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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Paul Nothaft	e9fadd2ef4	chore(stable): release 3.46.3 (#1143) v3.46.3	2026-08-23 20:23:29 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	d977e3e296	fix(gallery): give masonry tiles their real shape back (#1130, #1131) ... Two independent causes of the same symptom — an aspect-ratio layout that does not lay anything out. gallery-premium discarded the tile height MasonryPhotoAlbum computed from photos.width/height and set height:auto on both card and image, so the rendered shape came from whatever rendition was served. With thumbnail_fit seeded 'cover' every rendition is square, so the masonry drew identical squares. The bundled CSS templates pinned images to a fixed pixel height, which beats the .h-full utility six of the seven layouts rely on. Elegant Dark is seeded is_default, so that was the out-of-the-box result for any layout other than grid/timeline. Migrations 052/053 corrected for fresh installs; 175 repairs the rows already seeded. The repair is whitespace-tolerant because sanitizeCSS strips newlines from any template ever saved through the editor, matches the height property with a lookbehind so line-height/max-height are untouched, handles grouped selectors and skips nested rules. Stable twin of #1135.	2026-08-22 21:36:51 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	da44f1947b	fix(gallery): a missing file must not take the backend down (#1128) ... LocalFsStorage.get() returns an fs.createReadStream, which is lazy: it resolves immediately and opens the file on a later tick, so an ENOENT arrives after the await returned and outside the route's try/catch. An unhandled 'error' event is a process-level throw Express cannot catch — the backend exits and every gallery goes blank until the container restarts. gallery.js had ten .pipe(res) calls and zero error handlers. pipeStreamToResponse attaches the missing handler: a vanished source becomes a 404 (410 for a prepared zip), anything else a 500, and a source that dies mid-response destroys the connection rather than rewriting a status already on the wire. Headers staged for the file are cleared first — Express does not overwrite an existing Content-Type, and a surviving Cache-Control would let a transient 404 be cached as a broken tile for up to an hour. It also releases the source when a client hangs up. Applied to all eight streaming responses, not just the thumbnail route. Stable twin of #1133, reduced: the tier-race half does not apply here because ensureThumbnailAtWidth does not exist on this branch.	2026-08-22 21:36:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	dc9e3cdc5e	fix(thumbnails): regenerate external photos, and stop destroying good ones (#1129) ... POST /admin/thumbnails/regenerate resolved every source as storage/events/active/<photo.path> and fs.access'd it. External and reference rows are not there — their originals live under events.external_path — so every one failed the check and was counted as an error, while the UI reported success because the response is sent before the background loop starts. It now goes through ensureThumbnail, which resolves both source kinds and writes thumbnail_path back itself. Nulling thumbnail_path stops it short-circuiting on isThumbnailValid, which matters because the old thumbnail is normally still readable at exactly the moment someone presses regenerate. And the half that destroys data: generateThumbnail deleted the target BEFORE sharp had opened the source, and again in its catch. A source that could not be read — a NAS mount that blipped — left the previous rendition gone and the database pointing at it. Across a bulk regenerate that is the whole gallery. Neither delete was needed: put stages to a temp file and renames atomically, and put is the last statement in the try so no partial object can exist. Also: videos filtered out, and the superseded rendition removed only when the storage key actually moved, compared through the same canonicalisation the backends apply. Stable twin of #1134.	2026-08-22 21:36:19 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	7598e20f55	chore(stable): release 3.46.2 (#1121) v3.46.2	2026-08-21 20:30:47 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	32db1c8052	fix(ui): stop iOS Safari zooming in on 14px form fields (#1114) ... Closes #1105. iOS Safari zooms the whole page in when a focused form control computes to under 16px, and it does not zoom back out. Unlocking a gallery is a client-side transition rather than a document navigation, so the zoom the password field triggers carries straight into the gallery: the layout pans horizontally and the header actions sit off-screen until the visitor pinch-zooms out by hand. A real page load would have reset it. `.input` and `.input-themed` are `text-sm`, so the field is 14px on every phone, and GalleryPage inverts the breakpoint on top of that (`text-sm sm:text-base` — 14px below 640px, where iOS zooms, and 16px above it, where it never does). Keyed to the POINTER, not a width. The zoom depends on the computed font size and a touch device, never on how wide the viewport is — and a phone in landscape is 667-956 CSS px, above any width you could call "phone". Measured on the admin login page, which has no `sm:` override: main portrait 390x844 14px zooms main landscape 844x390 14px zooms main iPad 820x1180 14px zooms fixed all three 16px fixed desktop (mouse) 14px unchanged, no zoom off touch One media query rather than flipping each call site. `.input` alone backs 334 `<Input>` usages, but there are also ~440 raw inputs, selects and textareas carrying their own `text-sm`, and Tailwind utilities sit in a later layer than @layer components — so a fix at the component definition misses most controls and any new `text-sm` silently reintroduces the bug. The `:not()` on each selector is load-bearing, not decoration: it buys the specificity to beat a utility class. Measured in a browser — input.text-sm 16px (0,2,1 beats .text-sm) select.text-sm 14px (0,0,1 loses) textarea.text-sm 14px (0,0,1 loses) 24 selects and textareas in the tree carry `text-sm`, so the bare form would have left them zooming. Checkbox and radio stay excluded so font-size never sizes their box. max(16px, 1em, 1rem) is a FLOOR, not a size. A flat 16px would make controls that are already bigger smaller: Typography -> Large sets --font-size-base to 18px on body, so anything inheriting it would be clamped down and the setting quietly ignored. Each term covers a case the others miss: normal (body 16) 16px Large theme (body 18) 18px Small theme (body 14) 16px browser default 20px 20px The viewport meta is deliberately left alone: `maximum-scale=1` would suppress the zoom by disabling pinch-to-zoom for everyone.	2026-08-21 19:25:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	9833237d37	chore(stable): release 3.46.1 (#1082) v3.46.1	2026-08-19 20:29:01 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	83290a0f1a	chore(security): ignore unfixed CVEs in Trivy, override deepmerge-ts (#1085) ... Stable twin of #1083, scoped to what exists on this branch. docker-build.yml — set ignore-unfixed on both Trivy steps. Stable has the backend and frontend legs only (no aio, no ml), so two steps here against four on main. Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not actionable: the Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a CACHEBUST, so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting them buries anything someone can actually act on. backend — deepmerge-ts <8.0.0 has a stack-exhaustion advisory (CVE-2026-40345, high) reached via mailparser -> html-to-text, which pins ^7.1.5 so npm cannot get there alone. Stable carries the same mailparser ^3.9.9 and the same 3-high exposure as main. Not reachable in our code: html-to-text only feeds deepmerge-ts its options object, never parsed email content. npm audit on this branch goes 3 high -> 0. The ml/Dockerfile half of #1083 has no counterpart here — the face sidecar does not exist on stable, so there is nothing to drift. Verified on stable itself rather than assuming main's results carry: npm audit 3 high -> 0, html-to-text exercised end-to-end through simpleParser, and jest at 1577 passed. The 5 failing suites (20 tests) fail identically on clean origin/stable with these changes stashed. Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-19 13:56:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	6df42ab22c	fix(preview): generate lightbox previews for external/reference photos (#1078) (#1080) ... * fix(preview): generate lightbox previews for external/reference photos (#1078) Stable twin of the main-line fix. ensurePreviewImage() resolved its source only via resolvePhotoStorageKey(), which returns null for external/reference photos by design — those live on a media mount outside the managed storage tree. The null went straight into withLocalCopy(), which throws, so the preview route fell back to redirecting at the full-size original. Galleries whose photos are all external got no benefit from the preview tier (#492): guests paid 5-12 MB on every lightbox open. Add the external branch ensureThumbnail() already has: resolve via resolvePhotoFilePath() and feed the mount path to generatePreviewImage() directly, with an ext<id>_ output basename. generatePreviewImage() on this branch hardcoded path.basename(imagePath) and ignored options.outputBasename, so it needs the same one-line honouring that generateThumbnail() already does — without it two events referencing the same NAS basename collide on one preview key. Also return null rather than throwing for a row with no source_origin in a reference-mode event, whose mode falls back to the event's. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(preview): select the columns the external branch needs on bulk regenerate POST /api/admin/thumbnails/regenerate-previews selected only id, event_id, path, media_type, mime_type and preview_path, so photo.source_origin was undefined by the time ensurePreviewImage branched on it. Every external row in a reference gallery took the managed path, resolvePhotoStorageKey returned null for it, and the endpoint reported success while generating nothing. Add source_origin, external_relpath and filename to the select, plus a source-inspection test pinning the caller contract and a service-level test showing a column-starved row is indistinguishable from a managed one. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-19 10:17:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	45ffe64b7c	fix(storage): write business documents under STORAGE_PATH, not the cwd (#1072) ... Stable twin of #1070. persistDocPdf, the invoice sending and reminder writers, both contract signature writers and persistSignatureImage built their targets from `path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'business-docs', ...)` and never consulted STORAGE_PATH. Both compose files pin STORAGE_PATH=/app/storage and the image's WORKDIR is /app, so on a stock deployment the two name the same directory and nothing looked wrong. Point STORAGE_PATH anywhere else and quotes, invoices, Mahnungen, contracts and signature images land outside the configured storage root: missed by the backup walker, invisible to storage accounting, and gone when the container is replaced. assertContractPdfPath moves with them. On this branch the writers and the guard are wrong together, so contract downloads currently work — migrating the writers alone would have introduced PATH_OUTSIDE_STORAGE on every newly generated contract. The guard now resolves through getStoragePath() like the writers, and keeps the legacy cwd root so contracts written before this still resolve; their absolute paths are in the database. Also on the shared resolver: the custom PDF font lookup (a font under STORAGE_PATH/fonts was never found, and the document silently fell back to the built-in face) and the two backup diagnostics, which otherwise inspect a different root than the backup walker when STORAGE_PATH is unset. No migration needed — the persisted path is stored absolute. Verified on this branch, not inferred from main: the new test is 6/6, and contract/quote/invoice/pdf/safePath suites are 213/213 both before and after the change. