fix(security): make the CSS sanitizer's remote-URL block actually block
sanitizeCSS "blocked" a remote url() by prefixing it with a /* BLOCKED URL */ COMMENT and leaving the URL in place. CSS comments are discarded during tokenization, so the declaration a browser parsed still carried the live URL — while adminCssTemplates returned sanitization_warnings claiming it had been stopped. Protection that reports success is worse than none, which is why it survived review. Scope is narrow: sanitizeCss (lowercase, the public-site path) never included the pattern and permits remote URLs by design — a test now pins that. Only sanitizeCSS (uppercase) was affected; outside this repo's newsletter branch its sole caller is adminCssTemplates.js. Migration 200 is required, not cosmetic: gallery.js serves css_templates.css_content VERBATIM as text/css and does not re-sanitize on read, so fixing the write path alone would leave every existing template serving its URL forever. Review follow-ups replaced the regex with a small three-state lexer (comment / string / identifier) over the RAW text, after five further bypasses: a ")" inside a quoted url(), CSS escapes (u\72l), the HTML comment strip JOINING tokens into a live url() after the scan, an escaped quote desynchronising the scan, and a quote inside a comment. Escapes are decoded only to decide, never to rewrite — a clean input now round-trips byte-identical, which also keeps unaffected rows out of the migration's write path. Severity is low (writing a template needs branding.edit) but the harm is a gallery visitor's IP reaching a third party from a page the operator believes carries no remote requests.
This commit is contained in:
Paul Nothaft
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
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/**
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* Repairing stored CSS templates that carry remote url() references.
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*
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* The migration exists because the public render path (gallery.js, GET
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* /gallery/:slug/css) serves `css_templates.css_content` VERBATIM to
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* visitors — it does not re-sanitize on read. Fixing the sanitizer alone
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* would only protect newly-saved templates; rows already carrying a remote
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* URL would keep serving it forever.
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*
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* As with migration 181, most of what is pinned here is what it must NOT
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* touch: inline data: images, and stylesheets that were already clean.
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*/
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const path = require('path');
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const fs = require('fs');
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const os = require('os');
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const migration = require('../../migrations/core/200_strip_remote_urls_from_css_templates');
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const WITH_REMOTE = `
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.gallery-page {
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background: #111 url(https://tracker.example/pixel.gif) no-repeat;
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color: #eee;
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}
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.photo-card {
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border-radius: 12px;
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}
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`;
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const WITH_DATA_URI = `
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.photo-card {
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background-image: url();
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border-radius: 8px;
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}
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`;
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const ALREADY_CLEAN = `
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.gallery-page {
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background: #fff;
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color: #222;
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}
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`;
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// What the old, broken sanitizer actually left in the column.
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const LEGACY_MARKER = '.a{background:/* BLOCKED URL */ url(https://tracker.example/pixel.gif)}';
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describe('migration 200 — remote url() in CSS templates', () => {
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let knex; let tmpDir;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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tmpDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-mig200-'));
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knex = require('knex')({
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client: 'sqlite3',
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connection: { filename: path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite') },
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useNullAsDefault: true,
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});
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await knex.schema.createTable('css_templates', (t) => {
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t.increments('id').primary();
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t.integer('slot_number');
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t.string('name');
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t.text('css_content');
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t.timestamp('updated_at');
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});
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await knex.schema.createTable('activity_logs', (t) => {
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t.increments('id').primary();
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t.string('activity_type');
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t.string('actor_type');
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t.text('metadata');
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t.timestamp('created_at').defaultTo(knex.fn.now());
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t.timestamp('read_at');
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});
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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if (knex) await knex.destroy();
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await fs.promises.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
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});
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beforeEach(async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').del();
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await knex('activity_logs').del();
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});
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const contentOf = async (name) =>
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(await knex('css_templates').where({ name }).first()).css_content;
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/** What a CSS parser sees — comments are discarded before parsing. */
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const asParsed = (css) => css.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '');
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it('removes a remote url() from a stored template', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 1, name: 'Tracked', css_content: WITH_REMOTE });
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await migration.up(knex);
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const css = await contentOf('Tracked');
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expect(asParsed(css)).not.toContain('tracker.example');
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// The rest of the stylesheet survives.
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expect(css).toContain('#111');
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expect(css).toContain('border-radius: 12px');
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});
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it('repairs a row left behind by the old inert marker', async () => {
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// The exact shape the broken sanitizer wrote: a comment that a parser
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// discards, followed by the live URL.
