Probing the live collector to settle the delete-sequence question turned up
something else: usage.picpeak.app answers a valid usage.v2 registration with
INVALID_PACKET while the identical v1 flow is accepted. It does not speak v2
yet — which the deployment notes already require, but the consequence of
getting that order wrong was worse than "reports do not send".
Opting in to v2 against a v1-only collector left the installation stuck.
Registration was refused, so nothing existed at the collector at all; the row
sat in activation_pending, disable moved it to deletion_pending, retry was
futile forever, and enable refused because the row was not `disabled`. The
abandon hatch added earlier did not apply: it was gated on
SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE. So the most harmless possible failure — nothing
registered anywhere — was the one an operator could not clear.
The gate is now the property that actually matters: a participation the
collector has provably never accepted (sequence 0, no receipt) with a failing
delivery can be discarded, from activation_pending as well as
deletion_pending. Its receipt records `never-registered` rather than an
unconfirmed deletion, because nothing remote exists to be unsure about. A
participation the collector *did* accept keeps the old narrow gate and its
explicit warning — clearing local state while the collector still holds
reports must stay a deliberate, warned-about act.
A collector that rejects a registration or a deletion outright now reports
SCHEMA_NOT_ACCEPTED instead of DELIVERY_FAILED, and the settings page says the
collector does not accept this report version yet. Retrying cannot fix that,
and sending the operator to look for a network fault they do not have was
wrong.
Verified end to end against the live collector: v2 opt-in reports
SCHEMA_NOT_ACCEPTED, the exit is offered immediately, the receipt says
never-registered, and joining again on v1 registers, reports and withdraws
with a collector-confirmed deletion.
The dialog described what is sent and where it goes, but never said which way
the connection runs. That is the part an operator is actually being asked to
accept: opening an outbound path to someone else's service.
PicPeak sends and never pulls. One place in the service reaches the network,
it is a POST, and it requests exactly two paths — /api/envelopes, and
/api/participant/lookup only when an operator asks for their own export. No
scheduled job contacts the collector; the daily rollup is driven solely by an
authenticated admin hitting /activity. There is no route the collector could
call, and redirect: 'error' means it cannot even point a request somewhere
else. From a reply only the acknowledgement for the packet just sent is read,
with every field compared against that packet before it is accepted; the
stored copy drops the session token and no read path hands it back to the UI.
A requested export is streamed to the operator as a file and never
interpreted.
The consequence is why it belongs in the consent text and not only in the
docs: this channel cannot deliver code, configuration or content into an
installation, not even from a collector that has been taken over. It is a
security property by design rather than by convention.
usageOutboundOnly.test.js guards it by source inspection rather than
behaviour, because a behavioural test only proves that today's calls behave.
It fails the moment someone adds a second fetch, a poll for messages, a
scheduled pull, or a public route touching the usage service — verified by
injecting each of those.
A QA exploration of this branch against an isolated rig — own stub
collector, SQLite and PostgreSQL — turned up one dead end and a set of
signals and controls that did not hold up. This closes all of them.
Rotating JWT_SECRET, the documented response to a suspected compromise,
made the signing key unreadable. That was already named and documented,
but it left no way out: the delete packet can never be signed, so the
row stays deletion_pending forever, and enable() refuses because it is
not `disabled`. An operator who rotated precisely because the secret was
compromised cannot restore it, so the feature was bricked with no
control left. POST /usage/abandon is offered only in that state; it
drops the local identity and records the receipt as
`collector-unconfirmed` rather than claiming a deletion that did not
happen.
Every failed delivery was retried on the next admin request, and
/activity is open to any authenticated admin while the settings ticker
fires it every five minutes per open tab — 30 activity calls against a
rejecting collector produced 30 outbound requests. Migration 206 adds
attempts/next_attempt_at and the unattended sender honours the gate;
Retry and opt-out still send immediately, and the tab names the time of
the next automatic attempt.
Feedback, votes and portal sessions now share an installation-wide
budget of 30/hour. They are the only endpoints whose effect is outbound
traffic carrying operator-written free text, and the general limiter
skips authenticated requests by design. Reading status and withdrawing
stay unthrottled.
gallery_image_protection was true on a bare install with no galleries:
PicPeak ships default_protection_level='standard' and
enable_devtools_protection=true, so it reported fleet-wide 100% and
could never separate a decision from an untouched default. It now reads
only what deviates from the shipped defaults, and the devtools flag is
not read at all — being on by default, its only informative state is
off, which is the opposite of what the key claims.
