A QA exploration of this branch against an isolated rig — own stub collector, SQLite and PostgreSQL — turned up one dead end and a set of signals and controls that did not hold up. This closes all of them. Rotating JWT_SECRET, the documented response to a suspected compromise, made the signing key unreadable. That was already named and documented, but it left no way out: the delete packet can never be signed, so the row stays deletion_pending forever, and enable() refuses because it is not `disabled`. An operator who rotated precisely because the secret was compromised cannot restore it, so the feature was bricked with no control left. POST /usage/abandon is offered only in that state; it drops the local identity and records the receipt as `collector-unconfirmed` rather than claiming a deletion that did not happen. Every failed delivery was retried on the next admin request, and /activity is open to any authenticated admin while the settings ticker fires it every five minutes per open tab — 30 activity calls against a rejecting collector produced 30 outbound requests. Migration 206 adds attempts/next_attempt_at and the unattended sender honours the gate; Retry and opt-out still send immediately, and the tab names the time of the next automatic attempt. Feedback, votes and portal sessions now share an installation-wide budget of 30/hour. They are the only endpoints whose effect is outbound traffic carrying operator-written free text, and the general limiter skips authenticated requests by design. Reading status and withdrawing stay unthrottled. gallery_image_protection was true on a bare install with no galleries: PicPeak ships default_protection_level='standard' and enable_devtools_protection=true, so it reported fleet-wide 100% and could never separate a decision from an untouched default. It now reads only what deviates from the shipped defaults, and the devtools flag is not read at all — being on by default, its only informative state is off, which is the opposite of what the key claims. Also: - the export receipt counted every packet and called the total "usage reports"; reports and participant operations are now counted and named separately - GET /usage/preview no longer persists the custom_css marker, so the transparency view stops changing what will be sent - the feedback route requires every field the packet schema requires, so an API caller gets the missing field named instead of a bare INVALID_PACKET from inside signing - the German strings for this feature use "Sie" throughout, matching the rest of the admin UI; the ignore hint says what ignoring will do rather than stating it as already true - the consent dialog returns focus to the control that opened it - the long buttons wrap instead of running off a 390px viewport - a deletion receipt is labelled as belonging to an earlier participation while a new one is active Regression tests cover each of these, including the delete packet's reuse of the last accepted sequence, which was an unwritten assumption about the collector rather than a defect.
263 lines
10 KiB
JavaScript
263 lines
10 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* The signing key is encrypted with USAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, which defaults to
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* JWT_SECRET. Rotating JWT_SECRET — the correct response to a suspected
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* compromise — makes that key unreadable.
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*
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* Before this was named, the failure surfaced as a generic DELIVERY_FAILED
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* that retried forever, and it silently blocked the DELETE packet as well:
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* an operator who asked to withdraw had their local state cleared while the
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* collector kept its copy, with nothing in the UI explaining why.
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*/
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const knex = require('knex');
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const { UsageService } = require('../../src/usage/UsageService');
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const { generateIdentity, makePacket } = require('../../src/usage/protocol.cjs');
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const SECRET_A = 'a'.repeat(48);
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const SECRET_B = 'b'.repeat(48);
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async function bootDb() {
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const db = knex({
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client: 'sqlite3',
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connection: { filename: ':memory:' },
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useNullAsDefault: true,
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});
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await db.schema.createTable('product_usage_state', (t) => {
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t.integer('id').primary();
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t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
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t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v1');
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t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
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t.string('installation_id', 64);
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t.string('public_key', 59);
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t.text('private_key_encrypted');
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t.string('instance_binding', 64);
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t.bigInteger('sequence').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
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t.text('pending_packet');
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t.text('last_packet');
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t.text('last_receipt');
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t.text('privacy_receipts');
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t.string('last_report_date', 10);
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t.string('last_error', 80);
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t.text('feedback_preferences');
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t.string('lease_token', 36);
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t.bigInteger('lease_until').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
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t.integer('attempts').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
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t.bigInteger('next_attempt_at').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
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});
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await db('product_usage_state').insert({ id: 1 });
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return db;
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}
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describe('usage signing key becomes unreadable after secret rotation', () => {
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let db;
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afterEach(async () => { if (db) await db.destroy(); db = null; });
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it('names the failure instead of reporting a generic decrypt error', async () => {
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db = await bootDb();
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const before = new UsageService(db, { secret: SECRET_A });
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const sealed = before.encrypt('the-signing-key');
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// Same value, different secret — exactly what rotating JWT_SECRET does.
