External (source_origin='external') photos always had thumbnail_path=NULL,
so the gallery returned thumbnail_url=null and every layout fell back to
streaming the full original from the NAS via the secure-image route.
With ~100 NAS-mounted photos that meant minutes of wall-clock load time,
sequential per tile.
Two halves:
1. import-external route generates the thumbnail right after each
successful insert and writes thumbnail_path on the row. Best-effort:
a single failure logs a warning and leaves thumbnail_path=NULL —
ensureThumbnail will retry lazily on first view. Synchronous in the
loop adds ~100-300ms per image; for the worst-case 1000-photo import
that's still under the typical request timeout.
2. ensureThumbnail() in imageProcessor handles external photos too —
resolves the local NAS mount path via resolvePhotoFilePath instead of
the storage-backend key. This covers existing externals already in
the database that were imported before this fix: first gallery view
per photo regenerates the thumbnail, subsequent views are fast.
Filename-collision protection: external thumbnails use
`thumb_ext<photoId>_<basename>` so two events both referencing
e.g. `IMG_0001.jpg` on different NAS subtrees can't clobber each other's
thumbnail. generateThumbnail accepts a new options.outputBasename to
support this without changing the managed-photo behaviour.
Verified locally with a 3-photo external dir and a real NAS-style import:
POST /api/admin/external-media/events/N/import-external
→ {imported:3, thumbnailsGenerated:3, thumbnailsFailed:0}
/api/gallery/<slug>/photos returns thumbnail_url for every photo
Lazy-regen path: clearing thumbnail_path + deleting the file, then
hitting /thumbnail/N regenerates and repopulates the row in 42ms.
Closes#423.
The "Send Test Email" button on the Update Notifications settings page
called sendUpdateNotificationNow() — which bailed out with "No updates
available" when the instance was already on the latest version. Admins
on a current install had no way to verify their SMTP / recipient list
was working until an update happened to be pending. Reported in #418
by @Rekoo-PS.
Changes:
- Add migration 087: insert a dedicated `version_update_test` email
template (EN + DE, matching the existing version_update_available
convention) with copy that reads as a config-check rather than as a
real update notice. Subject prefixed with [TEST] so it's unambiguous
in the inbox. Variables: current_version, channel, recipient_email.
- Replace sendUpdateNotificationNow() with sendTestUpdateNotification()
in updateNotificationService.js. The new path:
- Always sends — no updateAvailable bail-out.
- Uses the version_update_test template.
- Falls back gracefully if checkForUpdates fails (so a transient
GitHub API hiccup doesn't block a config-check email).
- Does NOT update last_notified_version — that field stays owned by
the real-update path so a test send doesn't shadow a future
genuine notification for the same version.
- Wire /admin/system/updates/notifications/send to the renamed function.
No frontend change needed (the button already calls this endpoint).
Verified locally with the dev mailhog: clicking Send Test Email on a
3.42.3-beta.0 instance (which has no pending update) delivers 4 emails
to all admin recipients with subject "[TEST] PicPeak Update Notification
— configuration check" and body interpolated correctly. Returns
{success: true, successCount: 4, ...} — previously would have returned
{success: false, message: "No updates available"}.
The bulk-delete modal previously used a password input as a confirmation
gate, with an Enter-to-submit handler. Windows Hello / passkey flows
that target password fields were able to autofill and synthesise an
Enter keystroke, which submitted the form and triggered the destructive
delete without an explicit click on the red Delete button (Rekoo's
report in #417).
Replace the password gate with a GitHub-style typed-literal pattern:
the user types the literal "DELETE" (English, case-sensitive) into a
plain text input. The Delete button stays disabled until the input
matches, and there is no Enter-to-submit handler — only an explicit
click on the red button proceeds. Plain text inputs aren't subject to
password autofill or passkey ceremony so the auto-submit class of bug
is gone.
