v3.101.3-beta.0
47
Commits
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f00661511c |
feat(gallery): admin preview skips the password on protected galleries (#981)
Closes #868. A logged-in admin opening a published, password-protected gallery is let straight in, mirroring the existing draft-visibility bypass. Mechanism: an explicit ?admin_preview=1 intent flag AND a verified admin session read from the httpOnly admin_token cookie (or an admin-typed Bearer) — never a token from the URL. This retires the old ?preview=<raw-admin-JWT> scheme, which leaked a 24h admin token into the address bar, referrers and proxy logs. Per-request bypass only: no gallery JWT is minted, the password endpoint is never reached so the login_attempts lockout buckets stay clean, and admin previews are excluded from guest analytics (access_logs, download counts, per-photo view_count, notification bells). Review (two rounds) closed three blockers and two concerns: - Transport: verifyGalleryAccess now resolves admin preview before any gallery credential, and isAdminPreview reads the admin cookie first and type-checks every candidate — so an admin Bearer no longer 403s on the type gate, and a coexisting gallery session can no longer shadow the admin cookie. - Reveal mode (#838) is a second consumer of isAdminPreview; its bypass is unchanged, only the transport moves. revealMode.test.js updated off the retired scheme and now carries a coexisting gallery Bearer. - Admin previews no longer inflate per-photo view counts, and the internal photo redirects preserve the flag via withPreview() so they still authorise. - Happy path: GalleryPage renders GalleryView directly for a preview instead of attempting the public empty-password auto-login, which 401'd against a genuinely protected gallery and stranded the page on the skeleton. The backend job timed out once at the 10-minute CI limit; a re-run completed in 2m02s, in line with main's ~2m10s baseline, so that was a runner flake rather than a hang. |
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6699855c93 |
fix(auth): fail closed when the adminAuth roles join errors (#974)
Closes #968. The roles-join fallback in adminAuth fabricated role_name='super_admin' on ANY database error, so a transient fault (connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout, pool exhaustion) silently granted super_admin for its duration. roleName is the sole discriminator for every ownership check, so this inverted the authorization model rather than failing the request. Gate the fallback on isMissingRolesSchema(), moved to utils/dbErrors.js and shared with apiTokenAuth. The predicate was also tightened: knex prefixes the failing SQL to err.message and that SQL always names `roles`, so the old /roles/i gate was vacuous and a generic /does not exist/ could accept unrelated faults. Now trusts SQLSTATE 42P01/42703 on Postgres and exact driver phrasing on SQLite. |
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7c0c0a5b7f |
fix(security): enforce project ownership on project + project-email routes (GHSA-wrg5, GHSA-93x4) (#960)
* fix(security): enforce project ownership (GHSA-wrg5, GHSA-93x4) Project routes authorized on generic events.view / events.edit with NO ownership check, so an editor-like admin could enumerate, read, update and aggregate projects belonging to other admins' events. The project email endpoints keyed on an email_queue id alone — any admin with events.view / email.send could preview, resend, cancel or retry ANY queued mail by walking ids. The earlier 'needs a migration, deferred' assessment was wrong in one direction and right in another: ownership IS derivable transitively via events.project_id -> events.created_by, but only for projects that already have a linked event. A brand-new EMPTY project has no derivable owner, which is exactly where the create -> attach flow starts. So migration 167 adds projects.created_by (backfilled from the single linked event owner, skipping ambiguous multi-owner projects) and createProject finally persists the adminId it was already being passed. - ownedProjectIds(): union of the stored owner and the transitive path, so pre-167 rows and new empty projects both resolve. Reads created_by defensively so an instance that hasn't run 167 falls back to the transitive rule instead of throwing. - requireProjectOwnership on detail/update/attach-event/attach-quote/ attach-contract/overview; list filtered by an id allowlist (empty array means 'owns nothing' and must return no rows, hence null-vs-[] care). - POST /:id/events also validates the INCOMING eventId — owning the project is not enough, or an editor could pull a foreign event in and read its rolled-up documents via /:id/overview. - Queued-email routes scoped via email_queue.event_id. CRM document mail has event_id NULL and no ownable parent here, so a scoped caller is denied rather than guessed into access. 404 (not 403) so it isn't an id oracle. Note: adminEmail.js:315/332 let any email.view/edit admin archive or delete any email_queue row — the same class, pre-existing and outside these two advisories. Left untouched and reported rather than silently widened. * fix(security): codex round 2 — make the stored project owner authoritative (GHSA-wrg5) The first predicate union'd 'any linked event I can see' with the stored owner, which opened two holes: - A project owned by admin B containing ONE legacy ownerless event became readable by every admin — and /:id/overview aggregates B's other events, invoices and emails, so a single legacy event exposed the whole project. - Migration 167 deliberately leaves multi-owner (ambiguous) projects NULL rather than guessing an owner. A NULL owner was then treated as 'everyone's', so exactly those mixed projects became globally accessible. Now: the stored created_by wins outright, and a project without a usable stored owner only derives access when EVERY linked event is accessible (and at least one exists). A created_by pointing at a hard-deleted admin degrades to 'no usable owner' so the project falls back to its events instead of being locked away — no ON DELETE SET NULL migration needed. A project with neither a usable owner nor linked events stays super_admin-only: failing closed beats failing open, and a super_admin can reassign it. Also returns a knex SUBQUERY rather than a materialised id list, so a large project count can't hit the driver's bind-parameter limit. * fix(security): codex round 3 — enforce deal-lineage ownership on project attach (GHSA-wrg5) requireProjectOwnership vets only the DESTINATION project, while attaching a quote or contract cascades through linkDealToProject — which re-points every event the deal produced into that project. An editor could therefore create an empty project of their own, attach another admin's quote, and pull that admin's events (plus the invoices, emails and gallery that roll up with them) into a project they own and can read via /:id/overview. The single-customer guard did not stand in the way: an unassigned project ADOPTS the deal's customer rather than rejecting it. linkDealToProject now refuses to move lineage events the actor cannot own, and assignDocument cascades BEFORE stamping the document so a refused attach leaves nothing half-applied (the old order committed the foreign document into the caller's project and only then declined the cascade). The quote/contract create+update paths, which reach the same cascade with an arbitrary project_id, thread their adminId through as well; isSuperAdmin() resolves the role for them and fails closed when it cannot. Events are the only ownership signal a deal carries — quotes and contracts have no created_by in this schema — so a lineage that produced no event still cannot be attributed. That is a property of the CRM model, noted in the code. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me * docs(security): drop the stale ownership JSDoc left by the rebase (GHSA-wrg5) Rebasing onto main (which had gained scopeEventsQuery from #957) replayed the round-1 doc block above round-2's replacement, leaving a comment that describes the ORIGINAL union rule — "a project is the caller's when … it has at least one linked event they own" — directly above the code that deliberately no longer does that. That union is the hole round 2 closed; a comment asserting it is worse than none. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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e2ce95ee48 |
fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697) (#957)
* fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697) Migration 081 documents the intent — 'the token's effective permissions are the intersection of the user's role permissions and the token's own scope flags' — but it was never implemented. - apiTokenAuth selected only id/username/email/role_id, so req.admin.roleName was undefined. Every ownership helper keys on roleName, so the v1 surface could not tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer. Now joins roles and emits the same req.admin shape adminAuth does, including the roles-table-missing upgrade fallback. - No v1 route applied any ownership predicate: GET /events listed every event on the instance, and GET /events/:id/share-link returned ANY event's share_token — the gallery access credential, same class as GHSA-rh8r. List is now scoped via a new scopeEventsQuery helper; the three :id routes (detail, photo upload, share-link) use the existing requireEventOwnership. Not a breaking change: tokens are minted by super_admins, who bypass ownership. It closes the case where a token's owner is later demoted — userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlived the demotion with full read of every gallery's share token. events.category.test.js stubbed apiTokenAuth without roleName; giving the stub super_admin keeps requireEventOwnership from issuing a DB query and desyncing that suite's sequenced dbMock. * fix(security): codex round 2 — intersect v1 token scopes with role permissions (GHSA-9697) Ownership scoping alone left half the documented control missing. Migration 081 defines a token's effective permissions as the INTERSECTION of the owner's role permissions and the token's scope flags; requireApiScope only ever checked the scope half. A token minted while its owner was super_admin therefore kept write access after the owner was demoted to viewer — userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlives the demotion, and ownership scoping does not help because the demoted owner still owns their events. Adds requirePermission to all six v1 routes (events.create on create, events.view on the reads, photos.upload on upload). It keys on req.admin.id, which apiTokenAuth already populates. The two existing v1 suites mock the database, so a real permission lookup 500s — they now mock the permissions middleware as pass-through, matching how they already mock apiTokenAuth. Those suites cover route logic; the intersection is pinned by the new v1TokenPermissions suite. * fix(security): codex round 3 — fail closed on the roles-join fallback (GHSA-9697) The round-2 fix loaded the token owner's role so the v1 ownership checks could tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer, and mirrored adminAuth's roles-table-missing fallback. That fallback assigns role_name = 'super_admin', and the catch around it was unconditional — so ANY failure of the joined query (connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout) elevated the token owner to super_admin as long as the simpler fallback query then succeeded. A restricted owner could ride that into listing, reading and share-tokening every event on the instance, which is the exact hole GHSA-9697 closes. The fallback is now reached only for an error that genuinely names a missing roles table/column (PG 42P01/42703 or the SQLite/MySQL wording); anything else propagates to the 500 handler. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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c2ce12c039 |
fix(security): authz/ownership gaps (token binding, auth revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging) (#950)
* fix(security): close authz/ownership gaps (secure-download binding, photo-auth+logout revocation, feedback/customer ownership, token logging) * fix(security): codex round-1 — complete admin-token invalidation + preserve foreign assignments - photoAuth: mirror adminAuth's active-admin lookup + iat<password_changed_at check in the admin branch, so a deactivated admin or a pre-password-change token can no longer fetch every photo (GHSA-x55x was only revoke+cutoff). - adminAuth logout: revoke req.token (the token adminAuth authenticated with, cookie OR header) instead of header-only, and clear the auth cookie — a cookie-based logout previously left the JWT live (GHSA-cjqh). - adminCustomers PUT /:id/events: preserve the customer's existing assignments to events the caller does NOT own, so a restricted admin can't revoke another admin's customer-event links via full-list replacement. * fix(security): codex round-2 — don't 403 legit restricted-admin assignment edits The Manage-galleries dialog submits the full initial assignment list, so a restricted admin editing a customer that already has a foreign assignment hit the denied.length 403 before the preservation logic ran. Reject only NEWLY-supplied foreign/nonexistent ids; retain foreign ids the customer is already assigned to (they can't be added or removed by a non-owner). --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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38b8d476d1 |
fix(security): bump backend deps to close all 14 open Trivy code-scanning alerts (#869)
* fix(security): bump backend deps to close all open Trivy code-scanning alerts - axios 1.16.0 -> 1.18.1 (GHSA-gcfj-64vw-6mp9 high + 10 medium advisories) - sharp 0.34.3 -> 0.35.3 (GHSA-f88m-g3jw-g9cj, inherited libvips CVEs) - mailparser 3.9.9 -> 3.9.14 (pulls linkify-it 5.0.2, CVE-2026-59887) - brace-expansion override >=5.0.6 -> >=5.0.7 (CVE-2026-13149) - body-parser 1.20.4 -> 1.20.6 via lockfile refresh (CVE-2026-12590) * fix(images): migrate removed sharp failOnError option and enforce Node >=20.9 sharp 0.35 drops the deprecated failOnError constructor option, so recoverably corrupt images would start failing upload validation and thumbnail generation; use the failOn: 'none' equivalent instead. sharp 0.35 also requires Node >=20.9: declare it in engines and make picpeak-setup.sh compare the full version instead of only the major, so native installs on Node 20.3-20.8 upgrade instead of breaking. * fix(setup): align the Node floor with the whole dependency tree and gate native updates html-to-text@10 needs Node >=20.19 and the glob/minimatch family excludes Node 21, so declare engines as ^20.19.0 || >=22 and enforce the same range in picpeak-setup.sh. Also run install_nodejs at the start of update_native_installation so existing native installs on an old Node get upgraded before the service is stopped, instead of restarting broken. * fix(setup): make the update-path Node gate actually work --update dispatches before detect_os, so install_nodejs saw an empty PACKAGE_MANAGER, matched no install branch, and reported success on the old runtime. Detect the OS on demand and re-verify the installed version afterwards, failing loudly (before the service is stopped) when the runtime still misses the engines range, e.g. a Node 21 that package managers refuse to downgrade. |
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c6ec93eef9 |
fix(dates): normalize SQLite epoch timestamps at remaining API surfaces (#485 follow-up) (#857)
The audit #485 called for: on SQLite (native installs), timestamp columns written with a raw `new Date()` through knex store epoch-ms numbers; Postgres returns ISO strings. Frontend code written against Postgres calls parseISO() on them — parseISO(number) throws and crashes the page. #485 fixed admin Users and listed api tokens / photos / activity as out-of-scope follow-ups. Verified crash on main: Timeline gallery layout parseISO(uploaded_at) against photos written by the archive-RESTORE path (raw Date). Other raw-write surfaces (api_tokens last_used_at/revoked_at, email_queue) degrade rather than crash but violate the ISO contract. - extract toIso() from adminUsers.js into utils/dateNormalize.js (contract unchanged — the 10 existing #485 tests still pin it) - write-side: archive-restore uploaded_at, api-token last_used_at / revoked_at, email_queue created_at/sent_at now write ISO strings - read-side (heals existing corrupted rows): gallery /photos normalizes uploaded_at/captured_at; api-tokens list normalizes all four timestamp fields - frontend defence-in-depth: Timeline layout parses uploaded_at tolerantly (typeof guard) for stale caches / old backends - 2 regression tests seed literal epoch numbers and assert the API serves ISO strings activity_logs turned out safe (created_at comes from the DB default, not a raw Date) — left untouched. Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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3d6c9848dc |
feat(feedback): emoji reactions on photos (#839) (#855)
* feat(feedback): emoji reactions on photos (#839) Per-photo emoji reactions from a fixed curated set (❤️ 😂 😍 👏 🎉), one reaction per guest per photo — same emoji toggles off, another switches in place. Stored as feedback_type='reaction' rows with per-guest scoping identical to likes (guest_id when present, device hash otherwise). - migration 164: allow_reactions toggle (default on, still gated by the opt-in feedback_enabled master switch), photo_feedback.reaction value column, denormalized photos.reaction_count - emoji whitelist enforced in the route validator AND the service (shared constants/reactions.js, mirrored in the frontend) - per-emoji tallies + my_feedback.reaction in the photo feedback endpoint; hidden-by-moderator reactions leave all counts - reactions ride the existing rate limiting (like-tier), guest identity modes, and moderation actions; long + pivot exports carry the emoji - gallery: reaction bar in the photo feedback panel (grid lightbox); admin: allow_reactions toggle next to likes, analytics tile, create/duplicate event paths - i18n for all 8 locales; 9 service-level tests * fix(feedback): reach reactions without comments; numeric analytics totals (#839) - the lightbox feedback-panel toggle was gated on allow_comments only — with comments off the new reaction bar was unreachable; the gate now opens for comments OR reactions - the analytics summary now coerces Postgres string counts to numbers: total_feedback concatenated instead of adding ("00006") * fix(feedback): harden reactions from review round 1 (#839) - per-emoji tallies are gated on show_feedback_to_guests — with sharing off a guest sees only their own selection, no aggregate counts - reaction toggle/switch operate on the guest-scoped row SET, so rows duplicated by the (like-parity) check-then-insert race collapse on the next interaction instead of counting