Files
picpeak/frontend
Paul Nothaft b00a16159e fix(security): harden .picpeak restore operator-preservation (GHSA-qxfx follow-up)
The req.admin.id fix activated reinjectCurrentAdmin(); hardening its preservation
logic (found across Codex review rounds of #811):

- MFA hijack: reinject wrote back only password_hash/is_active/
  must_change_password, leaving a crafted backup's two_factor_* on the
  operator's row — it could strip or replace their second factor. The email-
  matched row is now updated with the operator's full AUTH set (login identity,
  password, and all two_factor_* columns). Relationship/audit FKs (role_id,
  created_by) are deliberately NOT forced from the snapshot: on a cross-instance
  restore those pre-restore ids may be absent from the backup and would dangle
  the FK (SQLite rolls back at commit); the restored row keeps its own valid
  values.

- Cross-instance restore rollback / FK safety: reinject matched only by email,
  so a backup shipping a different admin with the default `admin` username hit
  UNIQUE(username) and rolled the whole restore back; email and username could
  even collide on two different rows. Reconciliation is now non-destructive:
  the email-matching row is updated in place (id preserved → restored FKs like
  events.created_by stay valid); any different row holding the operator's
  username is RENAMED, not deleted (deletion would fire ON DELETE actions /
  dangle references); only when no row has the operator's email is a fresh row
  inserted, with created_by nulled and an explicit max(id)+1 id (batchInsert
  left the Postgres identity sequence unadvanced, so a sequence-based insert
  could collide).

- Stale session after restore: admin_users ids shift on restore, but the
  operator's live JWT is bound only to decoded.id (IP logged not enforced; the
  backup controls password_changed_at). The route now revokes the token (result
  checked and logged) and clears the admin cookie; the client redirects to a
  fresh login via a sessionInvalidated flag. Cookie clear is the unconditional
  guarantee.

Adds SQLite-backed reinject regression tests (in-place login/MFA restore with id
and FK columns preserved, username-only rename, email+username on different rows,
clean insert with created_by nulled) and the frontend redirect on
sessionInvalidated.

Deferred (design decisions / pre-existing, need a Postgres test env — see PR
discussion): global "invalidate all pre-restore sessions" cutoff; preserving the
operator's ROLE semantics across an RBAC-table replace; and resyncing Postgres
identity sequences after any restore (batchInsert leaves them behind max(id) —
pre-existing, affects every restored table).
2026-07-16 12:31:28 +02:00
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