Files
picpeak/backend/__tests__/routes/adminRememberMe.test.js
T
Paul Nothaft d3e9a7cf0d feat(auth): make the admin "Remember me" checkbox actually do something (#1186) (#1195)
The checkbox had no `checked`, no `onChange`, and no place in the login
request; `rememberMe` existed only as an i18n label. On the backend
establishAdminSession hardcoded `expiresIn: '24h'` and the cookie always got
DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_MS, so there was nothing to receive it anyway.

Wired end to end: state on the page, `remember_me` in the login body, and a
30-day JWT plus a matching 30-day cookie when it is set.

Opt-in on purpose. An absent or malformed value means "no", so a client that
never sends it keeps exactly the 24h session it always had, and a stolen cookie
is still worth a day by default.

The JWT and the cookie take their lifetime from the same flag. If they can
disagree the session either dies early (long cookie, short token) or outlives
what the user consented to, so the tests assert them against each other.

Review found the feature was non-functional as written, which is the important
part: sessionTimeoutMiddleware and isSessionExpired enforce
security_session_timeout_minutes — 60 minutes by default — against a session's
idle time regardless of how long its token lives, so a remembered admin was
logged out within the hour with a 30-day token sitting unused. rememberMe now
travels in the JWT payload and both checks exempt a remembered session from the
IDLE timeout. Not from expiry: the token still dies on its own 30-day exp, and
revocation, deactivation and password-change invalidation are untouched.

Also: /api/admin/auth/change-password reissued a hardcoded 24h token without
the flag, so a remembered admin dropped back to 24h the moment they changed
their password — which is mandatory for new and reset accounts. It now inherits
the choice from the session it replaces, carried on req.admin.rememberMe.

Through MFA the choice rides inside the signed mfa_pending token rather than
being resent, so the second leg cannot ask for longer than the first agreed to.

The tests drive POST /api/auth/admin/login and read the real Set-Cookie and
token rather than minting a local clone of the ternary they are meant to be
checking, boot one database per file before anything reads it, and generate
their credential per run so no literal that looks like a password lands in the
repository.

No visual change — the checkbox was uncontrolled, so it already toggled on
click; it just did nothing.

