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picpeak/backend/__tests__/routes/publicPaymentCheck.test.js
T
Paul Nothaft 5c4da1eacd test(crm): HTTP route tests for CRM public + admin surface (#570)
Closes #570.

PR #555 shipped the CRM module with strong service-layer coverage
but no HTTP-layer tests. This adds Supertest-based route coverage
across the externally-reachable public routes (P0) and an auth-gate
sweep of every CRM admin route (P1+P2).

## What's covered

### P0 — Public routes (49% of new tests)

The three public routes are the security-sensitive surface — any IP
with the raw token from a leaked email can hit them. Tests pin the
publicTokenGuards.loadActionToken contract end-to-end:

- **publicQuotes** (8 tests) — GET load + POST respond: 404 unknown,
  400 malformed, 410 expired, 200 valid w/ sanitised payload (no
  customer_account_id / created_by_admin_id leakage), 429 after 20
  bad attempts (IP lockout), 400 invalid action.
- **publicContracts** (10 tests) — GET load + POST sign + POST
  upload-signed-pdf + GET pdf: same guard outcomes per endpoint,
  plus the pre-multer token check (malformed token rejected before
  multer reads the body — prevents the disk-spam attack the
  preMulterTokenGuard was added for).
- **publicPaymentCheck** (6 tests) — different shape (no
  loadActionToken; service does its own validation): validator gate
  on token shape, all 4 canonical actions pass through the
  validator, negative amountMinor rejected.

The NULL-expires_at defensive branch in loadActionToken is
documented but not tested here — current schema declares
quote/contract_action_tokens.expires_at NOT NULL, so the branch is
unreachable at the route level. Worth a direct unit test on
loadActionToken if anyone wants to cover it.

### P1 + P2 — Admin routes (51% of new tests, 25 cases)

One consolidated `adminCrmAuth.test.js` file rather than nine
per-route files — the auth-gate contract is identical for every CRM
admin route, so a parametrised `describe.each` is more efficient
and lands the same coverage:

Per route (adminQuotes, adminContracts, adminInvoices, adminCalendar,
adminDeals, adminTaxReport, adminBusinessProfile):
- 401 without Authorization header (adminAuth gate)
- 401 with invalid JWT signature (adminAuth signature check)
- 2xx with super-admin token + CRM feature flags on (permission +
  feature-flag gates both pass)

Plus 4 tests for the CRM additions in adminCustomers
(hour-entries / bill / trigger-monthly-bill) — those endpoints
are mixed in with pre-existing customer routes, so they get
explicit coverage rather than bulk via the parametrised sweep.

## Harness extensions to integration/helpers/crmDb.js

Three new helpers (one place for any future route test to find):

- `mintAdminToken(adminId, opts)` — JWT signed with the test
  JWT_SECRET, shape matches what adminAuth expects.
- `createPublicToken(db, tableName, opts)` — insert a row into
  quote/contract_action_tokens with controllable expires_at /
  used_at / token. Note: Date values are explicitly ISO-stringified
  before insert — bare Date objects round-tripped inconsistently
  through knex+SQLite, sometimes via .toString() → literal
  `"[object Object]"` which parsed back to NaN and silently defeated
  the expiry guard. Caught it in test bring-up.
- `buildRouteApp(mount, router)` — minimal Express app (json + cookies)
  with a catch-all error handler that mirrors middleware/errorHandler
  (uses err.statusCode, not err.status — getting that wrong silently
  maps every 4xx to 500 in tests).
- `assignAdminRole(db, adminId, roleName)` — promotes a seedMinimal
  admin into super_admin (or any seeded role) for happy-path tests.

## Out of scope (follow-up)

Deeper integration tests for the document mint/send paths
(adminQuotes.send → PDF persisted + token minted + email queued;
adminInvoices.Storno → new row with shared deal_uuid + original
cancelled; adminContracts.countersign → integrity_hash computed)
are deferred. The service-layer behind those is already covered by
the existing __tests__/services/ suites — this PR pins the
HTTP-layer contract, which is what #570 actually asked for.

## Counts

- 4 new test files, 49 tests total
- ~860 LOC of test code + ~85 LOC of new harness in crmDb.js
- All tests pass in <2.5s (no real network, no real disk except the
  per-test tmpdir, no email sending)
2026-05-29 22:36:59 +02:00

107 lines
4.1 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* HTTP route tests for backend/src/routes/publicPaymentCheck (P0 — #570).
*
* Two endpoints:
* GET /:token — load invoice payment-check view
* POST /:token — record customer's "paid / unpaid / partial" claim
*
* Unlike the quote / contract public routes, payment-check goes
* through invoiceService rather than the shared publicTokenGuards.
* Tests focus on the validator gates and the unknown-token edge.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-paymentcheck-test-'));
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'db.sqlite');
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, 'storage');
fs.mkdirSync(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, { recursive: true });
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'crm-route-test-secret';
const request = require('supertest');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal, buildRouteApp } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
describe('publicPaymentCheck routes', () => {
let cleanup;
let app;
beforeAll(async () => {
let db;
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
app = buildRouteApp('/api/public/payment-check', require('../../src/routes/publicPaymentCheck'));
}, 60000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
describe('GET /:token', () => {
it('rejects malformed tokens with 400', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/public/payment-check/short');
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it('returns a service-level error for an unknown well-formed token (4xx, not 500)', async () => {
const fakeToken = 'a'.repeat(64);
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/public/payment-check/${fakeToken}`);
// Service throws NotFound or similar — what matters is the
// request reaches the service AND isn't an unhandled 500.
expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
expect(res.status).toBeLessThan(600);
});
});
describe('POST /:token', () => {
it('rejects malformed tokens with 400', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/public/payment-check/short')
.send({ action: 'paid_full' });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it('rejects an invalid action with 400', async () => {
const validToken = 'b'.repeat(64);
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/public/payment-check/${validToken}`)
.send({ action: 'maybe' });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it('accepts the canonical four actions through the validator', async () => {
// Each action passes validator (token is well-formed); service
// then rejects unknown token with a 4xx — what we're pinning is
// the validator doesn't reject any of the canonical actions.
const validToken = 'c'.repeat(64);
for (const action of ['paid_full', 'paid_with_skonto', 'partial', 'unpaid']) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/public/payment-check/${validToken}`)
.send({ action });
// Either succeeds (rare — no real invoice) or service-level
// 4xx for unknown token. Must NOT be 400 (which would mean
// the validator rejected the action).
expect(res.status).not.toBe(400);
expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
expect(res.status).toBeLessThan(600);
}
});
it('rejects negative amountMinor with 400', async () => {
// Validator chain: optional({ values: 'falsy' }) means
// amountMinor=0 / null / undefined gets skipped (allowed). For
// any actually-supplied integer, isInt({ min: 1 }) takes over —
// pin the negative-rejection so a future refactor can't loosen
// the lower bound silently.
const validToken = 'd'.repeat(64);
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/public/payment-check/${validToken}`)
.send({ action: 'partial', amountMinor: -100 });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
});
});