Files
picpeak/backend/server.js
T
Luca 9431b9f094 feat(setup): configure the public address and SMTP in the wizard, not .env (#1104)
* feat(setup): configure the public address and SMTP in the wizard, not .env

A fresh install could not configure its own public address. `general_site_url`
and the `email_configs` row already existed as admin settings, but nothing
could reach them:

- docker-compose.yml injected FRONTEND_URL=${FRONTEND_URL:-http://localhost:3000}
  and Dockerfile.aio baked in ENV FRONTEND_URL=http://localhost:3000, so
  getFrontendBaseUrl() returned on its first branch every time and the setting
  was never read. .env.example shipped the same value as an uncommented
  placeholder for FRONTEND_URL / ADMIN_URL / API_URL.
- the wizard never asked for the address at all, and skipped its whole config
  step unless a CRM-ish feature was selected — so a gallery-only install was
  also never offered SMTP, despite gallery links, guest invites and expiry
  warnings all going out through email_configs.
- eleven call sites read process.env.FRONTEND_URL directly rather than the
  resolver, three of them defaulting to placeholder hosts that reached real
  recipients: https://app.example.com in payment-reminder emails, localhost:3005
  in admin invitation emails, https://app.example.com in dev template previews.

Stop injecting a default anywhere, and resolve the origin instead:
FRONTEND_URL -> general_site_url -> the origin the request arrived on ->
whichever exists -> ''. A loopback candidate is treated as unconfigured so the
installs that already have http://localhost:3000 baked into their environment
self-heal; the same guard previously lived inline in routes/gallery.js for the
slideshow QR (#848) and is now shared. The empty return is preserved because
shareLinkService and the SSO redirects in routes/auth rely on it to emit
relative urls — callers needing an absolute url use getAbsoluteFrontendUrl(),
which still ends at http://localhost:3000.

The wizard now persists window.location.origin right after the admin account is
created, so an install that skips the rest still has a usable origin for
background jobs that have no request to derive one from, and offers it as an
editable "Public address" field. Settings -> General shows the field read-only
when FRONTEND_URL pins it, instead of silently ignoring edits.

Also drop the `|| 'mailhog'` fallback when seeding email_configs: that host only
exists in the dev compose profile (which does not even start by default), so a
fresh install came up with a live config pointing nowhere while the wizard
showed empty SMTP fields. With no row, blank fields are the truth and
emailProcessor logs "No email configuration found". Developers set
SMTP_HOST=mailhog explicitly.

backend/src/services/emailService.js is deleted: nothing in backend/ references
it, and it was the only consumer of the SMTP_* variables, which misrepresented
how mail is configured.

Refs #705

* fix(setup): keep FRONTEND_URL ahead of ADMIN_URL/APP_URL when resolving links

The previous commit routed two call sites through the resolver but put the
site-specific variable FIRST, silently reversing precedence:

  userManagementService  was: FRONTEND_URL || ADMIN_URL || localhost:3005
                    became: ADMIN_URL || resolver
  adminEvents/crud       was: FRONTEND_URL || APP_URL || ''
                    became: APP_URL || resolver

An install with both variables set would have flipped which one won. Call the
resolver first instead — it starts with FRONTEND_URL, so the original relative
order is preserved and only the final fallback changes: localhost:3005 (not
even the frontend's port) and '' (a relative link inside an email) both become
the resolved origin.

Refs #705

* fix(setup): unpin loopback FRONTEND_URL, keep ADMIN_URL/APP_URL reachable

Review feedback on #1104.

isEnvPinned() reported ANY FRONTEND_URL as authoritative, including the
loopback values getFrontendBaseUrl() deliberately demotes. An install
upgrading with the old compose default FRONTEND_URL=http://localhost:3000
therefore resolved its origin from general_site_url correctly, but got the
Site URL field rendered read-only in Settings and skipped by the wizard's
seeding - locking the exact operators this change exists to unblock out of
configuring a public address anywhere. The predicate now mirrors the
resolver, and the derived general_site_url_effective the General tab reads
comes from the same helper instead of re-normalising process.env inline.

APP_URL and ADMIN_URL had become dead code: getFrontendBaseUrl() only
returns falsy when NOTHING is configured, so `|| process.env.ADMIN_URL`
after it never ran once a site URL existed - which after this PR is the
normal case. A split-origin install pointing ADMIN_URL at a separate admin
host got invite links on the public gallery origin instead. They are now
passed as an explicit `override` that resolves directly below FRONTEND_URL,
preserving the historic FRONTEND_URL-before-ADMIN_URL order while beating
the database- and request-derived fallbacks.

general_site_url now feeds the CORS allowlist and the
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header, not just email links, so a schemeless
value is an allowlist entry no browser origin can match. Validate it
server-side in PUT /general (isURL with require_protocol, require_tld off
so LAN/NAS installs on http://nas:3000 still work) and client-side in both
surfaces that write it - type="url" never fires in either, since neither
input sits inside a form.

Two more wizard fixes: the General tab no longer reposts general_site_url
while it is env-pinned, because the field then holds the effective env
value rather than the stored one and the round-trip read as a change to a
protected key, 403ing a settings.edit-without-settings.domains admin on an
unrelated save. And SetupConfigStep validates the From address before
posting - /admin/email/config rejects a blank one, which used to surface as
a generic warning while the wizard advanced from its finally block anyway,
discarding every SMTP value the user had typed, password included. A failed
save now keeps them on the step.

* fix(setup): surface a rejected public address instead of swallowing it

Review round 2 follow-up on #1104, pushed onto the branch.

saveSiteUrl() caught and discarded every error. That was defensible before
round 2 added a server-side URL check, but PUT /general can now answer 400 —
and the two validators disagreed:

  http://my_nas.local      client: accepted   server: rejected
  http://foo_bar:3000      client: accepted   server: rejected

validate() let those through, the 400 was swallowed, `failed` stayed false and
onDone() ran. The operator finished the wizard believing the public address was
stored when nothing had been. That is the silent misconfiguration this whole
change exists to remove, landing on the LAN and NAS installs it targets.

Three parts:

- saveSiteUrl() throws. finish() resolves it before anything else is posted and
  puts the message on the address field rather than the generic "some settings
  could not be saved" warning. Skip for now still always leaves, by contract,
  but warns instead of dropping the value in silence.
- allow_underscores on the server check, for the same reason require_tld is
  off: browsers resolve http://my_nas.local and the client accepts it, so
  rejecting it server-side only produced the mismatch above. Both validators
  now agree across the LAN/NAS, IDN, bare-IP and scheme-less cases.
- LOOPBACK_BASE_RE anchors its host token. Bare prefix matching also demoted
  https://localhost-nas.example.com, and now that this predicate gates the
  whole resolver rather than just the slideshow QR, being demoted means a
  configured address is silently ignored. 127. stays a bare prefix on purpose:
  all of 127.0.0.0/8 is loopback.

Resolver suite 31 passing, up from 26. Mutation-checked: restoring the
unanchored regex fails the three new host-boundary cases.

* fix(settings): don't lock the General tab on a site URL nobody typed

Review follow-up on #1104, pushed onto the branch.

general_site_url was free-text until this PR added a server-side check, so an
upgraded install can hold something schemeless that predates it. The tab
flagged that on load, and `disabled={!!siteUrlError}` then killed Save for
EVERY General setting.

