hero_logo_visible is nullable — null means "inherit the global
branding_logo_display_hero toggle" (#756, migration 152). But the create and
update validators used `.optional()` without `{ nullable: true }`, which only
skips `undefined`; an explicit `null` still ran `.isBoolean()` and failed with
HTTP 400 "Invalid value". Saving an event with `hero_logo_visible: null` (the
inherit state the frontend sends) was rejected on v3.45.2.
- Both routes: `body('hero_logo_visible').optional({ nullable: true }).isBoolean()`,
matching the already-correct `hero_logo_size` rule next to it.
- Create handler: guard on `!= null` instead of `!== undefined` so an explicit
null stores NULL (inherit) rather than being coerced to 0/false by
formatBoolean on SQLite. The update handler already did `=== null ? null`.
Left hero_logo_position on plain `.optional()` on purpose: its column is NOT
NULL (no inherit migration) and its handler always resolves to a concrete value
via `|| brandingDefaults`, so null is genuinely invalid there — allowing it
would trade the 400 for a 500.
Adds smoke tests: PUT accepts hero_logo_visible: null and stores NULL; a
non-boolean value is still rejected.
Production installs use docker-compose.production.yml (the README's documented
path, pinned GHCR images, no dev services), but the dashboard's update
instructions emitted bare `docker compose pull` / `up -d`. Bare `docker compose`
operates on docker-compose.yml — a different, build-based stack — so a
production user who followed the steps:
- never pulled/recreated their real containers (stayed on the old version,
e.g. stuck on 3.44.0 after "updating" to 3.45.2), and
- started the dev-only mailhog service that docker-compose.yml defines
(reported restart-looping).
The backend runs inside a container and can't stat the host's compose files, but
docker-compose.production.yml passes PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL into the backend env
and docker-compose.yml does not. detectEnvironment() now derives
isProductionCompose from it, and the Docker update steps prepend
`-f docker-compose.production.yml` when set. The non-production branch keeps the
bare commands but the warning now tells users to add `-f docker-compose.production.yml`
if they installed with it.
Also gates the mailhog service in docker-compose.yml behind a `dev` compose
profile so a plain `docker compose up -d` never starts it (opt in with
`docker compose --profile dev up -d`). Nothing depends on it (SMTP_HOST comes
from .env), so gating is safe. Verified: `docker compose config` lists mailhog
only with `--profile dev`; production compose is unchanged.
Adds unit tests for the production-vs-default command generation.
The legacy gallery router mounted at /api/events exposed create/list/update/
delete/extend guarded by adminAuth ALONE — no requirePermission, no
requireEventOwnership. adminAuth only checks the token is a valid type:'admin'
session, which every back-office role holds, down to read-only `viewer`. So any
non-super-admin account could:
- GET /api/events → every gallery's bcrypt password_hash, share_token, and
client name/email (the list handler selects * and mapEventForApi keeps
those columns),
- PUT /api/events/:id → reset any gallery's password (full takeover),
- DELETE /api/events/:id → delete any gallery,
all bypassing the per-photographer ownership isolation the canonical
/api/admin/events router enforces. Affects any instance with more than the
single super_admin.
Fix: remove the legacy router entirely (mount + require + src/routes/events.js).
It was a superseded duplicate of /api/admin/events and unused by the frontend
EXCEPT for one live route — POST /:id/extend (the "Extend expiration" UI action,
which hit /api/events/:id/extend via the api client's /api base). That route is
migrated to the canonical mount as POST /api/admin/events/:id/extend with the
same guards as every other gallery mutation (adminAuth + requirePermission
('events.edit') + requireEventOwnership), and the frontend is repointed to it.
Behaviour of the extend itself is unchanged (expires_at + reactivate).
Verified end-to-end on a booted instance: /api/events (all methods) now 404;
/api/admin/events/:id/extend returns 401 unauth, 200 for the owner, 403 for a
non-owning editor; the full login→create→extend flow works. Adds a regression
test pinning the router removal and the extend ownership check.
The req.admin.id fix activated reinjectCurrentAdmin(); hardening its preservation
logic (found across Codex review rounds of #811):
- MFA hijack: reinject wrote back only password_hash/is_active/
must_change_password, leaving a crafted backup's two_factor_* on the
operator's row — it could strip or replace their second factor. The email-
matched row is now updated with the operator's full AUTH set (login identity,
password, and all two_factor_* columns). Relationship/audit FKs (role_id,
created_by) are deliberately NOT forced from the snapshot: on a cross-instance
restore those pre-restore ids may be absent from the backup and would dangle
the FK (SQLite rolls back at commit); the restored row keeps its own valid
values.