twice - rate-limit defaults merge UNDER the persisted settings object — stored rows predating the reaction key otherwise dropped it to the generic 100/h fallback - optimistic revert uses the pre-mutation value via mutation context; the onError closure sees the post-optimistic render, so the old revert froze the wrong state on failed toggles * fix(feedback): review round 2 — hide reaction_count with sharing off, admin list shows emoji (#839) - summary.reaction_count is gated on show_feedback_to_guests like the per-emoji map, keeping the "no aggregates while sharing is off" promise consistent - the admin feedback list renders the reaction emoji on reaction rows and the type filter gains a Reactions option (7 locales; es has no types block and falls back to EN defaults) * fix(feedback): register reaction activity types with translated labels (#839) photo_reaction / guest_feedback_reaction are logged by the submission paths but were absent from the frontend activity-type union and the admin.activities label maps — the recent-activity feed would have shown the raw identifiers. All 8 locales. * feat(feedback): reactions in guest CRM and the premium gallery layout (#839) - guest CRM: per-guest reaction counts in the list aggregation and a Reacted tab (photo grid with emoji badges) + stats card in the guest detail modal; picks/aggregate/exports stay selection-only by design - premium layout: its own yet-another-react-lightbox now gets a fixed reaction-bar overlay (per-photo fetch, optimistic switch) — reactions were otherwise unreachable in this layout since it bypasses the shared PhotoLightbox - allowReactions threaded through the layout feedbackOptions; guest i18n keys for the 7 locales that carry the guests block * fix(feedback): portal the premium reaction bar to document.body (#839) Inside the layout tree an ancestor stacking context (framer-motion transforms) painted the bar under yarl's body-level portal — visible but unclickable, every tap landed on the slide image. As a direct body child the z-index 10000 genuinely wins over yarl's 9999. Verified by clicking through in the running app. --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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cb5b319f10 |
feat(notifications): surface guest activity in the admin bell (#849)
* feat(notifications): surface guest activity in the admin bell (#746) Favorites already reached activity_logs (feedbackService), but gallery opens and downloads only landed in access_logs — invisible in the notification bell. Now: - gallery_opened on the guest photo-list route, debounced in-memory to one notification per event per 6h (the endpoint fires per page load; per-hit notifications would spam the bell). Slideshow traffic stays excluded, matching the analytics exclusion. - gallery_downloaded on all four download paths (streamed + pre-zipped + presigned download-all, download-selected) with scope metadata. - Frontend: locale entries for galleryOpened/galleryDownloaded (and photoFavorite, which previously fell through to the generic 'system activity' line) in all 8 languages — resolved via the existing smart camelCase fallback, no switch cases needed. Distinct bell icons per type. * fix(notifications): single-photo download activity + render per-type bell icons (codex review of #849) - The per-photo Save route (GET /:slug/download/:photoId) only wrote to access_logs — the most common download path never reached the bell. Now emits gallery_downloaded with scope 'single', debounced to one notification per event per hour: a guest saving 30 photos is one signal, not thirty (exact counts stay in access_logs/analytics). - getNotificationStyle's icon names were dead — AdminHeader hard-coded <Bell> for every row. Added an icon map so gallery opens (Eye), downloads (Download), favorites (Heart) and the pre-existing style names render their intended icons. * fix(notifications): notify after successful delivery, complete the icon map (codex review of #849, round 2) - Single-photo notification now fires on res 'finish' with status < 400: emitting up-front logged downloads that then 404ed/failed AND burned the 1h debounce window against the next real download. - Icon map completed over every name getNotificationStyle returns (grep-verified) — settings/user/mail/etc. styles render their declared icons instead of falling back to Bell. Deliberately NOT taken from the review: DB-backed debounce state for multi-worker deployments. The backend's current deployment contract is single-process (no PM2 cluster in-repo; multi-replica explicitly parked in #799 — chunked-upload/session state is process-local for the same reason). Worst case under a future multi-worker setup is N notifications per window, which degrades, not breaks; a shared-store debounce belongs to the #799 phase-3 work. * fix(notifications): attribute client sessions, log cached-ZIP after finish, add Trash2 icon (codex review of #849, round 3) - gallery_opened/gallery_downloaded now carry the real actor: client sessions (accessLevel 'client') are recorded as 'customer' instead of being mislabeled 'guest' — #746 explicitly covers client activity, so they are attributed, not excluded. - Cached-ZIP streaming path logs on res 'finish' (< 400) like the single-photo path — piping is not delivery. The presigned-redirect and on-the-fly-archiver paths keep their existing timing (redirect handoff / post-finalize). - Trash2 added to the icon map (customer_erased, bulk_delete_completed no longer fall back to Bell — the grep that built the map missed the digit in the name). * fix(notifications): dashboard formatting, portal dedup, actor-aware wording, archiver finish-hooks (codex review of #849, confirmation round) - activity_logs feed TWO surfaces: the dashboard's Recent Activity used admin.activities.<type> keys that didn't exist, rendering raw identifiers — added gallery_opened/gallery_downloaded entries in all 8 locales. - Customer-portal opens already log customer_event_access at the access-token mint; the ensuing /photos call no longer double-notifies (client sessions surface via downloads only). - gallery_downloaded formatting is actor-aware: customer sessions render 'Customer downloaded…' (new galleryDownloadedCustomer key ×8) instead of 'A guest…'. - Both on-the-fly ZIP paths (download-all fallback + download-selected) notify on res 'finish' < 400 — archive.finalize() ends Archiver's input, not the HTTP transfer. * fix(notifications): key customer dedup/attribution on portal provenance, neutral favorite wording (codex review of #849, final round) The previous dedup was inverted: portal-minted tokens carry via:'customer' but NO accessLevel (they run as guest), while PIN-client logins carry accessLevel:'client' and log nothing else. So PIN clients' only open signal was suppressed while portal opens still double- notified and portal downloads read as guest activity. verifyGalleryAccess now surfaces req.viaCustomer; gallery_opened dedups on THAT (portal only), and galleryActor treats via-customer OR accessLevel-client as 'customer'. photoFavorite wording is actor-neutral across all 8 locales — feedbackService logs favorites without an actor, so claiming 'a guest' was wrong for customer favorites. |
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cbde7636aa |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/oidc-sso-phase1
# Conflicts: # backend/src/middleware/maintenance.js |
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a77c2c2c57 |
Merge pull request #813 from PicPeak/feat/harden-picpeak-restore-robustness
feat(security): harden .picpeak restore robustness — sessions, roles, sequences |
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340d91bdd5 |
feat(security): harden .picpeak restore robustness — sessions, roles, sequences
Implements the three restore-hardening items deferred from the #811 Codex review (all validated against a real Postgres, see __tests__/integration/ picpeakRestorePg.test.js). Backend-only; targets main (feature, not a backport). 1. Global session cutoff (utils/sessionCutoff.js). A restore reassigns admin/ customer/event ids, so ANY pre-restore JWT can rebind to a different restored principal. Revoking just the importing token wasn't enough. importFromPicpeak now stamps a unix-second cutoff in app_settings after the restore commits, and adminAuth / galleryAuth / verifyGalleryAccess / customerAuth reject any token whose iat predates it (cached 30s → one in-memory compare on the hot path). The operator's forced re-login mints a token past the cutoff, so it passes. 2. Role preservation across an RBAC replace (captureOperatorRole / preserveOperatorRole). The operator's role + granted permission NAMES are captured before the wipe; after roles/role_permissions are replaced the role is resolved by NAME against the restored data, and re-created with its grants if the backup omits it — so a crafted or cross-instance backup can't silently downgrade or lock out the operator. reinjectCurrentAdmin now returns the operator's id so the row can be re-pointed at the resolved role. 3. Postgres identity-sequence resync (resyncSequences). batchInsert writes explicit ids without advancing the sequences, so the next natural insert into any restored table collided on the PK. Runs AFTER commit (setval isn't transactional) and guards every table with a column-existence check — pg_get_serial_sequence RAISES on id-less tables like role_permissions. No-op on SQLite. Tests: SQLite unit tests for the cutoff and role preservation; a gated Postgres integration suite (npm run test:pg with PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL) covering sequence resync, the id-less-table guard, explicit-id reinject, role re-creation, and a full cross-instance replaceAllTables run asserting operator preservation, role re-establishment, FK integrity, and collision-free post-restore inserts. Stacks on #811 (shares the reinject hardening); merge after it. |