An admin holding settings.edit but not settings.domains could not clear it
either: correcting the address is a change to a protected key and 403s. The
tab has no permission gating, so that role was simply locked out of the tab
with no self-service way back.

That is the same role adminSettings.js:85-95 documents the no-op round-trip
allowance for. The allowance only helps if the request is made, and this
blocked it in the browser first.

Validation now waits until the field is actually edited, and an unchanged
value is dropped from the payload rather than reposted — matching what the
env-pinned case already does one line above, and for the same reason.

  stored value invalid, untouched   Save works, key not sent
  edited to something unusable      Save blocked
  edited to a usable absolute url   saved

Four tests, first coverage for this feature. Mutation-checked: removing the
dirty gate fails the untouched-value case.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <53005142+the-luap@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-21 12:54:14 +02:00

1241 lines
54 KiB
JavaScript

require('dotenv').config();
// Validate critical environment variables before proceeding
const { validateEnvironment } = require('./src/config/validateEnv');
validateEnvironment();
// Resolve which database engine this process should use, BEFORE anything
// requires knexfile/db (#1038). wait-for-db.sh normally does this and exports
// DATABASE_CLIENT, but a Kubernetes manifest that sets `command`/`args`, or a
// plain `docker run … node server.js`, bypasses the entrypoint entirely — and
// those are exactly the deployments this fix is for. Without this, such an
// install would resolve to Postgres (NODE_ENV is baked into the image now) and
// come up against an empty database while its SQLite data sat there unseen.
//
// spawnSync because the decision needs an async Postgres probe and this must
// happen before the first `require` of knexfile. It short-circuits without
// probing when DATABASE_CLIENT is already set, so the entrypoint path pays
// nothing.
// Also run it when a migration pin exists: an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT=pg
// would otherwise skip the check and start against a half-migrated Postgres
// while SQLite is still the database of record.
if (!process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT
|| require('./src/utils/databaseEngine').hasMigrationInProgress()) {
const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
const probe = spawnSync(
process.execPath,
[require('path').join(__dirname, 'scripts', 'resolve-db-engine.js')],
{ encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'inherit'] }
);
// Exit 3: two populated databases and no record of which is authoritative.
// The resolver has printed the comparison and the two ways to resolve it;
// starting either engine would hide the other's data.
if (probe.status === 3) {
process.exit(1);
}
const resolved = (probe.stdout || '').trim();
if (probe.status === 0 && resolved) {
process.env.DATABASE_CLIENT = resolved;
// Pin the CONNECTION too, not just the client. knexfile's development block
// defaults Postgres to localhost/postgres/photo_sharing and production to
// db/picpeak/picpeak, so naming only the client can point this process at a
// different database than the resolver probed — with SQLite already retired.
if (resolved === 'pg') {
const conn = require('./src/utils/databaseEngine').pgConnectionFromEnv();
process.env.DB_HOST = String(conn.host);
process.env.DB_PORT = String(conn.port);
process.env.DB_USER = String(conn.user);
process.env.DB_NAME = String(conn.database);
}
}
}
// Initialize logger early to capture startup logs
const logger = require('./src/utils/logger');
logger.info('Server starting up', {
nodeVersion: process.version,
environment: process.env.NODE_ENV || 'development',
// Which database this process actually talks to (#1038). Nothing logged this
// before, so an install silently running on SQLite with Postgres configured
// had no way to notice.
database: require('./src/utils/databaseEngine').describeEngine(require('./knexfile')),
timestamp: new Date().toISOString()
});
const fs = require('fs');
const express = require('express');
const helmet = require('helmet');
const compression = require('compression');
const cors = require('cors');
const path = require('path');
const { initializeDatabase, db } = require('./src/database/db');
const {
getFrontendBaseUrlSync,
getAbsoluteFrontendUrl,
primeSiteUrlCache,
} = require('./src/utils/frontendUrl');
const { startFileWatcher } = require('./src/services/fileWatcher');
const { startExpirationChecker } = require('./src/services/expirationChecker');
const { startTransferCleanup } = require('./src/services/transferCleanupService');
const { startDownloadJobCleanup } = require('./src/services/downloadJobCleanupService');
const { startRevealScheduler } = require('./src/services/revealScheduler');
const { startInvoiceScheduler } = require('./src/services/invoiceSchedulerService');
const { initializeTransporter, startEmailQueueProcessor } = require('./src/services/emailProcessor');
const { startBackupService } = require('./src/services/backupService');
const { startScheduledBackups } = require('./src/services/databaseBackup');
const backgroundProcessor = require('./src/services/backgroundProcessor');
const { maintenanceMiddleware } = require('./src/middleware/maintenance');
const { sessionTimeoutMiddleware } = require('./src/middleware/sessionTimeout');
const { errorHandler, notFoundHandler } = require('./src/middleware/errorHandler');
const { createRateLimiter, createAuthRateLimiter } = require('./src/services/rateLimitService');
const { getPublicSitePayload } = require('./src/services/publicSiteService');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const {
getAdminTokenFromRequest,
getGalleryTokenFromRequest,
} = require('./src/utils/tokenUtils');
// Import routes
const authRoutes = require('./src/routes/auth');
const galleryRoutes = require('./src/routes/gallery');
const adminRoutes = require('./src/routes/admin');
const adminAuthRoutes = require('./src/routes/adminAuth');
const secureImagesRoutes = require('./src/routes/secureImages');
const setupRoutes = require('./src/routes/setup');
const app = express();
const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3000;
// Trust proxy headers (required for Traefik/nginx).
//
// `req.ip` is computed by Express by walking X-Forwarded-For from
// right-to-left and stopping at the first hop NOT in this list, so
// the value picpeak audits (signing IPs, payment-check actions,
// rate-limit keys) is the originating client IP behind any number
// of trusted reverse proxies.
//
// Default: 'loopback, linklocal, uniquelocal' — covers localhost,
// link-local (169.254.0.0/16), and unique-local IPv6 (fc00::/7).
// Standard for nginx-in-front-of-Node deployments on the same host
// and for Docker bridge networks. Operators with unusual topologies
// (load balancer in a public subnet, multi-hop NAT) override via
// TRUST_PROXY env, accepting any value Express accepts: a number,
// 'loopback', 'linklocal', 'uniquelocal', a CIDR, a comma list, or
// 'true' (trust ALL proxies — only safe behind a fully-controlled
// reverse-proxy chain).
//
// NEVER read req.headers['x-forwarded-for'] directly in audit paths
// — see utils/clientIp.js for the rationale.
const trustProxySetting = process.env.TRUST_PROXY || 'loopback, linklocal, uniquelocal';
app.set('trust proxy', trustProxySetting === 'true' ? true : trustProxySetting);
// Security middleware with custom CSP
// In native HTTP installs, do NOT force HTTPS for subresources.
const enableHsts = process.env.ENABLE_HSTS === 'true';
