Files
picpeak/backend/__tests__/services/usageExportReceipt.test.js
T
Paul Nothaft 1e8b6f1b0f fix(usage): close the QA findings on opt-in product usage
A QA exploration of this branch against an isolated rig — own stub
collector, SQLite and PostgreSQL — turned up one dead end and a set of
signals and controls that did not hold up. This closes all of them.

Rotating JWT_SECRET, the documented response to a suspected compromise,
made the signing key unreadable. That was already named and documented,
but it left no way out: the delete packet can never be signed, so the
row stays deletion_pending forever, and enable() refuses because it is
not `disabled`. An operator who rotated precisely because the secret was
compromised cannot restore it, so the feature was bricked with no
control left. POST /usage/abandon is offered only in that state; it
drops the local identity and records the receipt as
`collector-unconfirmed` rather than claiming a deletion that did not
happen.

Every failed delivery was retried on the next admin request, and
/activity is open to any authenticated admin while the settings ticker
fires it every five minutes per open tab — 30 activity calls against a
rejecting collector produced 30 outbound requests. Migration 206 adds
attempts/next_attempt_at and the unattended sender honours the gate;
Retry and opt-out still send immediately, and the tab names the time of
the next automatic attempt.

Feedback, votes and portal sessions now share an installation-wide
budget of 30/hour. They are the only endpoints whose effect is outbound
traffic carrying operator-written free text, and the general limiter
skips authenticated requests by design. Reading status and withdrawing
stay unthrottled.

gallery_image_protection was true on a bare install with no galleries:
PicPeak ships default_protection_level='standard' and
enable_devtools_protection=true, so it reported fleet-wide 100% and
could never separate a decision from an untouched default. It now reads
only what deviates from the shipped defaults, and the devtools flag is
not read at all — being on by default, its only informative state is
off, which is the opposite of what the key claims.

Also:
- the export receipt counted every packet and called the total "usage
  reports"; reports and participant operations are now counted and named
  separately
- GET /usage/preview no longer persists the custom_css marker, so the
  transparency view stops changing what will be sent
- the feedback route requires every field the packet schema requires,
  so an API caller gets the missing field named instead of a bare
  INVALID_PACKET from inside signing
- the German strings for this feature use "Sie" throughout, matching the
  rest of the admin UI; the ignore hint says what ignoring will do
  rather than stating it as already true
- the consent dialog returns focus to the control that opened it
- the long buttons wrap instead of running off a 390px viewport
- a deletion receipt is labelled as belonging to an earlier
  participation while a new one is active

Regression tests cover each of these, including the delete packet's
reuse of the last accepted sequence, which was an unwritten assumption
about the collector rather than a defect.
2026-09-06 17:40:43 +02:00

148 lines
5.5 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* Two things the participant is entitled to have stated exactly.
*
* The export receipt is a privacy document — the artefact an operator shows a
* third party — so a count in it has to mean what its label says. It counted
* every packet in the participation (feedback, votes, portal sessions, the
* registration) and called the total "usage reports": an install that had sent
* one report and twenty feedback items reported twenty-one reports.
*
* The delete packet's sequence is the other: it reuses the last ACCEPTED
* sequence rather than taking the next one, unlike every other action. That is
* a contract with the collector, not an implementation detail — if the
* collector ever enforced strictly increasing sequences per installation, the
* withdrawal would be rejected forever and the operator could never leave. It
* is pinned here so the assumption is written down and a change to it has to
* be deliberate.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
const { UsageService } = require('../../src/usage/UsageService');
const { generateIdentity, verifyEnvelope } = require('../../src/usage/protocol.cjs');
const SECRET = 's'.repeat(48);
async function bootDb() {
const db = knex({
client: 'sqlite3',
connection: { filename: ':memory:' },
useNullAsDefault: true,
});
await db.schema.createTable('product_usage_state', (t) => {
t.integer('id').primary();
t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v2');
t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
t.string('installation_id', 64);
t.string('public_key', 59);
t.text('private_key_encrypted');
t.string('instance_binding', 64);
t.bigInteger('sequence').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.text('pending_packet');
t.text('last_packet');
t.text('last_receipt');
t.text('privacy_receipts');
t.string('last_report_date', 10);
t.string('last_error', 80);
t.text('feedback_preferences');
t.string('lease_token', 36);
t.bigInteger('lease_until').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.bigInteger('cancel_seq').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.integer('attempts').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.bigInteger('next_attempt_at').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
});
await db('product_usage_state').insert({ id: 1 });
await db.schema.createTable('product_usage_markers', (t) => t.string('feature', 60).primary());
return db;
}
const envelope = (action) => ({ packet: { action, installation_id: 'a'.repeat(64) } });
describe('the export receipt states what it actually counted', () => {
let db;
afterEach(async () => { if (db) await db.destroy(); db = null; });
const exportWith = async (packets) => {
db = await bootDb();
await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
status: 'active',
installation_id: 'a'.repeat(64),
});
const service = new UsageService(db, {
secret: SECRET,
endpoint: 'https://usage.example.test',
now: () => Date.parse('2026-09-06T12:00:00.000Z'),
fetch: async () => ({
ok: true,
headers: { get: () => null },
body: (async function* () {
yield Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ installation_id: 'a'.repeat(64), packets }));
})(),
}),
});
await service.export();
return JSON.parse((await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).first()).privacy_receipts)
.last_export;
};
it('counts reports as reports and everything else separately', async () => {
const receipt = await exportWith([
envelope('register'),
envelope('report'),
envelope('consent'),
envelope('feedback'),
envelope('feedback'),
envelope('vote'),
envelope('session'),
]);
expect(receipt.report_count).toBe(1);
expect(receipt.packet_count).toBe(7);
expect(receipt.scope).toEqual([
'accepted usage reports',
'accepted participant operations',
]);
});
it('reports zero rather than a total when no report was ever accepted', async () => {
const receipt = await exportWith([envelope('register'), envelope('feedback')]);
expect(receipt.report_count).toBe(0);
expect(receipt.packet_count).toBe(2);
});
});
describe('the delete packet reuses the last accepted sequence', () => {
let db;
afterEach(async () => { if (db) await db.destroy(); db = null; });
it('sends the accepted sequence, not the next one', async () => {
db = await bootDb();
const identity = generateIdentity();
const sent = [];
const service = new UsageService(db, {
secret: SECRET,
endpoint: 'https://usage.example.test',
now: () => Date.parse('2026-09-06T12:00:00.000Z'),
bindingPath: `${require('os').tmpdir()}/usage-delete-seq-${Date.now()}.key`,
fetch: async (_url, options) => {
const body = JSON.parse(options.body);
sent.push(verifyEnvelope(body, Date.parse('2026-09-06T12:00:00.000Z')));
// Deliberately not a sequence-enforcing collector: this test pins what
// PicPeak sends, and the collector contract is what must match it.
throw new Error('stop after capturing the packet');
},
});
await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
status: 'deletion_pending',
installation_id: identity.installation_id,
public_key: identity.public_key,
private_key_encrypted: service.encrypt(identity.private_key),
sequence: 7,
});
await service.tick({ force: true });
expect(sent).toHaveLength(1);
expect(sent[0].action).toBe('delete');
expect(sent[0].sequence).toBe(7);
});
});