Trivy flags the backend image on two sanitize-html advisories, both
fixed upstream:
- CVE-2026-63670 (fixed 2.17.6): a literal solidus after a raw-text end
tag (`</textarea/>`) is treated as text by htmlparser2 and re-emitted
unescaped, so disallowed markup passes when textarea or xmp is in
allowedTags.
- CVE-2026-84371 (fixed 2.17.7): an SVG SMIL animation whose
attributeName selects href lets the sibling values/from/to/by
attributes carry URLs past the scheme policy.
2.17.5 -> 2.17.7, exact pin as before. The new version brings its own
htmlparser2 12 / domhandler 6 / domutils 4 / dom-serializer 3 /
entities 8 tree under node_modules/sanitize-html; nothing else in the
lock moves.
That tree is ESM-only, so the backend now needs unflagged require(esm):
Node 20.19+ or 22.12+. The image is node:22-alpine and CI runs 22, but
engines.node still admitted 22.0-22.11, where require('sanitize-html')
throws ERR_REQUIRE_ESM at startup (publicSiteService loads it during
initialisation). engines is now ^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0 and the native
setup script's Node check enforces the same range instead of accepting
any 22.x. On the supported versions the sanitiser behaves identically
to 2.17.5 on the tracker and newsletter fixtures.
Jest 29's CommonJS registry cannot evaluate ESM either, so every suite
importing a route or service that uses the sanitiser would fail at
import. jest.config.js now maps `sanitize-html` to jest.sanitizeHtml.js,
which hands that one module to Node's real loader via
process.getBuiltinModule('module') — a plain require('module') inside
Jest is Jest's wrapper and returns an empty object for this package.
Verified against a real 2.17.7 install: the sanitiser suites and a
settings route suite pass; without the mapper they fail with "Cannot
use import statement outside a module".
Stable twin of the main commit: backend qs/body-parser, frontend axios,
dompurify, linkify-it and the transitive set npm audit fix resolves without
a major bump. sanitize-html 2.17.7 (ESM-only parser tree, Jest 29 cannot
load it; the advisory needs svg tags no sanitizer config allows) and the
tiptap / react-router majors are left out, as on main.
Stable twin of #1083, scoped to what exists on this branch.
docker-build.yml — set ignore-unfixed on both Trivy steps. Stable has
the backend and frontend legs only (no aio, no ml), so two steps here
against four on main. Base-image CVEs with no released fix are not
actionable: the Dockerfiles already run `apt-get upgrade -y` behind a
CACHEBUST, so a fix lands in the next build automatically. Reporting
them buries anything someone can actually act on.
backend — deepmerge-ts <8.0.0 has a stack-exhaustion advisory
(CVE-2026-40345, high) reached via mailparser -> html-to-text, which
pins ^7.1.5 so npm cannot get there alone. Stable carries the same
mailparser ^3.9.9 and the same 3-high exposure as main. Not reachable
in our code: html-to-text only feeds deepmerge-ts its options object,
never parsed email content. npm audit on this branch goes 3 high -> 0.
The ml/Dockerfile half of #1083 has no counterpart here — the face
sidecar does not exist on stable, so there is nothing to drift.
Verified on stable itself rather than assuming main's results carry:
npm audit 3 high -> 0, html-to-text exercised end-to-end through
simpleParser, and jest at 1577 passed. The 5 failing suites (20 tests)
fail identically on clean origin/stable with these changes stashed.
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
Backport of #1013 to the curated channel. Both are production dependencies of the backend image (npm ci --omit=dev):
- nanoid 3.3.16 -> 3.3.18 (CVE-2026-67213, infinite loop in customAlphabet)
- js-yaml 4.3.0 -> 4.3.1 (GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj, quadratic CPU in !!omap resolution)
Stable reported no open alerts only because its last Trivy scan ran on 2026-08-04 with v3.45.14, before either advisory was published — the vulnerable versions were present in the lockfile regardless.
Lockfile-only; the existing ^ ranges already permitted both fixes.
Backport of #987. stable carried the same vulnerable versions.
brace-expansion 5.0.8 -> 5.0.9 CVE-2026-69152 (high)
ip-address 10.2.0 -> 10.4.0 CVE-2026-69192 (high), CVE-2026-54272,
CVE-2026-69198 (medium) — SSRF and
trust-boundary bypasses
postcss 8.5.18 -> 8.5.23 CVE-2026-69153 (medium)
Lockfile holds exactly one entry per package, all at or above the fixed
version; the image installs via npm ci --omit=dev.