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07f2c90055 |
fix(security): mask backup credentials on read + unblock MFA login during maintenance
Two pre-existing bugs surfaced while reviewing #806 (kept separate per scope policy — no OIDC code here): - backup_s3_secret_key and backup_rsync_ssh_key (an SSH PRIVATE KEY) were returned in PLAINTEXT by GET /admin/backup/config and by the generic settings reads (GET /admin/settings and /admin/settings/:type — which mask the recaptcha/umami/rybbit keys but not these). All three now mask with the established bullet sentinel, and PUT /admin/backup/config skips the sentinel on write so the edit form round-trips without clobbering stored credentials (same pattern as the email/WhatsApp config endpoints) - /api/auth/admin/login/mfa was missing from the maintenance-mode allowlist: the first login step passed, the second factor got a 503 — any MFA-enrolled admin was locked out exactly while maintenance mode was on Regression tests: masking on all three read paths, sentinel round-trip preserves stored values, real rotation still writes. |
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7f7d38a57f |
fix(oidc): security + robustness hardening from codex review rounds 1-2
Round 1: - bind SSO identities to (external_issuer, external_subject): OIDC only guarantees sub uniqueness within an issuer, so a sub-only lookup let a newly configured IdP's user inherit an old IdP's admin account on subject collision; migration 162 gains external_issuer + composite unique index (unmerged migration, edited in place) - fetch UserInfo (with sub cross-check) when the ID token carries no email — spec-compliant providers may serve email/profile claims only there; ID-token claims win on merge - allowlist /admin/sso/login + /callback in maintenance mode, or SSO-only (JIT) admins are locked out exactly when they need in - strip reserved keys (oidc_client_secret, setup_token) from BOTH generic settings reads (GET / and GET /:type) Round 2: - redirect_uri prefers API_URL (the API's public origin — where the state cookie lives); final redirects absolute to the frontend base; login button builds its URL via buildResourceUrl — split-origin deployments (absolute VITE_API_URL) work end to end - PUT /sso validates the MERGED resulting state (partial update cannot blank issuer/client while enabled=true survives; enabling requires a derivable redirect URI) - openid scope forced into oidc_scopes on save - discovery-cache key includes a secret fingerprint (multi-worker secret rotation) - email→admin linking claims the row atomically (conditional update on external_subject IS NULL) — concurrent first-time callbacks with the same verified email but different subjects can't both authenticate Tests: mock IdP gains userinfo endpoint + email-via-userinfo-only mode; new cases pin the userinfo merge and issuer-collision non-inheritance; redirect assertions updated for absolute URLs. 13/13. |
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f564b38c5a |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into refactor/codebase-cleanup
# Conflicts: # backend/src/routes/adminEvents.js # backend/src/routes/protectedImages.js # frontend/src/pages/admin/EventDetailsPage.tsx |
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081f3edcdf |
fix(security): close cross-event thumbnail leak, bulk-op ownership bypass, + hardening
Auth/access-control audit fixes (all pre-existing on main; none are regressions). Verified end-to-end where noted. HIGH - Thumbnail enumeration: photoAuth granted any gallery token access to any flat /thumbnails/thumb_* file, so a visitor to one gallery could enumerate another (password-protected) gallery's entire thumbnail set. Scope thumbnail access to the token's event via photos.thumbnail_path. Live-verified: cross-event fetch now 404s, own-event still 200s. - Bulk ownership bypass: bulk-archive/bulk-delete acted on body-supplied event ids with no owner filter (single-event routes enforce requireEventOwnership), letting admin/editor archive or cascade-delete any event. Add filterOwnedEventIds; also guard rename + import-external; tighten photo-retry to scope admin (not just editor). Fix misleading bulk-delete comment. MED - verifyGalleryAccess never checked decoded.type — assert 'gallery' instead of relying on other token types incidentally lacking eventId. - secure-images generate-token/secure-download missing denySlideshowToken (#646 bypass): a leaked slideshow token could download originals. - Frontend: AuthenticatedImage + api.ts attached the gallery bearer token to absolute/external URLs — only attach to relative same-app paths. LOW hardening - Pin algorithms:['HS256'] on all auth-boundary jwt.verify calls. - crypto.timingSafeEqual for share-token + HMAC compares (utils/timingSafe). - Remove dead photoAuth import in galleryFeedback. Tests: new regression suites for thumbnail scoping + filterOwnedEventIds; fixed verifyGalleryAccess.customerRevoke fixture (real customer tokens carry type:'gallery'). Full backend suite at the pre-existing baseline (5 suites/27 tests fail on main too), zero new failures. |
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2ea26a4962 |
fix: conform moved code to eslint indent/quotes, 4-arg mutation callbacks
- eslint --fix on branch-changed backend files (indent shift from the module-wrapper nesting in decomposed files); backend lint now 904 errors vs 1,315 on main - useMutationWithToast forwards all four TanStack v5 callback args (tsc -b strict build flagged the 3-arg passthrough) |
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6eb46d8c31 |
refactor(backend): standardize error responses, logging, pagination
- errorResponse(res, error, status, publicMessage) in routeHelpers,
wired into 125 catch blocks across 10 route files; wire format
({ error: <string> }) unchanged byte-for-byte
- Replace remaining console.* with logger across src (178 sites);
3 intentional console sites kept (install boot, unbound .catch ref)
- Adopt getPagination in 6 routes where semantics match exactly
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e36b3309ca |
fix(slideshow): deny display-only token on download/upload/feedback (PR #646 review)
The slideshow JWT reuses type:'gallery', so verifyGalleryAccess accepts it on every gallery route — a leaked projector link could download (single/all/ selected), upload (when allow_user_uploads), or post feedback for up to ~12h, beyond its display-only contract. Add a `denySlideshowToken` middleware (403 when req.accessLevel==='slideshow') after verifyGalleryAccess on those 5 routes. The photo-display routes (/photos, photo/thumbnail/preview/hero) stay open — the kiosk needs them. +4 tests mint a real slideshow JWT and assert 403. Docs note that Regenerate/Disable isn't instant revocation (~12h) and the feature flag is the hard cut-off. |
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a93b6dc232 |
fix(accounting): PR #622 concerns — flag-cache, customer master gate, VAT-unconfigured, helpers, page cap
1. requireFeatureFlag now caches each flag for 10s (the accounting area is 10+ gated endpoints); PUT /admin/feature-flags invalidates the cache so toggles still take effect immediately. 2. Customer routes (/quotes, /invoices, /contracts + their PDFs) now gate via getEffectiveFeaturesForCustomer — the global MASTER flag AND the per-customer override — instead of the per-customer column alone, via a shared customerFeatureAllowed() helper. Admin disabling a feature globally is now honoured for customers too. 4. Tax-report VAT-payable: when accounting_vat_registered is UNSET, stop guessing from grandTotalVat>0 (a zero-output-VAT quarter silently flipped to "not registered" and hid the reclaim). Treat null as "not configured": vatPayableMinor=null + vatRegistrationConfigured=false; the UI renders "—" and a "configure VAT registration" warning. Tests updated. 5. Shared upsertAppSetting() in utils/appSettings — the two adminSettings upsert loops use it, so the app_settings created_at class can't be re-introduced. 6. PDF rasterise per-file bound: getRenderedPagePath refuses pages beyond MAX_RENDERABLE_PAGES (200); page_count is capped to match at ingest, so a hostile high-page PDF can't drive an unbounded pager. 7. (no code) original_filename is only rendered via auto-escaped JSX; the two dangerouslySetInnerHTML sites are admin-authored content — paranoia pass clean. Concerns 3 (foreign-VAT reclaim-country) and 8 (imap_pass plaintext) are PR-reply / doc items, addressed in the PR response, not code. |
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03fa3d8296 |
fix(flags): close CRM/accounting feature-gating gaps from the audit
A sweep of every CRM/accounting toggle found surfaces still reachable
with their flag OFF. Adds a shared requireFeatureFlag middleware (the two
existing per-file copies predate it) and closes the gaps:
- Hours logging: only createEntry checked the flag — edit/delete/bill and
the list/summary routes were permission-only. Gate all six
/hour-entries routes on the hoursLogging master so a disabled feature
can't be read, mutated, or invoiced via a direct API hit.