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 2, name: 'Legacy', css_content: LEGACY_MARKER });
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await migration.up(knex);
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const css = await contentOf('Legacy');
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expect(asParsed(css)).not.toContain('tracker.example');
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expect(css).not.toContain('BLOCKED URL');
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});
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it('leaves an inline data: image alone', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 3, name: 'Inline', css_content: WITH_DATA_URI });
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await migration.up(knex);
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expect(await contentOf('Inline')).toContain('');
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});
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it('does not touch a template that was already clean', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 4, name: 'Clean', css_content: ALREADY_CLEAN });
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await migration.up(knex);
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expect(await contentOf('Clean')).toBe(ALREADY_CLEAN);
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});
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it('names every repaired slot in an activity log entry', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert([
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{ slot_number: 1, name: 'Tracked', css_content: WITH_REMOTE },
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{ slot_number: 2, name: 'Legacy', css_content: LEGACY_MARKER },
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{ slot_number: 3, name: 'Clean', css_content: ALREADY_CLEAN },
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]);
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await migration.up(knex);
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const log = await knex('activity_logs')
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.where({ activity_type: 'css_template_remote_urls_removed' }).first();
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expect(log).toBeTruthy();
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const meta = JSON.parse(log.metadata);
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expect(meta.count).toBe(2);
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expect(meta.templates.map((t) => t.slot).sort()).toEqual([1, 2]);
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// Unread, so it surfaces in the admin notification bell.
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expect(log.read_at).toBeNull();
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});
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it('writes no notification when nothing needed repair', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 1, name: 'Clean', css_content: ALREADY_CLEAN });
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await migration.up(knex);
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expect(await knex('activity_logs').count({ c: '*' })).toEqual([{ c: 0 }]);
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});
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it('is idempotent — a re-run changes nothing and adds no second notification', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 1, name: 'Tracked', css_content: WITH_REMOTE });
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await migration.up(knex);
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const afterFirst = await contentOf('Tracked');
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await migration.up(knex);
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expect(await contentOf('Tracked')).toBe(afterFirst);
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expect(await knex('activity_logs').count({ c: '*' })).toEqual([{ c: 1 }]);
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});
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it('skips rows with no CSS at all', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 5, name: 'Empty', css_content: null });
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await expect(migration.up(knex)).resolves.not.toThrow();
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});
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it('no-ops on an install with no css_templates table', async () => {
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const bare = require('knex')({
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client: 'sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true,
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});
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await expect(migration.up(bare)).resolves.not.toThrow();
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await bare.destroy();
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});
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it('down() is a deliberate no-op', async () => {
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await knex('css_templates').insert({ slot_number: 1, name: 'Tracked', css_content: WITH_REMOTE });
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await migration.up(knex);
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const repaired = await contentOf('Tracked');
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await migration.down(knex);
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// A rollback must not silently re-introduce third-party requests into
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// pages served to visitors.
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expect(await contentOf('Tracked')).toBe(repaired);
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});
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});
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@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
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/**
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* cssSanitizer — remote url() removal.
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*
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* Regression: `sanitizeCSS` used to "block" a remote url() by prefixing it
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* with a `/* BLOCKED URL *\/` COMMENT and leaving the URL in place. CSS
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* comments are discarded during tokenization, so the declaration a browser
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* actually parsed still carried the live URL — while the returned warning
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* told the caller it had been blocked.
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*
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* The load-bearing assertion in most of these is therefore not "the marker is
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* gone" but "the HOST is gone", checked against the comment-stripped text the
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* way a parser would see it.