* fix(uploads): prevent cross-photo contamination from filename collisions and non-atomic writes (#931)
* test: pin the suffixed photo filename format in the NFD pipeline suite (#931)
* chore(deps): promote p-limit to a direct dependency for the watermark limiter (#931)
* test: make the suffix-uniqueness check deterministic-in-practice (#931)
* fix(uploads): widen the anti-collision suffix to 48 bits (#931)
* fix(uploads): hide staging files from list() + share one watermark limiter process-wide (#931)
* fix(uploads): reclaim orphaned staging files + revalidate watermark settings in queued jobs (#931)
---------
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local>
* fix(security): close the 5 open Trivy alerts — dep bumps + drop npm from the runtime image
Backend deps:
- postcss 8.5.10 -> 8.5.18 (CVE-2026-45623, GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849; the pin
exists to force sanitize-html's transitive copy onto a fixed version)
- tar pin/override >=7.5.16 -> >=7.5.21, resolves 7.5.22
(GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m)
Runtime image:
- Remove the npm CLI from the final stage instead of upgrading it: npm's
bundled node_modules ship tar 7.5.19 and brace-expansion 5.0.7 (no npm
release bundles the fixed versions — checked 11.18.0 and 12.0.1), and
npm never runs in production. wait-for-db.sh now invokes the migration
runners via node directly. This ends the recurring npm-bundled-CVE
alert class; the previous 'npm install -g npm@11' line was itself a
patch for the last batch. (stable)
* fix(restore): run post-restore migrations via node — the image ships no npm
restoreService still shelled out to 'npm run migrate:safe' after a
restore; with npm removed from the runtime image that would ENOENT into
the non-fatal catch, silently leaving a restored older backup on a
schema behind the running code until the next container restart. Invoke
migrations/run-migrations-safe.js through node directly, matching
wait-for-db.sh. The PR #596 source-contract test now pins the new
invocation. (stable)
* fix(backup): make backup settings actually apply (#871) (stable)
- Wire the What-to-Backup toggles into the walker: honor
backup_include_thumbnails / backup_include_photos (opt-out,
default ON) and accept the UI's backup_include_archives spelling
for the archived gate (the engine expected _archived, so the
Archives checkbox silently never worked).
- Fix the 167.6 TB dashboard size: file_size_bytes is a bigint that
node-postgres returns as a string, and the S3 path concatenated it
onto the byte counter; coerce to Number at the source.
- Compute the real next scheduled run (cron-parser) and return it as
nextBackup; the UI read a field the API never sent and rendered a
hardcoded 'Not scheduled'. A named schedule label now beats the
stray default cron the UI always sent, which silently turned
weekly schedules into daily 03:00 runs.
- Never back up filesystem noise (.nfs* silly-renames, .DS_Store,
Thumbs.db) and honor backup_exclude_patterns in the walker
(previously rsync-only).
- Remove the compression/encryption toggles from the configuration
UI: no backend implementation exists, and collecting an encryption
passphrase while uploading plaintext is a false promise.
* fix(backup): close the review gaps in the settings wiring (stable)
- The UI's backup_include_archives now beats the migration-seeded
backup_include_archived: every install has the singular key seeded
true, so the alias-only-when-absent lookup made unchecking Archives
a no-op.
- rsync destinations now receive the de-selected What-to-Backup paths
and the noise filters as anchored --exclude args; previously rsync
synced the whole storage root and the walker's selection only shaped
the manifest, which then misreported what was actually transferred.
- Escape regex metacharacters in the walker's glob matcher: '.nfs*'
compiled to /^.nfs.*$/ whose leading dot matched any character, so
files like anfs-photo.jpg were silently dropped from backups.
- The Backup Coverage report now uses the same gate as the walker
(new 'skipped-by-setting' status) instead of re-implementing it
without the opt-out toggles and the archives alias.
* fix(backup): make the coverage diagnostics agree with the walker
- The coverage table shows the alias-aware flag value the gate actually
used, instead of the seeded backup_include_archived shadowed by the
UI's plural key (true next to a 'Gated off' badge).
