hero_logo_visible is nullable — null means "inherit the global
branding_logo_display_hero toggle" (#756, migration 152). But the create and
update validators used `.optional()` without `{ nullable: true }`, which only
skips `undefined`; an explicit `null` still ran `.isBoolean()` and failed with
HTTP 400 "Invalid value". Saving an event with `hero_logo_visible: null` (the
inherit state the frontend sends) was rejected on v3.45.2.
- Both routes: `body('hero_logo_visible').optional({ nullable: true }).isBoolean()`,
matching the already-correct `hero_logo_size` rule next to it.
- Create handler: guard on `!= null` instead of `!== undefined` so an explicit
null stores NULL (inherit) rather than being coerced to 0/false by
formatBoolean on SQLite. The update handler already did `=== null ? null`.
Left hero_logo_position on plain `.optional()` on purpose: its column is NOT
NULL (no inherit migration) and its handler always resolves to a concrete value
via `|| brandingDefaults`, so null is genuinely invalid there — allowing it
would trade the 400 for a 500.
Adds smoke tests: PUT accepts hero_logo_visible: null and stores NULL; a
non-boolean value is still rejected.
Production installs use docker-compose.production.yml (the README's documented
path, pinned GHCR images, no dev services), but the dashboard's update
instructions emitted bare `docker compose pull` / `up -d`. Bare `docker compose`
operates on docker-compose.yml — a different, build-based stack — so a
production user who followed the steps:
- never pulled/recreated their real containers (stayed on the old version,
e.g. stuck on 3.44.0 after "updating" to 3.45.2), and
- started the dev-only mailhog service that docker-compose.yml defines
(reported restart-looping).
The backend runs inside a container and can't stat the host's compose files, but
docker-compose.production.yml passes PICPEAK_RELEASE_CHANNEL into the backend env
and docker-compose.yml does not. detectEnvironment() now derives
isProductionCompose from it, and the Docker update steps prepend
`-f docker-compose.production.yml` when set. The non-production branch keeps the
bare commands but the warning now tells users to add `-f docker-compose.production.yml`
if they installed with it.
Also gates the mailhog service in docker-compose.yml behind a `dev` compose
profile so a plain `docker compose up -d` never starts it (opt in with
`docker compose --profile dev up -d`). Nothing depends on it (SMTP_HOST comes
from .env), so gating is safe. Verified: `docker compose config` lists mailhog
only with `--profile dev`; production compose is unchanged.
Adds unit tests for the production-vs-default command generation.
The admin's Settings → General → "Max File Size (MB)" value
(general_max_file_size_mb) never applied to guest gallery uploads — the guest
route hardcoded multer's per-file cap at 50MB (gallery.js) and the guest UI
hardcoded the same 50MB client-side guard and "max 50MB" hint text. So a guest
could not upload a large video even when the admin raised the limit (reported by
mat1990dj on #613). Same class as the file-count miss fixed in #614, for size.
- uploadSettings.js: new getMaxFileSizeMb()/getMaxFileSizeBytes() reading
general_max_file_size_mb (default 50MB, cached 60s, clamped to a 10GB ceiling),
mirroring getMaxFilesPerUpload.
- gallery.js (guest upload): multer limits.fileSize now resolves from the
setting; a LIMIT_FILE_SIZE error returns an actionable "max N MB" message.
- publicSettings.js: exposes general_max_file_size_mb (default 50) so the gallery
UI can render the real limit and guard client-side before an oversized POST.
- UserPhotoUpload.tsx: reads the limit, uses it for the client-side size guard,
and passes it to the requirements hint. The "max 50MB" literal in
upload.fileRequirements is now interpolated ({{sizeLimit}}) across all 8
locales; adds upload.fileTooLarge (en/de; others fall back to en).
Scope: guest path only (the reported gap). The admin path keeps its generous
10GB cap — admins are trusted and default 50MB would otherwise regress large
admin video uploads. Format and batch-size limits already work correctly and are
untouched. Adds SQLite-backed unit tests for the new getter.
Verified end-to-end on a booted instance: admin sets 500MB → persisted → public
settings exposes 500 → guest multer sources its cap from it.