const cspDirectives = {
defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
scriptSrc: [
"'self'",
'https://www.google.com',
'https://www.gstatic.com'
],
styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'", "https:"], // Required for styled components
imgSrc: ["'self'", "data:", "https:", "blob:"], // Allow data URLs and external images
connectSrc: ["'self'", 'https://www.google.com', 'https://www.gstatic.com'], // API connections
fontSrc: ["'self'", "https:", "data:"], // Web fonts
objectSrc: ["'none'"], // Disable plugins
mediaSrc: ["'self'"], // Audio/video
frameSrc: ["'self'", 'https://www.google.com'],
};
// Only upgrade insecure requests when HSTS explicitly enabled (HTTPS deployment)
if (enableHsts) {
// In helmet, an empty array enables the directive
cspDirectives.upgradeInsecureRequests = [];
}
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use((req, res, next) => {
if (req.headers.authorization) {
return next();
}
const path = req.path || '';
const slugMatch = path.match(/\/api\/(?:gallery|secure-images)\/([^\/]+)/);
const slug = slugMatch ? slugMatch[1] : req.requestedSlug;
const adminToken = getAdminTokenFromRequest(req);
const galleryToken = getGalleryTokenFromRequest(req, slug);
const isAdminRequest = path.startsWith('/api/admin') || path.startsWith('/admin');
const isGalleryRequest = Boolean(slugMatch)
|| path.startsWith('/api/gallery')
|| path.startsWith('/gallery')
|| path.startsWith('/api/secure-images');
// Prefer admin credentials on admin routes so gallery sessions cannot override them.
if (isAdminRequest) {
if (adminToken) {
req.headers.authorization = `Bearer ${adminToken}`;
}
} else if (isGalleryRequest) {
if (galleryToken) {
req.headers.authorization = `Bearer ${galleryToken}`;
} else if (adminToken) {
req.headers.authorization = `Bearer ${adminToken}`;
}
} else if (adminToken) {
req.headers.authorization = `Bearer ${adminToken}`;
} else if (galleryToken) {
req.headers.authorization = `Bearer ${galleryToken}`;
}
next();
});
app.use(helmet({
contentSecurityPolicy: {
// Avoid helmet adding defaults like upgrade-insecure-requests when not desired
useDefaults: false,
directives: cspDirectives,
},
hsts: enableHsts ? {
maxAge: 31536000, // 1 year
includeSubDomains: true,
preload: true
} : false,
permittedCrossDomainPolicies: false,
referrerPolicy: { policy: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" }
}));
// Additional security headers
app.use((req, res, next) => {
// Permissions Policy (controls browser features)
res.setHeader('Permissions-Policy', 'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=()');
next();
});
// CORS configuration (apply only to API routes)
const corsOptions = {
origin: function (origin, callback) {
// getFrontendBaseUrlSync() resolves FRONTEND_URL, else the configured
// general_site_url (#705) — without it, an install that leaves the
// environment untouched and answers the setup wizard instead would have
// its own public origin missing from the allowlist.
const allowedOrigins = [
getFrontendBaseUrlSync() || 'http://localhost:3005',
process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3005'
];
// In development, also allow localhost origins
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development') {
allowedOrigins.push(
'http://localhost:5173', // Vite dev server
'http://localhost:3002', // Backend server
'http://localhost:3001', // For API testing
'http://localhost:3000' // Direct backend access
);
}
// Allow requests with no origin (like curl) and allow-listed origins
if (!origin || allowedOrigins.indexOf(origin) !== -1) {
callback(null, true);
} else {
// Do not error globally; just omit CORS headers on disallowed origins
callback(null, false);
}
},
credentials: true,
// Expose Content-Disposition so split (cross-origin) frontend
// deployments can read the server's chosen download filename. Used
// by the gallery/admin download flows to honour the #493 "original
// camera filename" toggle on individual photo downloads (#507).
exposedHeaders: ['Content-Disposition'],
};
// Only attach CORS to API endpoints, not static assets
app.use('/api', cors(corsOptions));
// Handle preflight explicitly for API paths
app.options('/api/*', cors(corsOptions));
// Initialize rate limiters (they will be created dynamically)
let generalRateLimiter;
let authRateLimiter;
function composeInlineStyles(payload) {
const { branding } = payload;
const cssSegments = [];
cssSegments.push(`:root {
--brand-primary: ${branding.colors.primary};
--brand-accent: ${branding.colors.accent};
--brand-background: ${branding.colors.background};
--brand-text: ${branding.colors.text};
--brand-surface: ${branding.colors.surface || '#ffffff'};
--brand-elevated: ${branding.colors.elevated || '#f5f5f5'};
--brand-border: ${branding.colors.border || '#e5e5e5'};
--brand-muted-text: ${branding.colors.mutedText || '#737373'};
}`);
if (payload.baseCss) {
cssSegments.push(payload.baseCss);
}
if (payload.css) {
cssSegments.push(`/* Custom styles */\n${payload.css}`);
}
return cssSegments.join('\n\n');
}
function escapeHtml(str) {
if (!str) return '';
return String(str)
.replace(/&/g, '&amp;')
.replace(/</g, '&lt;')
.replace(/>/g, '&gt;')
.replace(/"/g, '&quot;')
.replace(/'/g, '&#039;');
}
function renderBrandHeader(branding) {
const displayName = escapeHtml(branding.companyName || 'PicPeak');
const logoSrc = encodeURI(branding.logoUrl || '/picpeak-logo-transparent.png');
const logo = `<img src="${logoSrc}" alt="${displayName}" class="brand-logo" loading="lazy" decoding="async" />`;
const tagline = branding.companyTagline
? `<p class="brand-tagline">${escapeHtml(branding.companyTagline)}</p>`
: '';
return `<header class="site-header">
<div class="header-inner">
<div class="brand">
${logo}
<div class="brand-copy">
<p class="brand-label">${displayName}</p>
${tagline}
</div>
</div>
<nav class="site-nav">
<a href="#features">${'Features'}</a>
<a href="#workflow">${'Workflow'}</a>
<a href="#collections">${'Collections'}</a>
<a href="#stories">${'Stories'}</a>
<a href="#contact">${'Contact'}</a>
</nav>
</div>
</header>`;
}
function renderBrandFooter(branding) {
const displayName = escapeHtml(branding.companyName || 'PicPeak');
const footerNote = branding.footerText
? `<p>${escapeHtml(branding.footerText)}</p>`
: '<p>Powered by PicPeak to keep every celebration beautifully organised.</p>';
const supportEmail = escapeHtml(branding.supportEmail || '');
const supportLink = supportEmail
? `<a href="mailto:${supportEmail}">Support</a>`
: '';
const legalLinks = `
<a href="/datenschutz">Privacy Policy</a>
<a href="/impressum">Impressum</a>
${supportLink}
`;
return `<footer class="site-footer" id="contact">
<div class="footer-inner">
<div>
<h2>${displayName}</h2>
${footerNote}
</div>
<div class="footer-links">
${legalLinks}
</div>
</div>
</footer>`;
}
function buildSeoMetaTags(seoSettings) {
const tags = [];
const robotsDirectives = [];
if (seoSettings.seo_meta_noindex) robotsDirectives.push('noindex');
if (seoSettings.seo_meta_nofollow) robotsDirectives.push('nofollow');
if (robotsDirectives.length > 0) {
tags.push(`<meta name="robots" content="${robotsDirectives.join(', ')}" />`);
}
if (seoSettings.seo_meta_noai) {
tags.push('<meta name="robots" content="noai, noimageai" />');
}
return tags.join('\n ');
}
function buildPublicSiteDocument(payload) {
const inlineStyles = composeInlineStyles(payload);
const header = renderBrandHeader(payload.branding);
const footer = renderBrandFooter(payload.branding);
const seoMeta = payload.seoSettings ? buildSeoMetaTags(payload.seoSettings) : '';
return `<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
<title>${escapeHtml(payload.title)}</title>