- skipped-by-setting paths are now counted in the coverage summary
(backend, TS contract, summary card, EN/DE locales) so the totals
reconcile again when Photos or Thumbnails is unchecked.
- The form's thumbnail default now matches the backend's never-saved
fallback (include): the checkbox no longer shows 'off' while
thumbnails are being backed up, and saving an unrelated setting no
longer flips the backup scope. (stable)
* fix(backup): keep custom crons, exclude disabled rows from rsync, normalize flag display
- Saving a named schedule no longer wipes the stored custom cron: the
backend already prefers the label, so the cron field stays inert for
named schedules and is preserved for switching back to Custom. A
custom schedule now validates the 5-field expression before saving
(the backend silently fell back to daily 02:00 on a blank value).
- resolveExcludedBackupPaths now also returns rows disabled via
include_in_default, so rsync excludes them; the enabled-only loader
hid them and rsync transferred their contents anyway.
- The coverage table normalizes flag values like the walker does —
Boolean('false') displayed true beside a gated-off badge. (stable)
* fix(security): bump backend deps to close all open Trivy code-scanning alerts (stable)
- axios 1.16.0 -> 1.18.1 (GHSA-gcfj-64vw-6mp9 high + 10 medium advisories)
- sharp 0.34.3 -> 0.35.3 (GHSA-f88m-g3jw-g9cj, inherited libvips CVEs)
- mailparser 3.9.9 -> 3.9.14 (pulls linkify-it 5.0.2, CVE-2026-59887)
- brace-expansion override >=5.0.6 -> >=5.0.7 (CVE-2026-13149)
- body-parser 1.20.4 -> 1.20.6 via lockfile refresh (CVE-2026-12590)
* fix(images): migrate removed sharp failOnError option and enforce Node >=20.9 (stable)
sharp 0.35 drops the deprecated failOnError constructor option, so
recoverably corrupt images would start failing upload validation and
thumbnail generation; use the failOn: 'none' equivalent instead.
sharp 0.35 also requires Node >=20.9: declare it in engines and make
picpeak-setup.sh compare the full version instead of only the major,
so native installs on Node 20.3-20.8 upgrade instead of breaking.
* fix(setup): align the Node floor with the whole dependency tree and gate native updates (stable)
html-to-text@10 needs Node >=20.19 and the glob/minimatch family excludes
Node 21, so declare engines as ^20.19.0 || >=22 and enforce the same range
in picpeak-setup.sh. Also run install_nodejs at the start of
update_native_installation so existing native installs on an old Node get
upgraded before the service is stopped, instead of restarting broken.
* fix(setup): make the update-path Node gate actually work (stable)
--update dispatches before detect_os, so install_nodejs saw an empty
PACKAGE_MANAGER, matched no install branch, and reported success on the
old runtime. Detect the OS on demand and re-verify the installed version
afterwards, failing loudly (before the service is stopped) when the
runtime still misses the engines range, e.g. a Node 21 that package
managers refuse to downgrade.
Backend for #738. Real TOTP 2FA for admin accounts, all roles incl.
super_admin (closes#735).
- mfaService: otplib TOTP; AES-256-GCM encryption of the secret at rest
(key derived from MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY or JWT_SECRET); bcrypt-hashed,
single-use recovery codes; otpauth URI + QR.
- Migration 151: adds two_factor_recovery_codes + two_factor_enrolled_at
(secret/enabled columns already existed from legacy 016).
- Enrollment endpoints (behind adminAuth, per-user): GET /mfa/status,
POST /mfa/{setup,enable,disable,recovery-codes}. Disable/regenerate
require a current code so a hijacked session can't strip 2FA.
- Login challenge: /admin/login returns {mfaRequired, mfaToken} (no
session) when 2FA is on; /admin/login/mfa exchanges a TOTP or recovery
code for the session. Lockout counter is NOT reset until the second
factor passes, so MFA brute-force is rate-limited too.
- CLI break-glass: scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --email <e> | --all --yes,
audit-logged, matches reset-admin-password.js convention.
- Docs + optional MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY env.
Verified end-to-end on a live backend: enroll (super_admin), challenge,
TOTP + single-use recovery login, disable, and CLI reset.