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const after = new UsageService(db, { secret: SECRET_B });
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expect(() => after.decrypt(sealed)).toThrow(
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expect.objectContaining({ code: 'SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE' })
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);
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});
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it('still round-trips under the unrotated secret', async () => {
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db = await bootDb();
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const service = new UsageService(db, { secret: SECRET_A });
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expect(service.decrypt(service.encrypt('the-signing-key'))).toBe('the-signing-key');
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});
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it('records SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE rather than DELIVERY_FAILED, and does not flag an identity conflict', async () => {
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db = await bootDb();
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const sealed = new UsageService(db, { secret: SECRET_A }).encrypt('key');
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await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
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status: 'active',
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installation_id: 'a'.repeat(64),
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public_key: 'p'.repeat(59),
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private_key_encrypted: sealed,
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sequence: 1,
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pending_packet: JSON.stringify({
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action: 'delete', packet_id: 'x', installation_id: 'a'.repeat(64), sequence: 1,
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}),
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});
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const service = new UsageService(db, {
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secret: SECRET_B,
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endpoint: 'http://127.0.0.1:9/',
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// A delivery must never be attempted: signing fails first.
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fetch: () => { throw new Error('network must not be reached'); },
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});
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await service.deliver(await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).first());
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const row = await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).first();
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expect(row.last_error).toBe('SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE');
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// A key we cannot read is not evidence of a cloned installation.
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expect(row.status).toBe('active');
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});
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});
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/**
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* Naming the failure told the operator what happened but left them nowhere to
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* go: the delete packet can never be signed, so the row stays in
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* deletion_pending forever, and enable() refuses because it is not `disabled`.
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* An operator who rotated the secret precisely because it was compromised
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* cannot restore it, so without an exit the feature is bricked.
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*/
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describe('abandoning a withdrawal that can never be signed', () => {
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let db;
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afterEach(async () => { if (db) await db.destroy(); db = null; });
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const stuck = async () => {
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db = await bootDb();
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await db.schema.createTable('product_usage_markers', (t) => {
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t.string('feature', 60).primary();
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});
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await db('product_usage_markers').insert({ feature: 'crm' });
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await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
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status: 'deletion_pending',
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installation_id: 'a'.repeat(64),
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public_key: 'p'.repeat(59),
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private_key_encrypted: new UsageService(db, { secret: SECRET_A }).encrypt('key'),
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sequence: 4,
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last_error: 'SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE',
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});
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return new UsageService(db, {
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secret: SECRET_B,
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endpoint: 'https://usage.example.test',
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bindingPath: `${require('os').tmpdir()}/usage-abandon-${Date.now()}.key`,
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fetch: () => { throw new Error('network must not be reached'); },
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});
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};
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it('clears the local identity and records the deletion as unconfirmed', async () => {
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const service = await stuck();
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const status = await service.abandon();
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expect(status.status).toBe('disabled');
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expect(status.installation_id).toBeNull();
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const row = await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).first();
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expect(row.private_key_encrypted).toBeNull();
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expect(row.public_key).toBeNull();
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expect(row.last_error).toBeNull();
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expect(await db('product_usage_markers').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 0 });
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// The receipt must not claim a deletion the collector never confirmed.