Server side, drop the bcrypt password verify on /admin/events/bulk-delete
and the related INVALID_PASSWORD response. The server's auth boundary
remains adminAuth + requirePermission('events.delete'); this matches
DELETE /admin/events/:id which has never required a re-entered password.
The client-side typed gate is the safeguard against accidental clicks.
i18n: drop password-related keys, add confirmLabel + confirmHelp across
en, de, nl, pt, ru. The literal "DELETE" stays English in all locales
to keep the gesture immune to translation drift and unambiguous.
Verified locally: typed-DELETE sanity spec covers the gate (wrong case
disabled, correct enables, Enter-on-input no-ops, click submits, events
deleted). Existing 03-bulk-archive smoke remains green.
Triage of an external SAST/SCA scan run on 2026-05-06. Most loud findings
were already resolved by PR #412 (the 18-CVE backport); this PR addresses
the residual real items:
* Drop unused `handlebars` from backend deps. The runtime require was
removed in PR #367 (#367) but the package.json line stayed. handlebars
was the source of two flagged criticals (CVE-2026-33937 RCE,
GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q AST injection) plus 8 highs — all now gone.
* `npm audit fix` on backend + frontend. Bumps transitive picomatch,
flatted, postcss, brace-expansion via lockfile, and direct dompurify,
lodash, vite, i18next-http-backend within their existing semver ranges.
Both audits now report 0 vulnerabilities.
* Add `event.origin === window.location.origin` check to the THEME_PREVIEW
message listener in PreviewPage. The branding page posts from the same
origin, so nothing legitimate is rejected; without the check, any third
party that window.open()'d the preview could push arbitrary
branding/theme payloads (semgrep
insufficient-postmessage-origin-validation).
* nginx: `proxy_hide_header` for X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options,
Referrer-Policy, Content-Security-Policy, Permissions-Policy,
Strict-Transport-Security at server level. nginx adds these itself, but
helmet on the backend was also emitting them — clients were seeing
duplicates (testssl flagged "Multiple X-Frame-Options / CSP /
Permissions-Policy / Referrer-Policy headers" on the live origin).
Single source of truth now.
* Dockerfile hardening (checkov):
- HEALTHCHECK on backend/Dockerfile, backend/Dockerfile.dev,
frontend/Dockerfile.dev. Frontend production Dockerfile already had
one.
- USER node in frontend/Dockerfile.dev (was running as root).
* GitHub Actions docker-build.yml: explicit top-level
`permissions: contents: read`. Per-job blocks already declare
`packages: write` where needed; this stops future steps from
inheriting unintended privileges (CKV2_GHA_1).
Backend npm audit: 4 vulns -> 0.
Frontend npm audit: 6 vulns -> 0.
Backend unit tests: 13 suites, 131/132 passing (1 pre-existing skip).
Frontend type-check + lint: clean.
The pre-existing integration-test failures (live DB / S3 required) and
the ThemeCustomizerEnhanced QueryClientProvider failures are unrelated
and reproduce on origin/beta without these changes.
Closes the open Trivy code-scanning alerts for app-side dependencies.
The npm-bundled CVEs in /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm (picomatch,
brace-expansion, ip-address inside the Node image itself) are deferred
to a separate Node-base-image PR — they're build-environment-side and
need their own compatibility testing.
