fix(security): make the CSS sanitizer's remote-URL block actually block
sanitizeCSS "blocked" a remote url() by prefixing it with a /* BLOCKED URL */ COMMENT and leaving the URL in place. CSS comments are discarded during tokenization, so the declaration a browser parsed still carried the live URL — while adminCssTemplates returned sanitization_warnings claiming it had been stopped. Protection that reports success is worse than none, which is why it survived review. Scope is narrow: sanitizeCss (lowercase, the public-site path) never included the pattern and permits remote URLs by design — a test now pins that. Only sanitizeCSS (uppercase) was affected; outside this repo's newsletter branch its sole caller is adminCssTemplates.js. Migration 200 is required, not cosmetic: gallery.js serves css_templates.css_content VERBATIM as text/css and does not re-sanitize on read, so fixing the write path alone would leave every existing template serving its URL forever. Review follow-ups replaced the regex with a small three-state lexer (comment / string / identifier) over the RAW text, after five further bypasses: a ")" inside a quoted url(), CSS escapes (u\72l), the HTML comment strip JOINING tokens into a live url() after the scan, an escaped quote desynchronising the scan, and a quote inside a comment. Escapes are decoded only to decide, never to rewrite — a clean input now round-trips byte-identical, which also keeps unaffected rows out of the migration's write path. Severity is low (writing a template needs branding.edit) but the harm is a gallery visitor's IP reaching a third party from a page the operator believes carries no remote requests.
This commit is contained in:
Paul Nothaft
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
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/**
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* Repairing stored CSS templates that carry remote url() references.
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*
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* The migration exists because the public render path (gallery.js, GET
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* /gallery/:slug/css) serves `css_templates.css_content` VERBATIM to
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* visitors — it does not re-sanitize on read. Fixing the sanitizer alone
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* would only protect newly-saved templates; rows already carrying a remote
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* URL would keep serving it forever.
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*
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* As with migration 181, most of what is pinned here is what it must NOT
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* touch: inline data: images, and stylesheets that were already clean.
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*/
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const path = require('path');
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const fs = require('fs');
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const os = require('os');
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const migration = require('../../migrations/core/200_strip_remote_urls_from_css_templates');
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const WITH_REMOTE = `
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.gallery-page {
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background: #111 url(https://tracker.example/pixel.gif) no-repeat;
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color: #eee;
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}
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.photo-card {
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border-radius: 12px;
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}
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`;
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const WITH_DATA_URI = `
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.photo-card {
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background-image: url();
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border-radius: 8px;
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}
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`;
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const ALREADY_CLEAN = `
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.gallery-page {
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background: #fff;
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color: #222;
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}
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`;
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// What the old, broken sanitizer actually left in the column.
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const LEGACY_MARKER = '.a{background:/* BLOCKED URL */ url(https://tracker.example/pixel.gif)}';
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describe('migration 200 — remote url() in CSS templates', () => {
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let knex; let tmpDir;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig200-'));
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knex = require('knex')({
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client: 'sqlite3',
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connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
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useNullAsDefault: true,
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});
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await knex.schema.createTable('css_templates', (t) => {
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t.increments('id').primary();
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t.integer('slot_number');
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t.string('name');
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t.text('css_content');
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t.timestamp('updated_at');
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});
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await knex.schema.createTable('activity_logs', (t) => {
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t.increments('id').primary();
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t.string('activity_type');
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t.string('actor_type');
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t.text('metadata');
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t.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
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t.timestamp('read_at');
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});
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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if (knex) await knex.destroy();
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await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
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});
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beforeEach(async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').del();
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await knex('activity_logs').del();
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});
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const contentOf = async (name) =>
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(await knex('css_templates').where({ name }).first()).css_content;
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/** What a CSS parser sees — comments are discarded before parsing. */
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const asParsed = (css) => css.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '');
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it('removes a remote url() from a stored template', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 1, name: 'Tracked', css_content: WITH_REMOTE });
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await migration.up(knex);
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const css = await contentOf('Tracked');
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expect(asParsed(css)).not.toContain('tracker.example');
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// The rest of the stylesheet survives.
