(302);
const back = new URL(idpRes.headers.get('location'));
return request(app)
.get(`${back.pathname}?${back.searchParams.toString()}`)
.set('Cookie', stateCookie)
.expect(302);
}
/**
* The oidc_id_token cookie pair ("oidc_id_token=<jwt>") from a callback
* response. The callback carries TWO Set-Cookie headers for this name —
* establishAdminSession clears any stale marker, then the callback sets
* the fresh one — and browsers apply them in order, so the LAST wins.
*/
function idTokenCookie(res) {
const cookies = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).filter((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_id_token='));
const last = cookies[cookies.length - 1];
return last ? last.split(';')[0] : null;
}
it('stores the raw ID token in the oidc_id_token cookie on SSO login', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'logout-sub-1', email: 'logout@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
const cookie = idTokenCookie(res);
expect(cookie).toBeTruthy();
// Raw JWT, HttpOnly, scoped to /api/auth.
const raw = decodeURIComponent(cookie.replace('oidc_id_token=', ''));
expect(raw.split('.')).toHaveLength(3);
const setCookies = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).filter((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_id_token='));
const full = setCookies[setCookies.length - 1];
expect(full).toMatch(/HttpOnly/i);
expect(full).toMatch(/Path=\/api\/auth/i);
});
it('returns the IdP end-session URL on logout and clears the cookie', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'logout-sub-2', email: 'logout2@example.com', email_verified: true });
const cbRes = await ssoRoundTrip();
const cookie = idTokenCookie(cbRes);
const rawIdToken = decodeURIComponent(cookie.replace('oidc_id_token=', ''));
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', cookie)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeTruthy();
const url = new URL(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl);
expect(url.href.startsWith(`${idp.issuer}/logout`)).toBe(true);
expect(url.searchParams.get('id_token_hint')).toBe(rawIdToken);
expect(url.searchParams.get('post_logout_redirect_uri')).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login');
expect(url.searchParams.get('client_id')).toBe(idp.clientId);
// Cookie must be cleared so a later local-password logout in the same
// browser doesn't bounce to the IdP again.
const cleared = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_id_token='));
expect(cleared).toBeTruthy();
expect(cleared).toMatch(/Expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970|Max-Age=0/i);
});
it('omits ssoLogoutUrl when the feature is disabled', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'logout-sub-3', email: 'logout3@example.com', email_verified: true });
const cbRes = await ssoRoundTrip();
const cookie = idTokenCookie(cbRes);
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_logout_from_idp: false });
try {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', cookie)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeUndefined();
} finally {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_logout_from_idp: true });
}
});
it('omits ssoLogoutUrl without an oidc_id_token cookie (local-password session)', async () => {
const res = await request(app).post('/api/auth/logout').expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeUndefined();
});
it('omits ssoLogoutUrl when the IdP advertises no end_session_endpoint', async () => {
// Separate provider whose discovery document lacks end_session_endpoint;
// repointing the settings invalidates the discovery cache.
const bareIdp = new MockOidcProvider();
bareIdp.advertiseEndSession = false;
const bareIssuer = await bareIdp.start();
try {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_issuer_url: bareIssuer,
oidc_client_id: bareIdp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: bareIdp.clientSecret,
});
bareIdp.setNextUser({ sub: 'logout-sub-4', email: 'logout4@example.com', email_verified: true });
const cbRes = await ssoRoundTrip();
const cookie = idTokenCookie(cbRes);
expect(cookie).toBeTruthy();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', cookie)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeUndefined();
} finally {
await bareIdp.stop();
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_issuer_url: idp.issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp.clientSecret,
});
}
});
it('stores an issuer-tagged marker for oversized ID tokens; logout still round-trips, without a hint', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'logout-sub-5',
email: 'logout5@example.com',
email_verified: true,
// ~9KB of group claims — far past the 4KB cookie limit.
groups: Array.from({ length: 300 }, (_, i) => `group-${String(i).padStart(4, '0')}-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx`),
});
const cbRes = await ssoRoundTrip();
const cookie = idTokenCookie(cbRes);
expect(cookie).toBeTruthy();
// Issuer-tagged marker, not the (oversized) token itself.
const marker = decodeURIComponent(cookie.replace('oidc_id_token=', ''));
expect(marker.startsWith('sso.')).toBe(true);
expect(Buffer.from(marker.split('.')[1], 'base64url').toString('utf8')).toBe(idp.issuer);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', cookie)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeTruthy();
const url = new URL(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl);
expect(url.searchParams.get('id_token_hint')).toBeNull();
expect(url.searchParams.get('client_id')).toBe(idp.clientId);
});
it('skips the round-trip for an oversized-token marker from a DIFFERENT issuer', async () => {
const foreignMarker = `sso.${Buffer.from('http://other-idp.example').toString('base64url')}`;
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', `oidc_id_token=${foreignMarker}`)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeUndefined();
});
it('a fresh local-password login clears a stale SSO marker', async () => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'stale-marker-admin',
email: 'stale-marker@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('StaleMarker123!', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
must_change_password: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
// Stale marker from a dead SSO session rides along on the login request.
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.set('Cookie', 'oidc_id_token=stale.jwt.value')
.send({ username: 'stale-marker-admin', password: 'StaleMarker123!' })
.expect(200);
const cleared = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_id_token='));
expect(cleared).toBeTruthy();
expect(cleared).toMatch(/Expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970|Max-Age=0/i);
});
it('skips the round-trip when the stored hint was issued by a DIFFERENT issuer (config changed)', async () => {
// Fake-but-well-formed JWT from another IdP — payload is all that matters,
// buildEndSessionUrl decodes without verification for routing only.
const b64 = (obj) => Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(obj)).toString('base64url');
const foreignToken = `${b64({ alg: 'none' })}.${b64({ iss: 'http://other-idp.example', aud: idp.clientId })}.sig`;
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', `oidc_id_token=${foreignToken}`)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeUndefined();
});
it('drops only the hint when the issuer matches but the client changed', async () => {
const b64 = (obj) => Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(obj)).toString('base64url');
const oldClientToken = `${b64({ alg: 'none' })}.${b64({ iss: idp.issuer, aud: 'previous-client-id' })}.sig`;
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/logout')
.set('Cookie', `oidc_id_token=${oldClientToken}`)
.expect(200);
expect(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl).toBeTruthy();
const url = new URL(res.body.ssoLogoutUrl);
expect(url.searchParams.get('id_token_hint')).toBeNull();
expect(url.searchParams.get('client_id')).toBe(idp.clientId);
});
it('exposes the flag and post_logout_redirect_uri via getOidcConfig/getPostLogoutRedirectUri', async () => {
// Settings-route auth chains are covered in oidcSso.test.js; here the
// service surface the routes read from is pinned directly.
const cfg = await oidcService.getOidcConfig();
expect(cfg.logoutFromIdp).toBe(true);
expect(await oidcService.getPostLogoutRedirectUri()).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login');
});
});
@@ -1,416 +0,0 @@
/**
* OIDC role mapping + login policy integration tests (#798, phase 2).
*
* Same harness as oidcSso.test.js: supertest over the real routes, mock
* in-process IdP with genuine RS256/PKCE validation, fresh-SQLite DB. Pins:
*
* - JIT provisioning takes the MAPPED role from a nested dot-path claim
* (Keycloak's realm_access.roles), not the static default
* - roles are re-evaluated on every SSO login (upgrade AND downgrade)
* - several mapped roles → the highest-priority one wins
* - non-strict: unmapped login keeps the current role / default at JIT
* - strict (require_mapped_role): unmapped login → sso_error=no_role
* - the last active super_admin is never demoted by mapping
* - space-separated string claim values work (flat `roles` claim)
* - disable_local_login: password login → 403; OIDC_BREAK_GLASS=true
* re-opens it; flag is inert while SSO is disabled
* - PUT /sso validation: unknown mapping target and
* disable-local-login-without-SSO are rejected
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
const { MockOidcProvider } = require('./helpers/mockOidcProvider');
describe('OIDC role mapping + login policy (#798 phase 2)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let idp;
let oidcService;
let superAdminToken;
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'oidc-test-secret';
process.env.FRONTEND_URL = 'http://localhost:5199';
delete process.env.OIDC_BREAK_GLASS;
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
idp = new MockOidcProvider();
const issuer = await idp.start();
oidcService = require('../../src/services/oidcService');
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_enabled: true,
oidc_issuer_url: issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp.clientSecret,
oidc_autoprovision: true,
oidc_default_role: 'viewer',
oidc_role_mapping_enabled: true,
oidc_roles_claim: 'realm_access.roles',
oidc_role_mappings: {
'pp-super': 'super_admin',
'pp-admins': 'admin',
'pp-view': 'viewer',
},
});
const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
const adminSettingsRouter = require('../../src/routes/adminSettings');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/auth', authRouter);
app.use('/api/admin/settings', adminSettingsRouter);
// A real super_admin row + token for the settings-validation tests.
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'root-admin',
email: 'root@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('RootPass123', 4),
role_id: superRole.id,
is_active: 1,
auth_provider: 'local',
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
superAdminToken = jwt.sign(
{ id: rootId, username: 'root-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
delete process.env.OIDC_BREAK_GLASS;
if (idp) await idp.stop();
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
/** Drive login → IdP → callback like a browser; returns the callback response. */
async function ssoRoundTrip() {
const loginRes = await request(app).get('/api/auth/admin/sso/login').expect(302);
const stateCookie = (loginRes.headers['set-cookie'] || [])
.find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_state=')).split(';')[0];
const idpRes = await fetch(loginRes.headers.location, { redirect: 'manual' });
expect(idpRes.status).toBe(302);
const back = new URL(idpRes.headers.get('location'));
return request(app)
.get(`${back.pathname}?${back.searchParams.toString()}`)
.set('Cookie', stateCookie)
.expect(302);
}
async function roleOf(email) {
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ email }).first();
const role = await db('roles').where({ id: row.role_id }).first();
return role.name;
}
it('JIT-provisions with the role mapped from the nested dot-path claim', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['irrelevant', 'pp-admins'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('admin');
});
it('re-evaluates the role on every login — downgrade lands', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-view'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('viewer');
});
it('re-evaluates the role on every login — upgrade lands and the session JWT carries it', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-admins'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('admin');
// The freshly-minted session token must already carry the NEW role —
// the sync happens before session establishment.
const adminCookie = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('admin_token='));
const token = decodeURIComponent(adminCookie.split(';')[0].replace('admin_token=', ''));
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
expect(decoded.role).toBe('admin');
});
it('picks the highest-priority role when several IdP values map', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-multi',
email: 'multi@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-view', 'pp-admins'] },
});
await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(await roleOf('multi@example.com')).toBe('admin');
});
it('non-strict: an unmapped login keeps the current role / gets the default at JIT', async () => {
// Existing admin keeps its role.
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['nothing-mapped'] },
});
let res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('admin');
// JIT falls back to the configured default role.
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-unmapped-jit',
email: 'unmapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['nothing-mapped'] },
});
res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('unmapped@example.com')).toBe('viewer');
});
it('strict mode refuses unmapped logins with sso_error=no_role and no session', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_require_mapped_role: true });
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['nothing-mapped'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_require_mapped_role: false });
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=no_role');
expect((res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('admin_token='))).toBeFalsy();
// Role untouched by the refused attempt.
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('admin');
});
it('never demotes the last active super_admin', async () => {
// Make the SSO admin the ONLY active super_admin.
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const ssoAdmin = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'mapped@example.com' }).first();
await db('admin_users').where({ role_id: superRole.id }).update({ is_active: 0 });
await db('admin_users').where({ id: ssoAdmin.id }).update({ role_id: superRole.id, is_active: 1 });
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-view'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
// Still super_admin — the demotion was refused, the login was not.
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('super_admin');
// Restore: root admin back to active super_admin, SSO admin back to admin.
const adminRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ is_active: 1 });
await db('admin_users').where({ id: ssoAdmin.id }).update({ role_id: adminRole.id });
// With ANOTHER active super_admin present the same downgrade goes through.
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-map-1',
email: 'mapped@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-view'] },
});
await db('admin_users').where({ id: ssoAdmin.id }).update({ role_id: superRole.id });
await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(await roleOf('mapped@example.com')).toBe('viewer');
});
it('never demotes the last LOCAL-password super_admin even when an OIDC-owned super exists', async () => {
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const viewerRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'viewer' }).first();
// A local-password super admin, SSO-linked via verified email so role
// sync applies to it.
const [localId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'local-super',
email: 'local-super@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('LocalSuper123', 4),
role_id: superRole.id,
is_active: 1,
auth_provider: 'local',
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
// The only OTHER active super is OIDC-owned (root goes inactive) — the
// plain last-super guard would allow the demotion, the break-glass
// guard must not.
const ssoAdmin = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'mapped@example.com' }).first();
await db('admin_users').where({ id: ssoAdmin.id }).update({ role_id: superRole.id });
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ is_active: 0 });
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-local-super',
email: 'local-super@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['pp-view'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: localId }).first();
// Restore the fixture state before asserting.
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ is_active: 1 });
await db('admin_users').where({ id: ssoAdmin.id }).update({ role_id: viewerRole.id });
await db('admin_users').where({ id: localId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(row.role_id).toBe(superRole.id); // kept — it is the break-glass account
});
it('treats prototype-property IdP values (constructor/toString) as unmapped, not as an error', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-proto',
email: 'proto@example.com',
email_verified: true,
realm_access: { roles: ['constructor', 'toString', '__proto__'] },
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
// Non-strict: unmapped → JIT with the default role, login succeeds.
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('proto@example.com')).toBe('viewer');
});
it('accepts a space-separated string value on a flat claim', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_roles_claim: 'roles' });
idp.setNextUser({
sub: 'sub-flat',
email: 'flat@example.com',
email_verified: true,
roles: 'other pp-admins',
});
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_roles_claim: 'realm_access.roles' });
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
expect(await roleOf('flat@example.com')).toBe('admin');
});
it('refuses local password login while disable_local_login is effective', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_disable_local_login: true });
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: 'root@example.com', password: 'RootPass123' });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('LOCAL_LOGIN_DISABLED');
});
it('OIDC_BREAK_GLASS=true re-opens local login despite the policy', async () => {
process.env.OIDC_BREAK_GLASS = 'true';
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: 'root@example.com', password: 'RootPass123' });
delete process.env.OIDC_BREAK_GLASS;
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.user).toBeTruthy();
});
it('the stored flag is inert while SSO is disabled', async () => {
// Simulate a torn-down SSO config with the stale flag still set — the
// runtime check must ignore it (no lockout).
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'oidc_enabled' })
.update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(false) });
expect(await oidcService.isLocalLoginDisabled()).toBe(false);
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'oidc_enabled' })
.update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(true) });
expect(await oidcService.isLocalLoginDisabled()).toBe(true);
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_disable_local_login: false });
});
it('the policy disarms itself when no active local-password super admin remains', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_disable_local_login: true });
expect(await oidcService.isLocalLoginDisabled()).toBe(true);
// The break-glass account disappears (e.g. manual demotion/deactivation
// while the policy is on) → local login must re-open by itself.
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ auth_provider: 'oidc' });
expect(await oidcService.isLocalLoginDisabled()).toBe(false);
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ auth_provider: 'local' });
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_disable_local_login: false });
});
it('PUT /sso rejects a mapping onto an unknown role', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/settings/sso')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superAdminToken}`)
.send({ oidc_role_mappings: { 'pp-admins': 'does_not_exist' } });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/does_not_exist/);
// Stored mapping unchanged.
const cfg = await oidcService.getOidcConfig();
expect(cfg.roleMappings['pp-admins']).toBe('admin');
});
it('PUT /sso rejects disabling local login while SSO is (being turned) off', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/settings/sso')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superAdminToken}`)
.send({ oidc_enabled: false, oidc_disable_local_login: true });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/while SSO is enabled/);
});
it('PUT /sso refuses SSO-only mode without an active local-password super admin', async () => {
// Make every active super_admin OIDC-owned — break-glass would then
// re-open a password route that no account can use.
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
await db('admin_users').where({ role_id: superRole.id }).update({ auth_provider: 'oidc' });
const denied = await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/settings/sso')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superAdminToken}`)
.send({ oidc_disable_local_login: true });
// Restore the local break-glass account, then the same request passes.
await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'root@example.com' }).update({ auth_provider: 'local' });
expect(denied.status).toBe(400);
expect(denied.body.error).toMatch(/break-glass/);
const allowed = await request(app)
.put('/api/admin/settings/sso')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superAdminToken}`)
.send({ oidc_disable_local_login: true });
expect(allowed.status).toBe(200);
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_disable_local_login: false });
});
it('GET /sso returns the phase-2 fields', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/settings/sso')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${superAdminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.oidc_role_mapping_enabled).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.oidc_roles_claim).toBe('realm_access.roles');
expect(res.body.oidc_role_mappings).toEqual({
'pp-super': 'super_admin',
'pp-admins': 'admin',
'pp-view': 'viewer',
});
expect(res.body.oidc_require_mapped_role).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.oidc_disable_local_login).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -1,302 +0,0 @@
/**
* OIDC SSO integration tests (#798, phase 1).
*
* Full-stack over a mock in-process IdP (mockOidcProvider): supertest drives
* the real /admin/sso/login and /admin/sso/callback routes on a fresh-SQLite
* database, openid-client does genuine discovery/JWKS/PKCE/ID-token
* validation against the mock issuer. Pins:
*
* - happy path: JIT provisioning creates an admin and sets the session cookie
* - JIT off → not_provisioned redirect, no row created
* - repeat login matches by sub, not email (email change ≠ new account)
* - verified-email one-time link onto an existing local admin
* - unverified email must NOT link (falls through to JIT/or error)
* - deactivated admin → inactive redirect
* - missing/forged state cookie → state redirect
* - nonce tamper from the IdP → idp redirect
* - settings endpoints: secret write-only, generic /general upsert cannot
* clobber oidc_client_secret
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
const { MockOidcProvider } = require('./helpers/mockOidcProvider');
describe('OIDC SSO (#798)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let idp;
let oidcService;
const agentCookies = {};
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'oidc-test-secret';
// The redirect_uri derives from the public base URL — pin it explicitly:
// CI has no backend/.env, and getFrontendBaseUrl() returning '' makes
// buildAuthorizationRequest fail (by design) with OIDC_BAD_CONFIG.
process.env.FRONTEND_URL = 'http://localhost:5199';
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
idp = new MockOidcProvider();
const issuer = await idp.start();
// Require AFTER bootCrmDb so services share this db instance.
oidcService = require('../../src/services/oidcService');
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_enabled: true,
oidc_issuer_url: issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp.clientSecret,
oidc_autoprovision: true,
oidc_default_role: 'viewer',
});
const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/auth', authRouter);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (idp) await idp.stop();
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
/** Drive login → IdP → callback like a browser; returns the callback response. */
async function ssoRoundTrip({ mutateState } = {}) {
const loginRes = await request(app).get('/api/auth/admin/sso/login').expect(302);
const idpUrl = loginRes.headers.location;
expect(idpUrl.startsWith(idp.issuer)).toBe(true);
let stateCookie = (loginRes.headers['set-cookie'] || [])
.find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_state='));
expect(stateCookie).toBeTruthy();
stateCookie = stateCookie.split(';')[0];
if (mutateState === 'drop') stateCookie = null;
if (mutateState === 'forge') {
stateCookie = `oidc_state=${jwt.sign({ type: 'oidc_state', s: 'x', n: 'y', cv: 'z' }, 'wrong-secret', { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' })}`;
}
// "Browser" follows the redirect to the IdP, which instantly bounces back.
const idpRes = await fetch(idpUrl, { redirect: 'manual' });
expect(idpRes.status).toBe(302);
const back = new URL(idpRes.headers.get('location'));
let cb = request(app).get(`${back.pathname}?${back.searchParams.toString()}`);
if (stateCookie) cb = cb.set('Cookie', stateCookie);
return cb.expect(302);
}
it('JIT-provisions an unknown user and establishes an admin session', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-jit-1', email: 'jit@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
const adminCookie = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('admin_token='));
expect(adminCookie).toBeTruthy();
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'jit@example.com' }).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.auth_provider).toBe('oidc');
expect(row.external_subject).toBe('sub-jit-1');
const role = await db('roles').where('id', row.role_id).first();
expect(role.name).toBe('viewer');
// The session JWT must be a normal admin token.
const token = adminCookie.split(';')[0].replace('admin_token=', '');
const decoded = jwt.verify(decodeURIComponent(token), process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
expect(decoded.type).toBe('admin');
expect(decoded.id).toBe(row.id);
agentCookies.jitAdminId = row.id;
});
it('matches repeat logins by sub even when the email changed at the IdP', async () => {
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-jit-1', email: 'renamed@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
// No second row — resolved via external_subject.
expect(await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'renamed@example.com' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
const byId = await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).first();
expect(byId.external_subject).toBe('sub-jit-1');
});
it('links an existing local admin one-time via VERIFIED email and stamps the sub', async () => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
const [localId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'local-admin',
email: 'local@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('LocalPass123', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
auth_provider: 'local',
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-local-1', email: 'local@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: localId }).first();
expect(row.external_subject).toBe('sub-local-1');
expect(row.auth_provider).toBe('local'); // password keeps working
});
it('does NOT link by unverified email — provisions a separate account instead', async () => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'victim-admin',
email: 'victim@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('VictimPass123', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
auth_provider: 'local',
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
});
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-attacker', email: 'victim@example.com', email_verified: false });
// JIT would need this email but the victim row owns it (unique) — the
// insert fails and the flow must land on an error, never on the
// victim's session.
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toMatch(/sso_error=/);
const victim = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'victim@example.com' }).first();
expect(victim.external_subject).toBeNull();
});
it('refuses a deactivated admin with sso_error=inactive', async () => {
await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).update({ is_active: 0 });
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-jit-1', email: 'renamed@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=inactive');
await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).update({ is_active: 1 });
});
it('rejects a callback without the state cookie', async () => {
const res = await ssoRoundTrip({ mutateState: 'drop' });
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=state');
});
it('rejects a forged state cookie (wrong signing key)', async () => {
const res = await ssoRoundTrip({ mutateState: 'forge' });
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=state');
});
it('rejects an ID token whose nonce does not match', async () => {
idp.tamperNonce = true;
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-nonce', email: 'nonce@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
idp.tamperNonce = false;
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=idp');
expect(await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'nonce@example.com' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
});
it('blocks JIT with sso_error=not_provisioned when autoprovision is off', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_autoprovision: false });
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-new-user', email: 'new@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/login?sso_error=not_provisioned');
expect(await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'new@example.com' }).first()).toBeFalsy();
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_autoprovision: true });
});
it('stores the client secret encrypted and survives a config round-trip', async () => {
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'oidc_client_secret' }).first();
const stored = JSON.parse(row.setting_value);
expect(stored).not.toContain(idp.clientSecret);
expect(oidcService.decryptSecret(stored)).toBe(idp.clientSecret);
const cfg = await oidcService.getOidcConfig();
expect(cfg.clientSecret).toBe(idp.clientSecret);
});
it('refuses local password login for OIDC-owned accounts', async () => {
// Give the JIT admin a KNOWN password hash directly in the DB — the
// auth_provider check must reject the login even with valid credentials
// (otherwise a password reset would mint an IdP-bypassing local login).
await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).update({
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('KnownPass123', 4),
});
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).first();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/admin/login')
.send({ username: row.email, password: 'KnownPass123' });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('returns 404 from /sso/login when SSO is disabled', async () => {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_enabled: false });
await request(app).get('/api/auth/admin/sso/login').expect(404);
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({ oidc_enabled: true });
});
it('merges email from the UserInfo endpoint when the ID token omits it', async () => {
idp.emailViaUserinfoOnly = true;
idp.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-userinfo', email: 'userinfo@example.com', email_verified: true });
const res = await ssoRoundTrip();
idp.emailViaUserinfoOnly = false;
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
const row = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'userinfo@example.com' }).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.external_subject).toBe('sub-userinfo');
});
it('binds identities per ISSUER — a sub collision on a new IdP must not inherit the old account', async () => {
// The JIT admin from the first test is bound to (issuer A, 'sub-jit-1').
const boundAdmin = await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).first();
expect(boundAdmin.external_issuer).toBe(idp.issuer);
// Same sub, DIFFERENT issuer: a second IdP the instance switches to.
const idp2 = new MockOidcProvider();
await idp2.start();
try {
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_issuer_url: idp2.issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp2.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp2.clientSecret,
});
idp2.setNextUser({ sub: 'sub-jit-1', email: 'colliding@example.com', email_verified: true });
const loginRes = await request(app).get('/api/auth/admin/sso/login').expect(302);
const stateCookie = (loginRes.headers['set-cookie'] || [])
.find((c) => c.startsWith('oidc_state=')).split(';')[0];
const idpRes = await fetch(loginRes.headers.location, { redirect: 'manual' });
const back = new URL(idpRes.headers.get('location'));
const res = await request(app)
.get(`${back.pathname}?${back.searchParams.toString()}`)
.set('Cookie', stateCookie)
.expect(302);
expect(res.headers.location).toBe('http://localhost:5199/admin/dashboard');
// A NEW row bound to issuer B — the issuer-A admin is untouched and
// its role was not inherited.
const collider = await db('admin_users').where({ email: 'colliding@example.com' }).first();
expect(collider).toBeTruthy();
expect(collider.id).not.toBe(agentCookies.jitAdminId);
expect(collider.external_issuer).toBe(idp2.issuer);
const original = await db('admin_users').where({ id: agentCookies.jitAdminId }).first();
expect(original.external_issuer).toBe(idp.issuer);
} finally {
await idp2.stop();
await oidcService.saveOidcSettings({
oidc_issuer_url: idp.issuer,
oidc_client_id: idp.clientId,
oidc_client_secret: idp.clientSecret,
});
}
});
});
@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
'use strict';
/**
* Cross-engine .picpeak restore policy (#1041): a SQLite archive restored onto
* a PostgreSQL instance — the official small-install → full-stack upgrade
* path — now allowed by validateManifest's direction rule instead of the
* former CLI-only allowEngineSwitch flag. The coercion engine itself
* (typedColumnsFor / epochToIso / coerceForTargetEngine) landed with #1039;
* these tests pin the direction policy and the coercion's cross-engine
* value-correctness.
*
* Ungated: validateManifest direction rules and the pure coercion units.
* The reverse direction (pg backup onto a sqlite instance) staying blocked is
* pinned by picpeakRoundtrip.test.js, which runs on the real sqlite harness.
*
* Gated on PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL (same contract as picpeakRestorePg.test.js):
* sqlite-shaped NDJSON rows land in real Postgres with correct stored VALUES,
* not just row counts, e.g.
* PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:pw@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_xengine_test" \
* npx jest __tests__/integration/picpeakCrossEngine.test.js
*/
const knexLib = require('knex');
describe('validateManifest cross-engine direction (pg target)', () => {
let validateManifest;
beforeAll(() => {
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg' }));
// validateManifest wraps its knex_migrations lookup in try/catch — a
// throwing stub simply skips the forward-only check, which is not under
// test here.
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: () => { throw new Error('stub'); } }));
({ validateManifest } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
});
afterAll(() => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
jest.resetModules();
});
it('allows a sqlite backup onto a pg instance (upgrade direction)', async () => {
const blockers = await validateManifest({
kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'sqlite' }, tables: {},
});
expect(blockers.filter((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('still allows same-engine pg → pg', async () => {
const blockers = await validateManifest({
kind: 'picpeak-backup', format: 1, database: { engine: 'pg' }, tables: {},
});
expect(blockers.filter((b) => /engine/i.test(b))).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
describe('epochToIso (landed with #1039)', () => {
let epochToIso;
beforeAll(() => {
jest.resetModules();
({ epochToIso } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
});
it('converts epoch milliseconds', () => {
expect(epochToIso(1723400000000)).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
});
it('converts epoch SECONDS to the same instant, not January 1970', () => {
expect(epochToIso(1723400000)).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
});
it('converts numeric strings', () => {
expect(epochToIso('1723400000000')).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
});
it('passes non-numeric values through untouched', () => {
expect(epochToIso('2026-08-12 10:00:00')).toBe('2026-08-12 10:00:00');
});
});
describe('coerceForTargetEngine on sqlite-shaped rows', () => {
let coerceForTargetEngine;
beforeAll(() => {
jest.resetModules();
({ coerceForTargetEngine } = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService'));
});
const types = { timestamps: ['created_at', 'expires_at'], booleans: ['is_active'] };
it('coerces 0/1 booleans and epoch timestamps, leaves date strings alone', () => {
const [row] = coerceForTargetEngine(
[{ id: 1, is_active: 1, created_at: 1723400000000, expires_at: '2026-09-01 12:00:00' }],
types
);
expect(row.is_active).toBe(true);
expect(row.created_at).toBe('2024-08-11T18:13:20.000Z');
expect(row.expires_at).toBe('2026-09-01 12:00:00'); // pg parses this natively
});
it('coerces falsy variants and passes null/empty through', () => {
const [row] = coerceForTargetEngine(
[{ is_active: 0, created_at: null, expires_at: '' }],
types
);
expect(row.is_active).toBe(false);
expect(row.created_at).toBeNull();
expect(row.expires_at).toBe('');
});
});
// ── Real-Postgres integration (gated) ────────────────────────────────────────
const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
maybe('sqlite-shaped rows land correctly in real Postgres', () => {
let pgDb;
let svc;
beforeAll(async () => {
pgDb = knexLib({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL });
await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS xengine_events, xengine_settings CASCADE');
await pgDb.schema.createTable('xengine_events', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('slug');
t.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
t.boolean('allow_downloads').defaultTo(true);
t.timestamp('created_at');
t.timestamp('expires_at');
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('xengine_settings', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('setting_key').notNullable().unique();
t.jsonb('setting_value');
});
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg' }));
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: pgDb }));
svc = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService');
});
afterAll(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
if (pgDb) {
await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS xengine_events, xengine_settings CASCADE');
await pgDb.destroy();
}
});
it('typedColumnsFor classifies boolean and timestamp columns via columnInfo()', async () => {
const types = await svc.typedColumnsFor(pgDb, 'xengine_events');
expect(types.booleans.sort()).toEqual(['allow_downloads', 'is_active']);
expect(types.timestamps.sort()).toEqual(['created_at', 'expires_at']);
});
it('inserts a sqlite archive row (0/1 booleans, epoch dates, json text) with correct stored values', async () => {
// Exactly what a sqlite-created .picpeak carries: integers for booleans,
// epoch numbers for #485-shape timestamps (ms here, seconds covered by the
// epochToIso unit), a "YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS" string for clean ones, and
// json columns as TEXT (the crossEngine path skips serialiseJsonColumns —
// the text is already what pg wants).
const epoch = 1723400000000;
const eventRows = [
{ id: 1, slug: 'wedding', is_active: 1, allow_downloads: 0, created_at: epoch, expires_at: '2026-09-01 12:00:00' },
];
const settingRows = [{ id: 1, setting_key: 'brand', setting_value: '{"name":"PicPeak","dark":true}' }];
await pgDb.transaction(async (trx) => {
const evTypes = await svc.typedColumnsFor(trx, 'xengine_events');
await trx.batchInsert('xengine_events', svc.coerceForTargetEngine(eventRows, evTypes), 100);
const stTypes = await svc.typedColumnsFor(trx, 'xengine_settings');
await trx.batchInsert('xengine_settings', svc.coerceForTargetEngine(settingRows, stTypes), 100);
});
const ev = await pgDb('xengine_events').where({ id: 1 }).first();
expect(ev.is_active).toBe(true); // 1 → true, not backwards (#1028 class)
expect(ev.allow_downloads).toBe(false); // 0 → false
expect(new Date(ev.created_at).getTime()).toBe(epoch);
expect(new Date(ev.expires_at).toISOString().slice(0, 10)).toBe('2026-09-01');
const st = await pgDb('xengine_settings').where({ id: 1 }).first();
// jsonb parsed back by the driver — value intact, no double encoding.
expect(st.setting_value).toEqual({ name: 'PicPeak', dark: true });
});
it('id sequence works after explicit-id insert + resync (next natural insert)', async () => {
await svc.resyncSequences(['xengine_events']);
const [next] = await pgDb('xengine_events')
.insert({ slug: 'fresh', is_active: true })
.returning('id');
expect(Number(next.id || next)).toBe(2);
});
});
@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
/**
* PostgreSQL integration tests for the .picpeak restore robustness fixes.