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*/
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const { sanitizeCSS, sanitizeCss, stripDisallowedUrls } = require('../../src/utils/cssSanitizer');
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/** What a CSS parser sees: comments are discarded before parsing. */
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const asParsed = (css) => css.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '');
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describe('stripDisallowedUrls', () => {
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it('removes a remote url() rather than commenting near it', () => {
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');
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expect(blocked).toBe(1);
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expect(sanitized).not.toContain('evil.example');
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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it.each([
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['unquoted', '.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
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['single-quoted', '.a{background:url(\'https://evil.example/p.gif\')}'],
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['double-quoted', '.a{background:url("https://evil.example/p.gif")}'],
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['spaced', '.a{background:url( https://evil.example/p.gif )}'],
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['uppercase URL(', '.a{background:URL(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
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['protocol-relative', '.a{background:url(//evil.example/p.gif)}'],
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['scheme-less host', '.a{background:url(evil.example/p.gif)}'],
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['http', '.a{background:url(http://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
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])('removes a %s remote url()', (_label, css) => {
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expect(asParsed(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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it('keeps an inline data: image', () => {
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const css = '.a{background:url()}';
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(blocked).toBe(0);
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expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
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});
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it.each(['jpeg', 'jpg', 'png', 'gif', 'webp'])('keeps a )}`;
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expect(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
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});
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it('removes a data: URI that is not a raster image', () => {
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// )}').sanitized;
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expect(out).not.toContain('svg+xml');
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});
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it('leaves the rest of a shorthand declaration intact', () => {
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const out = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:#fff url(https://x/p.gif) no-repeat center}').sanitized;
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expect(out).toContain('#fff');
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expect(out).toContain('no-repeat center');
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expect(out).toContain('none');
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expect(out).not.toContain('https://x');
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});
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it('counts and removes every offender in one stylesheet', () => {
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(
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'.a{background:url(https://a.example/1.gif)}'
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+ '.b{background:url(https://b.example/2.gif)}'
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+ '.c{background:url()}'
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);
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expect(blocked).toBe(2);
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expect(sanitized).not.toContain('a.example');
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expect(sanitized).not.toContain('b.example');
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expect(sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
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});
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// Codex review: `)` is ordinary content inside a QUOTED url(), so a pattern
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// that stops at the first `)` failed to match at all — reporting the token
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// as clean and storing it verbatim. A working bypass of the block.
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it.each([
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['double-quoted', '.a{background:url("https://evil.example/pixel).gif")}'],
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['single-quoted', ".a{background:url('https://evil.example/pixel).gif')}"],
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['several parens', '.a{background:url("https://evil.example/a)b)c.gif")}'],
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])('removes a %s remote url() containing a closing paren', (_label, css) => {
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(blocked).toBe(1);
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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it('keeps a QUOTED data: image, parens and all', () => {
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const css = '.a{background:url("")}';
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expect(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
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});
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it('does not swallow an unquoted url() that never closes', () => {
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// Malformed input must not eat the rest of the stylesheet.
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const css = '.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif}.b{color:red}';
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const { sanitized } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(sanitized).toContain('color:red');
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});
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// Round-2 review: three more ways a regex could not see CSS structure.
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it('blocks a url() hidden behind a CSS escape', () => {
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// `\\72` is a legal way to write `r`, so this IS url(...) to a browser.
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:u\\72l(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');
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expect(blocked).toBe(1);
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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it('leaves url()-looking text inside a CSS string alone', () => {
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// `content:` is inert display text, not a resource request. Rewriting it
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// is a visible change to a page that never fetched anything.
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const css = '.a::after{content:"url(https://docs.example)"}';
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(blocked).toBe(0);
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expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
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});
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it('does not treat a ) inside a quoted string as the end of a token', () => {
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const css = '.a::after{content:"a) b"}.c{background:url(https://evil.example/x.gif)}';
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const { sanitized } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(sanitized).toContain('content:"a) b"');
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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|
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// Round-3 review: all three came from decoding escapes globally before
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// scanning, which destroyed the difference between an escaped quote and a
|
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// real one — and rewrote clean escapes that were never URLs.
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it('does not let an escaped quote desynchronise the scan', () => {
|
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// `\\"` inside a double-quoted string does NOT close it. Treating it as a
|
||||
// delimiter put the scanner a quote out of phase and let the url() that
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// followed through untouched.
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const css = '.a{content:"foo\\"";background:url(https://evil.example/x)}';
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
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expect(blocked).toBe(1);
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||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not treat a quote inside a CSS comment as a string', () => {
|
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// A browser ignores the comment and makes the request; the scanner used
|
||||
// to enter string mode on the apostrophe and copy the rest unscanned.
|
||||
const css = "/* don't */ .a{background:url(https://evil.example/x)}";
|
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const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
|
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expect(blocked).toBe(1);
|
||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('leaves an escaped selector byte-identical', () => {
|
||||
// `.w-1\\/2` is an ordinary escaped Tailwind class. Global decoding
|
||||
// rewrote it to `.w-1/2` — a DIFFERENT selector — and migration 200 then
|
||||
// committed that irreversibly, since its down() is a no-op.