<meta name="description" content="Curated photo galleries and stories from unforgettable celebrations." />
${seoMeta}
<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com" />
<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossorigin />
<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@400;500;600;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet" />
<style>${inlineStyles}</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class="site-shell">
${header}
<main class="site-main">
${payload.html}
</main>
${footer}
</div>
</body>
</html>`;
}
async function handlePublicSiteRequest(req, res, next) {
try {
const payload = await getPublicSitePayload();
if (!payload.enabled) {
res.redirect(302, '/admin/login');
return;
}
if (payload.etag && req.headers['if-none-match'] === payload.etag) {
res.status(304).end();
return;
}
// Inject SEO meta settings into payload
try {
const seoRows = await db('app_settings')
.where('setting_type', 'seo')
.whereIn('setting_key', ['seo_meta_noindex', 'seo_meta_nofollow', 'seo_meta_noai'])
.select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
const seoSettings = {};
for (const row of seoRows) {
let val = row.setting_value;
if (typeof val === 'string') { try { val = JSON.parse(val); } catch {} }
seoSettings[row.setting_key] = val;
}
payload.seoSettings = seoSettings;
} catch {}
const document = buildPublicSiteDocument(payload);
res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/html; charset=utf-8');
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=30, must-revalidate');
res.setHeader('ETag', payload.etag);
res.setHeader('Vary', 'Accept-Encoding');
res.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', "default-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https:; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self'; form-action 'self'");
res.status(200).send(document);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to render public site', { error: error.message });
next();
}
}
// Function to initialize rate limiters
async function initializeRateLimiters() {
generalRateLimiter = await createRateLimiter();
authRateLimiter = await createAuthRateLimiter();
// Apply rate limiting
app.use('/api/', generalRateLimiter);
app.use('/api/auth', authRateLimiter);
app.use('/api/gallery/:slug/verify', authRateLimiter);
app.use('/api/admin/auth/login', authRateLimiter);
app.use('/api/setup/admin', authRateLimiter);
app.use('/api/setup/verify-token', authRateLimiter);
}
// Note: Rate limiters will be initialized after database connection
app.use(express.json({ limit: '50mb' }));
app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true, limit: '50mb' }));
// CSRF protection: require JSON Content-Type on mutating API requests
// This blocks cross-origin form submissions which cannot set Content-Type: application/json
app.use('/api', (req, res, next) => {
if (['POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH'].includes(req.method)) {
const contentType = req.headers['content-type'] || '';
const contentLength = parseInt(req.headers['content-length'] || '0', 10);
// Allow empty-body requests (e.g. logout), multipart for uploads, and JSON for API calls
if (contentLength > 0 && !contentType.includes('application/json') && !contentType.includes('multipart/form-data')) {
return res.status(415).json({ error: 'Unsupported Content-Type. Use application/json or multipart/form-data.' });
}
}
next();
});
// Request logging for API routes (with timestamps)
const apiRequestLogger = (req, res, next) => {
try {
const started = Date.now();
const ts = new Date().toISOString();
logger.info(`[${ts}] ${req.method} ${req.originalUrl}`);
res.on('finish', () => {
const ms = Date.now() - started;
const tsDone = new Date().toISOString();
logger.info(`[${tsDone}] ${req.method} ${req.originalUrl} -> ${res.statusCode} (${ms}ms)`);
});
} catch (_) {}
next();
};
app.use('/api', apiRequestLogger);
// Maintenance mode middleware - add after body parsing but before routes
app.use(maintenanceMiddleware);
// Session timeout middleware for admin routes
app.use('/api/admin', sessionTimeoutMiddleware);
// Middleware to set CORS headers for static files
const setCorsHeaders = (req, res, next) => {
const origin = req.headers.origin;
const staticAllowedOrigins = [
getFrontendBaseUrlSync() || 'http://localhost:3005',
process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3005'
];
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development') {
staticAllowedOrigins.push(
'http://localhost:5173',
'http://localhost:3002',
'http://localhost:3001',
'http://localhost:3000'
);
}
if (origin && staticAllowedOrigins.indexOf(origin) !== -1) {
res.header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', origin);
res.header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials', 'true');
}
res.header('Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy', 'cross-origin');
next();
};
// Import secure static middleware
const secureStatic = require('./src/middleware/secureStatic');
// Get storage path from environment or use default
const storagePath = process.env.STORAGE_PATH || path.join(__dirname, '../storage');
process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT = process.env.EXTERNAL_MEDIA_ROOT || '/external-media';
// Static file serving for photos (protected)
app.use('/photos', require('./src/middleware/photoAuth'), setCorsHeaders, secureStatic(path.join(storagePath, 'events/active')));
// Static file serving for thumbnails (protected)
app.use('/thumbnails', require('./src/middleware/photoAuth'), setCorsHeaders, secureStatic(path.join(storagePath, 'thumbnails')));
// Static file serving for uploads (public - logos, favicons)
app.use('/uploads', setCorsHeaders, secureStatic(path.join(storagePath, 'uploads')));
// Static file serving for self-hosted webfonts (public — gallery visitors
// load these via @font-face). Replaces the previous Google Fonts CDN
// dependency, which leaked visitor IPs to a third party (LG München 2022
// GDPR ruling).
//
// Two mounts in priority order:
// 1. STORAGE_PATH/fonts/ — runtime user additions (drop a folder, restart)
// 2. backend/assets/fonts/ — bundled defaults baked into the image
// Express evaluates handlers in order, so user-supplied files win on overlap.
//
// We deliberately do NOT set `immutable` on these responses. The filenames
// are stable (e.g. Inter/400.woff2), so an admin replacing the file on disk
// must be able to roll out the change to clients. With max-age + Last-Modified
// (set by express.static from file mtime), browsers send If-Modified-Since
// after expiry and pick up the new version automatically. See https://docs.picpeak.app/guides/custom-fonts
// "Replacing an existing font" for the documented rollout strategy.
const fontStaticOpts = { maxAge: '7d' };
app.use(
'/fonts',
setCorsHeaders,
secureStatic(path.join(storagePath, 'fonts'), fontStaticOpts)
);
app.use(
'/fonts',
setCorsHeaders,
secureStatic(path.resolve(__dirname, 'assets/fonts'), fontStaticOpts)
);
// Debug endpoint to check IP detection (only in development)
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development') {
app.get('/api/debug/ip', (req, res) => {
const clientIp = req.headers['x-forwarded-for']?.split(',')[0]?.trim() ||
req.headers['x-real-ip'] ||
req.connection.remoteAddress ||
req.ip;
res.json({
detectedIp: clientIp,
reqIp: req.ip,
headers: {
'x-forwarded-for': req.headers['x-forwarded-for'],
'x-real-ip': req.headers['x-real-ip'],
'x-forwarded-proto': req.headers['x-forwarded-proto'],
'x-forwarded-host': req.headers['x-forwarded-host']
},
trustProxy: app.get('trust proxy')
});
});
}
// OG/Twitter-card preview endpoint for gallery share URLs. Crawlers (WhatsApp,