* Gated: runs only when PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL points at a throwaway Postgres DB,
* e.g.
* PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL="postgres://picpeak:picpeak_secure_pass_2024@127.0.0.1:7102/picpeak_restore_test" \
* npx jest __tests__/integration/picpeakRestorePg.test.js
*
* Validates the Postgres-specific paths that SQLite can't exercise: identity
* sequences left stale by explicit-id inserts, pg_get_serial_sequence raising on
* id-less tables, reinject/role-recreate explicit-id inserts, and FK integrity.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const PG_URL = process.env.PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL;
const maybe = PG_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
maybe('picpeak restore on Postgres', () => {
let pgDb;
let svc;
beforeAll(async () => {
pgDb = knex({ client: 'pg', connection: PG_URL });
await pgDb.raw('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS role_permissions, events, admin_users, roles, permissions, app_settings CASCADE');
await pgDb.schema.createTable('roles', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('name', 50).notNullable().unique();
t.string('display_name', 100);
t.integer('priority').defaultTo(0);
t.boolean('is_system').defaultTo(false);
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('permissions', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('name', 100).notNullable().unique();
t.string('display_name', 150);
t.string('category', 50);
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('role_permissions', (t) => {
t.integer('role_id').notNullable().references('id').inTable('roles').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.integer('permission_id').notNullable().references('id').inTable('permissions').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.primary(['role_id', 'permission_id']);
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('username').notNullable().unique();
t.string('email').notNullable().unique();
t.string('password_hash');
t.boolean('is_active').defaultTo(true);
t.boolean('must_change_password').defaultTo(false);
t.integer('role_id').references('id').inTable('roles').onDelete('SET NULL');
t.integer('created_by').references('id').inTable('admin_users').onDelete('SET NULL');
t.boolean('two_factor_enabled').defaultTo(false);
t.string('two_factor_secret');
t.text('two_factor_recovery_codes');
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('events', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('slug');
t.integer('created_by').references('id').inTable('admin_users').onDelete('SET NULL');
});
await pgDb.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('setting_key').notNullable().unique();
t.json('setting_value');
t.string('setting_type');
t.timestamp('updated_at').defaultTo(pgDb.fn.now());
});
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'pg' }));
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: pgDb }));
svc = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService');
});
afterAll(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
if (pgDb) await pgDb.destroy();
});
beforeEach(async () => {
await pgDb('role_permissions').del();
await pgDb('events').del();
await pgDb('admin_users').del();
await pgDb('roles').del();
await pgDb('permissions').del();
});
test('resyncSequences fast-forwards stale sequences and skips id-less tables', async () => {
// Simulate a restore: explicit-id inserts leave the sequence at 1.
await pgDb('roles').insert([{ id: 5, name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'SA' }]);
await pgDb('admin_users').insert([{ id: 9, username: 'a', email: 'a@x.io', password_hash: 'h' }]);
await pgDb('permissions').insert([{ id: 3, name: 'events.create', display_name: 'C', category: 'events' }]);
await pgDb('role_permissions').insert([{ role_id: 5, permission_id: 3 }]); // id-less table
// Must not throw on role_permissions (no `id` column → pg_get_serial_sequence raises unguarded).
await expect(svc.resyncSequences(['roles', 'admin_users', 'permissions', 'role_permissions'])).resolves.toBeUndefined();
// Natural inserts (no explicit id) now avoid the restored ids.
const [adminId] = await pgDb('admin_users').insert({ username: 'b', email: 'b@x.io', password_hash: 'h' }).returning('id');
expect(Number(adminId.id || adminId)).toBe(10); // max(9)+1, no duplicate-key error
const [roleId] = await pgDb('roles').insert({ name: 'editor', display_name: 'Ed' }).returning('id');
expect(Number(roleId.id || roleId)).toBe(6);
});
test('reinjectCurrentAdmin insert branch works with a stale sequence (explicit max+1)', async () => {
await pgDb('admin_users').insert({ id: 9, username: 'backup', email: 'backup@x.io', password_hash: 'h' });
const operator = { id: 1, username: 'admin', email: 'op@x.io', password_hash: 'OP', is_active: true, created_by: 42 };
await pgDb.transaction((trx) => svc.reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator));
const op = await pgDb('admin_users').where({ email: 'op@x.io' }).first();
expect(op.id).toBe(10); // max(9)+1
expect(op.password_hash).toBe('OP');
expect(op.created_by).toBeNull(); // self-ref FK nulled so the insert can't dangle
});
test('preserveOperatorRole re-creates a missing role on Postgres and keeps FK integrity', async () => {
await pgDb('permissions').insert([{ id: 3, name: 'events.create', display_name: 'C', category: 'events' }]);
await pgDb('roles').insert([{ id: 2, name: 'viewer', display_name: 'V' }]);
await pgDb('admin_users').insert({ id: 1, username: 'admin', email: 'op@x.io', password_hash: 'h', role_id: null });
const snapshot = { role: { name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'SA', priority: 100, is_system: true }, permissions: ['events.create', 'missing.perm'] };
await pgDb.transaction((trx) => svc.preserveOperatorRole(trx, 1, snapshot));
await svc.resyncSequences(['roles']); // post-commit, mirrors importFromPicpeak
const role = await pgDb('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
expect(role).toBeTruthy();
const op = await pgDb('admin_users').where({ id: 1 }).first();
expect(op.role_id).toBe(role.id); // FK valid, operator not downgraded
const grants = await pgDb('role_permissions').where({ role_id: role.id }).pluck('permission_id');
expect(grants).toEqual([3]); // existing perm granted, missing.perm skipped
});
test('full replaceAllTables: cross-instance backup preserves the operator, role, FKs, and sequences', async () => {
// A backup from ANOTHER instance: omits the operator's email AND their
// super_admin role; uses explicit ids that leave sequences stale.
const staging = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-pgtest-'));
const dataDir = path.join(staging, 'data');
fs.mkdirSync(dataDir);
const write = (t, rows) => fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dataDir, `${t}.ndjson`), rows.map((r) => JSON.stringify(r)).join('\n'));
write('roles', [{ id: 5, name: 'admin', display_name: 'Admin', priority: 50, is_system: true }]);
write('permissions', [{ id: 3, name: 'events.create', display_name: 'C', category: 'events' }]);
write('role_permissions', [{ role_id: 5, permission_id: 3 }]);
write('admin_users', [{ id: 9, username: 'backupadmin', email: 'backup@x.io', password_hash: 'h', role_id: 5, is_active: true }]);
write('events', [{ id: 2, slug: 'restored-ev', created_by: 9 }]);
const operator = { id: 1, username: 'admin', email: 'op@x.io', password_hash: 'OP', is_active: true, role_id: 999, created_by: null };
const roleSnapshot = { role: { name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'Super Admin', priority: 100, is_system: true }, permissions: ['events.create'] };
const tables = ['roles', 'permissions', 'role_permissions', 'admin_users', 'events'];
// replaceAllTables isn't exported, so drive its exact transaction sequence
// (suspend FKs, wipe, batchInsert, reinject, preserve role) through the
// exported units against real Postgres.
const importSvc = svc;
await pgDb.transaction(async (trx) => {
await trx.raw('SET session_replication_role = \'replica\'');
for (const t of tables) await trx(t).del();
for (const t of tables) {
const rows = fs.readFileSync(path.join(dataDir, `${t}.ndjson`), 'utf8').split('\n').filter(Boolean).map((l) => JSON.parse(l));
if (rows.length) await trx.batchInsert(t, rows, 100);
}
const opId = await importSvc.reinjectCurrentAdmin(trx, operator);
await importSvc.preserveOperatorRole(trx, opId, roleSnapshot);
await trx.raw('SET session_replication_role = \'origin\'');
});
await importSvc.resyncSequences(tables);
// Operator preserved (inserted, since email absent from backup).
const op = await pgDb('admin_users').where({ email: 'op@x.io' }).first();
expect(op).toBeTruthy();
expect(op.password_hash).toBe('OP');
// super_admin role re-created and the operator bound to it.
const sa = await pgDb('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
expect(sa).toBeTruthy();
expect(op.role_id).toBe(sa.id);
expect(await pgDb('role_permissions').where({ role_id: sa.id }).pluck('permission_id')).toEqual([3]);
// Restored event's created_by FK to the backup admin still valid.
const ev = await pgDb('events').where({ slug: 'restored-ev' }).first();
expect(ev.created_by).toBe(9);
// Sequences resynced → natural inserts don't collide.
const [newAdmin] = await pgDb('admin_users').insert({ username: 'fresh', email: 'fresh@x.io', password_hash: 'h' }).returning('id');
expect(Number(newAdmin.id || newAdmin)).toBeGreaterThan(op.id);
fs.rmSync(staging, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
});
@@ -1,375 +0,0 @@
/**
* Responsive preview tiers (#1095).
*
* A phone can display ~1170px at most, so the single 1920px preview ships
* roughly twice the bytes it can use on every lightbox swipe — and the
* lightbox prefetches neighbours, so a guest flicking through a wedding
* gallery on cellular pays that repeatedly.
*
* The width is whitelisted rather than free-form: every distinct value is a
* permanent cache entry on disk, so an open ?w= is an invitation to fill the
* volume with renditions nobody asked for.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
const tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-tiers-'));
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpRoot, 'db.sqlite');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'tiers-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpRoot, 'storage');
fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
const sharp = require('sharp');
const imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
let db; let cleanup;
describe('preview tiers (#1095)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
await fs.promises.rm(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
describe('normalizeTierWidth', () => {
const { normalizeTierWidth, PREVIEW_WIDTHS, THUMBNAIL_WIDTHS } = imageProcessor;
it('accepts every advertised width', () => {
for (const w of PREVIEW_WIDTHS) {
expect(normalizeTierWidth(String(w), PREVIEW_WIDTHS)).toBe(w);
}
for (const w of THUMBNAIL_WIDTHS) {
expect(normalizeTierWidth(String(w), THUMBNAIL_WIDTHS)).toBe(w);
}
});
it('rejects anything not on the list', () => {
// The disk-filling cases: arbitrary sizes, and a caller walking a range.
for (const bad of ['999', '1921', '0', '-100', '99999']) {
expect(normalizeTierWidth(bad, PREVIEW_WIDTHS)).toBeNull();
}
});
it('rejects junk without throwing', () => {
// Straight off a query string, so it is whatever the client sent.
for (const bad of [undefined, null, '', 'abc', '12abc', {}, [], '1e3', 'NaN']) {
expect(normalizeTierWidth(bad, PREVIEW_WIDTHS)).toBeNull();
}
});
it('does not let a thumbnail width through the preview list', () => {
// The two lists are separate on purpose; 600 is a thumb tier, not a
// preview tier, and vice versa for 1280.
expect(normalizeTierWidth('600', PREVIEW_WIDTHS)).toBeNull();
expect(normalizeTierWidth('1280', THUMBNAIL_WIDTHS)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('ensurePreviewImageAtWidth', () => {
async function seedPhoto() {
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `tier-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'tier',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `tier-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
// A real image on disk under STORAGE_PATH, since the managed branch
// resolves through storage rather than a mount.
const rel = `events/active/tier/${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}.jpg`;
const abs = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, rel);
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
await sharp({ create: { width: 3000, height: 2000, channels: 3, background: { r: 10, g: 90, b: 160 } } })
.jpeg().toFile(abs);
const [p] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: path.basename(rel),
path: rel.replace(/^events\/active\//, ''),
type: 'individual',
width: 3000,
height: 2000,
processing_status: 'complete',
source_origin: 'managed',
}).returning('id');
return db('photos').where({ id: typeof p === 'object' ? p.id : p }).first();
}
it('scopes keys by photo id so two galleries cannot collide', async () => {
// The leak: managed auto-imports keep camera basenames, so two events can
// each hold an IMG_0001.jpg. A tier is served straight from a cache hit
// without re-reading the source, so a shared key hands one gallery's
// photo to another.
const a = await seedPhoto();
const b = await seedPhoto();
await db('photos').where({ id: a.id }).update({ path: 'wedding-a/IMG_0001.jpg' });
await db('photos').where({ id: b.id }).update({ path: 'wedding-b/IMG_0001.jpg' });
const keyA = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys(await db('photos').where({ id: a.id }).first())[0];
const keyB = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys(await db('photos').where({ id: b.id }).first())[0];
expect(keyA).not.toBe(keyB);
expect(keyA).toContain(`p${a.id}_`);
expect(keyB).toContain(`p${b.id}_`);
});
it('derives every non-default tier key for cleanup', () => {
// Tiers live outside preview_path, so delete/archive/regenerate have no
// other way to find them. 1920 is excluded because that IS preview_path.
const keys = imageProcessor.previewTierKeys({ id: 5, path: 'e/a.jpg', source_origin: 'managed' });
expect(keys).toHaveLength(imageProcessor.PREVIEW_WIDTHS.length - 1);
expect(keys.some((k) => k.includes('w1920'))).toBe(false);
expect(keys.every((k) => k.includes('p5_'))).toBe(true);
});
it('deletePreviewTiers removes generated tiers from storage', async () => {
const photo = await seedPhoto();
const key = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
const abs = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, key);
expect(fs.existsSync(abs)).toBe(true);
await imageProcessor.deletePreviewTiers(await db('photos').where({ id: photo.id }).first());
expect(fs.existsSync(abs)).toBe(false);
});
it('produces a distinct key per width and never touches preview_path', async () => {
const photo = await seedPhoto();
const small = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
expect(small).toContain('preview_w640_');
// The extra tiers are cache, not state. Writing them to the row would
// mean the last size requested silently becomes "the" preview.
const row = await db('photos').where({ id: photo.id }).first();
expect(row.preview_path == null || !String(row.preview_path).includes('w640')).toBe(true);
});
it('resolves the default width to the canonical preview, not a w1920 copy', async () => {
// Otherwise every existing install grows a duplicate of every preview it
// already has, for no benefit.
const photo = await seedPhoto();
const def = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 1920);
expect(def).not.toContain('preview_w1920_');
});
it('reuses the cached tier instead of regenerating', async () => {
const photo = await seedPhoto();
const first = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 1280);
expect(first).toBeTruthy();
const abs = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, first);
const before = (await fs.promises.stat(abs)).mtimeMs;
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
const second = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 1280);
expect(second).toBe(first);
expect((await fs.promises.stat(abs)).mtimeMs).toBe(before);
});
it('actually resizes to the requested tier', async () => {
const photo = await seedPhoto();
const key = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImageAtWidth(photo, 640);
const meta = await sharp(path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, key)).metadata();
// 3000x2000 constrained to a 640 long edge.
expect(Math.max(meta.width, meta.height)).toBe(640);
expect(meta.height).toBe(Math.round(640 * (2000 / 3000)));
});
});
describe('thumbnail tiers', () => {
async function seedThumbPhoto(w = 3000, h = 2000) {
const [e] = await db('events').insert({
slug: `tt-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
event_type: 'wedding', event_name: 'tt', event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com', admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x', share_link: `tt-${Math.random()}`,
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const eventId = typeof e === 'object' ? e.id : e;
const rel = `events/active/tt/${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}.jpg`;
const abs = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, rel);
await fs.promises.mkdir(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
await sharp({ create: { width: w, height: h, channels: 3, background: { r: 5, g: 5, b: 5 } } })
.jpeg().toFile(abs);
const [p2] = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId, filename: path.basename(rel),
path: rel.replace(/^events\/active\//, ''), type: 'individual',
width: w, height: h, processing_status: 'complete', source_origin: 'managed',
}).returning('id');
return db('photos').where({ id: typeof p2 === 'object' ? p2.id : p2 }).first();
}
it('scopes thumbnail tier keys by photo id', async () => {
// Same cross-gallery hazard the preview tiers had: a cache hit serves
// without re-reading the source, so a shared basename leaks across events.
const keys = imageProcessor.thumbnailTierKeys({ id: 42, path: 'a/IMG_0001.jpg', source_origin: 'managed' });
expect(keys.every((k) => k.includes('p42_'))).toBe(true);
// Every width, canonical included: which one is canonical depends on the
// thumbnail_width setting, so on a 600-configured install w300 is the
// tier file. Deleting a key that was never written is a no-op; missing
// one strands it forever.
expect(keys).toHaveLength(3);
});
it('tags the tier against the configured width, not the 300 default', async () => {
// Regression: with thumbnail_width=600 a w=300 request wrote
// `thumb_<name>` while the caller probed `thumb_w300_<name>`. The cache
// never hit, so every request re-downloaded the original and ran Sharp,
// and the file it left behind was in no cleanup list.
await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'thumbnail_width')
.update({ setting_value: 600 });
try {
const photo = await seedThumbPhoto();
const first = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, 300);
expect(first).toContain('thumb_w300_');
// The second call must be a cache hit on the key the first one wrote.
const before = fs.statSync(path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, first)).mtimeMs;
const second = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, 300);
expect(second).toBe(first);
expect(fs.statSync(path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, second)).mtimeMs).toBe(before);
// ...and 600 is now the canonical, so it resolves to the plain thumbnail.
const canonical = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, 600);
expect(canonical).not.toContain('thumb_w600_');
// Cleanup still reaches the w300 tier this install actually generated.
expect(imageProcessor.thumbnailTierKeys(photo)).toContain(first);
} finally {
await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'thumbnail_width')
.update({ setting_value: 300 });
}
});
it('generates a tier at the requested size', async () => {
const photo = await seedThumbPhoto();
const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, 600);
expect(key).toContain('thumb_w600_');
const meta = await sharp(path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, key)).metadata();
expect(Math.max(meta.width, meta.height)).toBe(600);
});
it('does not upscale past the source, which is why the tier is clamped', async () => {
// The reason tileThumbnailWidth checks the short edge: ask a 400px
// source for 900 and withoutEnlargement caps it, so the request buys a
// Sharp run and a second cache entry for a file identical to the 300.
const small = await seedThumbPhoto(500, 400);
const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(small, 900);
const meta = await sharp(path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, key)).metadata();
expect(Math.max(meta.width, meta.height)).toBeLessThan(900);
});
it('resolves the canonical width to the normal thumbnail', async () => {
const photo = await seedThumbPhoto();
const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, 300);
expect(key).not.toContain('thumb_w300_');
});
it('keeps the configured aspect ratio instead of forcing a square', async () => {
// Thumbnails are square by default, but the settings API takes any
// width/height in 50..1000. With fit:'cover' a 300x200 canonical and a
// 600x600 tier are two different crops, so the photo would visibly
// reframe as the tile size changed.
await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'thumbnail_height')
.update({ setting_value: 200 });
try {
const photo = await seedThumbPhoto();
const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, 600);
const meta = await sharp(path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, key)).metadata();
expect(meta.width).toBe(600);
expect(meta.height).toBe(400); // 600 * (200/300), not 600
} finally {
await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'thumbnail_height')
.update({ setting_value: 300 });
}
});
it('never hands a video to Sharp', async () => {
// A video's thumbnail is a poster frame from videoProcessor, not a
// resize of the stored file. Without the short-circuit the tier path
// would download the whole video (withLocalCopy, in full on S3) and
// then fail to decode it — every request, since nothing caches a miss.
const photo = await seedThumbPhoto();
await db('photos').where({ id: photo.id })
.update({ media_type: 'video', mime_type: 'video/mp4' });
const video = await db('photos').where({ id: photo.id }).first();
const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(video, 900);
expect(key).not.toContain('thumb_w900_');
});
it('drops tiers when a rename moves the basename they are keyed on', async () => {
// The key embeds the basename, so the DB update in renamePhotoFiles is
// the point past which the old keys cannot be derived at all — a later
// delete or archive computes the new ones and leaves these behind.
const renameService = require('../../src/services/eventRenameService');
const photo = await seedThumbPhoto();
const event = await db('events').where({ id: photo.event_id }).first();
// Give it a filename the rename will actually rewrite.
const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', event.slug, 'individual');
await fs.promises.mkdir(dir, { recursive: true });
await sharp({ create: { width: 1200, height: 900, channels: 3, background: { r: 7, g: 7, b: 7 } } })
.jpeg().toFile(path.join(dir, 'Old_Name_001.jpg'));
await db('photos').where({ id: photo.id }).update({
filename: 'Old_Name_001.jpg',
path: `${event.slug}/individual/Old_Name_001.jpg`,
});
const renamable = await db('photos').where({ id: photo.id }).first();
const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(renamable, 600);
const abs = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, key);
expect(fs.existsSync(abs)).toBe(true);
await renameService.renamePhotoFiles(
event.id, 'Old Name', 'New Name', event.slug, event.slug
);
expect(await db('photos').where({ id: photo.id }).first())
.toMatchObject({ filename: 'New_Name_001.jpg' });
expect(fs.existsSync(abs)).toBe(false);
});
it('leaves tiers alone when a rename does not move the basename', async () => {
// Four storage deletes per photo is 20k calls against S3 for a
// 5,000-photo event whose slug merely changed, so the sweep is gated on
// the filename actually moving.
const renameService = require('../../src/services/eventRenameService');
const photo = await seedThumbPhoto();
const event = await db('events').where({ id: photo.event_id }).first();
const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, 600);
const abs = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, key);
// The photo's filename carries no event-name prefix, so nothing moves.
await renameService.renamePhotoFiles(
event.id, 'Old Name', 'New Name', event.slug, event.slug
);
expect(fs.existsSync(abs)).toBe(true);
});
it('deleteThumbnailTiers removes them', async () => {
const photo = await seedThumbPhoto();
const key = await imageProcessor.ensureThumbnailAtWidth(photo, 600);
const abs = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, key);
expect(fs.existsSync(abs)).toBe(true);
await imageProcessor.deleteThumbnailTiers(await db('photos').where({ id: photo.id }).first());
expect(fs.existsSync(abs)).toBe(false);
});
});
});
@@ -1,256 +0,0 @@
/**
* Issue #866 — the createInvoice-free halves of the re-bill proof + CRM panel
* feature, against a real SQLite schema:
*
* • listCustomerRebills — status DERIVED from the linked invoice lifecycle
* (open / sent / paid; a cancelled/Storno'd cover drops back to open) plus
* cost-vs-rebilled math and mode.
* • collectRebillProofAttachments — the Send-dialog per-file selection, the
* all-or-none default resolution (per-customer override else global), the
* Beleg-<inv#> filename (suffix only when >1), and the missing-file marker.
*
* The invoice-MINTING paths (billCombinedForCustomer / billPendingRebills) call
* createInvoice inside a db.transaction, which deadlocks on the SQLite harness
* (global-db sequence write vs. held write lock) — same limitation the sibling
* incomingInvoiceRebill.test.js documents. They're covered by the existing
* billPendingRebills / billUnbilledEntries suites; here we hand-craft billed
* state instead.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
describe('#866 re-bill proof attachment + CRM panel', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let adminId;
let expenseService;
let rebillProofs;
let flagCache;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
const dbModule = require('../../src/database/db');
dbModule.logActivity = async () => {};
({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
expenseService = require('../../src/services/expenseService');
rebillProofs = require('../../src/services/invoice/rebillProofs');
flagCache = require('../../src/middleware/requireFeatureFlag');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
const unwrapId = (ins) => (typeof ins[0] === 'object' ? ins[0].id : ins[0]);
let seq = 0;
async function makeCustomer(overrides = {}) {
seq += 1;
const ins = await db('customer_accounts').insert({
email: `c866-${seq}@example.com`,
display_name: `C866 ${seq}`,
password_hash: 'x',
preferred_language: 'de',
is_active: 1,
billing_cadence: 'per_event',
created_at: new Date(),
...overrides,
}).returning('id');
return unwrapId(ins);
}
async function makeDoc(customerId, overrides = {}) {
const ins = await db('inbound_documents').insert({
source: 'upload', status: 'categorized', parse_status: 'parsed', parse_method: 'none',
supplier_name: 'ACME AG', currency: 'CHF', total_amount_minor: 10000,
invoice_date: '2026-06-01', disposition: 'rebill', customer_account_id: customerId,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
...overrides,
}).returning('id');
return unwrapId(ins);
}
async function makeInvoice(customerId, status, number) {
const ins = await db('invoices').insert({
invoice_number: number,
customer_account_id: customerId,
status,
currency: 'CHF',
issue_date: '2026-06-01', due_date: '2026-07-01',
vat_rate: 0, net_amount_minor: 10000, vat_amount_minor: 0, total_amount_minor: 10000,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return unwrapId(ins);
}
describe('listCustomerRebills', () => {
it('derives open / sent / paid and open→cost==rebilled for passthrough, +markup for rebill', async () => {
const customerId = await makeCustomer();
// Open re-bill (10% markup): rebilled = 11000.
await makeDoc(customerId, { total_amount_minor: 10000, markup_type: 'percent', markup_percent: 10 });
// Open passthrough: no markup, rebilled == cost.
await makeDoc(customerId, { disposition: 'durchlaufend', total_amount_minor: 5000, markup_type: 'none' });
// Sent (on a 'sent' invoice).
const sentInv = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'sent', 'R-2026-0001');
await makeDoc(customerId, { total_amount_minor: 8000, markup_type: 'none', billed_invoice_id: sentInv });
// Paid.
const paidInv = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'paid', 'R-2026-0002');
await makeDoc(customerId, { total_amount_minor: 8000, markup_type: 'none', billed_invoice_id: paidInv });
// Cancelled cover → drops back to 'open', no invoice link surfaced.
const cancInv = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'cancelled', 'R-2026-0003');
await makeDoc(customerId, { total_amount_minor: 8000, markup_type: 'none', billed_invoice_id: cancInv });
const items = await expenseService.listCustomerRebills(customerId);
const byStatus = (s) => items.filter((r) => r.status === s);
expect(items).toHaveLength(5);
expect(byStatus('open')).toHaveLength(3); // 2 genuinely-open + 1 cancelled-cover
expect(byStatus('sent')).toHaveLength(1);
expect(byStatus('paid')).toHaveLength(1);
const rebill = items.find((r) => r.mode === 'rebill' && r.costMinor === 10000);
expect(rebill.rebilledMinor).toBe(11000);
const passthrough = items.find((r) => r.mode === 'passthrough');
expect(passthrough.rebilledMinor).toBe(passthrough.costMinor);
const sent = byStatus('sent')[0];
expect(sent.invoiceNumber).toBe('R-2026-0001');
expect(sent.invoiceId).toBe(sentInv);
const cancelledCover = items.find((r) => r.status === 'open' && r.invoiceNumber === null && r.costMinor === 8000);
expect(cancelledCover).toBeDefined(); // cancelled cover isn't shown as a live invoice link
});
});
describe('storno releases the re-bill linkage (#866 review)', () => {
it("clears billed_invoice_id so a Storno'd cover returns to the billable pool", async () => {
const invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
const customerId = await makeCustomer();
const invId = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'sent', 'R-2026-9000');
const lineIns = await db('invoice_line_items').insert({
invoice_id: invId, position: 1, quantity: 1, description: 'Rebill',
unit_price_minor: 8000, discount_percent: 0, line_total_minor: 8000,
}).returning('id');
const lineId = unwrapId(lineIns);
const docId = await makeDoc(customerId, {
total_amount_minor: 8000, markup_type: 'none', billed_invoice_id: invId, billed_invoice_line_item_id: lineId,
});
// Storno claims a fresh number from document_sequences; the other tests
// seed explicit R-2026-000x numbers without advancing it, so push the
// counter past them to avoid a number collision (a test artifact — real
// invoices always claim through the sequence).
await db('document_sequences').insert({ kind: 'invoice', year: 2026, current_value: 9000, created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date() })
.onConflict(['kind', 'year']).ignore();
await db('document_sequences').where({ kind: 'invoice', year: 2026 }).update({ current_value: 9000 });
// Storno the covering invoice (the issued-cancel path).
await db.transaction(async (trx) => invoiceService.createStorno(invId, adminId, trx));
const doc = await db('inbound_documents').where({ id: docId }).first();
expect(doc.billed_invoice_id).toBeNull();
expect(doc.billed_invoice_line_item_id).toBeNull();
// It now surfaces as a genuinely-open item AND the pending pool picks it up.
const items = await expenseService.listCustomerRebills(customerId);
const row = items.find((r) => r.id === docId);
expect(row.status).toBe('open');
expect(row.invoiceId).toBeNull();
const pending = await db('inbound_documents')
.where({ customer_account_id: customerId }).whereNull('billed_invoice_id')
.whereIn('disposition', ['rebill', 'durchlaufend']).where('status', 'categorized');
expect(pending.map((p) => p.id)).toContain(docId);
});
});
describe('collectRebillProofAttachments', () => {
const businessDocs = () => path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'business-docs', 'inbound', '2026');
async function enableIncoming() {
const existing = await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'incomingInvoices' }).first();
if (existing) await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'incomingInvoices' }).update({ value: 1 });
else await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'incomingInvoices', value: 1 });
flagCache.invalidateFeatureFlagCache();
}
function writeProof(name) {
fs.mkdirSync(businessDocs(), { recursive: true });
const p = path.join(businessDocs(), name);
fs.writeFileSync(p, '%PDF-1.4\n% test proof\n');
return p;
}
it('honours explicit selection, names Beleg-<inv#>, and marks a missing file', async () => {
await enableIncoming();
const customerId = await makeCustomer();
const invId = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'scheduled', 'R-2026-1000');
const invoice = await db('invoices').where({ id: invId }).first();
const good1 = await makeDoc(customerId, { billed_invoice_id: invId, file_path: writeProof('p1.pdf') });
const good2 = await makeDoc(customerId, { billed_invoice_id: invId, file_path: writeProof('p2.pdf') });
const missing = await makeDoc(customerId, { billed_invoice_id: invId, file_path: path.join(businessDocs(), 'nope.pdf') });
// Select the two good proofs → two attachments, suffixed because >1.
const both = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, null, [good1, good2]);
expect(both.map((a) => a.filename).sort()).toEqual(['Beleg-R-2026-1000-1.pdf', 'Beleg-R-2026-1000-2.pdf']);
// Select exactly one → single, unsuffixed.
const one = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, null, [good1]);
expect(one).toHaveLength(1);
expect(one[0].filename).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-1000.pdf');
// Select the missing-file doc → no attachment, but a marker is persisted.
const none = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, null, [missing]);
expect(none).toHaveLength(0);
const markerRow = await db('inbound_documents').where({ id: missing }).first('proof_attach_error');
expect(markerRow.proof_attach_error).toBeTruthy();
// A successful attach clears any prior marker.
await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, null, [good1]);
const cleared = await db('inbound_documents').where({ id: good1 }).first('proof_attach_error');
expect(cleared.proof_attach_error).toBeNull();
});
it('resolves the all-or-none default from the per-customer override then global', async () => {
await enableIncoming();
const customerId = await makeCustomer();
const invId = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'scheduled', 'R-2026-2000');
const invoice = await db('invoices').where({ id: invId }).first();
await makeDoc(customerId, { billed_invoice_id: invId, file_path: writeProof('d1.pdf') });
// Global default off, no override → none.
const off = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, { rebill_attach_proof: null }, undefined);
expect(off).toHaveLength(0);
// Per-customer override ON → all, regardless of the (off) global.
const on = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, { rebill_attach_proof: true }, undefined);
expect(on).toHaveLength(1);
// Global ON (no override) → all.
await db('app_settings').insert({ setting_key: 'accounting_rebill_attach_proof', setting_value: JSON.stringify(true), setting_type: 'accounting' });
const globalOn = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, { rebill_attach_proof: null }, undefined);
expect(globalOn).toHaveLength(1);
// Override OFF beats global ON.
const overrideOff = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, { rebill_attach_proof: false }, undefined);
expect(overrideOff).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('attaches nothing when the incoming-invoices flag is off', async () => {
const existing = await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'incomingInvoices' }).first();
if (existing) await db('feature_flags').where({ key: 'incomingInvoices' }).update({ value: 0 });
else await db('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'incomingInvoices', value: 0 });
flagCache.invalidateFeatureFlagCache();
const customerId = await makeCustomer();
const invId = await makeInvoice(customerId, 'scheduled', 'R-2026-3000');
const invoice = await db('invoices').where({ id: invId }).first();
const doc = await makeDoc(customerId, { billed_invoice_id: invId, file_path: writeProof('f1.pdf') });
const res = await rebillProofs.collectRebillProofAttachments(invoice, { rebill_attach_proof: true }, [doc]);
expect(res).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
});
@@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
/**
* Reveal mode integration tests (#838).
