Files
picpeak/backend/__tests__/services/usageServiceKeyRotation.test.js
T
Paul Nothaft 1e8b6f1b0f fix(usage): close the QA findings on opt-in product usage
A QA exploration of this branch against an isolated rig — own stub
collector, SQLite and PostgreSQL — turned up one dead end and a set of
signals and controls that did not hold up. This closes all of them.

Rotating JWT_SECRET, the documented response to a suspected compromise,
made the signing key unreadable. That was already named and documented,
but it left no way out: the delete packet can never be signed, so the
row stays deletion_pending forever, and enable() refuses because it is
not `disabled`. An operator who rotated precisely because the secret was
compromised cannot restore it, so the feature was bricked with no
control left. POST /usage/abandon is offered only in that state; it
drops the local identity and records the receipt as
`collector-unconfirmed` rather than claiming a deletion that did not
happen.

Every failed delivery was retried on the next admin request, and
/activity is open to any authenticated admin while the settings ticker
fires it every five minutes per open tab — 30 activity calls against a
rejecting collector produced 30 outbound requests. Migration 206 adds
attempts/next_attempt_at and the unattended sender honours the gate;
Retry and opt-out still send immediately, and the tab names the time of
the next automatic attempt.

Feedback, votes and portal sessions now share an installation-wide
budget of 30/hour. They are the only endpoints whose effect is outbound
traffic carrying operator-written free text, and the general limiter
skips authenticated requests by design. Reading status and withdrawing
stay unthrottled.

gallery_image_protection was true on a bare install with no galleries:
PicPeak ships default_protection_level='standard' and
enable_devtools_protection=true, so it reported fleet-wide 100% and
could never separate a decision from an untouched default. It now reads
only what deviates from the shipped defaults, and the devtools flag is
not read at all — being on by default, its only informative state is
off, which is the opposite of what the key claims.

Also:
- the export receipt counted every packet and called the total "usage
  reports"; reports and participant operations are now counted and named
  separately
- GET /usage/preview no longer persists the custom_css marker, so the
  transparency view stops changing what will be sent
- the feedback route requires every field the packet schema requires,
  so an API caller gets the missing field named instead of a bare
  INVALID_PACKET from inside signing
- the German strings for this feature use "Sie" throughout, matching the
  rest of the admin UI; the ignore hint says what ignoring will do
  rather than stating it as already true
- the consent dialog returns focus to the control that opened it
- the long buttons wrap instead of running off a 390px viewport
- a deletion receipt is labelled as belonging to an earlier
  participation while a new one is active

Regression tests cover each of these, including the delete packet's
reuse of the last accepted sequence, which was an unwritten assumption
about the collector rather than a defect.
2026-09-06 17:40:43 +02:00