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expect(css).toContain('#111');
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expect(css).toContain('border-radius: 12px');
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});
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it('repairs a row left behind by the old inert marker', async () => {
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// The exact shape the broken sanitizer wrote: a comment that a parser
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// discards, followed by the live URL.
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 2, name: 'Legacy', css_content: LEGACY_MARKER });
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await migration.up(knex);
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const css = await contentOf('Legacy');
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expect(asParsed(css)).not.toContain('tracker.example');
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expect(css).not.toContain('BLOCKED URL');
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});
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it('leaves an inline data: image alone', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 3, name: 'Inline', css_content: WITH_DATA_URI });
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await migration.up(knex);
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expect(await contentOf('Inline')).toContain('');
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});
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it('does not touch a template that was already clean', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 4, name: 'Clean', css_content: ALREADY_CLEAN });
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await migration.up(knex);
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expect(await contentOf('Clean')).toBe(ALREADY_CLEAN);
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});
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it('names every repaired slot in an activity log entry', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert([
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{ slot_number: 1, name: 'Tracked', css_content: WITH_REMOTE },
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{ slot_number: 2, name: 'Legacy', css_content: LEGACY_MARKER },
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{ slot_number: 3, name: 'Clean', css_content: ALREADY_CLEAN },
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]);
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await migration.up(knex);
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const log = await knex('activity_logs')
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.where({ activity_type: 'css_template_remote_urls_removed' }).first();
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expect(log).toBeTruthy();
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const meta = JSON.parse(log.metadata);
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expect(meta.count).toBe(2);
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expect(meta.templates.map((t) => t.slot).sort()).toEqual([1, 2]);
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// Unread, so it surfaces in the admin notification bell.
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expect(log.read_at).toBeNull();
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});
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it('writes no notification when nothing needed repair', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 1, name: 'Clean', css_content: ALREADY_CLEAN });
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await migration.up(knex);
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expect(await knex('activity_logs').count({ c: '*' })).toEqual([{ c: 0 }]);
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});
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it('is idempotent — a re-run changes nothing and adds no second notification', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 1, name: 'Tracked', css_content: WITH_REMOTE });
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await migration.up(knex);
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const afterFirst = await contentOf('Tracked');
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await migration.up(knex);
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expect(await contentOf('Tracked')).toBe(afterFirst);
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expect(await knex('activity_logs').count({ c: '*' })).toEqual([{ c: 1 }]);
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});
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it('skips rows with no CSS at all', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 5, name: 'Empty', css_content: null });
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await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.not.toThrow();
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});
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it('no-ops on an install with no css_templates table', async () => {
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const bare = require('knex')({
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client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true,
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});
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await expect(migration.up(bare)).resolves.not.toThrow();
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await bare.destroy();
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});
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it('down() is a deliberate no-op', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 1, name: 'Tracked', css_content: WITH_REMOTE });
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await migration.up(knex);
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const repaired = await contentOf('Tracked');
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await migration.down(knex);
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// A rollback must not silently re-introduce third-party requests into
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// pages served to visitors.
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expect(await contentOf('Tracked')).toBe(repaired);
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});
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});
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@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
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/**
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* cssSanitizer — remote url() removal.
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*
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* Regression: `sanitizeCSS` used to "block" a remote url() by prefixing it
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* with a `/* BLOCKED URL *\/` COMMENT and leaving the URL in place. CSS
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* comments are discarded during tokenization, so the declaration a browser
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* actually parsed still carried the live URL — while the returned warning
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* told the caller it had been blocked.
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*
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* The load-bearing assertion in most of these is therefore not "the marker is
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* gone" but "the HOST is gone", checked against the comment-stripped text the
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* way a parser would see it.