|
||||
const css = '.w-1\\/2{color:red}';
|
||||
const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
|
||||
expect(blocked).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('returns clean input unchanged, whatever escapes it carries', () => {
|
||||
// The migration only writes when the bytes differ, so "unchanged" is
|
||||
// what keeps a clean row out of the repair path entirely.
|
||||
for (const css of [
|
||||
'.a{color:red}',
|
||||
'/* a comment */ .b{color:blue}',
|
||||
'.c\\:hover{color:green}',
|
||||
'.d::after{content:"\\201C"}',
|
||||
'.e{background:url()}',
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
|
||||
expect(blocked).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('keeps a comment that merely mentions a url', () => {
|
||||
const css = '/* see url(https://docs.example) for details */ .a{color:red}';
|
||||
expect(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('is idempotent', () => {
|
||||
const once = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:url(https://x/p.gif)}').sanitized;
|
||||
expect(stripDisallowedUrls(once).sanitized).toBe(once);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('handles empty and nullish input', () => {
|
||||
expect(stripDisallowedUrls('').sanitized).toBe('');
|
||||
expect(stripDisallowedUrls(null).sanitized).toBe('');
|
||||
expect(stripDisallowedUrls(undefined).sanitized).toBe('');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('sanitizeCSS', () => {
|
||||
it('no longer emits an inert BLOCKED URL marker', () => {
|
||||
const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');
|
||||
|
||||
expect(sanitized).not.toContain('BLOCKED URL');
|
||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('warns with the number it actually removed', () => {
|
||||
const { warnings } = sanitizeCSS(
|
||||
'.a{background:url(https://a.example/1.gif)}.b{background:url(https://b.example/2.gif)}'
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(warnings.some((w) => /Blocked 2 external URL references/.test(w))).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not warn about URLs when there are none', () => {
|
||||
const { warnings } = sanitizeCSS('.a{color:red}');
|
||||
expect(warnings.filter((w) => /external URL/.test(w))).toHaveLength(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('blocks a url() that only becomes one after HTML comments are removed', () => {
|
||||
// The comment strip JOINS the remaining characters into a live url(...).
|
||||
// A scan that ran before it saw no token and called the input clean.
|
||||
const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:u<!--x-->rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');
|
||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('still blocks the other forbidden patterns', () => {
|
||||
const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
|
||||
'@import url("https://x/e.css"); .a{width:expression(alert(1));behavior:url(e.htc)}'
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(sanitized).not.toContain('@import');
|
||||
expect(sanitized).not.toContain('expression(');
|
||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('https://x/e.css');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('neutralises a javascript: url()', () => {
|
||||
const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(javascript:alert(1))}');
|
||||
expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('javascript:');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('leaves ordinary declarations untouched', () => {
|
||||
const css = '.btn { color: #fff; padding: 12px 24px; border-radius: 6px; }';
|
||||
expect(sanitizeCSS(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('sanitizeCss (lowercase) — public-site path, deliberately unchanged', () => {
|
||||
it('still permits a remote url()', () => {
|
||||
// This function never blocked remote URLs and never claimed to. The
|
||||
// public-site CSS surface may legitimately reference a remote font or
|
||||
// background; changing that is a product decision, not this bug fix.