## Direct dependency bumps
| Package | From | To | CVEs cleared |
|---|---|---|---|
| axios (backend + frontend) | 1.14.0 | 1.15.2 | CVE-2026-42264 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42043 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42035 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42033 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42044, CVE-2026-42042, CVE-2026-42041, CVE-2026-42040, CVE-2026-42039, CVE-2026-42038, CVE-2026-42037, CVE-2026-42036, CVE-2026-42034, CVE-2026-40175, CVE-2025-62718 |
| nodemailer (backend) | ^7.0.13 | ^8.0.5 | GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g, GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 |
| i18next-http-backend (frontend) | ^3.0.2 | ^3.0.5 | CVE-2026-41691 |
| uuid (backend) | ^11.1.0 | ^11.1.1 | CVE-2026-41907 |
| postcss (frontend, devDep) | ^8.4.21 | ^8.5.10 | CVE-2026-41305 |
## Transitive bumps (npm overrides)
For transitives whose direct parents haven't released a version that
picks up the patched range, pinned via npm overrides:
| Package | Min | CVE |
|---|---|---|
| follow-redirects (backend + frontend) | >=1.16.0 | GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 |
| fast-xml-parser (backend) | >=5.7.0 | CVE-2026-41650 |
| @tootallnate/once (backend) | >=3.0.1 | CVE-2026-3449 |
| ip-address (backend) | >=10.1.1 | CVE-2026-42338 |
## Why axios is now safe to bump past 1.14.0
PR #268 originally pinned axios to 1.14.0 to avoid a supply-chain
attack on a specific compromised version range. The 1.15.x series
are post-incident upstream releases — clean. Confirmed with the
maintainer before bumping.
## Verified
* `npx tsc --noEmit` (frontend) — clean
* `npx vite build` (frontend) — clean (~4s, existing bundle-size
warning, not new)
* Backend module-load smoke test — all critical modules load
(`auth`, `adminAuth` middleware, `emailProcessor`, `recaptcha`,
`storage`) with the new axios + nodemailer
* Lockfile re-verification — every targeted CVE now resolves to
the patched version range
## Remaining out of scope
* npm-bundled CVEs inside `/usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm/` —
picomatch CVE-2026-33671 (HIGH), CVE-2026-33672, brace-expansion
CVE-2026-33750, ip-address (npm-internal) CVE-2026-42338. These
live in the Node base image and require a Node base image bump
with its own compatibility testing — separate PR.
Targeting `beta` so the bumps go through the normal release-please
flow before promotion to `main`.
Third loop fix in the same /admin/login → /admin/dashboard → /admin/login
pattern as #355 and #363. Reported on v3.39.1-beta.0 — the loop returns
after a server restart or after an idle gap longer than the configured
session timeout.
## Root cause (server)
`sessionTimeoutMiddleware` is mounted on `/api/admin` (server.js:411). It
rejects with `401 SESSION_TIMEOUT` when either:
- the in-memory `lastActivity` for the token is older than the timeout, or
- this is the first request with this token AND the token's `iat` is
older than the timeout (post-restart guard).
`/auth/session` lives under `/api/auth/session`, NOT under `/api/admin`,
so the middleware never runs for it. Result: an idle/old-iat admin token
returns `valid: true` from `/auth/session` while every protected
endpoint immediately rejects it with `401 SESSION_TIMEOUT`. Frontend's
401 interceptor hard-redirects to `/admin/login`, `/auth/session` says
valid again, loop closes — exact same shape as the previous two
asymmetries the symmetry pass missed.
Fix: add a non-mutating `isSessionExpired(token, decoded)` helper to
`middleware/sessionTimeout.js` that reads the same in-memory map and
applies the same lastActivity / iat-vs-timeout logic as the middleware,
without updating the map (the middleware is the only place that records
activity; `/auth/session` is read-only by design). `/auth/session`
calls the helper for `decoded.type === 'admin'` after the existing
admin-existence and password-change checks. Same try/catch fall-through
pattern as the prior fixes so a missing/broken helper doesn't fail-closed
during early bootstrap or in test stubs.
## Root cause (client race amplifying the loop)
Even with the server fix, the previous `useSessionTimeout` hook called
`AdminAuthContext.logout()` which dispatches `POST /auth/logout`
fire-and-forget AND has its own `finally { window.location.href }`,
then immediately set `window.location.href = '/admin/login?session=expired'`
on top. Two consequences:
- The cookie wasn't reliably cleared before the new page loaded —
if any /auth/session asymmetry slipped through, the loop replayed
inside the same tab. New-tab and "refresh several times" "fixes"
were just the logout request eventually completing.
- Two redirects raced; sometimes the `?session=expired` query was
dropped, breaking the login-page toast.