- Installment plans: PUT /deals/:uuid/installment-plan mutates invoices
but wasn't bills-gated; add requireFeatureFlag('bills').
- Customer invoice PDF: /invoices/:id/pdf lacked the feature_bills check
the list + quotes routes have. Also fixes the quotes-PDF gate, which
read req.customer.feature_quotes (never populated → silent no-op).
- Customer contracts: /contracts + /contracts/:id/pdf were gated by
neither the master nor a per-customer column.
Per-customer contracts override (the missing counterpart):
- Migration 131 adds customer_accounts.feature_contracts, default TRUE so
existing customers keep their Contracts tab (preserve-visuals).
- Effective resolver now contractsMaster AND feature_contracts; admin
detail page gains the toggle; service/validator/serializer wired.
Cleanups:
- Drop stale `taxReport` from the sidebar's Clients-reveal list (Tax moved
to Accounting); add the missing `projects` so it mirrors the context
derivation.
- SettingsPage tab-snap effect now depends on flags.accounting.
- Fix stale taxReport "forced off when bills off" comment (it's accounting).
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249313072b |
fix(maintenance): enabling maintenance mode no longer locks admins out
Turning on maintenance mode locked out every admin — including ones already logged in — with no way back in from the browser. Two causes: 1. Backend (middleware/maintenance.js): the skipPaths allow-list pointed at /api/admin/login and /api/admin/auth/login, but the real admin auth routes live under /api/auth (POST /api/auth/admin/login, GET /api/auth/session). So during maintenance both the login POST and the session check 503'd. The 503 on /auth/session made the frontend read every admin as logged-out, and also tripped the axios interceptor that force-enables maintenance globally. Fixed the allow-list to the actual endpoints. 2. Frontend (MaintenanceWrapper.tsx): the maintenance screen rendered over every /admin/* route unless an admin session already existed — covering the /admin/login page itself. A logged-out admin could never reach the form to get a session (catch-22). /admin/login is now always allowed through. With both: a logged-in admin keeps working (session check passes), and a logged-out admin can reach /admin/login and sign back in, all while maintenance mode correctly blocks customers. |
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807ae3d4fa |
fix(security): block script execution in served SVGs via CSP
Serve uploaded SVGs (admin logos etc.) with a restrictive Content-Security-Policy (default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:) + X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff in secureStatic. The browser still renders the vector, but any embedded <script>/on* handler can't execute if the SVG is opened directly — keeps real SVGs (scalable) instead of rasterising them. Applies to all secureStatic mounts (uploads/photos/thumbnails/fonts); only SVGs get the header. |
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ecb2aeacf9 |
fix(test-infra): unref sessionTimeout cleanup interval so workers exit gracefully
The 5-minute session-sweep interval at sessionTimeout.js:17 fired at module-load time without .unref(), so every jest worker that transitively required this module (server.js → middleware → most of the route layer) kept the event loop alive forever. The worker then got force-killed on shutdown, surfacing as the longstanding "worker failed to exit gracefully" warning at the end of every CI run on upstream/beta. Under enough I/O / memory pressure on a CI runner, the force-kill could land MID-test rather than after the suite finished, taking out whatever else was running on that worker — most visibly integration/storageBackend.test.js on PR #555's runs. .unref() makes the timer not keep the loop alive on its own. Production behaviour is unchanged: the timer still fires every 5 min as long as anything else is holding the loop open (the HTTP server, always). |
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3122dd08a8 |
fix(customer-routes): Cache-Control: no-store on customer endpoints (#470)
The trigger: PR #458 mounted requireCustomerPortalEnabled which 410'd every /api/customer/* + /api/admin/customers/* request when the master toggle was off. Some browsers cached that 410 (no Cache-Control header was set, so heuristic freshness applied — the wrong default for an authenticated/sensitive surface). PR #470 reverted the middleware, but a customer whose tab cached the 410 still saw 410s until they hard-refreshed. Add noStoreCache middleware and mount it in front of both route groups. Every response (200, 4xx, 5xx) now carries `Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, private` plus the HTTP/1.0 Pragma + Expires fallbacks. Any future transient error from these endpoints can no longer get pinned in browser or proxy caches and outlive its cause. Cost is one setHeader per request; applied per route group rather than globally so static assets + galleries keep their own caching strategy unchanged. Includes a dedicated unit test pinning the header set so a future cleanup pass can't quietly drop it and re-introduce the bug. |
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3f4419356a | revert(customer-portal): make the global flag UI-only, drop the kill-switch middleware | ||
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55a5846f6f | feat(gallery): revoke customer-minted JWTs when assignment is removed | ||
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9091ed4012 | feat(clients): scaffold top-level Clients section with sub-nav around Accounts | ||
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087ef45942 |
feat(customers): customer portal (#354) on top of feature-flags reorg
Implements the recurring-customer login surface from the-luap/picpeak#354 plugged into the maintainer's new feature-flag infrastructure (PR #443) instead of a parallel toggle. * New `customerPortal` feature flag (foundation flag for the not-yet-built calendar/quotes/bills/messaging customer surfaces). Defaults FALSE on fresh installs, TRUE on existing installs (events > 0) via migration 095 so live customer accounts don't disappear mid-deployment. * Foundation schema: customer_accounts, customer_invitations, event_customer_assignments, customer_password_resets, plus RBAC permissions customers.view / .create / .delete granted to super_admin + admin system roles. * Backend: /api/admin/customers (invite, list, search, assign, deactivate, reset password) + /api/customer/auth/* + /api/customer/* (login, dashboard, accept-invite, reset). Customer JWT bypass minted via /api/customer/events/:slug/access-token so existing gallery middleware stays untouched. * Frontend: /customer/* route tree gated by RequireFeature flag customerPortal, with login / dashboard / accept-invite / reset pages and a customer-side sidebar layout. /admin/customers and /admin/customers/:id gated identically. * Settings → Features grows a "Customers" section with a Customer portal card. The maintainer's Features tab stays the single source of truth — no parallel Advanced features tab. * CustomerAccountPicker on event create/edit forms hides itself when the flag is off; backend ignores customer_account_ids in that case instead of erroring the whole event save. Translations: en + de hand-translated. nl/pt/ru fall through to en — flagged here as needing native review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> |
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b106da1ede |
fix(auth): /auth/session must enforce session timeout symmetrically (#350 recurrence)