|
||||
const out = sanitizeCss('.a{background:url(https://cdn.example/x.png)}');
|
||||
expect(out).toContain('https://cdn.example/x.png');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('still strips @import and javascript: urls', () => {
|
||||
expect(sanitizeCss('@import url("https://x/e.css"); .a{color:red}')).not.toContain('@import');
|
||||
expect(sanitizeCss('.a{background:url(\'javascript:alert(1)\')}')).not.toContain('javascript:');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Remove remote `url()` references from stored CSS templates.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* `sanitizeCSS` was supposed to block them on write. It didn't: it prefixed
|
||||
* the offending token with a `/* BLOCKED URL *\/` COMMENT and left the URL
|
||||
* in place. CSS comments are discarded during tokenization, so what a browser
|
||||
* parsed still carried the live URL:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* '.a{background:url(https://x/p.gif)}'
|
||||
* stored as '.a{background:/* BLOCKED URL *\/ url(https://x/p.gif)}'
|
||||
* parsed as '.a{background: url(https://x/p.gif)}'
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Meanwhile the route returned `sanitization_warnings: ["Blocked external URL
|
||||
* references..."]`, so the admin was told it had been stopped.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The sanitizer is fixed, but that only covers FUTURE writes. The public
|
||||
* render path (`gallery.js`, GET /gallery/:slug/css) serves
|
||||
* `css_templates.css_content` verbatim as text/css to gallery visitors — it
|
||||
* does not re-sanitize on read. So without this pass every template already
|
||||
* carrying a remote URL keeps serving it to every visitor forever, which is
|
||||
* exactly the population the fix exists for.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* WHY A MIGRATION AND NOT A BOOT SELF-HEAL: once the sanitizer is fixed, the
|
||||
* write path is the only way a bad row can appear, so there is nothing left
|
||||
* to self-heal. This is a one-time data correction and belongs in the ledger.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* IRREVERSIBLE BY DESIGN: `down()` cannot restore the removed URLs — the
|
||||
* original text is gone, and re-introducing third-party requests into pages
|
||||
* served to visitors is not something a rollback should do silently. It is a
|
||||
* no-op, deliberately.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* WHAT IT COSTS: a template using a remote background image has worked until
|
||||
* now (because the block was inert) and will stop. That is the point, but it
|
||||
* is a visible change, so every affected slot is named in an `activity_logs`
|
||||
* entry — which is what the admin notification bell reads — rather than
|
||||
* changing silently. Note the CSS is served with `Cache-Control: public,
|
||||
* max-age=3600`, so a visitor may hold a cached copy for up to an hour after
|
||||
* this runs.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Inline `data:image/*` URIs are untouched.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
const { stripDisallowedUrls } = require('../../src/utils/cssSanitizer');
|
||||
|
||||
exports.up = async function (knex) {
|
||||
if (!(await knex.schema.hasTable('css_templates'))) return;
|
||||
|
||||
const templates = await knex('css_templates')
|
||||
.whereNotNull('css_content')
|
||||
.select('id', 'slot_number', 'name', 'css_content');
|
||||
|
||||
const repaired = [];
|
||||
|
||||
for (const template of templates) {
|
||||
// ONLY the url() pass, not the whole of sanitizeCSS.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Re-running the full sanitizer would be the obvious move and is wrong:
|
||||
// it strips control characters, and `\n` is one — so every template would
|
||||
// come back as a single line. Migration 181 hit the same edge from the
|
||||
// other side. Reformatting every stylesheet in the install is far beyond
|
||||
// "remove the remote URLs", and it would land in the editor the operator
|
||||
// next opens.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The url() pass is also the ONLY thing that was broken: `@import`,
|
||||
// `expression(`, `behavior:` and friends were genuinely removed by the
|
||||
// old code. So the narrow fix is also the complete one.
|
||||
const { sanitized: urlSafe, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(template.css_content);
|
||||
|
||||
// Drop the stale marker the broken sanitizer left behind. Only rows that
|
||||
// carry one are touched, and by definition those are affected rows.
|
||||
const sanitized = urlSafe.replace(/\/\*\s*BLOCKED URL\s*\*\/\s*/gi, '');
|
||||
|
||||
if (blocked === 0 && sanitized === template.css_content) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
await knex('css_templates')
|
||||
.where({ id: template.id })
|
||||
.update({ css_content: sanitized, updated_at: knex.fn.now() });
|
||||
|
||||
repaired.push({
|
||||
slot: template.slot_number,
|
||||
name: template.name || `Slot ${template.slot_number}`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (repaired.length === 0) return;
|
||||
|
||||
console.log(
|
||||
`200: removed remote url() references from ${repaired.length} CSS template(s): `
|
||||
+ repaired.map((r) => `#${r.slot} ${r.name}`).join(', ')
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Surface it to the operator. Admin notifications ARE unread activity_logs
|
||||
// rows (adminNotifications.js reads that table), so this shows up in the
|
||||
// bell without a second mechanism. Written directly rather than through
|
||||
// logActivity() to keep the migration free of a service import.
|
||||
if (await knex.schema.hasTable('activity_logs')) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await knex('activity_logs').insert({
|
||||
activity_type: 'css_template_remote_urls_removed',
|
||||
actor_type: 'system',
|
||||
metadata: JSON.stringify({
|
||||
count: repaired.length,
|
||||
templates: repaired,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
// A notification is not worth failing the data correction over.
|
||||
console.log(`200: could not write the activity log entry (${err.message})`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
exports.down = async function () {
|
||||
// Intentionally a no-op — see the header.
