Files
picpeak/backend/src/utils/fileSecurityUtils.js
T
Paul Nothaft be2ec0a4a1 feat(uploads): DNG / camera-RAW support via embedded-preview extraction (#821)
Sharp's bundled libvips has no raw loader, so a DNG can't be thumbnailed
directly. This adds a preview-extraction step so RAW/DNG uploads get a proper
thumbnail + gallery preview while the original RAW is kept for download.

- imageProcessor: isRawFilename() + extractRawPreview() (exiftool extracts the
  embedded full-res JPEG — JpgFromRaw → PreviewImage → ThumbnailImage, validated
  with sharp) + withProcessableImage() which is a pass-through for ordinary
  images and swaps in the extracted JPEG for RAW. Wired into ingest
  (photoProcessor) and all three on-demand generators (ensureThumbnail/Hero/
  Preview). generateHeroImage/generatePreviewImage gained outputBasename so
  RAW-derived outputs stay named after the source.
- Dockerfile: add exiftool (confirmed present in Alpine v3.24 community).
- Format maps: dng → image/x-adobe-dng in uploadSettings.js and fileTypes.ts;
  ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES gains a DNG entry (TIFF magic numbers) so it passes the
  security file-validator.

Strictly gated by extension: nothing in this path runs for jpg/png/webp/etc, so
existing photos are unaffected. If extraction fails (corrupt RAW, no embedded
preview), the photo is marked 'failed' with a clear error — same as any
unreadable upload.

Verification boundary (please validate on a real DNG after the image rebuilds):
the exiftool extraction itself couldn't be exercised in the dev sandbox
(exiftool isn't a dev dependency and there's no DNG fixture). Unit tests cover
the gating (RAW detection + non-RAW pass-through + clean failure without
exiftool); existing processPhoto tests still pass. Known limitation: a DNG is
only accepted when the browser reports its MIME as image/x-adobe-dng (Chrome
does); browsers that send an empty type reject it client- and server-side —
a follow-up can add extension-based acceptance for the RAW set.

Companion to the HEIC/dynamic-hint PR; targets main only.
2026-07-17 21:51:21 +02:00