- Cross-instance restore rollback / FK safety: reinject matched only by email,
so a backup shipping a different admin with the default `admin` username hit
UNIQUE(username) and rolled the whole restore back; email and username could
even collide on two different rows. Reconciliation is now non-destructive:
the email-matching row is updated in place (id preserved → restored FKs like
events.created_by stay valid); any different row holding the operator's
username is RENAMED, not deleted (deletion would fire ON DELETE actions /
dangle references); only when no row has the operator's email is a fresh row
inserted, with created_by nulled and an explicit max(id)+1 id (batchInsert
left the Postgres identity sequence unadvanced, so a sequence-based insert
could collide).
- Stale session after restore: admin_users ids shift on restore, but the
operator's live JWT is bound only to decoded.id (IP logged not enforced; the
backup controls password_changed_at). The route now revokes the token (result
checked and logged) and clears the admin cookie; the client redirects to a
fresh login via a sessionInvalidated flag. Cookie clear is the unconditional
guarantee.
Adds SQLite-backed reinject regression tests (in-place login/MFA restore with id
and FK columns preserved, username-only rename, email+username on different rows,
clean insert with created_by nulled) and the frontend redirect on
sessionInvalidated.
Deferred (design decisions / pre-existing, need a Postgres test env — see PR
discussion): global "invalidate all pre-restore sessions" cutoff; preserving the
operator's ROLE semantics across an RBAC-table replace; and resyncing Postgres
identity sequences after any restore (batchInsert leaves them behind max(id) —
pre-existing, affects every restored table).
The chunked video upload stored req.body.filename unmodified and later built
the merged path as path.join(tempDir, uploadMeta.filename). path.join does not
neutralise '../', so a filename like '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the
temp dir on merge and overwrote arbitrary files. Requires admin with
photos.upload.
Fix: path.basename() the client filename in initializeUpload() and reject
names that collapse to nothing. Adds a regression test.
node-stream-zip's extract(null, root) writes each entry to path.join(root,
entry.name) without neutralising '../', so a crafted archive entry named
'../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the target dir and overwrote arbitrary
files (logos, .env, route files → RCE on source deploys). Requires admin with
archives.restore.
Adds assertZipEntriesWithin() to utils/safePath.js — a lexical containment
check run on the entry list BEFORE extract() — and guards both extract sinks:
adminArchives.js (the reported route) and picpeakImportService.js (the sibling
.picpeak import, same sink). Adds unit tests for traversal, absolute-path, and
sibling-prefix entries.
POST /auth/gallery/share-login validated only the 128-bit share token and then
minted a full type:'gallery' access token regardless of require_password —
computing requiresPassword at the end only to echo it, never enforce it. Anyone
holding a gallery's share link could read and download every photo in a
password-protected gallery via a direct API call, no password needed.
Fix: compute requiresPassword before minting; for a password-protected gallery
return { requires_password: true } with NO token and NO cookie. The client then
goes through /gallery/verify, which does bcrypt.compare the password. The public
(no-password) auto-login path is unchanged. The frontend already falls through
to the password prompt when share-login returns no token/event.
Adds route regression test covering the bypass, the public path, and bad tokens.
adminAuth populates req.admin, not req.user, so currentAdminId was always
undefined in the /api/admin/picpeak/import handler. reinjectCurrentAdmin()
then had no account to preserve and the admin_users table was fully replaced
by the uploaded backup — a crafted .picpeak let any admin with backup.restore
take over every admin account (critical). One-line fix: pass req.admin.id.
Closes GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f and its duplicate GHSA-pjp6-jcrj-3cr5.
The frontend image kept shipping vulnerable OS packages (nginx 1.28.3-r1,
curl/libcurl 8.19.0, c-ares 1.34.6) despite the apk upgrade line, for two
independent reasons:
1. The runtime stage's apk upgrade layer was cached indefinitely — the
CACHEBUST build-arg CI passes (github.run_number) was only declared in
the builder stage, and ARGs don't cross stage boundaries. Both
Dockerfiles now redeclare CACHEBUST in the runtime stage and consume it
in the apk RUN, so every build re-runs the upgrade and picks up current
Alpine security updates.
2. nginx itself can never upgrade via apk on the nginx.org-based image:
the bundled nginx-module-* packages pin the exact nginx version, so
Alpine's patched 1.28.3-r4 is unreachable (verified empirically —
apk add --upgrade nginx is a silent no-op). nginx fixes must come via
the base tag, so bump to nginx:1.30-alpine (current stable, 1.30.4 on
Alpine 3.24, same nginx.org conf.d layout — drop-in).
Verified: local image build scans clean with Trivy (0 OS findings, was 21);
container serves /health, SPA fallback, and BRAND_TITLE envsubst as non-root
nginx user.
