Files
picpeak/backend/__tests__/routes/databaseBackupDestination.test.js
T
Paul Nothaft 3b88036fda fix(security): backup/restore hardening — public-dir DB dump, restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest keying (stable) (#962)
* fix(security): stop caller-chosen database backup destination (GHSA-jw8m)

POST /api/admin/database-backup/backup forwarded req.body straight into
databaseBackupService.backup(), which merges options over config:
  const { destinationPath = '/backup/database', ... } = { ...config, ...options }

destinationPath is not a persistable setting — the /config allowlist only
accepts database_backup_* keys — so the request body was its only source.
The built-in `admin` role holds backup.create but neither settings.edit nor
backup.restore, so it could aim a full DB dump (admin bcrypt hashes, gallery
password hashes, encrypted SMTP creds) at the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
(server.js mounts it with no auth middleware) and then fetch it
unauthenticated. Filed low; it is a privilege escalation to unauthenticated
disclosure.

Forward only the real knobs, and only when present so absent keys can't
override config defaults via spread.

* fix(security): backup/restore hardening — restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest checksum keying (GHSA-fw4c, h652, hgp8)

- adminRestore /validate + /start: constrain caller-supplied source and
  manifestPath to the operator-configured backup roots — the SAME set the
  restore wizard discovers from — so disaster recovery from a rescued mount
  still works, with RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS as an escape hatch (GHSA-fw4c).
- restoreService.decompressFile: bound the EXPANDED size and abort the
  pipeline when exceeded; default 50 GB, RESTORE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES
  overrides (GHSA-h652).
- backupManifest: BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY upgrades new manifests to a keyed
  HMAC (GHSA-hgp8). Deliberately opt-in and verify-if-present — the key
  cannot live in the database because the database is inside the backup, so
  a mandatory HMAC would lock operators out of the exact disaster-recovery
  case this exists for.

Also fixes a pre-existing bug found while testing hgp8: the checksum passed
Object.keys().sort() as JSON.stringify's second argument, which is an array
REPLACER (a property allowlist applied at every depth), not a key sorter. All
nested keys — path, size, per-file checksum — were dropped before hashing, so
the file list sat outside the integrity check entirely and a manifest path
could be rewritten to ../../etc/passwd without disturbing the digest. Now
hashes a recursively-canonicalized copy, with the legacy serialization
accepted on validation so existing backups stay restorable.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — unbreak the restore wizard, share checksum verification, guard downgrades

- adminRestore: `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE ('local'|'s3'|'upload'),
  not a path — restoreService branches on those literals. The containment
  check treated it as a path, so path.resolve('local') fell outside the
  backup roots and BOTH /validate and /start returned 400, blocking every
  normal restore. Type tokens are now excluded from the path check.
- backupManifest: extracted verifyManifestChecksum() as the single source of
  truth for the legacy/keyed fallbacks. restoreService.performPreRestoreValidation
  recomputed the digest itself with the default canonical+keyed settings,
  which rejected EVERY backup written before this batch. It now delegates.
- backupManifest: guard the algorithm downgrade — with a key configured, an
  attacker able to rewrite the backup store could strip checksum_algorithm,
  edit the manifest and recompute a plain SHA-256 that verified. Opt-in via
  BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED so pre-key backups keep restoring by default.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — close two manifest-verification fail-opens (GHSA-hgp8)

verifyManifestChecksum returned valid for a manifest with no
verification.total_checksum at all, and restoreService only called it when
that field was present. Deleting the field was therefore a complete bypass of
the keying work: no digest check, no downgrade guard, no
BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED. Every manifest this codebase writes stamps the
field, so an absent one now fails validation, and the call site invokes the
verifier unconditionally.

Second fail-open: the strict-mode rejection of an unkeyed manifest was gated on
`&& key`, so with BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED=true and no BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY
configured a plain SHA-256 manifest sailed through. Strict mode is a statement
about the operator's manifests, not about the host — it is exactly the fresh
disaster-recovery box that lacks the secret. The rejection no longer depends on
a key being present.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 292a5b784acd7f47099aa234c1c2ea00050fca97)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:18:43 +02:00

121 lines
4.5 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* Manual database backup must not honour a caller-supplied destination
* (GHSA-jw8m-43r2-jqrm).
*
* POST /api/admin/database-backup/backup forwarded req.body straight into
* databaseBackupService.backup(), which merges options over its config:
* const { destinationPath = '/backup/database', ... } = { ...config, ...options }
* `destinationPath` is not a persistable setting (the /config allowlist only
* accepts `database_backup_*` keys), so the request body was its ONLY source.
*
* The `admin` role holds backup.create but neither settings.edit nor
* backup.restore — so it could aim a full DB dump (bcrypt hashes, gallery
* password hashes, encrypted SMTP creds) at the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
* (server.js mounts it with no auth middleware) and fetch it unauthenticated.
*
* Pins that destinationPath from the body is ignored, while the legitimate
* knobs still pass through.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-dbbackup-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dbbackup-test-secret';
// Capture what the route hands the service; never run a real backup.
const mockBackup = jest.fn(async () => ({ success: true }));
jest.mock('../../src/services/databaseBackup', () => ({
databaseBackupService: {
get isRunning() { return false; },
backup: (...args) => mockBackup(...args),
},
}));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('manual database backup destination (GHSA-jw8m)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let app; let adminToken;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
const role = await db('roles').where({ name: 'admin' }).first();
const r = await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'limited-admin',
email: 'limited-admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash('Passw0rd!', 4),
role_id: role.id,
is_active: 1,
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
const id = r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
adminToken = jwt.sign(
{ id, username: 'limited-admin', type: 'admin', role: 'admin', loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' },
);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/admin/database-backup', require('../../src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
beforeEach(() => mockBackup.mockClear());
it('ignores a caller-supplied destinationPath', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({ destinationPath: '/app/storage/uploads' });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// Give the fire-and-forget call a tick to land.
await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
expect(mockBackup).toHaveBeenCalled();
const opts = mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(opts).not.toHaveProperty('destinationPath');
expect(JSON.stringify(opts)).not.toContain('uploads');
});
it('still forwards the legitimate backup knobs', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({ compress: false, validateIntegrity: false, destinationPath: '/tmp/evil' });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
const opts = mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(opts.compress).toBe(false);
expect(opts.validateIntegrity).toBe(false);
expect(opts).not.toHaveProperty('destinationPath');
});
it('omits absent knobs entirely so service/config defaults still apply', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/admin/database-backup/backup')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${adminToken}`)
.send({});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
// An explicit `{compress: undefined}` would override config on spread —
// absent keys must simply not be present.
expect(mockBackup.mock.calls[0][0]).toEqual({});
});
});