263 lines
10 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* The signing key is encrypted with USAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, which defaults to
* JWT_SECRET. Rotating JWT_SECRET — the correct response to a suspected
* compromise — makes that key unreadable.
*
* Before this was named, the failure surfaced as a generic DELIVERY_FAILED
* that retried forever, and it silently blocked the DELETE packet as well:
* an operator who asked to withdraw had their local state cleared while the
* collector kept its copy, with nothing in the UI explaining why.
*/
const knex = require('knex');
const { UsageService } = require('../../src/usage/UsageService');
const { generateIdentity, makePacket } = require('../../src/usage/protocol.cjs');
const SECRET_A = 'a'.repeat(48);
const SECRET_B = 'b'.repeat(48);
async function bootDb() {
const db = knex({
client: 'sqlite3',
connection: { filename: ':memory:' },
useNullAsDefault: true,
});
await db.schema.createTable('product_usage_state', (t) => {
t.integer('id').primary();
t.string('status', 30).notNullable().defaultTo('disabled');
t.string('consent_version', 40).notNullable().defaultTo('usage-consent.v1');
t.boolean('notice_dismissed').notNullable().defaultTo(false);
t.string('installation_id', 64);
t.string('public_key', 59);
t.text('private_key_encrypted');
t.string('instance_binding', 64);
t.bigInteger('sequence').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.text('pending_packet');
t.text('last_packet');
t.text('last_receipt');
t.text('privacy_receipts');
t.string('last_report_date', 10);
t.string('last_error', 80);
t.text('feedback_preferences');
t.string('lease_token', 36);
t.bigInteger('lease_until').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.integer('attempts').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
t.bigInteger('next_attempt_at').notNullable().defaultTo(0);
});
await db('product_usage_state').insert({ id: 1 });
return db;
}
describe('usage signing key becomes unreadable after secret rotation', () => {
let db;
afterEach(async () => { if (db) await db.destroy(); db = null; });
it('names the failure instead of reporting a generic decrypt error', async () => {
db = await bootDb();
const before = new UsageService(db, { secret: SECRET_A });
const sealed = before.encrypt('the-signing-key');
// Same value, different secret — exactly what rotating JWT_SECRET does.
const after = new UsageService(db, { secret: SECRET_B });
expect(() => after.decrypt(sealed)).toThrow(
expect.objectContaining({ code: 'SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE' })
);
});
it('still round-trips under the unrotated secret', async () => {
db = await bootDb();
const service = new UsageService(db, { secret: SECRET_A });
expect(service.decrypt(service.encrypt('the-signing-key'))).toBe('the-signing-key');
});
it('records SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE rather than DELIVERY_FAILED, and does not flag an identity conflict', async () => {
db = await bootDb();
const sealed = new UsageService(db, { secret: SECRET_A }).encrypt('key');
await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
status: 'active',
installation_id: 'a'.repeat(64),
public_key: 'p'.repeat(59),
private_key_encrypted: sealed,
sequence: 1,
pending_packet: JSON.stringify({
action: 'delete', packet_id: 'x', installation_id: 'a'.repeat(64), sequence: 1,
}),
});
const service = new UsageService(db, {
secret: SECRET_B,
endpoint: 'http://127.0.0.1:9/',
// A delivery must never be attempted: signing fails first.
fetch: () => { throw new Error('network must not be reached'); },
});
await service.deliver(await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).first());
const row = await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).first();
expect(row.last_error).toBe('SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE');
// A key we cannot read is not evidence of a cloned installation.
expect(row.status).toBe('active');
});
});
/**
* Naming the failure told the operator what happened but left them nowhere to
* go: the delete packet can never be signed, so the row stays in
* deletion_pending forever, and enable() refuses because it is not `disabled`.
* An operator who rotated the secret precisely because it was compromised
* cannot restore it, so without an exit the feature is bricked.
*/
describe('abandoning a withdrawal that can never be signed', () => {
let db;
afterEach(async () => { if (db) await db.destroy(); db = null; });
const stuck = async () => {
db = await bootDb();
await db.schema.createTable('product_usage_markers', (t) => {
t.string('feature', 60).primary();
});
await db('product_usage_markers').insert({ feature: 'crm' });
await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
status: 'deletion_pending',
installation_id: 'a'.repeat(64),
public_key: 'p'.repeat(59),
private_key_encrypted: new UsageService(db, { secret: SECRET_A }).encrypt('key'),
sequence: 4,
