Files
picpeak/backend/__tests__/routes/secureImageTokenBinding.test.js
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Paul NothaftandPaul Nothaft 03087c798c fix(security): close GHSA-g94x (cross-gallery photo read) + GHSA-pv6w (admin DB export) (#924)
* fix(security): close two access-control advisories (GHSA-g94x, GHSA-pv6w)

GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f (HIGH) — the secure-image VIEW route
(/secure-images/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token) validated only the token
signature and took the gallery/photo from the URL, so a token minted on
any PUBLIC gallery read every other gallery's photos with no password
(its download sibling has verifyGalleryAccess; the view route can't —
it serves via <img src> with no header). Bind the token to its scope
instead: the URL photoId must equal the token's minted photoId (photos
belong to exactly one gallery, and minting is gallery-scoped), and the
gallery embedded in the token's sessionId must equal the URL gallery.

GHSA-pv6w-rj34-wj9v (MEDIUM) — GET /admin/backup/picpeak/export dumps
every table unredacted (bcrypt hashes, 2FA, SMTP/SSO/WhatsApp/webhook/S3
secrets) and was gated only by backup.create, which the built-in admin
role holds. Gate it behind super_admin, matching the restore side
(backup.restore, already admin-denied) and the masked config APIs.

Regression tests pin both: cross-gallery token reads 403 (photo and
gallery checks), backup export 403 for admin / passes for super_admin.

* test: stub requireSuperAdmin in the backup masking mock

adminBackup now calls requireSuperAdmin() at load (GHSA-pv6w export
gate), and backupSecretMasking mocks the permissions module — add the
new function to the mock so the module loads.

* fix(security): review follow-ups on the export gate (GHSA-pv6w)

- test: place the mocked export in its own mkdtemp dir. The route
  recursively deletes path.dirname(filePath) after download, so a stub
  in bare os.tmpdir() made the super_admin test wipe the whole temp
  root — other jest workers' DB files included (latent CI flake).
- ui: hide PicpeakExportCard from non-super_admins. The role keeps
  settings.view + backup.create, so after the gate its Download button
  always 403'd with a generic toast; gate the card on role super_admin
  to match the endpoint.

* fix(security): keep the token-mismatch audit values within varchar(20) (GHSA-g94x review)

image_access_logs.access_type is varchar(20) (migration 038), but
'token_gallery_mismatch' is 22 chars — on Postgres the audit write
threw value-too-long and logImageAccess swallowed it, so the security
event went unrecorded (the 403 still fired; log is best-effort). Shorten
to 'photo_mismatch' / 'gallery_mismatch' (14/16).

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>
2026-07-30 14:24:28 +02:00

137 lines
5.3 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* Secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x-8vv8-3c9f).
*
* The view route GET /api/secure-images/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token serves
* via <img src> with the token in the URL, so it can't carry a gallery-token
* header like the download sibling. Before the fix it validated only the
* token signature and took the gallery/photo from the URL — so a token minted
* on any PUBLIC gallery read every other gallery's photos with no password.
*
* Pins that the route now enforces the scope inside the token:
* - the URL photoId must equal the token's minted photoId
* - the gallery embedded in the token's sessionId must equal the URL gallery
* A token minted on gallery A cannot read gallery B under either check; a
* token used on its own gallery+photo passes the binding.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-secimg-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'secimg-test-secret';
process.env.STORAGE_PATH = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-secimg-storage-'));
// Stub the anti-bot/rate-limit middleware so the fingerprint is deterministic
// — the token below is minted with the same fingerprint, so verifySecureToken
// passes and the binding logic under test is what decides the outcome.
jest.mock('../../src/middleware/secureImageMiddleware', () => ({
secureImageAccess: (req, _res, next) => {
req.clientInfo = { fingerprint: 'test-fp', ip: '127.0.0.1', userAgent: 'jest' };
next();
},
getSecurityStatus: (_req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }),
}));
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const secureImageService = require('../../src/services/secureImageService');
describe('secure-image view route token binding (GHSA-g94x)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
let galleryA; let galleryB;
let photoA; let photoB;
const mkEvent = async (slug, requirePassword) => {
const r = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: slug,
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: '[email protected]',
admin_email: '[email protected]',
password_hash: 'x',
require_password: requirePassword ? 1 : 0,
share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
share_token: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
const mkPhoto = async (eventId, slug, filename) => {
const dir = path.join(process.env.STORAGE_PATH, 'events/active', slug);
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, filename), Buffer.from('img'));
const r = await db('photos').insert({
event_id: eventId,
filename,
path: `${slug}/${filename}`,
type: 'individual',
uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return r[0]?.id ?? r[0];
};
// Mint a token exactly as the mint route does — bound to (photoId, gallery
// sessionId, fingerprint) — bypassing the anti-bot HTTP path.
const mint = (photoId, eventId) => secureImageService.generateSecureToken(
photoId,
`gallery_public_${eventId}_${Date.now()}`,
{ clientFingerprint: 'test-fp', maxUses: 100, expiresIn: 3600 },
);
const view = (slug, photoId, token) => request(app)
.get(`/api/secure-images/${slug}/secure/${photoId}/${token}`);
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
galleryA = await mkEvent('secimg-public-a', false); // public — token source
galleryB = await mkEvent('secimg-private-b', true); // password-protected — victim
photoA = await mkPhoto(galleryA, 'secimg-public-a', 'a.jpg');
photoB = await mkPhoto(galleryB, 'secimg-private-b', 'b.jpg');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/secure-images', require('../../src/routes/secureImages'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
it('rejects a gallery-A token used against gallery B (cross-photo)', async () => {
const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoB, token);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this photo/i);
});
it('rejects a gallery-A token replayed on gallery B with A\'s photoId', async () => {
const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
// URL photoId matches the token, so the photo check passes — the gallery
// check (sessionId gallery A != URL gallery B) must catch it.
const res = await view('secimg-private-b', photoA, token);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/not valid for this gallery/i);
});
it('lets a token read its own gallery + photo (binding passes)', async () => {
const token = mint(photoA, galleryA);
const res = await view('secimg-public-a', photoA, token);
// Binding passes; serving may 200/404/500 depending on the pipeline, but
// it must NOT be rejected as a token mismatch.
expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
});
});