The legacy gallery router mounted at /api/events exposed create/list/update/
delete/extend guarded by adminAuth ALONE — no requirePermission, no
requireEventOwnership. adminAuth only checks the token is a valid type:'admin'
session, which every back-office role holds, down to read-only `viewer`. So any
non-super-admin account could:
- GET /api/events → every gallery's bcrypt password_hash, share_token, and
client name/email (the list handler selects * and mapEventForApi keeps
those columns),
- PUT /api/events/:id → reset any gallery's password (full takeover),
- DELETE /api/events/:id → delete any gallery,
all bypassing the per-photographer ownership isolation the canonical
/api/admin/events router enforces. Affects any instance with more than the
single super_admin.
Fix: remove the legacy router entirely (mount + require + src/routes/events.js).
It was a superseded duplicate of /api/admin/events and unused by the frontend
EXCEPT for one live route — POST /:id/extend (the "Extend expiration" UI action,
which hit /api/events/:id/extend via the api client's /api base). That route is
migrated to the canonical mount as POST /api/admin/events/:id/extend with the
same guards as every other gallery mutation (adminAuth + requirePermission
('events.edit') + requireEventOwnership), and the frontend is repointed to it.
Behaviour of the extend itself is unchanged (expires_at + reactivate).
Verified end-to-end on a booted instance: /api/events (all methods) now 404;
/api/admin/events/:id/extend returns 401 unauth, 200 for the owner, 403 for a
non-owning editor; the full login→create→extend flow works. Adds a regression
test pinning the router removal and the extend ownership check.
Implements the three restore-hardening items deferred from the #811 Codex
review (all validated against a real Postgres, see __tests__/integration/
picpeakRestorePg.test.js). Backend-only; targets main (feature, not a backport).
1. Global session cutoff (utils/sessionCutoff.js). A restore reassigns admin/
customer/event ids, so ANY pre-restore JWT can rebind to a different restored
principal. Revoking just the importing token wasn't enough. importFromPicpeak
now stamps a unix-second cutoff in app_settings after the restore commits, and
adminAuth / galleryAuth / verifyGalleryAccess / customerAuth reject any token
whose iat predates it (cached 30s → one in-memory compare on the hot path).
The operator's forced re-login mints a token past the cutoff, so it passes.
2. Role preservation across an RBAC replace (captureOperatorRole /
preserveOperatorRole). The operator's role + granted permission NAMES are
captured before the wipe; after roles/role_permissions are replaced the role
is resolved by NAME against the restored data, and re-created with its grants
if the backup omits it — so a crafted or cross-instance backup can't silently
downgrade or lock out the operator. reinjectCurrentAdmin now returns the
operator's id so the row can be re-pointed at the resolved role.
3. Postgres identity-sequence resync (resyncSequences). batchInsert writes
explicit ids without advancing the sequences, so the next natural insert into
any restored table collided on the PK. Runs AFTER commit (setval isn't
transactional) and guards every table with a column-existence check —
pg_get_serial_sequence RAISES on id-less tables like role_permissions.
No-op on SQLite.
Tests: SQLite unit tests for the cutoff and role preservation; a gated Postgres
integration suite (npm run test:pg with PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL) covering sequence
resync, the id-less-table guard, explicit-id reinject, role re-creation, and a
full cross-instance replaceAllTables run asserting operator preservation, role
re-establishment, FK integrity, and collision-free post-restore inserts.
Stacks on #811 (shares the reinject hardening); merge after it.
The req.admin.id fix activated reinjectCurrentAdmin(); hardening its preservation
logic (found across Codex review rounds of #811):
- MFA hijack: reinject wrote back only password_hash/is_active/
must_change_password, leaving a crafted backup's two_factor_* on the
operator's row — it could strip or replace their second factor. The email-
matched row is now updated with the operator's full AUTH set (login identity,
password, and all two_factor_* columns). Relationship/audit FKs (role_id,
created_by) are deliberately NOT forced from the snapshot: on a cross-instance
restore those pre-restore ids may be absent from the backup and would dangle
the FK (SQLite rolls back at commit); the restored row keeps its own valid
values.
- Cross-instance restore rollback / FK safety: reinject matched only by email,
so a backup shipping a different admin with the default `admin` username hit
UNIQUE(username) and rolled the whole restore back; email and username could
even collide on two different rows. Reconciliation is now non-destructive:
the email-matching row is updated in place (id preserved → restored FKs like
events.created_by stay valid); any different row holding the operator's
username is RENAMED, not deleted (deletion would fire ON DELETE actions /
dangle references); only when no row has the operator's email is a fresh row
inserted, with created_by nulled and an explicit max(id)+1 id (batchInsert
left the Postgres identity sequence unadvanced, so a sequence-based insert
could collide).
