c6ec93eef9
The audit #485 called for: on SQLite (native installs), timestamp columns written with a raw `new Date()` through knex store epoch-ms numbers; Postgres returns ISO strings. Frontend code written against Postgres calls parseISO() on them — parseISO(number) throws and crashes the page. #485 fixed admin Users and listed api tokens / photos / activity as out-of-scope follow-ups. Verified crash on main: Timeline gallery layout parseISO(uploaded_at) against photos written by the archive-RESTORE path (raw Date). Other raw-write surfaces (api_tokens last_used_at/revoked_at, email_queue) degrade rather than crash but violate the ISO contract. - extract toIso() from adminUsers.js into utils/dateNormalize.js (contract unchanged — the 10 existing #485 tests still pin it) - write-side: archive-restore uploaded_at, api-token last_used_at / revoked_at, email_queue created_at/sent_at now write ISO strings - read-side (heals existing corrupted rows): gallery /photos normalizes uploaded_at/captured_at; api-tokens list normalizes all four timestamp fields - frontend defence-in-depth: Timeline layout parses uploaded_at tolerantly (typeof guard) for stale caches / old backends - 2 regression tests seed literal epoch numbers and assert the API serves ISO strings activity_logs turned out safe (created_at comes from the DB default, not a raw Date) — left untouched. Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
124 lines
3.8 KiB
JavaScript
124 lines
3.8 KiB
JavaScript
const crypto = require('crypto');
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const { db } = require('../database/db');
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const logger = require('../utils/logger');
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const TOKEN_PREFIX = 'pp_live_';
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const VALID_SCOPES = ['read', 'write', 'admin'];
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function hashToken(plaintext) {
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return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(plaintext).digest('hex');
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}
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/**
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* Generate a new API token. Returns the plaintext (return once, never
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* stored) plus the row payload to insert. Caller persists.
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*/
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function generateApiToken() {
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const random = crypto.randomBytes(24).toString('base64url'); // 32 chars
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const plaintext = `${TOKEN_PREFIX}${random}`;
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return {
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plaintext,
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hashed: hashToken(plaintext),
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preview: random.slice(0, 8)
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};
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}
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function parseScopes(raw) {
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if (!raw) return [];
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return String(raw)
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.split(',')
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.map((s) => s.trim().toLowerCase())
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.filter((s) => VALID_SCOPES.includes(s));
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}
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/**
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* Middleware: authenticate via API token. Maps the token to its owner
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* admin user, attaches { req.admin, req.apiToken }, then defers to the
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* regular permission machinery on top.
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*
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* Mount this *instead* of `adminAuth` on /api/v1/* routes. Existing
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* permission decorators (`requirePermission('events.create')`) still
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* work because they read `req.admin.id`.
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*/
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async function apiTokenAuth(req, res, next) {
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try {
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const header = req.headers?.authorization || '';
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if (!header.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Missing API token', code: 'NO_TOKEN' });
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}
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const token = header.slice(7).trim();
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if (!token.startsWith(TOKEN_PREFIX)) {
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token format', code: 'INVALID_TOKEN' });
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}
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const hashed = hashToken(token);
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const row = await db('api_tokens').where({ hashed_token: hashed }).first();
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if (!row) {
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token', code: 'INVALID_TOKEN' });
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}
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if (row.revoked_at) {
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token revoked', code: 'TOKEN_REVOKED' });
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}
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if (row.expires_at && new Date(row.expires_at) <= new Date()) {
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token expired', code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' });
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}
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const admin = await db('admin_users')
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.where({ id: row.created_by, is_active: true })
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.select('id', 'username', 'email', 'role_id')
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.first();
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if (!admin) {
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Token owner unavailable', code: 'OWNER_INACTIVE' });
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}
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// Touch last_used_at — async, don't block the request.
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db('api_tokens').where({ id: row.id }).update({ last_used_at: new Date().toISOString() })
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.catch((err) => logger.debug('api_tokens last_used update failed', { err: err.message }));
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req.admin = admin;
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req.apiToken = {
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id: row.id,
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name: row.name,
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scopes: parseScopes(row.scopes)
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};
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return next();
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} catch (error) {
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logger.error('apiTokenAuth error', { error: error.message });
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return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Authentication error' });
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}
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}
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/**
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* Middleware factory: require a specific scope on the API token. Use
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* after apiTokenAuth — `requireApiScope('write')` rejects read-only
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* tokens trying to mutate.
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*/
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function requireApiScope(scope) {
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return (req, res, next) => {
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const have = req.apiToken?.scopes || [];
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// 'admin' implies write/read; 'write' implies read.
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const expanded = new Set(have);
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if (have.includes('admin')) ['write', 'read'].forEach((s) => expanded.add(s));
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if (have.includes('write')) expanded.add('read');
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if (!expanded.has(scope)) {
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return res.status(403).json({
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error: `Token lacks required scope: ${scope}`,
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code: 'INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE',
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required: scope,
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granted: have
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});
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}
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next();
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};
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}
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module.exports = {
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apiTokenAuth,
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requireApiScope,
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generateApiToken,
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hashToken,
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parseScopes,
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TOKEN_PREFIX,
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VALID_SCOPES
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};
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