Fix: rewrite the hook to (a) await `POST /auth/logout` so the cookie
is guaranteed cleared, (b) clear `sessionStorage.admin_user` directly
instead of going through AdminAuthContext.logout (which has the
side-effect redirect we don't want), and (c) navigate exactly once
with the `?session=expired` query.
## Tests
- `__tests__/routes/authSession.symmetry.test.js` — 4 new cases under
a `session-timeout symmetry` describe block: helper says expired →
valid:false; helper says active → valid:true; helper not called for
gallery tokens; helper throws → fall through to valid:true (defensive).
Existing 9 tests still pass (mock now includes
`isSessionExpired: jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve(false))` as the
default).
- `__tests__/middleware/sessionTimeout.isSessionExpired.test.js` — 7
new unit tests for the helper itself: fresh token / old-iat /
recently-active / null-input / no-mutation / 60-min default
boundary cases.
20 cases total, all green. Lint clean on every touched file.
Two issues in the fonts service test suite added by #390 — the behaviour
assertions all passed, but 5 of 24 tests had assertions that silently
no-op'd, so any regression in those code paths would not have been
caught.
## Issue 1: jest.resetModules() bypassed the logger mock
`beforeEach` called `jest.resetModules()` then re-required `fontsService`.
After resetModules, the `jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', ...)` factory
at the top of the file no longer applied to subsequent requires — so the
freshly-required `fontsService` captured the REAL logger while the test
file's `logger` variable still pointed at the mocked one. The 4
"warning logged" / "info logged" assertions resolved as 0 calls and
silently passed-as-noop.
The resetModules call wasn't necessary in the first place — module-level
state in fontsService is just the cache, which clearFontsCache() already
resets. And both getBundledFontsRoot() and getUserFontsRoot() read
process.env at call-time, not at module load, so the env vars set in
beforeEach are picked up without needing a fresh require.
Fix: require fontsService once at module top (inside the jest.mock
hoisting scope) and drop resetModules + the per-test re-require.
## Issue 2: case-insensitive filesystem (macOS / Windows)
The "case-insensitive duplicate within the same root" test created
`Inter/` and `INTER/` to trigger the dedup warning. On a case-sensitive
FS (Linux ext4) both directory entries exist and the dedup branch fires;
on macOS APFS or Windows NTFS the second mkdir resolves to the same
folder as the first, so only one ever exists and the dedup is
unreachable from this test setup. Test failed on macOS dev, passed on
Linux CI.
Fix: probe at load time by creating a lowercase file and checking if
its uppercase variant resolves to the same inode, then conditionally
test.skip the affected test on case-insensitive hosts. Comment in the
test body explains why.
## Result
23 of 24 tests now pass on macOS; the case-sensitive-only test runs on
Linux CI. All previously-no-op'd assertions now exercise their code
paths.
Adds the bulk-delete half of #384 — admins can select multiple
events from the list and delete them in one batch, gated by
re-entering their password.
## Why password confirmation
Bulk delete is destructive and irreversible (cascades across 5 DB
tables and 3 filesystem paths per event). Re-entering the password
matches the pattern already used by /auth/admin/change-password and
makes accidental clicks much harder than a plain "type DELETE to
confirm" — the muscle-memory required to type your real password is
a stronger gate than typing a literal word.
## Changes
### Backend (adminEvents.js)
- Extracted the per-event cascade-delete logic into a module-private
`deleteEventCascade(eventId, adminContext)` helper. The DELETE /:id
route now calls it instead of inlining 60 lines of cascade — same
behaviour, no drift between the per-event and bulk paths.
- New `POST /admin/events/bulk-delete`. Body: `{ eventIds, password }`.
Permission: `events.delete`.
- Validates `eventIds` array length (1–100) and that each id is an
integer. The 100-cap keeps request time bounded; the per-event
cascade touches DB + filesystem so 1000 events at once would risk
timing out the request.