// Slack, Facebook, etc.) don't execute JS, so the SPA's client-side meta tags
// never reach them. nginx routes UA-detected crawlers from /gallery/:slug to
// here; humans still get the SPA via try_files.
const {
isSocialCrawler,
handleGalleryOgRequest,
handleGalleryOgCover,
} = require('./src/services/galleryOgService');
app.get('/og/gallery/:slug', handleGalleryOgRequest);
// Public hero-photo cover served as og:image when the admin has flipped
// events.og_image_share_enabled (#474). Unauthenticated by design;
// returns 404 unless the opt-in is on AND a hero_photo_id is set.
app.get('/og/gallery/:slug/cover', handleGalleryOgCover);
// Branded URL shortener (#699). /s/<short_slug> is bot-UA aware:
// - Social crawler → server-render OG for the target event so the
// SHORT URL itself is what scrapes cache against. The og:url canonical
// in the rendered HTML points back at /s/<slug>, not the underlying
// gallery URL — so a re-share of the same short URL keeps the cache
// warm even if the underlying gallery slug rotates.
// - Browser → 302 to the stored target_path. The target_path was
// captured at create time from the event's slug + share_token + the
// global "Use short gallery URLs" setting, so it doesn't silently
// change later.
// - Soft-deleted → 410 Gone so the admin can tell their delete worked
// vs. a typo'd unknown slug (which returns 404).
const galleryShortUrlService = require('./src/services/galleryShortUrlService');
const { buildOgMetadata, renderOgHtml } = require('./src/services/galleryOgService');
app.get('/s/:shortSlug', async (req, res) => {
try {
const row = await galleryShortUrlService.findByShortSlug(req.params.shortSlug);
if (!row) {
return res.status(404).type('text/plain').send('Short URL not found');
}
if (row.deleted_at) {
return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL has been removed');
}
// Bot UA → render OG metadata for the target event. We look up the
// event via the short URL's event_id rather than re-parsing the
// target_path so a future migration that adds new target shapes
// (slideshow, client-access) doesn't need to rewrite the URL parser.
if (isSocialCrawler(req.get('user-agent'))) {
const event = await require('./src/database/db').db('events')
.where({ id: row.event_id })
.first('slug');
if (event?.slug) {
const meta = await buildOgMetadata(event.slug, req.originalUrl);
// Override the canonical to point at the SHORT URL itself —
// social platforms cache OG by URL, and the short URL is the
// one operators actually share, so that's the cache key we
// want them to stick with.
const base = await getAbsoluteFrontendUrl(req);
meta.url = `${base}/s/${row.short_slug}`;
res.set('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=300');
res.set('Content-Type', 'text/html; charset=utf-8');
res.send(renderOgHtml(meta));
// Hit accounting is fire-and-forget — don't block the bot.
galleryShortUrlService.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
return;
}
// Event disappeared (FK CASCADE in flight, or admin hard-deleted
// outside the normal soft-delete path) — fall through to 410 so
// the scraper sees a clean signal.
return res.status(410).type('text/plain').send('Short URL points at a deleted event');
}
// Browser path: redirect. Hit accounting is fire-and-forget.
galleryShortUrlService.recordHit(row.id).catch(() => {});
return res.redirect(302, row.target_path);
} catch (err) {
logger.error('Short URL resolver failed', { slug: req.params.shortSlug, error: err.message });
return res.status(500).type('text/plain').send('Internal server error');
}
});
// robots.txt endpoint (dynamic, served from DB settings)
const { generateRobotsTxt } = require('./src/services/robotsTxtService');
app.get('/robots.txt', async (req, res) => {
try {
const robotsTxt = await generateRobotsTxt();
res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/plain');
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=3600');
res.status(200).send(robotsTxt);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to generate robots.txt', { error: error.message });
// Safe default for a private photo platform
res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/plain');
res.status(200).send('User-agent: *\nDisallow: /\n');
}
});
// Dynamic favicon endpoints. Browsers — notably Safari — request
// /favicon.ico and /apple-touch-icon*.png directly at the site root and are
// unreliable about honouring JS-injected <link rel="icon"> tags. Serving the
// admin's configured branding favicon here makes it work without client-side
// JS (and survive aggressive favicon caches). Falls back to the bundled asset
// shipped with the frontend build when no custom favicon is set.
app.get(
['/favicon.ico', '/apple-touch-icon.png', '/apple-touch-icon-precomposed.png'],
async (req, res) => {
try {
const { getAppSetting } = require('./src/utils/appSettings');
const raw = await getAppSetting('branding_favicon_url', null);
const url = (raw && String(raw).trim()) || null;
if (url) {
// External URL — can't stream the bytes, so redirect (best effort).
if (/^https?:\/\//i.test(url)) return res.redirect(302, url);
// Local upload → stream the file bytes DIRECTLY rather than 302'ing.
// Safari does NOT reliably follow a redirect for favicon requests
// (it falls back to the HTML <link>, i.e. the bundled default),
// whereas Firefox/Chrome do — so a 302 worked everywhere except
// Safari. sendFile sets the right content-type from the extension.
const rel = String(url).replace(/^\/+/, '').replace(/^uploads\//, '');
const uploadsRoot = path.resolve(path.join(storagePath, 'uploads'));
const resolved = path.resolve(path.join(uploadsRoot, rel));
// Path containment — never serve outside the uploads dir.
if (resolved.startsWith(uploadsRoot + path.sep) && fs.existsSync(resolved)) {
// This route streams the file directly, bypassing the secureStatic
// middleware — so re-apply its SVG hardening here. An admin-uploaded
// SVG favicon could contain <script>; served at the top-level
// /favicon.ico origin without CSP that would be stored XSS. Keep in
// sync with secureStatic.js.
if (/\.svg$/i.test(resolved)) {
res.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:");
res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
}
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=86400');
return res.sendFile(resolved);
}
}
} catch (error) {
logger.warn('Favicon lookup failed; serving bundled default', { error: error.message });
}
return res.redirect(302, '/favicon-32x32.png');
}
);
// Health check endpoint. `pid` + `uptime` let monitors (and the local E2E
// watchdog) detect a silent process restart between two checks.
app.get('/health', async (req, res) => {
try {
await db.raw('SELECT 1');
res.json({
status: 'ok',
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
pid: process.pid,
uptime: process.uptime()
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Health check failed:', error);
res.status(503).json({
status: 'error',
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
pid: process.pid,
uptime: process.uptime()
});
}
});
// Routes
app.use('/api/setup', setupRoutes); // public first-run bootstrap (self-closes after setup)
app.use('/api/auth', authRoutes);
app.use('/api/admin/external-media', require('./src/routes/adminExternalMedia'));
// Gallery routes - main routes first, then feedback routes
app.use('/api/gallery', galleryRoutes);
app.use('/api/gallery', require('./src/routes/galleryFeedback'));
app.use('/api/gallery', require('./src/routes/galleryGuests'));
app.use('/api/admin', adminRoutes);
app.use('/api/admin/auth', adminAuthRoutes);
app.use('/api/admin/system', require('./src/routes/adminSystem'));
// Branded URL shortener admin CRUD (#699) — list/create/delete short URLs