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-18 22:14:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	84eab88801	test(e2e): read the admin JWT from the cookie, not the login body (#1073) ... Stable twin of #1071. Three specs acquire an admin token with `const body = await res.json(); return body.token`. On this branch too the admin login sets the JWT as the httpOnly `admin_token` cookie and responds with `res.json({ user })` — verified in auth.js on stable, not assumed from main — so the token is undefined and each spec fails at its first assertion, before exercising anything it was written to cover. Cookie and Authorization: Bearer are interchangeable server-side, so the helpers read the value back out of the context cookie jar and keep threading it as a Bearer. Every downstream call is unchanged. Verification is weaker than the main twin's, deliberately: the three spec files are byte-identical to the ones measured there (0 passed / 6 failed before, 3 passed / 3 failed after, against a live stack), and they compile and enumerate on this branch. Standing up a full stable compose stack to re-measure test-only changes was not worth it — say the word if you want that done before merge. The remaining failures are UI staleness, not auth, and are not addressed here. No CI workflow runs tests/e2e on this branch either, which is why this rotted unnoticed. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-18 22:14:15 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	10d5cf54a5	chore(stable): release 3.46.0 (#1060) v3.46.0	2026-08-16 20:22:19 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	376311cb90	fix(pdf): RFC 6266-encode Content-Disposition on quote/invoice PDFs (#1024) (#1062) ... Stable backport of #1055 (main: 3a11e6eb). Change content is byte-identical to the main twin; cherry-picked clean, no resolutions needed. The six quote/invoice PDF endpoints interpolated buildPdfFilename()'s result straight into `inline; filename="${filename}"`. That result deliberately preserves non-ASCII (it doubles as the PDF's internal Title metadata), and HTTP header values are latin1, so a customer label reaching the header directly failed in one of two ways: - U+0080-U+00FF (ä ö ü ß — every German umlaut): no throw. The raw byte goes out and the client reads back a mangled name. Silent corruption. - above U+00FF (Polish ł, Czech ř, Turkish ş, €, Cyrillic, CJK, emoji): Node's setHeader rejects it with ERR_INVALID_CHAR. The throw lands after the PDF buffer is already rendered, so the request 500s. This corrects the issue's diagnosis: it reported umlauts as the 500 case, but umlauts are inside latin1 and mangle rather than throw. Route all six through buildContentDisposition(), which emits an ASCII fallback plus the RFC 5987 filename*=UTF-8'' form. Also stops sanitiseSegment splitting surrogate pairs at its 80-unit cap — a dangling high surrogate makes encodeURIComponent throw URIError inside the helper, reaching the same 500 a different way (found by external review on the main twin). Verified on this branch: 14/14 in the new suite, 151/151 across the nine surrounding pdf/filename/quote/invoice suites, lint clean. Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-16 19:52:39 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	88fa3c5297	fix(storage): add S3 client timeouts so a dropped connection can't wedge uploads (#1049) (#1054) ... Stable backport of #1049 (main: 3600231d). Change content is byte-identical to the main twin. S3StorageAdapter built its S3Client with no requestHandler timeouts, and the SDK's defaults wait indefinitely. When a connection is dropped silently (no FIN/RST — NAT/LB idle reaps, transient faults), the in-flight request hangs forever and every subsequent storage operation queues behind it process-wide; only a restart recovers. _retryOperation never ran because the promise it wraps never settled. Configure connectionTimeout (120s) and socketTimeout (60s) on the request handler, overridable via STORAGE_S3_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT / STORAGE_S3_SOCKET_TIMEOUT, and add TimeoutError to the retryable list so the existing backoff engages. socketTimeout rather than requestTimeout: the latter is a total-duration cap that would kill legitimate large uploads and only warns without throwOnRequestTimeout. Both values are deliberately generous — connectionTimeout covers time queuing for a socket from the agent pool (maxSockets 50), so a short value expires while merely waiting in line and breaks reads. Reported against v3.45.16 on Cloudflare R2: wedged roughly every 40 minutes with serial uploads, every 15-20 with 4 parallel uploaders. Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-16 19:23:59 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	980378a17b	feat(backup): open sqlite → pg .picpeak restore as the supported upgrade direction (#1041) (#1059) ... Stable backport of #1043 (main: 8809564a). sqlite → pg restore is allowed for anyone holding backup.restore, from the upload UI and the CLI alike, gated by the manifest-direction rule in validateManifest. pg → sqlite stays refused, with an error naming the supported direction. allowEngineSwitch is removed rather than kept alongside: one gate, no way to drive the refused direction. Two resolutions were needed against stable rather than a clean cherry-pick, both from known main/stable divergences: - replaceAllTables has no roleSnapshot parameter on this branch, so the call keeps stable's 4-arg signature while taking the derived { crossEngine }. - resyncSequences was guarded by `if (allowEngineSwitch)`, which this change removes — leaving an undefined reference. It now runs unconditionally, matching main. That also closes a stable-only gap: a same-engine pg → pg restore previously left identity sequences stale, so the next natural insert collided on the primary key. Also exports resyncSequences (the function already existed here, main already exports it) so the cross-engine suite can drive the post-restore fixup. Verified on this branch: all four picpeak suites green on SQLite, and 20/20 against a real Postgres 15 with the PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL-gated cases executing. Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-16 19:20:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	0a999795cc	ci(tests): run the gated real-Postgres .picpeak cases in the backend job (#1058) ... Stable backport of #1056 (main: 18b1e0f6). Change content is byte-identical to the main twin. The .picpeak restore suites gate their Postgres cases behind PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL and describe.skip themselves out when it is unset. The variable is set in no workflow, so those cases have never run in CI. On this branch the effect lands together with the #1041 backport, which brings picpeakCrossEngine.test.js and its three real-Postgres stored-value cases — stable has no picpeakRestorePg.test.js, so before that PR this wires up a service nothing reads yet. Merging it first keeps the two twins mirroring their main counterparts one-for-one instead of folding both into one PR. Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-16 19:17:17 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	ed4e32c4df	chore(stable): release 3.45.16 (#1047) v3.45.16	2026-08-13 20:58:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	9003b34c8a	fix(docker): default NODE_ENV=production so non-compose deploys don't fall back to SQLite (#1038) (#1040) ... * fix(docker): default NODE_ENV=production so non-compose deploys don't fall back to SQLite (#1038) knexfile.js selects its config block by NODE_ENV and the `development` block defaults to sqlite3. The image never set NODE_ENV, so every deployment that doesn't go through our compose files — Kubernetes, Helm, plain `docker run` — silently ran on SQLite and ignored DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD. It stayed invisible because wait-for-db.sh is shell: it reads DB_HOST directly, connects to Postgres, creates the database and logs "PostgreSQL is up" in the same container where the Node process then writes to a SQLite file. Migrations go through src/database/db.js → the same knexfile, so they also ran against SQLite, leaving the provisioned Postgres database empty. Setting the default alone would be unsafe: an affected install would flip to Postgres on its next image pull and come up against an EMPTY database, which reads as total data loss. So this adds a guard that runs before migrations touch anything: - logs the resolved engine + target at boot - refuses to start when pointed at a virgin Postgres while a populated SQLite file exists, naming the file and the .picpeak export path for moving the data, with PICPEAK_ALLOW_EMPTY_PG=true as the escape hatch - warns but boots when Postgres settings are present yet SQLite is in use Compose files already set NODE_ENV explicitly, so compose users are unaffected. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): stay on SQLite instead of blocking, and add a migration path (#1038) Reworks the guard after walking through what an existing install actually experiences on its next image pull. Blocking was the wrong trade. An operator who had unknowingly been running on SQLite (because the image left NODE_ENV unset) would have pulled the fix and got a CrashLoopBackOff: data safe, galleries offline, for something they did not do. Now the boot RESOLVES the engine before migrations run and stays on whichever one holds the data: - Postgres configured but holding no galleries, while a populated SQLite file exists → keep serving from SQLite, print what happened and how to migrate. - once Postgres holds the data, the next restart switches over on its own. - an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT is always honoured. Keyed on Postgres holding DATA, not on it having tables: a stray `run-migrations` against the empty database creates every table, which would otherwise blind the check. Adds scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js, which reuses the .picpeak export/import services rather than hand-rolling a cross-engine copy. Two additions were needed for the SQLite → Postgres direction, both opt-in and CLI-only so the upload/restore UI is untouched: - `allowEngineSwitch` relaxes the importer's same-engine guard - cross-engine row coercion: SQLite has no real date or boolean types, so its rows carry epoch numbers where Postgres wants a timestamp and 0/1 where it wants a boolean, both of which Postgres rejects outright. Driven by the TARGET schema, never guessed from the value. DELTA FROM THE BETA PR: this branch's import service has no resyncSequences() — that landed on main only. Without it a cross-engine load leaves Postgres identity sequences at 1 and the next insert collides on the primary key, so the function is backported here and called ONLY on the cross-engine path. Same-engine restores through the UI keep their current behaviour exactly. Verified end to end on this branch against a real PostgreSQL 15: a seeded SQLite install migrated across with booleans, timestamps and foreign keys intact, and the next INSERT got id 2 rather than colliding. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close four review findings on the SQLite fallback + migration (#1038) External review (codex) found four issues, all confirmed against the code and fixed here. Two of them could have cost data. 1. The engine resolver was reachable only through wait-for-db.sh. A Kubernetes manifest that sets `command`/`args`, or a plain `docker run … node server.js`, bypasses the entrypoint — exactly the deployment styles this fix targets. With NODE_ENV now baked into the image, such an install would have resolved to Postgres and come up against an empty database while its SQLite data sat there unseen. server.js now resolves the engine itself, before anything requires knexfile, via the same script the entrypoint uses. Verified by running `node server.js` directly against an install with stranded SQLite data: it logs the banner and serves SQLite. 2. Cross-engine loads double-encoded JSON. SQLite has no json type, so its json columns are TEXT holding JSON; the export dumps that as a string and serialiseJsonColumns stringified it again, storing `true` as the scalar string "true". app_settings.setting_value is json on every install, so this reshaped every migrated setting. The text is decoded before serialisation now — verified against a real Postgres: json_typeof(setting_value) is `boolean`, matching a native install exactly. 