Also:
- the export receipt counted every packet and called the total "usage
reports"; reports and participant operations are now counted and named
separately
- GET /usage/preview no longer persists the custom_css marker, so the
transparency view stops changing what will be sent
- the feedback route requires every field the packet schema requires,
so an API caller gets the missing field named instead of a bare
INVALID_PACKET from inside signing
- the German strings for this feature use "Sie" throughout, matching the
rest of the admin UI; the ignore hint says what ignoring will do
rather than stating it as already true
- the consent dialog returns focus to the control that opened it
- the long buttons wrap instead of running off a 390px viewport
- a deletion receipt is labelled as belonging to an earlier
participation while a new one is active
Regression tests cover each of these, including the delete packet's
reuse of the last accepted sequence, which was an unwritten assumption
about the collector rather than a defect.
Everything about this feature had been exercised on SQLite only, which is
the engine least likely to show its problems.
Adds __tests__/integration/productUsagePg.test.js, following the gated
pattern the .picpeak restore suites use: it runs the real migrations
201-203 against a real PostgreSQL and covers what SQLite cannot answer.
node-postgres returns bigint as a STRING, and the withdrawal guard
compares `cancel_seq` — a `'1' !== 1` slip there would let an activation
complete after an opt-out, and SQLite, which hands back a number, would
never show it. Booleans are real booleans rather than 0/1, which is what
every `configured` signal in a report is built from. And markUsed takes
SELECT ... FOR UPDATE on this engine only.
Seven cases, all passing against PostgreSQL 15. Removing the
compare-and-swap condition fails the withdrawal case there too, so the
suite has teeth on that engine and not only on SQLite. CI already
provides PICPEAK_PG_TEST_URL, so these run there rather than skipping.
The collector default is harder to lose. An unset, empty or
whitespace-only USAGE_COLLECTOR_URL now falls back to
https://usage.picpeak.app — deployments that template the variable in
(docker-compose writes ${USAGE_COLLECTOR_URL:-...}) can hand over an
empty string, and that has to mean "use the default" rather than "no
collector". A value that is present but malformed is still reported as a
configuration error instead of being silently replaced: quietly
retargeting a self-hoster's collector at ours would send their reports
somewhere they did not choose.
Refs #1110
Review follow-ups on #1304.
SIGNING_KEY_UNREADABLE. USAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY defaults to JWT_SECRET, so
rotating JWT_SECRET — the correct response to a suspected compromise —
makes the stored Ed25519 key undecryptable. That surfaced as a generic
DELIVERY_FAILED which retried forever, and it silently blocks the DELETE
packet too: an operator who withdraws has their local state cleared
while the collector keeps its copy. decrypt() now tags its own failure
and deliver() reports it under its own name, without flagging an
identity conflict — an unreadable key is not evidence of a clone. The
docs already warned that losing the key breaks deletion signing; they
now name the trigger and the error.
The collector default is no longer an inline string in the constructor.
It is a declared DEFAULT_COLLECTOR_URL, since it is a deployment choice:
self-hosters point USAGE_COLLECTOR_URL at their own collector and the UI
already derives every link from whatever is configured. schema.cjs is
deliberately untouched — it is vendored byte-identical with
picpeak-usage, and its $id is a schema identity, not a delivery address.
Links in the consent dialog. It named the collector inside prose but
never linked it, so an operator deciding whether to opt in could not
open the destination or the public schema without retyping a URL. Both
are links now, built from the configured collector.
UI standards. The tab hand-rolled its surfaces as
`<section className="rounded-xl border border-theme …">` and imported
Button from a deep path; every other settings tab uses `<Card
padding="md">` from the components/common barrel. Converted, with the
feedback <form> wrapped rather than replaced so its semantics survive,
and headings given the same colour tokens as ImageSecurityTab. The
barrel pulls ErrorBoundary -> i18n/config, so the tab's test needed the
initReactI18next shim the FaceRecognitionCard test already uses.
Not changed: the delete packet reusing the current sequence. The
collector handles delete before any sequence check — "possession proof
is sufficient for deletion, including when a restored backup has a
stale sequence" (picpeak-usage server/collector.js) — so deletion is
deliberately sequence-exempt and the client is correct as written.
Refs #1110
Paul Nothaft