- Verifies `password` against the calling admin's bcrypt hash via
`bcrypt.compare()` (same as /auth/admin/change-password). Wrong
password → 401 `{ error, code: 'INVALID_PASSWORD' }` and no
events are touched.
- Loops via `deleteEventCascade`, returns
`{ results: { successful, failed } }` with the same shape as
/bulk-archive so the frontend can show partial-failure feedback.
- Logs `bulk_delete_completed` activity with totals.
### Frontend
- `events.service.ts`: `bulkDeleteEvents(eventIds, password)`.
- New `BulkDeleteModal.tsx`. Red/destructive variant of the
bulk-archive modal:
- Lists the events to be deleted (so the admin can verify).
- Password input with show/hide toggle, autofocus, Enter-to-submit.
- Inline `passwordError` prop surfaces the 401 INVALID_PASSWORD
response without losing the modal state — admin can retry
without re-typing the event list.
- "Processing" state replaces the form with a spinner + "Deleting
N events. This may take a few minutes — please don't close this
window." (i18n) so admins know not to abandon the page during
a slow operation.
- `EventsListPage.tsx`: "Delete Selected" button next to "Archive
Selected" in the bulk-actions bar (red-styled to signal danger),
bulkDeleteMutation that maps the 401 to the modal's inline error
and any other failure to a generic toast.
### i18n
12 new keys under `events.bulkDelete.*` in all 5 locales
(en/de/nl/pt/ru): title, warning, password label/placeholder/help,
submit, processing, incorrectPassword, successAll, successPartial,
errorGeneric, plus `events.deleteSelected` for the button. Hand-
written for de; nl/pt/ru should get a native-speaker pass at some
point but read naturally.
### Verified
- `npx tsc --noEmit` clean
- `npx eslint` clean on every touched file (4 pre-existing errors in
adminEvents.js for unused vars unrelated to this PR)
- All 5 locale JSON files parse cleanly
- `node -e "require('./src/routes/adminEvents')"` loads the module
Closes the bulk-delete half of #384. The Photos-column half lands
separately in PR #387.
Video uploads on production fail with "missing ffmpeg" because the
backend container ships nothing usable for the video pipeline.
Two compounding causes:
1. **Alpine + glibc mismatch.** The npm `@ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg`
dependency added with the video-support PR (commit 68a9dc5)
ships per-platform binaries via optionalDependencies. The Linux
binaries are built against glibc, but the backend image runs on
`node:22-alpine` (musl libc) — known to either fail to execute
or fail on shared-library lookups on Alpine.
2. **`ffprobe` missing entirely.** `@ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg`
bundles only the `ffmpeg` binary. There's a separate
`@ffprobe-installer/ffprobe` package that the codebase never
depended on. But `videoProcessor.js:21` calls
`ffmpeg.ffprobe(videoPath, …)` — the very first step of the
video pipeline shells out to a `ffprobe` binary that doesn't
exist in the image. Even if (1) worked, every video upload
would 500 here.
The fix is to install Alpine's `ffmpeg` package via apk. It ships
both `ffmpeg` and `ffprobe` built natively against musl, ~70MB
extra image size, single line in the Dockerfile, no per-arch
handling needed (apk pulls the right binary for both linux/amd64
and linux/arm64 — works with the multi-arch infra from #349).
- `backend/Dockerfile`: add `ffmpeg` to the apk install line.
- `backend/Dockerfile.dev`: same for dev parity.
- `backend/src/services/videoProcessor.js`: remove the
`setFfmpegPath(require('@ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg').path)` line
— without removing it, fluent-ffmpeg would prefer the broken
bundled binary over the working apk one. Letting fluent-ffmpeg
fall back to PATH lookup picks up the apk binary in the
container and the developer's locally-installed binary on dev
hosts (Homebrew on macOS, apt on Debian).
- `backend/package.json`: drop the now-unused
`@ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg` dependency. `npm install` removes
2 packages from the lockfile.
Verified: `videoProcessor.js` still loads cleanly (`node -e
"require('./src/services/videoProcessor')"`); lint clean.