3. The migration could silently miss concurrent writes. If the backend keeps serving, rows written after the export never reach Postgres and vanish from view once the engine switches. The script now fingerprints the SQLite tables whose loss would be noticed, checks for drift BEFORE loading Postgres (so a detected race leaves the target untouched) and again after, and refuses with the exact rows that moved. It also says plainly to stop the backend first. 4. The child phases shared stdout with winston. Outside production, and whenever LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true, createPicpeak's own log line was concatenated with the archive path and the migration failed on a bogus filename. Payloads travel through a result file now; verified with LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 2 — six more data-safety findings (#1038) 1. The engine choice is now PINNED once the data is in Postgres. Previously the boot decided from "does Postgres hold galleries", so an operator who later deleted every gallery would be sent back to the stale pre-migration SQLite file while their settings, admins and CRM data stayed in Postgres. The migration writes a marker next to the database file (and retires the file itself by renaming it); the marker wins over any probe. 2. The migration refused to overwrite Postgres only when it held GALLERIES. A target with admins, customers, invoices or projects but no galleries was wiped without --force. Both the source and target checks now look for user data across the tables that are empty on a fresh install. 3. Same bug in the other direction: an install with no galleries but real admins/settings/customers was refused a migration it was entitled to. 4. Drift detection covered four tables and only count/max(id), so an in-place UPDATE (event edit, password change) or a write to any other table passed unnoticed. It now fingerprints every table the export carries, including max(updated_at). It still is not a substitute for stopping the backend, and the script says so rather than implying a guarantee. 5. probeSqliteData() treated an unreadable or corrupt file as "no data", which would have switched the install to an empty Postgres — the very failure this module exists to prevent. It fails closed now and stays on SQLite so the real error surfaces. 6. The "you are leaving SQLite data behind" warning was unreachable: setting DATABASE_CLIENT skipped the probes, so the branch that produces it never had the inputs. Postgres and SQLite are both probed whenever Postgres is the engine in play. Also: the final verification compares row counts for EVERY table rather than just galleries, and flags only a shortfall — the import legitimately adds an app_settings row (setSessionsValidAfter) that made the strict equality fail on a first real run. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15 end to end, including: the marker keeps an install on Postgres after every gallery is deleted; removing the marker and restoring the file rolls back to SQLite as documented. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 3 — occupancy, bootstrap admin, secrets in /tmp (#1038) 1. Both engine probes judged occupancy by GALLERIES alone. An install whose galleries were all deleted, but which still has admins, customers or accounting records, was treated as empty: on the SQLite side that meant booting the empty Postgres and appearing to lose everything; on the Postgres side it meant diverting a live install to a stale SQLite file. Both now look across the tables that are empty on a fresh install, matching the migration script. 2. The migration ran migrate-schema BEFORE checking the target, and migration 001 seeds a bootstrap admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set (common on legacy installs). The occupancy check then saw that admin and refused, pushing the operator towards --force against a genuinely empty database. The target is read first now. 3. probeSqliteData()'s warning went through the app logger, which writes to STDOUT when LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true — and the resolver's stdout is the protocol channel wait-for-db.sh captures, so DATABASE_CLIENT could have been set to a JSON log line. Diagnostics take an injected sink (stderr in the resolver), and the shell now validates the value it captured instead of trusting it. 4. The .picpeak archive holds password hashes, SMTP credentials and API keys in plaintext, and was only removed on the fully-successful path — any drift or import failure left it in /tmp. Every exit path removes it now. 5. A database-only migration still hauled every business-doc and upload through /tmp and back into the same volume. createPicpeak takes includeFiles:false for this path; rows move, files stay where they already are. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a gallery-less install with only an admin account now stays on SQLite and migrates successfully with ADMIN_PASSWORD set; the resolver emits exactly one token on stdout with LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true and a corrupt database; a drift failure leaves Postgres untouched and no archive behind. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): pin the boot to SQLite while a migration is unfinished (#1038) Review round 4. A migration that dies after touching Postgres leaves rows behind — schema creation alone seeds a bootstrap admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set, and a drift or row-count failure can leave a partial load. Since the occupancy probes were widened in round 3, those rows read as "Postgres is occupied", so the next restart would switch engines and hide the SQLite data that is still the database of record. The script now writes a pin file next to the database BEFORE its first Postgres write and clears it only on success (after the success marker exists, so no restart in between can pick the wrong engine). While the pin is present the resolver stays on SQLite and explains why. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15 by reproducing the exact scenario: a migration failed mid-run with ADMIN_PASSWORD set, leaving one bootstrap admin in Postgres. With the pin the next boot resolves to sqlite3; with the pin removed it resolves to pg — the failure this closes. The subsequent successful re-run clears the pin and the boot moves to Postgres. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 5 — occupancy, path drift, retry, host default (#1038) 1. A seeded bootstrap admin counted as "Postgres is occupied". core/001_init.js inserts one whenever ADMIN_PASSWORD is set, so a Postgres that was initialised once and never used would have beaten a SQLite file full of real galleries — the exact failure the guard exists to prevent, reintroduced by widening the probe in round 3. The two sides are deliberately asymmetric now: the SQLite probe counts any user data (err towards keeping data visible), the Postgres probe ignores rows that schema creation seeds (err towards requiring proof of real use). 2. The guard resolved DATABASE_PATH with its own logic while knexfile trimmed whitespace and collapsed the legacy duplicated-backend form. A path either engine normalised differently meant probing a file nobody uses, concluding there was no SQLite data, and booting an empty Postgres. The resolution now lives in one module both require. 3. Re-running after a partial migration — the documented recovery — was refused unless the operator passed the destructive-sounding --force, because the half-written rows read as target data. An unfinished run of this same script is now recognised as a safe retry. 4. wait-for-db.sh verified readiness against its own default host (`postgres`) while knexfile's production block defaults to `db`. With NODE_ENV now baked in, a bare `docker run` without DB_HOST would have passed the readiness check against one host and then dialled another. The entrypoint exports the exact connection it verified. Compose sets DB_HOST explicitly and is unaffected. Verified: a Postgres holding only a seeded admin now loses to real SQLite data; a DATABASE_PATH with surrounding whitespace resolves to the identical file in both knexfile and the guard. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 6 — explicit-client bypasses, retry scope, cleanup (#1038) 1. An explicit DATABASE_CLIENT bypassed the unfinished-migration pin, because decideBootEngine honoured it first. docker-compose sets DATABASE_CLIENT=pg, so a failed migration would have restarted on a half-written Postgres on exactly the deployments that pin it. Worse in the other direction: with DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3, a SUCCESSFUL migration renames the source file, so the next start created a NEW, empty SQLite database and served that. The pin now outranks explicit pg (clearing the marker is the override), explicit sqlite3 is left alone since it already points at the data, and the migration refuses up front when the deployment pins anything other than pg. 2. The retry allowance was bound to the SQLite file, not to the target. An operator who repointed DB_HOST/DB_NAME between attempts could have replaced an unrelated populated database without --force. The pin records the target and the allowance only applies when it matches. 3. The printed rollback did not roll back: with data on both sides and no marker, the resolver still selects Postgres. It now spells out all three steps, including DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3. 4. A failure inside createPicpeak left a partial archive — plaintext hashes and credentials — in the caller-supplied temp dir, which that service deliberately does not clean. The export phase removes it on error. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 7 — pin bypass on direct start, real admins (#1038) 1. server.js only ran the engine resolver when DATABASE_CLIENT was unset, so a deployment that both bypasses the entrypoint (Kubernetes `command:`) AND pins DATABASE_CLIENT=pg never consulted the migration pin — the round-6 fix was unreachable on exactly that path, and a failed migration would have served a half-populated Postgres. The resolver now also runs whenever a pin file exists. 2. Round 5 excluded admin_users from Postgres occupancy to stop a seeded bootstrap admin counting as real data. That over-corrected: an install that has completed first-run setup but has no galleries yet has exactly one user-created row — an admin — so Postgres looked empty and, with a stale SQLite file present, the boot would switch away and the admin's credentials and configuration would disappear. core/001_init.js seeds must_change_password=true; setupService writes false once a human completes setup. The FLAG, not the table, distinguishes them, and a legacy NULL counts as a real admin. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a Postgres holding only the seeded row loses to real SQLite data, the same Postgres wins once setup is completed, and a server started directly with DATABASE_CLIENT=pg and a pin present comes up on SQLite with the warning. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 8 — reset admins, CLI config, JSON nulls (#1038) 1. must_change_password is mutable: resetAdminPassword() re-raises it on REAL accounts (userManagementService.js:474). Round 7's discriminator therefore read a gallery-less Postgres whose only admin had been reset as an untouched bootstrap seed — and with a stale SQLite file present, the boot would have switched away and hidden those live credentials. The rule is layered now: more than one admin, any admin that has logged in, or must_change_password false all count as use. Only core/001_init.js's exact leftovers — one admin, never logged in, still flagged — read as a seed. 2. The CLI read process.env directly but never loaded the configuration the child phases get through knexfile, so running it directly (or via `docker exec`, which does not inherit wait-for-db.sh's exports) failed the pre-flight checks even with valid settings in backend/.env or /run/secrets/db_password. Both sources are loaded up front now. 3. The migration's target check counted a seeded bootstrap admin as user data while probePgData classified the identical row as empty, so migrating into a previously-initialised-but-unused Postgres demanded --force. Same rule on both sides. 4. Cross-engine JSON handling is simpler and no longer lossy. SQLite keeps json columns as TEXT holding valid JSON and Postgres accepts JSON text directly, so the correct action is to pass them through untouched. Round 1 parsed then re-serialised them to undo a double-stringify; that round-tripped the JSON literal `null` into SQL NULL, changing data and breaking NOT NULL json columns. Not serialising at all fixes both. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a migrated install now carries json_typeof = null for a JSON null, object for a nested object, and boolean for a boolean — matching a native install exactly. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 9 — probe error classes, marker ordering (#1038) 1. probePgData() answered every failure with "Postgres has data". That is right for an unreachable server — the app cannot run on it either way, and diverting a healthy pg install to a stale SQLite file over a transient blip would be worse — but wrong for a server that answers and then fails the query, which is what a half-built or damaged schema looks like. That is not evidence of data, and reporting it as such booted the empty Postgres and hid a populated SQLite file: the exact failure this guard exists to prevent. Reachability is now established with SELECT 1 first, so the two cases get opposite answers: unreachable → leave the configured engine alone; reachable-but-uninspectable → unproven, and the SQLite side wins if it actually holds data. 2. The success marker was written after the SQLite file was renamed away. A failure in between — a full disk — left the source retired with no marker: the next attempt reported "No SQLite database", the in-progress pin stayed, and the operator never saw the rollback path. The marker is written first and updated with the retired filename once the rename succeeds, so a failure at any point leaves everything recoverable. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a reachable database whose admin_users table lacks the probed column now resolves to sqlite3 rather than hiding the data, while an unreachable host still resolves to pg. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): don't fail the migration on empty SQLite-only tables (#1038) Review round 10. The final verification flagged every source table missing from Postgres, regardless of whether it held rows — and SQLite-only tables do exist: initializeDatabase() creates an `events_new` scratch table and, when its legacy column copy throws, the catch swallows the error and leaves the empty table behind (db.js:236). The importer correctly skips tables Postgres does not have, so verification then reported a mismatch AFTER the data had already landed, exited 1, and left the install pinned to SQLite with no way to finish. An absent target table only matters if the source actually had rows. Empty ones are now listed and skipped. Reproduced both ways against a real PostgreSQL 15 with an events_new table present: without the fix the run ends in "ROW COUNTS DO NOT MATCH" and leaves the in-progress pin; with it, the table is reported as skipped, the migration completes and the pin is released. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): a completed migration overrides an implicit SQLite config (#1038) Review round 11. The migration allowed the one configuration it should have worried about most: DATABASE_CLIENT unset AND NODE_ENV not "production", which resolves to the development block — i.e. sqlite3. That is precisely the state the affected installs are in, since it is why they ended up on SQLite at all, so an operator can easily run the migration before fixing it. The script then renames the source database away, and the next start resolved to the implicit sqlite3, created a NEW empty database and served it — after reporting success. The success marker now overrides an IMPLICITLY resolved sqlite3 when Postgres settings are present, because the marker is durable proof of where the data actually went. An explicit DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3 still wins: that is the documented rollback. The script says something rather than refusing — refusing would block exactly the population this exists for. Reproduced with NODE_ENV and DATABASE_CLIENT both empty, against a real PostgreSQL 15: the migration completes, the source is renamed away, and the next boot resolves to pg with the data intact. Before this it resolved to sqlite3 and would have served an empty database. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * refactor(db): drop the dead reachability flag in probePgData (#1038) github-code-quality flagged `if (reachable)` as always true, and it is right: the unreachable branch returns, so everything below it runs only when the probe connected. The variable and the conditional were leftovers from a first draft that used a single catch for both failure classes. No behaviour change — the two error paths still return opposite answers. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): refuse to choose when both databases hold data (#1038) Review round 12. 1. An install that ran on PostgreSQL, lost NODE_ENV/DATABASE_CLIENT, and kept working on SQLite has REAL data on both sides: old rows in Postgres, newer ones in SQLite. The stranded-data rule only protected SQLite when Postgres was empty, so pulling this fix would have booted Postgres and hidden every gallery created since the switch — the exact failure this PR exists to prevent, in a variant I had not considered. A completed migration leaves a marker saying which side is current. Without one, two populated databases are a conflict: the boot stops and prints both targets, the two DATABASE_CLIENT values that resolve it, and the migration command that merges them. This is the only deliberate refusal in the change — guessing here would hide data AND split subsequent writes across two databases. 2. probePgData was handed knexConfig.connection even when knexfile had resolved to SQLite (a completed migration whose environment still says sqlite3), so node-postgres dialled its own localhost defaults instead of DB_HOST/DB_NAME — false "unreachable" diagnostics and a needless delay on every boot. The probe target is now built from the environment when the config is not pg. The conflict is honoured by all three entry points: the resolver exits 3 with an empty stdout, wait-for-db.sh stops the container, and server.js refuses to start. Two existing tests asserted that Postgres wins when both sides hold data. They encoded the pre-conflict assumption and described a state that cannot occur after a real migration (which always leaves a marker); both now pass the marker. Found while testing: the resolver's logger shim had no .error, so the conflict path threw, was swallowed by the fallback, and silently chose Postgres — the precise outcome this refuses to make. The shim is complete now. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): symmetric bootstrap rule, one resolved Postgres target (#1038) Review round 13. Both findings are consequences of earlier rounds. 1. The conflict rule added in round 12 counted an untouched SQLite bootstrap admin as data. core/001_init.js seeds one whenever ADMIN_PASSWORD is set — including into the accidental SQLite database — so a healthy Postgres install that had ever started once without NODE_ENV would have had a seeded-only SQLite file beside it, been declared a both-populated conflict, and REFUSED TO BOOT. The bootstrap discrimination is applied on both sides now; a setup-completed or logged-in admin still counts as real use on either. 2. The CLI's child phases inherited whichever knexfile block NODE_ENV selected. The development block defaults Postgres to localhost/postgres/photo_sharing, production to db/picpeak/picpeak — and this script is explicitly meant to run with NODE_ENV unset. With DB_USER/DB_NAME left to defaults it would therefore have migrated into `photo_sharing`, after which following the script's own advice to set NODE_ENV=production pointed the app at an empty `picpeak`. The target is resolved once, with production defaults, and passed explicitly to every phase — so the block knexfile happens to pick can no longer decide which database the data lands in. The pin and success marker record that same resolved identity. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a live Postgres beside a seeded-only SQLite file now boots pg rather than refusing, flipping that admin to setup-completed restores the conflict, and a migration records localhost:7102/picpeak_r13b as its target rather than a defaulted guess. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): one Postgres identity everywhere; protect the credentials file (#1038) Review round 14. Three of the six findings were the same defect as round 13's, surfacing through paths that fix did not cover: the connection used to PROBE or MIGRATE could differ from the one the application then OPENS, because knexfile's development block points Postgres at localhost/postgres/photo_sharing while production uses db/picpeak/picpeak. 1. server.js exported only DATABASE_CLIENT=pg after the resolver decided, so knexfile filled in host/user/database from whichever block NODE_ENV selected. With SQLite already retired by a migration, that meant opening an empty database. The whole connection is pinned now. 2. Two defaults existed for DB_HOST: wait-for-db.sh resolves and exports `postgres`, knexfile's production block says `db`. Since the entrypoint exports its value, `postgres` is what a running container actually uses — so a `docker exec` migration, which inherits neither, has to agree with that, not with the default that is only reached when the entrypoint did not run. 3. The migration's Postgres phases inherited an unset NODE_ENV and therefore the development block, which ignores DB_SSL entirely — a managed Postgres requiring TLS could never be migrated into. The phases run with production semantics now. 4. core/001_init.js writes data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt, and that data directory belongs to the SOURCE install. Bootstrapping the Postgres schema replaced the operator's real credentials file with ones for a temporary admin the import immediately discards. The file is preserved across the phase, including when it fails. 5. The boot line described knexConfig, so an install redirected to Postgres by a migration marker still logged "Database engine: sqlite (...)", contradicting the warning printed one line earlier. 6. On a both-populated conflict resolveBootEngine returns client:null, and both migration runners told the operator their data was in "null" and to set DATABASE_CLIENT=null. They now present the two real choices. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a migrated install started directly with NODE_ENV unset now logs `postgres (localhost:7102/picpeak_r14)` and opens it, where before it would have gone to the development block's photo_sharing. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * refactor(db): resolve the PostgreSQL target in exactly one place (#1038) Rounds 13 and 14 both traced back to the same thing, each time through a caller the previous fix had not covered: three different defaults existed for the same connection. knexfile development : localhost / postgres / photo_sharing knexfile production : db / picpeak / picpeak wait-for-db.sh : postgres / picpeak / picpeak (and it EXPORTS them) So a process that probed or migrated against one could hand over to a process that opened another. Patching each caller was not converging — the guard, then the CLI's child phases, then server.js — so this deletes the divergence instead. `src/utils/pgConnection.js` now owns the resolution and knexfile's development and production blocks both derive from it, as does the engine guard. Same shape as the earlier sqlitePath.js extraction, for the same reason. The database NAME is what made this dangerous: a wrong host or user fails loudly at connect time, while a wrong name connects fine and presents an empty installation. BEHAVIOUR CHANGE: with DATABASE_CLIENT=pg and no DB_* variables, a non-production environment now resolves to postgres/picpeak/picpeak instead of localhost/postgres/photo_sharing. Deployments are unaffected — compose sets these explicitly and wait-for-db.sh exports them — but a local machine running Postgres bare now needs DB_HOST=localhost DB_USER=postgres DB_NAME=photo_sharing (or DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3, which is what backend/.env already uses). The failure mode of getting this wrong is a refused connection, not a silently empty database. Side effect worth having: DB_SSL is now honoured whatever NODE_ENV says, so the managed-Postgres case is fixed at the root rather than by forcing production semantics onto the migration's child phases. The test block keeps its own photo_sharing_test default — isolation is the point there. Verified: every block plus the guard resolve identically from the same environment; explicit DB_* still wins; production's pool tuning is preserved; and a full SQLite → PostgreSQL migration with NODE_ENV unset lands in the right database with JSON shapes intact. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): two more components that guessed the database instead of asking (#1038) Both found while sweeping for copies of the connection defaults. Checked in detail first — one of my suspicions about them was wrong. scripts/set-admin-password.js hand-rolled its own knex config while all four sibling scripts (reset-admin-password, create-admin, show-admin-credentials, reset-admin-mfa) use the application's connection. Two consequences: - it read DB_CLIENT, a variable nothing else in this codebase sets, so it defaulted to Postgres and could not work on a SQLite install at all; - it defaulted to database `picpeak_dev`, a name no other component uses. It now uses `require('../src/database/db')` like its siblings, so it follows whatever engine the install actually runs on. Timestamps are written as ISO strings because it reaches SQLite now, where raw Date objects are the documented landmine. NOT changed: the script's "all existing sessions have been invalidated" notice is accurate — auth.js compares token iat against password_changed_at — and it deliberately leaves must_change_password alone, which is right for an operator choosing a password rather than being issued one. routes/adminSystem.js re-derived three things the live connection already knows, and each could disagree with it: - the engine, from DATABASE_CLIENT || 'sqlite3' — so a Postgres install without an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT took the SQLite branch; - the Postgres database, from DB_NAME || 'picpeak'; - the SQLite file, from a hardcoded ../../data/photo_sharing.db that ignored DATABASE_PATH entirely. All three now come from db.client.config, with pg_database_size(current_database()). Verified: set-admin-password works on SQLite (new hash verifies, old rejected) and still on PostgreSQL; and on a SQLite install with a custom DATABASE_PATH the size logic reports the real database (1,748,992 bytes) where the old code reported a different file entirely (1,851,392) — or 0 where that path does not exist. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): bind the migration marker to its target; fix a phantom table (#1038) Review round 15. 1. The marker records `host:port/database`, but only its EXISTENCE was checked. Repoint DB_NAME or DB_HOST at a different, empty PostgreSQL after migrating and the marker would vouch for that one too — booting it, presenting an empty installation, and suppressing the SQLite fallback while the real data sits in the recorded target and the renamed rollback copy. The marker is compared against the current connection now, and a mismatch stops the boot with both targets named and the two ways out. 2. `incoming_invoices` is not a table — supplier documents live in `inbound_documents` (core migration 124). Both occupancy lists skip tables that do not exist, so those records were silently not protecting anything: an install whose only remaining data was inbound documents could be switched away from, or overwritten without --force. Verified every other name in the lists against the live schema at the same time. Verified: a marker naming picpeak_original with picpeak_mk configured refuses with exit 3 and prints both; making them agree boots pg. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-13 18:51:20 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	de459c701f	fix(feedback): persist guest feedback settings, unshadow the guest route (#1030) (#1032) ... Enabling Guest Feedback on an event could silently do nothing. 1. `updateEventFeedbackSettings` spread the request body straight into the knex UPDATE. The admin event form posts its whole client-side state, including three keys that were never columns on event_feedback_settings (`enable_rate_limiting`, `rate_limit_window_minutes`, `rate_limit_max_requests`), so the write threw and the route answered 500. Writable columns are now whitelisted; identity columns and timestamps stay server-managed. 2. EventDetailsPage swallowed that 500 in a bare `catch {}` ("Error already handled by mutation" — it is a different request), so the admin was left looking at "Event updated successfully" while the toggle never persisted. The error is surfaced now and the settings query is invalidated on success. 3. gallery.js declared a duplicate `GET /:slug/feedback-settings`. server.js mounts galleryRoutes before galleryFeedback, so it shadowed the real handler and dropped the per-guest caps (#655) from the guest payload — the gallery could never render the favorite/like limits or their counters. Timestamps are written as ISO strings so they round-trip on both engines. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-13 18:51:16 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	8b6cd3c74f	fix(gallery): coerce SQLite 0/1 booleans in the guest surface (#1028) (#1037) ... SQLite stores booleans as 0/1, Postgres as true/false. The guest gallery compared strictly against `true`/`false`, so every flag read backwards on SQLite installs: allow_downloads: 0 !== false → true (header Download button shown with downloads disabled) allow_user_uploads: 1 === true → false (upload button hidden with uploads enabled) Worse, all five download guards used `allow_downloads === false`, which never fires against a stored 0 — so on SQLite "Allow photo downloads = off" was inert end to end: single photo, download-all, download-selected, download-jobs and the job-status poll all kept serving, as did the secure-images download route. Per-category blocking (#640) was ignored for the same reason, the protection toggles (right-click, devtools, canvas, watermark) reported false while enabled, overlay_protection was stuck on, and show_feedback_to_guests leaked feedback with the setting off. The /info endpoint was already correct — it checks 0/'0' explicitly. The two payloads had simply drifted. Everything now goes through parseBooleanInput (utils/parsers.js), which normalises both engines and takes a per-column default so legacy NULL rows keep their documented behaviour. Tests run on the SQLite harness, so they assert the real engine values. Every one of them fails on the unfixed code — the payload assertions return the inverted value, and the guard assertions never get their 403 (the request proceeds to serve instead). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-13 18:51:12 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	fb3d0b08b2	fix(events): make event_date/expires_at nullable on SQLite (#1029) (#1036) ... Clearing a gallery's expiration failed on every SQLite install with SQLITE_CONSTRAINT: NOT NULL constraint failed: events.expires_at surfacing in the admin UI as "Failed to update event". Migration 061 added the event_require_event_date / event_require_expiration settings and dropped the NOT NULL on both columns — but only for Postgres. It skipped SQLite on the premise that "SQLite doesn't enforce NOT NULL as strictly", which is untrue, so "never expires" was never reachable there. The #426 work that allows clearing the expiration on edit therefore never worked on SQLite either. Migration 174 finishes 061 for SQLite. Knex implements .alter() on SQLite by recreating the table; migration 073 already does that on `events`, so the path is well-trodden. Postgres is skipped — it was handled in 061 and .alter() there would needlessly rewrite a column that is already correct. The test asserts against the real engine (the Jest harness runs SQLite) and reproduces the reporter's exact error without the migration. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-13 18:51:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	945e63ae86	chore: ignore all of backend/storage on stable (#1033) ... main already ignores `backend/storage/` wholesale; stable only ignored `backend/storage/business-docs/`. A dev instance writes event photos, thumbnails and previews into backend/storage/, so `git add -A` on this branch sweeps 17 runtime artifacts into the commit. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-13 18:51:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	93d4ae68f4	chore(stable): release 3.45.15 (#1017) v3.45.15	2026-08-10 20:52:00 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	2bdb1204fe	fix(slideshow): stop "no crop" fit letterboxing a pre-cropped frame (stable) (#1015) (#1019) ... Backport of #1018 to the curated channel; the reporter on #1015 is running v3.45.14. The slideshow resolved its image as preview_url || hero_url || url. preview_url is only emitted when lightbox_preview_enabled is on (default false), so a default install fell through to hero_url — the 1920x1080 fit:'cover' centre crop built for gallery header banners. object-fit: contain then letterboxed an already-cropped 16:9 frame. Emits slideshow_url (same aspect-preserved preview tier) unconditionally for image photos; the show prefers it and never falls back to hero_url. preview_url stays gated so the lightbox opt-in is unchanged.	2026-08-10 13:32:24 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	cee0a380a6	fix(deps): bump nanoid and js-yaml out of two HIGH advisories (stable) (#1014) ... Backport of #1013 to the curated channel. Both are production dependencies of the backend image (npm ci --omit=dev): - nanoid 3.3.16 -> 3.3.18 (CVE-2026-67213, infinite loop in customAlphabet) - js-yaml 4.3.0 -> 4.3.1 (GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj, quadratic CPU in !!omap resolution) Stable reported no open alerts only because its last Trivy scan ran on 2026-08-04 with v3.45.14, before either advisory was published — the vulnerable versions were present in the lockfile regardless. Lockfile-only; the existing ^ ranges already permitted both fixes.	2026-08-10 11:00:03 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	c01d8d8d2e	chore(stable): release 3.45.14 (#990) v3.45.14	2026-08-04 21:26:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	bf9bd76278	fix(security): vet the destination project when linking a deal (stable) (#992) ... Backport of #991. stable carried the identical code path and the same missing guards. A scoped admin could point a quote or contract at a project they do not own — the quote/contract create+update paths pass a body-supplied projectId with no ownership check, and linkDealToProject's lineage guard is skipped when the deal has no event yet. On an ownerless project this escalated to a read once the quote converted to an event. Vetted at the service choke point, ahead of both the null-deal early return and the customer check. 404 PROJECT_NOT_FOUND throughout. super_admin unaffected.	2026-08-04 16:36:28 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	0fe5792a7d	fix(deps): bump ip-address, brace-expansion and postcss for open CVEs (stable) (#988) ... Backport of #987. stable carried the same vulnerable versions. brace-expansion 5.0.8 -> 5.0.9 CVE-2026-69152 (high) ip-address 10.2.0 -> 10.4.0 CVE-2026-69192 (high), CVE-2026-54272, CVE-2026-69198 (medium) — SSRF and trust-boundary bypasses postcss 8.5.18 -> 8.5.23 CVE-2026-69153 (medium) Lockfile holds exactly one entry per package, all at or above the fixed version; the image installs via npm ci --omit=dev.	2026-08-04 14:36:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	3f7364be8e	chore(stable): release 3.45.13 (#972) v3.45.13	2026-08-03 21:26:03 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	2d0e6ab2dc	fix(projects): stop the cockpit offering email controls the API rejects (stable) (#977) ... Closes #969 on stable. Backport of #976. The cockpit's email feed rendered preview/resend/cancel/retry/send-now for every mail regardless of role or permission, producing 404s (CRM document mail has no event_id; project ownership does not imply event ownership) and 403s (preview needs events.view, the write actions need email.send). getProjectOverview now stamps each email with an authoritative canAct, mirroring filterOwnedEventIds; created_by is selected only for that check and stripped before the response. A missing canAct reads as false.	