last_error: 'SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE',
});
return new UsageService(db, {
secret: SECRET_B,
endpoint: 'https://usage.example.test',
bindingPath: `${require('os').tmpdir()}/usage-abandon-${Date.now()}.key`,
fetch: () => { throw new Error('network must not be reached'); },
});
};
it('clears the local identity and records the deletion as unconfirmed', async () => {
const service = await stuck();
const status = await service.abandon();
expect(status.status).toBe('disabled');
expect(status.installation_id).toBeNull();
const row = await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).first();
expect(row.private_key_encrypted).toBeNull();
expect(row.public_key).toBeNull();
expect(row.last_error).toBeNull();
expect(await db('product_usage_markers').count('* as c').first()).toEqual({ c: 0 });
// The receipt must not claim a deletion the collector never confirmed.
const receipt = JSON.parse(row.privacy_receipts).last_abandonment;
expect(receipt.status).toBe('collector-unconfirmed');
expect(receipt.reason).toBe('SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE');
expect(receipt.installation_id).toBe('a'.repeat(64));
});
it('lets the operator rejoin afterwards', async () => {
const service = await stuck();
await service.abandon();
expect((await service.state()).status).toBe('disabled');
});
it('refuses on a withdrawal that is merely undelivered', async () => {
const service = await stuck();
await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({ last_error: 'DELIVERY_FAILED' });
await expect(service.abandon()).rejects.toThrow(/abandoned/);
expect((await service.state()).installation_id).toBe('a'.repeat(64));
});
it('refuses while participation is active', async () => {
const service = await stuck();
await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({ status: 'active' });
await expect(service.abandon()).rejects.toThrow(/abandoned/);
expect((await service.state()).installation_id).toBe('a'.repeat(64));
});
});
/**
* Every failed delivery used to be retried on the next admin request, and
* /activity is open to any authenticated admin while the settings ticker fires
* it every five minutes per open tab. A permanently rejected packet therefore
* produced one collector request per admin action, indefinitely.
*/
describe('delivery backoff', () => {
let db;
afterEach(async () => { if (db) await db.destroy(); db = null; });
// A real identity and a schema-valid packet, so the failure happens where
// this test claims it does — at the network — rather than in signPacket.
const activeWithPendingPacket = async (fetchImpl, now) => {
db = await bootDb();
await db.schema.createTable('product_usage_markers', (t) => {
t.string('feature', 60).primary();
});
const service = new UsageService(db, {
secret: SECRET_A,
endpoint: 'https://usage.example.test',
now: () => now(),
fetch: fetchImpl,
});
const identity = generateIdentity();
await db('product_usage_state').where({ id: 1 }).update({
status: 'active',
consent_version: 'usage-consent.v2',
installation_id: identity.installation_id,
public_key: identity.public_key,
private_key_encrypted: service.encrypt(identity.private_key),
sequence: 1,
pending_packet: JSON.stringify(
makePacket(identity, 'session', 2, {}, 'usage.v2')
),
});
return service;
};
it('paces the next unattended attempt after a failure, and lets Retry skip it', async () => {
let clock = 1_000_000;
let calls = 0;
const service = await activeWithPendingPacket(() => {
calls += 1;
throw new Error('collector unreachable');
}, () => clock);
await service.tick();
expect(calls).toBe(1);
const paced = await service.state();
expect(Number(paced.attempts)).toBe(1);
expect(Number(paced.next_attempt_at)).toBeGreaterThan(clock);
// The unattended callers — /activity and the settings ticker — wait.
await service.tick();
await service.tick();
expect(calls).toBe(1);
// The operator pressing Retry does not.
await service.tick({ force: true });
expect(calls).toBe(2);
expect(Number((await service.state()).attempts)).toBe(2);
// Once the window passes, the automatic sender tries again on its own.
clock = Number((await service.state()).next_attempt_at) + 1;
await service.tick();
expect(calls).toBe(3);
});
it('grows the wait with consecutive failures and caps it at an hour', () => {
const service = new UsageService(null, { secret: SECRET_A, endpoint: 'https://usage.example.test' });
expect(service.backoffMs(1)).toBe(2 * 60000);
expect(service.backoffMs(3)).toBe(8 * 60000);
expect(service.backoffMs(20)).toBe(60 * 60000);
});
it('clears the pacing once a packet is accepted', async () => {
const clock = 1_000_000;
const service = await activeWithPendingPacket(async () => {
throw new Error('collector unreachable');
}, () => clock);
await service.tick();
expect(Number((await service.state()).attempts)).toBe(1);
await service.clearDeliveryBackoff();
const cleared = await service.state();
expect(Number(cleared.attempts)).toBe(0);
expect(Number(cleared.next_attempt_at)).toBe(0);
});
});