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -29,8 +29,38 @@ const FORBIDDEN_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
/on\w+\s*=/gi, // onclick=, onload=, etc.
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
// Pattern for external URLs (block external, allow only safe raster data: images)
|
||||
const EXTERNAL_URL_PATTERN = /url\s*\(\s*["']?(?!data:image\/(?:jpeg|jpg|png|gif|webp))/gi;
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Decode CSS escape sequences.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* `\72` is a legal way to write `r`, so `u\72l(https://evil.example/x.gif)`
|
||||
* IS a url() to a browser while matching no literal pattern for "url(".
|
||||
* Decoding first means the scanner below sees what the browser will see. The
|
||||
* decoded form is what gets stored, which is safe: the same stylesheet,
|
||||
* spelled unambiguously.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Per CSS syntax: a backslash plus 1-6 hex digits and one optional trailing
|
||||
* whitespace, or a backslash plus any other single character.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function decodeCssEscapes(css) {
|
||||
return String(css).replace(
|
||||
/\\([0-9a-fA-F]{1,6})[ \t\n\f]?|\\([^0-9a-fA-F])/g,
|
||||
(match, hex, literal) => {
|
||||
if (hex) {
|
||||
const code = parseInt(hex, 16);
|
||||
// Null, out-of-range and surrogate escapes are invalid; leave them
|
||||
// exactly as written rather than throwing.
|
||||
if (!Number.isFinite(code) || code === 0 || code > 0x10FFFF
|
||||
|| (code >= 0xD800 && code <= 0xDFFF)) return match;
|
||||
return String.fromCodePoint(code);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return literal;
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The only target a url() may name: an inline raster data: image. Anything
|
||||
// else is a request to a third party from someone else's browser.
|
||||
const ALLOWED_URL_TARGET = /^data:image\/(?:jpeg|jpg|png|gif|webp)/i;
|
||||
|
||||
// Maximum CSS size in bytes (100KB)
|
||||
const MAX_CSS_SIZE = 100 * 1024;
|
||||
@@ -69,6 +99,163 @@ function sanitizeCss(css) {
|
||||
return sanitized.trim();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Replace every `url(...)` that does not name an inline data: image with the
|
||||
* inert keyword `none`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This REPLACES an earlier implementation that prefixed the offending token
|
||||
* with a `/* BLOCKED URL *\/` comment and left the URL in place. CSS comments
|
||||
* are discarded during tokenization, so the declaration a browser actually
|
||||
* parsed still carried the live URL — the "block" was inert, while the
|
||||
* warning returned to the caller said it had worked:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* before: '.a{background:url(https://x/p.gif)}'
|
||||
* → '.a{background:/* BLOCKED URL *\/ url(https://x/p.gif)}'
|
||||
* → parsed as '.a{background: url(https://x/p.gif)}'
|
||||
*
|
||||
* `none` is used rather than deleting the declaration because it is valid in
|
||||
* the shorthand positions these appear in (`background: #fff none no-repeat`)
|
||||
* and leaves the rest of the rule intact.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param {string} css
|
||||
* @returns {{ sanitized: string, blocked: number }}
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function stripDisallowedUrls(css) {
|
||||
const input = css == null ? '' : String(css);
|
||||
let out = '';
|
||||
let blocked = 0;
|
||||
let i = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
while (i < input.length) {
|
||||
// --- CSS comment ---------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Its own lexical state. A comment containing an unmatched apostrophe
|
||||
// (`/* don't */`) otherwise put the scanner into string mode and let it
|
||||
// copy the rest of the stylesheet — including a live url() — unscanned,
|
||||
// while a browser ignores the comment entirely and makes the request.
|
||||
if (input[i] === '/' && input[i + 1] === '*') {
|
||||
const close = input.indexOf('*/', i + 2);
|
||||
const stop = close === -1 ? input.length : close + 2;
|
||||
out += input.slice(i, stop);
|
||||
i = stop;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- string ----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Escape-aware: `\"` inside a double-quoted string does NOT close it.
|
||||
// Decoding escapes up front (an earlier attempt) turned that into a real
|
||||
// quote, desynchronised the scanner, and hid the url() that followed.
