picpeak/backend/__tests__/utils/cssSanitizer.remoteUrls.test.js

/**
 * cssSanitizer — remote url() removal.
 *
 * Regression: `sanitizeCSS` used to "block" a remote url() by prefixing it
 * with a `/* BLOCKED URL *\/` COMMENT and leaving the URL in place. CSS
 * comments are discarded during tokenization, so the declaration a browser
 * actually parsed still carried the live URL — while the returned warning
 * told the caller it had been blocked.
 *
 * The load-bearing assertion in most of these is therefore not "the marker is
 * gone" but "the HOST is gone", checked against the comment-stripped text the
 * way a parser would see it.
 */

const { sanitizeCSS, sanitizeCss, stripDisallowedUrls } = require('../../src/utils/cssSanitizer');

/** What a CSS parser sees: comments are discarded before parsing. */
const asParsed = (css) => css.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '');

describe('stripDisallowedUrls', () => {
  it('removes a remote url() rather than commenting near it', () => {
    const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');

    expect(blocked).toBe(1);
    expect(sanitized).not.toContain('evil.example');
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it.each([
    ['unquoted', '.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
    ['single-quoted', '.a{background:url(\'https://evil.example/p.gif\')}'],
    ['double-quoted', '.a{background:url("https://evil.example/p.gif")}'],
    ['spaced', '.a{background:url(  https://evil.example/p.gif  )}'],
    ['uppercase URL(', '.a{background:URL(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
    ['protocol-relative', '.a{background:url(//evil.example/p.gif)}'],
    ['scheme-less host', '.a{background:url(evil.example/p.gif)}'],
    ['http', '.a{background:url(http://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
  ])('removes a %s remote url()', (_label, css) => {
    expect(asParsed(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it('keeps an inline data: image', () => {
    const css = '.a{background:url()}';
    const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);

    expect(blocked).toBe(0);
    expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
  });

  it.each(['jpeg', 'jpg', 'png', 'gif', 'webp'])('keeps a )}`;
    expect(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
  });

  it('removes a data: URI that is not a raster image', () => {
    // )}').sanitized;
    expect(out).not.toContain('svg+xml');
  });

  it('leaves the rest of a shorthand declaration intact', () => {
    const out = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:#fff url(https://x/p.gif) no-repeat center}').sanitized;

    expect(out).toContain('#fff');
    expect(out).toContain('no-repeat center');
    expect(out).toContain('none');
    expect(out).not.toContain('https://x');
  });

  it('counts and removes every offender in one stylesheet', () => {
    const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(
      '.a{background:url(https://a.example/1.gif)}'
      + '.b{background:url(https://b.example/2.gif)}'
      + '.c{background:url()}'
    );

    expect(blocked).toBe(2);
    expect(sanitized).not.toContain('a.example');
    expect(sanitized).not.toContain('b.example');
    expect(sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
  });

  // Codex review: `)` is ordinary content inside a QUOTED url(), so a pattern
  // that stops at the first `)` failed to match at all — reporting the token
  // as clean and storing it verbatim. A working bypass of the block.
  it.each([
    ['double-quoted', '.a{background:url("https://evil.example/pixel).gif")}'],
    ['single-quoted', ".a{background:url('https://evil.example/pixel).gif')}"],
    ['several parens', '.a{background:url("https://evil.example/a)b)c.gif")}'],
  ])('removes a %s remote url() containing a closing paren', (_label, css) => {
    const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
    expect(blocked).toBe(1);
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it('keeps a QUOTED data: image, parens and all', () => {
    const css = '.a{background:url("")}';
    expect(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
  });

  it('does not swallow an unquoted url() that never closes', () => {
    // Malformed input must not eat the rest of the stylesheet.
    const css = '.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif}.b{color:red}';
    const { sanitized } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
    expect(sanitized).toContain('color:red');
  });