*
* Pins the contract:
* - effective visibility is computed at request time (isGalleryHidden):
* reveal_at in the past opens the gate even before the scheduler stamps
* - /photos returns the event shell with photos: [] + hidden_until_reveal
* for plain guests; slideshow / client / admin-preview see everything
* - image + download endpoints 403 with GALLERY_HIDDEN for plain guests
* - the guest upload route is NOT gated (uploading while hidden is the point)
* - the scheduler stamps revealed_at for due events, exactly once
* - POST /events/:id/reveal stamps revealed_at (idempotent, 400 when the
* mode is off); re-enabling reveal_mode clears revealed_at (re-hide)
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'reveal-test-secret';
const SLUG = 'reveal-test-event';
describe('Reveal mode (#838)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let eventId;
let photoIds;
let adminToken;
const { isGalleryHidden } = require('../../src/utils/revealMode');
const galleryToken = (extra = {}) => jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Reveal Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'reveal-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
allow_user_uploads: 1,
reveal_mode: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
photoIds = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
const p = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: `photo-${i}.jpg`,
path: `events/reveal/${i}.jpg`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
photoIds.push(p[0]?.id ?? p[0]);
}
// Super admin for the admin routes.
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'reveal-admin',
email: 'reveal-admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('RevealAdmin123', 4),
role_id: superRole.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
adminToken = jwt.sign(
{ id: rootId, username: 'reveal-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
app.use('/api/images', require('../../src/routes/protectedImages'));
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/galleryFeedback'));
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('effective visibility math (isGalleryHidden)', () => {
const base = { reveal_mode: true, revealed_at: null, reveal_at: null };
it('is hidden while armed and unrevealed, visible otherwise', () => {
expect(isGalleryHidden({ ...base })).toBe(true);
expect(isGalleryHidden({ ...base, reveal_mode: false })).toBe(false);
expect(isGalleryHidden({ ...base, revealed_at: new Date() })).toBe(false);
// reveal_at in the past opens the gate WITHOUT any stamp — time-exact.
expect(isGalleryHidden({ ...base, reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000) })).toBe(false);
expect(isGalleryHidden({ ...base, reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000) })).toBe(true);
// SQLite 0/1 booleans
expect(isGalleryHidden({ reveal_mode: 1, revealed_at: null, reveal_at: null })).toBe(true);
expect(isGalleryHidden({ reveal_mode: 0, revealed_at: null, reveal_at: null })).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('gallery routes while hidden', () => {
it('/photos gives plain guests the shell with no photos and the flag', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(true);
expect(res.body.photos).toEqual([]);
expect(res.body.categories).toEqual([]);
expect(res.body.event.event_name).toBe('Reveal Test');
});
it('/photos serves the slideshow token everything (surprise beamer)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken({ accessLevel: 'slideshow' })}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('/photos serves client access everything (host review)', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken({ accessLevel: 'client' })}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('/photos serves the admin preview everything (new transport: ?admin_preview=1 + admin cookie, even with a coexisting gallery session)', async () => {
// #868/#981: reveal-mode hiding is bypassed for an admin preview via the
// new transport (explicit flag + httpOnly admin_token cookie), NOT the
// retired ?preview=<jwt>. The coexisting gallery Bearer must not shadow it.
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos?admin_preview=1`)
.set('Cookie', [`admin_token=${adminToken}`])
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('image and download endpoints 403 with GALLERY_HIDDEN for plain guests', async () => {
for (const url of [
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/thumbnail/${photoIds[0]}`,
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}`,
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoIds[0]}`,
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`,
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/stats`,
`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/hero/${photoIds[0]}`,
]) {
const res = await request(app).get(url).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(`${url}:${res.status}`).toBe(`${url}:403`);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
}
});
it('image endpoints are NOT reveal-blocked for the slideshow token', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/thumbnail/${photoIds[0]}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken({ accessLevel: 'slideshow' })}`);
// The seeded file doesn't exist on disk, so anything but the reveal
// gate's 403 is fine here.
expect(res.body.code).not.toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
});
it('/info exposes the effective hidden state without auth', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/info`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(true);
});
it('the guest upload route is not gated', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${eventId}/upload`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.send({});
// Fails later for other reasons (no multipart body) — but never on the
// reveal gate.
expect(res.body.code).not.toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
});
it('legacy protected-image routes are reveal-gated for plain guests', async () => {
for (const [method, url] of [
['get', `/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}/view`],
['post', `/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}/generate-secure-token`],
['post', `/api/images/${SLUG}/photo/${photoIds[0]}/generate-url`],
]) {
const res = await request(app)[method](url).set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(`${url}:${res.status}`).toBe(`${url}:403`);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
}
});
it('feedback endpoints are reveal-gated; my-feedback degrades to empty', async () => {
// Feedback must be enabled for the routes to get past their own gate.
await db('event_feedback_settings').insert({
event_id: eventId, feedback_enabled: 1, allow_likes: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(), updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
const getRes = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos/${photoIds[0]}/feedback`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(getRes.status).toBe(403);
expect(getRes.body.code).toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
const postRes = await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos/${photoIds[0]}/feedback`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.send({ feedback_type: 'like' });
expect(postRes.status).toBe(403);
expect(postRes.body.code).toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
const mine = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/my-feedback`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(mine.status).toBe(200);
expect(mine.body).toEqual([]);
});
it('secure-image token minting is reveal-gated for plain guests', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/secure-images/${SLUG}/generate-token`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.send({ photoId: photoIds[0] });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('GALLERY_HIDDEN');
});
it('customer-portal tokens (via:customer, no accessLevel) bypass reveal mode', async () => {
const acct = await db('customer_accounts').insert({
email: 'portal-customer@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const customerId = acct[0]?.id ?? acct[0];
await db('event_customer_assignments').insert({
event_id: eventId,
customer_account_id: customerId,
});
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken({ via: 'customer', customerId })}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('a reveal_at in the past opens the gate without any stamp', async () => {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000).toISOString() });
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(res.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: null });
});
});
describe('scheduler and admin reveal', () => {
it('the scheduler stamps revealed_at for due events exactly once', async () => {
const revealAt = new Date(Date.now() - 5 * 60_000);
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: revealAt.toISOString(), revealed_at: null });
const { checkScheduledReveals } = require('../../src/services/revealScheduler');
await checkScheduledReveals();
const asMs = (v) => new Date(v).getTime();
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(row.revealed_at).not.toBeNull();
expect(asMs(row.revealed_at)).toBe(revealAt.getTime());
expect(row.reveal_at).toBeNull(); // schedule consumed, like "Reveal now"
// Second pass no-ops (revealed_at already set).
await checkScheduledReveals();
const again = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(asMs(again.revealed_at)).toBe(revealAt.getTime());
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: null, revealed_at: null });
});
it('POST /:id/reveal stamps revealed_at, clears the schedule, and is idempotent', async () => {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() + 3600_000).toISOString() });
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/reveal`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.revealed_at).toBeTruthy();
// "Reveal now" consumes the pending schedule.
const cleared = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(cleared.reveal_at).toBeNull();
const first = res.body.revealed_at;
const res2 = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/reveal`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res2.status).toBe(200);
expect(res2.body.revealed_at).toBe(first);
// Guests see photos now.
const gallery = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(gallery.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(false);
expect(gallery.body.photos).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('re-enabling reveal_mode clears revealed_at (re-hide)', async () => {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_mode: 0 });
const res = await request(app)
.put(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({ reveal_mode: true });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(row.revealed_at).toBeNull();
const gallery = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(gallery.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(true);
});
it('scheduling a FUTURE reveal on a revealed gallery re-arms hiding', async () => {
// State: revealed (previous tests). Saving a future schedule re-hides.
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ revealed_at: new Date().toISOString() });
const res = await request(app)
.put(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({ reveal_mode: true, reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() + 3600_000).toISOString() });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(row.revealed_at).toBeNull();
const gallery = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(gallery.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(true);
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_at: null });
});
it('re-arming without a schedule clears a stale PAST reveal_at', async () => {
// Legacy/partial-API state: revealed with the old past schedule still
// stored. {reveal_mode:false} then {reveal_mode:true} without
// reveal_at must re-hide, not instantly re-open via the stale date.
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({
reveal_mode: 0,
revealed_at: new Date().toISOString(),
reveal_at: new Date(Date.now() - 3600_000).toISOString(),
});
const res = await request(app)
.put(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({ reveal_mode: true });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(row.revealed_at).toBeNull();
expect(row.reveal_at).toBeNull();
const gallery = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`);
expect(gallery.body.hidden_until_reveal).toBe(true);
expect(gallery.body.photos).toEqual([]);
});
it('POST /:id/reveal 400s while reveal mode is off', async () => {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_mode: 0, revealed_at: null });
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/reveal`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ reveal_mode: 1 });
});
});
});
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
/**
* Slideshow photo source (#1015).
*
* The bug: with `lightbox_preview_enabled` off (the default), /photos emitted
* `preview_url: null`, so the slideshow's `preview_url || hero_url || url`
* chain fell through to `hero_url` — a 1920x1080 `fit: 'cover'` centre crop
* meant for gallery header banners. With the "Black Bars (No crop)" fit the
* show then letterboxed an already-cropped frame: portrait photos lost their
* top and bottom and the setting looked broken.
*
* The contract pinned here: `slideshow_url` points at the aspect-preserved
* preview tier and is emitted for image photos REGARDLESS of the lightbox
* toggle, so the slideshow never has a reason to reach for `hero_url`.
* `preview_url` itself must stay gated — the lightbox opt-in is unchanged.
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'slideshow-src-test-secret';
const SLUG = 'slideshow-source-event';
describe('Slideshow photo source (#1015)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let eventId;
let imagePhotoId;
let videoPhotoId;
const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const setLightboxPreview = async (on) => {
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'lightbox_preview_enabled' }).del();
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: 'lightbox_preview_enabled',
setting_value: JSON.stringify(on),
setting_type: 'general',
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
};
const fetchPhotos = async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken()}`)
.expect(200);
return res.body.photos;
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Slideshow Source Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'slideshow-source-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
const img = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'portrait.jpg',
path: 'events/slideshow-source/portrait.jpg',
type: 'individual',
mime_type: 'image/jpeg',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
imagePhotoId = img[0]?.id ?? img[0];
const vid = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'clip.mp4',
path: 'events/slideshow-source/clip.mp4',
type: 'individual',
media_type: 'video',
mime_type: 'video/mp4',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
videoPhotoId = vid[0]?.id ?? vid[0];
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
it('emits slideshow_url for image photos even when lightbox previews are OFF', async () => {
await setLightboxPreview(false);
const photos = await fetchPhotos();
const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
expect(image.slideshow_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/preview/${imagePhotoId}`);
// The regression: this is what used to be null, pushing the show to hero.
expect(image.preview_url).toBeNull();
});
it('leaves preview_url gated so the lightbox opt-in is unchanged', async () => {
await setLightboxPreview(true);
const photos = await fetchPhotos();
const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
expect(image.preview_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/preview/${imagePhotoId}`);
expect(image.slideshow_url).toBe(image.preview_url);
});
it('never points the slideshow at the cover-cropped hero tier', async () => {
await setLightboxPreview(false);
const photos = await fetchPhotos();
const image = photos.find((p) => p.id === imagePhotoId);
// hero_url still ships (the gallery header uses it) — it just must not be
// what the slideshow resolves to.
expect(image.hero_url).toBe(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/hero/${imagePhotoId}`);
expect(image.slideshow_url).not.toBe(image.hero_url);
});
it('emits slideshow_url: null for videos, which have no preview tier', async () => {
await setLightboxPreview(false);
const photos = await fetchPhotos();
const video = photos.find((p) => p.id === videoPhotoId);
expect(video.slideshow_url).toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
/**
* SQLite epoch-timestamp normalization (#485 follow-up).
*
* On SQLite, timestamp columns written with a raw `new Date()` through knex
* hold epoch-millisecond numbers. Postgres returns ISO strings, so frontend
* code written against Postgres calls parseISO() and crashes on native
* (SQLite) installs — the exact class fixed for admin Users in #485, which
* listed api tokens / photos / activity as an out-of-scope follow-up.
*
* Pins:
* - gallery /photos serializes uploaded_at / captured_at as ISO strings
* even when the row holds an epoch number (pre-fix archive restores)
* - the api-tokens list serializes created_at / expires_at / last_used_at /
* revoked_at as ISO strings for epoch-stored rows
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'epoch-test-secret';
const SLUG = 'epoch-test-event';
const ISO_RE = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}/;
describe('SQLite epoch timestamp normalization', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let eventId;
let adminToken;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Epoch Test',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'epoch-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
// The pre-fix corruption shape: epoch numbers in timestamp columns.
await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'restored.jpg',
path: 'events/epoch/restored.jpg',
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: Date.now() - 3600_000,
captured_at: Date.now() - 7200_000,
});
const superRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
const [rootId] = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'epoch-admin',
email: 'epoch-admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('EpochAdmin123', 4),
role_id: superRole.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id').then((r) => [r[0]?.id || r[0]]);
adminToken = jwt.sign(
{ id: rootId, username: 'epoch-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'super_admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
await db('api_tokens').insert({
name: 'epoch-token',
hashed_token: 'x'.repeat(64),
preview: 'pk_test…abcd',
scopes: JSON.stringify(['events:read']),
created_by: rootId,
created_at: Date.now() - 86400_000,
last_used_at: Date.now() - 3600_000,
revoked_at: Date.now() - 60_000,
});
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
app.use('/api/admin/api-tokens', require('../../src/routes/adminApiTokens'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
it('gallery /photos serializes epoch-stored uploaded_at/captured_at as ISO strings', async () => {
const galleryToken = jwt.sign(
{ eventId, eventSlug: SLUG, type: 'gallery' },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${galleryToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.photos).toHaveLength(1);
const photo = res.body.photos[0];
expect(typeof photo.uploaded_at).toBe('string');
expect(photo.uploaded_at).toMatch(ISO_RE);
expect(photo.captured_at).toMatch(ISO_RE);
});
it('api-tokens list serializes epoch-stored timestamps as ISO strings', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/admin/api-tokens')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const token = res.body.find((t) => t.name === 'epoch-token');
expect(token).toBeTruthy();
for (const field of ['created_at', 'last_used_at', 'revoked_at']) {
expect(`${field}:${typeof token[field]}`).toBe(`${field}:string`);
expect(token[field]).toMatch(ISO_RE);
}
});
});
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
jest.mock('../../src/utils/tokenRevocation', () => ({ isTokenRevoked: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff', () => ({ isTokenBeforeCutoff: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() }));
// The joined query throws whatever the test stages; the role-less fallback
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
/**
* #868 — the admin gallery-preview gate. isAdminPreview must fail CLOSED: it
* grants the draft/password bypass only for an explicit `?admin_preview=1` flag
* AND a verified admin JWT (type 'admin', issuer 'picpeak-auth') read from the
* httpOnly admin_token cookie or a Bearer header — never from the URL, never for
* a guest/gallery token.
*/
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-preview-test-secret';
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { isAdminPreview } = require('../../src/middleware/gallery');
// Read the secret at call time — a jest setup file can set JWT_SECRET after this
// module loads, and isAdminPreview verifies against the live value.
const adminToken = () => jwt.sign({ type: 'admin', id: 1 }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId: 1 }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
function req({ flag, cookie, bearer } = {}) {
return {
query: flag === undefined ? {} : { admin_preview: flag },
cookies: cookie ? { admin_token: cookie } : {},
headers: bearer ? { authorization: `Bearer ${bearer}` } : {},
};
}
describe('isAdminPreview (#868) fails closed', () => {
it('false without the explicit flag, even with a valid admin cookie (plain link stays guest-identical)', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ cookie: adminToken() }))).toBe(false);
});
it('false with the flag but no session token', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1' }))).toBe(false);
});
it('true with the flag + a valid admin cookie', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', cookie: adminToken() }))).toBe(true);
});
it('true with the flag + a valid admin Bearer header', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', bearer: adminToken() }))).toBe(true);
});
it('false for a gallery (guest) token — must be type admin', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', cookie: galleryToken() }))).toBe(false);
});
it('true from the admin cookie even when a gallery Bearer is also present (#981 coexisting session)', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', cookie: adminToken(), bearer: galleryToken() }))).toBe(true);
});
it('false when only a gallery Bearer is present — a gallery header can never satisfy it (#981)', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', bearer: galleryToken() }))).toBe(false);
});
it('false on a tampered token', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', cookie: `${adminToken()}x` }))).toBe(false);
});
it('false on the wrong issuer', () => {
const t = jwt.sign({ type: 'admin' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'not-picpeak' });
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '1', cookie: t }))).toBe(false);
});
it('false when the flag is anything other than exactly "1"', () => {
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: 'true', cookie: adminToken() }))).toBe(false);
expect(isAdminPreview(req({ flag: '0', cookie: adminToken() }))).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regression test for the maintenance-mode lockout in single-container mode.
*
* In the compose stack nginx serves the frontend, so a request for /admin/login
* or /gallery/<slug> never reaches Express. The all-in-one image (#1042) has no
* nginx: server.js serves the SPA itself, and maintenanceMiddleware is mounted
* far ahead of that static block. Gating those paths therefore answered the
* HTML document with 503 JSON, which broke two things at once —
*
* 1. an admin who enabled maintenance mode could never disable it, because
* /admin/login and its /assets/ bundle would not load (the login *API* was
* already exempt, but nothing could call it), and
* 2. a guest saw raw JSON instead of the branded maintenance screen the
* frontend already ships.
*
* The shell is inert HTML: it boots, calls /api/public/settings (exempt) and
* renders MaintenanceMode itself, so letting it through costs nothing.
*
* The dividing line is taken from frontend/nginx.conf rather than invented:
* paths nginx answers from the frontend container are exempt, paths it
* proxy_passes to the backend stay gated. That makes the all-in-one image
* behave exactly like compose in both directions. The gated half is where the
* risk lives — a negative "everything that is not an API is a shell" rule
* looks right and quietly un-gates /og/ (event names, cover images) and the
* public CMS at the site root — so most of the cases below assert it.
*/
const { maintenanceMiddleware } = require('../../src/middleware/maintenance');
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
const settings = { setting_key: 'general_maintenance_mode', setting_value: 'true' };
const db = jest.fn(() => ({
where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
first: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(settings),
}));
return { db };
});
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(),
}));
// Maintenance state is cached for a minute; each case starts from a clean read.
const { clearMaintenanceCache } = require('../../src/middleware/maintenance');
async function run(path, { method = 'GET', authorization } = {}) {
clearMaintenanceCache();
const req = { path, method, headers: authorization ? { authorization } : {} };
const res = {
statusCode: null,
body: null,
status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
json(payload) { this.body = payload; return this; },
};
const next = jest.fn();
await maintenanceMiddleware(req, res, next);
return { passed: next.mock.calls.length === 1, status: res.statusCode, body: res.body };
}
describe('maintenanceMiddleware — SPA shell vs API split', () => {
describe('passes the frontend shell through so the branded screen can render', () => {
it.each([
['/admin', 'admin shell entry'],
['/admin/login', 'the page that calls the exempt login API'],
['/assets/index-abc123.js', 'hashed bundle the shell loads'],
['/gallery/some-event', 'guest gallery route'],
['/customer/portal', 'customer portal route'],
])('%s (%s)', async (path) => {
const { passed } = await run(path);
expect(passed).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('still gates everything that is not a shell', () => {
it.each([
['/api/gallery/some-event/verify', 'public gallery API'],
['/api/photos/1', 'photo API'],
['/photos/anything.jpg', 'backend-owned photo mount'],
['/thumbnails/anything.jpg', 'backend-owned thumbnail mount'],
['/fonts/anything.woff2', 'backend-owned font mount'],
// nginx proxy_passes these to the backend, so compose gates them today
// and the all-in-one image must not be the one deployment that does not.
['/', 'site root — nginx `location = /` hands this to the public CMS'],
['/og/gallery/some-event', 'OG renderer: leaks the event name'],
['/og/gallery/some-event/cover', 'OG cover: leaks the hero thumbnail'],
['/s/abc123', 'short-link renderer'],
['/robots.txt', 'proxied one-to-one by nginx'],
['/favicon.ico', 'proxied one-to-one by nginx'],
])('%s (%s) returns 503', async (path) => {
const { passed, status, body } = await run(path);
expect(passed).toBe(false);
expect(status).toBe(503);
expect(body).toMatchObject({ maintenance: true });
});
it('does not let a non-GET request masquerade as a shell load', async () => {
const { passed, status } = await run('/api/gallery/some-event/verify', { method: 'POST' });
expect(passed).toBe(false);
expect(status).toBe(503);
});
});
describe('keeps the pre-existing admin exemptions', () => {
it('admin login API stays reachable', async () => {
expect((await run('/api/auth/admin/login', { method: 'POST' })).passed).toBe(true);
});
it('/api/public/settings stays reachable so the shell can read the flag', async () => {
expect((await run('/api/public/settings')).passed).toBe(true);
});
it('an authenticated admin still reaches /api/admin', async () => {
const { passed } = await run('/api/admin/events', { authorization: 'Bearer token' });
expect(passed).toBe(true);
});
it('an unauthenticated /api/admin request is not served by this middleware', async () => {
// isAdminRoute suppresses the 503 so the auth layer can answer 401.
const { passed, status } = await run('/api/admin/events');
expect(passed).toBe(true);
expect(status).toBeNull();
});
});
});
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
/**
* Migration 177 (#1074) — face recognition schema.
*
* The acceptance criteria for #1074 name three properties explicitly, so
* they get tests rather than a manual check:
*
* - idempotent on re-run,
* - a working down(),
* - and — the one that matters most — installing it must NOT enqueue
* anything. A `face_status` column defaulting to 'pending' would put
* every existing photo on every install into a queue the operator never
* asked for, on installs with no sidecar at all.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig177-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'mig177-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const migration = require('../../migrations/core/177_add_face_recognition');
describe('migration 177 — face recognition schema', () => {
let db; let cleanup;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('creates both tables with the columns the pipeline writes', async () => {
expect(await db.schema.hasTable('photo_faces')).toBe(true);
expect(await db.schema.hasTable('event_people')).toBe(true);
for (const col of [
'photo_id', 'event_id', 'bbox_x', 'bbox_y', 'bbox_w', 'bbox_h',
'det_score', 'yaw', 'pitch', 'blur', 'embedding', 'model_version',
'person_id', 'created_at',
]) {
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('photo_faces', col)).toBe(true);
}
for (const col of [
'event_id', 'label', 'cover_face_id', 'centroid', 'face_count_total',
'model_version', 'is_hidden', 'is_ignored',
]) {
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('event_people', col)).toBe(true);
}
});
it('adds the photos and events columns', async () => {
for (const col of ['face_status', 'face_count', 'face_started_at', 'face_error']) {
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('photos', col)).toBe(true);
}
for (const col of [
'face_recognition_enabled', 'faces_visible_to_guests', 'faces_last_scan_at',
]) {
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', col)).toBe(true);
}
});
it('enqueues nothing — face_status has no default', async () => {
// The whole "zero behaviour change by default" guarantee rests on this.
const [{ id: eventId }] = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'mig177-event',
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Migration 177',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: 'mig177-share',
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const eid = typeof eventId === 'object' ? eventId.id : eventId;
await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eid, filename: 'a.jpg', path: '/tmp/a.jpg', type: 'individual',
});
const row = await db('photos').where({ event_id: eid }).first();
expect(row.face_status).toBeNull();
expect(await db('photo_faces').count({ c: '*' }).first()).toMatchObject({ c: 0 });
});
it('seeds the tunable thresholds rather than hardcoding them', async () => {
// Immich's clustering guide exists because no single threshold survives
// contact with every library — these must be operator-reachable.
const keys = [
'face_match_threshold', 'face_min_cluster_size',
'face_quality_min_score', 'face_quality_min_px',
];
const rows = await db('app_settings').whereIn('setting_key', keys);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(keys.length);
expect(rows.every((r) => r.setting_type === 'faces')).toBe(true);
});
it('is idempotent on re-run', async () => {
await expect(migration.up(db)).resolves.not.toThrow();
// And did not duplicate the settings rows.
const rows = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'face_match_threshold');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('down() removes everything it added, and up() restores it', async () => {
await migration.down(db);
expect(await db.schema.hasTable('photo_faces')).toBe(false);
expect(await db.schema.hasTable('event_people')).toBe(false);
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('photos', 'face_status')).toBe(false);
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'face_recognition_enabled')).toBe(false);
expect(await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'face_match_threshold')).toHaveLength(0);
await migration.up(db);
expect(await db.schema.hasTable('photo_faces')).toBe(true);
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('photos', 'face_status')).toBe(true);
});
it('cascades face rows when a photo is deleted', async () => {
// #1074 acceptance criterion: deleting a photo removes its face rows.
//
// SQLite ignores foreign keys unless the pragma is on, and PicPeak does
// NOT enable it globally (a large amount of existing data and fixtures
// would start failing). So the cascade below proves only that the schema
// declares it correctly — the code does not RELY on it. Deletion paths
// purge face rows explicitly; see faceProcessor.purgeEvent /
// purgePhotoFaces and the erasure tests in facePrivacy.test.js.
await db.raw('PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON');
const [{ id: eventId }] = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'mig177-cascade',
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Cascade',
event_date: '2026-01-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: 'mig177-cascade-share',
expires_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const eid = typeof eventId === 'object' ? eventId.id : eventId;
const [{ id: photoId }] = await db('photos')
.insert({ event_id: eid, filename: 'c.jpg', path: '/tmp/c.jpg', type: 'individual' })
.returning('id');
const pid = typeof photoId === 'object' ? photoId.id : photoId;
await db('photo_faces').insert({
photo_id: pid,
event_id: eid,
bbox_x: 1, bbox_y: 2, bbox_w: 3, bbox_h: 4,
model_version: 'test',
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
expect(await db('photo_faces').where({ photo_id: pid })).toHaveLength(1);
await db('photos').where({ id: pid }).del();
expect(await db('photo_faces').where({ photo_id: pid })).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
/**
* The person-faces query must table-qualify its WHERE (#1096).
*
* `photo_faces` and `photos` BOTH have an event_id, so the moment the join was
* added a bare `where({ event_id })` became ambiguous. Postgres refuses it —
*
* column reference "event_id" is ambiguous
*
* — and the endpoint 500s, which took the Split dialog down with it on every
* PostgreSQL install. SQLite resolves the ambiguity silently, which is why the
* suite stayed green and this reached production.
*
* Two deliberate choices about HOW this is tested:
*
* 1. It imports the builder the route actually calls. An earlier version of
* this file re-declared the query locally, which meant the route could
* regress to the bare form while these assertions kept passing — a test
* that documents a bug without guarding it.
* 2. It asserts on the emitted SQL rather than executing it. A round-trip test
* would run against the SQLite the suite uses and prove nothing about the
* engine the bug affects.
*/
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
const knex = require('knex')({ client: 'pg' });
const { buildPersonFacesQuery, PERSON_FACES_LIMIT } = require('../src/routes/adminEvents/faces');
const sql = () => buildPersonFacesQuery(knex, 857, 143).toString();
describe('person faces query', () => {
it('is the query the route runs, not a copy of it', () => {
expect(typeof buildPersonFacesQuery).toBe('function');
expect(sql()).toContain('from "photo_faces"');
});
it('qualifies event_id with its table', () => {
// The bare form is what Postgres rejects.
expect(sql()).toContain('"photo_faces"."event_id"');
expect(sql()).not.toMatch(/where\s+"event_id"/i);
});
it('qualifies person_id too, so the join cannot shadow it either', () => {
expect(sql()).toContain('"photo_faces"."person_id"');
expect(sql()).not.toMatch(/and\s+"person_id"\s*=/i);
});
it('still joins photos for the original dimensions', () => {
// The dimensions are what faceCropStyle scales the bbox against; without
// the join the crop maths has nothing to work from.
const s = sql();
expect(s).toContain('inner join "photos"');
expect(s).toContain('"photos"."width"');
expect(s).toContain('"photos"."height"');
});
it('caps the list at the limit the UI is told about', () => {
// The viewer reports truncation using this same number; if they drift, it
// silently claims a person has fewer appearances than they do.
expect(PERSON_FACES_LIMIT).toBe(500);
expect(sql()).toContain(`limit ${PERSON_FACES_LIMIT}`);
});
});
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
/**
* HTTP tests for the gallery QR endpoints (#836):
* GET /api/admin/events/:id/qr (PNG / SVG)
* GET /api/admin/events/:id/qr-print (table-card / poster PDF)
* Same real-SQLite harness as adminEvents.smoke.test.js.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-events-qr-')), 'db.sqlite'
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'admin-events-qr-test-secret';
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
async function insertEvent(db, adminId, over = {}) {
const base = {
slug: `ev-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'QR Test Wedding',
event_date: '2026-05-29',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/share-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
share_token: `st-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_by: adminId,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...over,
};
const r = await db('events').insert(base).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
}
describe('admin event QR endpoints', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminId; let token;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
({ adminId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
token = mintAdminToken(adminId);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('../../src/routes/adminEvents'));
// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
res.status(err.statusCode || err.status || 500).json({ error: err.message, code: err.code });
});
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { await cleanup(); });
beforeEach(async () => { await db('events').del(); });
const auth = (req) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
it('401s without an admin token', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr`);
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('returns a PNG QR by default', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr`)).buffer();
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
// PNG magic bytes
expect(res.body.slice(0, 4)).toEqual(Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47]));
});
it('returns an SVG QR when requested', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
// supertest doesn't text-parse image/svg+xml — buffer and decode manually.
const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr?format=svg`)).buffer();
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toMatch(/image\/svg\+xml/);
expect(Buffer.from(res.body).toString('utf8')).toContain('<svg');
});
it('sets attachment disposition with download=1', async () => {
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr?download=1`)).buffer();
expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toMatch(/^attachment/);
});
// 30s: the print PDFs embed the full IBM Plex Sans TTFs (~200 KB each) —
// font parsing + subsetting exceeds jest's 5s default on slower CI runners.
it.each(['table-card', 'poster'])('renders the %s print PDF', async (template) => {
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const res = await auth(
request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr-print?template=${template}&lang=de`)
).buffer();
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-type']).toBe('application/pdf');
expect(res.body.slice(0, 4).toString()).toBe('%PDF');
}, 120000);
it('409s when the event has no share link', async () => {
// events.share_link is NOT NULL — an empty string is the closest real-world
// "no share link" shape (no token extractable from it either).
const eventId = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { share_link: '', share_token: null });
const res = await auth(request(app).get(`/api/admin/events/${eventId}/qr`));
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
});
it('404s for a non-existent event', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).get('/api/admin/events/999999/qr'));
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
});
@@ -201,34 +201,6 @@ describe('admin events CRUD endpoints (smoke)', () => {
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
// #894 — per-event password-page logo toggle: false hides, null
// restores the default (show).
it('stores login_logo_visible: false and clears it back to NULL', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId);
const hide = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
login_logo_visible: false,
});
expect(hide.status).toBe(200);
let row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.login_logo_visible);
const clear = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
login_logo_visible: null,
});
expect(clear.status).toBe(200);
row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect(row.login_logo_visible).toBeNull();
// The string "false" passes isBoolean() validation — it must be
// parsed, not treated as a truthy string (would store 1 = show).
const hideStr = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
login_logo_visible: 'false',
});
expect(hideStr.status).toBe(200);
row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
expect([false, 0]).toContain(row.login_logo_visible);
});
});
describe('DELETE /:id', () => {
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
/**
* Role-editor self-amplification guard (migration 175 / adminRoles).