Code-scanning Trivy alerts on the open beta (PR #641). Of the 10 open
alerts, 6 are stale (lockfile already past the fix) or live in
floating-tag base images (`nginx:1.28-alpine`, `node:22-alpine`) which
auto-update on the next CI rebuild — no code change needed for those.
The 3 actually present in the current `backend/package-lock.json`:
- `qs 6.15.0 → 6.15.2` (CVE-2026-8723, alert #266). Bump override from
`>=6.14.2` to `>=6.15.2`.
- `brace-expansion 5.0.5 → 5.0.6` (CVE-2026-45149, alert #264). Bump
override from `>=5.0.5` to `>=5.0.6`.
- `uuid 8.3.2` transitively via `node-cron@3.0.3` (CVE-2026-41907,
alert #265). Add top-level `uuid: ^11.1.1` override so node-cron's
nested resolution collapses into our root uuid version. node-cron
uses only `uuid.v4()` — API-stable across v8 → v11. Verified the
scheduler still constructs tasks under the override.
Lockfile regenerated; net -9 lines (one fewer uuid copy).
Stale alerts that will close on next code-scan rebuild:
- #205 postcss (frontend lockfile already at 8.5.14)
- #221 i18next-http-backend (backend lockfile already at 3.0.6)
Auto-resolved on next image rebuild (no Dockerfile change — floating
tags):
- #267 nginx (frontend `nginx:1.28-alpine`)
- #223 ip-address, #156/#155 picomatch, #140 brace-expansion (all in
the npm CLI shipped inside `node:22-alpine`)
Refs: code-scanning alerts #264, #265, #266
Two related backup-integrity fixes from 8digit's fork (issue #640 items
#3 + #4), bundled because they touch the same two files and ship better
together than apart.
### Stream-extract restore for >2 GiB archives
`adminArchives.js:170` was using `adm-zip`, which loads the entire ZIP
into a Node Buffer before extracting. Node has a hard 2 GiB Buffer cap,
so any restore over that limit fails with `ERR_FS_FILE_TOO_LARGE` — and
since the frontend `onError` toast is the generic "Something went wrong",
the cause stays invisible. Real-world wedding archives routinely cross
2 GiB; affected restores have likely been silent failures.
Swapped `adm-zip` for `node-stream-zip` which streams each entry to disk
as it's processed — no full-file Buffer, no 2 GiB ceiling. API shape:
```js
const zip = new StreamZip.async({ file: archivePath });
const entries = Object.values(await zip.entries());
await zip.extract(null, eventDir);
await zip.close();
```
Re-import logic (photos, categories, sizes) unchanged; only field rename
`entry.entryName` → `entry.name`. Credit: 8digit/picpeak@69033c6.
### Preserve `original_filename` via photos manifest
Archive → restore round-trip currently loses `original_filename` (the
post-#508 column tracking the camera-side name) because the gallery
filenames are renamed on upload and can't be derived from the extracted
files. This matters now that the Lightroom export (#623) depends on
`original_filename` — a restored event lost that signal.
- **`archiveService.js`**: writes `photos_manifest.json` into the archive
containing per-photo `{filename, original_filename, type, uploaded_at,
category_name}`. Non-fatal: a manifest write failure falls through to
legacy behaviour (filename used as original_filename, same as before).
- **`adminArchives.js`**: reads the manifest on restore, builds a
`Map<filename → manifest>`, and assigns
`original_filename = manifest?.original_filename || filename`.
Archives produced before this lands have no manifest — restore logs a
one-shot notice and falls back to filename, preserving backward compat.
Credit: 8digit/picpeak@eb018aa.
### Deps
- Removed `adm-zip ^0.5.16`
- Added `node-stream-zip ^1.15.0`
### What's NOT in this PR
8digit's commit also fixed the production compose healthcheck (`curl`
isn't in our Alpine image); that's already been addressed upstream in
the meantime. The frontend `onError` swallow on the restore toast is a
separate small follow-up.
### Test plan
- [x] `node -c` on both files clean
- [x] `node-stream-zip` async API verified at load time
- [ ] Manual: archive a multi-GB event → restore → confirm photos
re-import with original_filename preserved
- [ ] Manual: restore an archive produced before this lands → confirm
fallback to filename works (no manifest path crashes)
- [ ] Manual: confirm the new photos_manifest.json is inside the
generated archive (`unzip -l <archive>.zip | grep manifest`)
Adds a second mail config (incoming/IMAP) alongside the outgoing SMTP one, a
1-minute poller, and a received-emails log. Standalone `incomingMail` feature
flag (default off).