  // Round-2 review: three more ways a regex could not see CSS structure.
  it('blocks a url() hidden behind a CSS escape', () => {
    // `\\72` is a legal way to write `r`, so this IS url(...) to a browser.
    const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:u\\72l(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');
    expect(blocked).toBe(1);
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it('leaves url()-looking text inside a CSS string alone', () => {
    // `content:` is inert display text, not a resource request. Rewriting it
    // is a visible change to a page that never fetched anything.
    const css = '.a::after{content:"url(https://docs.example)"}';
    const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
    expect(blocked).toBe(0);
    expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
  });

  it('does not treat a ) inside a quoted string as the end of a token', () => {
    const css = '.a::after{content:"a) b"}.c{background:url(https://evil.example/x.gif)}';
    const { sanitized } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
    expect(sanitized).toContain('content:"a) b"');
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  // Round-3 review: all three came from decoding escapes globally before
  // scanning, which destroyed the difference between an escaped quote and a
  // real one — and rewrote clean escapes that were never URLs.
  it('does not let an escaped quote desynchronise the scan', () => {
    // `\\"` inside a double-quoted string does NOT close it. Treating it as a
    // delimiter put the scanner a quote out of phase and let the url() that
    // followed through untouched.
    const css = '.a{content:"foo\\"";background:url(https://evil.example/x)}';
    const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
    expect(blocked).toBe(1);
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it('does not treat a quote inside a CSS comment as a string', () => {
    // A browser ignores the comment and makes the request; the scanner used
    // to enter string mode on the apostrophe and copy the rest unscanned.
    const css = "/* don't */ .a{background:url(https://evil.example/x)}";
    const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
    expect(blocked).toBe(1);
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it('leaves an escaped selector byte-identical', () => {
    // `.w-1\\/2` is an ordinary escaped Tailwind class. Global decoding
    // rewrote it to `.w-1/2` — a DIFFERENT selector — and migration 200 then
    // committed that irreversibly, since its down() is a no-op.
    const css = '.w-1\\/2{color:red}';
    const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
    expect(blocked).toBe(0);
    expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
  });

  it('returns clean input unchanged, whatever escapes it carries', () => {
    // The migration only writes when the bytes differ, so "unchanged" is
    // what keeps a clean row out of the repair path entirely.
    for (const css of [
      '.a{color:red}',
      '/* a comment */ .b{color:blue}',
      '.c\\:hover{color:green}',
      '.d::after{content:"\\201C"}',
      '.e{background:url()}',
    ]) {
      const { sanitized, blocked } = stripDisallowedUrls(css);
      expect(blocked).toBe(0);
      expect(sanitized).toBe(css);
    }
  });

  it('keeps a comment that merely mentions a url', () => {
    const css = '/* see url(https://docs.example) for details */ .a{color:red}';
    expect(stripDisallowedUrls(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
  });

  it('is idempotent', () => {
    const once = stripDisallowedUrls('.a{background:url(https://x/p.gif)}').sanitized;
    expect(stripDisallowedUrls(once).sanitized).toBe(once);
  });

  it('handles empty and nullish input', () => {
    expect(stripDisallowedUrls('').sanitized).toBe('');
    expect(stripDisallowedUrls(null).sanitized).toBe('');
    expect(stripDisallowedUrls(undefined).sanitized).toBe('');
  });
});

describe('sanitizeCSS', () => {
  it('no longer emits an inert BLOCKED URL marker', () => {
    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');

    expect(sanitized).not.toContain('BLOCKED URL');
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it('warns with the number it actually removed', () => {
    const { warnings } = sanitizeCSS(
      '.a{background:url(https://a.example/1.gif)}.b{background:url(https://b.example/2.gif)}'
    );
    expect(warnings.some((w) => /Blocked 2 external URL references/.test(w))).toBe(true);
  });

  it('does not warn about URLs when there are none', () => {
    const { warnings } = sanitizeCSS('.a{color:red}');
    expect(warnings.filter((w) => /external URL/.test(w))).toHaveLength(0);
  });

  it('blocks a url() that only becomes one after HTML comments are removed', () => {
    // The comment strip JOINS the remaining characters into a live url(...).
    // A scan that ran before it saw no token and called the input clean.
    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:u<!--x-->rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}');
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it.each([
    ['a C0 control character', '\u0001'],
    ['a NUL byte', '\u0000'],
    ['a DEL byte', '\u007F'],
    // Newlines are control characters for this strip, so the bypass did not
    // need an exotic byte — ordinary-looking wrapped CSS was enough.
    ['a newline', '\n'],
  ])('blocks a url() that only becomes one after %s is removed', (_label, ch) => {
    // Same token-joining hazard as the HTML-comment case above: the control
    // strip used to run AFTER the URL scan, so `u\u0001rl(...)` was scanned
    // as clean and then joined into a live remote request, with no warning.
    const { sanitized, warnings } = sanitizeCSS(
      `.a{background:u${ch}rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}`
    );
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
    expect(warnings.join(' ')).toContain('external URL');
  });