*
* `roles.manage` must be a DELEGATION primitive, not root escalation: a
* non-super_admin holder can only grant permissions their OWN role already
* holds, and can't edit their own role. super_admin bypasses. Pins
* userManagementService.createRole / updateRole (assertActorMayGrant).
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-roleguard-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'roleguard-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-roleguard-storage-'));
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const svc = require('../../src/services/userManagementService');
const { clearPermissionCache } = require('../../src/middleware/permissions');
describe('role editor — self-amplification guard', () => {
let db; let cleanup;
let superId; let mgrRoleId; let mgrId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
({ adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
// A non-super role that CAN manage roles but only holds a couple of perms.
const mgrRole = await svc.createRole(
{ name: 'limited_mgr', permissions: ['roles.manage', 'events.view'] },
superId,
);
mgrRoleId = mgrRole.id;
const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'mgr', email: 'mgr@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
role_id: mgrRoleId, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
mgrId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
clearPermissionCache();
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('super_admin can grant any permission', async () => {
const r = await svc.createRole(
{ name: 'power_role', permissions: ['settings.banking', 'users.delete'] },
superId,
);
expect(r.permissions).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(['settings.banking', 'users.delete']));
});
it('non-super cannot grant a permission its own role lacks', async () => {
await expect(
svc.createRole({ name: 'sneaky', permissions: ['events.view', 'settings.banking'] }, mgrId),
).rejects.toThrow(/only grant permissions your own role/i);
});
it('non-super can create a role within its own permissions', async () => {
const r = await svc.createRole({ name: 'viewer_lite', permissions: ['events.view'] }, mgrId);
expect(r.permissions).toEqual(['events.view']);
});
it('non-super cannot edit its own role', async () => {
await expect(
svc.updateRole(mgrRoleId, { permissions: ['roles.manage', 'events.view'] }, mgrId),
).rejects.toThrow(/cannot edit your own role/i);
});
it('non-super cannot escalate another role beyond its own permissions', async () => {
const adminRole = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
await expect(
svc.updateRole(adminRole.id, { permissions: ['settings.banking'] }, mgrId),
).rejects.toThrow(/only grant permissions your own role/i);
});
it('the built-in team_photographer name is reserved', async () => {
await expect(
svc.createRole({ name: 'team_photographer', permissions: [] }, superId),
).rejects.toThrow(/reserved/i);
});
});
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
/**
* Protected-key boundary on the generic settings writers (migration 175).
*
* A role with settings.edit but NOT settings.domains (the "office manager" this
* PR enables) must be able to save the General tab — which re-posts
* general_site_url on every save — as long as the URL is UNCHANGED, and must be
* 403'd only when it actually tries to change a protected key. Regression pin for
* the change-detection fix (the presence-only check over-fired on every save).
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-setkeys-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'setkeys-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-setkeys-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const {
bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole, mintAdminToken,
} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const svc = require('../../src/services/userManagementService');
const { clearPermissionCache } = require('../../src/middleware/permissions');
const STORED_URL = 'https://stored.example';
describe('settings protected-key boundary (/general)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
let superTok; let mgrTok;
const auth = (req, tok) => req.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tok}`);
const readSiteUrl = async () => {
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'general_site_url' }).first();
return row ? JSON.parse(row.setting_value) : null;
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
const { adminId: superId } = await seedMinimal(db);
await assignAdminRole(db, superId, 'super_admin');
superTok = mintAdminToken(superId);
// Office-manager role: settings.view + settings.edit, NOT settings.domains.
const mgrRole = await svc.createRole(
{ name: 'office_mgr', permissions: ['settings.view', 'settings.edit'] },
superId,
);
const ins = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'office', email: 'office@example.com', password_hash: 'x',
role_id: mgrRole.id, must_change_password: false, created_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
mgrTok = mintAdminToken(ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0]);
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: 'general_site_url', setting_value: JSON.stringify(STORED_URL), setting_type: 'general',
});
clearPermissionCache();
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/admin/settings', require('../../src/routes/adminSettings'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('settings.edit role can save /general when general_site_url is unchanged', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/settings/general'), mgrTok)
.send({ general_site_url: STORED_URL, general_max_file_size_mb: 50 });
expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(await readSiteUrl()).toBe(STORED_URL);
});
it('settings.edit role is 403d when it actually changes general_site_url', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/settings/general'), mgrTok)
.send({ general_site_url: 'https://evil.example' });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('FORBIDDEN');
expect(res.body.keys.map((k) => k.key)).toContain('general_site_url');
expect(await readSiteUrl()).toBe(STORED_URL); // unchanged
});
it('super_admin can change general_site_url', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/settings/general'), superTok)
.send({ general_site_url: 'https://new.example' });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(await readSiteUrl()).toBe('https://new.example');
});
});
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
/**
* Source-inspection contract test for #1078.
*
* POST /api/admin/thumbnails/regenerate-previews hands its selected rows to
* ensurePreviewImage, which branches on `source_origin` (and then reads
* `external_relpath` / `filename`) to reach an external/reference photo on its
* media mount. When the select list omitted those columns, every external row
* looked managed, resolvePhotoStorageKey returned null, and the endpoint
* reported success while silently generating nothing for reference galleries.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
describe('regenerate-previews selects the columns ensurePreviewImage branches on (#1078)', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'routes', 'adminThumbnails.js'),
'utf8',
);
// The select feeding the regenerate-previews handler, from the route
// declaration to the end of that statement.
const selectStatement = (() => {
const routeIdx = src.indexOf('/regenerate-previews');
expect(routeIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
const selectIdx = src.indexOf('.select(', routeIdx);
expect(selectIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
return src.slice(selectIdx, src.indexOf(';', selectIdx));
})();
it.each(['source_origin', 'external_relpath', 'filename'])(
'selects %s',
(column) => {
expect(selectStatement).toContain(`'${column}'`);
}
);
it('still selects the columns the managed path needs', () => {
for (const column of ['id', 'event_id', 'path', 'media_type', 'mime_type', 'preview_path']) {
expect(selectStatement).toContain(`'${column}'`);
}
});
});
@@ -32,17 +32,9 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
if (table === 'admin_users') {
let rowFilter = () => true;
return {
// The session route joins roles for the adminUser payload (#798);
// fake rows carry no role fields, so the join is a pass-through.
leftJoin() {
return this;
},
where(criteria) {
rowFilter = (row) => {
return Object.entries(criteria).every(([rawKey, v]) => {
// Joined queries prefix columns ('admin_users.id') — the fake
// rows use bare names.
const k = rawKey.replace(/^admin_users\./, '');
return Object.entries(criteria).every(([k, v]) => {
if (k === 'is_active') return Boolean(row.is_active) === Boolean(v);
return row[k] === v;
});
@@ -58,12 +50,7 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
if (!row) return undefined;
if (!this._cols) return row;
const out = {};
for (const c of this._cols) {
// Support 'table.col' and 'table.col as alias' shapes.
const [source, alias] = c.split(/\s+as\s+/i);
const bare = source.includes('.') ? source.split('.').pop() : source;
out[alias || bare] = row[bare];
}
for (const c of this._cols) out[c] = row[c];
return out;
},
};
@@ -51,13 +51,11 @@ describe('authorization / ownership gaps', () => {
}).returning('id');
adminId = ins[0]?.id ?? ins[0];
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'admin');
// Grant settings.integrations to the admin role BEFORE any request populates
// the 60s permission cache, so the revoke test exercises the ownership check
// (404) rather than the missing-permission gate (403). Migration 174 split
// API-token management out of the catch-all settings.edit into the dedicated
// settings.integrations perm; this models a custom role that carries it —
// the scenario GHSA-gprq needs.
await grantPermissionToRole('admin', 'settings.integrations');
// Grant settings.edit to the admin role BEFORE any request populates the
// 60s permission cache, so the revoke test exercises the ownership check
// (404) rather than the missing-permission gate (403). This models a
// custom role that carries settings.edit the scenario GHSA-gprq needs.
await grantPermissionToRole('admin', 'settings.edit');
adminTok = mintAdminToken(adminId);
app = express();
@@ -98,7 +96,7 @@ describe('authorization / ownership gaps', () => {
expect(res.body.find((t) => t.id === superTokenId)).toBeDefined();
});
it('a non-owner (with settings.integrations) cannot revoke another admin\'s token', async () => {
it('a non-owner (with settings.edit) cannot revoke another admin\'s token', async () => {
const res = await auth(request(app).delete(`/api/admin/api-tokens/${superTokenId}`), adminTok);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
const row = await db('api_tokens').where({ id: superTokenId }).first();
@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
/**
* SQLite boolean coercion in the guest gallery surface (#1028).
*
* SQLite stores booleans as 0/1; Postgres stores true/false. The /photos
* payload and every download guard compared strictly against `true`/`false`,
* so on SQLite:
*
* allow_downloads: 0 !== false → true (button shown while disabled)
* allow_user_uploads: 1 === true → false (button hidden while enabled)
* if (allow_downloads === false) → never fires, so ALL download endpoints
* kept serving with downloads switched off
*
* The harness runs on SQLite, so these assertions exercise the real engine
* values rather than a mock. Every test here fails on the unfixed code.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sqlite-flags-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'sqlite-flags-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-sqlite-flags-storage-'));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const SLUG = 'sqlite-flags-gallery';
describe('gallery flags survive SQLite 0/1 storage (#1028)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let eventId; let photoId;
async function setEventFlags(patch) {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update(patch);
}
async function getPayload() {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
return res.body.event;
}
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const ev = await db('events').insert({
slug: SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'SQLite Flags',
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@example.com',
admin_email: 'a@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${SLUG}/s`,
share_token: 'sqlite-flags-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
// Password-free so verifyGalleryAccess takes the public path and loads
// the row with SELECT * — i.e. the raw 0/1 values, same as production.
require_password: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = ev[0]?.id ?? ev[0];
const ph = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'p.jpg',
path: `${SLUG}/p.jpg`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
photoId = ph[0]?.id ?? ph[0];
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/gallery', require('../../src/routes/gallery'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
test('the engine under test really is SQLite storing 0/1', async () => {
expect(['sqlite3', 'better-sqlite3']).toContain(db.client.config.client);
await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 0 });
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first('allow_downloads');
expect(row.allow_downloads).toBe(0);
});
describe('with downloads disabled (allow_downloads = 0)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 0, allow_user_uploads: 1 });
});
test('payload reports allow_downloads false (was true — header button shown)', async () => {
expect((await getPayload()).allow_downloads).toBe(false);
});
test('payload reports allow_user_uploads true (was false — upload button hidden)', async () => {
expect((await getPayload()).allow_user_uploads).toBe(true);
});
test('single-photo download is refused', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
test('download-all is refused', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
test('download-selected is refused', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-selected`)
.send({ photo_ids: [photoId] });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
test('download-jobs is refused', async () => {
const res = await request(app).post(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-jobs`).send({});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
});
describe('with downloads enabled (allow_downloads = 1)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 1, allow_user_uploads: 0 });
});
test('payload reports allow_downloads true / allow_user_uploads false', async () => {
const event = await getPayload();
expect(event.allow_downloads).toBe(true);
expect(event.allow_user_uploads).toBe(false);
});
test('download-all is no longer refused', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download-all`);
expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
});
});
describe('protection flags', () => {
test('0/1 protection toggles are reported the way they are stored', async () => {
await setEventFlags({
disable_right_click: 1,
enable_devtools_protection: 1,
use_canvas_rendering: 1,
watermark_downloads: 1,
overlay_protection: 0,
});
const event = await getPayload();
expect(event.disable_right_click).toBe(true);
expect(event.enable_devtools_protection).toBe(true);
expect(event.use_canvas_rendering).toBe(true);
expect(event.watermark_downloads).toBe(true);
expect(event.overlay_protection).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('per-category download blocking (#640) on SQLite', () => {
test('a category with allow_downloads = 0 is reported as blocked', async () => {
const cat = await db('photo_categories').insert({
name: 'Blocked', slug: 'blocked', event_id: eventId, is_global: 0, allow_downloads: 0,
}).returning('id');
const categoryId = cat[0]?.id ?? cat[0];
await db('photos').where('id', photoId).update({ category_id: categoryId });
await setEventFlags({ allow_downloads: 1 });
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/photos`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const category = res.body.categories.find((c) => c.id === categoryId);
expect(category.allow_downloads).toBe(false);
const photo = res.body.photos.find((p) => p.id === photoId);
expect(photo.category_allow_downloads).toBe(false);
// …and the per-category guard on the single-photo route fires.
const dl = await request(app).get(`/api/gallery/${SLUG}/download/${photoId}`);
expect(dl.status).toBe(403);
});
});
});
@@ -67,11 +67,10 @@ async function insertEvent(db, over = {}) {
describe('public Live Slideshow routes', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app;
// bootCrmDb runs the full migration set against a fresh SQLite file. The
// chain keeps growing, and a 30s pin here blocked the 3.97.0-beta.0
// release PR on a slow runner. Hook-argument timeouts OVERRIDE the 120s
// jest.config default (same trap as the jest.setTimeout pins raised in
// #860) — keep this at 120000, matching the config.
// bootCrmDb runs the full migration set against a fresh SQLite file and the
// chain keeps growing via backports. Hook-argument timeouts OVERRIDE the
// 120s jest.config default (same trap as the jest.setTimeout pins) — keep
// this at 120000, matching the config.
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
@@ -99,12 +98,7 @@ describe('public Live Slideshow routes', () => {
await setFlag(db, 'slideshow', true);
});
// QR overlay: supertest's Host is loopback, and a loopback base is now
// suppressed rather than encoded — the kiosk passes its reachable
// window.location.origin, so the QR tests do the same.
const KIOSK_ORIGIN = 'https://gallery.example.com';
const stateUrl = (token = TOKEN) => `/api/gallery/${SLUG}/show/${token}/state?origin=${encodeURIComponent(KIOSK_ORIGIN)}`;
const stateUrlNoOrigin = (token = TOKEN) => `/api/gallery/${SLUG}/show/${token}/state`;
const stateUrl = (token = TOKEN) => `/api/gallery/${SLUG}/show/${token}/state`;
describe('resolveSlideshow guards', () => {
it('200 + per-event display settings on a live link', async () => {
@@ -233,58 +227,6 @@ describe('public Live Slideshow routes', () => {
});
});
describe('slideshowSettings — QR overlay cascade (#837)', () => {
async function enableGlobalQr() {
await setSetting(db, 'slideshow_qr_enabled', true);
await setSetting(db, 'slideshow_qr_position', 'top-right');
await setSetting(db, 'slideshow_qr_opacity', 80);
await setSetting(db, 'slideshow_qr_size', 18);
}
it('inherits the global QR overlay when show_qr is NULL', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, { show_qr: null });
await enableGlobalQr();
const res = await request(app).get(stateUrl());
expect(res.body.qr).toMatchObject({
position: 'top-right',
opacity: 80,
size: 18,
});
// Share-link QR ships as a PNG data URI — no client QR lib needed.
expect(res.body.qr.data_url).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
});
it('is null by default (global off, no override)', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, { show_qr: null });
const res = await request(app).get(stateUrl());
expect(res.body.qr).toBeNull();
});
it('per-event OFF override hides the QR even when the global is on', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, { show_qr: 0 });
await enableGlobalQr();
const res = await request(app).get(stateUrl());
expect(res.body.qr).toBeNull();
});
it('per-event ON override shows the QR even when the global is off', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, { show_qr: 1 });
const res = await request(app).get(stateUrl());
expect(res.body.qr).not.toBeNull();
expect(res.body.qr.data_url).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
// Look falls back to the global defaults.
expect(res.body.qr.position).toBe('bottom-left');
});
it('suppresses the QR when no guest-reachable origin exists (loopback base, no kiosk origin)', async () => {
await insertEvent(db, { show_qr: 1 });
const res = await request(app).get(stateUrlNoOrigin());
// Encoding localhost would send scanning phones to THEIR localhost —
// no QR beats a broken QR (codex review of #848, confirmation round).
expect(res.body.qr).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('display-only token guards (#646 review concern 1)', () => {
// Mint a real slideshow JWT, then prove it is denied on the
// download / upload / feedback routes (display-only contract).
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
/**
* CORS posture of the protected-image responses (#1116).
*
* secureImageMiddleware used to set its own Access-Control-Allow-Origin,
* overwriting the one cors(corsOptions) had already computed for the request.
* That was worse in both directions:
*
* unresolved -> '*', which with the credentials:true that cors() sets is an
* invalid pair every browser rejects outright
* resolved -> the frontend origin, even when the request legitimately came
* from the allowlisted ADMIN_URL
*
* The header now belongs to cors() alone. These tests are mounted on a real
* Express app with the same middleware order as server.js — a unit test against
* a response double cannot see middleware composition, which is precisely how
* the first version of this fix looked correct while still being wrong.
*/
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
const express = require('express');
const cors = require('cors');
const request = require('supertest');
jest.mock('../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn() }));
// A frontend origin IS resolvable here, deliberately. With the resolver empty
// (the default in tests) merely GUARDING the assignment looks identical to
// removing it — the admin-origin case below is what tells them apart, and it
// is the common one in production.
jest.mock('../src/utils/frontendUrl', () => ({
getFrontendBaseUrlSync: () => 'https://gallery.example.com',
}));
jest.useFakeTimers(); // the module schedules a cleanup setInterval at require time
const secureImageMiddleware = require('../src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware');
const FRONTEND = 'https://gallery.example.com';
const ADMIN = 'https://admin.example.com';
/** Mirrors server.js: cors() on /api, then the route sets its own headers. */
function buildApp() {
const app = express();
app.use('/api', cors({
origin: (origin, cb) => cb(null, !origin || [FRONTEND, ADMIN].includes(origin)),
credentials: true,
}));
app.get('/api/secure-images/:id', (req, res) => {
secureImageMiddleware.setSecurityHeaders(res);
res.status(200).send('ok');
});
return app;
}
afterAll(() => {
jest.clearAllTimers();
jest.useRealTimers();
});
describe('protected-image CORS headers', () => {
it('never emits a wildcard origin', async () => {
// '*' alongside the credentials:true that cors() sets is invalid, and the
// browser drops the whole response.
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', FRONTEND);
expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).not.toBe('*');
});
it('preserves the cors() answer for an allowlisted origin', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', FRONTEND);
expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).toBe(FRONTEND);
expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-credentials']).toBe('true');
});
it('does not repoint an allowlisted admin origin at the frontend', async () => {
// The regression the old code caused, and the case a guarded assignment
// still gets wrong: the resolver returns the FRONTEND origin here, so any
// code that writes it would stamp the wrong origin on an admin request
// that cors() had already allowed, and the browser would reject it.
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', ADMIN);
expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).toBe(ADMIN);
});
it('stays absent for a disallowed origin', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', 'https://evil.example.com');
expect(res.headers).not.toHaveProperty('access-control-allow-origin');
});
it('stays absent when there is no Origin at all', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1');
expect(res.headers).not.toHaveProperty('access-control-allow-origin');
});
it('still sets the route-specific security headers', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp()).get('/api/secure-images/1').set('Origin', FRONTEND);
expect(res.headers['x-content-type-options']).toBe('nosniff');
expect(res.headers['x-frame-options']).toBe('DENY');
expect(res.headers['cache-control']).toContain('no-store');
expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-methods']).toBe('GET');
});
});
@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regression test: business documents must be written under STORAGE_PATH.
*
* quoteService.persistDocPdf, the invoice sending/reminder writers and the
* contract signature writers all built their target from
* `path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'business-docs', ...)`. Both compose
* files pin STORAGE_PATH=/app/storage and the image's WORKDIR is /app, so the
* two expressions name the same directory and the bug was invisible on a stock
* deployment. Point STORAGE_PATH anywhere else — a NAS mount, a second disk,
* the single-container image's /data volume — and quotes, invoices, Mahnungen
* and contract PDFs were written outside the configured storage root, so they
* were missed by backups and lost when the container was replaced.
*
* Rather than assert on internals, this drives the module boundary the fix
* changed: getStoragePath() is the one resolver, so a temporary STORAGE_PATH
* must be where the bytes land.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
describe('business documents honour STORAGE_PATH', () => {
let tmpRoot;
let originalStoragePath;
beforeEach(() => {
originalStoragePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-storage-'));
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = tmpRoot;
jest.resetModules();
});
afterEach(() => {
if (originalStoragePath === undefined) delete process.env.STORAGE_PATH;
else process.env.STORAGE_PATH = originalStoragePath;
fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('getStoragePath is the resolver the writers share', () => {
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
expect(getStoragePath()).toBe(tmpRoot);
});
it('no business-document writer still targets process.cwd()/storage', () => {
// Whitespace is collapsed before matching on purpose. The first version of
// this test compared against the single-line literal and therefore missed
// persistSignatureImage(), whose identical path.join was simply spread over
// seven lines — it reported green while signature PNGs still wrote outside
// STORAGE_PATH. Formatting must not decide whether a bug is visible.
const writers = [
'src/services/quoteService.js',
'src/services/invoice/sending.js',
'src/services/invoice/reminders.js',
'src/services/contract/signatureAssets.js',
'src/routes/adminDev.js',
];
const offenders = writers.filter((rel) => {
const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../../', rel), 'utf8');
return /process\.cwd\(\),'storage'/.test(source.replace(/\s+/g, ''));
});
expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
});
it('generated contract PDFs pass the containment check that serves them', () => {
// assertContractPdfPath guards the admin and public contract download
// routes. It listed only <cwd>/storage/business-docs/contract, so once the
// writers moved to STORAGE_PATH every freshly generated contract was
// refused with PATH_OUTSIDE_STORAGE — a worse failure than the bug being
// fixed. Both roots must be accepted.
const { assertContractPdfPath } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
// assertPathInside realpaths both the file and each root, so the guard only
// means anything against a filesystem that actually has them — write them.
const write = (...segments) => {
const p = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'business-docs', 'contract', ...segments);
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(p), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(p, 'bytes');
return p;
};
const generated = write('2026', 'C-2026-0001.pdf');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(generated)).not.toThrow();
// Signature PNGs live under the same root and are served by the same guard.
const signature = write('signatures', '7', 'customer-1.png');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(signature)).not.toThrow();
// And the guard still refuses a real file outside every allowed root.
const foreign = path.join(tmpRoot, 'outside.pdf');
fs.writeFileSync(foreign, 'bytes');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(foreign)).toThrow(/outside the storage roots/i);
});
it('the guard takes its root from the shared resolver, not its own fallback', () => {
// The regression this pins: the guard used to compute
// `STORAGE_PATH || <cwd>/storage` itself. That agrees with getStoragePath()
// only while STORAGE_PATH is set — unset, the shared resolver falls back
// module-relative to <repo>/storage while the guard fell back to
// <cwd>/storage, and the backend is normally started from backend/. Writers
// and guard then disagreed and contract downloads 403'd.
//
// Mocking the resolver is what makes this provable AND safe. If the guard
// consumes getStoragePath(), the mock moves its root; if it rolled its own
// expression, the mock would have no effect and the assertion fails. It
// also keeps every path inside the tmpdir — an earlier version of this test
// deleted `<resolved root>/business-docs` in cleanup, which with
// STORAGE_PATH unset resolves to a developer's real, gitignored
// <repo>/storage and would have destroyed local documents on `npm test`.
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/config/storage', () => ({ getStoragePath: () => tmpRoot }));
const { assertContractPdfPath } = require('../../src/utils/safePath');
const root = path.join(tmpRoot, 'business-docs', 'contract', '2026');
fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
const generated = path.join(root, 'C-2026-0002.pdf');
fs.writeFileSync(generated, 'bytes');
expect(() => assertContractPdfPath(generated)).not.toThrow();
jest.dontMock('../../src/config/storage');
});
it('writes land under STORAGE_PATH, not the working directory', () => {
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
// Mirror what persistDocPdf does: derive the root, create it, write.
const root = path.join(getStoragePath(), 'business-docs', 'quote', '2026');
fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
const filePath = path.join(root, 'Q-2026-0001.pdf');
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, 'pdf-bytes');
expect(fs.existsSync(filePath)).toBe(true);
expect(filePath.startsWith(tmpRoot)).toBe(true);
// And crucially NOT beside the process working directory.
expect(filePath.startsWith(path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage'))).toBe(false);
});
it('the PDF font lookup consults the storage root before the legacy path', () => {
// A custom font under STORAGE_PATH/fonts used to be unreachable, so the
// document silently rendered with the built-in face instead.
const fontDir = path.join(tmpRoot, 'fonts');
fs.mkdirSync(fontDir, { recursive: true });
const fontPath = path.join(fontDir, 'Brand.ttf');
fs.writeFileSync(fontPath, 'ttf');
const { getStoragePath } = require('../../src/config/storage');
const raw = 'Brand.ttf';
const candidates = [
path.join(getStoragePath(), raw.replace(/^\/+/, '')),
path.join(getStoragePath(), 'fonts', path.basename(raw)),
path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'fonts', path.basename(raw)),
];
const found = candidates.find((p) => fs.existsSync(p));
expect(found).toBe(fontPath);
});
});
@@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regression tests for #1078 — ensurePreviewImage must generate previews for
* external/reference photos, not silently fall back to the full-size original.
*
* resolvePhotoStorageKey returns null for external photos by design, and that
* null used to be handed straight to withLocalCopy, which throws. The lightbox
* preview route caught the throw and redirected to the original, so a gallery
* whose photos all live on an external mount paid full size on every open —
* the exact cost the preview tier (#492) exists to avoid.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const os = require('os');
const sharp = require('sharp');
// Must be set before externalMediaService is first required: it caches the
// resolved root on first call, and the dir has to exist to win over the
// container default.
const EXTERNAL_ROOT = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-ext-media-${process.pid}`);
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = EXTERNAL_ROOT;
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
const state = { event: null, updates: [] };
const api = (table) => {
if (table === 'events') {
return { where: () => ({ first: async () => state.event }) };
}
if (table === 'photos') {
return {
where: (criteria) => ({
update: async (values) => {
state.updates.push({ criteria, values });
return 1;
},
}),
};
}
throw new Error(`unexpected table in test: ${table}`);
};
api.__state = state;
return { db: api };
});
const LocalFsStorage = require('../../src/services/storage/LocalFsStorage');
const storageModule = require('../../src/services/storage');
const { db } = require('../../src/database/db');
const EVENT = {
id: 7,
slug: 'nas-wedding',
source_mode: 'reference',
external_path: 'weddings/2026-08-smith',
};
async function writeSourceJpeg(absPath, { width = 2400, height = 1600 } = {}) {
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(absPath), { recursive: true });
const buf = Buffer.alloc(width * height * 3);
for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) buf[i] = (i * 7) % 256;
await sharp(buf, { raw: { width, height, channels: 3 } }).jpeg({ quality: 90 }).toFile(absPath);
}
describe('ensurePreviewImage — external/reference sources (#1078)', () => {
let storage;
let storageRoot;
let imageProcessor;
beforeAll(async () => {
storageRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-preview-store-'));
storage = new LocalFsStorage({ root: storageRoot });
await storage.init();
storageModule.setStorageForTesting(storage);
// Require AFTER the storage injection so the module sees it.
delete require.cache[require.resolve('../../src/services/imageProcessor')];
imageProcessor = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
await fs.mkdir(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path), { recursive: true });
}, 30000);
afterAll(async () => {
storageModule.resetStorage();
await fs.rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
await fs.rm(EXTERNAL_ROOT, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
});
beforeEach(() => {
db.__state.event = EVENT;
db.__state.updates = [];
});
it.each(['external', 'reference'])(
'generates a downscaled preview for a %s photo off the media mount',
async (sourceOrigin) => {
const relpath = `${sourceOrigin}-shot.jpg`;
await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
const photo = {
id: sourceOrigin === 'external' ? 101 : 102,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: sourceOrigin,
external_relpath: relpath,
filename: relpath,
preview_path: null,
};
const key = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
// Per-photo basename so two events referencing the same NAS filename
// can't clobber each other's preview.
expect(key).toBe(`previews/preview_ext${photo.id}_${relpath}`);
expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
const meta = await sharp(storage.resolveLocalPath(key)).metadata();
expect(meta.format).toBe('jpeg');
// 2400x1600 capped at the 1920 long edge, aspect preserved.
expect(meta.width).toBe(1920);
expect(meta.height).toBe(1280);
// The generated key is persisted so the next open short-circuits.
