Paul Nothaft
ed5fc5ad5c
Authorization-code + PKCE against a single configurable IdP via
openid-client v5, with JIT provisioning. Verified end-to-end against a
real Keycloak 26 (realm + confidential client + verified-email user):
settings → discovery test → login button → Keycloak → dashboard.
Backend:
- migration 162: admin_users.auth_provider ('local' default) +
external_subject, composite unique index
- oidcService: settings-driven config (client secret AES-256-GCM at
rest, mfaService pattern, OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY fallback JWT_SECRET),
cached discovery, sub-based identity binding — email linking of
existing admins only with email_verified=true; JIT behind
oidc_autoprovision with configurable default role and an unusable
random password hash
- GET /api/auth/admin/sso/login + /callback: state/nonce/PKCE verifier
cross the redirect in a 10-min signed httpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie;
the callback reuses the local login's session establishment
(completeAdminLogin split into establishAdminSession + JSON wrapper)
so SSO sessions are identical downstream; every failure lands on
/admin/login?sso_error=<key> as a translated toast
- dedicated /admin/settings/sso GET/PUT/test endpoints (secret
write-only, redacted to a set-flag; registered ABOVE the generic
/:type matcher which would shadow them); oidc_client_secret added to
the reserved keys stripped from generic settings upserts
- public settings expose only oidc_enabled + oidc_button_label for the
login page
Frontend:
- Settings → Single Sign-On (OIDC) tab: issuer/client/secret, scopes,
autoprovision + default role, button label, enable toggle, redirect
URI copy box, server-side discovery test
- login page: SSO button (custom label) when enabled; sso_error query
param surfaced as translated toasts; EN+DE i18n
Tests: 11 integration cases against an in-process mock IdP (real
discovery/JWKS/PKCE/ID-token validation) — JIT on/off, sub-vs-email
binding, unverified-email rejection, deactivated admin, missing/forged
state cookie, nonce tamper, secret encryption round-trip, disabled 404.
MFA is delegated to the IdP on the SSO path; local login stays
available as break-glass. Role-claim mapping and logout-to-IdP follow
in phase 2/3.
Database Migrations
This directory contains database migrations for the PicPeak photo sharing platform.
Directory Structure
/core
Essential migrations that are always run for new deployments. These include:
init.js- Initial database schema creation- Backup service tables (029-035)
- Gallery feedback tables (033)
- Pre-generated watermarks (061)
/legacy
Migrations needed only when upgrading from older versions. New deployments can skip these as the core schema already includes all necessary tables and columns.
For New Deployments
If you're deploying this application for the first time:
- The
initializeDatabase()function insrc/database/db.jswill create all necessary tables - Only migrations in the
/coredirectory will be run - This ensures a clean, optimized database schema
For Existing Deployments
If you're upgrading from an older version:
- All migrations (both core and legacy) will be run in sequence
- The migration system tracks which migrations have been applied
- Only new migrations will be executed
Running Migrations
# Development
npm run migrate
# Production
npm run migrate:prod
Note on Duplicate Migration Numbers
The legacy directory contains renamed duplicates:
014_add_host_name_to_events_duplicate.js(was duplicate of 014)027_add_rate_limit_settings_duplicate.js(was duplicate of 027)
These have been renamed to avoid conflicts while preserving the migration history.