- deps: imapflow + mailparser (receive-side; picpeak only had nodemailer).
- migration 128: email_configs gains imap_* columns (same shape as smtp_*);
seed incomingMail flag; new received_emails audit table.
- emailIntakeService: polls the mailbox every 60s when the flag is on AND a
mailbox is configured (no-op otherwise); parses each unseen message
(mailparser flattens forwarded/nested attachments), drops PDF/JPEG/PNG into
the incoming-invoices inbox (inbound_documents, source='email'), logs each
message in received_emails (dedupe by message-id; duplicate attachments
caught by the existing SHA-256 guard), marks it \Seen.
- adminEmail: GET/POST /incoming-config (mirrors SMTP config, masks imap_pass,
SSRF host guard) + GET /received (paginated log).
- server.js starts the poller at boot.
Verified: node -c, require-graph, migration-128 harness (imap columns, flag,
received_emails). Frontend (IMAP block under SMTP + Received tab + flag card)
follows.
Triage of an external SAST/SCA scan run on 2026-05-06. Most loud findings
were already resolved by PR #412 (the 18-CVE backport); this PR addresses
the residual real items:
* Drop unused `handlebars` from backend deps. The runtime require was
removed in PR #367 (#367) but the package.json line stayed. handlebars
was the source of two flagged criticals (CVE-2026-33937 RCE,
GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q AST injection) plus 8 highs — all now gone.
* `npm audit fix` on backend + frontend. Bumps transitive picomatch,
flatted, postcss, brace-expansion via lockfile, and direct dompurify,
lodash, vite, i18next-http-backend within their existing semver ranges.
Both audits now report 0 vulnerabilities.
* Add `event.origin === window.location.origin` check to the THEME_PREVIEW
message listener in PreviewPage. The branding page posts from the same
origin, so nothing legitimate is rejected; without the check, any third
party that window.open()'d the preview could push arbitrary
branding/theme payloads (semgrep
insufficient-postmessage-origin-validation).
* nginx: `proxy_hide_header` for X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options,
Referrer-Policy, Content-Security-Policy, Permissions-Policy,
Strict-Transport-Security at server level. nginx adds these itself, but
helmet on the backend was also emitting them — clients were seeing
duplicates (testssl flagged "Multiple X-Frame-Options / CSP /
Permissions-Policy / Referrer-Policy headers" on the live origin).
Single source of truth now.
* Dockerfile hardening (checkov):
- HEALTHCHECK on backend/Dockerfile, backend/Dockerfile.dev,
frontend/Dockerfile.dev. Frontend production Dockerfile already had
one.
- USER node in frontend/Dockerfile.dev (was running as root).
* GitHub Actions docker-build.yml: explicit top-level
`permissions: contents: read`. Per-job blocks already declare
`packages: write` where needed; this stops future steps from
inheriting unintended privileges (CKV2_GHA_1).
Backend npm audit: 4 vulns -> 0.
Frontend npm audit: 6 vulns -> 0.
Backend unit tests: 13 suites, 131/132 passing (1 pre-existing skip).
Frontend type-check + lint: clean.
The pre-existing integration-test failures (live DB / S3 required) and
the ThemeCustomizerEnhanced QueryClientProvider failures are unrelated
and reproduce on origin/beta without these changes.
Closes the open Trivy code-scanning alerts for app-side dependencies.
The npm-bundled CVEs in /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm (picomatch,
brace-expansion, ip-address inside the Node image itself) are deferred
to a separate Node-base-image PR — they're build-environment-side and
need their own compatibility testing.
