Adds a one-click tidy that re-lays the graph top-to-bottom with dagre
(@dagrejs/dagre) and fits the view — handles the loop-back cycle by breaking
it internally. en + de string.
Adds the admin Workflows surface (top-level nav, gated by the workflows
flag + workflows.view): a list page (enable toggle, delete, new), a
pending-approvals inbox (confirm/deny), and a React Flow (@xyflow/react)
canvas editor — palette to add nodes, drag handle→handle to connect
(branch/gate/loop expose yes-no / confirm-deny / loop-exit handles), a
side-panel JSON config editor, and save (writes a new version). Routes +
sidebar entry + workflows.service. Build + tsc clean.
NOTE: the workflow page strings render via inline English fallbacks; DE
translations for the workflows.* block are still pending native review.
Combined footer overhaul:
- Per-CMS-page show_in_footer toggle (#441) — admins can hide
Impressum / Datenschutz from the gallery footer when an external
privacy / imprint URL is enough.
- Five social-media URL fields in branding settings (#441) — Facebook,
Instagram, WhatsApp, X/Twitter, YouTube. Empty string hides each
icon individually; the row is omitted when none are set.
- Promotional banner slot above or below the gallery footer (#440) —
global default authored as markdown in branding settings, plus a
three-way per-event override on the Edit Event form
(inherit / custom / off). Backend nulls promo_markdown automatically
when mode != 'custom' so stale text never persists.
Sanitization: marked with gfm/breaks → DOMPurify with a tight
allowlist (no img, no tables, no inline html). Post-process forces
target=_blank rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" on every link so
admin-set URLs can't tab-nap the gallery context.
i18n covers all six locales (en/de/nl/pt/ru/fr).
Targets the beta branch.
Triage of an external SAST/SCA scan run on 2026-05-06. Most loud findings
were already resolved by PR #412 (the 18-CVE backport); this PR addresses
the residual real items:
* Drop unused `handlebars` from backend deps. The runtime require was
removed in PR #367 (#367) but the package.json line stayed. handlebars
was the source of two flagged criticals (CVE-2026-33937 RCE,
GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q AST injection) plus 8 highs — all now gone.
* `npm audit fix` on backend + frontend. Bumps transitive picomatch,
flatted, postcss, brace-expansion via lockfile, and direct dompurify,
lodash, vite, i18next-http-backend within their existing semver ranges.
Both audits now report 0 vulnerabilities.
* Add `event.origin === window.location.origin` check to the THEME_PREVIEW
message listener in PreviewPage. The branding page posts from the same
origin, so nothing legitimate is rejected; without the check, any third
party that window.open()'d the preview could push arbitrary
branding/theme payloads (semgrep
insufficient-postmessage-origin-validation).
* nginx: `proxy_hide_header` for X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options,
Referrer-Policy, Content-Security-Policy, Permissions-Policy,
Strict-Transport-Security at server level. nginx adds these itself, but
helmet on the backend was also emitting them — clients were seeing
duplicates (testssl flagged "Multiple X-Frame-Options / CSP /
Permissions-Policy / Referrer-Policy headers" on the live origin).
Single source of truth now.
* Dockerfile hardening (checkov):
- HEALTHCHECK on backend/Dockerfile, backend/Dockerfile.dev,
frontend/Dockerfile.dev. Frontend production Dockerfile already had
one.
- USER node in frontend/Dockerfile.dev (was running as root).
* GitHub Actions docker-build.yml: explicit top-level
`permissions: contents: read`. Per-job blocks already declare
`packages: write` where needed; this stops future steps from
inheriting unintended privileges (CKV2_GHA_1).
Backend npm audit: 4 vulns -> 0.
Frontend npm audit: 6 vulns -> 0.
Backend unit tests: 13 suites, 131/132 passing (1 pre-existing skip).
Frontend type-check + lint: clean.