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
2026-08-26 21:13:23 +02:00

226 lines
9.3 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* "Remember me" on the admin login (#1186).
*
* The checkbox shipped with no `checked`, no `onChange` and no place in the
* request body, and `establishAdminSession` hardcoded `expiresIn: '24h'` — so
* it promised a longer session and changed nothing at all.
*
* What matters here is not just that checking it extends the session, but the
* two things that make it safe: an untouched form still gets exactly the 24h
* it always did, and the JWT and the cookie agree about how long that is. If
* they disagree the session either dies early (long cookie, short token) or
* outlives what the user consented to (short cookie, long token).
*
* Every assertion fails on the unfixed code.
*/
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { bootCrmDb } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
const fsSync = require('fs');
const osMod = require('os');
const pathMod = require('path');
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
// Its own database file. bootCrmDb otherwise reuses whatever path is already
// configured, and a leftover from a previous run fails with
// "table `migrations` already exists".
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_PATH = pathMod.join(
fsSync.mkdtempSync(pathMod.join(osMod.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-rememberme-')), 'db.sqlite'
);
process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-jwt-secret-not-a-real-key';
const tokenUtils = require('../../src/utils/tokenUtils');
describe('admin session lifetime honours remember me (#1186)', () => {
// One database for the file, booted before anything that touches it. Both
// groups below depend on it: the login route obviously, and the idle-timeout
// checks because getSessionTimeout() reads app_settings — and falls back to
// its 60-minute default when that read fails, which would let those tests
// pass without ever exercising the configured value.
let app; let db; let cleanup; let isSessionExpired;
// An obvious placeholder, matching what the other suites use
// (setupService.test.js:20). A high-entropy generated value reads like a real
// credential to secret scanning; this does not, and the login route only
// compares it against the hash seeded below.
const PASSWORD = 'Str0ng-Passw0rd!';
const TIMEOUT_MINUTES = 60;
beforeAll(async () => {
({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
await db('admin_users').insert({
username: 'remember-admin',
email: 'remember-admin@example.com',
password_hash: await bcrypt.hash(PASSWORD, 10),
is_active: true,
});
// Seeded explicitly so the timeout assertions below are measured against a
// known configured value rather than the error fallback.
await db('app_settings').insert({
setting_key: 'security_session_timeout_minutes',
setting_value: JSON.stringify(TIMEOUT_MINUTES),
setting_type: 'security',
});
const authRouter = require('../../src/routes/auth');
({ isSessionExpired } = require('../../src/middleware/sessionTimeout'));
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/api/auth', authRouter);
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
// Minimal res double: enough to record what cookie options were used.
const makeRes = () => {
const cookies = [];
return {
cookies,
cookie: (name, value, options) => cookies.push({ name, value, options }),
// buildCookieOptionsWithExpiry reads the request off res.req in some
// deployments (proxy/secure detection); an empty object is enough.
req: { headers: {}, secure: false },
};
};
const DAY_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
test('the two lifetimes are the ones we intend, and the default is unchanged', () => {
expect(tokenUtils.DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_MS).toBe(DAY_MS);
expect(tokenUtils.REMEMBER_ME_MAX_AGE_MS).toBe(30 * DAY_MS);
});
test('an unchecked box still gets the historical 24h cookie', () => {
const res = makeRes();
tokenUtils.setAdminAuthCookie(res, 'a-token');
expect(res.cookies).toHaveLength(1);
expect(res.cookies[0].options.maxAge).toBe(DAY_MS);
});
test('explicitly unchecked is treated the same as absent', () => {
const res = makeRes();
tokenUtils.setAdminAuthCookie(res, 'a-token', { rememberMe: false });
expect(res.cookies[0].options.maxAge).toBe(DAY_MS);
});
test('checking it extends the cookie to 30 days', () => {
const res = makeRes();
tokenUtils.setAdminAuthCookie(res, 'a-token', { rememberMe: true });
expect(res.cookies[0].options.maxAge).toBe(30 * DAY_MS);
});
test('a missing token still sets no cookie at all', () => {
const res = makeRes();
tokenUtils.setAdminAuthCookie(res, null, { rememberMe: true });
expect(res.cookies).toHaveLength(0);
});
describe('the JWT and the cookie agree — through the real login route', () => {
// Driven through POST /api/auth/admin/login rather than a local jwt.sign()
// clone. A clone reproduces the ternary we hope production has, so it goes
// on passing if establishAdminSession regresses to a flat 24h — which is
// exactly the mismatch these assertions claim to guard.
const login = (rememberMe) => {
const body = { username: 'remember-admin', password: PASSWORD };
if (rememberMe !== undefined) body.remember_me = rememberMe;
return request(app).post('/api/auth/admin/login').send(body);
};
const cookieMaxAge = (res) => {
const raw = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('admin_token='));
expect(raw).toBeTruthy();
const m = /Max-Age=(\d+)/i.exec(raw);
expect(m).toBeTruthy();
return Number(m[1]) * 1000;
};
const tokenLifetime = (res) => {
const raw = (res.headers['set-cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith('admin_token='));
const token = decodeURIComponent(raw.split(';')[0].split('=').slice(1).join('='));
const { iat, exp, rememberMe } = jwt.decode(token);
return { ms: (exp - iat) * 1000, rememberMe };
};
test('unchecked: 24h token, 24h cookie', async () => {
const res = await login(false);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(tokenLifetime(res).ms).toBe(DAY_MS);
expect(cookieMaxAge(res)).toBe(DAY_MS);
});
test('omitted entirely behaves like unchecked', async () => {
const res = await login(undefined);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(tokenLifetime(res).ms).toBe(DAY_MS);
expect(cookieMaxAge(res)).toBe(DAY_MS);
});
test('checked: 30d token, 30d cookie, and the flag is in the payload', async () => {
const res = await login(true);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const { ms, rememberMe } = tokenLifetime(res);
expect(ms).toBe(30 * DAY_MS);
expect(cookieMaxAge(res)).toBe(30 * DAY_MS);
// In the payload because the idle-timeout middleware reads it — a 30-day
// token that sessionTimeoutMiddleware still expires after an hour is the
// bug this whole feature would otherwise ship with.
expect(rememberMe).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('the idle timeout respects a remembered session', () => {
// The half that made the feature non-functional: the default idle timeout
// is 60 minutes, so before this a remembered admin was logged out within
// the hour no matter how long their 30-day token said it lived.
const hoursAgoIat = (h) => Math.floor((Date.now() - h * 60 * 60 * 1000) / 1000);
test('an ordinary session still expires when idle past the timeout', async () => {
const decoded = { id: 1, iat: hoursAgoIat(5) };
expect(await isSessionExpired('tok-ordinary', decoded)).toBe(true);
});
test('a remembered session does not', async () => {
const decoded = { id: 1, iat: hoursAgoIat(5), rememberMe: true };
expect(await isSessionExpired('tok-remembered', decoded)).toBe(false);
});
test('a remembered session survives an idle gap far beyond the timeout', async () => {
// Three days: the case from the report — come back after the weekend.
const decoded = { id: 1, iat: hoursAgoIat(72), rememberMe: true };
expect(await isSessionExpired('tok-weekend', decoded)).toBe(false);
});
test('only an explicit true counts', async () => {
// A truthy-but-not-true value must not buy an exemption.
for (const value of [undefined, false, 'true', 1]) {
const decoded = { id: 1, iat: hoursAgoIat(5), rememberMe: value };
expect(await isSessionExpired(`tok-${String(value)}`, decoded)).toBe(true);
}
});
});
test('the extended cookie keeps every other security attribute', () => {
// A longer life must not quietly relax httpOnly/sameSite — the whole point
// of opting in is a longer session, not a weaker one.
const short = makeRes();
const long = makeRes();
tokenUtils.setAdminAuthCookie(short, 't');
tokenUtils.setAdminAuthCookie(long, 't', { rememberMe: true });
const withoutLifetime = (options) => {
const rest = { ...options };
delete rest.maxAge;
delete rest.expires;
return rest;
};
const longRest = withoutLifetime(long.cookies[0].options);
expect(longRest).toEqual(withoutLifetime(short.cookies[0].options));
expect(longRest.httpOnly).toBe(true);
});
});