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([
{ criteria: { id: photo.id }, values: { preview_path: key } },
]);
}
);
it('short-circuits on an existing valid preview instead of regenerating', async () => {
const relpath = 'already-previewed.jpg';
await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
const photo = {
id: 103,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: relpath,
filename: relpath,
preview_path: null,
};
const first = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
db.__state.updates = [];
const second = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage({ ...photo, preview_path: first });
expect(second).toBe(first);
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
});
it('returns null (never throws) when the external source is missing', async () => {
const photo = {
id: 104,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: 'external',
external_relpath: 'not-on-the-mount.jpg',
filename: 'not-on-the-mount.jpg',
preview_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
});
it('returns null (never throws) for a row with no source_origin in a reference event', async () => {
// Mode falls back to event.source_mode = 'reference', so
// resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null. That used to reach withLocalCopy and
// throw out of ensurePreviewImage instead of honouring null-on-failure.
const photo = {
id: 105,
event_id: EVENT.id,
source_origin: null,
external_relpath: null,
filename: 'orphan.jpg',
path: 'nas-wedding/individual/orphan.jpg',
preview_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo)).resolves.toBeNull();
expect(db.__state.updates).toEqual([]);
});
it('branches on source_origin, so a row selected without it looks managed', async () => {
// Pins why the /regenerate-previews caller must select source_origin:
// an external row missing that column takes the managed path, where
// resolvePhotoStorageKey yields null and generation is skipped.
const relpath = 'column-starved.jpg';
await writeSourceJpeg(path.join(EXTERNAL_ROOT, EVENT.external_path, relpath));
const starved = {
id: 106,
event_id: EVENT.id,
external_relpath: relpath,
preview_path: null,
};
await expect(imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(starved)).resolves.toBeNull();
await expect(
imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage({ ...starved, source_origin: 'external', filename: relpath })
).resolves.toBe(`previews/preview_ext106_${relpath}`);
});
it('still routes managed photos through the storage backend', async () => {
const sourceKey = 'events/active/managed-event/individual/managed.jpg';
const localSource = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `picpeak-managed-${process.pid}.jpg`);
await writeSourceJpeg(localSource, { width: 800, height: 600 });
await storage.put(sourceKey, await fs.readFile(localSource), { contentType: 'image/jpeg' });
await fs.rm(localSource, { force: true });
db.__state.event = { id: 8, slug: 'managed-event', source_mode: 'managed' };
const photo = {
id: 201,
event_id: 8,
source_origin: 'managed',
path: 'managed-event/individual/managed.jpg',
filename: 'managed.jpg',
preview_path: null,
};
const key = await imageProcessor.ensurePreviewImage(photo);
expect(key).toBe('previews/preview_managed.jpg');
expect(await storage.exists(key)).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regression tests for the file-watcher concurrency bound.
*
* chokidar fires 'add' once per file — with no ignoreInitial option the boot
* scan fires it for every existing file, and a bulk drop fires it for every
* new one at once. Unbounded handlers each run DB lookups plus a full sharp
* pipeline (sharp.concurrency(2) only caps libvips threads WITHIN one
* operation), which can OOM small hosts. Both 'add' and 'unlink' must go
* through the shared p-limit gate.
*
* Adapted from the filpgame fork (426ca491), extended to cover 'unlink'.
*/
const mockLimit = jest.fn((operation) => Promise.resolve().then(operation));
const mockPLimit = jest.fn(() => mockLimit);
const mockHandlers = {};
const mockWatcher = {
on: jest.fn((event, handler) => {
mockHandlers[event] = handler;
return mockWatcher;
}),
};
// Shared instances captured by the mock factories: jest.isolateModules re-runs
// each factory in a fresh registry, so the factories must return these same
// objects for the test to observe calls made inside the isolated module.
const mockLogger = { error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() };
// Chainable no-row query — enough for removePhoto's lookup/delete calls.
const mockDb = jest.fn(() => ({
where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
first: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
delete: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(0),
}));
jest.mock('p-limit', () => mockPLimit);
jest.mock('chokidar', () => ({
watch: jest.fn(() => mockWatcher),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: mockDb }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => mockLogger);
jest.mock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => ({
generateThumbnail: jest.fn(),
generateVideoPlaceholder: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/videoProcessor', () => ({
isVideoMimeType: jest.fn(() => false),
}));
jest.mock('../../src/services/downloadZipService', () => ({ invalidate: jest.fn() }));
jest.mock('../../src/utils/dbCompat', () => ({
formatBoolean: jest.fn((value) => value),
}));
const loadFileWatcher = () => {
let fileWatcher;
jest.isolateModules(() => {
fileWatcher = require('../../src/services/fileWatcher');
});
return fileWatcher;
};
describe('fileWatcher concurrency bound', () => {
const originalBackend = process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND;
const originalConcurrency = process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY;
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
Object.keys(mockHandlers).forEach((key) => delete mockHandlers[key]);
process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND = 'local';
delete process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY;
});
afterAll(() => {
if (originalBackend === undefined) delete process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND;
else process.env.STORAGE_BACKEND = originalBackend;
if (originalConcurrency === undefined) delete process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY;
else process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY = originalConcurrency;
});
it.each([
[undefined, 2], // default
['3', 3], // explicit
['0', 1], // floored to 1
['-4', 1], // floored to 1
['invalid', 2], // falls back to default
])('configures the limiter with FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY=%s as %i', (configured, expected) => {
if (configured === undefined) delete process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY;
else process.env.FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY = configured;
loadFileWatcher().startFileWatcher();
expect(mockPLimit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expected);
});
it('routes add events through the shared limiter', async () => {
loadFileWatcher().startFileWatcher();
expect(mockHandlers.add).toEqual(expect.any(Function));
mockHandlers.add('/outside-watch-root'); // early-returns inside processNewPhoto
expect(mockLimit).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(mockLimit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.any(Function));
await mockLimit.mock.results[0].value;
});
it('routes unlink events through the same limiter', async () => {
loadFileWatcher().startFileWatcher();
expect(mockHandlers.unlink).toEqual(expect.any(Function));
mockHandlers.unlink('/outside-watch-root'); // early-returns inside removePhoto
expect(mockLimit).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
await mockLimit.mock.results[0].value;
});
it('logs instead of rejecting when a queued handler throws', async () => {
loadFileWatcher().startFileWatcher();
const failure = new Error('boom');
mockLimit.mockImplementationOnce(() => Promise.reject(failure));
mockHandlers.add('/whatever');
await new Promise(process.nextTick);
expect(mockLogger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Error processing new photo:', failure);
});
});
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
/**
* Locks the process-wide Sharp memory guards. The file-watcher concurrency
* bound (FILE_WATCHER_CONCURRENCY) assumes these caps stay in place — they
* limit libvips threads/cache WITHIN one operation while p-limit bounds the
* number of parallel pipelines. From the filpgame fork (426ca491).
*/
const mockSharp = jest.fn();
mockSharp.cache = jest.fn();
mockSharp.concurrency = jest.fn();
jest.mock('sharp', () => mockSharp);
jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({
error: jest.fn(),
warn: jest.fn(),
info: jest.fn(),
debug: jest.fn(),
}));
describe('imageProcessor Sharp configuration', () => {
it('disables the Sharp cache and caps libvips concurrency', () => {
jest.isolateModules(() => {
require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
});
expect(mockSharp.cache).toHaveBeenCalledWith(false);
expect(mockSharp.concurrency).toHaveBeenCalledWith(2);
});
});
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the RAW/DNG handling helpers (#821). The actual exiftool
* extraction can only be exercised in the built image (exiftool isn't a dev
* dependency), so these cover the gating logic: which files are treated as RAW,
* and that ordinary images pass through untouched (zero cost / no extraction).
*/
const path = require('path');
const { isRawFilename, withProcessableImage, RAW_EXTENSIONS } = require('../../src/services/imageProcessor');
describe('isRawFilename', () => {
it('recognises common RAW / DNG extensions', () => {
for (const ext of ['dng', 'cr2', 'cr3', 'nef', 'arw', 'raf', 'rw2', 'orf']) {
expect(isRawFilename(`IMG_1234.${ext}`)).toBe(true);
expect(isRawFilename(`IMG_1234.${ext.toUpperCase()}`)).toBe(true); // case-insensitive
}
});
it('does not treat ordinary images/videos as RAW', () => {
for (const name of ['photo.jpg', 'photo.jpeg', 'photo.png', 'photo.webp', 'clip.mp4', 'clip.mov', 'photo.heic']) {
expect(isRawFilename(name)).toBe(false);
}
});
it('is null/empty safe', () => {
expect(isRawFilename(null)).toBe(false);
expect(isRawFilename('')).toBe(false);
expect(isRawFilename('noextension')).toBe(false);
});
it('RAW_EXTENSIONS includes dng (Apple ProRAW)', () => {
expect(RAW_EXTENSIONS.has('dng')).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('withProcessableImage', () => {
it('passes ordinary images through with no extraction and a no-op cleanup', async () => {
const localPath = '/tmp/whatever/photo.jpg';
const proc = await withProcessableImage(localPath, 'photo.jpg');
expect(proc.path).toBe(localPath); // unchanged — sharp reads it directly
expect(proc.outputBasename).toBeUndefined(); // generators keep their default naming
await expect(Promise.resolve(proc.cleanup())).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it('routes RAW files to extraction (which fails cleanly without exiftool/preview)', async () => {
// In the dev sandbox exiftool isn't installed, so extraction throws — the
// caller turns that into a normal processing failure. In the built image
// (exiftool present) this instead returns the embedded JPEG preview.
await expect(withProcessableImage('/tmp/whatever/IMG_1234.dng', 'IMG_1234.dng')).rejects.toThrow();
});
});
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regression tests for logActivity calls inside transactions (#850 review
* find). createContract / updateContract / createStorno / reissueInvoice
* called logActivity() (and contract paths also adminActor()) from inside
* a knex transaction WITHOUT the trx executor. On single-connection SQLite
* the audit insert then waits on a second pool connection while the trx
* holds the only one — a 60s acquire-timeout stall per call, after which
* logActivity's catch swallows the failure and the audit row is silently
* lost. Postgres was unaffected.
*
* The observable fix: the activity_logs rows now exist, and the calls
* complete without waiting on the pool. The shrunken acquire timeout
* below makes any reintroduced deadlock fail the test quickly instead
* of appearing to pass after a long stall.
*/
const path = require('path');
const {
bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, assignAdminRole,
} = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
jest.setTimeout(120000);
let db;
let cleanup;
let tmpDir;
let adminId;
let customerId;
let contractService;
let invoiceService;
const prevCwd = process.cwd();
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup, tmpDir } = await bootCrmDb());
// Business-doc artifacts land under process.cwd()/storage — isolate.
process.chdir(tmpDir);
// A reintroduced in-trx pool grab should fail fast (2s), not stall 60s.
db.client.pool.acquireTimeoutMillis = 2000;
// node-sqlite3 detects Date bindings via the NATIVE realm's Date —
// under jest's vm sandbox that check fails and Dates stringify to
// "[object Object]". Normalize to ISO strings on the client prototype
// (transaction clients are Object.create()d from it). Same shim as
// crmMintPaths.test.js.
const clientProto = Object.getPrototypeOf(db.client);
const origQuery = clientProto._query;
clientProto._query = function patchedQuery(connection, obj) {
if (obj && Array.isArray(obj.bindings)) {
obj.bindings = obj.bindings.map(
(b) => (b && typeof b === 'object' && typeof b.toISOString === 'function' ? b.toISOString() : b),
);
}
return origQuery.call(this, connection, obj);
};
({ adminId, customerId } = await seedMinimal(db));
await assignAdminRole(db, adminId, 'super_admin');
contractService = require('../../src/services/contractService');
invoiceService = require('../../src/services/invoiceService');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
process.chdir(prevCwd);
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
test('createContract persists the contract_created audit row (was silently lost on SQLite)', async () => {
const contractId = await contractService.createContract({
customerAccountId: customerId,
title: 'Audit-Trail-Vertrag',
}, adminId);
const row = await db('activity_logs')
.where({ activity_type: 'contract_created' })
.orderBy('id', 'desc')
.first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(JSON.parse(row.metadata).contractId).toBe(contractId);
expect(row.actor_type).toBe('admin');
});
test('updateContract persists the contract_updated audit row', async () => {
const contractId = await contractService.createContract({
customerAccountId: customerId,
title: 'Vorher',
}, adminId);
await contractService.updateContract(contractId, { title: 'Nachher' }, adminId);
const row = await db('activity_logs')
.where({ activity_type: 'contract_updated' })
.orderBy('id', 'desc')
.first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(JSON.parse(row.metadata).contractId).toBe(contractId);
});
test('cancelInvoice (Storno mint) persists the invoice_cancelled_via_storno audit row', async () => {
const { invoiceIds } = await invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: customerId,
currency: 'CHF',
vatRate: 0,
lineItems: [
{ position: 1, quantity: 1, description: 'Coverage', unit_price_minor: 100000, discount_percent: 0 },
],
}, adminId);
const id = invoiceIds[0];
await db('invoices').where({ id }).update({ status: 'sent', sent_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date() });
const result = await invoiceService.cancelInvoice(id, adminId);
expect(result.cancelled).toBe(true);
const row = await db('activity_logs')
.where({ activity_type: 'invoice_cancelled_via_storno' })
.orderBy('id', 'desc')
.first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
const meta = JSON.parse(row.metadata);
expect(meta.invoiceId).toBe(id);
expect(meta.stornoId).toBe(result.stornoId);
});
test('reissueInvoice completes on SQLite and persists the invoice_reissued audit row', async () => {
const { invoiceIds } = await invoiceService.createInvoice({
customerAccountId: customerId,
currency: 'CHF',
vatRate: 0,
lineItems: [
{ position: 1, quantity: 1, description: 'Album', unit_price_minor: 50000, discount_percent: 0 },
],
}, adminId);
const id = invoiceIds[0];
await db('invoices').where({ id }).update({ status: 'sent', sent_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date() });
// Pre-fix this stalled inside the wrapping transaction (createInvoice's
// global-connection reads vs. the single-connection pool) and aborted
// before the replacement existed — with the Storno already committed.
const result = await invoiceService.reissueInvoice(id, adminId);
expect(result.id).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(result.replaces).toBe(id);
const replacement = await db('invoices').where({ id: result.id }).first();
expect(replacement.replaces_invoice_id).toBe(id);
const row = await db('activity_logs')
.where({ activity_type: 'invoice_reissued' })
.orderBy('id', 'desc')
.first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(JSON.parse(row.metadata).newInvoiceId).toBe(result.id);
});
void path; // referenced for parity with sibling suites
@@ -234,66 +234,3 @@ describe('renderInvoiceToBuffer — Storno branch', () => {
expect(stornoBuf.length).toBeLessThan(invoiceBuf.length);
});
});
// VAT free-text note (#794) + multi-page page-number placement. Same
// constraint as the Storno tests: PDFKit Flate-compresses content streams,
// so we can't grep the note text — but the page-TREE objects are NOT
// compressed, so `/Type /Page` (not `/Pages`) is countable to assert
// pagination, and a byte-size delta proves the note actually rendered.
describe('renderInvoiceToBuffer — VAT note + multi-page footer (#794)', () => {
function baseCtx(overrides = {}) {
return {
locale: 'de', currency: 'CHF',
issuer: { companyName: 'AcmeCo' },
recipient: {
companyName: 'KundenCo', addressLine1: 'Strasse 1',
city: 'Bern', postalCode: '3000',
},
lineItems: [{
quantity: 1, description: 'Photo session',
unitPriceMinor: 30000, lineTotalMinor: 30000,
parentLineItemId: null, parentPosition: null,
}],
totals: {
netAmountMinor: 30000, vatRate: 0, vatAmountMinor: 0,
shippingAmountMinor: 0, totalAmountMinor: 30000,
},
doc: { invoiceNumber: 'R-2026-0042', issueDate: '2026-04-12' },
qrFormat: 'none',
paymentTerm: { netDays: 30 },
...overrides,
};
}
const pageCount = (buf) => (buf.toString('latin1').match(/\/Type\s*\/Page(?![s])/g) || []).length;
const VAT_NOTE = 'Gemäß § 6 Abs. 1 Z 27 UStG 1994 wird keine Umsatzsteuer berechnet (Kleinunternehmer).';
it('renders the VAT note on a single-page invoice (adds content, valid PDF)', async () => {
const withNote = await pdfService.renderInvoiceToBuffer(baseCtx({ vatNote: VAT_NOTE }));
const without = await pdfService.renderInvoiceToBuffer(baseCtx());
expect(withNote.slice(0, 4).toString('ascii')).toBe('%PDF');
expect(pageCount(withNote)).toBe(1);
expect(withNote.length).toBeGreaterThan(without.length);
});
it('paginates a long invoice (with the note) across multiple pages without a stray blank page', async () => {
const manyItems = Array.from({ length: 60 }, (_, i) => ({
quantity: 1, description: `Position ${i + 1} — fotografische Leistung`,
unitPriceMinor: 3225, lineTotalMinor: 3225,
parentLineItemId: null, parentPosition: null,
}));
const buf = await pdfService.renderInvoiceToBuffer(baseCtx({
lineItems: manyItems,
totals: {
netAmountMinor: 193500, vatRate: 0, vatAmountMinor: 0,
shippingAmountMinor: 0, totalAmountMinor: 193500,
},
vatNote: VAT_NOTE,
}));
expect(buf.slice(0, 4).toString('ascii')).toBe('%PDF');
const pages = pageCount(buf);
expect(pages).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
// 60 short rows fit in 23 pages; a stray blank page (the old margin
// bug) or a runaway loop would blow past this.
expect(pages).toBeLessThanOrEqual(3);
});
});
@@ -71,24 +71,15 @@ jest.mock('../../src/services/imageProcessor', () => {
const mockExtractCaptureDate = jest.fn();
return {
generateThumbnail: mockGenerateThumbnail,
generateVideoPlaceholder: jest.fn(async (filename) => `thumbnails/thumb_${filename.replace(/\.[^.]+$/, '')}.jpg`),
extractCaptureDate: mockExtractCaptureDate,
withLocalCopy: jest.fn(async (key, fn) =>
fn(`/tmp/local-copy-${require('path').basename(key)}`)
),
// Pass-through for ordinary (non-RAW) images: returns the path unchanged
// with a no-op cleanup, matching the real helper's behaviour for jpg/png.
withProcessableImage: jest.fn(async (localPath) => ({
path: localPath,
outputBasename: undefined,
cleanup: () => {},
})),
};
});
jest.mock('../../src/services/videoProcessor', () => ({
processUploadedVideo: jest.fn(),
extractVideoMetadata: jest.fn(),
isVideoMimeType: (mime) => typeof mime === 'string' && mime.startsWith('video/'),
}));
@@ -214,44 +205,6 @@ describe('photoProcessor.processPhoto', () => {
expect(watermarkService.generateForPhoto).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('keeps a video complete with a placeholder thumbnail when ffmpeg fails', async () => {
dbModule.__setPhoto({
id: 203,
event_id: 9,
filename: 'drone-clip.mp4',
original_filename: 'drone.mp4',
mime_type: 'video/mp4',
media_type: 'video',
size_bytes: 12345,
captured_at: null,
});
dbModule.__setEvent({ id: 9, slug: 'wedding', event_name: 'Wedding' });
// ffmpeg thumbnail pipeline throws (e.g. unsupported pixel format)…
videoProcessor.processUploadedVideo.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('ffmpeg exited with code 1'));
// …but a plain probe still works.
videoProcessor.extractVideoMetadata.mockResolvedValueOnce({
duration: 42,
videoCodec: 'hevc',
audioCodec: 'aac',
width: 3840,
height: 2160,
});
const { processPhoto } = require('../../src/services/photoProcessor');
await processPhoto(203);
const finalUpdate = dbModule.__recorded().updateCalls.pop();
// The row must complete — 'failed' rows are invisible to guests.
expect(finalUpdate.data.processing_status).toBe('complete');
// Placeholder instead of NULL: a completed video without thumbnail would
// make the grid fetch the original video file for the tile (#845 review).
expect(finalUpdate.data.thumbnail_path).toBe('thumbnails/thumb_drone-clip.jpg');
expect(imageProcessor.generateVideoPlaceholder).toHaveBeenCalledWith('drone-clip.mp4');
expect(finalUpdate.data.duration).toBe(42);
expect(finalUpdate.data.video_codec).toBe('hevc');
});
it('throws when the photo row no longer exists', async () => {
dbModule.__setPhoto(null);
dbModule.__setEvent({ id: 1 });
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
/**
* Tests for preserveOperatorRole — re-establishing the operator's authorization
* after a restore replaces the roles / permissions / role_permissions tables.
* Real in-memory SQLite so the joins and inserts behave as in production.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
let db;
let svc;
beforeEach(async () => {
db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
await db.schema.createTable('roles', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('name').notNullable().unique();
t.string('display_name');
t.integer('priority').defaultTo(0);
t.boolean('is_system').defaultTo(false);
});
await db.schema.createTable('permissions', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('name').notNullable().unique();
t.string('display_name');
t.string('category');
});
await db.schema.createTable('role_permissions', (t) => {
t.integer('role_id').notNullable();
t.integer('permission_id').notNullable();
t.primary(['role_id', 'permission_id']);
});
await db.schema.createTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('email');
t.integer('role_id');
});
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../knexfile', () => ({ client: 'sqlite3' }));
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db }));
svc = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService');
});
afterEach(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
jest.dontMock('../../knexfile');
await db.destroy();
});
test('captureOperatorRole returns the role + its permission names', async () => {
await db('roles').insert({ id: 1, name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'Super Admin', priority: 100 });
await db('permissions').insert([
{ id: 1, name: 'events.create', display_name: 'Create', category: 'events' },
{ id: 2, name: 'users.manage', display_name: 'Manage', category: 'users' },
]);
await db('role_permissions').insert([{ role_id: 1, permission_id: 1 }, { role_id: 1, permission_id: 2 }]);
const snap = await svc.captureOperatorRole(1);
expect(snap.role.name).toBe('super_admin');
expect(snap.permissions.sort()).toEqual(['events.create', 'users.manage']);
});
test('preserveOperatorRole binds to a restored role of the same NAME (ids remapped)', async () => {
const snapshot = { role: { name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'Super Admin', priority: 100, is_system: true }, permissions: ['events.create'] };
// Simulate post-restore RBAC where super_admin now has a DIFFERENT id.
await db('roles').insert({ id: 7, name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'Super Admin (restored)', priority: 100 });
await db('admin_users').insert({ id: 3, email: 'op@example.com', role_id: null });
await db.transaction((trx) => svc.preserveOperatorRole(trx, 3, snapshot));
const op = await db('admin_users').where({ id: 3 }).first();
expect(op.role_id).toBe(7); // bound to restored super_admin by name
expect(await db('roles').count({ c: '*' }).first()).toEqual({ c: 1 }); // no duplicate role created
});
test('preserveOperatorRole re-creates the role + grants when the backup omits it', async () => {
const snapshot = {
role: { name: 'super_admin', display_name: 'Super Admin', priority: 100, is_system: true },
permissions: ['events.create', 'users.manage', 'gone.permission'],
};
// Post-restore RBAC WITHOUT super_admin; only some permissions exist.
await db('roles').insert({ id: 2, name: 'viewer', display_name: 'Viewer', priority: 10 });
await db('permissions').insert([
{ id: 5, name: 'events.create', display_name: 'Create', category: 'events' },
{ id: 6, name: 'users.manage', display_name: 'Manage', category: 'users' },
]);
await db('admin_users').insert({ id: 3, email: 'op@example.com', role_id: null });
await db.transaction((trx) => svc.preserveOperatorRole(trx, 3, snapshot));
const recreated = await db('roles').where({ name: 'super_admin' }).first();
expect(recreated).toBeTruthy(); // role re-created, not left missing
expect(recreated.id).toBe(3); // max(2)+1
const op = await db('admin_users').where({ id: 3 }).first();
expect(op.role_id).toBe(recreated.id); // operator not locked out / downgraded
const grants = await db('role_permissions').where({ role_id: recreated.id }).pluck('permission_id');
expect(grants.sort()).toEqual([5, 6]); // existing perms re-granted; 'gone.permission' skipped
});
test('preserveOperatorRole no-ops when the operator had no role', async () => {
await db('admin_users').insert({ id: 3, email: 'op@example.com', role_id: null });
await db.transaction((trx) => svc.preserveOperatorRole(trx, 3, null));
const op = await db('admin_users').where({ id: 3 }).first();
expect(op.role_id).toBeNull();
});
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
/**
* renderProofName — the configurable Beleg proof-attachment filename template.
* Pure function; no DB. Covers token substitution, the multi-proof index
* fallback, padding, and filesystem-safe sanitisation.
*/
const { renderProofName } = require('../../src/services/invoice/rebillProofs');
describe('renderProofName', () => {
const base = { invoiceNumber: 'R-2026-0042', supplierName: 'ACME AG', seq: 1, hasMulti: false, issueDate: '2026-08-03' };
it('defaults to Beleg-<invoice>.pdf', () => {
expect(renderProofName('Beleg-{INVOICE}', base)).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042.pdf');
expect(renderProofName('', base)).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042.pdf');
expect(renderProofName(null, base)).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042.pdf');
});
it('substitutes every token incl. padded SEQ and date parts', () => {
expect(renderProofName('{SUPPLIER}-{INVOICE}-{YEAR}{MONTH}-{SEQ:03d}', { ...base, seq: 7 }))
.toBe('ACME-AG-R-2026-0042-202608-007.pdf');
});
it('appends an index for multiple proofs only when the template has no {SEQ}', () => {
// No {SEQ} + multi → auto-suffixed with the index.
expect(renderProofName('Beleg-{INVOICE}', { ...base, seq: 2, hasMulti: true })).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042-2.pdf');
// Single proof → no suffix.
expect(renderProofName('Beleg-{INVOICE}', { ...base, seq: 1, hasMulti: false })).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042.pdf');
// Explicit {SEQ} → no double index even when multi.
expect(renderProofName('Beleg-{INVOICE}-{SEQ}', { ...base, seq: 2, hasMulti: true })).toBe('Beleg-R-2026-0042-2.pdf');
});
it('sanitises unsafe characters and slashes, and always ends in a single .pdf', () => {
expect(renderProofName('Beleg {INVOICE}', { ...base, invoiceNumber: '2026/0042' })).toBe('Beleg-2026-0042.pdf');
// Author-supplied extension is stripped and re-added (no double .pdf).
expect(renderProofName('{INVOICE}.pdf', base)).toBe('R-2026-0042.pdf');
// Falls back to 'Beleg' if the template renders empty after sanitising.
expect(renderProofName('{SUPPLIER}', { ...base, supplierName: '///' })).toBe('Beleg.pdf');
});
});
@@ -1,247 +0,0 @@
/**
* Ownership guards for PicTransfer (#998 review, tracked as #1005).
*
* A transfer bundles ORIGINAL files and hands them out over an unauthenticated
* token URL, so the two guards below are the only thing standing between a
* scoped admin and every other admin's originals:
*
* 1. filterOwnedPhotoIds — a scoped admin may only bundle photos from events
* they own. Without it, arbitrary photo ids in the create/add-files body
* became a public download link to anyone's originals.
* 2. listTransfers scoping + payload stripping — the list used to be unscoped
* AND to carry each row's download token, so any admin holding events.view
* could read another's token and fetch their originals without creating
* anything at all.
*
* Both were correct when merged. These tests exist so they stay that way: an
* untested guard does not survive refactoring, which #999 demonstrated when the
* same attribution fix landed in one component and was left stale in another.
* Each case below fails against the pre-fix behaviour, not merely passes
* against the current code.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-transferown-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'transferown-test-secret';
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('PicTransfer ownership guards (#998)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let transferService;
let editorA; let editorB; let superAdmin;
let eventA; let eventB; let eventOwnerless;
let photoA; let photoB; let photoOwnerless;
const asEditor = (id) => ({ id, roleName: 'editor' });
const mkAdmin = async (username, roleName) => {
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: roleName }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username, email: `${username}@example.com`,
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id, is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(), updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkEvent = async (slug, createdBy) => {
const r = await db('events').insert({
slug, event_type: 'wedding', event_name: slug, event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'h@e.com', admin_email: 'a@e.com', password_hash: 'x',
share_token: `t-${slug}`, share_link: `/g/${slug}/t-${slug}`,
created_by: createdBy,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
is_active: 1, is_archived: 0, is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkPhoto = async (eventId, filename) => {
const r = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId, filename, path: `events/${eventId}/${filename}`,
type: 'individual', uploaded_at: Date.now(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkTransfer = async (title, createdBy) => {
const r = await db('transfers').insert({
token: `tok-${title}-${'0'.repeat(50)}`.slice(0, 64),
title, created_by: createdBy,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 864e5).toISOString(),
download_count: 0, is_active: 1, grace_days: 7, allow_uploads: 0,
delivery_method: 'link',
created_at: new Date().toISOString(), updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
transferService = require('../../src/services/transferService');
editorA = await mkAdmin('xfer-a', 'editor');
editorB = await mkAdmin('xfer-b', 'editor');
superAdmin = await mkAdmin('xfer-root', 'super_admin');
eventA = await mkEvent('xfer-own', editorA);
eventB = await mkEvent('xfer-foreign', editorB);
eventOwnerless = await mkEvent('xfer-legacy', null);
photoA = await mkPhoto(eventA, 'own.jpg');
photoB = await mkPhoto(eventB, 'foreign.jpg');
photoOwnerless = await mkPhoto(eventOwnerless, 'legacy.jpg');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
describe('filterOwnedPhotoIds', () => {
it("drops photos from another admin's event", async () => {
// The exfiltration path: these ids would otherwise be bundled into a
// transfer and served over the public download token.
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(asEditor(editorA), [photoB]);
expect(owned).toEqual([]);
});
it("keeps photos from the caller's own event", async () => {
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(asEditor(editorA), [photoA]);
expect(owned).toEqual([photoA]);
});
it('keeps photos from an ownerless legacy event', async () => {
// Parity with filterOwnedEventIds, which treats created_by IS NULL as
// ownable by anyone — otherwise legacy events become unusable.
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(asEditor(editorA), [photoOwnerless]);
expect(owned).toEqual([photoOwnerless]);
});
it('keeps only the owned subset of a mixed request', async () => {
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(
asEditor(editorA), [photoA, photoB, photoOwnerless],
);
expect(owned.sort()).toEqual([photoA, photoOwnerless].sort());
expect(owned).not.toContain(photoB);
});
it('drops ids that do not exist', async () => {
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(asEditor(editorA), [999999]);
expect(owned).toEqual([]);
});
it('leaves super_admin unrestricted', async () => {
const owned = await transferService.filterOwnedPhotoIds(
{ id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin' }, [photoA, photoB, photoOwnerless],
);
expect(owned.sort()).toEqual([photoA, photoB, photoOwnerless].sort());
});
});
describe('addFiles gates on the same rule', () => {
it("refuses to attach another admin's photo", async () => {
// The guard has to sit in addFiles, not only at the route, because both
// createTransfer and POST /:id/files funnel through it.
const transferId = await mkTransfer('gate', editorA);
await transferService.addFiles(transferId, [photoA, photoB], asEditor(editorA));
const attached = await db('transfer_files')
.where({ transfer_id: transferId }).pluck('photo_id');
expect(attached).toContain(photoA);
expect(attached).not.toContain(photoB);
});
});
describe('listTransfers', () => {
let mineId; let theirsId;
beforeAll(async () => {
mineId = await mkTransfer('mine', editorA);
theirsId = await mkTransfer('theirs', editorB);
});
it("hides another admin's transfers from a scoped caller", async () => {
const rows = await transferService.listTransfers({ admin: asEditor(editorA) });
const ids = rows.map((r) => r.id);
expect(ids).toContain(mineId);
expect(ids).not.toContain(theirsId);
});
it('shows everything to super_admin', async () => {
const rows = await transferService.listTransfers({
admin: { id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin' },
});
const ids = rows.map((r) => r.id);
expect(ids).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([mineId, theirsId]));
});
it('never carries download or upload links in the list payload', async () => {
// Defence in depth on top of the scoping above, and the layer most likely
// to be undone by a "the list needs the link too" change. The token is a
// bearer credential for the originals — detail only.
const rows = await transferService.listTransfers({ admin: asEditor(editorA) });
expect(rows.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const row of rows) {
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('token');
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('upload_token');
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('download_url');
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('upload_url');
}
});
});
// The guard is a module-local middleware, so rather than stand up supertest
// just to prove Express ordering, assert the contract at the source — the
// same approach taken for the backup/restore contracts in #596. Ordering is
// the whole mechanism here: `router.use('/:id', …)` registered after the
// `/:id` routes would silently guard nothing while still looking present.
describe('requireTransferOwnership registration', () => {
const routerSrc = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, '../../src/routes/adminTransfers.js'), 'utf8',
);
it('mounts the ownership guard before every /:id route', () => {
const guardAt = routerSrc.indexOf("router.use('/:id', requireTransferOwnership)");
expect(guardAt).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
const idRoutes = [...routerSrc.matchAll(/^router\.(get|post|patch|delete)\('\/:id/gm)];
expect(idRoutes.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const m of idRoutes) {
expect(m.index).toBeGreaterThan(guardAt);
}
});
it('answers missing and foreign ids identically, so it is not an existence oracle', () => {
const guard = routerSrc.slice(
routerSrc.indexOf('async function requireTransferOwnership'),
routerSrc.indexOf('// List'),
);
// Both branches must 404. A 403 on foreign would confirm the row exists.
const notFounds = [...guard.matchAll(/status\(404\)/g)];
expect(notFounds.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
expect(guard).not.toMatch(/status\(403\)/);
expect(guard).toMatch(/roleName === 'super_admin'/);
});
});
describe('getTransferOwner (backs requireTransferOwnership)', () => {
it('reports the creator so the route guard can compare it', async () => {
const id = await mkTransfer('owned-lookup', editorB);
const owner = await transferService.getTransferOwner(id);
expect(Number(owner.created_by)).toBe(Number(editorB));
});
it('returns nothing for a missing id, so the guard 404s rather than throwing', async () => {
const owner = await transferService.getTransferOwner(999999);
expect(owner).toBeFalsy();
});
});
});
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the pure gating logic in transferService (PicTransfer, #997).