2026-08-03 14:49:04 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	cc49f6997a	fix(auth): fail closed when the adminAuth roles join errors (stable) (#975) ... Closes #968 on stable. Backport of #974. The roles-join fallback in adminAuth fabricated role_name='super_admin' on ANY database error, so a transient fault silently granted super_admin for its duration. Gate it on isMissingRolesSchema(), moved to utils/dbErrors.js and shared with apiTokenAuth, with the predicate tightened to trust SQLSTATE 42P01/42703 on Postgres and exact driver phrasing on SQLite.	2026-08-03 14:48:33 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	fecc18cbc8	fix(security): enforce project ownership on project + project-email routes (stable) (#966) ... * fix(security): enforce project ownership (GHSA-wrg5, GHSA-93x4) Project routes authorized on generic events.view / events.edit with NO ownership check, so an editor-like admin could enumerate, read, update and aggregate projects belonging to other admins' events. The project email endpoints keyed on an email_queue id alone — any admin with events.view / email.send could preview, resend, cancel or retry ANY queued mail by walking ids. The earlier 'needs a migration, deferred' assessment was wrong in one direction and right in another: ownership IS derivable transitively via events.project_id -> events.created_by, but only for projects that already have a linked event. A brand-new EMPTY project has no derivable owner, which is exactly where the create -> attach flow starts. So migration 167 adds projects.created_by (backfilled from the single linked event owner, skipping ambiguous multi-owner projects) and createProject finally persists the adminId it was already being passed. - ownedProjectIds(): union of the stored owner and the transitive path, so pre-167 rows and new empty projects both resolve. Reads created_by defensively so an instance that hasn't run 167 falls back to the transitive rule instead of throwing. - requireProjectOwnership on detail/update/attach-event/attach-quote/ attach-contract/overview; list filtered by an id allowlist (empty array means 'owns nothing' and must return no rows, hence null-vs-[] care). - POST /:id/events also validates the INCOMING eventId — owning the project is not enough, or an editor could pull a foreign event in and read its rolled-up documents via /:id/overview. - Queued-email routes scoped via email_queue.event_id. CRM document mail has event_id NULL and no ownable parent here, so a scoped caller is denied rather than guessed into access. 404 (not 403) so it isn't an id oracle. Note: adminEmail.js:315/332 let any email.view/edit admin archive or delete any email_queue row — the same class, pre-existing and outside these two advisories. Left untouched and reported rather than silently widened. * fix(security): codex round 2 — make the stored project owner authoritative (GHSA-wrg5) The first predicate union'd 'any linked event I can see' with the stored owner, which opened two holes: - A project owned by admin B containing ONE legacy ownerless event became readable by every admin — and /:id/overview aggregates B's other events, invoices and emails, so a single legacy event exposed the whole project. - Migration 167 deliberately leaves multi-owner (ambiguous) projects NULL rather than guessing an owner. A NULL owner was then treated as 'everyone's', so exactly those mixed projects became globally accessible. Now: the stored created_by wins outright, and a project without a usable stored owner only derives access when EVERY linked event is accessible (and at least one exists). A created_by pointing at a hard-deleted admin degrades to 'no usable owner' so the project falls back to its events instead of being locked away — no ON DELETE SET NULL migration needed. A project with neither a usable owner nor linked events stays super_admin-only: failing closed beats failing open, and a super_admin can reassign it. Also returns a knex SUBQUERY rather than a materialised id list, so a large project count can't hit the driver's bind-parameter limit. * fix(security): codex round 3 — enforce deal-lineage ownership on project attach (GHSA-wrg5) requireProjectOwnership vets only the DESTINATION project, while attaching a quote or contract cascades through linkDealToProject — which re-points every event the deal produced into that project. An editor could therefore create an empty project of their own, attach another admin's quote, and pull that admin's events (plus the invoices, emails and gallery that roll up with them) into a project they own and can read via /:id/overview. The single-customer guard did not stand in the way: an unassigned project ADOPTS the deal's customer rather than rejecting it. linkDealToProject now refuses to move lineage events the actor cannot own, and assignDocument cascades BEFORE stamping the document so a refused attach leaves nothing half-applied (the old order committed the foreign document into the caller's project and only then declined the cascade). The quote/contract create+update paths, which reach the same cascade with an arbitrary project_id, thread their adminId through as well; isSuperAdmin() resolves the role for them and fails closed when it cannot. Events are the only ownership signal a deal carries — quotes and contracts have no created_by in this schema — so a lineage that produced no event still cannot be attributed. That is a property of the CRM model, noted in the code. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me (cherry picked from commit 688e318850db1b5f4ea2a4ae3c0fcf0fc137620d) * docs(security): drop the stale ownership JSDoc left by the rebase (GHSA-wrg5) Rebasing onto stable (which had gained scopeEventsQuery from #963) replayed the round-1 doc block above round-2's replacement, leaving a comment that describes the ORIGINAL union rule — "a project is the caller's when … it has at least one linked event they own" — directly above the code that deliberately no longer does that. That union is the hole round 2 closed; a comment asserting it is worse than none. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-02 21:24:41 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	7f27e6771f	fix(security): escape brand tokens, block tracker redirects, trim logo diagnostic (stable) (#967) ... * fix(security): escape brand tokens, block tracker redirects, trim logo diagnostic (GHSA-j347, mw76, 29vm) GHSA-j347 — buildCachedPayload sanitizes the operator's HTML and THEN runs applyBrandTokens over the result with a plain String.replace, so any markup in a token value reached the public origin unfiltered. The default templates interpolate tokens into text AND into quoted attributes (<img src="{{brand_logo_url}}" alt="{{company_name}} logo">, href="mailto:{{support_email}}"), so a value could close the attribute and inject. Token values are now HTML-escaped on substitution, mirroring galleryOgService's escapeHtml. sanitizeBrandUrl's case-sensitive literal 'javascript:' check (which 'JavaScript:' walked straight past) is replaced by an http/https scheme allowlist; relative logo paths are unaffected. Writer is settings.edit (super_admin only) and the CSP blocks inline script, so this is defence-in-depth — but sanitize-then-substitute is a real ordering bug regardless. GHSA-mw76 — the SSRF decline STANDS: self-hosted operators legitimately point analytics at private addresses, so connection-time IP blocking would break real deployments. Fixed only the narrow leak: undici strips Authorization/Cookie/Proxy-Authorization/Host across a cross-origin redirect, but umamiAdapter sends a CUSTOM x-umami-api-key header, which would be replayed verbatim to the redirect target. Both adapters now use redirect: 'error'. GHSA-29vm — the logo diagnostic echoed absolute storage roots, process.cwd() and absolute candidate paths. It now reports candidates relative to <STORAGE>/<CWD_STORAGE>, which answers the same 'which candidate existed' question. It also still advertised the raw-absolute candidate that GHSA-c7x5 removed from resolveLogoFile, so it was misreporting what the resolver tries — aligned with the real candidate list. publicSiteService.test.js expectation updated: an '&' in a company name is now emitted as '&amp;'. Renders identically; the raw payload string differs. * fix(security): codex round 2 — stop the remaining logo-path disclosure, mirror the resolver (GHSA-29vm) - sources[].value was still echoed verbatim. branding_logo_path is stored ABSOLUTE by multer, so relativising only resolvedTo and the candidate paths left the filesystem layout going out anyway. It is now relativised too. - Round 1 dropped the raw-absolute candidate on the grounds that GHSA-c7x5 removed it from resolveLogoFile — but the c7x5 follow-up RE-ADDED it (kept, subject to the containment filter, so a legitimate multer path still resolves). The diagnostic therefore reported every candidate as missing for a contained absolute logo while resolvedTo named the file. It now mirrors the resolver, containment filter included. One deliberate cosmetic divergence, commented in place: for an absolute value the resolver also tries path.join(root, value-minus-leading-slash), which can never exist and would re-embed the absolute path this endpoint must stop echoing. Omitted; every candidate that can actually match is still shown. * fix(security): codex round 3 — mirror the resolver for root-relative logo paths (GHSA-29vm) The logo diagnostic skipped the `<STORAGE>/<value>` candidates whenever path.isAbsolute(value) was true. That test cannot distinguish a multer disk path from a root-relative URL such as `/custom/logo.png`, and for the URL form resolveLogoFile.generateCandidates() does try `<STORAGE>/custom/logo.png` and can resolve it — so the endpoint reported "no source candidate exists" about a logo that renders fine, and collapsed the configured value to its basename. The stripped joins are now built unconditionally, exactly as the resolver does. Disclosure stays closed: every candidate still passes the containment filter and redact() rewrites survivors to `<STORAGE>/…`, never an absolute host path. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me (cherry picked from commit 093480a753ff3d4b6ed48dd9f1108f975c8e0d47) * fix(security): gate the logo stripped-joins on containment, not isAbsolute (GHSA-29vm) The previous commit dropped the isAbsolute() gate entirely and regressed logoDiagnostic's own disclosure assertion: for a genuine multer disk path, path.join(root, value-minus-leading-slash) yields `<STORAGE>/tmp/…/storage/custom/logo.png`, and redact() only rewrites the LEADING root — so the inner absolute path went straight back into the payload. The right discriminator is not "is this absolute" (which cannot separate a disk path from a root-relative URL) but "does the value already resolve inside a storage root". If it does, it is a real disk path, the raw candidate already covers it, and the stripped join is the double-prefixed junk that can never exist. If it does not — the `/custom/logo.png` URL form — the stripped join is exactly what resolveLogoFile resolves, and is shown. Covered by a new case asserting both halves: the candidate appears for the URL form, and the payload still contains neither the storage root nor cwd. