Files
picpeak/backend/__tests__/services/emailIntakeCaps.test.js
T
Paul Nothaft 1b4e5fee3e fix(security): bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (GHSA-2qf9, pgmp, r794) (#959)
* fix(security): bound inbound-mail resources, redact secrets from logs (GHSA-2qf9, pgmp, r794)

GHSA-2qf9 — emailIntakeService downloaded, parsed and persisted every message
with no size, attachment-count or attachment-byte limit, reachable
unauthenticated by anyone who can email the operator's mailbox:
- fetch the envelope with `size` (same cheap pass) and refuse an oversized
  message BEFORE downloading its source;
- cap attachment count and cumulative attachment bytes;
- limits env-overridable, defaults generous for real supplier invoices.

The teeth were in the dedup key. received_emails.message_id is varchar(512)
UNIQUE, and the failure path wrote `err-<uid>-<Date.now()>`, which can never
match the envelope-derived messageId the dedup pass compares against — so an
oversized (or overlong-Message-ID) mail was re-downloaded every poll forever,
and an OOM-kill/restart just resumed the loop. Size-skips are now recorded
under the REAL message id, and overlong ids collapse to a stable sha256 key
that always fits the column.

GHSA-pgmp / r794 — new sanitizeForLog() util (key-name deny-set, recursive,
cycle-safe) applied to the three request-body log sites in adminEvents/crud.js,
plus sanitizeValidationErrors() because express-validator's errors.array()
embeds the SUBMITTED value per field — a rejected plaintext password was still
logged. Scope is wider than filed: the update path also logged
client_password_hash and a LIVE client_share_token bearer credential.

Also: the one-time setup token was logged at warn AND printed to stdout on
every first boot, putting a live first-admin credential in combined.log,
security.log and `docker logs`. It is now written to the 0600 token file and
only surfaced when that write fails — the last-resort path it existed for.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — repair the first-run token recovery flow (GHSA-r794)

Two regressions from keeping the setup token out of the logs.

1. server.js decided whether to print the token by calling existsSync() on the
   candidate path. That answers a different question than "did the write
   succeed": a stale, read-only or directory-shaped SETUP_TOKEN reports as
   present, so the banner suppressed the live token and pointed the operator at
   content that is not it — leaving the current token only in combined.log
   under default production logging. setupService now records the path the
   write actually produced and exposes it via writtenSetupTokenFile().

2. The setup screen, its EN/DE strings, README, SIMPLE_SETUP and .env.example
   all still told first-time users to run
   `docker compose logs backend | grep -i "setup token"`. On the normal path
   that command now returns a path banner and no credential, so the documented
   browser-first onboarding could not be completed. They now point at
   `docker compose exec backend cat /app/data/SETUP_TOKEN`, with the log
   fallback described as what it is — the failure path.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-02 21:17:11 +02:00

128 lines
4.5 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* Inbound-mail resource caps (GHSA-2qf9).
*
* emailIntakeService downloaded, parsed and persisted every message with no
* size, attachment-count or attachment-byte limit. Anyone who can email the
* operator's mailbox reaches this path unauthenticated.
*
* The teeth were in the dedup key: on failure the service wrote an error row
* keyed `err-<uid>-<Date.now()>`, which can never match the envelope-derived
* `messageId` the dedup pass compares against. So the same oversized message
* was re-downloaded every poll interval forever — and an OOM-kill/restart just
* resumed the loop. This pins that an over-limit message is (a) never
* downloaded and (b) recorded under its REAL message id so it dedups.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-intake-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'intake-test-secret';
process.env.EMAIL_INTAKE_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES = '1000';
const OVERSIZED_UID = 11;
const NORMAL_UID = 12;
const OVERSIZED_MSGID = '<huge@example.com>';
const fetchOneCalls = [];
jest.mock('imapflow', () => ({
ImapFlow: class {
async connect() {}
async logout() {}
async getMailboxLock() { return { release() {} }; }
async search() { return [OVERSIZED_UID, NORMAL_UID]; }
// Envelope pass now also returns `size`.
async *fetch() {
yield { uid: OVERSIZED_UID, size: 50_000, envelope: { messageId: OVERSIZED_MSGID } };
yield { uid: NORMAL_UID, size: 500, envelope: { messageId: '<ok@example.com>' } };
}
async fetchOne(uid) {
fetchOneCalls.push(String(uid));
return { source: Buffer.from('Subject: ok\r\n\r\nbody') };
}
async messageFlagsAdd() { return true; }
},
}));
jest.mock('mailparser', () => ({
simpleParser: async () => ({
messageId: '<ok@example.com>',
subject: 'ok',
date: new Date(),
attachments: [],
text: 'body',
html: null,
}),
}));
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('email intake caps (GHSA-2qf9)', () => {
let db; let cleanup; let intake;
let pollResult;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
// pollOnce short-circuits unless the feature flag is on AND an IMAP
// account is configured — without both, this suite would pass vacuously.
await db('feature_flags')
.insert({ key: 'incomingMail', value: 1 })
.onConflict('key').merge({ value: 1 });
// getImapConfig() reads email_configs.first() — seedMinimal may already
// have inserted a row, so update that one rather than adding a second
// (the first row would win and report "unconfigured").
const imapFields = {
imap_host: 'imap.example.com',
imap_user: 'intake@example.com',
imap_pass: 'x',
imap_folder: 'INBOX',
};
const existingCfg = await db('email_configs').first();
if (existingCfg) {
await db('email_configs').where({ id: existingCfg.id }).update(imapFields);
} else {
await db('email_configs').insert({
smtp_host: 'smtp.example.com',
smtp_port: 587,
from_email: 'intake@example.com',
...imapFields,
});
}
intake = require('../../src/services/emailIntakeService');
pollResult = await intake.pollOnce().catch((e) => ({ thrown: e.message }));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('actually ran the poll (guards against a vacuous suite)', () => {
expect(pollResult).toBeDefined();
expect(pollResult.skipped).toBeUndefined();
});
it('never downloads a message whose envelope size exceeds the cap', () => {
// The oversized uid must never reach fetchOne (the source download) —
// that download is the DoS. The normal one must still be processed.
expect(fetchOneCalls).not.toContain(String(OVERSIZED_UID));
expect(fetchOneCalls).toContain(String(NORMAL_UID));
});
it('records the skip under the REAL message id so it dedups next poll', async () => {
const row = await db('received_emails').where({ message_id: OVERSIZED_MSGID }).first();
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(row.status).toBe('error');
expect(String(row.error)).toMatch(/too large/i);
// The whole point: keyed by messageId, NOT err-<uid>-<timestamp>, which
// could never match the dedup pass and so looped forever.
expect(row.message_id).not.toMatch(/^err-/);
});
});