// per event. Mounted at /api/admin so the routes appear at
// /api/admin/events/:eventId/short-urls and /api/admin/short-urls/:id.
app.use('/api/admin', require('./src/routes/adminShortUrls'));
app.use('/api/admin/feature-flags', require('./src/routes/adminFeatureFlags'));
app.use('/api/admin/whatsapp', require('./src/routes/adminWhatsapp'));
app.use('/api/admin/backup', require('./src/routes/adminBackup'));
app.use('/api/admin/database-backup', require('./src/routes/adminDatabaseBackup'));
app.use('/api/admin/feedback', require('./src/routes/adminFeedback'));
app.use('/api/admin', require('./src/routes/adminGuests'));
app.use('/api/admin/image-security', require('./src/routes/adminImageSecurity'));
app.use('/api/admin/thumbnails', require('./src/routes/adminThumbnails'));
app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('./src/routes/adminPhotoDimensions'));
app.use('/api/admin/photos', require('./src/routes/adminPhotos'));
app.use('/api/admin/photo-export', require('./src/routes/adminPhotoExport'));
app.use('/api/admin/css-templates', require('./src/routes/adminCssTemplates'));
app.use('/api/admin/events', require('./src/routes/adminEventRename'));
app.use('/api/admin/users', require('./src/routes/adminUsers'));
app.use('/api/admin/roles', require('./src/routes/adminRoles'));
// Customer portal (#354). The customerPortal feature flag is a
// VISIBILITY toggle for the admin surface, not a kill switch for
// customer access. Enforcement:
//
// 1. Frontend: RequireFeature guards + AdminSidebar visibility
// hide the Clients section when the flag is off. Customer-side
// /customer/* surfaces stay reachable.
// 2. Backend: NO route-level gate. The admin surface is gated by
// adminAuth + permission checks (admin still has rights to
// manage customer records even if the section is hidden in
// their UI). The customer surface is gated by customerAuth +
// is_active checks on customer_accounts.
//
// For close-to-realtime access changes use the dedicated tools:
// - Revoke a customer's access to ONE gallery → "Manage galleries"
// dialog removes the event_customer_assignments row, which
// verifyGalleryAccess re-checks on every customer-minted JWT.
// - Lock out a customer entirely → "Deactivate" sets is_active=false
// and bumps password_changed_at, killing every outstanding JWT.
// - Toggle per-customer feature surfaces (calendar/quotes/bills)
// → toggles on the customer detail page.
//
// Putting the global flag in the kill-switch role was a mistake — a
// stray click in Settings → Features would lock every paying
// customer out at once. PR-revert moved the gate back to per-record.
//
// `noStoreCache` belt-and-braces the cache-control story for both
// surfaces: any response — 200, 4xx, 5xx — carries `Cache-Control:
// no-store` so a transient error (the now-reverted #458 410, a
// permission flip mid-session, a backend restart) can't get pinned
// in browser or intermediate caches and outlive its cause. See the
// PR #458 → #470 history in the middleware file for context.
const { noStoreCache } = require('./src/middleware/noStoreCache');
app.use('/api/admin/customers', noStoreCache, require('./src/routes/adminCustomers'));
// Customer-side surface (#354). Strictly separate from /api/admin/* —
// distinct token type, distinct cookie, distinct middleware. The
// noStoreCache wrapper (upstream) prevents stale customer-portal
// data from being served after logout. The CRM-area route-flag
// gate was reverted upstream and lives in the UI now.
app.use('/api/customer/auth', noStoreCache, require('./src/routes/customerAuth'));
app.use('/api/customer', noStoreCache, require('./src/routes/customer'));
// --- CRM (#TBD) -------------------------------------------------------
// Quotes / Invoices / Contracts / Calendar / Tax report / Deals lineage.
// Business profile (issuer block for PDFs) lives at
// /api/admin/business-profile, gated by the existing settings.manage
// permission rather than a CRM-specific one. The public endpoints
// host the customer-side accept/decline / sign / payment-check pages.
app.use('/api/admin/business-profile', require('./src/routes/adminBusinessProfile'));
app.use('/api/admin/quotes', require('./src/routes/adminQuotes'));
app.use('/api/admin/invoices', require('./src/routes/adminInvoices'));
app.use('/api/admin/contracts', require('./src/routes/adminContracts'));
app.use('/api/admin/projects', require('./src/routes/adminProjects'));
app.use('/api/admin/calendar', require('./src/routes/adminCalendar'));
app.use('/api/admin/deals', require('./src/routes/adminDeals'));
app.use('/api/admin/workflows', require('./src/routes/adminWorkflows'));
app.use('/api/admin/tax-report', require('./src/routes/adminTaxReport'));
app.use('/api/admin/expenses', require('./src/routes/adminExpenses'));
app.use('/api/admin/ledger', require('./src/routes/adminLedger'));
// Read-only VAT-code registry for the invoice/quote editors — un-gated by the
// accounting flag (management stays under /ledger).
app.use('/api/admin/vat-codes', require('./src/routes/adminVatCodes'));
app.use('/api/admin/system-health', require('./src/routes/adminSystemHealth'));
app.use('/api/admin/dev', require('./src/routes/adminDev'));
app.use('/api/admin/transfers', require('./src/routes/adminTransfers'));
app.use('/api/public/quotes', require('./src/routes/publicQuotes'));
app.use('/api/public/contracts', require('./src/routes/publicContracts'));
// PicTransfer (#997): recipient download + client upload, token-authenticated.
app.use('/api/public/transfer', require('./src/routes/publicTransfer'));
app.use('/api/public/transfer-upload', require('./src/routes/publicTransferUpload'));
app.use('/api/public/payment-check', require('./src/routes/publicPaymentCheck'));
app.use('/api/public/workflow-approvals', require('./src/routes/publicWorkflowApprovals'));
app.use('/api/admin/event-types', require('./src/routes/adminEventTypes'));
app.use('/api/admin/api-tokens', require('./src/routes/adminApiTokens'));
app.use('/api/admin/webhooks', require('./src/routes/adminWebhooks'));
// Public v1 API for n8n / external integrations (#322). Mounted under
// /api/v1; auth handled per-route via apiTokenAuth (Bearer tokens).
app.use('/api/v1', require('./src/routes/v1/events'));
// Swagger UI for the v1 API. Admin-gated since it lists endpoint shapes
// that should not be enumerable to anonymous users (a common reduce-info-leak hardening).
{
const swaggerUi = require('swagger-ui-express');
const { adminAuth } = require('./src/middleware/auth');
const { getOpenApiSpec } = require('./src/openapi/spec');
app.get('/api/openapi.json', adminAuth, (_req, res) => res.json(getOpenApiSpec()));
app.use(
'/api/docs',
adminAuth,
swaggerUi.serve,
swaggerUi.setup(getOpenApiSpec(), { customSiteTitle: 'PicPeak API · v1' })
);
}
app.use('/api/invite', require('./src/routes/acceptInvite'));
app.use('/api/public/settings', require('./src/routes/publicSettings'));
app.use('/api/public/fonts', require('./src/routes/publicFonts'));
app.use('/api/public', require('./src/routes/publicCMS'));
app.use('/api/images', require('./src/routes/protectedImages'));
app.use('/api/secure-images', secureImagesRoutes);
// Optional: Serve built frontend (native installs and the all-in-one image, #1042)
// Set when the SPA is being served, and registered as a catch-all AFTER the
// /api 404 handler further down — see the registration site for why it cannot
// live inside this block.
let spaCatchAll = null;
try {
const serveFrontendEnv = process.env.SERVE_FRONTEND; // 'true' | 'false' | undefined
const frontendDir = process.env.FRONTEND_DIR || path.join(__dirname, '../frontend/dist');
const indexPath = path.join(frontendDir, 'index.html');