283 lines
8.4 KiB
JavaScript

const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const logger = require('./logger');
/**
* Secure file security utilities to prevent path traversal and validate file types
*/
/**
* Safely join paths and prevent directory traversal attacks
* @param {string} basePath - The base directory path
* @param {string} userPath - The user-provided path to join
* @returns {string} - Safe joined path
* @throws {Error} - If path traversal is detected
*/
function safePathJoin(basePath, userPath) {
// Normalize the base path
const normalizedBase = path.resolve(basePath);
// Join and resolve the full path
const joinedPath = path.join(normalizedBase, userPath);
const resolvedPath = path.resolve(joinedPath);
// Ensure the resolved path starts with the base path
if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(normalizedBase + path.sep) && resolvedPath !== normalizedBase) {
throw new Error('Path traversal attempt detected');
}
return resolvedPath;
}
/**
* Validate file path to prevent directory traversal
* @param {string} filePath - The file path to validate
* @returns {boolean} - True if path is safe
*/
function isPathSafe(filePath) {
// Check for common path traversal patterns
const dangerousPatterns = [
/\.\.[\/\\]/, // ../ or ..\
/^[A-Za-z]:/, // Windows drive letters
/[\x00-\x1f]/ // Control characters
];
return !dangerousPatterns.some(pattern => pattern.test(filePath));
}
/**
* Enhanced MIME type validation for images and videos
*/
const ALLOWED_IMAGE_TYPES = {
'image/jpeg': {
extensions: ['.jpg', '.jpeg'],
magicNumbers: [
{ offset: 0, bytes: [0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF] } // JPEG
]
},
'image/png': {
extensions: ['.png'],
magicNumbers: [
{ offset: 0, bytes: [0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A] } // PNG
]
},
'image/webp': {
extensions: ['.webp'],
magicNumbers: [
{ offset: 0, bytes: [0x52, 0x49, 0x46, 0x46] }, // RIFF
{ offset: 8, bytes: [0x57, 0x45, 0x42, 0x50] } // WEBP
]
},
'image/gif': {
extensions: ['.gif'],
magicNumbers: [
{ offset: 0, bytes: [0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38, 0x37, 0x61] }, // GIF87a
{ offset: 0, bytes: [0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38, 0x39, 0x61] } // GIF89a
]
},
'image/svg+xml': {
extensions: ['.svg'],
// SVG files are XML-based text files, so we skip magic number validation
magicNumbers: null
},
// Camera RAW / Apple ProRAW (#821). DNG is a TIFF container, so it carries the
// TIFF magic (little-endian "II*\0" or big-endian "MM\0*"). The pipeline can't
// sharp-decode it directly — it extracts the embedded JPEG preview (exiftool)
// for thumbnails/display while storing the original for download. Only reached
// when an admin adds `dng` to the allowed types AND the browser reports the
// DNG MIME (Chrome does; browsers that send an empty type won't get this far).
'image/x-adobe-dng': {
extensions: ['.dng'],
magicNumbers: [
{ offset: 0, bytes: [0x49, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x00] }, // little-endian TIFF (II*\0)
{ offset: 0, bytes: [0x4D, 0x4D, 0x00, 0x2A] } // big-endian TIFF (MM\0*)
]
}
};
const ALLOWED_VIDEO_TYPES = {
'video/mp4': {
extensions: ['.mp4', '.m4v'],
magicNumbers: [
{ offset: 4, bytes: [0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70] } // 'ftyp' signature for MP4
]
},
'video/webm': {
extensions: ['.webm'],
magicNumbers: [
{ offset: 0, bytes: [0x1A, 0x45, 0xDF, 0xA3] } // EBML header for WebM/MKV
]
},
'video/quicktime': {
extensions: ['.mov'],
magicNumbers: [
{ offset: 4, bytes: [0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, 0x71, 0x74] } // 'ftypqt' signature for QuickTime
]
},
'video/x-msvideo': {
extensions: ['.avi'],
magicNumbers: [
{ offset: 0, bytes: [0x52, 0x49, 0x46, 0x46] }, // RIFF
{ offset: 8, bytes: [0x41, 0x56, 0x49, 0x20] } // 'AVI '
]
}
};
// Combined media types
const ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES = {
...ALLOWED_IMAGE_TYPES,
...ALLOWED_VIDEO_TYPES
};
/**
* Validate file type by MIME type and extension
* @param {string} filename - The filename
* @param {string} mimetype - The MIME type
* @param {string[]} allowedTypes - Array of allowed MIME types
* @returns {boolean} - True if file type is valid
*/
function validateFileType(filename, mimetype, allowedTypes) {
// Check if MIME type is allowed
if (!allowedTypes.includes(mimetype)) {
return false;
}
// Get file extension
const ext = path.extname(filename).toLowerCase();
// Check if extension matches the MIME type
const typeConfig = ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES[mimetype];
if (!typeConfig || !typeConfig.extensions.includes(ext)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Validate file content by checking magic numbers (file signatures)
* @param {string} filePath - Path to the file
* @param {string} expectedMimeType - Expected MIME type
* @returns {Promise<boolean>} - True if file content matches expected type
*/
async function validateFileContent(filePath, expectedMimeType) {
try {
const typeConfig = ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES[expectedMimeType];
if (!typeConfig) {
return false;
}
// Skip validation for file types without magic numbers (like SVG)
if (!typeConfig.magicNumbers) {
return true;
}
// Read the first 20 bytes of the file (enough for most magic numbers)
const buffer = Buffer.alloc(20);
const fileHandle = await fs.open(filePath, 'r');
await fileHandle.read(buffer, 0, 20, 0);
await fileHandle.close();
// Check magic numbers
return typeConfig.magicNumbers.every(magic => {
for (let i = 0; i < magic.bytes.length; i++) {
if (buffer[magic.offset + i] !== magic.bytes[i]) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error validating file content:', error);
return false;
}
}
/**
* Get safe filename for storage
* @param {string} originalFilename - Original filename
* @returns {string} - Safe filename
*/
function getSafeFilename(originalFilename) {
const timestamp = Date.now();
const randomString = Math.random().toString(36).substring(2, 15);
const ext = path.extname(originalFilename).toLowerCase();
// Validate extension - including both image and video extensions
const validExtensions = ['.jpg', '.jpeg', '.png', '.webp', '.gif', '.svg', '.ico', '.mp4', '.m4v', '.webm', '.mov', '.avi'];
if (!validExtensions.includes(ext)) {
throw new Error('Invalid file extension');
}
return `upload_${timestamp}_${randomString}${ext}`;
}
/**
* Create a file upload validator middleware
* @param {Object} options - Validation options
* @returns {Function} - Express middleware function
*/
function createFileUploadValidator(options = {}) {
const {
allowedTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'],
maxFileSize = 50 * 1024 * 1024, // 50MB default
validateContent = true
} = options;
return async (req, res, next) => {
try {
if (!req.files || req.files.length === 0) {
return next();
}
for (const file of req.files) {
// Validate file type
if (!validateFileType(file.originalname, file.mimetype, allowedTypes)) {
return res.status(400).json({
error: `Invalid file type: ${file.originalname}. Allowed types: ${allowedTypes.join(', ')}`
});
}
// Validate file size
if (file.size > maxFileSize) {
return res.status(400).json({
error: `File too large: ${file.originalname}. Maximum size: ${maxFileSize / 1024 / 1024}MB`
});
}
// Validate file content if enabled
if (validateContent && file.path) {
const isValidContent = await validateFileContent(file.path, file.mimetype);
if (!isValidContent) {
// Remove the file if content doesn't match
try {
await fs.unlink(file.path);
} catch (err) {
logger.error('Error removing invalid file:', err);
}
return res.status(400).json({
error: `File content does not match declared type: ${file.originalname}`
});
}
}
}
next();
} catch (error) {
logger.error('File validation error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'File validation failed' });
}
};
}
module.exports = {
safePathJoin,
isPathSafe,
validateFileType,
validateFileContent,
getSafeFilename,
createFileUploadValidator,
ALLOWED_IMAGE_TYPES,
ALLOWED_VIDEO_TYPES,
ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES
};