  it('blocks a url() hidden behind an escaped quote outside a string', () => {
    // `\'` is an escaped identifier character, not a string opener. The
    // scanner used to step onto the apostrophe, enter string mode, and copy
    // the rest of the stylesheet — url() included — unexamined.
    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
      ".hero{--marker:\\';background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}"
    );
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it.each([
    ['a leading escape', '.a{background:\\75rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
    ['an escape mid-identifier', '.a{background:u\\72l(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
  ])('blocks a url() spelled with %s', (_label, css) => {
    // `\75` is the CSS escape for `u`, so a browser reads `\75rl(` as
    // url(). The escape-outside-a-string handling has to run AFTER the
    // identifier check, or it eats the escape and hides the token.
    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(css);
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it('blocks a url() the TAG strip would have un-quoted', () => {
    // `<[^>]*>` deletes the span it matches, and `<">` takes a quote with it.
    // Running that after the URL scan meant the scanner saw the url() safely
    // inside a string and this pass then removed the quotes that made it so.
    // URL validation has to be the last thing that looks at the text.
    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
      '--x:x<">;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--y:x<">'
    );
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it('does not treat NBSP as CSS whitespace inside url()', () => {
    // JS `\s` matches U+00A0; CSS whitespace does not. Skipping it let the
    // scanner read the following quote as a legitimate data: URI and swallow
    // a remote url() inside the "string", while a browser sees an unquoted
    // url-token ending at the first `)` and fetches the remote background.
    const NBSP = '\u00a0';
    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
      `.a{background:url(${NBSP}"data:image/png);background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--x:");}`
    );
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it('still allows ordinary CSS whitespace around a data: URI', () => {
    const spaced = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url( "" )}');
    expect(spaced.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
    const tabbed = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(\t"")}');
    expect(tabbed.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
  });

  it('does not let an unterminated quote hide everything after it', () => {
    // An unclosed quote is a parse error. Trusting it meant one stray
    // apostrophe disabled scanning for the remainder of the stylesheet, so
    // the safe reading is to treat it as an ordinary character and continue.
    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
      "p{font-family:'don't;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}"
    );
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
  });

  it('still keeps legitimate quoted values and data: images intact', () => {
    const font = sanitizeCSS('p{font-family:"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;color:red}');
    expect(font.sanitized).toContain('"Helvetica Neue"');
    const data = sanitizeCSS(".a{background:url('')}");
    expect(data.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
  });

  it('still blocks the other forbidden patterns', () => {
    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
      '@import url("https://x/e.css"); .a{width:expression(alert(1));behavior:url(e.htc)}'
    );
    expect(sanitized).not.toContain('@import');
    expect(sanitized).not.toContain('expression(');
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('https://x/e.css');
  });

  it('neutralises a javascript: url()', () => {
    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(javascript:alert(1))}');
    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('javascript:');
  });

  it('leaves ordinary declarations untouched', () => {
    const css = '.btn { color: #fff; padding: 12px 24px; border-radius: 6px; }';
    expect(sanitizeCSS(css).sanitized).toBe(css);
  });
});

describe('sanitizeCss (lowercase) — public-site path, deliberately unchanged', () => {
  it('still permits a remote url()', () => {
    // This function never blocked remote URLs and never claimed to. The
    // public-site CSS surface may legitimately reference a remote font or
    // background; changing that is a product decision, not this bug fix.
    const out = sanitizeCss('.a{background:url(https://cdn.example/x.png)}');
    expect(out).toContain('https://cdn.example/x.png');
  });

  it('still strips @import and javascript: urls', () => {
    expect(sanitizeCss('@import url("https://x/e.css"); .a{color:red}')).not.toContain('@import');
    expect(sanitizeCss('.a{background:url(\'javascript:alert(1)\')}')).not.toContain('javascript:');
  });
});