- Stale session after restore: admin_users ids shift on restore, but the
operator's live JWT is bound only to decoded.id (IP logged not enforced; the
backup controls password_changed_at). The route now revokes the token (result
checked and logged) and clears the admin cookie; the client redirects to a
fresh login via a sessionInvalidated flag. Cookie clear is the unconditional
guarantee.
Adds SQLite-backed reinject regression tests (in-place login/MFA restore with id
and FK columns preserved, username-only rename, email+username on different rows,
clean insert with created_by nulled) and the frontend redirect on
sessionInvalidated.
Deferred (design decisions / pre-existing, need a Postgres test env — see PR
discussion): global "invalidate all pre-restore sessions" cutoff; preserving the
operator's ROLE semantics across an RBAC-table replace; and resyncing Postgres
identity sequences after any restore (batchInsert leaves them behind max(id) —
pre-existing, affects every restored table).
The chunked video upload stored req.body.filename unmodified and later built
the merged path as path.join(tempDir, uploadMeta.filename). path.join does not
neutralise '../', so a filename like '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the
temp dir on merge and overwrote arbitrary files. Requires admin with
photos.upload.
Fix: path.basename() the client filename in initializeUpload() and reject
names that collapse to nothing. Adds a regression test.
node-stream-zip's extract(null, root) writes each entry to path.join(root,
entry.name) without neutralising '../', so a crafted archive entry named
'../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the target dir and overwrote arbitrary
files (logos, .env, route files → RCE on source deploys). Requires admin with
archives.restore.
Adds assertZipEntriesWithin() to utils/safePath.js — a lexical containment
check run on the entry list BEFORE extract() — and guards both extract sinks:
adminArchives.js (the reported route) and picpeakImportService.js (the sibling
.picpeak import, same sink). Adds unit tests for traversal, absolute-path, and
sibling-prefix entries.
POST /auth/gallery/share-login validated only the 128-bit share token and then
minted a full type:'gallery' access token regardless of require_password —
computing requiresPassword at the end only to echo it, never enforce it. Anyone
holding a gallery's share link could read and download every photo in a
password-protected gallery via a direct API call, no password needed.
Fix: compute requiresPassword before minting; for a password-protected gallery
return { requires_password: true } with NO token and NO cookie. The client then
goes through /gallery/verify, which does bcrypt.compare the password. The public
(no-password) auto-login path is unchanged. The frontend already falls through
to the password prompt when share-login returns no token/event.
Adds route regression test covering the bypass, the public path, and bad tokens.
adminAuth populates req.admin, not req.user, so currentAdminId was always
undefined in the /api/admin/picpeak/import handler. reinjectCurrentAdmin()
then had no account to preserve and the admin_users table was fully replaced
by the uploaded backup — a crafted .picpeak let any admin with backup.restore
take over every admin account (critical). One-line fix: pass req.admin.id.
Closes GHSA-qxfx-4493-4v8f and its duplicate GHSA-pjp6-jcrj-3cr5.
The frontend image kept shipping vulnerable OS packages (nginx 1.28.3-r1,
curl/libcurl 8.19.0, c-ares 1.34.6) despite the apk upgrade line, for two
independent reasons:
1. The runtime stage's apk upgrade layer was cached indefinitely — the
CACHEBUST build-arg CI passes (github.run_number) was only declared in
the builder stage, and ARGs don't cross stage boundaries. Both
Dockerfiles now redeclare CACHEBUST in the runtime stage and consume it
in the apk RUN, so every build re-runs the upgrade and picks up current
Alpine security updates.
2. nginx itself can never upgrade via apk on the nginx.org-based image:
the bundled nginx-module-* packages pin the exact nginx version, so
Alpine's patched 1.28.3-r4 is unreachable (verified empirically —
apk add --upgrade nginx is a silent no-op). nginx fixes must come via
the base tag, so bump to nginx:1.30-alpine (current stable, 1.30.4 on
Alpine 3.24, same nginx.org conf.d layout — drop-in).
Verified: local image build scans clean with Trivy (0 OS findings, was 21);
container serves /health, SPA fallback, and BRAND_TITLE envsubst as non-root
nginx user.
Closes code-scanning alerts 371-374, 376-392 (nginx HTTP/2 & module CVEs,
curl CVE-2026-5773/-6276 + 6 medium, c-ares CVE-2026-33630).
Paul Nothaft