// Auto-serve when dist exists unless explicitly disabled
const shouldServe = (serveFrontendEnv === 'true') || ((serveFrontendEnv === undefined || serveFrontendEnv === 'auto') && fs.existsSync(indexPath));
if (shouldServe) {
logger.info(`Serving frontend from ${frontendDir}`);
// The built index.html carries ${BRAND_TITLE} / ${BRAND_DESCRIPTION}
// placeholders (#521) that the nginx image renders via envsubst in its
// entrypoint. Here the render happens once at boot, in memory — same
// semantics: locked to exactly these two vars (never the JS bundle's own
// template literals), defaults applied when unset, re-rendered on every
// process start so changing the env + restarting is enough.
const spaHtml = fs
.readFileSync(indexPath, 'utf8')
.split('${BRAND_TITLE}').join(process.env.BRAND_TITLE || 'PicPeak')
.split('${BRAND_DESCRIPTION}').join(process.env.BRAND_DESCRIPTION || 'Photo gallery shared with PicPeak.');
// Mirrors nginx's `location = /index.html` cache rule: the SPA shell must
// revalidate so a redeploy is picked up, while the hashed assets below
// cache immutably.
const sendSpa = (res) => {
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate');
res.type('html').send(spaHtml);
};
// gzip for the SPA bundle (nginx parity — its server block gzips js/css/
// json). Mounted here, after every /api router, so API responses keep
// their exact current behavior; only the statics and SPA shell below
// pass through it.
app.use(compression());
// /index.html must serve the RENDERED shell, and express.static would
// otherwise answer first with the raw template straight off disk.
app.get('/index.html', (req, res) => sendSpa(res));
// Serve pre-built assets. index:false keeps `/` flowing to the landing-page
// handler below (nginx parity: `location = /` goes to the backend, it never
// serves index.html off disk) — express.static's default index option was
// shadowing handlePublicSiteRequest in native installs. Vite's hashed
// /assets/* get nginx's 1y-immutable rule; everything else keeps etag
// revalidation.
app.use(express.static(frontendDir, {
index: false,
setHeaders: (res, filePath) => {
if (/[/\\]assets[/\\]/.test(filePath)) {
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=31536000, immutable');
}
},
}));
// Landing page handler or SPA fallback
app.get('/', handlePublicSiteRequest, (req, res) => {
sendSpa(res);
});
// SPA fallback for admin + gallery routes. For gallery URLs we intercept
// social-crawler User-Agents and serve OG/Twitter-card metadata so link
// previews show the event name + branding instead of the SPA stub.
//
// Two route shapes — 1-2 segments (`/gallery/:slug/:token?`) and the
// 3-segment slideshow form (`/gallery/:slug/show/:token`). The slideshow
// shape was previously falling through to the SPA-catchall below and
// skipping OG injection entirely (#699). Both patterns route to the
// same handler — buildOgMetadata only looks at `slug`, so the extra
// /show/ segment is harmless.
const ogIntercept = (req, res, next) => {
if (isSocialCrawler(req.get('user-agent'))) {
return handleGalleryOgRequest(req, res);
}
return next();
};
app.get('/gallery/:slug/:token?', ogIntercept, (req, res) => sendSpa(res));
app.get('/gallery/:slug/show/:token', ogIntercept, (req, res) => sendSpa(res));
app.get(['/admin', '/admin/*', '/gallery/*'], (req, res) => {
sendSpa(res);
});
// Everything else the router owns client-side. nginx did `try_files $uri
// $uri/ /index.html`, so behind compose every client route survived a
// reload and the short route list above was never exercised. Without
// nginx it is the whole contract: /setup, /customer, /impressum,
// /datenschutz, /payment-check, /quote/:token, /contract/:token,
// /invite/:token, /transfer/:token, /transfer-upload/:token and the
// branded short URLs all 404'd on a direct hit or a refresh. /setup is
// the first URL a new install visits.
spaCatchAll = (req, res) => sendSpa(res);
} else {
logger.info('Frontend static serving disabled or dist not found', { serveFrontendEnv, frontendDir });
app.get('/', handlePublicSiteRequest, (req, res) => {
res.status(503).send('Frontend bundle not available. Build frontend or enable public site.');
});
}
} catch (e) {
logger.warn('Failed to enable frontend static serving', { error: e.message });
}
// 404 handler for undefined API routes
app.use('/api', notFoundHandler);
// SPA history fallback, deliberately registered here — AFTER the /api 404
// handler, so an unknown /api/* route still answers JSON instead of being
// handed the HTML shell, and after the short-URL resolver so a real short
// code still redirects. GET-only: a stray POST/PUT keeps 404ing rather than
// getting a 200 page back.
if (spaCatchAll) {
// nginx gives these their own `location` blocks, so `try_files` never applied
// to them. The fallback has to mirror that: /photos, /thumbnails, /uploads
// and /fonts are backend-owned static mounts whose middleware calls next()
// when the file is missing, and swallowing that would answer 200 text/html
// under an image or font URL instead of a 404.
// /assets/ belongs on this list for the same reason even though it is the
// frontend's own bundle: after an upgrade a still-open tab requests the old
// hashed chunk, which no longer exists. Answering index.html would hand a
// JavaScript URL a 200 text/html body, so the module load fails with a MIME
// error instead of the plain 404 nginx returns — and the 200 hides it from
// any monitoring watching status codes.
const BACKEND_OWNED = ['/photos/', '/thumbnails/', '/uploads/', '/fonts/', '/assets/', '/health'];
app.get('*', (req, res, next) => {
if (BACKEND_OWNED.some((prefix) => req.path.startsWith(prefix))) return next();
return spaCatchAll(req, res);
});
}
// Global error handler (must be last)
app.use(errorHandler);
// Initialize services
async function startServer() {
try {
// Initialize database
await initializeDatabase();
// Warm the public-origin cache so the SYNCHRONOUS resolver (CORS headers,
// secureImageMiddleware) can see the general_site_url setting. Best-effort:
// the async resolver reads through on its own, and a cold cache only means
// falling back to the environment.
await primeSiteUrlCache().catch(() => {});
// Initialize storage backend (local fs or S3) — fail fast on misconfig
const { initStorage } = require('./src/services/storage');
await initStorage();
// Initialize rate limiters after database is ready
await initializeRateLimiters();
logger.info('Rate limiters initialized with database configuration');
// Initialize auth security cleanup job
const { initializeCleanupJob } = require('./src/utils/authSecurity');
initializeCleanupJob();
// Initialize temp upload cleanup job
const { cleanupTempUploads } = require('./src/utils/cleanupTempUploads');
// Run cleanup on startup
cleanupTempUploads();
// Schedule periodic cleanup every hour
setInterval(cleanupTempUploads, 60 * 60 * 1000);
logger.info('Temp upload cleanup scheduled');
// Start file watcher
startFileWatcher();
// Start expiration checker
startExpirationChecker();
// PicTransfer retention sweep (#997): expire links, notify admins, and
// hard-delete client uploads once the grace window elapses.
startTransferCleanup();
// Custom-resolution download archives (#858) are disposable renditions —
// sweep them once their TTL passes so .download-cache doesn't grow forever.
startDownloadJobCleanup();
// Reveal-mode scheduler (#838): minutely stamp for scheduled reveals.
startRevealScheduler();
// CRM invoice scheduler: hourly tick to flush scheduled-send invoices
// + run the overdue reminder ladder. No-op when the `bills` feature
// flag is OFF (the service short-circuits on empty result sets).