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me (cherry picked from commit c6b95d3cd1cb28e5c2828d29d4d63fadad981dcf) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-02 21:18:55 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	4e99897313	fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697) (stable) (#963) ... * fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697) Migration 081 documents the intent — 'the token's effective permissions are the intersection of the user's role permissions and the token's own scope flags' — but it was never implemented. - apiTokenAuth selected only id/username/email/role_id, so req.admin.roleName was undefined. Every ownership helper keys on roleName, so the v1 surface could not tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer. Now joins roles and emits the same req.admin shape adminAuth does, including the roles-table-missing upgrade fallback. - No v1 route applied any ownership predicate: GET /events listed every event on the instance, and GET /events/:id/share-link returned ANY event's share_token — the gallery access credential, same class as GHSA-rh8r. List is now scoped via a new scopeEventsQuery helper; the three :id routes (detail, photo upload, share-link) use the existing requireEventOwnership. Not a breaking change: tokens are minted by super_admins, who bypass ownership. It closes the case where a token's owner is later demoted — userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlived the demotion with full read of every gallery's share token. events.category.test.js stubbed apiTokenAuth without roleName; giving the stub super_admin keeps requireEventOwnership from issuing a DB query and desyncing that suite's sequenced dbMock. * fix(security): codex round 2 — intersect v1 token scopes with role permissions (GHSA-9697) Ownership scoping alone left half the documented control missing. Migration 081 defines a token's effective permissions as the INTERSECTION of the owner's role permissions and the token's scope flags; requireApiScope only ever checked the scope half. A token minted while its owner was super_admin therefore kept write access after the owner was demoted to viewer — userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlives the demotion, and ownership scoping does not help because the demoted owner still owns their events. Adds requirePermission to all six v1 routes (events.create on create, events.view on the reads, photos.upload on upload). It keys on req.admin.id, which apiTokenAuth already populates. The two existing v1 suites mock the database, so a real permission lookup 500s — they now mock the permissions middleware as pass-through, matching how they already mock apiTokenAuth. Those suites cover route logic; the intersection is pinned by the new v1TokenPermissions suite. * fix(security): codex round 3 — fail closed on the roles-join fallback (GHSA-9697) The round-2 fix loaded the token owner's role so the v1 ownership checks could tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer, and mirrored adminAuth's roles-table-missing fallback. That fallback assigns role_name = 'super_admin', and the catch around it was unconditional — so ANY failure of the joined query (connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout) elevated the token owner to super_admin as long as the simpler fallback query then succeeded. A restricted owner could ride that into listing, reading and share-tokening every event on the instance, which is the exact hole GHSA-9697 closes. The fallback is now reached only for an error that genuinely names a missing roles table/column (PG 42P01/42703 or the SQLite/MySQL wording); anything else propagates to the 500 handler. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me (cherry picked from commit 53d1e5d1b3148a7f4067308b08fcdf8ddab0a39f) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-02 21:18:52 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	ccab9024d4	fix(security): bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (stable) (#965) ... * fix(security): bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (GHSA-2qf9, pgmp, r794) GHSA-2qf9 — emailIntakeService downloaded, parsed and persisted every message with no size, attachment-count or attachment-byte limit, reachable unauthenticated by anyone who can email the operator's mailbox: - fetch the envelope with `size` (same cheap pass) and refuse an oversized message BEFORE downloading its source; - cap attachment count and cumulative attachment bytes; - limits env-overridable, defaults generous for real supplier invoices. The teeth were in the dedup key. received_emails.message_id is varchar(512) UNIQUE, and the failure path wrote `err-<uid>-<Date.now()>`, which can never match the envelope-derived messageId the dedup pass compares against — so an oversized (or overlong-Message-ID) mail was re-downloaded every poll forever, and an OOM-kill/restart just resumed the loop. Size-skips are now recorded under the REAL message id, and overlong ids collapse to a stable sha256 key that always fits the column. GHSA-pgmp / r794 — new sanitizeForLog() util (key-name deny-set, recursive, cycle-safe) applied to the three request-body log sites in adminEvents/crud.js, plus sanitizeValidationErrors() because express-validator's errors.array() embeds the SUBMITTED value per field — a rejected plaintext password was still logged. Scope is wider than filed: the update path also logged client_password_hash and a LIVE client_share_token bearer credential. Also: the one-time setup token was logged at warn AND printed to stdout on every first boot, putting a live first-admin credential in combined.log, security.log and `docker logs`. It is now written to the 0600 token file and only surfaced when that write fails — the last-resort path it existed for. (stable) * fix(security): codex round 3 — repair the first-run token recovery flow (GHSA-r794) Two regressions from keeping the setup token out of the logs. 1. server.js decided whether to print the token by calling existsSync() on the candidate path. That answers a different question than "did the write succeed": a stale, read-only or directory-shaped SETUP_TOKEN reports as present, so the banner suppressed the live token and pointed the operator at content that is not it — leaving the current token only in combined.log under default production logging. setupService now records the path the write actually produced and exposes it via writtenSetupTokenFile(). 2. The setup screen, its EN/DE strings, README, SIMPLE_SETUP and .env.example all still told first-time users to run `docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`. On the normal path that command now returns a path banner and no credential, so the documented browser-first onboarding could not be completed. They now point at `docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN`, with the log fallback described as what it is — the failure path. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me (cherry picked from commit 9a54b6f0231c3285df4c4865eb846e63e1ed0dda) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-02 21:18:49 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	11f9f584de	fix(security): scope dashboard stats/analytics/activity to the caller's events (stable) (#964) ... * fix(security): scope dashboard endpoints to the caller's events (GHSA-c2jj, gqx7, jhcf) /dashboard/stats, /analytics and /activity are gated only by analytics.view, which the editor role holds — but the events LIST restricts editors to their own rows (adminEvents/crud.js: roleName === 'editor' -> created_by = admin.id). So an editor saw instance-wide totals, and via /analytics topGalleries other admins' gallery NAMES and SLUGS (the public gallery URL component), for events invisible to them everywhere else. - stats: all 10 aggregates scoped (events by id, photos/access_logs by event_id). - analytics: all 8 series/aggregates scoped, including topGalleries. The external tracker device breakdown reports instance-wide data with no event filter, so a scoped caller falls through to the access_logs heuristic instead, which IS scoped. - activity: feed scoped. activity_logs.event_id is nullable and the join is a leftJoin, so system-level rows (logins, settings changes) are deliberately excluded for a scoped caller — those are precisely the cross-admin actions the advisory is about. Scoping keys on 'editor' to mirror the events list exactly, so the admin role's dashboard is unchanged. filterOwnedEventIds uses the broader '!== super_admin' rule; the two conventions disagree in this codebase and matching the list is the no-regression choice. * fix(security): codex round 2 — fix activity misattribution, scope via subquery (GHSA-jhcf, c2jj, gqx7) - expenseService passed adminId as logActivity's THIRD positional parameter, which is eventId — so admin ids were being written into activity_logs.event_id. The /activity scoping filter trusts that column, and admin/event id sequences overlap, so a foreign admin's expense metadata could surface under an editor's event. All 11 calls now pass null for eventId and the admin as the actor, which is what they meant. - Dashboard scoping now uses a SUBQUERY instead of pluck()+whereIn. An editor owning more events than the driver's bind-parameter limit (~999 SQLite, 65535 Postgres) would have turned all three endpoints into 500s once each id became a placeholder; below the limit it still re-sent the full list for each of the ~10 aggregates per request. Note: two billInboundNow() calls also end in ', adminId)' but have an unrelated signature — verified untouched. * fix(security): codex round 3 — correct legacy accounting activity rows (GHSA-jhcf) expenseService called logActivity(type, metadata, adminId), but logActivity's third positional parameter is eventId. Every expense / incoming-invoice entry therefore stored the ACTING ADMIN'S ID in activity_logs.event_id. Round 2 scoped the activity feed with `WHERE activity_logs.event_id IN (SELECT id FROM events WHERE created_by = me)`, which does nothing about the rows already on disk. Admin ids and event ids are small integers from the same range, so on any upgraded instance an editor who owns the event whose id happens to equal another admin's id is served that admin's accounting activity, verbatim metadata included — GHSA-jhcf, still live. Migration 168 re-attributes those rows (event_id holds exactly the actor id that was lost) and then clears event_id so the scope predicate can no longer match them. All ten activity types are emitted by expenseService and nothing else, so no row with a genuine event_id is touched. Also: the round-2 rewrite passed `{ type: 'admin', id: adminId }` unconditionally, which stored actor_type='admin' with a null id for the automated mailbox intake (emailIntakeService calls recordInboundDocument with no adminId). adminActor() restores 'system' attribution for those. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me (cherry picked from commit 459e9e42434defd0dc7b87246e4d894dd47dcc56) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-02 21:18:46 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	3b88036fda	fix(security): backup/restore hardening — public-dir DB dump, restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest keying (stable) (#962) ... * fix(security): stop caller-chosen database backup destination (GHSA-jw8m) POST /api/admin/database-backup/backup forwarded req.body straight into databaseBackupService.backup(), which merges options over config: const { destinationPath = '/backup/database', ... } = { ...config, ...options } destinationPath is not a persistable setting — the /config allowlist only accepts database_backup_* keys — so the request body was its only source. The built-in `admin` role holds backup.create but neither settings.edit nor backup.restore, so it could aim a full DB dump (admin bcrypt hashes, gallery password hashes, encrypted SMTP creds) at the PUBLIC /uploads static mount (server.js mounts it with no auth middleware) and then fetch it unauthenticated. Filed low; it is a privilege escalation to unauthenticated disclosure. Forward only the real knobs, and only when present so absent keys can't override config defaults via spread. * fix(security): backup/restore hardening — restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest checksum keying (GHSA-fw4c, h652, hgp8) - adminRestore /validate + /start: constrain caller-supplied source and manifestPath to the operator-configured backup roots — the SAME set the restore wizard discovers from — so disaster recovery from a rescued mount still works, with RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS as an escape hatch (GHSA-fw4c). - restoreService.decompressFile: bound the EXPANDED size and abort the pipeline when exceeded; default 50 GB, RESTORE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES overrides (GHSA-h652). - backupManifest: BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY upgrades new manifests to a keyed HMAC (GHSA-hgp8). Deliberately opt-in and verify-if-present — the key cannot live in the database because the database is inside the backup, so a mandatory HMAC would lock operators out of the exact disaster-recovery case this exists for. Also fixes a pre-existing bug found while testing hgp8: the checksum passed Object.keys().sort() as JSON.stringify's second argument, which is an array REPLACER (a property allowlist applied at every depth), not a key sorter. All nested keys — path, size, per-file checksum — were dropped before hashing, so the file list sat outside the integrity check entirely and a manifest path could be rewritten to ../../etc/passwd without disturbing the