Files
picpeak/backend/src/services/setupService.js
T
Luca b0912c7427 feat(setup): validate setup token at step 1 before advancing
Previously "Continue" on the token step only checked the field was
non-empty; a wrong token wasn't caught until the final submit, after the
user had filled in email + password. Add a non-burning verify:

- backend: POST /setup/verify-token constant-time compares the token
  without consuming it (createInitialAdmin still claims it atomically on
  submit), gated on no-admin-exists and rate-limited like /setup/admin.
- frontend: step-1 "Continue" calls verifyToken and only advances on a
  valid token; a wrong token shows the invalidToken error on the field,
  429 -> too-many-attempts, 409 -> redirect to login.

Adds integration tests for accept-without-burn / reject / closed-once-set.
2026-07-02 15:18:22 +02:00

177 lines
7.3 KiB
JavaScript

'use strict';
const crypto = require('crypto');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { db } = require('../database/db');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { getAppSetting, upsertAppSetting } = require('../utils/appSettings');
const { ValidationError, ConflictError } = require('../utils/errors');
const { validatePassword, getBcryptRounds } = require('../utils/passwordValidation');
const { formatBoolean } = require('../utils/dbCompat');
// First-run bootstrap. The app boots with NO admin account and no
// ADMIN_PASSWORD in the environment; the first browser visit creates the admin.
// That create call is guarded by a one-time setup token, generated at boot
// while no admin exists and printed to the logs (+ a best-effort data/SETUP_TOKEN
// file). The token is ALWAYS required and burned on first use, so the endpoint
// is permanently closed once setup is done — safe even on a public IP.
const SETUP_TOKEN_KEY = 'setup_token';
async function noAdminExists() {
const row = await db('admin_users').count({ c: '*' }).first();
return Number(row?.c || 0) === 0;
}
// Public status the /setup gate reads. Deliberately leaks nothing beyond
// "is the instance still waiting for its first admin".
async function getSetupStatus() {
const needsAdmin = await noAdminExists();
return { needsAdmin, complete: !needsAdmin };
}
// Logs are the source of truth; the file is a convenience for operators who
// reach a shell more easily than the container log view (e.g. `cat data/SETUP_TOKEN`).
function setupTokenFilePath() {
const dir = process.env.DATA_DIR || path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'data');
return path.join(dir, 'SETUP_TOKEN');
}
// Called once at startup. Idempotent: generates + surfaces a token only while
// the instance still needs an admin, and clears any stale token afterwards.
// Clear the token everywhere — the app_settings row AND the on-disk file — so a
// completed (or restored) install leaves no stale token behind.
async function clearSetupToken() {
await upsertAppSetting(SETUP_TOKEN_KEY, null, 'string');
try { fs.unlinkSync(setupTokenFilePath()); } catch (_) { /* file may be absent — best-effort */ }
}
async function ensureSetupToken() {
if (!(await noAdminExists())) {
await clearSetupToken();
return null;
}
let token = await getAppSetting(SETUP_TOKEN_KEY);
if (!token) {
token = crypto.randomBytes(24).toString('base64url');
// app_settings.setting_value is JSON on Postgres — store JSON-stringified
// (getAppSetting JSON.parses on read). A raw string is rejected by jsonb.
await upsertAppSetting(SETUP_TOKEN_KEY, JSON.stringify(token), 'string');
}
logger.warn(`[setup] No admin account yet — open /admin to finish setup. One-time setup token: ${token}`);
try {
const file = setupTokenFilePath();
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(file, `${token}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(`[setup] Could not write setup token file (logs still have it): ${err.message}`);
}
return token;
}
// Constant-time compare so the token can't be recovered by timing the response.
function tokensMatch(provided, expected) {
if (!provided || !expected) return false;
const a = Buffer.from(String(provided));
const b = Buffer.from(String(expected));
if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b);
}
// Pre-flight check for the two-step wizard: lets step 1 confirm the token is
// valid before advancing to the account step, so a wrong token is caught at
// "Continue" rather than after the user has filled in email + password. Does
// NOT burn the token — createInitialAdmin still claims it atomically on submit.
// Rate-limited at the mount point (same as /admin) so it can't be used to
// brute-force the token; the token is also 24 random bytes, so guessing is
// infeasible regardless.
async function verifySetupToken(token) {
if (!(await noAdminExists())) {
// Setup already finished — treat the endpoint as closed (the client
// redirects to login on a 409).
throw new ConflictError('Setup already completed — an admin account exists');
}
const expected = await getAppSetting(SETUP_TOKEN_KEY);
return tokensMatch(token, expected);
}
// Creates the first admin as super_admin (the highest role) and returns a
// ready-to-set admin JWT so the browser flows straight into the wizard.
async function createInitialAdmin({ token, email, password, ip }) {
if (!(await noAdminExists())) {
throw new ConflictError('Setup already completed — an admin account exists');
}
const expected = await getAppSetting(SETUP_TOKEN_KEY);
if (!tokensMatch(token, expected)) {
throw new ValidationError('Invalid setup token', 'token');
}
const cleanEmail = String(email || '').trim().toLowerCase();
if (!/^[^@\s]+@[^@\s]+\.[^@\s]+$/.test(cleanEmail)) {
throw new ValidationError('A valid email address is required', 'email');
}
const strength = validatePassword(password);
if (!strength.valid) {
throw new ValidationError(strength.errors[0] || 'Password does not meet requirements', 'password');
}
const role = await db('roles').where('name', 'super_admin').first();
if (!role) {
throw new ConflictError('super_admin role missing — database not initialised');
}
const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(password, getBcryptRounds());
// Create the admin and burn the token ATOMICALLY. The claim (null the token
// row expecting exactly one match) serialises concurrent valid-token submits,
// so a double-submit can't create two super_admins. All writes use `trx`
// (never the global db) to avoid the SQLite in-transaction deadlock.
const id = await db.transaction(async (trx) => {
const claimed = await trx('app_settings')
.where({ setting_key: SETUP_TOKEN_KEY })
.whereNotNull('setting_value')
.update({ setting_value: null, updated_at: new Date() });
if (claimed !== 1) {
throw new ConflictError('Setup already completed — an admin account exists');
}
const cnt = await trx('admin_users').count({ c: '*' }).first();
if (Number(cnt?.c || 0) !== 0) {
throw new ConflictError('Setup already completed — an admin account exists');
}
const inserted = await trx('admin_users').insert({
username: cleanEmail,
email: cleanEmail,
password_hash: passwordHash,
role_id: role.id,
is_active: formatBoolean(true),
must_change_password: formatBoolean(false),
created_at: new Date(),
updated_at: new Date(),
}).returning('id');
return inserted[0]?.id || inserted[0];
});
// DB token cleared inside the tx; remove the on-disk file too (best-effort).
try { fs.unlinkSync(setupTokenFilePath()); } catch (_) { /* best-effort */ }
logger.info(`[setup] Initial super_admin created (id=${id}, email=${cleanEmail})`);
const authToken = jwt.sign(
{ id, username: cleanEmail, type: 'admin', role: role.name, ip: ip || null, loginTime: Date.now() },
process.env.JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '24h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
);
return {
token: authToken,
user: {
id,
username: cleanEmail,
email: cleanEmail,
role: { name: role.name, displayName: role.display_name },
},
};
}
module.exports = { getSetupStatus, ensureSetupToken, verifySetupToken, createInitialAdmin };