Security hardening for inbound supplier-invoice previews. The admin UI no
longer renders raw PDFs — a malicious inbound PDF could otherwise run embedded
JS or phone home in the admin's session. Instead PDFs are rasterised to flat
PNGs server-side and only those images are shown.
- backend: new rasterizeService shells out to poppler `pdftoppm` (added to the
Docker image via apk poppler-utils — an OS package, NOT a Node PDF lib, so it
respects the pdfkit+pdf-lib "no third PDF lib" rule). pdftoppm executes no JS
and fetches no remote resources, so it doubles as the SSRF/phone-home guard.
Rendered pages cached under storage/business-docs/inbound/rendered/<id>/.
- GET /inbound/:id/page/:n streams the rasterised PNG (CSP default-src 'none'
+ nosniff). GET /inbound/:id/file now serves PDFs as a DOWNLOAD only
(Content-Disposition: attachment) — never inline; images still inline.
- frontend: triage preview switched from a raw-PDF <iframe> to rasterised page
images (getInboundPageBlob), defaulting to the LAST page (QR-bill) with
prev/next nav for multi-page PDFs; images stream as before.
- i18n: previewError / prevPage / nextPage / pageOf (EN + DE).
REQUIRES A BACKEND IMAGE REBUILD (Dockerfile adds poppler-utils) — a plain
`docker compose pull` of a stale image won't have pdftoppm; the route then
returns 503 RASTERIZER_UNAVAILABLE and the UI shows "preview unavailable".
Verified: node -c, a pdfkit->pdftoppm rasterise smoke test (renders + caches),
en/de JSON valid, npm run build green.