Closes code-scanning alerts 371-374, 376-392 (nginx HTTP/2 & module CVEs,
curl CVE-2026-5773/-6276 + 6 medium, c-ares CVE-2026-33630).
Triggers the correct stable release from the stable branch (manifest
3.44.0 -> 3.45.0). Same fix as #774 (which fixes it on main for future
promotes); merging this to stable is what re-runs release-please
correctly for the promote that mis-fired as v2.7.0.
Same one-liner as #772 — adds stable to tests.yml push/pull_request
filters so the required backend/frontend checks report on this PR
instead of hanging on 'Expected — Waiting for status to be reported'.
Merge main (v3.83.0-beta.0) into stable to cut the next stable release.
Conflicts resolved toward main (the promoted code); stable release-control
files (manifest, CHANGELOG) restored separately.
- Search now hits the backend (debounced) so results aren't truncated to the
first loaded page: /received gains a `q` filter (sender/subject); the frontend
passes the debounced term to every list query. The instant client-side filter
stays for responsiveness.
- Reply/compose recipient extracts the bare address from a "Name <addr>" From
header (extractEmail) — also used for the customer-lookup key.
- Added the full de + en `messages.*` and `email.customerMailbox.*` translation
namespaces (were English inline-fallbacks only). Swiss-German spelling.
- BLOCKER: stored XSS via inbound sender display name. The reply stub built raw
HTML with the unsanitized From name and set it as innerHTML on the composer's
contentEditable (admin origin) → onerror JS ran on Reply. Now HTML-escape
from_address in the stub AND DOMPurify-sanitize the composer body before
innerHTML (defense in depth).
- Gate the NEW Messages routes with requireFeatureFlag('messaging') per-route
(queue/:id, received/:id, item/*, identities, accounts, accounts/test, send)
— NOT the shared /email mount, so the pre-existing email-config endpoints stay
ungated.
- DocumentActionModal auto-picks a customer only on an EXACT email match
(customer search is prefix/fuzzy), else leaves the picker to the admin.
- Search box in the header filters the current folder's list (sender/subject),
client-side; works across the merged Archived/Deleted views too.
- Archive and Delete are now implemented as soft moves: migration 157 adds
mailbox_state ('active'|'archived'|'deleted') to email_queue + received_emails.
Archive → 'archived', Delete → 'deleted' (trash). Restore → 'active'. Deleting
FROM the Deleted folder is permanent (hard row delete).
- New cross-account system folders Archived + Deleted (merge sent + received of
that state, sorted by date). Normal folders now exclude archived/deleted.
- Backend: /queue + /received gain a `state` filter (default active + legacy
NULL); new POST /item/:kind/:id/state (archive/delete/restore) and DELETE
/item/:kind/:id (purge, email.edit).
- Toolbar Archive/Delete wired; Restore + "Delete permanently" shown in the
system folders.
Frontend build + migration boot (157) verified.
Pre-upstream review hardening:
- /accounts + /accounts/test now reject private/internal IMAP/SMTP hosts via
isPrivateIP(), matching /config + /incoming-config (SSRF).
- QueueDetail body iframe uses sandbox="" (script-less, no same-origin) like the
inbound pane, instead of allow-same-origin.
- /send sanitizer drops the <style> tag + data: scheme to match the stricter
inbound sanitizeBody allowlist.
- Per-account SMTP transport sets tls.rejectUnauthorized explicitly.
CustomerPicker uses its 'label' prop as the selected-customer chip text, so
passing the static 'Customer' string hid the actual name. Pass the resolved
customer's name as label and add a separate field heading.
The toolbar doc buttons now open a real document-action flow instead of just
loading an email template:
- DocumentActionModal resolves the customer from the message's sender address
(customers/search); if no match, the CustomerPicker lets you search or create
a passive customer inline.
- Create new -> jumps to the real editor prefilled with the customer
(quotes/contracts/bills ?customerAccountId=), so numbering, line items and PDF
all come from the existing CRM. Gallery opens the event editor.
- Select existing -> lists that customer's quotes/contracts/invoices and drops
the chosen document number into a reply composer.
- Toolbar buttons are gated by the global feature flags (quotes/contracts/bills).
Adds the missing customerAccountId prefill to ContractEditorPage (quotes + bills
already had it). Frontend-only; reuses existing endpoints. Build verified.
Addresses dev-test feedback:
- Sidebar + reading-pane addresses (rechnungen@ / hello@ / no-reply@) are now
read from the mail config via GET /admin/email/identities, not hardcoded.
- Highlight/selection now uses the branding accent (bg-accent-soft /
text-on-accent-soft / accent-dark) instead of hardcoded blue, so it follows
the admin's CI colour like the sidebar.
- Header gains "New message" (compose) and "Sync" (poll mailboxes now) buttons.