|
||||
if (input[i] === '"' || input[i] === '\'') {
|
||||
const quote = input[i];
|
||||
let j = i + 1;
|
||||
while (j < input.length) {
|
||||
if (input[j] === '\\') { j += 2; continue; }
|
||||
if (input[j] === quote) { j += 1; break; }
|
||||
j += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
out += input.slice(i, Math.min(j, input.length));
|
||||
i = Math.min(j, input.length);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- url( token --------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
const ident = readIdentifier(input, i);
|
||||
if (ident.end > i && decodeCssEscapes(ident.raw).toLowerCase() === 'url') {
|
||||
let j = ident.end;
|
||||
while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
|
||||
if (input[j] === '(') {
|
||||
const token = readUrlToken(input, j);
|
||||
if (token) {
|
||||
// The target is decoded only to DECIDE; the original bytes are what
|
||||
// gets emitted when it is allowed, so nothing else in the
|
||||
// stylesheet is rewritten.
|
||||
const target = decodeCssEscapes(token.target).trim();
|
||||
if (ALLOWED_URL_TARGET.test(target)) {
|
||||
out += input.slice(i, token.end);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
blocked += 1;
|
||||
out += 'none';
|
||||
}
|
||||
i = token.end;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Not actually a url() call — emit the identifier and carry on.
|
||||
out += input.slice(i, ident.end);
|
||||
i = ident.end;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out += input[i];
|
||||
i += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return { sanitized: out, blocked };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A CSS escape sequence at `start`, or null. */
|
||||
function matchEscape(input, start) {
|
||||
if (input[start] !== '\\') return null;
|
||||
const rest = input.slice(start, start + 8);
|
||||
const m = /^\\(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,6}[ \t\n\f]?|[^0-9a-fA-F])/.exec(rest);
|
||||
return m ? m[0] : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Read a CSS identifier, escapes included, WITHOUT decoding it.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* `u\72l` is a legal spelling of `url`, so the identifier has to be decoded
|
||||
* to be recognised — but only for the comparison. Returning the raw text
|
||||
* means an identifier that is not a url() (`.w-1\/2`, a perfectly ordinary
|
||||
* escaped Tailwind selector) is emitted byte-identical rather than silently
|
||||
* rewritten to `.w-1/2`, which is a different selector.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function readIdentifier(input, start) {
|
||||
let j = start;
|
||||
let raw = '';
|
||||
while (j < input.length) {
|
||||
const escape = matchEscape(input, j);
|
||||
if (escape) { raw += escape; j += escape.length; continue; }
|
||||
if (/[A-Za-z0-9_-]/.test(input[j])) { raw += input[j]; j += 1; continue; }
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { raw, end: j };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Read a `url( … )` token starting at the opening paren.
|
||||
* @returns {{ target: string, end: number }|null} null when unterminated.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function readUrlToken(input, openParen) {
|
||||
let j = openParen + 1;
|
||||
let target = '';
|
||||
while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (input[j] === '"' || input[j] === '\'') {
|
||||
// Quoted: the quote closes the value, so ")" inside it is content.
|
||||
const quote = input[j];
|
||||
j += 1;
|
||||
while (j < input.length && input[j] !== quote) {
|
||||
if (input[j] === '\\') { target += input.slice(j, j + 2); j += 2; continue; }
|
||||
target += input[j];
|
||||
j += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (j >= input.length) return null;
|
||||
j += 1;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
while (j < input.length && input[j] !== ')') {
|
||||
if (input[j] === '\\') { target += input.slice(j, j + 2); j += 2; continue; }
|
||||
target += input[j];
|
||||
j += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
|
||||
// Unterminated url( — malformed. Leave it alone rather than swallowing the
|
||||
// remainder of the stylesheet.
|
||||
if (input[j] !== ')') return null;
|
||||
return { target, end: j + 1 };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Enhanced CSS sanitization with warnings
|
||||
* @param {string} cssContent - Raw CSS content
|
||||
@@ -101,17 +288,24 @@ function sanitizeCSS(cssContent) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Block external URLs (only allow data: URIs for images)
|
||||
EXTERNAL_URL_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;
|
||||
if (EXTERNAL_URL_PATTERN.test(sanitized)) {
|
||||
warnings.push('Blocked external URL references. Only data: URIs are allowed for images.');
|
||||
EXTERNAL_URL_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;
|
||||
sanitized = sanitized.replace(EXTERNAL_URL_PATTERN, '/* BLOCKED URL */ url(');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Remove HTML comments that might be used for injection
|
||||
sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, '');
|
||||
|
||||
// URLs are scanned AFTER the comment strip, not before. Removing
|
||||
// `<!--x-->` from `u<!--x-->rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)` JOINS the
|
||||
// remaining characters into a live `url(...)` — so a scan that ran first
|
||||
// saw no token, reported the input clean, and the transformation below it
|
||||
// then produced exactly the request the scan was there to prevent. Any
|
||||
// pass that can join tokens has to happen before validation, not after.