digest. Now hashes a recursively-canonicalized copy, with the legacy serialization accepted on validation so existing backups stay restorable. * fix(security): codex round 2 — unbreak the restore wizard, share checksum verification, guard downgrades - adminRestore: `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE ('local'|'s3'|'upload'), not a path — restoreService branches on those literals. The containment check treated it as a path, so path.resolve('local') fell outside the backup roots and BOTH /validate and /start returned 400, blocking every normal restore. Type tokens are now excluded from the path check. - backupManifest: extracted verifyManifestChecksum() as the single source of truth for the legacy/keyed fallbacks. restoreService.performPreRestoreValidation recomputed the digest itself with the default canonical+keyed settings, which rejected EVERY backup written before this batch. It now delegates. - backupManifest: guard the algorithm downgrade — with a key configured, an attacker able to rewrite the backup store could strip checksum_algorithm, edit the manifest and recompute a plain SHA-256 that verified. Opt-in via BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED so pre-key backups keep restoring by default. * fix(security): codex round 3 — close two manifest-verification fail-opens (GHSA-hgp8) verifyManifestChecksum returned valid for a manifest with no verification.total_checksum at all, and restoreService only called it when that field was present. Deleting the field was therefore a complete bypass of the keying work: no digest check, no downgrade guard, no BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED. Every manifest this codebase writes stamps the field, so an absent one now fails validation, and the call site invokes the verifier unconditionally. Second fail-open: the strict-mode rejection of an unkeyed manifest was gated on `&& key`, so with BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED=true and no BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY configured a plain SHA-256 manifest sailed through. Strict mode is a statement about the operator's manifests, not about the host — it is exactly the fresh disaster-recovery box that lacks the secret. The rejection no longer depends on a key being present. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me (cherry picked from commit 292a5b784acd7f47099aa234c1c2ea00050fca97) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-02 21:18:43 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	0c73bf2cdc	chore(stable): release 3.45.12 (#955) v3.45.12	2026-08-02 20:25:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	2c7b5dfd02	fix(security): redact gallery share tokens from analytics tracking (GHSA-7m6c) (stable) (#953) ... * fix(security): redact gallery share tokens from analytics page-view tracking (GHSA-7m6c) * fix(security): codex round-1 — actually disable raw auto-tracking (GHSA-7m6c) The previous patch was inert: App.tsx passed autoTrack:true (so Umami's data-auto-track=false was never set) and the sanitized trackPageView had no caller (useAnalytics sits outside <Router>), so the raw token URL still hit the collector. - Umami: drop autoTrack:true → data-auto-track=false; page views now come from a sanitized manual tracker. - Rybbit: its initial-load auto pageview can't be intercepted client-side, so use native data-mask-patterns=['/gallery/**'] to strip the token on every auto-tracked view; skip manual tracking for it to avoid double counting. - Mount <AnalyticsRouteTracker/> INSIDE <Router> so manual tracking runs. --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-02 08:39:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	5d5db4e766	fix(security): authz/ownership gaps (token binding, auth revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging) (stable) (#951) ... * fix(security): close authz/ownership gaps (secure-download binding, photo-auth+logout revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging) * fix(security): codex round-1 — complete admin-token invalidation + preserve foreign assignments - photoAuth: mirror adminAuth's active-admin lookup + iat<password_changed_at check in the admin branch, so a deactivated admin or a pre-password-change token can no longer fetch every photo (GHSA-x55x was only revoke+cutoff). - adminAuth logout: revoke req.token (the token adminAuth authenticated with, cookie OR header) instead of header-only, and clear the auth cookie — a cookie-based logout previously left the JWT live (GHSA-cjqh). - adminCustomers PUT /:id/events: preserve the customer's existing assignments to events the caller does NOT own, so a restricted admin can't revoke another admin's customer-event links via full-list replacement. * fix(security): codex round-2 — don't 403 legit restricted-admin assignment edits The Manage-galleries dialog submits the full initial assignment list, so a restricted admin editing a customer that already has a foreign assignment hit the denied.length 403 before the preservation logic ran. Reject only NEWLY-supplied foreign/nonexistent ids; retain foreign ids the customer is already assigned to (they can't be added or removed by a non-owner). --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-02 08:39:32 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	e5dccf1664	fix(security): neutralize spreadsheet formulas in all CSV/export cell-writers (CSV injection cluster) (#949) ... Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-02 08:38:55 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	bfafecedc7	fix(security): unauth share_token leak (HIGH) + restore path-traversal, logo file-read (stable) (#947) ... * fix(security): stop unauth share_token leak + block restore path-traversal, logo-path file read, branding path keys * test: update resolveLogoFile for the c7x5 containment (reject outside-storage absolute paths, keep inside) * fix(security): codex round-1 — escape LIKE wildcards in share-link resolve, keep in-storage absolute logos, guard restore verification - shareLinkService: escape %/_ in the link_partial LIKE fallback so an anonymous /resolve/____… wildcard can't match an arbitrary share_link and leak its bearer token (reopened GHSA-rh8r). Explicit ESCAPE for SQLite. - resolveLogoFile: re-add the raw absolute candidate but keep it subject to the storage-root containment filter (GHSA-c7x5) so legit in-storage absolute logos resolve while /etc/passwd stays rejected. - restoreService: apply the same pathEscapes guard in post-restore verification so a skipped traversal entry isn't fs.access'd/hashed. --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-02 08:38:47 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	2c5a094c5c	chore(stable): release 3.45.11 (#936) v3.45.11	2026-08-01 17:38:06 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	2462ba6897	fix(security): close authorization/ownership gaps (token scope, mass-assignment, category hero, project docs) (stable) (#944) ... * fix(security): close authorization/ownership gaps (token scope, mass-assignment, category hero, project docs) * fix(security): block archive columns in event mass-assignment per review * fix(security): comprehensive event mass-assignment denylist + deal-cascade cross-domain permission gate (codex r2) * fix(security): case-insensitive complete event denylist + project_id + empty-update no-op (codex r3) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-01 17:36:57 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	90275f88e9	fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) (stable) (#942) ... * fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) * fix(security): harden SSRF fix per review (rsync backup path, S3 config-save, webhook transient-DNS retry) * fix(security): S3 endpoint validation on any endpoint update + no-connect on unresolved webhook host (codex r2) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-01 17:36:51 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	34a7b1c013	fix(security): block guest access to hidden/client-only photos across bulk + secure routes (stable) (#940) ... * fix(security): block guest access to hidden/client-only photos across bulk + secure routes * fix(security): harden hidden-photo fix per review (stale ZIP cache, legacy token mint, SQLite bool, client rebuild) * fix(security): invalidate ZIP cache on photo visibility/category change (codex r2) * fix(security): recheck photo visibility at signed/secure serve time (TOCTOU) + invalidate ZIP on client visibility change (codex r3) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-01 17:36:46 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	7419c68337	fix(security): bump sanitize-html to 2.17.5 (CVE-2026-53606) (stable) (#938) ... Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-01 17:36:40 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	fc99e2b233	fix(uploads): prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes (#931) (stable) (#934) ... * fix(uploads): prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes (#931) * test: pin the suffixed photo filename format in the NFD pipeline suite (#931) * chore(deps): promote p-limit to a direct dependency for the watermark limiter (#931) * test: make the suffix-uniqueness check deterministic-in-practice (#931) * fix(uploads): widen the anti-collision suffix to 48 bits (#931) * fix(uploads): hide staging files from list() + share one watermark limiter process-wide (#931) * fix(uploads): reclaim orphaned staging files + revalidate watermark settings in queued jobs (#931) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-08-01 12:29:23 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	7974b9c6d7	chore(stable): release 3.45.10 (#923) v3.45.10	2026-07-30 21:20:10 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	60cbda5b22	fix(security): close GHSA-g94x (cross-gallery photo read) + GHSA-pv6w (admin DB export) (stable) (#925) ... * fix(security): close two access-control advisories (GHSA-g94x, GHSA-pv6w) (stable) GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f (HIGH) — the secure-image VIEW route (/secure-images/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token) validated only the token signature and took the gallery/photo from the URL, so a token minted on any PUBLIC gallery read every other gallery's photos with no password (its download sibling has verifyGalleryAccess; the view route can't — it serves via <img src> with no header). Bind the token to its scope instead: the URL photoId must equal the token's minted photoId (photos belong to exactly one gallery, and minting is gallery-scoped), and the gallery embedded in the token's sessionId must equal the URL gallery. GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v (MEDIUM) — GET /admin/backup/picpeak/export dumps every table unredacted (bcrypt hashes, 2FA, SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/webhook/S3 secrets) and was gated only by backup.create, which the built-in admin role holds. Gate it behind super_admin, matching the restore side (backup.restore, already admin-denied) and the masked config APIs. Regression tests pin both: cross-gallery token reads 403 (photo and gallery checks), backup export 403 for admin / passes for super_admin. Stable port of #924. secureImages on stable has no reveal-mode block, so only the token-binding checks are added; the backup export gate is identical. * fix(security): review follow-ups on the export gate (GHSA-pv6w) - test: place the mocked export in its own mkdtemp dir. The route recursively deletes path.dirname(filePath) after download, so a stub in bare os.tmpdir() made the super_admin test wipe the whole temp root — other jest workers' DB files included (latent CI flake). - ui: hide PicpeakExportCard from non-super_admins. The role keeps settings.view + backup.create, so after the gate its Download button always 403'd with a generic toast; gate the card on role super_admin to match the endpoint. * fix(security): keep the token-mismatch audit values within varchar(20) (GHSA-g94x review) image_access_logs.access_type is varchar(20) (migration 038), but 'token_gallery_mismatch' is 22 chars — on Postgres the audit write threw value-too-long and logImageAccess swallowed it, so the security event went unrecorded (the 403 still fired; log is best-effort). Shorten to 'photo_mismatch' / 'gallery_mismatch' (14/16). --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>	2026-07-30 14:24:34 +02:00