Triage of an external SAST/SCA scan run on 2026-05-06. Most loud findings
were already resolved by PR #412 (the 18-CVE backport); this PR addresses
the residual real items:
* Drop unused `handlebars` from backend deps. The runtime require was
removed in PR #367 (#367) but the package.json line stayed. handlebars
was the source of two flagged criticals (CVE-2026-33937 RCE,
GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q AST injection) plus 8 highs — all now gone.
* `npm audit fix` on backend + frontend. Bumps transitive picomatch,
flatted, postcss, brace-expansion via lockfile, and direct dompurify,
lodash, vite, i18next-http-backend within their existing semver ranges.
Both audits now report 0 vulnerabilities.
* Add `event.origin === window.location.origin` check to the THEME_PREVIEW
message listener in PreviewPage. The branding page posts from the same
origin, so nothing legitimate is rejected; without the check, any third
party that window.open()'d the preview could push arbitrary
branding/theme payloads (semgrep
insufficient-postmessage-origin-validation).
* nginx: `proxy_hide_header` for X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options,
Referrer-Policy, Content-Security-Policy, Permissions-Policy,
Strict-Transport-Security at server level. nginx adds these itself, but
helmet on the backend was also emitting them — clients were seeing
duplicates (testssl flagged "Multiple X-Frame-Options / CSP /
Permissions-Policy / Referrer-Policy headers" on the live origin).
Single source of truth now.
* Dockerfile hardening (checkov):
- HEALTHCHECK on backend/Dockerfile, backend/Dockerfile.dev,
frontend/Dockerfile.dev. Frontend production Dockerfile already had
one.
- USER node in frontend/Dockerfile.dev (was running as root).
* GitHub Actions docker-build.yml: explicit top-level
`permissions: contents: read`. Per-job blocks already declare
`packages: write` where needed; this stops future steps from
inheriting unintended privileges (CKV2_GHA_1).
Backend npm audit: 4 vulns -> 0.
Frontend npm audit: 6 vulns -> 0.
Backend unit tests: 13 suites, 131/132 passing (1 pre-existing skip).
Frontend type-check + lint: clean.
The pre-existing integration-test failures (live DB / S3 required) and
the ThemeCustomizerEnhanced QueryClientProvider failures are unrelated
and reproduce on origin/beta without these changes.
Remove sync-versions job that fails on protected branches.
Instead, use Release Please's extra-files feature to update
package.json versions as part of the release PR.
QEMU emulation of ARM64 on x86 GitHub runners is too slow and
unreliable for npm operations, causing builds to hang or crash
with "Illegal instruction" errors.
Changed platform detection logic to:
- Tagged releases (v*.*.*): Build both amd64 and arm64
- All other builds (branches, PRs): Build amd64 only
This ensures fast CI feedback during development while still
providing multi-arch images for production releases.
Sharp library native binaries cause QEMU 'Illegal instruction' errors during
ARM64 emulation. This change builds only amd64 for PR checks (faster, reliable)
while maintaining multi-arch (amd64+arm64) builds for main/develop/tags.
The workflow was generating invalid Docker tags with format ':-3b251d7'
due to empty branch names in PR contexts.
Problem:
- Tag config: type=sha,prefix={{branch}}-,format=short
- For PRs: {{branch}} is empty → results in ':-3b251d7' (invalid)
- Docker doesn't allow tags starting with hyphen
Solution:
- Changed to: type=sha,format=short
- Now generates: '3b251d7' (valid) without branch prefix
- Works correctly for PRs, branches, and tags
Valid tag examples now:
- PRs: pr-44, 3b251d7
- Branches: main, 3b251d7
- Tags: v1.0.0, 1.0, 1, 3b251d7
The publish-manifest job was failing because it tried to create manifests
from non-existent architecture-specific tags (latest-amd64, latest-arm64).
docker/build-push-action@v5 already creates multi-arch manifests automatically
when building for multiple platforms, making this job redundant.
The workflow now correctly builds and pushes multi-arch images in a single
step with proper manifest lists included.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>