Third loop fix in the same /admin/login → /admin/dashboard → /admin/login pattern as #355 and #363. Reported on v3.39.1-beta.0 — the loop returns after a server restart or after an idle gap longer than the configured session timeout. ## Root cause (server) `sessionTimeoutMiddleware` is mounted on `/api/admin` (server.js:411). It rejects with `401 SESSION_TIMEOUT` when either: - the in-memory `lastActivity` for the token is older than the timeout, or - this is the first request with this token AND the token's `iat` is older than the timeout (post-restart guard). `/auth/session` lives under `/api/auth/session`, NOT under `/api/admin`, so the middleware never runs for it. Result: an idle/old-iat admin token returns `valid: true` from `/auth/session` while every protected endpoint immediately rejects it with `401 SESSION_TIMEOUT`. Frontend's 401 interceptor hard-redirects to `/admin/login`, `/auth/session` says valid again, loop closes — exact same shape as the previous two asymmetries the symmetry pass missed. Fix: add a non-mutating `isSessionExpired(token, decoded)` helper to `middleware/sessionTimeout.js` that reads the same in-memory map and applies the same lastActivity / iat-vs-timeout logic as the middleware, without updating the map (the middleware is the only place that records activity; `/auth/session` is read-only by design). `/auth/session` calls the helper for `decoded.type === 'admin'` after the existing admin-existence and password-change checks. Same try/catch fall-through pattern as the prior fixes so a missing/broken helper doesn't fail-closed during early bootstrap or in test stubs. ## Root cause (client race amplifying the loop) Even with the server fix, the previous `useSessionTimeout` hook called `AdminAuthContext.logout()` which dispatches `POST /auth/logout` fire-and-forget AND has its own `finally { window.location.href }`, then immediately set `window.location.href = '/admin/login?session=expired'` on top. Two consequences: - The cookie wasn't reliably cleared before the new page loaded — if any /auth/session asymmetry slipped through, the loop replayed inside the same tab. New-tab and "refresh several times" "fixes" were just the logout request eventually completing. - Two redirects raced; sometimes the `?session=expired` query was dropped, breaking the login-page toast. Fix: rewrite the hook to (a) await `POST /auth/logout` so the cookie is guaranteed cleared, (b) clear `sessionStorage.admin_user` directly instead of going through AdminAuthContext.logout (which has the side-effect redirect we don't want), and (c) navigate exactly once with the `?session=expired` query. ## Tests - `__tests__/routes/authSession.symmetry.test.js` — 4 new cases under a `session-timeout symmetry` describe block: helper says expired → valid:false; helper says active → valid:true; helper not called for gallery tokens; helper throws → fall through to valid:true (defensive). Existing 9 tests still pass (mock now includes `isSessionExpired: jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve(false))` as the default). - `__tests__/middleware/sessionTimeout.isSessionExpired.test.js` — 7 new unit tests for the helper itself: fresh token / old-iat / recently-active / null-input / no-mutation / 60-min default boundary cases. 20 cases total, all green. Lint clean on every touched file. |
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808b15bafb |
feat: public v1 API + token management + OpenAPI docs (#322)
Adds a long-lived bearer-token mechanism + scoped REST surface designed
for n8n-style automation: create a gallery, upload photos, fetch the
share URL — all via documented HTTPS endpoints instead of poking at the
admin UI's internal routes.
API
- Migration 081 adds `api_tokens` (hashed_token, scopes, owner FK,
last_used/expires/revoked timestamps).
- New apiTokenAuth middleware: parses `Authorization: Bearer pp_live_…`,
resolves to the owner admin user, attaches `req.admin` so existing
permission decorators (events.create etc.) still work. Token-level
scope check (read/write/admin) layers on top as defence in depth —
a leaked read-only token cannot mutate even if its owner is super_admin.
- adminApiTokens route exposes list/create/revoke for admins (cookie-
authed). Plaintext token is returned exactly once on creation.
- v1 surface mounted at /api/v1: POST/GET /events, GET /events/:id,
POST /events/:id/photos (multipart, single file), GET
/events/:id/share-link. Each endpoint annotated with @openapi JSDoc.
Documentation
- swagger-jsdoc + swagger-ui-express produce a live spec at
/api/openapi.json and a Swagger UI at /api/docs (admin-gated).
- backend/scripts/generate-openapi.js writes docs/openapi.{json,yaml}
to the repo so the spec is versioned.
- scripts/sync-api-docs.sh runs in pre-push: regenerates the spec and
copies it into the picpeak-docs Nextra site at app/api/. Writes only,
never commits or pushes the docs repo (PUSH_SKIP_DOCS=1 to bypass).
Frontend
- New Settings → API Tokens tab: generate, list, revoke. Plaintext
tokens are shown once with a copy-to-clipboard control.
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793e410554 |
fix: floor password_changed_at when comparing against JWT iat
JWT `iat` has 1-second resolution; `password_changed_at` is stored with sub-second precision. The previous comparison rejected tokens whose iat fell in the same wall-clock second as a password change — e.g. a token issued by an immediate re-login after a password reset, or by any script-driven flow that resets and logs in in quick succession. Floor the stored timestamp to whole seconds before comparing. Caught while wiring up the local E2E suite: the seeder needed a "set password_changed_at 10 s in the past" hack to avoid this race; with the fix in place that hack is gone and the suite is naturally deterministic. |
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ad4e5a7506 |
feat: guest selections with per-person identity (#292)
Introduces a new "Per-guest selections" identity mode for event feedback, letting each visitor register under their own name so their likes/favorites/comments/ratings are tracked independently. Includes admin insights (list, per-guest detail, aggregate view, export) and advanced identity features (forget-me, email recovery, invite tokens, merge). New event-level setting - event_feedback_settings.identity_mode = 'simple' | 'guest' (default 'simple' → zero behavior change for existing events). - Admin UI radio under Feedback Settings to toggle per event. Root cause of the previous "all guests share state" bug - generateGuestIdentifier() was sha256(ip + userAgent), so every visitor on the same WiFi + similar device collided into one identity. - Now: when a verified guest JWT is present (x-guest-token header), req.guest.identifier takes precedence — per-person rate limits and per-person deduplication. Phase 1 — identity layer - Migration 078: new gallery_guests, guest_invites, guest_verification_ codes tables; identity_mode column + check constraint; nullable guest_id FK on photo_feedback. - New guest JWT type scoped to (eventId, guestId). - New middleware guestAuth.resolveGuest (non-blocking) + requireGuest. - POST /gallery/:slug/guest, GET /guest/me, DELETE /guest/me. - Gallery feedback route enforces guest identity in guest mode and reads name/email from the verified token (never from the body). - Frontend GuestIdentityContext + GuestNamePromptModal; axios interceptor injects x-guest-token on gallery API calls. - Feedback-only blocking: gallery opens freely, prompt only on first interactive feedback action. - Admin "Guests" tab (conditional on identity_mode='guest') with the AdminGuestsList component. Phase 2 — admin insights - GET /admin/events/:eventId/guests list + aggregated counts. - GET /admin/events/:eventId/guests/:guestId detail with per-type groupings; AdminGuestDetail modal with thumbnail grid + tabs. - GET /admin/events/:eventId/guests/aggregate sorted by distinct guest pick count; GuestSelectionsAggregate component. - Per-guest export (txt/csv/json) and bulk export-all ZIP. Phase 3 — polish - 3.1 Self-service forget-me link in gallery footer. - 3.2 Email-based identity recovery: POST /guest/recover sends a 6-digit code via the existing emailProcessor, POST /guest/verify exchanges it for a token (rate-limited, enumeration-safe). - 3.3 Admin invite tokens: pre-mint identities, share URLs with ?invite=, single-use redemption stripping the param from history. - 3.4 Admin merge endpoint reassigns feedback + soft-deletes sources. Shared helper - useGalleryFeedbackAction hook wraps the identity-check logic for inline like buttons across Masonry/Grid/Justified/Mosaic/Carousel/ Timeline/Premium layouts. Backwards compatibility - Existing events default to 'simple' after migration; behavior unchanged. - Legacy photo_feedback rows keep guest_id NULL; admin shows them in the generic feedback moderation view as before. - feedback_count denormalized stat now uses COALESCE(guest_id, guest_identifier) so per-guest counts are accurate without touching legacy rows. Verified end-to-end against local Docker - Migration clean on existing data. - Simple mode unchanged (no prompt, legacy flow). - Guest mode: Alice registers on click, tokens persist in sessionStorage, feedback rows carry guest_id. - Carol via invite link auto-redeems, sees Alice's "1 likes" badge. - Admin Guests tab shows both with correct counts; detail modal displays thumbnail grid with badges; aggregate view sorts by picker count (photo 227 = 2, others = 1); CSV/JSON export matches DB. - Merge Carol into Alice: feedback reassigned, Carol soft-deleted, Alice count = 4. |