* These exercise the download/upload eligibility rules without touching the DB.
*/
const transferService = require('../../src/services/transferService');
const HOUR = 60 * 60 * 1000;
function make(overrides = {}) {
return {
id: 1,
title: 'T',
is_active: true,
deleted_at: null,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 24 * HOUR),
max_downloads: null,
download_count: 0,
allow_uploads: false,
upload_expires_at: null,
...overrides,
};
}
describe('transferService.downloadsRemaining', () => {
it('returns null (unlimited) when no cap or zero cap', () => {
expect(transferService.downloadsRemaining(make({ max_downloads: null }))).toBeNull();
expect(transferService.downloadsRemaining(make({ max_downloads: 0 }))).toBeNull();
});
it('returns the remaining count and never goes negative', () => {
expect(transferService.downloadsRemaining(make({ max_downloads: 5, download_count: 2 }))).toBe(3);
expect(transferService.downloadsRemaining(make({ max_downloads: 5, download_count: 9 }))).toBe(0);
});
});
describe('transferService.computeStatus', () => {
it('is deleted when deleted_at set, regardless of activity', () => {
expect(transferService.computeStatus(make({ deleted_at: new Date(), is_active: true }))).toBe('deleted');
});
it('is expired when inactive or past expiry', () => {
expect(transferService.computeStatus(make({ is_active: false }))).toBe('expired');
expect(transferService.computeStatus(make({ expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - HOUR) }))).toBe('expired');
});
it('is active within the window', () => {
expect(transferService.computeStatus(make())).toBe('active');
});
});
describe('transferService.assertDownloadable', () => {
it('allows a live, in-window, uncapped transfer', () => {
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(make()).ok).toBe(true);
});
it('404s a missing/deleted transfer', () => {
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(null)).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 404 });
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(make({ deleted_at: new Date() }))).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 404 });
});
it('410s when disabled or expired', () => {
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(make({ is_active: false }))).toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: 'TRANSFER_DISABLED', status: 410 });
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(make({ expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - HOUR) }))).toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: 'TRANSFER_EXPIRED', status: 410 });
});
it('410s when the download cap is reached', () => {
expect(transferService.assertDownloadable(make({ max_downloads: 2, download_count: 2 })))
.toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: 'DOWNLOAD_LIMIT_REACHED', status: 410 });
});
});
describe('transferService.assertUploadable', () => {
it('403s when uploads are disabled', () => {
expect(transferService.assertUploadable(make({ allow_uploads: false }))).toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: 'UPLOADS_DISABLED', status: 403 });
});
it('allows when uploads enabled and not expired', () => {
expect(transferService.assertUploadable(make({ allow_uploads: true })).ok).toBe(true);
});
it('410s when the upload window has passed', () => {
expect(transferService.assertUploadable(make({ allow_uploads: true, upload_expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - HOUR) })))
.toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: 'UPLOAD_EXPIRED', status: 410 });
});
});
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
/**
* Pre-rename detection for the registry-move notice (#985).
*
* The in-app MigrationBanner shipped 2026-06-29, a month AFTER
* ghcr.io/the-luap/picpeak/* stopped receiving images on 2026-05-27. Anyone
* still pulling the retired path is therefore running a build that predates the
* banner and can never render it — the structural gap that keeps producing
* reports like #982. The update check is the one channel that still reaches
* them, so it carries the notice instead.
*
* The boundary is exact rather than heuristic: v3.44.0 shipped on the freeze
* date and v3.45.0 followed on 2026-07-09 to the org registry only, with
* nothing published in between.
*/
const { isPreRenameStable, REGISTRY_RENAME_STABLE_FLOOR } = require('../../src/services/updateCheckService');
describe('isPreRenameStable (#985)', () => {
it('pins the floor to the first org-registry-only stable release', () => {
expect(REGISTRY_RENAME_STABLE_FLOOR).toBe('3.45.0');
});
it('flags stable installs below the floor', () => {
// v3.44.0 is the last stable that reached the retired path.
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.44.0', 'stable')).toBe(true);
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.43.1', 'stable')).toBe(true);
expect(isPreRenameStable('2.6.5', 'stable')).toBe(true);
});
it('leaves stable installs at or above the floor alone', () => {
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.45.0', 'stable')).toBe(false);
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.45.13', 'stable')).toBe(false);
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.99.0', 'stable')).toBe(false);
});
it('never fires on the beta channel', () => {
// The beta boundary is inferred, not clean — 3.59.0-beta.0 landed two days
// after the freeze. A false positive would tell a correctly-configured
// operator their registry is retired, so beta is deliberately excluded even
// where the number looks old.
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.44.0-beta.0', 'beta')).toBe(false);
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.58.0-beta.0', 'beta')).toBe(false);
expect(isPreRenameStable('3.99.0-beta.0', 'beta')).toBe(false);
});
it('does not fire on an unresolvable version', () => {
// getCurrentVersion() falls back to '0.0.0' when package.json is
// unreadable. That is a broken install, not a pre-rename one — claiming its
// registry is retired would send the operator down the wrong path.
expect(isPreRenameStable('0.0.0', 'stable')).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const {
EXTENSION_TO_MIME,
extensionsToMimeTypes,
} = require('../../src/services/uploadSettings');
const { validateFileType } = require('../../src/utils/fileSecurityUtils');
const RAW_AND_HEIF_TYPES = {
dng: 'image/x-adobe-dng',
heic: 'image/heic',
heif: 'image/heif',
};
function getFrontendExtensionMap() {
const source = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, '../../../frontend/src/utils/fileTypes.ts'),
'utf8'
);
const match = source.match(/const EXTENSION_TO_MIME[^=]*= \{([\s\S]*?)\n\};/);
if (!match) throw new Error('Could not find frontend EXTENSION_TO_MIME');
// Parse `key: 'mime',` entries — quoted keys and trailing `//` comments are
// tolerated; any other non-blank, non-comment line inside the map is a parse
// failure, so a syntax the parser can't read fails loudly instead of silently
// dropping the entry from the comparison.
const entries = [];
for (const line of match[1].split('\n')) {
const trimmed = line.trim();
if (trimmed === '' || trimmed.startsWith('//')) continue;
const entry = trimmed.match(/^'?(\w+)'?\s*:\s*'([^']+)'\s*,?\s*(?:\/\/.*)?$/);
if (!entry) throw new Error(`Unparsable EXTENSION_TO_MIME line in frontend fileTypes.ts: "${trimmed}"`);
entries.push([entry[1], entry[2]]);
}
return Object.fromEntries(entries);
}
describe('configured upload file types', () => {
test('supports configured DNG, HEIC, and HEIF uploads', () => {
expect(extensionsToMimeTypes('dng,heic,heif')).toEqual(Object.values(RAW_AND_HEIF_TYPES));
for (const [extension, mimeType] of Object.entries(RAW_AND_HEIF_TYPES)) {
expect(validateFileType(`image.${extension}`, mimeType, [mimeType])).toBe(true);
}
});
test('uses the same extension-to-MIME map as the frontend', () => {
expect(getFrontendExtensionMap()).toEqual(EXTENSION_TO_MIME);
});
});
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the per-file upload size limit getter (general_max_file_size_mb),
* added so the admin's "Max File Size (MB)" setting applies to guest uploads
* (#613 follow-up — mat1990dj). Real in-memory SQLite app_settings so the
* read/parse/cache path runs exactly as in production.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
let db;
let svc;
beforeEach(async () => {
db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
await db.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('setting_key').notNullable().unique();
t.text('setting_value');
t.string('setting_type');
t.timestamp('updated_at');
});
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db }));
svc = require('../../src/services/uploadSettings');
svc.clearMaxFileSizeCache();
});
afterEach(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
await db.destroy();
});
async function setLimit(mb) {
await db('app_settings')
.insert({ setting_key: 'general_max_file_size_mb', setting_value: JSON.stringify(mb), setting_type: 'general', updated_at: new Date() })
.onConflict('setting_key').merge({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(mb) });
svc.clearMaxFileSizeCache();
}
test('defaults to 50MB when the setting is absent', async () => {
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(50);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeBytes()).toBe(50 * 1024 * 1024);
});
test('honours a configured value (e.g. 500MB video)', async () => {
await setLimit(500);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(500);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeBytes()).toBe(500 * 1024 * 1024);
});
test('clamps a nonsense value to the default and caps absurd values at the ceiling', async () => {
await setLimit(0);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(50); // 0 → default
await setLimit(99_999_999);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(svc.MAX_ALLOWED_FILE_SIZE_MB); // ceiling
});
test('caches for the TTL — a mid-window DB change is not seen until the cache is cleared', async () => {
await setLimit(200);
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(200);
// change the DB but do NOT clear cache
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'general_max_file_size_mb' }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(300) });
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(200); // still cached
svc.clearMaxFileSizeCache();
expect(await svc.getMaxFileSizeMb()).toBe(300); // refreshed
});
@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
/**
* Per-event banner overrides — end-to-end plumbing for BOTH banners.
*
* The promo banner (#440) shipped with per-event inherit/custom/off, but the
* override never actually reached a guest: GalleryView reads promo_mode from
* the /photos payload and /photos never sent it, so every gallery resolved to
* 'inherit'. Setting a gallery's promo banner to "Off" did nothing. The info
* banner (#932) mirrored that shape and inherited the same gaps.
*
* Four places dropped the fields. This pins all of them for both banners so
* the two stay in step:
*
* 1. GET /gallery/:slug/photos — must carry the columns
* 2. POST /admin/events — validators accepted them, insert dropped
* 3. POST /admin/events/:id/duplicate — copy promised, not delivered
* 4. PUT /admin/events/:id — partial update parked stale markdown
*
* The route-level normalisation is exercised directly against its own rules
* rather than through supertest: the intent is to pin the DATA contract, which
* is what silently broke.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-banner-plumbing-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'banner-plumbing-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
const baseEvent = (slug, extra = {}) => ({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: slug,
event_date: '2026-06-22',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
share_token: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...extra,
});
const insertEvent = async (slug, extra) => {
const [id] = await db('events').insert(baseEvent(slug, extra)).returning('id');
return id?.id ?? id;
};
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
// Mirrors the unified normalisation in adminEvents/crud.js.
function normalizeBannerUpdates(updates, stored) {
for (const field of ['promo', 'info']) {
const modeKey = `${field}_mode`;
const mdKey = `${field}_markdown`;
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, modeKey)
&& !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, mdKey)) continue;
const effectiveMode = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, modeKey)
? updates[modeKey]
: stored[modeKey];
if (effectiveMode !== 'custom') {
updates[mdKey] = null;
} else if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, mdKey)) {
const md = typeof updates[mdKey] === 'string' ? updates[mdKey].trim() : '';
updates[mdKey] = md || null;
}
}
return updates;
}
describe('partial update resolves the mode from the stored row', () => {
it.each(['promo', 'info'])(
'%s: markdown-only PUT on an inherit gallery does not park hidden text',
(field) => {
const stored = { promo_mode: 'inherit', info_mode: 'inherit' };
const updates = normalizeBannerUpdates({ [`${field}_markdown`]: 'hidden draft' }, stored);
// Previously stored the text; a later switch to 'custom' resurrected it.
expect(updates[`${field}_markdown`]).toBeNull();
},
);
it.each(['promo', 'info'])('%s: markdown-only PUT on an off gallery also clears', (field) => {
const stored = { promo_mode: 'off', info_mode: 'off' };
const updates = normalizeBannerUpdates({ [`${field}_markdown`]: 'hidden draft' }, stored);
expect(updates[`${field}_markdown`]).toBeNull();
});
it.each(['promo', 'info'])('%s: markdown-only PUT on a custom gallery is kept', (field) => {
const stored = { promo_mode: 'custom', info_mode: 'custom' };
const updates = normalizeBannerUpdates({ [`${field}_markdown`]: ' keep me ' }, stored);
expect(updates[`${field}_markdown`]).toBe('keep me');
});
it.each(['promo', 'info'])('%s: switching away from custom clears the copy', (field) => {
const stored = { promo_mode: 'custom', info_mode: 'custom' };
const updates = normalizeBannerUpdates(
{ [`${field}_mode`]: 'off', [`${field}_markdown`]: 'stale' }, stored,
);
expect(updates[`${field}_markdown`]).toBeNull();
});
it('leaves both banners alone when the request touches neither', () => {
const updates = normalizeBannerUpdates({ event_name: 'Renamed' }, { promo_mode: 'custom', info_mode: 'custom' });
expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, 'promo_markdown')).toBe(false);
expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(updates, 'info_markdown')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('columns round-trip through the events table', () => {
it('stores and reads both banners independently', async () => {
const id = await insertEvent('banner-roundtrip', {
promo_mode: 'off',
info_mode: 'custom',
info_markdown: 'Use the menu button to filter.',
});
const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
// Independent slots — muting one must not touch the other.
expect(row.promo_mode).toBe('off');
expect(row.promo_markdown ?? null).toBeNull();
expect(row.info_mode).toBe('custom');
expect(row.info_markdown).toBe('Use the menu button to filter.');
});
it('duplicating drops markdown left over on a non-custom source', async () => {
// A row written before the PUT normalisation landed can hold text while
// its mode is inherit/off. Copying that verbatim would smuggle hidden copy
// into the duplicate and resurrect it on the next switch to 'custom'.
const sourceId = await insertEvent('banner-dup-stale', {
promo_mode: 'off',
promo_markdown: 'stale promo text',
info_mode: 'inherit',
info_markdown: 'stale info text',
});
const source = await db('events').where({ id: sourceId }).first();
const dupId = await insertEvent('banner-dup-stale-copy', {
promo_mode: source.promo_mode || 'inherit',
promo_markdown: source.promo_mode === 'custom' ? (source.promo_markdown || null) : null,
info_mode: source.info_mode || 'inherit',
info_markdown: source.info_mode === 'custom' ? (source.info_markdown || null) : null,
});
const dup = await db('events').where({ id: dupId }).first();
expect(dup.promo_mode).toBe('off');
expect(dup.promo_markdown).toBeNull();
expect(dup.info_mode).toBe('inherit');
expect(dup.info_markdown).toBeNull();
});
it('duplicating an event carries both banners across', async () => {
const sourceId = await insertEvent('banner-dup-source', {
promo_mode: 'custom',
promo_markdown: 'Book your next session',
info_mode: 'off',
});
const source = await db('events').where({ id: sourceId }).first();
// Mirrors the duplicate route's insert.
const dupId = await insertEvent('banner-dup-copy', {
promo_mode: source.promo_mode || 'inherit',
promo_markdown: source.promo_mode === 'custom' ? (source.promo_markdown || null) : null,
info_mode: source.info_mode || 'inherit',
info_markdown: source.info_mode === 'custom' ? (source.info_markdown || null) : null,
});
const dup = await db('events').where({ id: dupId }).first();
expect(dup.promo_mode).toBe('custom');
expect(dup.promo_markdown).toBe('Book your next session');
// The muted info banner must stay muted in the copy.
expect(dup.info_mode).toBe('off');
});
});
@@ -1,609 +0,0 @@
/**
* Engine resolution + the stranded-SQLite guard (#1038).
*
* knexfile.js picks its config block by NODE_ENV and the `development` block
* defaults to sqlite3. The image never set NODE_ENV, so Kubernetes / Helm /
* plain `docker run` deployments silently ran on SQLite while ignoring
* DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD — and wait-for-db.sh, being shell, reported
* "PostgreSQL is up" in the same log.
*
* Pinned here:
* - the image default really is production (so knexfile resolves to pg)
* - the boot line names the engine and never leaks credentials
* - the guard blocks exactly one case — virgin Postgres while a populated
* SQLite file exists — and nothing else
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const {
resolveSqlitePath,
describeEngine,
decideBootEngine,
probeSqliteData,
migrationMarkerPath,
hasMigrationMarker,
migrationInProgressPath,
hasMigrationInProgress,
isUntouchedBootstrapRow,
adminsIndicateUse,
} = require('../../src/utils/databaseEngine');
const {
epochToIso,
coerceForTargetEngine,
} = require('../../src/services/picpeakImportService');
describe('knexfile engine selection (#1038)', () => {
// Resolved in a child process with a clean cwd: knexfile calls
// dotenv.config(), so running in-process would let a developer's
// backend/.env (or the container's) decide the answer instead of the
// knexfile defaults this test is about.
function clientFor(env) {
const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
const os = require('os');
const knexfile = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'knexfile.js');
const cwd = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-knexenv-'));
const childEnv = { PATH: process.env.PATH };
if (env.NODE_ENV !== undefined) childEnv.NODE_ENV = env.NODE_ENV;
const out = execFileSync(
process.execPath,
['-e', `process.stdout.write(String(require(${JSON.stringify(knexfile)}).client))`],
{ cwd, env: childEnv, encoding: 'utf8' },
);
return out.trim();
}
test('an unset NODE_ENV resolves to sqlite — the trap the image fell into', () => {
expect(clientFor({})).toBe('sqlite3');
});
test('NODE_ENV=production resolves to pg, so the Dockerfile default fixes it', () => {
expect(clientFor({ NODE_ENV: 'production' })).toBe('pg');
});
test('the Dockerfile pins NODE_ENV=production', () => {
const dockerfile = fs.readFileSync(
path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'Dockerfile'), 'utf8',
);
expect(dockerfile).toMatch(/^ENV NODE_ENV=production$/m);
});
});
describe('describeEngine', () => {
// Built at runtime rather than written inline: a literal after `password:`
// trips secret scanners, and this is a marker string, not a credential.
const FAKE_CREDENTIAL = ['not', 'a', 'real', 'credential'].join('-');
test('names the postgres host/port/database', () => {
const text = describeEngine({
client: 'pg',
connection: { host: 'db.internal', port: 5432, database: 'picpeak', password: FAKE_CREDENTIAL },
});
expect(text).toBe('postgres (db.internal:5432/picpeak)');
});
test('never leaks the password', () => {
const text = describeEngine({
client: 'pg',
connection: { host: 'h', port: 5432, database: 'd', password: FAKE_CREDENTIAL, user: 'picpeak' },
});
expect(text).not.toContain(FAKE_CREDENTIAL);
});
test('names the sqlite file', () => {
expect(describeEngine({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: '/app/data/x.db' } }))
.toBe('sqlite (/app/data/x.db)');
});
});
describe('resolveSqlitePath', () => {
const ORIGINAL = process.env.DATABASE_PATH;
afterEach(() => {
if (ORIGINAL === undefined) delete process.env.DATABASE_PATH;
else process.env.DATABASE_PATH = ORIGINAL;
});
test('defaults to backend/data/photo_sharing.db', () => {
delete process.env.DATABASE_PATH;
expect(resolveSqlitePath().endsWith(path.join('data', 'photo_sharing.db'))).toBe(true);
expect(path.isAbsolute(resolveSqlitePath())).toBe(true);
});
test('honours an absolute DATABASE_PATH', () => {
process.env.DATABASE_PATH = '/var/lib/picpeak/db.sqlite';
expect(resolveSqlitePath()).toBe('/var/lib/picpeak/db.sqlite');
});
});
describe('decideBootEngine — what an existing install gets after the fix', () => {
test('STAYS on SQLite when Postgres is configured but holds no galleries', () => {
// The install that has been unknowingly running on SQLite. Switching would
// serve an empty database; blocking would take the galleries offline. It
// keeps running exactly as before, loudly.
const r = decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null, pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: true,
});
expect(r.client).toBe('sqlite3');
expect(r.overridden).toBe(true);
expect(r.reason).toBe('stranded-sqlite-data');
});
test('switches to Postgres by itself once the data is there', () => {
// i.e. straight after scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js — no further
// operator action needed on the next restart. The marker is what makes it
// unambiguous; without one, data on both sides is a conflict (see below).
const r = decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null, pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true,
migrationCompleted: true, pgConfigured: true,
});
expect(r.client).toBe('pg');
expect(r.overridden).toBe(false);
});
test('a fresh install with no SQLite file goes straight to Postgres', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null, pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: false,
}).client).toBe('pg');
});
test('an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT is always honoured', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'sqlite3', pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true,
}).client).toBe('sqlite3');
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'sqlite3', explicitClient: 'pg', pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: false,
}).client).toBe('pg');
});
test('forcing pg while SQLite still holds data is allowed, but flagged', () => {
const r = decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'pg', pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: true,
});
expect(r.client).toBe('pg');
expect(r.reason).toBe('explicit-pg-leaves-sqlite-behind');
});
test('keyed on DATA, not on tables: a migrated-but-empty Postgres still defers to SQLite', () => {
// A stray `run-migrations` against the empty Postgres creates every table.
// Keying the check on "has tables" would blind it and strand the operator
// on an empty database; keying on rows survives that.
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null, pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: true,
}).client).toBe('sqlite3');
});
});
describe('cross-engine row coercion (#1038)', () => {
test('epoch milliseconds become an ISO timestamp Postgres accepts', () => {
// SQLite writes Date objects as epoch ms; pg rejects the bare number with
// "date/time field value out of range".
expect(epochToIso(1786548038763)).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z');
});
test('epoch seconds are recognised too', () => {
expect(epochToIso(1786548038)).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.000Z');
});
test('a non-numeric value is left alone', () => {
expect(epochToIso('not-a-date')).toBe('not-a-date');
});
test('timestamp and boolean columns are coerced, others untouched', () => {
const rows = [{
id: 1, created_at: 1786548038763, expires_at: '1786548038763',
allow_downloads: 0, allow_user_uploads: 1, event_name: 'Wedding', hero_photo_id: null,
}];
const [out] = coerceForTargetEngine(rows, {
timestamps: ['created_at', 'expires_at'],
booleans: ['allow_downloads', 'allow_user_uploads'],
});
expect(out.created_at).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z');
expect(out.expires_at).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z');
expect(out.allow_downloads).toBe(false);
expect(out.allow_user_uploads).toBe(true);
expect(out.event_name).toBe('Wedding');
expect(out.hero_photo_id).toBeNull();
expect(out.id).toBe(1);
});
test('nulls and empty strings survive untouched', () => {
const [out] = coerceForTargetEngine(
[{ created_at: null, expires_at: '', allow_downloads: null }],
{ timestamps: ['created_at', 'expires_at'], booleans: ['allow_downloads'] },
);
expect(out.created_at).toBeNull();
expect(out.expires_at).toBe('');
expect(out.allow_downloads).toBeNull();
});
test('an ISO string is not mangled into a number', () => {
const [out] = coerceForTargetEngine(
[{ created_at: '2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z' }], { timestamps: ['created_at'], booleans: [] },
);
expect(out.created_at).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z');
});
});
describe('probeSqliteData fails closed (#1038 review)', () => {
function tmpDb(contents) {
const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-probe-'));
const file = path.join(dir, 'photo_sharing.db');
fs.writeFileSync(file, contents);
return file;
}
test('a corrupt/unreadable file counts as "holds data", never as empty', async () => {
// Reporting "no data" here would switch the install to an empty Postgres —
// the exact failure this module exists to prevent.
await expect(probeSqliteData(tmpDb('this is not a sqlite database'))).resolves.toBe(true);
});
test('a missing file is genuinely no data', async () => {
await expect(probeSqliteData('/nonexistent/photo_sharing.db')).resolves.toBe(false);
});
test('the migration marker pins the install to Postgres', async () => {
// Once migrated, a Postgres that merely LOOKS empty (every gallery deleted)
// must not send the install back to the now-stale SQLite file.
const file = tmpDb('this is not a sqlite database');
expect(hasMigrationMarker(file)).toBe(false);
expect(await probeSqliteData(file)).toBe(true);
fs.writeFileSync(migrationMarkerPath(file), '{}');
expect(hasMigrationMarker(file)).toBe(true);
expect(await probeSqliteData(file)).toBe(false);
});
test('the marker sits next to the database file', () => {
expect(migrationMarkerPath('/app/data/photo_sharing.db'))
.toBe('/app/data/photo_sharing.db.migrated-to-postgres');
});
});
describe('an unfinished migration pins the boot to SQLite (#1038 review)', () => {
// A migration that dies after touching Postgres leaves rows there — schema
// creation alone seeds a bootstrap admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set. Those
// rows read as "occupied", so without a pin the next restart would switch
// engines and hide the SQLite data that is still authoritative.
test('Postgres holding partial data does NOT win while the migration is unfinished', () => {
const r = decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg',
explicitClient: null,
pgHasData: true, // e.g. just the bootstrap admin, or a half-load
sqliteHasData: true,
migrationInProgress: true,
});
expect(r.client).toBe('sqlite3');
expect(r.reason).toBe('migration-incomplete');
});
test('once the migration completes, Postgres wins again', () => {
// Completed means the marker exists — that is what distinguishes this from
// two populated databases nobody has reconciled.
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg',
explicitClient: null,
pgHasData: true,
sqliteHasData: true,
migrationInProgress: false,
migrationCompleted: true,
pgConfigured: true,
}).client).toBe('pg');
});
test('the pin is irrelevant when there is no SQLite data to protect', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg',
explicitClient: null,
pgHasData: true,
sqliteHasData: false,
migrationInProgress: true,
}).client).toBe('pg');
});
test('the pin file sits next to the database', () => {
expect(migrationInProgressPath('/app/data/photo_sharing.db'))
.toBe('/app/data/photo_sharing.db.migration-in-progress');
expect(hasMigrationInProgress('/nonexistent/photo_sharing.db')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('the migration pin outranks an explicit client (#1038 review r6)', () => {
// docker-compose sets DATABASE_CLIENT=pg, so without this an unfinished
// migration would be ignored on exactly the deployments that pin it, and a
// half-written Postgres would be served.
test('explicit pg loses to an unfinished migration while SQLite holds data', () => {
const r = decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'pg',
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationInProgress: true,
});
expect(r.client).toBe('sqlite3');
expect(r.reason).toBe('migration-incomplete');
});
test('explicit sqlite3 is left alone — it already points at the data', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'sqlite3',
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationInProgress: true,
}).client).toBe('sqlite3');
});
test('once the migration finishes, explicit pg is honoured again', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'pg',
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationInProgress: false,
}).client).toBe('pg');
});
test('a pin with no SQLite data left does not strand the install', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'pg',
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: false, migrationInProgress: true,
}).client).toBe('pg');
});
});
describe('bootstrap admin vs real admin (#1038 review r7)', () => {
// core/001_init.js seeds must_change_password=true when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set;
// setupService writes false once a human finishes first-run setup. Judging by
// the FLAG rather than the table keeps both mistakes away: counting the seed
// as real data would abandon a populated SQLite file, and ignoring the whole
// table would abandon a legitimately set-up Postgres.
test('an untouched seeded row is recognised across both engines', () => {
expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(true)).toBe(true);
expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(1)).toBe(true);
expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow('1')).toBe(true);
});
test('a completed setup is not a bootstrap row', () => {
expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(false)).toBe(false);
expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(0)).toBe(false);
expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow('0')).toBe(false);
});
test('a legacy NULL counts as a real admin, not a seed', () => {
expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(null)).toBe(false);
expect(isUntouchedBootstrapRow(undefined)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('admin rows: bootstrap seed vs real use (#1038 review r7/r8)', () => {
// must_change_password alone is mutable — resetAdminPassword() sets it on real
// accounts — so it cannot be the only signal. Only the exact shape
// core/001_init.js leaves behind reads as an untouched seed.
test('one never-used seeded admin is NOT use', () => {
expect(adminsIndicateUse([{ must_change_password: true, last_login: null }])).toBe(false);
expect(adminsIndicateUse([{ must_change_password: 1, last_login: null }])).toBe(false);
});
test('a completed first-run setup IS use', () => {
expect(adminsIndicateUse([{ must_change_password: false, last_login: null }])).toBe(true);
});
test('a real admin whose password was RESET is still use', () => {
// resetAdminPassword() re-raises must_change_password on a live account.
expect(adminsIndicateUse([
{ must_change_password: true, last_login: '2026-08-01T10:00:00Z' },
])).toBe(true);
});
test('more than one admin is use regardless of flags', () => {
expect(adminsIndicateUse([
{ must_change_password: true, last_login: null },
{ must_change_password: true, last_login: null },
])).toBe(true);
});
test('no admins at all is not use', () => {
expect(adminsIndicateUse([])).toBe(false);
});
test('installs predating the last_login column still work', () => {
expect(adminsIndicateUse([{ must_change_password: true }])).toBe(false);
expect(adminsIndicateUse([{ must_change_password: false }])).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('cross-engine JSON columns pass through untouched (#1038 review r8)', () => {
// SQLite keeps json columns as TEXT holding valid JSON, and pg accepts JSON
// text directly, so the coercion must not touch them at all: serialising
// would store `{"a":1}` as a scalar string, and parse-then-serialise turned
// the JSON literal `null` into SQL NULL, breaking NOT NULL json columns.
test('timestamps and booleans are coerced; nothing else is', () => {
const [out] = coerceForTargetEngine(
[{ setting_value: '{"a":1}', nulled: 'null', created_at: 1786548038763, flag: 1 }],
{ timestamps: ['created_at'], booleans: ['flag'] },
);
expect(out.setting_value).toBe('{"a":1}');
expect(out.nulled).toBe('null');
expect(out.created_at).toBe('2026-08-12T15:20:38.763Z');
expect(out.flag).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('Postgres probe: unreachable vs unusable (#1038 review r9)', () => {
const { probePgData } = require('../../src/utils/databaseEngine');
test('an unreachable Postgres reports "occupied" so a healthy install is not diverted', async () => {
// A transient network failure must not hand a live pg install over to a
// stale SQLite file; startup should surface the real connection error.
const warnings = [];
const result = await probePgData(
{ host: '127.0.0.1', port: 59999, user: 'nobody', password: 'x', database: 'nope' },
(m) => warnings.push(m),
);
expect(result).toBe(true);
expect(warnings.join(' ')).toMatch(/unreachable/i);
}, 30000);
});
describe('a completed migration overrides an implicit SQLite config (#1038 review r11)', () => {
// The affected installs ARE the ones with NODE_ENV unset — that is why they
// ended up on SQLite. An operator can easily migrate before fixing that, and
// by then the source file has been renamed away, so honouring the implicit
// sqlite3 would create a NEW empty database and serve it.
test('marker + Postgres settings beat an implicitly-resolved sqlite3', () => {
const r = decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'sqlite3', explicitClient: null,
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: false,
migrationCompleted: true, pgConfigured: true,
});
expect(r.client).toBe('pg');
expect(r.reason).toBe('migrated-to-postgres');
});
test('an EXPLICIT sqlite3 still wins — that is a deliberate rollback', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'sqlite3', explicitClient: 'sqlite3',
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: false,
migrationCompleted: true, pgConfigured: true,
}).client).toBe('sqlite3');
});
test('without Postgres settings there is nowhere to send it', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'sqlite3', explicitClient: null,
pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: false,
migrationCompleted: true, pgConfigured: false,
}).client).toBe('sqlite3');
});
test('no marker, no override — a plain SQLite install is left alone', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'sqlite3', explicitClient: null,
pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: true,
migrationCompleted: false, pgConfigured: true,
}).client).toBe('sqlite3');
});
});
describe('two populated databases is a conflict, not a guess (#1038 review r12)', () => {
// An install that ran on Postgres, lost NODE_ENV, and kept working on SQLite
// has real data on BOTH sides: the Postgres rows are old, the SQLite rows are
// newer. Picking either hides galleries and splits future writes.
test('no marker + data on both sides refuses to choose', () => {
const r = decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null,
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationCompleted: false,
});
expect(r.client).toBeNull();
expect(r.reason).toBe('ambiguous-both-populated');
});
test('a completed migration is not a conflict — the marker says which is current', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null,
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationCompleted: true, pgConfigured: true,
}).client).toBe('pg');
});
test('an explicit choice always resolves it', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'sqlite3',
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationCompleted: false,
}).client).toBe('sqlite3');
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: 'pg',
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: true, migrationCompleted: false,
}).client).toBe('pg');
});
test('only one side populated is not a conflict', () => {
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null,
pgHasData: true, sqliteHasData: false, migrationCompleted: false,
}).client).toBe('pg');
expect(decideBootEngine({
configuredClient: 'pg', explicitClient: null,
pgHasData: false, sqliteHasData: true, migrationCompleted: false,
}).client).toBe('sqlite3');
});
test('the pg probe target comes from the environment, not a sqlite config', () => {
const { pgConnectionFromEnv } = require('../../src/utils/databaseEngine');
const prev = { ...process.env };
process.env.DB_HOST = 'db.internal';
process.env.DB_NAME = 'picpeak_prod';
try {
const c = pgConnectionFromEnv();
expect(c.host).toBe('db.internal');
expect(c.database).toBe('picpeak_prod');
} finally {
process.env.DB_HOST = prev.DB_HOST;
process.env.DB_NAME = prev.DB_NAME;
}
});
});
describe('the target is resolved once, with production defaults (#1038 review r13)', () => {
// knexfile's DEVELOPMENT block defaults pg to localhost/postgres/photo_sharing
// while production uses db/picpeak/picpeak. The CLI runs in the NODE_ENV-unset
// state by design, so without an explicit resolution the migration could land
// in a database the running application never opens.
const { pgConnectionFromEnv } = require('../../src/utils/databaseEngine');
test('falls back to what a running container actually uses', () => {
// Host is `postgres`, matching wait-for-db.sh, which resolves and EXPORTS
// that value — so it is the host a bare container really runs against.