## Direct dependency bumps
| Package | From | To | CVEs cleared |
|---|---|---|---|
| axios (backend + frontend) | 1.14.0 | 1.15.2 | CVE-2026-42264 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42043 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42035 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42033 (HIGH), CVE-2026-42044, CVE-2026-42042, CVE-2026-42041, CVE-2026-42040, CVE-2026-42039, CVE-2026-42038, CVE-2026-42037, CVE-2026-42036, CVE-2026-42034, CVE-2026-40175, CVE-2025-62718 |
| nodemailer (backend) | ^7.0.13 | ^8.0.5 | GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g, GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 |
| i18next-http-backend (frontend) | ^3.0.2 | ^3.0.5 | CVE-2026-41691 |
| uuid (backend) | ^11.1.0 | ^11.1.1 | CVE-2026-41907 |
| postcss (frontend, devDep) | ^8.4.21 | ^8.5.10 | CVE-2026-41305 |
## Transitive bumps (npm overrides)
For transitives whose direct parents haven't released a version that
picks up the patched range, pinned via npm overrides:
| Package | Min | CVE |
|---|---|---|
| follow-redirects (backend + frontend) | >=1.16.0 | GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 |
| fast-xml-parser (backend) | >=5.7.0 | CVE-2026-41650 |
| @tootallnate/once (backend) | >=3.0.1 | CVE-2026-3449 |
| ip-address (backend) | >=10.1.1 | CVE-2026-42338 |
## Why axios is now safe to bump past 1.14.0
PR #268 originally pinned axios to 1.14.0 to avoid a supply-chain
attack on a specific compromised version range. The 1.15.x series
are post-incident upstream releases — clean. Confirmed with the
maintainer before bumping.
## Verified
* `npx tsc --noEmit` (frontend) — clean
* `npx vite build` (frontend) — clean (~4s, existing bundle-size
warning, not new)
* Backend module-load smoke test — all critical modules load
(`auth`, `adminAuth` middleware, `emailProcessor`, `recaptcha`,
`storage`) with the new axios + nodemailer
* Lockfile re-verification — every targeted CVE now resolves to
the patched version range
## Remaining out of scope
* npm-bundled CVEs inside `/usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm/` —
picomatch CVE-2026-33671 (HIGH), CVE-2026-33672, brace-expansion
CVE-2026-33750, ip-address (npm-internal) CVE-2026-42338. These
live in the Node base image and require a Node base image bump
with its own compatibility testing — separate PR.
Targeting `beta` so the bumps go through the normal release-please
flow before promotion to `main`.
Video uploads on production fail with "missing ffmpeg" because the
backend container ships nothing usable for the video pipeline.
Two compounding causes:
1. **Alpine + glibc mismatch.** The npm `@ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg`
dependency added with the video-support PR (commit 68a9dc5)
ships per-platform binaries via optionalDependencies. The Linux
binaries are built against glibc, but the backend image runs on
`node:22-alpine` (musl libc) — known to either fail to execute
or fail on shared-library lookups on Alpine.
2. **`ffprobe` missing entirely.** `@ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg`
bundles only the `ffmpeg` binary. There's a separate
`@ffprobe-installer/ffprobe` package that the codebase never
depended on. But `videoProcessor.js:21` calls
`ffmpeg.ffprobe(videoPath, …)` — the very first step of the
video pipeline shells out to a `ffprobe` binary that doesn't
exist in the image. Even if (1) worked, every video upload
would 500 here.
The fix is to install Alpine's `ffmpeg` package via apk. It ships
both `ffmpeg` and `ffprobe` built natively against musl, ~70MB
extra image size, single line in the Dockerfile, no per-arch
handling needed (apk pulls the right binary for both linux/amd64
and linux/arm64 — works with the multi-arch infra from #349).
- `backend/Dockerfile`: add `ffmpeg` to the apk install line.
- `backend/Dockerfile.dev`: same for dev parity.
- `backend/src/services/videoProcessor.js`: remove the
`setFfmpegPath(require('@ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg').path)` line
— without removing it, fluent-ffmpeg would prefer the broken
bundled binary over the working apk one. Letting fluent-ffmpeg
fall back to PATH lookup picks up the apk binary in the
container and the developer's locally-installed binary on dev
hosts (Homebrew on macOS, apt on Debian).
- `backend/package.json`: drop the now-unused
`@ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg` dependency. `npm install` removes
2 packages from the lockfile.
Verified: `videoProcessor.js` still loads cleanly (`node -e
"require('./src/services/videoProcessor')"`); lint clean.
Adds a long-lived bearer-token mechanism + scoped REST surface designed
for n8n-style automation: create a gallery, upload photos, fetch the
share URL — all via documented HTTPS endpoints instead of poking at the
admin UI's internal routes.