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40332a71db |
feat: draft mode, admin branding, and workflow improvements
Draft Mode: - Events are created as drafts by default — no email sent until published - Add "Publish & Notify Client" button with confirmation dialog - Draft banner with yellow styling on event details page - Draft filter tab in events list - Gallery middleware blocks public access to draft events - Migration 076 adds is_draft column to events table Admin Draft Preview: - Admins can preview draft galleries via JWT preview token (?preview=) - "View Gallery" link on drafts auto-appends preview token Admin & Login Page Branding: - Admin header uses configured company logo/name from branding settings - Login page shows configured logo instead of hardcoded PicPeak - Respects logo_display_mode (logo_only, text_only, logo_and_text) OG Tag Branding: - DynamicFavicon component updates OG meta tags and page title from branding settings Editable Client Email: - Customer email is now editable after event creation in edit mode Branding Inheritance: - New events inherit hero logo settings (visibility, size, position) from global branding configuration Share Link Full Domain URL: - New getFrontendBaseUrl() utility with DB fallback to general_site_url - Used in email processor and share link service |
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23cd9cb680 |
fix: address Shannon security assessment findings (37 vulnerabilities) (#254)
Remediate 4 Critical, 18 High, 10 Medium, and 5 Low vulnerabilities identified in the Shannon security assessment (2026-03-20). Critical fixes: - Command injection via rsync SSH key path (INJ-VULN-01) - Self-escalation to super_admin role (AUTHZ-VULN-11) - Invite super_admin backdoor (AUTHZ-VULN-12) - Handlebars SSTI in email templates (INJ-VULN-05) Authentication hardening: - Rate limit on share-link login (AUTH-VULN-01) - X-Forwarded-For spoofing bypass (AUTH-VULN-02) - reCAPTCHA fails closed when misconfigured (AUTH-VULN-03) - Token revocation on admin/gallery logout (AUTH-VULN-04/05) - Cookie Secure flag defaults true in production (AUTH-VULN-06) - Remove JWT from admin login response body (AUTH-VULN-07) - Timing-safe gallery slug validation (AUTH-VULN-09) - Account lockout fails closed on DB error (AUTH-VULN-12) - Session endpoint checks token revocation Path traversal & file access: - checksums endpoint path containment (INJ-VULN-03) - manifest validate path containment (INJ-VULN-04) XSS prevention: - Block SVG data URIs in CSS sanitizer (XSS-VULN-01) - Email preview iframe sandbox (XSS-VULN-02) - SSR branding HTML escaping (XSS-VULN-03) - User-Agent sanitization in feedback (XSS-VULN-04) Authorization (IDOR): - Event ownership middleware for all admin routes - Cross-admin user profile read restriction (AUTHZ-VULN-10) SSRF & infrastructure: - Private IP validation for SMTP, S3, rsync hosts - Replace inline JWT with standard adminAuth middleware - CSRF Content-Type enforcement on mutating API endpoints - CSP headers in nginx location blocks Token revocation fix: - Remove overly broad orWhere clause that invalidated all future tokens - Allow empty-body POST requests (logout) in CSRF middleware Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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e1b6e43e52 |
feat: photo visibility control with client access (#172)
Add two-tier gallery access system allowing clients (e.g., wedding couples) to review and hide photos before the gallery is shared with guests. Backend: - Migration 074: add visibility column to photos, client_access_enabled/ client_password_hash/client_share_token to events - Client login endpoint (POST /auth/gallery/:slug/client-login) with bcrypt PIN - Gallery photo list filters hidden photos for guests, shows all for clients - Visibility toggle endpoints (single + bulk) for client access level - Admin event CRUD supports client access fields - Email template includes client access link + PIN (EN/DE/RU/PT) Frontend: - ClientAccessPage: PIN entry form at /gallery/:slug/client-access - GalleryView: client mode banner, visibility counter, toggle controls - GridGalleryLayout: eye/eye-off overlay per photo for clients - AdminPhotoGrid: visibility badge, bulk Hide/Show buttons - EventDetailsPage: Client Access settings section (toggle, PIN, link) - CreateEventPage: client access toggle + PIN in event creation form - GalleryAuthContext: accessLevel/isClient/clientLogin support - New complete pt-BR locale (pt.json) with all translations - Client access i18n keys for EN, DE, RU, PT |
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f3622396e7 |
fix(security): invalidate tokens on password change, enforce session timeout, fix role update
- Set password_changed_at when changing password via adminAuth route so existing JWT tokens are rejected by the auth middleware check - Enforce session timeout on first request with unseen tokens by checking token iat against configured timeout (prevents bypass after server restart) - Convert camelCase roleId/isActive to snake_case role_id/is_active in frontend updateUser service (fixes silent role update failures) Resolves GHSA-rqg3-47p5-vgwg |
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2151147f2d |
feat: add optional event date and expiration settings
Add global settings to make event_date and expiration optional when creating galleries. This supports non-event use cases like portraits, corporate shoots, etc. New features: - Settings toggles in Settings → Event Creation tab - "Require event date" checkbox with warning about random URL identifiers - "Require expiration date" checkbox with warning about manual archiving - Galleries without date use random hex suffix in slug (e.g. portrait-smith-a1b2c3) - Galleries without expiration never expire (stay active until archived) Backend changes: - New migration for settings and nullable columns - Conditional validation based on settings - Updated slug generation with random suffix fallback - Updated expiration checker to skip null expires_at - Updated gallery access control for null expiration Frontend changes: - New checkboxes in EventsTab with warnings - Conditional event date field (shows optional label) - No Expiration message when expiration disabled - Updated types for nullable event_date and expires_at Closes #118 |
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892e47d017 |
feat: add multi-administrator support with RBAC and fix backup/restore for S3
## Multi-Administrator System
- Add role-based access control (RBAC) with predefined roles (Super Admin, Admin, Editor, Viewer)
- Add granular permissions system for all admin operations
- Add admin user management page with invite functionality
- Add email invitation system for new administrators
- Add permission middleware protecting all admin routes
- Add PermissionGate component for frontend permission checks
- Track event creator (created_by) for audit purposes
## Backup & Restore Fixes
- Fix S3 backup: endpoint URL handling, manifest loading, field name compatibility
- Fix S3 restore: add list-backups endpoint, transform S3 config from frontend format
- Fix PostgreSQL compatibility: add .returning('id') for insert operations
- Fix disk space check: use df command, handle unknown space gracefully
- Fix dry-run validation to not block on warnings
- Fix req.user → req.admin in restore routes
## Database Migrations
- 054: Add roles table with predefined roles
- 055: Add permissions table
- 056: Add role_permissions junction table
- 057: Add role_id to admin_users
- 058: Add admin_invitations table
- 059: Add admin email templates
- 060: Add created_by to events table
## Other Improvements
- Update .gitignore to exclude planning docs and local backup directory
- Remove SQLite database file from tracking