The pre-existing integration-test failures (live DB / S3 required) and
the ThemeCustomizerEnhanced QueryClientProvider failures are unrelated
and reproduce on origin/beta without these changes.
Closes the open Trivy code-scanning alerts for app-side dependencies.
The npm-bundled CVEs in /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm (picomatch,
brace-expansion, ip-address inside the Node image itself) are deferred
to a separate Node-base-image PR — they're build-environment-side and
need their own compatibility testing.
## Direct dependency bumps
| Package | From | To | CVEs cleared |
|---|---|---|---|
| axios (backend + frontend) | 1.14.0 | 1.15.2 | CVE-2026-42264 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42043 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42035 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42033 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42044, CVE-2026-42042, CVE-2026-42041, CVE-2026-42040, CVE-2026-42039, CVE-2026-42038, CVE-2026-42037, CVE-2026-42036, CVE-2026-42034, CVE-2026-40175, CVE-2025-62718 |
| nodemailer (backend) | ^7.0.13 | ^8.0.5 | GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g, GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 |
| i18next-http-backend (frontend) | ^3.0.2 | ^3.0.5 | CVE-2026-41691 |
| uuid (backend) | ^11.1.0 | ^11.1.1 | CVE-2026-41907 |
| postcss (frontend, devDep) | ^8.4.21 | ^8.5.10 | CVE-2026-41305 |
## Transitive bumps (npm overrides)
For transitives whose direct parents haven't released a version that
picks up the patched range, pinned via npm overrides:
| Package | Min | CVE |
|---|---|---|
| follow-redirects (backend + frontend) | >=1.16.0 | GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 |
| fast-xml-parser (backend) | >=5.7.0 | CVE-2026-41650 |
| @tootallnate/once (backend) | >=3.0.1 | CVE-2026-3449 |
| ip-address (backend) | >=10.1.1 | CVE-2026-42338 |
## Why axios is now safe to bump past 1.14.0
PR #268 originally pinned axios to 1.14.0 to avoid a supply-chain
attack on a specific compromised version range. The 1.15.x series
are post-incident upstream releases — clean. Confirmed with the
maintainer before bumping.
## Verified
* `npx tsc --noEmit` (frontend) — clean
* `npx vite build` (frontend) — clean (~4s, existing bundle-size
warning, not new)
* Backend module-load smoke test — all critical modules load
(`auth`, `adminAuth` middleware, `emailProcessor`, `recaptcha`,
`storage`) with the new axios + nodemailer
* Lockfile re-verification — every targeted CVE now resolves to
the patched version range
## Remaining out of scope
* npm-bundled CVEs inside `/usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm/` —
picomatch CVE-2026-33671 (HIGH), CVE-2026-33672, brace-expansion
CVE-2026-33750, ip-address (npm-internal) CVE-2026-42338. These
live in the Node base image and require a Node base image bump
with its own compatibility testing — separate PR.
Targeting `beta` so the bumps go through the normal release-please
flow before promotion to `main`.
Axios versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 were compromised on March 31, 2026
with a RAT dropper (plain-crypto-js) attributed to North Korean threat
actor UNC1069/Sapphire Sleet. The malicious versions have been removed
from npm but our ^1.12.2 range could have pulled 1.14.1 on next install.
Pin to exact version 1.14.0 (latest safe release) in both frontend and
backend package.json and lock files to prevent any future resolution to
compromised versions.
References:
- https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/10604
- https://snyk.io/blog/axios-npm-package-compromised-supply-chain-attack-delivers-cross-platform/
- Add Flickr justified-layout and react-photo-album as masonry mode options
- Implement aspect-ratio-aware mosaic layout that dynamically selects
patterns based on photo orientations to minimize cropping
- Add 9 mosaic pattern types optimized for different orientation combinations
- Add theme customizer options for masonry mode selection (columns/rows/flickr/justified)
- Add i18n translations for new layout options
Paul Nothaft
paul