Files
picpeak/backend/__tests__/integration/galleryPasswordSanitize.test.js
T
Paul Nothaft 323dcae917 fix(gallery): block password form in Instagram in-app browser and unmask login errors (#863)
* fix(gallery): block password form in Instagram in-app browser (#654)

Field reports show gallery password login still failing inside
Instagram's IAB after the #656 input-attribute/trim defenses. Three
changes:

- Replace the advisory amber banner with a red blocking state: the
  password form is hidden in the Instagram IAB and replaced with
  platform-specific "open in external browser" instructions plus a
  copy-link button (clipboard API with execCommand fallback). A
  "try anyway" link restores the form as an escape hatch.
- Stop masking non-password failures as "incorrect password": a request
  that never got a response (offline, webview killed it) now reports a
  connection error, and a reCAPTCHA 400 reports a verification failure —
  both previously fell through to the wrong-password message and sent
  guests chasing the wrong cause.
- Strip invisible Unicode (zero-width chars, word joiner, BOM, soft
  hyphen) from the submitted password in addition to trimming — these
  ride along when the password is copy-pasted out of a chat app and fail
  byte-exact bcrypt compare server-side.

* fix(gallery): retry login with typed password + honor execCommand result (#654)

Codex review round 1:
- Stored passwords can legitimately contain the invisible code points the
  sanitizer strips (e.g. ZWJ emoji sequences) — creation paths don't
  normalize. On a 401 where the sanitized form differs from the typed
  (trimmed) input, retry once with the typed value. Skipped when a
  reCAPTCHA token is in play (single-use).
- document.execCommand('copy') signals failure via its return value, not
  by throwing — only show "Link copied" when it returns true.

* fix(gallery): move invisible-char password fallback server-side (#654)

Codex review round 2: the client-side retry either burned the single-use
reCAPTCHA token (making exotic-but-valid passwords impossible to enter
with reCAPTCHA on) or burned failed-attempt lockout quota on every
rescued login. Doing the fallback as a second bcrypt compare inside the
same gallery/verify request eliminates both: exact bytes are compared
first (stored passwords containing e.g. ZWJ emoji keep working), the
sanitized form only on mismatch, and trackFailedAttempt only fires when
both fail. Frontend goes back to plain trim-on-submit; the client-side
sanitizer util and retry are removed. 7 integration tests pin the
contract.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-07-23 21:45:07 +02:00

122 lines
4.2 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* Gallery password invisible-Unicode fallback (#654).
*
* Passwords relayed through chat apps (Instagram DMs especially) pick up
* invisible characters on copy-paste — zero-width space/joiners, word
* joiner, BOM, soft hyphen — which fail the byte-exact bcrypt compare and
* surface as "incorrect password" for a correct password. The verify route
* retries the compare with those characters stripped, in the SAME request,
* so the fallback costs no reCAPTCHA token and no failed-attempt quota.
*
* Pins the contract:
* - exact submitted bytes always win first, so stored passwords that
* legitimately contain these characters (e.g. ZWJ emoji sequences)
* keep working
* - paste artifacts (mid-string ZWSP, leading BOM, trailing space) are
* rescued by the sanitized fallback compare
* - the fallback never invents a match (missing ZWJ still 401s), and a
* rescued login records no failed attempt
*/
const request = require('supertest');
const express = require('express');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'sanitize-test-secret';
const PLAIN_SLUG = 'sanitize-plain-event';
const ZWJ_SLUG = 'sanitize-zwj-event';
const PLAIN_PASSWORD = 'wedding2026';
// Stored password legitimately containing a ZWJ emoji sequence.
const ZWJ_PASSWORD = 'Family\u{1F468}\u200D\u{1F469}Aa1';
describe('gallery/verify invisible-Unicode fallback (#654)', () => {
let db;
let cleanup;
let app;
const makeEvent = async (slug, password) => {
const inserted = await db('events').insert({
slug,
event_type: 'wedding',
event_name: `Sanitize ${slug}`,
event_date: '2026-08-01',
host_email: 'host@example.com',
admin_email: 'admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash(password, 4),
share_link: `/gallery/${slug}/share`,
share_token: `${slug}-share`,
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000).toISOString(),
is_active: 1,
is_archived: 0,
is_draft: 0,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
}).returning('id');
return inserted[0]?.id ?? inserted[0];
};
let plainEventId;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await seedMinimal(db);
plainEventId = await makeEvent(PLAIN_SLUG, PLAIN_PASSWORD);
await makeEvent(ZWJ_SLUG, ZWJ_PASSWORD);
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/auth', require('../../src/routes/auth'));
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (cleanup) await cleanup();
});
const verify = (slug, password) =>
request(app).post('/api/auth/gallery/verify').send({ slug, password });
it('accepts the exact password', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, PLAIN_PASSWORD);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('rescues a mid-string zero-width space from chat-app copy-paste', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, 'wedding\u200B2026');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('rescues leading BOM + trailing space paste artifacts', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, `\uFEFF${PLAIN_PASSWORD} `);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('records no login_fail for a rescued login (single-request fallback)', async () => {
await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, 'wedding\u200B2026').expect(200);
const failed = await db('access_logs')
.where({ event_id: plainEventId, action: 'login_fail' });
expect(failed).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('still accepts a stored password that legitimately contains a ZWJ', async () => {
const res = await verify(ZWJ_SLUG, ZWJ_PASSWORD);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.token).toBeTruthy();
});
it('does not invent a match when the ZWJ is missing from the input', async () => {
const res = await verify(ZWJ_SLUG, 'Family\u{1F468}\u{1F469}Aa1');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('rejects a plain wrong password', async () => {
const res = await verify(PLAIN_SLUG, 'not-the-password');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});