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*/
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const { sanitizeCSS, sanitizeCss, stripDisallowedUrls } = require('../../src/utils/cssSanitizer');
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/** What a CSS parser sees: comments are discarded before parsing. */
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const asParsed = (css) => css.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '');
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describe('stripDisallowedUrls', () => {
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it('removes a remote url() rather than commenting near it', () => {
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');
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expect(blocked).toBe(1);
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expect(sanitized).not.toContain('evil.example');
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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it.each([
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['unquoted', '.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
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['single-quoted', '.a{background:url(\'https://evil.example/p.gif\')}'],
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['double-quoted', '.a{background:url("https://evil.example/p.gif")}'],
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['spaced', '.a{background:url( https://evil.example/p.gif )}'],
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['uppercase URL(', '.a{background:URL(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
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['protocol-relative', '.a{background:url(//evil.example/p.gif)}'],
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['scheme-less host', '.a{background:url(evil.example/p.gif)}'],
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['http', '.a{background:url(http://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
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])('removes a %s remote url()', (_label, css) => {
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expect(asParsed(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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it('keeps an inline data: image', () => {
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const css = '.a{background:url()}';
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(blocked).toBe(0);
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expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
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});
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it.each(['jpeg', 'jpg', 'png', 'gif', 'webp'])('keeps a )}`;
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expect(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
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});
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it('removes a data: URI that is not a raster image', () => {
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// )}').sanitized;
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expect(out).not.toContain('svg+xml');
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});
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it('leaves the rest of a shorthand declaration intact', () => {
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const out = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:#fff url(https://x/p.gif) no-repeat center}').sanitized;
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expect(out).toContain('#fff');
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expect(out).toContain('no-repeat center');
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expect(out).toContain('none');
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expect(out).not.toContain('https://x');
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});
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it('counts and removes every offender in one stylesheet', () => {
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(
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'.a{background:url(https://a.example/1.gif)}'
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+ '.b{background:url(https://b.example/2.gif)}'
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+ '.c{background:url()}'
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);
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expect(blocked).toBe(2);
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expect(sanitized).not.toContain('a.example');
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expect(sanitized).not.toContain('b.example');
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expect(sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
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});
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// Codex review: `)` is ordinary content inside a QUOTED url(), so a pattern
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// that stops at the first `)` failed to match at all — reporting the token
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// as clean and storing it verbatim. A working bypass of the block.
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it.each([
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['double-quoted', '.a{background:url("https://evil.example/pixel).gif")}'],
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['single-quoted', ".a{background:url('https://evil.example/pixel).gif')}"],
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['several parens', '.a{background:url("https://evil.example/a)b)c.gif")}'],
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])('removes a %s remote url() containing a closing paren', (_label, css) => {
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(blocked).toBe(1);
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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it('keeps a QUOTED data: image, parens and all', () => {
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const css = '.a{background:url("")}';
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expect(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
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});
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it('does not swallow an unquoted url() that never closes', () => {
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// Malformed input must not eat the rest of the stylesheet.
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const css = '.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif}.b{color:red}';
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const { sanitized } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(sanitized).toContain('color:red');
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});
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// Round-2 review: three more ways a regex could not see CSS structure.
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it('blocks a url() hidden behind a CSS escape', () => {
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// `\\72` is a legal way to write `r`, so this IS url(...) to a browser.
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:u\\72l(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');
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expect(blocked).toBe(1);
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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it('leaves url()-looking text inside a CSS string alone', () => {
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// `content:` is inert display text, not a resource request. Rewriting it
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// is a visible change to a page that never fetched anything.
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const css = '.a::after{content:"url(https://docs.example)"}';
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(blocked).toBe(0);
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expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
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});
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it('does not treat a ) inside a quoted string as the end of a token', () => {
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const css = '.a::after{content:"a) b"}.c{background:url(https://evil.example/x.gif)}';
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const { sanitized } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(sanitized).toContain('content:"a) b"');
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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|
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// Round-3 review: all three came from decoding escapes globally before
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// scanning, which destroyed the difference between an escaped quote and a
|
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// real one — and rewrote clean escapes that were never URLs.
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it('does not let an escaped quote desynchronise the scan', () => {
|
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// `\\"` inside a double-quoted string does NOT close it. Treating it as a
|
||||
// delimiter put the scanner a quote out of phase and let the url() that
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// followed through untouched.