// knexfile's production block says `db`, but that default is only reached
// when the entrypoint did not run; a `docker exec` CLI has to agree with
// the runtime, not with the dormant default (#1038 review r14).
const prev = { ...process.env };
delete process.env.DB_HOST; delete process.env.DB_USER; delete process.env.DB_NAME;
try {
const c = pgConnectionFromEnv();
expect(c.host).toBe('postgres');
expect(c.user).toBe('picpeak');
expect(c.database).toBe('picpeak');
} finally {
Object.assign(process.env, prev);
}
});
test('explicit settings always win', () => {
const prev = { ...process.env };
process.env.DB_HOST = 'pg.example'; process.env.DB_NAME = 'mypics';
try {
const c = pgConnectionFromEnv();
expect(c.host).toBe('pg.example');
expect(c.database).toBe('mypics');
} finally {
Object.assign(process.env, prev);
}
});
});
describe('the marker is bound to the target it describes (#1038 review r15)', () => {
const { currentPgTargetId, readMigrationMarker } = require('../../src/utils/databaseEngine');
test('the target id has the shape the migration records', () => {
const prev = { ...process.env };
process.env.DB_HOST = 'pg.host'; process.env.DB_PORT = '6543'; process.env.DB_NAME = 'picpeak_prod';
try {
expect(currentPgTargetId()).toBe('pg.host:6543/picpeak_prod');
} finally {
Object.assign(process.env, prev);
}
});
test('an absent or unreadable marker reads as null, not a throw', () => {
expect(readMigrationMarker('/nonexistent/photo_sharing.db')).toBeNull();
});
test('inbound_documents is a real table; incoming_invoices never was', () => {
// The occupancy lists silently skip tables that do not exist, so a wrong
// name meant supplier documents never protected the install.
const src = fs.readFileSync(
path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'utils', 'databaseEngine.js'), 'utf8',
);
const cli = fs.readFileSync(
path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js'), 'utf8',
);
for (const text of [src, cli]) {
expect(text).toContain("'inbound_documents'");
expect(text).not.toContain("'incoming_invoices'");
}
});
});
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
/**
* Unit tests for rating removal (#884).
*
* Pins the contract of `feedbackService.submitFeedback` for
* `feedback_type: 'rating'` with `rating: 0` ("clear my rating"):
* - An existing rating row is DELETED (not updated to 0 — a stored 0
* would drag the photo's average down and still count in totals).
* - Photo stats (average_rating) are recalculated after the delete.
* - Rating 0 with no existing rating is a no-op that never inserts a row.
* - Removal is guest-scoped: clearing guest A's rating leaves guest B's
* rating (and the resulting average) intact.
* - Regular re-rating (3 → 5) still updates in place.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-rating-removal-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'rating-removal-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const feedbackService = require('../../src/services/feedbackService');
const EVENT_SLUG = 'rating-removal-event';
const GUEST_A = 'guest-a-identifier';
const GUEST_B = 'guest-b-identifier';
let db;
let cleanup;
let eventId;
let photoId;
async function rate(rating, guestIdentifier = GUEST_A) {
return feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
feedback_type: 'rating',
rating,
ip_address: '127.0.0.1',
user_agent: 'jest',
}, guestIdentifier);
}
async function ratingRows(guestIdentifier) {
const q = db('photo_feedback').where({
photo_id: photoId,
feedback_type: 'rating',
});
if (guestIdentifier) q.where('guest_identifier', guestIdentifier);
return q.select('*');
}
async function photoAverage() {
const photo = await db('photos').where('id', photoId).first();
return Number(photo.average_rating);
}
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: EVENT_SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Rating Removal Test',
event_date: '2026-06-22',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${EVENT_SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'rating-removal-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
const r = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: 'photo-1.jpg',
path: 'events/rating-removal/1.jpg',
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
photoId = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
beforeEach(async () => {
await db('photo_feedback').where('event_id', eventId).del();
await db('photos').where('id', photoId).update({ average_rating: 0, feedback_count: 0 });
});
describe('rating removal (#884)', () => {
test('rating 0 deletes the existing rating row and resets the average', async () => {
const created = await rate(4);
expect(created.created).toBe(true);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(4);
const removed = await rate(0);
expect(removed.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(0);
});
test('rating 0 without an existing rating is a no-op (no 0-row inserted)', async () => {
const r = await rate(0);
expect(r.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await ratingRows()).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(0);
});
test('removal is guest-scoped: guest B keeps their rating and the average', async () => {
await rate(2, GUEST_A);
await rate(4, GUEST_B);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(3);
const removed = await rate(0, GUEST_A);
expect(removed.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_B)).toHaveLength(1);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(4);
});
test('numeric string "0" also clears (truthy-string bypass guard)', async () => {
await rate(4);
const removed = await rate('0');
expect(removed.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(0);
});
test('malformed rating input never clears an existing rating', async () => {
await rate(4);
for (const bad of [undefined, null, 'bad', NaN]) {
const r = await rate(bad);
expect(r.removed).toBeFalsy();
}
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(1);
});
test('clearing deletes racy duplicate rating rows, not just the first', async () => {
// Simulate the check-then-insert race: two rating rows for one guest.
const row = {
photo_id: photoId,
event_id: eventId,
feedback_type: 'rating',
guest_identifier: GUEST_A,
is_approved: 1,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
};
await db('photo_feedback').insert({ ...row, rating: 3 });
await db('photo_feedback').insert({ ...row, rating: 5 });
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(2);
const removed = await rate(0);
expect(removed.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await ratingRows(GUEST_A)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(0);
});
test('re-rating with a different value still updates in place', async () => {
await rate(3);
const updated = await rate(5);
expect(updated.updated).toBe(true);
const rows = await ratingRows(GUEST_A);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].rating).toBe(5);
expect(await photoAverage()).toBe(5);
});
});
@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
/**
* Emoji reactions (#839) — pins the contract of the `reaction` feedback type:
* - only emojis from the fixed curated set are accepted
* - one reaction per guest per photo: same emoji again toggles OFF,
* a different emoji SWITCHES the existing row (never a second row)
* - per-guest scoping mirrors likes: guest_id when present, else the
* device-hash guest_identifier — two token-guests on one device react
* independently
* - denormalized photos.reaction_count and the per-emoji tallies follow
* visibility: hidden-by-moderator reactions disappear from both
* - the long and pivoted exports carry the reaction
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-feedback-reactions-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'feedback-reactions-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const feedbackService = require('../../src/services/feedbackService');
const { REACTION_EMOJIS } = require('../../src/constants/reactions');
const EVENT_SLUG = 'reactions-test-event';
const GUEST_A = 'guest-a-identifier';
const GUEST_B = 'guest-b-identifier';
let db;
let cleanup;
let eventId;
let photoIds;
async function react(photoId, emoji, { guestIdentifier = GUEST_A, guestId = null } = {}) {
return feedbackService.submitFeedback(photoId, eventId, {
feedback_type: 'reaction',
reaction: emoji,
guest_id: guestId,
ip_address: '127.0.0.1',
user_agent: 'jest',
}, guestIdentifier);
}
async function reactionCountOf(photoId) {
const row = await db('photos').where('id', photoId).first();
return Number(row.reaction_count) || 0;
}
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: EVENT_SLUG,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Reactions Test',
event_date: '2026-07-20',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${EVENT_SLUG}/share`,
share_token: 'reactions-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
photoIds = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
const photo = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename: `photo-${i}.jpg`,
path: `events/reactions/${i}.jpg`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
photoIds.push(photo[0]?.id ?? photo[0]);
}
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('reaction submission (#839)', () => {
it('rejects emojis outside the curated set', async () => {
await expect(react(photoIds[0], '🦄')).rejects.toThrow('Invalid reaction');
await expect(react(photoIds[0], undefined)).rejects.toThrow('Invalid reaction');
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(0);
});
it('creates a reaction row and maintains the denormalized count', async () => {
const result = await react(photoIds[0], '❤️');
expect(result.created).toBe(true);
const row = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoIds[0], feedback_type: 'reaction' })
.first();
expect(row.reaction).toBe('❤️');
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(1);
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[0])).toEqual({ '❤️': 1 });
});
it('switches to another emoji in place — never a second row per guest', async () => {
const result = await react(photoIds[0], '🎉');
expect(result.updated).toBe(true);
const rows = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoIds[0], feedback_type: 'reaction' });
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].reaction).toBe('🎉');
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[0])).toEqual({ '🎉': 1 });
});
it('tallies different guests per emoji', async () => {
await react(photoIds[0], '🎉', { guestIdentifier: GUEST_B });
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[0])).toEqual({ '🎉': 2 });
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(2);
});
it('toggles off with the same emoji', async () => {
const result = await react(photoIds[0], '🎉');
expect(result.removed).toBe(true);
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[0])).toEqual({ '🎉': 1 }); // GUEST_B remains
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(1);
});
it('scopes per guest_id when present — two token-guests on one device stay independent', async () => {
const first = await react(photoIds[1], '😍', { guestIdentifier: GUEST_A, guestId: 101 });
const second = await react(photoIds[1], '👏', { guestIdentifier: GUEST_A, guestId: 102 });
expect(first.created).toBe(true);
expect(second.created).toBe(true); // NOT treated as guest 101's switch
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[1])).toEqual({ '😍': 1, '👏': 1 });
});
it('accepts every emoji of the curated set', async () => {
for (const emoji of REACTION_EMOJIS) {
const res = await react(photoIds[2], emoji, { guestIdentifier: `guest-${emoji}` });
expect(res.created).toBe(true);
}
const counts = await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[2]);
expect(Object.keys(counts)).toHaveLength(REACTION_EMOJIS.length);
});
it('hidden reactions leave both the per-emoji tallies and reaction_count', async () => {
const row = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoIds[0], feedback_type: 'reaction' })
.first();
await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(row.id, 'hide', 1);
expect(await feedbackService.getPhotoReactionCounts(photoIds[0])).toEqual({});
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(0);
await feedbackService.moderateFeedback(row.id, 'approve', 1);
expect(await reactionCountOf(photoIds[0])).toBe(1);
});
it('toggle and switch collapse racy duplicate rows for the same guest', async () => {
// Simulate the check-then-insert race: two rows for one guest+photo.
const mk = (emoji) => ({
photo_id: photoIds[1], event_id: eventId, feedback_type: 'reaction',
reaction: emoji, guest_identifier: 'dup-guest', is_approved: true, is_hidden: false,
created_at: new Date(), updated_at: new Date(),
});
await db('photo_feedback').insert([mk('❤️'), mk('❤️')]);
// Switching converges to exactly ONE row with the new emoji…
const switched = await react(photoIds[1], '🎉', { guestIdentifier: 'dup-guest' });
expect(switched.updated).toBe(true);
let rows = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoIds[1], feedback_type: 'reaction', guest_identifier: 'dup-guest' });
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].reaction).toBe('🎉');
// …and toggle-off removes the full guest-scoped set.
await db('photo_feedback').insert(mk('🎉'));
const removed = await react(photoIds[1], '🎉', { guestIdentifier: 'dup-guest' });
expect(removed.removed).toBe(true);
rows = await db('photo_feedback')
.where({ photo_id: photoIds[1], feedback_type: 'reaction', guest_identifier: 'dup-guest' });
expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('summary and exports carry reactions', async () => {
const summary = await feedbackService.getEventFeedbackSummary(eventId);
expect(Number(summary.stats.total_reactions)).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const longRows = await feedbackService.exportEventFeedback(eventId);
const longReaction = longRows.find((r) => r.feedback_type === 'reaction');
expect(longReaction.reaction).toBeTruthy();
const pivotRows = await feedbackService.exportEventFeedbackPivoted(eventId);
const pivotWithReaction = pivotRows.find((r) => r.reaction);
expect(REACTION_EMOJIS).toContain(pivotWithReaction.reaction);
});
});
@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regression tests for the feedback-settings write path (#1030).
*
* The admin event form posts its whole client-side feedback state back,
* including three keys that were never columns on event_feedback_settings:
* `enable_rate_limiting`, `rate_limit_window_minutes` and
* `rate_limit_max_requests`. Spreading those into the knex UPDATE threw,
* the route answered 500, and EventDetailsPage swallowed it — so the admin
* saw "Event updated successfully" while "Enable feedback" never persisted
* and guests could not leave any feedback.
*
* Pinned here:
* - UI-only keys are dropped, not written, on BOTH the insert (no row yet)
* and update (row exists) branches.
* - Every real column still round-trips.
* - Identity columns can't be mass-assigned through the settings body.
* - gallery.js no longer declares a duplicate GET /:slug/feedback-settings.
* server.js mounts galleryRoutes before galleryFeedback, so the duplicate
* shadowed the real handler and dropped the #655 per-guest caps from the
* guest payload.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-feedback-settings-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'feedback-settings-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const feedbackService = require('../../src/services/feedbackService');
// Exactly what EventDetailsPage holds in state before its settings GET
// resolves — the three rate-limit keys are UI-only.
const ADMIN_FORM_BODY = {
feedback_enabled: true,
allow_ratings: true,
allow_likes: true,
allow_comments: true,
allow_favorites: true,
allow_reactions: true,
require_name_email: false,
moderate_comments: true,
show_feedback_to_guests: true,
enable_rate_limiting: false,
rate_limit_window_minutes: 15,
rate_limit_max_requests: 10,
};
let db;
let cleanup;
let eventId;
async function insertEvent(slug) {
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Feedback Settings Test',
event_date: '2026-06-22',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
share_token: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
}
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
eventId = await insertEvent('feedback-settings-test');
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
describe('updateEventFeedbackSettings ignores UI-only keys (#1030)', () => {
test('insert branch: enabling feedback on an event with no settings row persists', async () => {
const freshEventId = await insertEvent('feedback-settings-fresh');
const result = await feedbackService.updateEventFeedbackSettings(freshEventId, ADMIN_FORM_BODY);
expect(result.feedback_enabled).toBeTruthy();
const row = await db('event_feedback_settings').where('event_id', freshEventId).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.feedback_enabled).toBeTruthy();
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('enable_rate_limiting');
});
test('update branch: flipping the toggle on an existing row persists', async () => {
await feedbackService.updateEventFeedbackSettings(eventId, { feedback_enabled: false });
expect((await feedbackService.getEventFeedbackSettings(eventId)).feedback_enabled).toBeFalsy();
const result = await feedbackService.updateEventFeedbackSettings(eventId, ADMIN_FORM_BODY);
expect(result.feedback_enabled).toBeTruthy();
const rows = await db('event_feedback_settings').where('event_id', eventId);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].feedback_enabled).toBeTruthy();
});
test('every real column round-trips', async () => {
const result = await feedbackService.updateEventFeedbackSettings(eventId, {
...ADMIN_FORM_BODY,
allow_comments: false,
show_feedback_to_guests: false,
identity_mode: 'guest',
max_favorites_per_guest: 10,
max_likes_per_guest: 5,
});
expect(result.allow_comments).toBeFalsy();
expect(result.show_feedback_to_guests).toBeFalsy();
expect(result.identity_mode).toBe('guest');
expect(result.max_favorites_per_guest).toBe(10);
expect(result.max_likes_per_guest).toBe(5);
});
test('identity columns cannot be mass-assigned through the settings body', async () => {
const otherEventId = await insertEvent('feedback-settings-other');
const before = await db('event_feedback_settings').where('event_id', eventId).first();
await feedbackService.updateEventFeedbackSettings(eventId, {
feedback_enabled: true,
id: 99999,
event_id: otherEventId,
});
const after = await db('event_feedback_settings').where('event_id', eventId).first();
expect(after.id).toBe(before.id);
expect(after.event_id).toBe(eventId);
expect(await db('event_feedback_settings').where('event_id', otherEventId).first()).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('guest feedback-settings route is not shadowed (#1030)', () => {
test('gallery.js does not declare GET /:slug/feedback-settings', () => {
const source = fs.readFileSync(
path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'routes', 'gallery.js'), 'utf8',
);
expect(source).not.toMatch(/router\.get\(\s*['"]\/:slug\/feedback-settings['"]/);
});
test('galleryFeedback.js still serves it, including the #655 per-guest caps', () => {
const source = fs.readFileSync(
path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'routes', 'galleryFeedback.js'), 'utf8',
);
expect(source).toMatch(/router\.get\(\s*['"]\/:slug\/feedback-settings['"]/);
expect(source).toMatch(/max_favorites_per_guest/);
expect(source).toMatch(/max_likes_per_guest/);
});
});
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
/**
* Gallery info banner (#932).
*
* A short note rendered ABOVE the photo grid — the reporter's case is an
* onboarding hint ("use the menu button to filter"), which is useless in the
* promo slot down by the footer because the guest has to scroll the whole
* gallery to reach it.
*
* Covers what the migration actually produces on a real engine (the harness
* runs SQLite) and the inherit/custom/off resolution the gallery render
* depends on. The resolution is duplicated here rather than imported because
* it lives in the React layer; the point is to pin the CONTRACT — which
* source wins for each mode — so a change on either side has to update this
* file deliberately.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-info-banner-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'info-banner-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('migration 176 — schema', () => {
it('adds events.info_mode defaulting to inherit', async () => {
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'info_mode')).toBe(true);
const [id] = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'info-default-test',
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Info Default Test',
event_date: '2026-06-22',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: '/gallery/info-default-test/share',
share_token: 'info-default-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const eventId = id?.id ?? id;
const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
// A gallery created before anyone configures the feature must inherit,
// so switching the global default on lights up every existing gallery.
expect(row.info_mode).toBe('inherit');
expect(row.info_markdown ?? null).toBeNull();
});
it('adds events.info_markdown as nullable text', async () => {
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'info_markdown')).toBe(true);
});
it('seeds branding_info_markdown empty, so upgrading shows no banner', async () => {
const row = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'branding_info_markdown' }).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(JSON.parse(row.setting_value)).toBe('');
expect(row.setting_type).toBe('branding');
});
});
// Mirrors GalleryLayout's resolution.
function resolveInfoBanner(event, brandingDefault) {
const mode = event.info_mode || 'inherit';
if (mode === 'off') return '';
if (mode === 'custom') {
const own = (event.info_markdown || '').trim();
return (own || brandingDefault || '').trim();
}
return (brandingDefault || '').trim();
}
describe('inherit / custom / off resolution', () => {
const GLOBAL = 'Use the menu button to filter.';
it('inherit renders the global default', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'inherit' }, GLOBAL)).toBe(GLOBAL);
});
it('a missing mode is treated as inherit (rows predating the migration)', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({}, GLOBAL)).toBe(GLOBAL);
});
it('custom renders the event copy instead of the global', () => {
const own = 'Proofs are watermarked until final delivery.';
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'custom', info_markdown: own }, GLOBAL)).toBe(own);
});
it('custom with blank copy falls back to the global rather than showing nothing', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'custom', info_markdown: ' ' }, GLOBAL)).toBe(GLOBAL);
});
it('off suppresses the banner even when a global default exists', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'off' }, GLOBAL)).toBe('');
});
it('off wins over the event own copy too', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'off', info_markdown: 'ignored' }, GLOBAL)).toBe('');
});
it('an empty global default means no banner anywhere — the upgrade state', () => {
expect(resolveInfoBanner({ info_mode: 'inherit' }, '')).toBe('');
expect(resolveInfoBanner({}, undefined)).toBe('');
});
});
describe('per-event persistence', () => {
let eventId;
beforeAll(async () => {
const [id] = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'info-persist-test',
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Info Persist Test',
event_date: '2026-06-22',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: '/gallery/info-persist-test/share',
share_token: 'info-persist-test-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = id?.id ?? id;
});
it('stores a custom override', async () => {
await db('events').where({ id: eventId })
.update({ info_mode: 'custom', info_markdown: '**Heads up** — proofs only.' });
const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
expect(row.info_mode).toBe('custom');
expect(row.info_markdown).toBe('**Heads up** — proofs only.');
});
it('switching away from custom clears the stored copy', async () => {
// Matches the route's normalisation: mode != custom nulls the text so a
// later switch back to custom can't resurrect stale copy.
await db('events').where({ id: eventId })
.update({ info_mode: 'off', info_markdown: null });
const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
expect(row.info_mode).toBe('off');
expect(row.info_markdown).toBeNull();
});
it('the promo banner is untouched by info-banner changes', async () => {
const row = await db('events').where({ id: eventId }).first();
// Independent slots: the whole point of #932 is that an info hint at the
// top does not consume the marketing slot at the bottom.
expect(row.promo_mode).toBe('inherit');
expect(row.promo_markdown ?? null).toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regression test for #1024: quote/invoice PDF endpoints 500'd (or silently
* corrupted the filename) for customers whose name carries non-ASCII.
*
* The six PDF routes built the header by interpolating buildPdfFilename()'s
* result straight into `inline; filename="${filename}"`. HTTP header values
* are latin1, which splits the failure in two — and the split matters,
* because the issue reported the umlaut case as the 500 and it isn't:
*
* U+0080-U+00FF (ä ö ü ß — every German umlaut)
* No throw. The byte goes out raw and the client reads back a mangled
* name. A silent corruption, not an error.
*
* above U+00FF (Polish ł, Czech ř, Turkish ş, €, Cyrillic, CJK, emoji)
* Node's setHeader rejects it with ERR_INVALID_CHAR. Because the
* throw lands after the PDF buffer is already rendered, the whole
* request fails as an unhandled 500.
*
* buildContentDisposition() fixes both: an ASCII fallback for the legacy
* `filename=` parameter plus the RFC 5987 `filename*=UTF-8''…` form that
* carries the real name.
*
* These assertions run against the real Node header validator via a live
* express server, so they'd fail against the old interpolation rather than
* merely testing the helper in isolation.
*/
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
const { buildPdfFilename, sanitiseSegment } = require('../../src/utils/pdfFilename');
const { buildContentDisposition } = require('../../src/utils/filenameSanitizer');
// The RFC 5987 parameter prefix, i.e. filename*=UTF-8'' — the two trailing
// quotes are the (empty) language tag the spec puts between the charset and
// the percent-encoded value.
const RFC5987_PREFIX = 'filename*=UTF-8\'\'';
// Mirrors what the six PDF routes now do.
function buildApp(customer, docNumber = 'Q-2026-0042') {
const app = express();
app.get('/pdf', (req, res) => {
const filename = buildPdfFilename({ docNumber, customer, fallback: 'quote-preview' });
res.set('Content-Type', 'application/pdf');
res.set('Content-Disposition', buildContentDisposition(filename, 'inline'));
res.send(Buffer.from('%PDF-1.4 fake'));
});
// Mirrors the real error handler: an ERR_INVALID_CHAR throw inside the
// handler surfaces as a 500, which is what #1024 reported.
// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
app.use((err, req, res, next) => res.status(500).json({ error: err.code || err.message }));
return app;
}
describe('#1024 — PDF Content-Disposition with non-ASCII customer names', () => {
it('serves a PDF for a German umlaut name and keeps the name intact', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp({ company_name: 'Müller Fotografie' })).get('/pdf');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const cd = res.headers['content-disposition'];
// RFC 5987 form carries the real, unmangled name...
expect(cd).toContain(RFC5987_PREFIX);
expect(cd).toContain(encodeURIComponent('Müller-Fotografie.pdf'));
// ...and the ASCII fallback is legal latin1 with no raw umlaut byte.
const fallback = /filename="([^"]+)"/.exec(cd)[1];
expect(fallback).toMatch(/^[\x20-\x7e]+$/);
});
it.each([
['Polish', 'Michał Kowalski'],
['Czech', 'Dvořák Studio'],
['Turkish', 'Şahin Fotoğraf'],
['Cyrillic', 'Иванов Фото'],
['CJK', '山田写真'],
['emoji', 'Studio 🎉 Berlin'],
])('does not 500 for a %s customer name (was ERR_INVALID_CHAR)', async (_label, company) => {
const res = await request(buildApp({ company_name: company })).get('/pdf');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const cd = res.headers['content-disposition'];
expect(cd).toContain(RFC5987_PREFIX);
// The legacy filename= token drops non-ASCII, so a name written entirely
// in another script degrades to just the document number
// (`Q-2026-0042_.pdf`). That's the intended trade — filename* carries the
// real name — but the fallback must still be a legal, non-empty,
// ASCII-only token, since that is what a client without RFC 5987 support
// ends up saving.
const fallback = /filename="([^"]*)"/.exec(cd)[1];
expect(fallback.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(fallback).toMatch(/^[\x20-\x7e]+$/);
expect(fallback).toContain('Q-2026-0042');
});
it('leaves a plain ASCII name on the familiar filename= form', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp({ company_name: 'Bright Studio' })).get('/pdf');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-disposition'])
.toContain('filename="Q-2026-0042_Bright-Studio.pdf"');
});
it('still works when the customer row is missing entirely (preview path)', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp(null, null)).get('/pdf');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toContain('quote-preview_customer.pdf');
});
// sanitiseSegment caps each segment at 80 UTF-16 code units. A cap landing
// inside an astral character used to leave a dangling high surrogate, which
// makes encodeURIComponent throw URIError inside buildContentDisposition —
// a 500 on the very endpoint this PR fixes, reached a different way.
it.each([
['emoji on the 80-char boundary', `${'a'.repeat(79)}🎉`],
['astral CJK on the boundary', `${'a'.repeat(79)}𠜎`],
['a label that is entirely astral', '🎉'.repeat(60)],
])('does not 500 when truncation splits a surrogate pair — %s', async (_label, company) => {
const res = await request(buildApp({ company_name: company })).get('/pdf');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['content-disposition']).toContain(RFC5987_PREFIX);
});
it('drops the orphaned surrogate rather than widening the length cap', () => {
const seg = sanitiseSegment(`${'a'.repeat(79)}🎉`);
// 79 'a's + a half-emoji would be 80; the orphan is dropped, not kept.
expect(seg).toHaveLength(79);
expect(seg).toBe('a'.repeat(79));
// Nothing in the result may be an unpaired surrogate.
expect(seg).toBe(seg.replace(/[\uD800-\uDBFF](?![\uDC00-\uDFFF])/g, ''));
});
it('the raw interpolation these routes used to do really does throw', () => {
// Pins the root cause itself, so nobody "simplifies" the helper away.
const filename = buildPdfFilename({
docNumber: 'Q-2026-0042',
customer: { company_name: 'Michał Kowalski' },
});
const res = new (require('http').ServerResponse)({});
expect(() => res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `inline; filename="${filename}"`))
.toThrow(/ERR_INVALID_CHAR|Invalid character/);
});
});
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the global session cutoff (utils/sessionCutoff.js). Uses a
* real in-memory SQLite `app_settings` table so the read/write/parse path is
* exercised exactly as in production.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
let db;
let cutoff;
beforeEach(async () => {
db = knex({ client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true });
await db.schema.createTable('app_settings', (t) => {
t.increments('id');
t.string('setting_key').notNullable().unique();
t.text('setting_value');
t.string('setting_type');
t.timestamp('updated_at');
});
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db }));
cutoff = require('../../src/utils/sessionCutoff');
cutoff._resetCache();
});
afterEach(async () => {
jest.dontMock('../../src/database/db');
await db.destroy();
});
test('no cutoff set → nothing is invalidated', async () => {
expect(await cutoff.getSessionsValidAfter()).toBe(0);
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff({ iat: 1000 })).toBe(false);
});
test('token issued before the cutoff is rejected, at/after is accepted', async () => {
await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(2000);
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff({ iat: 1999 })).toBe(true); // pre-restore session
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff({ iat: 2000 })).toBe(false); // same second → kept
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff({ iat: 2001 })).toBe(false); // post-restore login
});
test('setSessionsValidAfter upserts a single row and refreshes the cache', async () => {
await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(1000);
await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(3000);
const rows = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'security_sessions_valid_after');
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
cutoff._resetCache();
expect(await cutoff.getSessionsValidAfter()).toBe(3000);
});
test('a token without iat is never treated as before the cutoff', async () => {
await cutoff.setSessionsValidAfter(2000);
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff({})).toBe(false);
expect(await cutoff.isTokenBeforeCutoff(null)).toBe(false);
});
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
/**
* Regression test for clearing an event's expiration on SQLite (#1029).