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const receipt = JSON.parse(row.privacy_receipts).last_abandonment;
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expect(receipt.status).toBe('collector-unconfirmed');
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expect(receipt.reason).toBe('SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE');
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expect(receipt.installation_id).toBe('a'.repeat(64));
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});
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it('lets the operator rejoin afterwards', async () => {
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const service = await stuck();
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await service.abandon();
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expect((await service.state()).status).toBe('disabled');
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});
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it('refuses on a withdrawal that is merely undelivered', async () => {
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const service = await stuck();
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await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({ last_error: 'DELIVERY_FAILED' });
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await expect(service.abandon()).rejects.toThrow(/abandoned/);
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expect((await service.state()).installation_id).toBe('a'.repeat(64));
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});
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it('refuses while participation is active', async () => {
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const service = await stuck();
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await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({ status: 'active' });
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await expect(service.abandon()).rejects.toThrow(/abandoned/);
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expect((await service.state()).installation_id).toBe('a'.repeat(64));
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});
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});
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/**
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* Every failed delivery used to be retried on the next admin request, and
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* /activity is open to any authenticated admin while the settings ticker fires
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* it every five minutes per open tab. A permanently rejected packet therefore
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* produced one collector request per admin action, indefinitely.
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*/
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describe('delivery backoff', () => {
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let db;
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afterEach(async () => { if (db) await db.destroy(); db = null; });
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// A real identity and a schema-valid packet, so the failure happens where
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// this test claims it does — at the network — rather than in signPacket.
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const activeWithPendingPacket = async (fetchImpl, now) => {
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db = await bootDb();
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await db.schema.createTable('product_usage_markers', (t) => {
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t.string('feature', 60).primary();
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});
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const service = new UsageService(db, {
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secret: SECRET_A,
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endpoint: 'https://usage.example.test',
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now: () => now(),
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fetch: fetchImpl,
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});
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const identity = generateIdentity();
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await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
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status: 'active',
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consent_version: 'usage-consent.v2',
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installation_id: identity.installation_id,
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public_key: identity.public_key,
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private_key_encrypted: service.encrypt(identity.private_key),
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sequence: 1,
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pending_packet: JSON.stringify(
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makePacket(identity, 'session', 2, {}, 'usage.v2')
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),
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});
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return service;
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};
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it('paces the next unattended attempt after a failure, and lets Retry skip it', async () => {
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let clock = 1_000_000;
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let calls = 0;
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const service = await activeWithPendingPacket(() => {
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calls += 1;
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throw new Error('collector unreachable');
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}, () => clock);
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await service.tick();
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expect(calls).toBe(1);
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const paced = await service.state();
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expect(Number(paced.attempts)).toBe(1);
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expect(Number(paced.next_attempt_at)).toBeGreaterThan(clock);
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// The unattended callers — /activity and the settings ticker — wait.
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await service.tick();
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await service.tick();
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expect(calls).toBe(1);
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// The operator pressing Retry does not.
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await service.tick({ force: true });
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expect(calls).toBe(2);
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expect(Number((await service.state()).attempts)).toBe(2);
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// Once the window passes, the automatic sender tries again on its own.
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clock = Number((await service.state()).next_attempt_at) + 1;
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await service.tick();
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expect(calls).toBe(3);
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});
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it('grows the wait with consecutive failures and caps it at an hour', () => {
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const service = new UsageService(null, { secret: SECRET_A, endpoint: 'https://usage.example.test' });
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expect(service.backoffMs(1)).toBe(2 * 60000);
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expect(service.backoffMs(3)).toBe(8 * 60000);
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expect(service.backoffMs(20)).toBe(60 * 60000);
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});
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it('clears the pacing once a packet is accepted', async () => {
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const clock = 1_000_000;
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const service = await activeWithPendingPacket(async () => {
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throw new Error('collector unreachable');
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}, () => clock);
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await service.tick();
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expect(Number((await service.state()).attempts)).toBe(1);
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await service.clearDeliveryBackoff();
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const cleared = await service.state();
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expect(Number(cleared.attempts)).toBe(0);
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expect(Number(cleared.next_attempt_at)).toBe(0);
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});
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});
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