Files
picpeak/backend/src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup.js
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Paul NothaftandPaul Nothaft 3b88036fda fix(security): backup/restore hardening — public-dir DB dump, restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest keying (stable) (#962)
* fix(security): stop caller-chosen database backup destination (GHSA-jw8m)

POST /api/admin/database-backup/backup forwarded req.body straight into
databaseBackupService.backup(), which merges options over config:
  const { destinationPath = '/backup/database', ... } = { ...config, ...options }

destinationPath is not a persistable setting — the /config allowlist only
accepts database_backup_* keys — so the request body was its only source.
The built-in `admin` role holds backup.create but neither settings.edit nor
backup.restore, so it could aim a full DB dump (admin bcrypt hashes, gallery
password hashes, encrypted SMTP creds) at the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
(server.js mounts it with no auth middleware) and then fetch it
unauthenticated. Filed low; it is a privilege escalation to unauthenticated
disclosure.

Forward only the real knobs, and only when present so absent keys can't
override config defaults via spread.

* fix(security): backup/restore hardening — restore path allowlist, gunzip bound, manifest checksum keying (GHSA-fw4c, h652, hgp8)

- adminRestore /validate + /start: constrain caller-supplied source and
  manifestPath to the operator-configured backup roots — the SAME set the
  restore wizard discovers from — so disaster recovery from a rescued mount
  still works, with RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS as an escape hatch (GHSA-fw4c).
- restoreService.decompressFile: bound the EXPANDED size and abort the
  pipeline when exceeded; default 50 GB, RESTORE_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES
  overrides (GHSA-h652).
- backupManifest: BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY upgrades new manifests to a keyed
  HMAC (GHSA-hgp8). Deliberately opt-in and verify-if-present — the key
  cannot live in the database because the database is inside the backup, so
  a mandatory HMAC would lock operators out of the exact disaster-recovery
  case this exists for.

Also fixes a pre-existing bug found while testing hgp8: the checksum passed
Object.keys().sort() as JSON.stringify's second argument, which is an array
REPLACER (a property allowlist applied at every depth), not a key sorter. All
nested keys — path, size, per-file checksum — were dropped before hashing, so
the file list sat outside the integrity check entirely and a manifest path
could be rewritten to ../../etc/passwd without disturbing the digest. Now
hashes a recursively-canonicalized copy, with the legacy serialization
accepted on validation so existing backups stay restorable.

* fix(security): codex round 2 — unbreak the restore wizard, share checksum verification, guard downgrades

- adminRestore: `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE ('local'|'s3'|'upload'),
  not a path — restoreService branches on those literals. The containment
  check treated it as a path, so path.resolve('local') fell outside the
  backup roots and BOTH /validate and /start returned 400, blocking every
  normal restore. Type tokens are now excluded from the path check.
- backupManifest: extracted verifyManifestChecksum() as the single source of
  truth for the legacy/keyed fallbacks. restoreService.performPreRestoreValidation
  recomputed the digest itself with the default canonical+keyed settings,
  which rejected EVERY backup written before this batch. It now delegates.
- backupManifest: guard the algorithm downgrade — with a key configured, an
  attacker able to rewrite the backup store could strip checksum_algorithm,
  edit the manifest and recompute a plain SHA-256 that verified. Opt-in via
  BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED so pre-key backups keep restoring by default.

* fix(security): codex round 3 — close two manifest-verification fail-opens (GHSA-hgp8)

verifyManifestChecksum returned valid for a manifest with no
verification.total_checksum at all, and restoreService only called it when
that field was present. Deleting the field was therefore a complete bypass of
the keying work: no digest check, no downgrade guard, no
BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED. Every manifest this codebase writes stamps the
field, so an absent one now fails validation, and the call site invokes the
verifier unconditionally.

Second fail-open: the strict-mode rejection of an unkeyed manifest was gated on
`&& key`, so with BACKUP_MANIFEST_REQUIRE_KEYED=true and no BACKUP_MANIFEST_KEY
configured a plain SHA-256 manifest sailed through. Strict mode is a statement
about the operator's manifests, not about the host — it is exactly the fresh
disaster-recovery box that lacks the secret. The rejection no longer depends on
a key being present.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
(cherry picked from commit 292a5b784acd7f47099aa234c1c2ea00050fca97)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>
2026-08-02 21:18:43 +02:00