Two follow-ups to PR #372 (external-URL toggle for imprint /
privacy CMS pages):
1. **i18n.** PR #372 added 6 new `cms.*` keys to the en + de
locales but the project ships 5 locales total. Adds the missing
nl / pt / ru translations so the admin CMS page renders in the
active language for those users instead of falling back to
English literals next to the German/Dutch/Portuguese/Russian
surrounding strings.
2. **API shape.** `publicCMS.js` returned `external_url`
unconditionally — even when `use_external_url` is false the URL
value was still emitted in the public response. The frontend
correctly gated on both flags so it worked, but the API surface
was leaking a value the admin had explicitly disabled. The
value still lives in the DB (so the toggle can be flipped back
on without losing it), but the public endpoint now returns
`null` whenever the toggle is off.
Note: kept the existing `logo_url` shape unchanged. Its semantics
are different — null means "fall back to global branding" and
consumers rely on always having the field, so emitting it
unconditionally is intentional there.
No frontend change needed: both `GalleryLayout` and `LegalPage`
already gate on `use_external_url && external_url`, so the
short-circuit handles `external_url: null` correctly.
Two related defects on the same gallery-email surface that PR #367
opened, addressed together:
1. Reset-password endpoint was a one-way auto-generate.
`POST /admin/events/:id/reset-password` always called
`generateReadablePassword()` and ignored any client-supplied value;
the modal only offered a confirm + a forced auto-generated result.
Admins who wanted to set a memorable customer-supplied password
had no way to do it.
Backend: route now reads optional `password` from the body. If
present, validates with `validatePasswordInContext('gallery', …)`
(same rules as create-event) and uses it; if absent, falls back to
the existing generator, so old callers / cron stay functional.
Switched the bcrypt rounds from a hard-coded `10` to
`getBcryptRounds()` to match the create flow.
Frontend: rebuilt `PasswordResetModal.tsx`. Typed input with
show/hide, confirm-password field that appears on type, the same
`<PasswordGenerator>` used by `CreateEventPage` (event-context-
aware, fills both fields when used), send-email checkbox,
client-side validation, server-side validation feedback inline.
Submit empty → server auto-generates and the success screen shows
the value with a copy button (legacy one-click flow preserved);
submit with a typed password → success toast + close (no need to
re-show what the admin already typed).
Service layer: `events.service.resetPassword(id, sendEmail,
password?)` only sends `password` in the body when set.
Caller: `EventDetailsPage` now passes `eventDate` + `eventType`
into the modal so the generator has event context.
2. `gallery_link` was the path-only `event.share_link` in three
email-queue sites, so customer mail showed
`/gallery/<slug>/<token>` instead of the full
`https://example.com/gallery/<slug>/<token>` URL.
- `adminEvents.js` reset-password queue (#1437)
- `adminEvents.js` resend-creation-email queue (#1502)
- `expirationChecker.js` expiration_warning queue (#82)
All three now derive `shareUrl` from `buildShareLinkVariants`
(the same helper already used by create-event, publish-from-
draft, and event-rename). The other 4 callers
(`adminEvents.js:651/913`, `events.js:187`,
`eventRenameService.js:231`) already used the full URL — this
closes the gap.
Verified: TypeScript clean (`npx tsc --noEmit`), ESLint clean on
every touched file (the 4 lint errors that remain in
`adminEvents.js` are pre-existing and predate this branch).
Bundle of email-renderer and email-caller fixes triggered by a
reproducer on picpeak.nothaft.cloud (gallery_created mail showing
literal `{{#if welcome_message}}` markers and `Passwort: (set at
creation)`). The audit that followed surfaced six more user-visible
defects in the same surface; all are fixed here so customer-facing
mail renders cleanly.