*
* Migration 061 dropped the NOT NULL on events.event_date / events.expires_at
* for Postgres only — it skipped SQLite on the (wrong) premise that SQLite
* doesn't enforce NOT NULL. It does, so every SQLite install answered
*
* SQLITE_CONSTRAINT: NOT NULL constraint failed: events.expires_at
*
* when an admin cleared the expiration, surfacing as "Failed to update event".
* Migration 174 finishes the job. The harness runs on SQLite, so this asserts
* the real engine behaviour rather than a mock.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-nullable-dates-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'nullable-dates-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
let db;
let cleanup;
let eventId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'nullable-dates-test',
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: 'Nullable Dates Test',
event_date: '2026-06-22',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: '/gallery/nullable-dates-test/share',
share_token: 'nullable-dates-share',
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
eventId = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
describe('events date columns are nullable on SQLite (#1029)', () => {
test('the engine under test really is SQLite', () => {
expect(['sqlite3', 'better-sqlite3']).toContain(db.client.config.client);
});
test('clearing expires_at succeeds — this threw SQLITE_CONSTRAINT before migration 174', async () => {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ expires_at: null });
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first('expires_at');
expect(row.expires_at).toBeNull();
});
test('clearing event_date succeeds too (061 covered both columns on PG)', async () => {
await db('events').where('id', eventId).update({ event_date: null });
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first('event_date');
expect(row.event_date).toBeNull();
});
test('a gallery can be created with no expiration at all', async () => {
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug: 'never-expires-test',
event_type: 'other',
event_name: 'Never Expires',
event_date: null,
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: 'x',
share_link: '/gallery/never-expires-test/share',
share_token: 'never-expires-share',
expires_at: null,
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
const id = inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
const row = await db('events').where('id', id).first('expires_at', 'event_date');
expect(row.expires_at).toBeNull();
expect(row.event_date).toBeNull();
});
test('columns the events table depends on survived the table rebuild', async () => {
// Knex implements .alter() on SQLite by recreating the table; make sure the
// rebuild kept the row and the wider schema intact.
const row = await db('events').where('id', eventId).first();
expect(row.slug).toBe('nullable-dates-test');
expect(row.share_token).toBe('nullable-dates-share');
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'allow_downloads')).toBe(true);
expect(await db.schema.hasColumn('events', 'hero_photo_id')).toBe(true);
const photos = await db('photos').where('event_id', eventId);
expect(Array.isArray(photos)).toBe(true);
});
});
Binary file not shown.
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@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
Copyright © 2017 IBM Corp. with Reserved Font Name "Plex"
This Font Software is licensed under the SIL Open Font License, Version 1.1.
This license is copied below, and is also available with a FAQ at: http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
-----------------------------------------------------------
SIL OPEN FONT LICENSE Version 1.1 - 26 February 2007
-----------------------------------------------------------
PREAMBLE
The goals of the Open Font License (OFL) are to stimulate worldwide
development of collaborative font projects, to support the font creation
efforts of academic and linguistic communities, and to provide a free and
open framework in which fonts may be shared and improved in partnership
with others.
The OFL allows the licensed fonts to be used, studied, modified and
redistributed freely as long as they are not sold by themselves. The
fonts, including any derivative works, can be bundled, embedded,
redistributed and/or sold with any software provided that any reserved
names are not used by derivative works. The fonts and derivatives,
however, cannot be released under any other type of license. The
requirement for fonts to remain under this license does not apply
to any document created using the fonts or their derivatives.
DEFINITIONS
"Font Software" refers to the set of files released by the Copyright
Holder(s) under this license and clearly marked as such. This may
include source files, build scripts and documentation.
"Reserved Font Name" refers to any names specified as such after the
copyright statement(s).
"Original Version" refers to the collection of Font Software components as
distributed by the Copyright Holder(s).
"Modified Version" refers to any derivative made by adding to, deleting,
or substituting -- in part or in whole -- any of the components of the
Original Version, by changing formats or by porting the Font Software to a
new environment.
"Author" refers to any designer, engineer, programmer, technical
writer or other person who contributed to the Font Software.
PERMISSION & CONDITIONS
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
a copy of the Font Software, to use, study, copy, merge, embed, modify,
redistribute, and sell modified and unmodified copies of the Font
Software, subject to the following conditions:
1) Neither the Font Software nor any of its individual components,
in Original or Modified Versions, may be sold by itself.
2) Original or Modified Versions of the Font Software may be bundled,
redistributed and/or sold with any software, provided that each copy
contains the above copyright notice and this license. These can be
included either as stand-alone text files, human-readable headers or
in the appropriate machine-readable metadata fields within text or
binary files as long as those fields can be easily viewed by the user.
3) No Modified Version of the Font Software may use the Reserved Font
Name(s) unless explicit written permission is granted by the corresponding
Copyright Holder. This restriction only applies to the primary font name as
presented to the users.
4) The name(s) of the Copyright Holder(s) or the Author(s) of the Font
Software shall not be used to promote, endorse or advertise any
Modified Version, except to acknowledge the contribution(s) of the
Copyright Holder(s) and the Author(s) or with their explicit written
permission.
5) The Font Software, modified or unmodified, in part or in whole,
must be distributed entirely under this license, and must not be
distributed under any other license. The requirement for fonts to
remain under this license does not apply to any document created
using the Font Software.
TERMINATION
This license becomes null and void if any of the above conditions are
not met.
DISCLAIMER
THE FONT SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT
OF COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR OTHER RIGHT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
COPYRIGHT HOLDER BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
FROM, OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE FONT SOFTWARE OR FROM
OTHER DEALINGS IN THE FONT SOFTWARE.
+3 -4
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
module.exports = {
testEnvironment: 'node',
// bootCrmDb() runs EVERY core migration in beforeAll; the chain keeps
// growing (163-165 pushed several suites past jest's default on CI
// runners — the 3.94 release PR failed on exactly this). 120s matches
// the convention the newer suites already pin explicitly.
// bootCrmDb() runs EVERY core migration in beforeAll and the chain keeps
// growing (134 migrations and counting via backports). 120s matches the
// beta-branch convention from #860.
testTimeout: 120000,
coverageDirectory: 'coverage',
collectCoverageFrom: [
+46 -9
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,39 @@
require('dotenv').config();
const path = require('path');
// Database configuration for different environments
// Shared with the engine guard (#1038) so both resolve the identical path.
const { resolveSqliteFilename } = require('./src/utils/sqlitePath');
// One resolution of the PostgreSQL target for the whole application (#1038).
// The development and production blocks used to carry different host/user/
// database defaults, so a process that probed or migrated against one could
// hand over to a process that opened another.
const { pgConnectionFromEnv } = require('./src/utils/pgConnection');
const resolveSqliteFilename = (filenameEnv) => {
const fallback = path.join(__dirname, './data/photo_sharing.db');
if (!filenameEnv) {
return fallback;
}
const trimmed = String(filenameEnv).trim();
if (!trimmed) {
return fallback;
}
let resolved;
if (path.isAbsolute(trimmed)) {
resolved = trimmed;
} else if (trimmed.startsWith('./') || trimmed.startsWith('../')) {
resolved = path.resolve(__dirname, trimmed);
} else {
resolved = path.join(__dirname, trimmed);
}
const normalized = path.normalize(resolved);
const baseSuffix = path.relative(path.parse(__dirname).root, path.normalize(__dirname));
const duplicatePattern = `${path.sep}${baseSuffix}${path.sep}${baseSuffix}`;
if (normalized.includes(duplicatePattern)) {
return normalized.replace(duplicatePattern, `${path.sep}${baseSuffix}`);
}
return normalized;
};
const sqliteConnection = (filenameEnv) => ({
filename: resolveSqliteFilename(filenameEnv)
@@ -28,7 +54,13 @@ const baseSqliteConfig = {
const config = {
development: {
client: process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT || 'sqlite3',
connection: process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT === 'pg' ? pgConnectionFromEnv() : {
connection: process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT === 'pg' ? {
host: process.env.DB_HOST || 'localhost',
port: process.env.DB_PORT || 5432,
user: process.env.DB_USER || 'postgres',
password: process.env.DB_PASSWORD || 'postgres',
database: process.env.DB_NAME || 'photo_sharing'
} : {
filename: resolveSqliteFilename(process.env.DATABASE_PATH || './data/photo_sharing.db')
},
useNullAsDefault: process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT !== 'pg',
@@ -65,7 +97,12 @@ const config = {
// Support both Postgres and SQLite in production based on DATABASE_CLIENT
connection: (process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT || 'pg') === 'pg'
? {
...pgConnectionFromEnv(),
host: process.env.DB_HOST || 'db',
port: process.env.DB_PORT || 5432,
user: process.env.DB_USER || 'picpeak',
password: process.env.DB_PASSWORD,
database: process.env.DB_NAME || 'picpeak',
ssl: process.env.DB_SSL === 'true' ? { rejectUnauthorized: false } : false,
// Connection stability settings
connectionTimeoutMillis: 30000,
idleTimeoutMillis: 30000,
+3 -10
View File
@@ -146,18 +146,11 @@ Generated on: ${new Date().toISOString()}
console.log('Default email templates created');
}
// Seed an email config ONLY when the environment actually supplies a host
// (#705). This used to fall back to `mailhog`, the dev compose service, so
// every fresh install came up with a LIVE config pointing at a host that
// does not exist outside the dev stack — the setup wizard then showed empty
// SMTP fields (reading as "nothing configured") while mail silently failed.
// With no row at all, emailProcessor logs "No email configuration found"
// and the wizard's blank fields are the truth. The dev stack keeps mailhog
// by setting SMTP_HOST explicitly in docker-compose.yml.
// Create default email config if none exists
const emailConfig = await knex('email_configs').first();
if (!emailConfig && process.env.SMTP_HOST) {
if (!emailConfig) {
await knex('email_configs').insert({
smtp_host: process.env.SMTP_HOST,
smtp_host: process.env.SMTP_HOST || 'mailhog',
smtp_port: process.env.SMTP_PORT || 1025,
smtp_secure: process.env.SMTP_SECURE === 'true',
smtp_user: process.env.SMTP_USER || '',
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
/**
* Migration 158: per-event slideshow ordering + category filter (#202).
*
* - `show_order` — 'chronological' (default, upload order) | 'random'
* (client-side shuffle). Lets the Live Slideshow play
* photos in a varied order during an event.
* - `show_category_id`— optional FK into `photo_categories`. When set, the
* slideshow only shows photos in that category (NULL =
* all visible photos, the existing behaviour).
*
* Both additive + guarded. Defaults preserve today's behaviour (chronological,
* all photos), so existing slideshows are unchanged.
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
const hasOrder = await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'show_order');
if (!hasOrder) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.string('show_order', 20).defaultTo('chronological');
});
}
const hasCat = await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'show_category_id');
if (!hasCat) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.integer('show_category_id').nullable();
});
}
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
for (const col of ['show_order', 'show_category_id']) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', col)) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => t.dropColumn(col));
}
}
};
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
/**
* Migration 159: per-event category ordering (#782).
*
* Adds a `display_order` integer to `photo_categories` so photographers can
* arrange an event's categories in the flow of the day (Pre-Ceremony →
* Ceremony → Reception …) instead of the hard-coded AZ order. Mirrors the
* `display_order` column + reorder pattern already used by `event_types`.
*
* Preserve existing galleries: backfill `display_order` from the CURRENT
* (alphabetical) order, scoped — globals numbered together, event-specific
* numbered per event — so nothing reshuffles on upgrade. A custom order is
* opt-in via the admin reorder controls. See feedback: migrations should pin
* previously-implicit defaults onto existing rows.
*
* Backfill runs in JS (not a SQL window function) to stay portable across
* SQLite (dev) and Postgres (prod).
*
* Additive + hasColumn-guarded.
*/
async function addColumn(knex, table, column, builder) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn(table, column))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable(table, builder);
}
}
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('photo_categories'))) return;
await addColumn(knex, 'photo_categories', 'display_order', (t) => {
t.integer('display_order').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.index('display_order');
});
// Backfill from the current alphabetical order, per scope, so existing
// galleries render exactly as before until an admin reorders.
const cats = await knex('photo_categories')
.select('id', 'name', 'is_global', 'event_id')
.orderBy('name', 'asc');
const counters = {};
for (const c of cats) {
const scope = c.is_global ? 'global' : `event:${c.event_id}`;
counters[scope] = (counters[scope] || 0) + 1;
await knex('photo_categories')
.where('id', c.id)
.update({ display_order: counters[scope] });
}
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('photo_categories'))) return;
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('photo_categories', 'display_order')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('photo_categories', (t) =>
t.dropColumn('display_order')
);
}
};
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
/**
* Migration 160: per-event category order override (#782).
*
* Builds on migration 159 (photo_categories.display_order = the GLOBAL default
* order) by adding a per-event OVERRIDE layer. Global categories are shared
* across every event, so a single display_order can only express one order for
* them. This table lets a single gallery arrange its categories — globals AND
* event-specific, interleaved into the flow of the day — independently of the
* global default.
*
* Resolution (see adminCategories / gallery):
* 1. if the event has override rows -> use override.position;
* 2. else fall back to photo_categories.display_order (the global default);
* 3. else name.
*
* An event is either "using the default" (no rows here) or "customised" (a row
* per category it shows). No backfill: every existing event starts on the
* default order, so nothing reshuffles — a custom order is opt-in per event.
*
* Additive + hasTable-guarded.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('photo_categories'))) return;
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('event_category_order')) return;
await knex.schema.createTable('event_category_order', (t) => {
t.increments('id').primary();
t.integer('event_id').notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('events').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.integer('category_id').notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('photo_categories').onDelete('CASCADE');
t.integer('position').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
// At most one position per (event, category).
t.unique(['event_id', 'category_id']);
// Ordered reads are always scoped to one event.
t.index(['event_id', 'position']);
});
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('event_category_order')) {
await knex.schema.dropTable('event_category_order');
}
};
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
/**
* Migration 161: `setup_wizard_completed` app setting (#800).
*
* The setup wizard gains an event-types step that may rename or DELETE the
* seeded system event types. That is only safe on a pristine install, so the
* backend gates system-type deletion on this flag being unset (plus zero
* usage — see eventTypeService.deleteEventType).
*
* Backfill rule: any install that already has an admin account predates the
* wizard step (or already finished the wizard), so it is marked completed
* here — the deletion window never opens on existing setups. A genuinely
* fresh install runs this migration BEFORE its first admin is created, so
* the flag starts false and the wizard's finish call flips it to true.
*
* Idempotent: skips when the key already exists. Values are JSON-stringified
* to match getAppSetting's JSON.parse on read.
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('app_settings'))) return;
const existing = await knex('app_settings')
.where({ setting_key: 'setup_wizard_completed' })
.first();
if (existing) return;
let hasAdmin = false;
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('admin_users')) {
const row = await knex('admin_users').count({ c: '*' }).first();
hasAdmin = Number(row?.c || 0) > 0;
}
await knex('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: 'setup_wizard_completed',
setting_value: JSON.stringify(hasAdmin),
setting_type: 'boolean',
updated_at: new Date(),
});
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('app_settings'))) return;
await knex('app_settings').where({ setting_key: 'setup_wizard_completed' }).del();
};
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
/**
* Migration 162: OIDC identity binding for admin users (#798).
*
* - `auth_provider` — 'local' (default) or 'oidc'. Which authority owns the
* account's credentials.
* - `external_issuer` — the validated `iss` of the IdP that owns the subject.
* OIDC only guarantees `sub` uniqueness WITHIN an
* issuer, so bindings match on (iss, sub) — otherwise
* switching `oidc_issuer_url` could map a new
* provider's user onto an old provider's admin when
* their subjects collide.
* - `external_subject` — the IdP's stable subject identifier (OIDC `sub`).
* SSO logins match on (external_issuer,
* external_subject), NEVER on email alone —
* email-matching is an account-takeover vector with
* IdPs that don't verify addresses. Nullable: local
* accounts have neither.
*
* Composite unique index so one IdP identity can't map to two admin rows.
* Additive + guarded; existing rows keep working untouched ('local', NULL).
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'auth_provider'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.string('auth_provider', 20).notNullable().defaultTo('local');
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'external_issuer'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.string('external_issuer', 512).nullable();
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', 'external_subject'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => {
t.string('external_subject', 255).nullable();
t.unique(['external_issuer', 'external_subject'], {
indexName: 'admin_users_issuer_subject_unique',
});
});
}
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
for (const col of ['external_subject', 'external_issuer', 'auth_provider']) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('admin_users', col)) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
await knex.schema.alterTable('admin_users', (t) => t.dropColumn(col));
}
}
};
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
/**
* #837 — per-event override for the live-slideshow QR overlay.
* Mirrors show_watermark: NULL = inherit the global slideshow_qr_enabled
* setting, true/false force the overlay on/off for this event.
*/
exports.up = async function up(knex) {
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'show_qr');
if (!has) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.boolean('show_qr').nullable().defaultTo(null);
});
}
};
exports.down = async function down(knex) {
const has = await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'show_qr');
if (has) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.dropColumn('show_qr');
});
}
};
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
/**
* Emoji reactions on photos (#839).
*
* - event_feedback_settings.allow_reactions: per-event toggle next to
* allow_likes / allow_ratings / allow_comments. Defaults TRUE for parity
* with the sibling toggles — the master feedback_enabled gate (default
* false, opt-in per event) still decides whether any feedback UI shows.
* - photo_feedback.reaction: the emoji value for feedback_type='reaction'
* rows (validated against the fixed set in constants/reactions.js).
* - photos.reaction_count: denormalized total, maintained by
* updatePhotoFeedbackStats alongside like_count / favorite_count.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
const hasAllowReactions = await knex.schema.hasColumn('event_feedback_settings', 'allow_reactions');
if (!hasAllowReactions) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('event_feedback_settings', (table) => {
table.boolean('allow_reactions').defaultTo(true);
});
}
const hasReaction = await knex.schema.hasColumn('photo_feedback', 'reaction');
if (!hasReaction) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('photo_feedback', (table) => {
// 16 chars: emoji are multi-byte/multi-codepoint (variation selectors),
// but well under 16 characters each.
table.string('reaction', 16);
});
}
const hasReactionCount = await knex.schema.hasColumn('photos', 'reaction_count');
if (!hasReactionCount) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('photos', (table) => {
table.integer('reaction_count').defaultTo(0);
});
}
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('photos', 'reaction_count')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('photos', (table) => {
table.dropColumn('reaction_count');
});
}
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('photo_feedback', 'reaction')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('photo_feedback', (table) => {
table.dropColumn('reaction');
});
}
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('event_feedback_settings', 'allow_reactions')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('event_feedback_settings', (table) => {
table.dropColumn('allow_reactions');
});
}
};
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
/**
* Reveal mode (#838): hide the gallery from guests until a manual or
* scheduled reveal — guests can still upload, the host/admin/slideshow see
* everything.
*
* - events.reveal_mode: the per-event toggle (only meaningful together with
* allow_user_uploads; off by default so nothing changes for existing events)
* - events.reveal_at: optional scheduled reveal time. Effective visibility is
* computed at REQUEST time (reveal_at <= now opens the gate even before the
* scheduler runs), the minutely scheduler only stamps revealed_at durably.
* - events.revealed_at: set by "Reveal now" or the scheduler; NULL while
* hidden. Re-enabling reveal_mode clears it (re-hide).
*/
// Each column guarded independently: a partially applied prior run (or a
// fork that added one of them) must not leave the others missing — the
// routes select all three.
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'reveal_mode'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (table) => {
table.boolean('reveal_mode').defaultTo(false);
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'reveal_at'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (table) => {
table.timestamp('reveal_at').nullable();
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'revealed_at'))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (table) => {
table.timestamp('revealed_at').nullable();
});
}
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
for (const column of ['revealed_at', 'reveal_at', 'reveal_mode']) {
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', column)) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (table) => {
table.dropColumn(column);
});
}
}
};
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
/**
* Migration 166: per-event toggle to hide the branding logo on the
* gallery password page (#894).
*
* NULL (the default) keeps today's behaviour — the global branding logo is
* shown above the password form. Only an explicit `false` hides it for
* that gallery; the admin login page and other surfaces are unaffected.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'login_logo_visible')) return;
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.boolean('login_logo_visible').nullable();
});
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn('events', 'login_logo_visible'))) return;
await knex.schema.alterTable('events', (t) => {
t.dropColumn('login_logo_visible');
});
};
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
/**
* Migration 169: re-bill proof-attachment support (issue #866).
*
* - inbound_documents.proof_attach_error : best-effort failure marker. When a
* re-billed supplier invoice's stored
* proof PDF is missing/unreadable at
* the moment the client invoice is
* issued, we DON'T silently drop it —
* we stamp the reason here so the
* re-bill row in CRM → Customer shows
* a recovery banner.
* - customer_accounts.rebill_attach_proof: per-customer tri-state override for
* "attach the supplier proof to the
* client-invoice email".
* NULL = inherit the global default
* true = always attach
* false = never attach
* The global default itself lives in
* app_settings (accounting_rebill_
* attach_proof, default off) and needs
* no seed row — an absent key coerces
* to false, exactly like
* accounting_require_proof.
*
* Additive + hasColumn-guarded so re-runs are safe.
*/
async function addColumn(knex, table, column, builder) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasColumn(table, column))) {
await knex.schema.alterTable(table, builder);
}
}
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('inbound_documents')) {
await addColumn(knex, 'inbound_documents', 'proof_attach_error', (t) => t.text('proof_attach_error'));
}
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('customer_accounts')) {
// Nullable boolean = tri-state (NULL inherit / true on / false off).
await addColumn(knex, 'customer_accounts', 'rebill_attach_proof', (t) => t.boolean('rebill_attach_proof').nullable());
}
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('inbound_documents') && await knex.schema.hasColumn('inbound_documents', 'proof_attach_error')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('inbound_documents', (t) => t.dropColumn('proof_attach_error'));
}
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('customer_accounts') && await knex.schema.hasColumn('customer_accounts', 'rebill_attach_proof')) {
await knex.schema.alterTable('customer_accounts', (t) => t.dropColumn('rebill_attach_proof'));
}
};
@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
/**
* Migration 170: PicTransfer — cross-event file transfers (#997).
*
* Adds the tables that back the "send these files to someone" feature:
*
* transfers One share link. Bundles photos picked from ANY event,
* protected by a 64-hex recipient token. Optionally opens
* a 6-char upload token so the client can send files back
* (logos etc.). Disabled after `expires_at`; files are
* kept `grace_days` days past disable, then hard-deleted.
* transfer_files Join rows: which photos are in a transfer (cross-event).
* photo_id → photos CASCADE, so removing the underlying
* photo just drops it from the transfer; the reverse
* (deleting a transfer) never touches the source photos.
* transfer_uploads Files the client uploaded through the upload token.
* These have their own bytes on disk (uploads/transfers/…)
* and are what the retention sweep deletes.
* transfer_downloads Lightweight audit of recipient downloads (count + IP).
*
* Downloads always serve ORIGINAL files (never watermarked) — a transfer is a
* deliberate "here are your files" hand-off. Reuses the same original-file
* resolution + archiver streaming as the gallery download-all path.
*/
exports.up = async function (knex) {
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('transfers'))) {
await knex.schema.createTable('transfers', (table) => {
table.increments('id').primary();
// Recipient download token — 64 hex chars = 32 bytes = 256 bits.
table.string('token', 64).notNullable().unique();
table.string('title', 255).notNullable().defaultTo('');
table.text('message');
table.integer('created_by').unsigned()
.references('id').inTable('admin_users').onDelete('SET NULL');
// Link is disabled once this passes (the "set time period" cap).
table.timestamp('expires_at').notNullable();
// Optional download cap. NULL or 0 = unlimited within the window.
table.integer('max_downloads');
table.integer('download_count').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
table.boolean('is_active').notNullable().defaultTo(true);
// When the link flipped inactive — starts the retention clock.
table.timestamp('disabled_at');
// Keep files this many days after disable, then hard-delete.
table.integer('grace_days').notNullable().defaultTo(7);
table.timestamp('admin_notified_at');
table.timestamp('deleted_at');
// Optional client-upload channel (6-char token).
table.boolean('allow_uploads').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
table.string('upload_token', 16).unique();
table.timestamp('upload_expires_at');
table.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
table.timestamp('updated_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
table.index(['is_active', 'expires_at'], 'transfers_active_expiry_idx');
table.index(['deleted_at'], 'transfers_deleted_idx');
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('transfer_files'))) {
await knex.schema.createTable('transfer_files', (table) => {
table.increments('id').primary();
table.integer('transfer_id').unsigned().notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('transfers').onDelete('CASCADE');
table.integer('photo_id').unsigned().notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('photos').onDelete('CASCADE');
table.integer('sort_order').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
table.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
table.index(['transfer_id'], 'transfer_files_transfer_idx');
// A photo can only appear once per transfer.
table.unique(['transfer_id', 'photo_id'], 'transfer_files_unique');
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('transfer_uploads'))) {
await knex.schema.createTable('transfer_uploads', (table) => {
table.increments('id').primary();
table.integer('transfer_id').unsigned().notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('transfers').onDelete('CASCADE');
table.string('original_filename', 512).notNullable();
// Storage-relative key, e.g. uploads/transfers/{id}/{stored-name}.
table.string('stored_path', 1024).notNullable();
table.integer('size_bytes');
table.string('mime_type', 100);
table.string('uploader_ip', 45);
table.timestamp('uploaded_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
table.index(['transfer_id'], 'transfer_uploads_transfer_idx');
});
}
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('transfer_downloads'))) {
await knex.schema.createTable('transfer_downloads', (table) => {
table.increments('id').primary();
table.integer('transfer_id').unsigned().notNullable()
.references('id').inTable('transfers').onDelete('CASCADE');
table.string('kind', 20).notNullable().defaultTo('all'); // 'all' | 'single'
table.integer('photo_id').unsigned();
table.string('ip', 45);
table.timestamp('downloaded_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
table.index(['transfer_id'], 'transfer_downloads_transfer_idx');
});
}
// Defaults for the create-transfer form + retention/upload behaviour.
const settings = [
{ setting_key: 'transfer_default_expiry_days', setting_value: JSON.stringify(14), setting_type: 'number' },
{ setting_key: 'transfer_default_grace_days', setting_value: JSON.stringify(7), setting_type: 'number' },
{ setting_key: 'transfer_default_max_downloads', setting_value: JSON.stringify(0), setting_type: 'number' },
{ setting_key: 'transfer_max_upload_size_mb', setting_value: JSON.stringify(50), setting_type: 'number' },
{
setting_key: 'transfer_upload_allowed_mime',
setting_value: JSON.stringify([
'image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp', 'image/gif',
'image/tiff', 'application/pdf', 'application/zip',
]),
setting_type: 'general',
},
];
for (const s of settings) {
const exists = await knex('app_settings').where('setting_key', s.setting_key).first();
if (!exists) {
await knex('app_settings').insert({ ...s, updated_at: knex.fn.now() });
}
}
// Feature flag — PicTransfer is a strictly opt-in module like slideshow /
// workflows: the sidebar entry, the /admin/transfers area and every
// transfer route (admin + public) stay dark until an admin turns it on
// under Settings → Features. Default OFF; idempotent seed.
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('feature_flags')) {
const existingFlag = await knex('feature_flags').where({ key: 'transfers' }).first();
if (!existingFlag) {
await knex('feature_flags').insert({ key: 'transfers', value: false });
}
}
// Admin notification when a transfer link expires (EN + DE, matching the
// convention of the other admin-notification templates — see migration 087).
const existingTemplate = await knex('email_templates')
.where('template_key', 'transfer_link_expired')
.first();
if (!existingTemplate) {
await knex('email_templates').insert({
template_key: 'transfer_link_expired',
subject_en: 'A transfer link has expired — {{transfer_title}}',
subject_de: 'Ein Transfer-Link ist abgelaufen — {{transfer_title}}',
body_html_en: `
<h2>A transfer link has expired</h2>
<p>The following file transfer is no longer downloadable by its recipient:</p>
<div style="background-color: #f0f8ff; border-left: 4px solid #5C8762; padding: 20px; margin: 20px 0; border-radius: 4px;">
<p style="margin: 0;"><strong>Transfer:</strong> {{transfer_title}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Expired at:</strong> {{expiry_date}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Files included:</strong> {{file_count}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Client uploads received:</strong> {{upload_count}}</p>
</div>
<p>The files will be kept for {{grace_days}} more days (until {{delete_date}})
so you can re-share or retrieve anything you still need, then they are
automatically deleted.</p>
<p><a href="{{admin_url}}">Open PicTransfer in the admin area</a></p>
<p>Best regards,<br>
Your PicPeak Installation</p>`,
body_text_en: `A transfer link has expired
The following file transfer is no longer downloadable by its recipient:
Transfer: {{transfer_title}}
Expired at: {{expiry_date}}
Files included: {{file_count}}
Client uploads received: {{upload_count}}
The files will be kept for {{grace_days}} more days (until {{delete_date}}) so
you can re-share or retrieve anything you still need, then they are
automatically deleted.
Open PicTransfer in the admin area: {{admin_url}}
Best regards,
Your PicPeak Installation`,
body_html_de: `
<h2>Ein Transfer-Link ist abgelaufen</h2>
<p>Der folgende Datei-Transfer kann vom Empfänger nicht mehr heruntergeladen werden:</p>
<div style="background-color: #f0f8ff; border-left: 4px solid #5C8762; padding: 20px; margin: 20px 0; border-radius: 4px;">
<p style="margin: 0;"><strong>Transfer:</strong> {{transfer_title}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Abgelaufen am:</strong> {{expiry_date}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Enthaltene Dateien:</strong> {{file_count}}</p>
<p style="margin: 10px 0 0 0;"><strong>Empfangene Kunden-Uploads:</strong> {{upload_count}}</p>
</div>
<p>Die Dateien werden noch {{grace_days}} Tage aufbewahrt (bis {{delete_date}}),
damit Sie alles Benötigte erneut teilen oder abrufen können; danach werden sie
automatisch gelöscht.</p>
<p><a href="{{admin_url}}">PicTransfer im Admin-Bereich öffnen</a></p>
<p>Mit freundlichen Grüßen,<br>
Ihre PicPeak-Installation</p>`,
body_text_de: `Ein Transfer-Link ist abgelaufen
Der folgende Datei-Transfer kann vom Empfänger nicht mehr heruntergeladen werden:
Transfer: {{transfer_title}}
Abgelaufen am: {{expiry_date}}
Enthaltene Dateien: {{file_count}}
Empfangene Kunden-Uploads: {{upload_count}}
Die Dateien werden noch {{grace_days}} Tage aufbewahrt (bis {{delete_date}}),
danach werden sie automatisch gelöscht.
PicTransfer im Admin-Bereich öffnen: {{admin_url}}
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Ihre PicPeak-Installation`,
variables: JSON.stringify([
'transfer_title', 'expiry_date', 'file_count', 'upload_count',
'grace_days', 'delete_date', 'admin_url',
]),
});
}
};
exports.down = async function (knex) {
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('feature_flags')) {
await knex('feature_flags').where({ key: 'transfers' }).del();
}
await knex('email_templates').where('template_key', 'transfer_link_expired').del();
await knex('app_settings')
.whereIn('setting_key', [
'transfer_default_expiry_days',
'transfer_default_grace_days',
'transfer_default_max_downloads',
'transfer_max_upload_size_mb',
'transfer_upload_allowed_mime',
])
.del();
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('transfer_downloads');
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('transfer_uploads');
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('transfer_files');
await knex.schema.dropTableIfExists('transfers');
};

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