285 lines
8.6 KiB
JavaScript

const express = require('express');
const router = express.Router();
const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
const { databaseBackupService } = require('../services/databaseBackup');
const { db } = require('../database/db');
const logger = require('../utils/logger');
const { getPagination } = require('../utils/routeHelpers');
// All routes require admin authentication
router.use(adminAuth);
/**
* Get database backup status and configuration
*/
router.get('/status', requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
// Get configuration
const config = await databaseBackupService.getBackupConfig();
// Get recent backup history
const history = await databaseBackupService.getBackupHistory(10);
// Get current progress if running
const progress = databaseBackupService.getProgress();
// Calculate health status
const lastBackup = history[0];
const isHealthy = lastBackup && lastBackup.status === 'completed' &&
new Date(lastBackup.completed_at) > new Date(Date.now() - 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000); // Within 48 hours
res.json({
config,
isRunning: databaseBackupService.isRunning,
isHealthy,
currentProgress: progress,
lastBackup,
recentBackups: history,
dbType: databaseBackupService.dbType
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get database backup status:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get backup status' });
}
});
/**
* Update database backup configuration
*/
router.put('/config', requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const allowedSettings = [
'database_backup_enabled',
'database_backup_schedule',
'database_backup_destination_path',
'database_backup_compress',
'database_backup_validate_integrity',
'database_backup_include_checksums',
'database_backup_retention_days',
'database_backup_email_on_failure',
'database_backup_email_on_success'
];
const updates = [];
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(req.body)) {
if (allowedSettings.includes(key)) {
// Check if setting exists
const existing = await db('app_settings')
.where('setting_key', key)
.first();
if (existing) {
await db('app_settings')
.where('setting_key', key)
.update({
setting_value: JSON.stringify(value),
updated_at: new Date()
});
} else {
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: key,
setting_value: JSON.stringify(value),
setting_type: 'database_backup'
});
}
updates.push(key);
}
}
// Restart scheduled backups if enabled state changed
if (updates.includes('database_backup_enabled') || updates.includes('database_backup_schedule')) {
const { startScheduledBackups, stopScheduledBackups } = require('../services/databaseBackup');
stopScheduledBackups();
await startScheduledBackups();
}
res.json({
success: true,
updatedSettings: updates,
message: 'Database backup configuration updated successfully'
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to update database backup config:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to update configuration' });
}
});
/**
* Trigger manual database backup
*/
router.post('/backup', requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
try {
if (databaseBackupService.isRunning) {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Backup already in progress' });
}
// Start backup asynchronously
res.json({
success: true,
message: 'Database backup started',
trackingUrl: '/api/admin/database-backup/progress'
});
// Forward ONLY the real backup knobs (GHSA-jw8m). Passing req.body
// straight through let the caller set `destinationPath`, which the
// service merges over its config — so a backup.create holder (the
// `admin` role, which has neither settings.edit nor backup.restore)
// could dump the whole database into the PUBLIC /uploads static mount
// and fetch it unauthenticated, hashes and encrypted SMTP creds included.
// destinationPath is not a persistable setting; the request body was its
// only source, so dropping it here costs no legitimate behaviour.
const body = req.body || {};
const options = {};
for (const key of ['compress', 'validateIntegrity', 'includeChecksums']) {
if (body[key] !== undefined) options[key] = body[key];
}
databaseBackupService.backup(options).catch(error => {
logger.error('Manual database backup failed:', error);
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to start database backup:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to start backup' });
}
});
/**
* Get current backup progress
*/
router.get('/progress', requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const progress = databaseBackupService.getProgress();
res.json({
isRunning: databaseBackupService.isRunning,
progress
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get backup progress:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get progress' });
}
});
/**
* Get backup history with pagination
*/
router.get('/history', requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const { page, limit, offset } = getPagination(req);
const [backups, totalCount] = await Promise.all([
db('database_backup_runs')
.orderBy('started_at', 'desc')
.limit(limit)
.offset(offset),
db('database_backup_runs').count('* as count').first()
]);
res.json({
backups,
pagination: {
page,
limit,
total: totalCount.count,
pages: Math.ceil(totalCount.count / limit)
}
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get backup history:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get history' });
}
});
/**
* Delete old backup files
*/
router.delete('/cleanup', requirePermission('backup.delete'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const { retentionDays = 30 } = req.body;
await databaseBackupService.cleanupOldBackups(retentionDays);
res.json({
success: true,
message: `Cleaned up backups older than ${retentionDays} days`
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to cleanup old backups:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to cleanup backups' });
}
});
/**
* Test database backup configuration
*/
router.post('/test', requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const config = await databaseBackupService.getBackupConfig();
// Test database connection
const testResults = {
databaseConnection: false,
destinationWritable: false,
compressionAvailable: true,
estimatedSize: null
};
// Test database connection
try {
await db.raw('SELECT 1');
testResults.databaseConnection = true;
} catch (error) {
testResults.databaseConnectionError = error.message;
}
// Test destination path
if (config.destinationPath) {
try {
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const testFile = `${config.destinationPath}/.test-${Date.now()}`;
await fs.writeFile(testFile, 'test');
await fs.unlink(testFile);
testResults.destinationWritable = true;
} catch (error) {
testResults.destinationError = error.message;
}
}
// Estimate database size
try {
testResults.estimatedSize = await databaseBackupService.getDatabaseSize();
} catch (error) {
testResults.sizeError = error.message;
}
res.json({
success: testResults.databaseConnection && testResults.destinationWritable,
results: testResults
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to test backup configuration:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to test configuration' });
}
});
/**
* Get table checksums
*/
router.get('/checksums', requirePermission('backup.view'), async (req, res) => {
try {
const checksums = await databaseBackupService.getTableChecksums();
res.json({
checksums,
tableCount: Object.keys(checksums).length,
totalRows: Object.values(checksums).reduce((sum, table) => sum + table.rowCount, 0)
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to get table checksums:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to get checksums' });
}
});
module.exports = router;