|
||||
const urlPass = stripDisallowedUrls(sanitized);
|
||||
if (urlPass.blocked > 0) {
|
||||
warnings.push(
|
||||
`Blocked ${urlPass.blocked} external URL reference${urlPass.blocked === 1 ? '' : 's'}. `
|
||||
+ 'Only data: URIs are allowed for images.'
|
||||
);
|
||||
sanitized = urlPass.sanitized;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Remove control characters
|
||||
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- intentional: strips control chars from untrusted CSS
|
||||
sanitized = sanitized.replace(/[\u0000-\u001F\u007F]/g, '');
|
||||
@@ -168,6 +362,7 @@ function scopeToGalleryPage(cssContent) {
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
sanitizeCss,
|
||||
sanitizeCSS,
|
||||
stripDisallowedUrls,
|
||||
validateCSS,
|
||||
scopeToGalleryPage,
|
||||
MAX_CSS_SIZE
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3127,7 +3127,8 @@
|
||||
"bulkDeleteCompleted_one": "Massen-Löschung abgeschlossen: {{count}} Event entfernt",
|
||||
"bulkDeleteCompleted_other": "Massen-Löschung abgeschlossen: {{count}} Events entfernt",
|
||||
"bulkArchiveCompleted_one": "Massen-Archivierung abgeschlossen: {{count}} Event archiviert",
|
||||
"bulkArchiveCompleted_other": "Massen-Archivierung abgeschlossen: {{count}} Events archiviert"
|
||||
"bulkArchiveCompleted_other": "Massen-Archivierung abgeschlossen: {{count}} Events archiviert",
|
||||
"cssTemplateRemoteUrlsRemoved": "Externe URLs aus {{count}} CSS-Vorlage(n) entfernt — siehe Release Notes"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"notificationToasts": {
|
||||
"markedAllRead": "Alle Benachrichtigungen als gelesen markiert",
|
||||
@@ -3429,7 +3430,8 @@
|
||||
"whatsapp_config_updated": "WhatsApp-Konfiguration aktualisiert",
|
||||
"feature_flags_summary_one": "{{count}} Funktion aktualisiert: {{summary}}",
|
||||
"feature_flags_summary_other": "{{count}} Funktionen aktualisiert: {{summary}}",
|
||||
"feature_flags_updated": "Funktionseinstellungen aktualisiert"
|
||||
"feature_flags_updated": "Funktionseinstellungen aktualisiert",
|
||||
"css_template_remote_urls_removed": "Externe URLs aus {{count}} CSS-Vorlage(n) entfernt — siehe Release Notes"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"people": {
|
||||
"title": "Personen in dieser Galerie",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2657,7 +2657,8 @@
|
||||
"bulkDeleteCompleted_one": "Bulk delete completed: {{count}} event removed",
|
||||
"bulkDeleteCompleted_other": "Bulk delete completed: {{count}} events removed",
|
||||
"bulkArchiveCompleted_one": "Bulk archive completed: {{count}} event archived",
|
||||
"bulkArchiveCompleted_other": "Bulk archive completed: {{count}} events archived"
|
||||
"bulkArchiveCompleted_other": "Bulk archive completed: {{count}} events archived",
|
||||
"cssTemplateRemoteUrlsRemoved": "Remote URLs removed from {{count}} CSS template(s) — see the release notes"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"notificationToasts": {
|
||||
"markedAllRead": "All notifications marked as read",
|
||||
@@ -2961,7 +2962,8 @@
|
||||
"whatsapp_config_updated": "WhatsApp configuration updated",
|
||||
"feature_flags_summary_one": "{{count}} features updated: {{summary}}",
|
||||
"feature_flags_summary_other": "{{count}} features updated: {{summary}}",
|
||||
"feature_flags_updated": "Feature settings updated"
|
||||
"feature_flags_updated": "Feature settings updated",
|
||||
"css_template_remote_urls_removed": "Remote URLs removed from {{count}} CSS template(s) — see the release notes"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"people": {
|
||||
"title": "People in this gallery",
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user