Renderer (`backend/src/services/emailProcessor.js`)
- `safeTemplateReplace` now resolves `{{#if VAR}}…{{/if}}` blocks
before flat `{{var}}` substitution. The shipped templates have used
Handlebars-style conditionals since migration 026; the renderer
ignored them, so the markers leaked verbatim into every mail with
an empty welcome_message. Lifted to module scope and exported so
the conditional contract is unit-testable. Single-pass, non-nested
(commented).
- Added `passwordSetAtCreationI18n` next to the existing two i18n
password sentinels so `(set at creation)` (sent by the publish-
from-draft flow when only the bcrypt hash remains) is localised
to "Das bei der Erstellung der Galerie gesetzte Passwort" /
equivalent in EN/DE/NL/PT/RU instead of the raw English string.
- Added an opt-in `{ escapeHtml: true }` mode to `safeTemplateReplace`
so admin-supplied free text (`event_name`, `host_name`, …) is
HTML-escaped on substitution into the HTML body. Allowlist of
passthrough keys (`welcome_message` already-HTML, server-generated
URLs `gallery_link` / `client_link`). Subject and text body keep
the legacy unescaped behaviour. `formatWelcomeMessage` now escapes
before nl2br so the welcome_message allowlist is safe.
- New `htmlToText()` strips `<style>` and `<script>` blocks (and
their content) before tag-stripping, decodes common entities, and
collapses whitespace. Used by the textBody fallback in
`sendTemplateEmail` — without this, every template missing a
`body_text` produced a "plain-text" mail starting with the 100+
lines of CSS embedded by `wrapEmailHtml()`.
- The client-access section (#172) now mirrors its HTML block into
`textBody` using the same per-language strings, so plain-text
recipients see the link / PIN / warning. `pinLabel = 'PIN'` moved
into `clientAccessI18n` (RU uses ПИН-код).
- Added `getSupportEmail()` exported helper that reads
`branding_support_email` from `app_settings` (JSON-decoded), with
the SMTP from-address as fallback. Used by the gallery_expired and
archive_complete callers below.
- Removed dead `require('handlebars')` (unused since the regex
renderer landed; pre-existing lint error in this file).
Callers (data the templates already reference)
- `expirationChecker.js queueExpirationWarning`: send `expiry_date`
(templates use this, the old code sent `expiration_date` —
typo'd key, never read), drop the hard-coded `.de`/`en` sniff
(the processor formats with the recipient's resolved language),
add the `{{password_security_message}}` sentinel for
`gallery_password` (plaintext is gone by warning time, so
customers used to see literal `{{gallery_password}}` in the mail).
- `expirationChecker.js handleExpiredEvent`: both queueEmail calls
now supply `host_name`, `event_date`, `expiry_date`,
`support_email` so the EN/DE/NL/PT/RU `gallery_expired` template
doesn't render literal `{{host_name}}, your gallery expired on
{{expiry_date}}`. Skip the duplicate admin send when
admin_email == customer_email.
- `archiveService.js`: `archive_complete` queue now supplies
`host_name`, `photo_count` (from `photoEntries.length`),
`archive_date`, `support_email` — the previous payload had only
`event_name` and `archive_size`, so most of the mail was
unfilled placeholders.
Tests
- `__tests__/services/emailProcessor.safeTemplateReplace.test.js`:
16 cases — flat substitution, conditional truthy/falsy/missing/
multi-line/sibling/numeric-0, plus 5 cases for the new
`escapeHtml` option (default off, escape on, allowlist
passthrough for welcome_message and gallery_link).
- `__tests__/services/emailProcessor.htmlToText.test.js`: 7 cases —
the regression scenario (full wrapped body with embedded `<style>`
block), tag-stripping, entity decoding, paragraph spacing.
- `__tests__/utils/formatters.test.js`: 12 cases for `escapeHtml`,
`nl2br`, and the now-escaping `formatWelcomeMessage`.
35 cases total, all green. Lint clean on every touched file
(also fixes a pre-existing `no-prototype-builtins` warning in the
process). Pre-existing failures in
`__tests__/services/backupService.enhanced.test.js` are unrelated
and pre-date this branch.
Paul Nothaft