- Add i18n translations for user management (EN/DE)
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0da45e699a |
feat: Add CSS template system with custom gallery styling support
## Changes ### CSS Template System - Added CSS class hooks to gallery components for custom template targeting - Gallery sidebar, header, footer, and photo cards can now be styled via CSS templates - CSS variables on :root allow themes to override colors, effects, and spacing ### Gallery Component CSS Classes Added - `.gallery-page` - Main gallery container - `.gallery-header` - Top header bar - `.gallery-sidebar` - Filter/download sidebar - `.gallery-sidebar-header`, `.gallery-sidebar-title`, `.gallery-sidebar-close` - `.gallery-sidebar-content`, `.gallery-sidebar-section` - `.gallery-sidebar-search-input`, `.gallery-sidebar-search-icon` - `.gallery-sidebar-backdrop` - Mobile overlay - `.gallery-btn`, `.gallery-btn-download` - Sidebar buttons - `.gallery-footer` - Footer section - `.photo-card`, `.photo-grid` - Photo display elements ### CSS Templates (Database) - Elegant Dark (id=1): Dark navy theme with light text and red accents - Liquid Glass Light (id=2): iOS 26 frosted glass effect with gradient background ### Bug Fixes - Fixed CSS variables not inheriting (moved from .gallery-page to :root) - Fixed sidebar position breaking layout (removed position: relative override) - Fixed Elegant Dark sidebar text visibility (white on white issue) ### Other Changes - Settings page refactoring and cleanup - i18n locale updates for new gallery features - Vite proxy port configuration fix - Admin auth route improvements - CSS templates service updates |
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3424bd22ee |
refactor: Phase 1 code consolidation and service layer setup
Phase 1.1: Shared parsers utility - Create backend/src/utils/parsers.js with parseBooleanInput, parseStringInput, etc. - Create frontend/src/utils/parsers.ts with TypeScript equivalents - Update routes to import from shared parsers Phase 1.2: Auth routes consolidation - Merge auth.js, auth-enhanced.js, auth-enhanced-v2.js into single auth.js - Add password change and password strength endpoints - Consolidate middleware (auth.js with token revocation support) - Update all imports across 14+ route files Phase 1.3: CreateEvent page consolidation - Remove duplicate CreateEventPage.tsx (basic version) - Rename CreateEventPageEnhanced.tsx to CreateEventPage.tsx - Update exports and imports Phase 1.4: CMS page consolidation - Remove duplicate CMSPage.tsx (basic version) - Rename CMSPageEnhanced.tsx to CMSPage.tsx - Update exports and imports Phase 1.5: Multer config factory - Create backend/src/config/multerConfig.js - Centralized upload configuration with presets for photos, logos, favicons - Reusable helpers: createDiskStorage, createFileFilter, uploadTimeoutMiddleware Phase 2.1: Event service layer - Create backend/src/services/eventService.js - Move event business logic out of routes - Functions: createEvent, getAllEvents, updateEvent, deleteEvent, extendExpiration |
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5d6c061f1c | feat: support per-gallery password toggle | ||
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71e7179145 |
Harden auth cookies and fix native schema for event creation
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1b4b497fdf |
chore: clean up codebase for production readiness
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- Remove all console.log/debug statements from production code - Add NODE_ENV checks for development-only logging - Remove test scripts (test-feedback, test-image-security, test-backup-*, test-restore) - Remove one-time fix scripts (fix-temp-photos, fix-migration-state, mark-migration-applied) - Remove sensitive files (.env.backup, ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt) - Update package.json to remove references to deleted scripts - Replace console statements with logger utility in backend - Secure error boundaries to not expose stack traces in production This makes the codebase production-ready with no debug output or test scripts. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]> |
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dc1419c051 |
feat: implement gallery feedback system with version tracking for backups
Gallery Feedback Features: - Add feedback system allowing ratings, likes, comments, and favorites on photos - Implement admin controls for enabling/disabling feedback per event - Add content moderation with word filters and spam detection - Implement rate limiting to prevent abuse (10 requests/15min per type) - Create comprehensive admin interface for feedback management - Add analytics dashboard for feedback insights - Export feedback data when archiving events Frontend Components: - PhotoRating: 5-star rating system with optimistic updates - PhotoLikes: Like/unlike with animation - PhotoComments: Threaded comments with moderation - PhotoFavorites: Bookmark functionality - FeedbackSettings: Admin configuration panel - EventFeedbackPage: Complete management interface Backend Implementation: - Database migration 033: 4 new tables for feedback system - RESTful API with proper authorization - Guest identification via SHA256(IP+UserAgent) - Automatic backup integration - Email notification support Backup Version Tracking: - Migration 034: Add version columns to backup tables - Track app version, Node.js version, and DB schema version - Create restore_history table for tracking restore attempts - Add version compatibility checking for safe restores - Configurable version matching requirements Security & Performance: - Input validation and sanitization - Rate limiting per feedback type - Content moderation system - Optimistic UI updates - Efficient database queries with proper indexes 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]> |
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8588133a4e |
fix: critical database connection pool exhaustion issues
- Disabled duplicate email service (emailService.js) that was creating redundant connections - Increased connection pool size from 10 to 25 for production environment - Extended session timeout cache from 5 to 30 minutes to reduce DB queries - Added connection retry logic with exponential backoff for transient failures - Fixed password validation to use retry wrapper and correct setting key - Updated public settings and gallery middleware to handle connection failures gracefully These changes address the "Connection terminated unexpectedly" errors in production by: 1. Reducing unnecessary database connections 2. Increasing available connection pool capacity 3. Implementing automatic retry for transient connection failures 4. Caching frequently accessed data for longer periods 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]> |
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1773ed5f95 |
Initial commit - Project start (July 17, 2025)
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Original: feat: enhance security logging and ensure rate limit blocks are properly tracked - Add comprehensive logging for rate limit blocks with full request details - IP address (with proper proxy detection), user agent, headers, timestamps - Rate limit info (current count, limit, remaining, reset time) - Separate tracking for auth vs general endpoints - Enhance authentication failure logging - JWT validation failures with detailed error info - Admin auth attempts without token - Failed token validation with user context - All events include IP, path, method, user agent - Improve Winston logger configuration for production - Add automatic log rotation (10MB errors, 50MB combined) - Create separate security.log for auth/rate limit events - Ensure logs directory exists automatically - Add structured JSON format for log aggregation - Support container logging with LOG_TO_CONSOLE env var - Create comprehensive documentation - Security logging guide with examples - Monitoring recommendations - Configuration reference - Add test script to verify logging functionality All rate limit settings remain configurable via admin panel: - Window duration, max requests, auth limits - Skip authenticated requests option - Public endpoints only option 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]> |