API
- Migration 081 adds `api_tokens` (hashed_token, scopes, owner FK,
last_used/expires/revoked timestamps).
- New apiTokenAuth middleware: parses `Authorization: Bearer pp_live_…`,
resolves to the owner admin user, attaches `req.admin` so existing
permission decorators (events.create etc.) still work. Token-level
scope check (read/write/admin) layers on top as defence in depth —
a leaked read-only token cannot mutate even if its owner is super_admin.
- adminApiTokens route exposes list/create/revoke for admins (cookie-
authed). Plaintext token is returned exactly once on creation.
- v1 surface mounted at /api/v1: POST/GET /events, GET /events/:id,
POST /events/:id/photos (multipart, single file), GET
/events/:id/share-link. Each endpoint annotated with @openapi JSDoc.
Documentation
- swagger-jsdoc + swagger-ui-express produce a live spec at
/api/openapi.json and a Swagger UI at /api/docs (admin-gated).
- backend/scripts/generate-openapi.js writes docs/openapi.{json,yaml}
to the repo so the spec is versioned.
- scripts/sync-api-docs.sh runs in pre-push: regenerates the spec and
copies it into the picpeak-docs Nextra site at app/api/. Writes only,
never commits or pushes the docs repo (PUSH_SKIP_DOCS=1 to bypass).
Frontend
- New Settings → API Tokens tab: generate, list, revoke. Plaintext
tokens are shown once with a copy-to-clipboard control.
Axios versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 were compromised on March 31, 2026
with a RAT dropper (plain-crypto-js) attributed to North Korean threat
actor UNC1069/Sapphire Sleet. The malicious versions have been removed
from npm but our ^1.12.2 range could have pulled 1.14.1 on next install.
Pin to exact version 1.14.0 (latest safe release) in both frontend and
backend package.json and lock files to prevent any future resolution to
compromised versions.
References:
- https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/10604
- https://snyk.io/blog/axios-npm-package-compromised-supply-chain-attack-delivers-cross-platform/
- Upgrade multer to 2.1.1 (CVE-2026-3520, DoS via malformed requests)
- Update tar override to >=7.5.11 (CVE-2026-31802, CVE-2026-29786)
- Upgrade Node base image from 20-alpine to 22-alpine to fix npm
bundled tar/minimatch CVEs in the Docker image
- Add Update Instructions Dialog with environment-specific commands (Docker/Git/Standalone)
- Add email notification settings for new version alerts
- Add "Sort by Capture Date" option using EXIF metadata extraction
- Fix E2E tests by loading environment variables via dotenv
- Add test-images/ and backend/*.db to .gitignore
Closes#181
This commit implements full video upload, storage, streaming, and playback functionality
for the PicPeak photo sharing platform, allowing users to upload and view videos alongside
photos in galleries.
Backend Changes:
- Added video processing dependencies (fluent-ffmpeg, @ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg)
- Created videoProcessor.js service for video metadata extraction and thumbnail generation
- Updated photoProcessor.js to handle both images and videos
- Modified adminPhotos.js to accept video files with 500MB size limit
- Enhanced gallery.js with HTTP range request support for video streaming
- Expanded fileSecurityUtils.js with video MIME types and magic number validation
- Added database migration for video support columns (media_type, duration, codecs, dimensions)
Frontend Changes:
- Updated TypeScript types to include video metadata fields
- Created VideoPlayer.tsx component with custom controls
- Modified PhotoUpload.tsx to accept video files (.mp4, .webm, .mov, .avi)
- Updated UserPhotoUpload.tsx for guest video uploads
- Enhanced PhotoGrid.tsx with video badges and duration display
- Modified PhotoLightbox.tsx to conditionally render VideoPlayer for videos
Database Schema:
- Added media_type column ('image' | 'video')
- Added mime_type, duration, video_codec, audio_codec columns
- Added width and height columns for media dimensions
- Migrated existing photos to media_type 'image'
Features:
- Video thumbnail generation from video frames
- Streaming support with range requests for efficient playback
- Video duration display on thumbnails
- Play button indicators on video items
- Full-featured video player with playback controls
- Support for MP4, WebM, MOV, and AVI formats
Paul Nothaft
paul