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const css = '.a{content:"foo\\"";background:url(https://evil.example/x)}';
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(blocked).toBe(1);
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||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not treat a quote inside a CSS comment as a string', () => {
|
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// A browser ignores the comment and makes the request; the scanner used
|
||||
// to enter string mode on the apostrophe and copy the rest unscanned.
|
||||
const css = "/* don't */ .a{background:url(https://evil.example/x)}";
|
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
|
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expect(blocked).toBe(1);
|
||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('leaves an escaped selector byte-identical', () => {
|
||||
// `.w-1\\/2` is an ordinary escaped Tailwind class. Global decoding
|
||||
// rewrote it to `.w-1/2` — a DIFFERENT selector — and migration 200 then
|
||||
// committed that irreversibly, since its down() is a no-op.
|
||||
const css = '.w-1\\/2{color:red}';
|
||||
const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
|
||||
expect(blocked).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('returns clean input unchanged, whatever escapes it carries', () => {
|
||||
// The migration only writes when the bytes differ, so "unchanged" is
|
||||
// what keeps a clean row out of the repair path entirely.
|
||||
for (const css of [
|
||||
'.a{color:red}',
|
||||
'/* a comment */ .b{color:blue}',
|
||||
'.c\\:hover{color:green}',
|
||||
'.d::after{content:"\\201C"}',
|
||||
'.e{background:url()}',
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
|
||||
expect(blocked).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('keeps a comment that merely mentions a url', () => {
|
||||
const css = '/* see url(https://docs.example) for details */ .a{color:red}';
|
||||
expect(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('is idempotent', () => {
|
||||
const once = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:url(https://x/p.gif)}').sanitized;
|
||||
expect(stripDisallowedUrls(once).sanitized).toBe(once);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('handles empty and nullish input', () => {
|
||||
expect(stripDisallowedUrls('').sanitized).toBe('');
|
||||
expect(stripDisallowedUrls(null).sanitized).toBe('');
|
||||
expect(stripDisallowedUrls(undefined).sanitized).toBe('');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('sanitizeCSS', () => {
|
||||
it('no longer emits an inert BLOCKED URL marker', () => {
|
||||
const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');
|
||||
|
||||
expect(sanitized).not.toContain('BLOCKED URL');
|
||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('warns with the number it actually removed', () => {
|
||||
const { warnings } = sanitizeCSS(
|
||||
'.a{background:url(https://a.example/1.gif)}.b{background:url(https://b.example/2.gif)}'
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(warnings.some((w) => /Blocked 2 external URL references/.test(w))).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not warn about URLs when there are none', () => {
|
||||
const { warnings } = sanitizeCSS('.a{color:red}');
|
||||
expect(warnings.filter((w) => /external URL/.test(w))).toHaveLength(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('blocks a url() that only becomes one after HTML comments are removed', () => {
|
||||
// The comment strip JOINS the remaining characters into a live url(...).
|
||||
// A scan that ran before it saw no token and called the input clean.
|
||||
const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:u<!--x-->rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');
|
||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('still blocks the other forbidden patterns', () => {
|
||||
const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
|
||||
'@import url("https://x/e.css"); .a{width:expression(alert(1));behavior:url(e.htc)}'
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(sanitized).not.toContain('@import');
|
||||
expect(sanitized).not.toContain('expression(');
|
||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('https://x/e.css');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('neutralises a javascript: url()', () => {
|
||||
const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(javascript:alert(1))}');
|
||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('javascript:');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('leaves ordinary declarations untouched', () => {
|
||||
const css = '.btn { color: #fff; padding: 12px 24px; border-radius: 6px; }';
|
||||
expect(sanitizeCSS(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('sanitizeCss (lowercase) — public-site path, deliberately unchanged', () => {
|
||||
it('still permits a remote url()', () => {
|
||||
// This function never blocked remote URLs and never claimed to. The
|
||||
// public-site CSS surface may legitimately reference a remote font or
|
||||
// background; changing that is a product decision, not this bug fix.
|
||||
const out = sanitizeCss('.a{background:url(https://cdn.example/x.png)}');
|
||||
expect(out).toContain('https://cdn.example/x.png');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('still strips @import and javascript: urls', () => {
|
||||
expect(sanitizeCss('@import url("https://x/e.css"); .a{color:red}')).not.toContain('@import');
|
||||
expect(sanitizeCss('.a{background:url(\'javascript:alert(1)\')}')).not.toContain('javascript:');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user