Files
picpeak/backend/__tests__/routes/restorePathAllowlist.test.js
T
Paul NothaftandPaul Nothaft 316bcbd679 fix(backend): contain and sanitize the SQLite restore source path (#1384)
The restore flow accepted an unvalidated database.backup_file from
the manifest (absolute paths and traversal both worked, and no
containment check enforced the configured backup root), then
interpolated it unescaped into a `sqlite3 .restore '<path>'` command,
letting an attacker-chosen source file replace the live database.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>
2026-09-11 10:40:54 +02:00

182 lines
7.5 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* Restore path containment must not break the normal restore wizard
* (GHSA-fw4c, codex round 2).
*
* `source` is usually a SOURCE TYPE, not a path: RestoreWizard posts
* 'local' | 's3' | 'upload', and restoreService.restore() branches on those
* literals before deriving a directory. The first version of the containment
* check treated `source` as a path, so path.resolve('local') landed outside
* the configured backup roots and BOTH /validate and /start returned 400 —
* blocking every normal restore.
*/
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = path.join(
fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-restorepath-')), 'db.sqlite',
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restorepath-test-secret';
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
// `bootCrmDb()` hands back the process-wide `db` singleton (module cache —
// see its own comment), so it must only be called ONCE per test file: a
// second call re-runs migrations against the same connection, and the first
// call's `cleanup()` (db.destroy()) would tear down the connection both
// describe blocks below share. Boot once at file scope; each describe below
// only touches app_settings / env vars, never the connection lifecycle.
let db; let cleanup; let checkRestorePathsAllowed;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
({ checkRestorePathsAllowed } = require('../../src/routes/adminRestore')._internal);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
async function setBackupSetting(key, value) {
const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).first();
if (existing) {
await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(value) });
} else {
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'backup',
});
}
}
describe('restore path allowlist (GHSA-fw4c)', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
// Configure a backup root so the allowlist is actually active.
await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
});
it('allows the wizard\'s source TYPE tokens', async () => {
for (const source of ['local', 's3', 'upload']) {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source, manifestPath: '/backup/manifests/backup-manifest-1.json',
});
expect(err).toBeNull();
}
});
it('allows an s3:// source URL', async () => {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source: 's3://bucket/key/backup.tar.gz',
manifestPath: '/backup/manifests/backup-manifest-1.json',
});
expect(err).toBeNull();
});
it('still rejects a manifestPath outside the configured roots', async () => {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source: 'local', manifestPath: '/etc/passwd',
});
expect(err).toMatch(/inside a configured backup location/i);
});
it('still rejects a traversal manifestPath', async () => {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source: 'local', manifestPath: '/backup/../etc/shadow',
});
expect(err).toBeTruthy();
});
it('accepts a real path source inside the roots', async () => {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source: '/backup/run-1', manifestPath: '/backup/run-1/manifest.json',
});
expect(err).toBeNull();
});
});
/**
* GHSA-xfvx-j447-732c: `checkRestorePathsAllowed` constrained the top-level
* `source`/`manifestPath` request fields (GHSA-fw4c above), but never looked
* INSIDE the manifest itself. `manifest.database.backup_file` — handed
* straight to restoreService's candidate resolution and eventually
* interpolated into `sqlite3 .restore '<path>'` — was unchecked, so an
* absolute path there could point the restore at an arbitrary file even
* though `source`/`manifestPath` both passed containment.
*/
describe('restore path allowlist — manifest database.backup_file containment (GHSA-xfvx)', () => {
let tmpRoot;
beforeAll(async () => {
await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-xfvx-manifest-'));
// Additional allowed root via the documented escape hatch — keeps this
// describe block's fixtures out of the shared '/backup' root above.
process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = tmpRoot;
});
afterAll(() => {
delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
const writeManifest = (name, databaseSection) => {
const manifestPath = path.join(tmpRoot, name);
fs.writeFileSync(manifestPath, JSON.stringify({
manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
backup: { type: 'full' },
system: { platform: 'linux' },
application: { version: '1.0.0' },
files: { count: 0, manifest: [] },
database: databaseSection,
verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: null },
}));
return manifestPath;
};
it('rejects a manifest whose database.backup_file is an absolute path outside every configured root', async () => {
const manifestPath = writeManifest('evil-1.json', { backup_file: '/etc/passwd' });
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
expect(err).toMatch(/database\.backup_file must be inside a configured backup location/i);
});
it('accepts a manifest whose database.backup_file is an absolute path inside a configured root', async () => {
const dbFile = path.join(tmpRoot, 'database', 'picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql.gz');
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(dbFile), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(dbFile, 'not a real sqlite dump, just a fixture');
const manifestPath = writeManifest('legit-1.json', { backup_file: dbFile });
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
expect(err).toBeNull();
});
it('does not choke on a manifest whose database.backup_file is a legitimate relative path', async () => {
// Relative candidates are resolved against restoreService's own
// `backupPath` (which this route-level pre-check doesn't have — it only
// sees `source`/`manifestPath`), so this layer intentionally defers
// relative-path containment to restoreService.performDatabaseRestore
// and must not false-positive here.
const manifestPath = writeManifest('legit-2.json', { backup_file: 'database/picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql.gz' });
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
expect(err).toBeNull();
});
it('rejects everything when no backup location is configured at all (fail closed, not fail open)', async () => {
// Simulate an install that never had backup_destination_path /
// backup_manifest_path seeded/configured, and isn't using the
// RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS escape hatch either.
const savedRoots = process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
await db('app_settings').whereIn('setting_key', ['backup_destination_path', 'backup_manifest_path']).del();
try {
const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
source: '/backup/run-1', manifestPath: '/backup/run-1/manifest.json',
});
expect(err).toMatch(/no backup location is configured/i);
} finally {
process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = savedRoots;
await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
}
});
});