- Composer modal enlarged (920px, taller editable body).
- Customer mailbox (hello@) now has BOTH incoming (IMAP) and outgoing (SMTP)
settings — migration 156 adds smtp_* + from_* to mail_accounts;
emailProcessor.sendRawEmail takes an accountKey and sends via that mailbox's
SMTP identity (falls back to the global from). Manual/reply sends from the
Messages UI use the 'customers' identity, so replies come from hello@.
Frontend build + migration boot (156) verified.
The Messaging FeatureCard was a hardcoded-disabled 'roadmap' placeholder
(no-op toggle), so the messaging flag could never be turned on — the Messages
sidebar item + page stayed hidden. Wire the toggle to setFlag, mark it 'new',
and describe the actual admin Messages client.
The CRM action buttons and Reply now open a send-composer, not a silent
templated send.
- New send-composer (MessageComposer): loads the rendered template (via
previewTemplate) or a reply stub into a fully-editable body — the admin can
rewrite it or drop a note anywhere before sending. On send it goes out as-is
(server-sanitized), no template re-render.
- Backend: emailProcessor.sendRawEmail() sends admin-edited HTML via the
configured SMTP identity; POST /admin/email/send sanitizes + sends + records
the message in email_queue as a 'manual' send.
- Migration 155: email_queue.origin ('system' default | 'manual'). The Sent
stream now splits by origin — Automated ▸ Sent = system, Customers ▸ Sent =
the human/edited messages (which finally populates that folder). /queue gains
an origin filter + returns origin.
- Toolbar wired: Reply enabled on inbound customer mail (prefilled + quoted);
Create Quote/Contract/Invoice open the composer with that template loaded;
Gallery opens a blank compose. Accounting/Forward/Archive/Delete stay disabled
(later phases). After send, jumps to Customers ▸ Sent.
Deferred to a later phase: two-way IMAP write-back; per-identity SMTP (manual
sends currently use the global from address). Frontend build + migration boot
verified.
Address review on #764: backfillDunningRuns emitted invoice.sent without a
target, so enabling dunning would also enroll every historical open invoice
into any custom invoice.sent flow. Pass the enabled flow's id through to
emitWorkflowEvent so the backfill only touches dunning. Also note the
computeWakeAt both-fields (untilVar + delay) behaviour change in its comment.
Second inbound mailbox and real message bodies for the Messages viewer.
Backend:
- Migration 154: mail_accounts table (additional inbound mailboxes beyond the
primary accounting IMAP) + received_emails.{account_key,to_address,body_html,
body_text}. Additive/guarded.
- emailIntakeService now polls the accounting mailbox AND every enabled
mail_accounts row. Extracted pollAccountOnce(cfg, {accountKey, routeToExpenses});
accounting keeps its exact attachment->expenses behavior, customer mail is
logged with its body and NOT routed to accounting. Inbound HTML is sanitized
server-side (sanitize-html) on ingest.
- adminEmail: /received gains an account filter + returns account_key/to_address
(bodies excluded from the list); new GET /received/:id returns the body;
GET/POST /accounts + /accounts/test manage the extra mailboxes.
Frontend:
- Customers inbox now pulls the hello@ mailbox; reading pane renders the
sanitized body in a strict (script-less, no same-origin) sandboxed iframe.
Accounting inbox shows bodies too. Toolbar context keys off the mailbox.
- CustomerMailboxCard in Settings -> Email (behind the messaging flag) to
configure + test the hello@ IMAP box.
No behavior change to the existing accounting inbound flow. Frontend build +
migration boot verified.
Repro: create an event, click into the date field, backspace a day digit.
The whole page white-screened and needed a reload.
Root cause: LocalizedDateInput's `toIso` only checked the day/month were
1-2 digits, not that they formed a real date — so a mid-backspace value
like "0/07/2026" was coerced to the string "2026-07-00" and committed to
`event_date`. CreateEventPage then rendered
`format(addDays(new Date('2026-07-00'), days))`, and date-fns `format`
throws RangeError on an Invalid Date — thrown during render, so React
tore the tree down to the error boundary.
Two complementary fixes:
- `toIso` round-trips the parsed y/m/d through `Date` and rejects
impossible dates (day 00, month 13, 31 Feb…), so the field never
commits a value that isn't a real calendar date.
- `useLocalizedDate.format`/`formatDistanceToNow` guard with `isValid`
and return '' instead of throwing — defence in depth for the ~57 call
sites that could otherwise white-screen on a bad date.
Verified live: backspacing to a partial/invalid date no longer crashes
(the form stays rendered), a valid date still commits + the expiry
preview renders. Adds a LocalizedDateInput regression test; tsc + build
green.
Paul Nothaft