Files
picpeak/frontend/Dockerfile.dev
T
Paul Nothaft 6b6191a426 fix(security): scan triage cleanup — drop dead deps, harden Docker/nginx/postMessage
Triage of an external SAST/SCA scan run on 2026-05-06. Most loud findings
were already resolved by PR #412 (the 18-CVE backport); this PR addresses
the residual real items:

* Drop unused `handlebars` from backend deps. The runtime require was
  removed in PR #367 (#367) but the package.json line stayed. handlebars
  was the source of two flagged criticals (CVE-2026-33937 RCE,
  GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q AST injection) plus 8 highs — all now gone.

* `npm audit fix` on backend + frontend. Bumps transitive picomatch,
  flatted, postcss, brace-expansion via lockfile, and direct dompurify,
  lodash, vite, i18next-http-backend within their existing semver ranges.
  Both audits now report 0 vulnerabilities.

* Add `event.origin === window.location.origin` check to the THEME_PREVIEW
  message listener in PreviewPage. The branding page posts from the same
  origin, so nothing legitimate is rejected; without the check, any third
  party that window.open()'d the preview could push arbitrary
  branding/theme payloads (semgrep
  insufficient-postmessage-origin-validation).

* nginx: `proxy_hide_header` for X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options,
  Referrer-Policy, Content-Security-Policy, Permissions-Policy,
  Strict-Transport-Security at server level. nginx adds these itself, but
  helmet on the backend was also emitting them — clients were seeing
  duplicates (testssl flagged "Multiple X-Frame-Options / CSP /
  Permissions-Policy / Referrer-Policy headers" on the live origin).
  Single source of truth now.

* Dockerfile hardening (checkov):
  - HEALTHCHECK on backend/Dockerfile, backend/Dockerfile.dev,
    frontend/Dockerfile.dev. Frontend production Dockerfile already had
    one.
  - USER node in frontend/Dockerfile.dev (was running as root).

* GitHub Actions docker-build.yml: explicit top-level
  `permissions: contents: read`. Per-job blocks already declare
  `packages: write` where needed; this stops future steps from
  inheriting unintended privileges (CKV2_GHA_1).

Backend npm audit: 4 vulns -> 0.
Frontend npm audit: 6 vulns -> 0.
Backend unit tests: 13 suites, 131/132 passing (1 pre-existing skip).
Frontend type-check + lint: clean.

The pre-existing integration-test failures (live DB / S3 required) and
the ThemeCustomizerEnhanced QueryClientProvider failures are unrelated
and reproduce on origin/beta without these changes.
2026-05-07 22:31:51 +02:00

32 lines
905 B
Docker

# Dockerfile.dev - Development configuration for frontend
FROM node:20-alpine
WORKDIR /app
# Upgrade all packages to fix security vulnerabilities (BusyBox CVEs)
RUN apk upgrade --no-cache
# Copy package files
COPY package*.json ./
# Install dependencies
RUN npm ci --legacy-peer-deps
# Copy source code
COPY . .
# Run as non-root: the node:alpine image ships a `node` user (uid 1000).
RUN chown -R node:node /app
USER node
# Expose the development server port
EXPOSE 3005
# Vite returns 200 on '/' once it's serving the SPA — good enough for a
# liveness probe in dev. start-period is long because cold dep-optimize on
# first run can take 20-30s.
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=60s --retries=3 \
CMD wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:3005/ || exit 1
# Start development server
CMD ["npm", "run", "dev", "--", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "3005"]