startInvoiceScheduler();
// Initialize email transporter and start queue processor
await initializeTransporter();
// Seed CRM / contract / event-reminder email templates and recover
// any queue rows that exhausted retries because their template
// didn't exist yet. Runs once per boot via module-level caches in
// each seeder. See _emailTemplateBoot.js for the full rationale.
try {
const { seedEmailTemplatesAndRecoverQueue } = require('./src/services/_emailTemplateBoot');
await seedEmailTemplatesAndRecoverQueue(db, logger);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('Email template self-heal failed at boot:', err.message);
}
startEmailQueueProcessor();
// Start WhatsApp queue processor — no-ops each cycle unless the
// `whatsapp` flag is on and a config exists (migration 136, #640D).
try {
const { startWhatsAppQueueProcessor } = require('./src/services/whatsappProcessor');
startWhatsAppQueueProcessor();
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('WhatsApp queue processor start failed:', err.message);
}
// Start incoming-mail (IMAP) poller — no-ops each minute unless the
// `incomingMail` flag is on and a mailbox is configured (migration 128).
try {
const { startIncomingMailPoller } = require('./src/services/emailIntakeService');
startIncomingMailPoller();
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('Incoming-mail poller failed to start:', err.message);
}
// Start webhook delivery worker (#327)
const { startWebhookDeliveryWorker } = require('./src/services/webhookDeliveryWorker');
startWebhookDeliveryWorker();
// Start S3 auto-importer (#328 follow-up). No-op when STORAGE_AUTO_IMPORT
// is unset OR STORAGE_BACKEND=local — replaces the chokidar watcher
// for S3-mode deployments that drop files into the bucket directly.
const { startS3AutoImporter } = require('./src/services/s3AutoImporter');
startS3AutoImporter();
// Self-heal the `backup_paths` table before the backup service
// starts — the file-backup walker reads from it, so missing
// canonical rows (a new subdirectory shipped by a future feature)
// get re-seeded here on every boot. See _backupPathsBoot.js for
// the full rationale; pattern mirrors _emailTemplateBoot.js.
try {
const { seedBackupPathsAtBoot } = require('./src/services/_backupPathsBoot');
await seedBackupPathsAtBoot(db, logger);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('backup_paths self-heal failed at boot:', err.message);
}
// Self-heal restore-meta settings — currently just
// `restore_allow_force` defaulting to ON so fresh installs can
// recover from disaster without a SQL incantation. Only seeds on
// FRESH installs (existing rows, true or false, are preserved).
// See _restoreSettingsBoot.js for the full rationale.
try {
const { seedRestoreSettingsAtBoot } = require('./src/services/_restoreSettingsBoot');
await seedRestoreSettingsAtBoot(db, logger);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('restore-settings self-heal failed at boot:', err.message);
}
// Seed built-in workflows (the editable invoice-dunning flow). Disabled by
// default — live reminder behaviour is unchanged. See _workflowSeedBoot.js.
try {
const { seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot } = require('./src/services/_workflowSeedBoot');
await seedBuiltinWorkflowsAtBoot(db, logger);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('built-in workflow seed failed at boot:', err.message);
}
// Self-heal the RBAC catalog: ensure super_admin holds every permission
// (the "Admin tracks all" guarantee) and the solo_photographer preset
// exists. New perms never need a compensation migration. See
// _permissionsBoot.js + project_permission_gating.
try {
const { seedPermissionsAtBoot } = require('./src/services/_permissionsBoot');
await seedPermissionsAtBoot(db, logger);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('permissions self-heal failed at boot:', err.message);
}
// Install-from-backup trigger. If `RESTORE_ON_INSTALL` (or
// `.txt`) exists in the /backup mount AND the DB is empty, run
// the restore HERE before any admin UI surfaces. Lets admins
// recover a picpeak install with: (a) place backup files in the
// bind mount, (b) drop the trigger file, (c) `docker compose up`.
// No onboarding wizard, no throwaway admin, no compose-file
// changes. See _installFromBackupBoot.js for the full rationale
// + the safety gates.
try {
const { tryInstallFromBackup } = require('./src/services/_installFromBackupBoot');
const result = await tryInstallFromBackup(db, logger);
if (result.ran) {
logger.info(`Install-from-backup: completed from ${result.manifestPath}. Server will start with restored state.`);
}
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('Install-from-backup hook threw:', err.message);
}
// First-run: surface a one-time setup token while no admin account exists.
// Runs AFTER install-from-backup so a restored instance (which repopulates
// admin_users) never prints a throwaway token. Best-effort — never blocks boot.
let setupToken = null;
let setupTokenFile = null;
try {
const setupSvc = require('./src/services/setupService');
setupToken = await setupSvc.ensureSetupToken();
// The path the write ACTUALLY produced (null when it failed). existsSync
// on the candidate answered a different question and reported success
// for a stale, read-only or directory-shaped SETUP_TOKEN — suppressing
// the token here while pointing the operator at content that is not it.
setupTokenFile = setupSvc.writtenSetupTokenFile();
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(`[setup] ensureSetupToken skipped: ${err.message}`);
}
// Start backup service
await startBackupService();
// Start database backup service
await startScheduledBackups();
// Start the async photo-processing worker pool. Picks up
// photos in 'pending' state (from POST /upload) and runs the
// sharp/ffmpeg/EXIF pipeline off the request thread.
backgroundProcessor.start();
// Face detection (#1074). Starts alongside the photo processor but stays
// idle — every worker tick re-checks the `faces` feature flag, which is
// off by default. It is safe to start unconditionally precisely because
// it never touches FACE_ML_URL until that flag is on.
//
// Required HERE rather than at module scope: the face stack pulls in
// axios and (via imageProcessor) sharp, and server.js is imported by a
// large number of supertest suites that never start a worker. Keeping it
// lazy means they don't pay for a module graph they never use.
require('./src/services/faceQueue').start();
app.listen(PORT, () => {
logger.info(`Server running on port ${PORT}`);
logger.info(`Admin interface: ${process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}`);
logger.info(`Frontend: ${process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3001'}`);
// First-run banner. Print the TOKEN ITSELF only when the 0600 token file
// could not be written — otherwise this lands a live first-admin
// credential in `docker logs` / journald, which is the leak GHSA-r794's
// sweep turned up. When the file exists we point at it instead.
if (setupToken) {
const url = `${process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}/admin`;
const line = '='.repeat(64);
const secretLine = setupTokenFile
? ` Setup token saved to: ${setupTokenFile}\n (read it there — deliberately not printed)`
: ` One-time setup token: ${setupToken}\n (could not write the token file, so it is shown here)`;
console.log(`\n${line}\n PicPeak first-run setup — no admin account yet.\n Open: ${url}\n${secretLine}\n${line}\n`);
}
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to start server:', error);
process.exit(1);
}
}
startServer();
module.exports = app; // For testing