98d25601b465ecc44d0875b52891073720fabbbc
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Paul Nothaft
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3e46530072 |
fix(security): contain logo, favicon and PDF-logo unlinks to their upload directories
Settings > Branding persisted logo_url / favicon_url verbatim and on clear
unlinked path.join(storage, url) behind a startsWith('/uploads/logos/')
check, which '..' segments pass. The business-profile PDF logo did the same
behind a /pdf-logo-\d+\./ marker test, and used absolute values as given.
Either let a settings.edit or settings.banking holder delete any file the
process can reach.
Both now resolve through helpers in utils/safePath that only ever name a
flat leaf inside the fixed directory. The /favicon.ico streamer is narrowed
the same way: it contained to the whole uploads/ root, which also holds
signed contracts and transfer files.
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Paul Nothaft
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f22999aba6 |
fix(storage): write business documents under STORAGE_PATH, not the cwd (#1070)
* fix(storage): write business documents under STORAGE_PATH, not the cwd persistDocPdf, the invoice sending and reminder writers and both contract signature writers built their target from `path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'business-docs', ...)` and never consulted STORAGE_PATH. docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.production.yml both pin STORAGE_PATH=/app/storage and the image's WORKDIR is /app, so on a stock deployment the two expressions name the same directory and nothing looked wrong. Point STORAGE_PATH anywhere else and quotes, invoices, Mahnungen and contract PDFs land outside the configured storage root: missed by the backup walker, invisible to the storage accounting, and gone when the container is replaced. It also fails outright where the working directory is not writable by the runtime user. Routed all six writers through getStoragePath(), the resolver the rest of the app already uses. Two read-side sites of the same class came along: the custom PDF font lookup now checks the storage root before the legacy cwd path (a font under STORAGE_PATH/fonts was simply never found, and the document silently fell back to the built-in face), and the dev-test scratch directory follows the same root. Left alone deliberately: resolveLogoFile and adminBusinessProfile already try both roots, so their cwd reference is a legacy fallback rather than a miss. No migration needed — the persisted path is stored absolute, so rows written before this keep resolving to where those files actually are. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(storage): allow the configured contract root, and move signature images too Two holes in the previous commit, both found by review. Contract downloads would have broken. assertContractPdfPath() guards the admin unsigned/signed PDF routes and GET /api/public/contracts/:token/pdf, and it listed only <cwd>/storage/business-docs/contract. Moving the writers to STORAGE_PATH without moving that root meant every newly generated contract was refused with PATH_OUTSIDE_STORAGE — a worse failure than the bug being fixed, and only on the installs the fix was for. The configured root is now allowed alongside the cwd one, which stays for contracts written before the move; their absolute paths are in the database and still resolve. Note the sibling root on the next line already honoured STORAGE_PATH, so the helper was half-migrated already. persistSignatureImage() still wrote customer and admin signature PNGs under process.cwd(). It was missed because its path.join is spread over seven lines while the others are single-line — and the regression test compared against the single-line literal, so it reported green over a live bug. The test now collapses whitespace before matching, which is the only reason a formatting difference ever hid this. A sweep of the whole of src/ with the same normalisation confirms the remaining process.cwd()/storage references are all deliberate `STORAGE_PATH || cwd` fallbacks, not misses. Added a case that drives assertContractPdfPath against real files on disk — the guard realpaths both the file and its roots, so a test using imaginary paths proves nothing. It fails without the fix. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(storage): resolve the contract guard's root through the shared resolver The guard still built its own `STORAGE_PATH || <cwd>/storage`. That matches getStoragePath() only while STORAGE_PATH is set — with it unset the shared resolver falls back module-relative to <repo>/storage while this fell back to <cwd>/storage, and the backend is normally started from backend/, so the two name different directories. Writers and guard then disagreed about where contracts live and the download routes refused them, which is the same failure the previous commit fixed for the configured case, reappearing in the fallback case. One resolver on both sides now, which is the point of the whole change. Docblock updated to describe the three roots as they actually are. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(storage): make the fallback test safe, and align the backup diagnostics The test added in the previous commit was dangerous. To exercise the STORAGE_PATH-unset case it deleted process.env.STORAGE_PATH and then, in cleanup, recursively removed `<resolved root>/business-docs` — which with the variable unset resolves to the developer's real, gitignored <repo>/storage. Running `npm test` in a working checkout would have destroyed local business documents. This checkout has 65 MB there, including a populated business-docs tree. Rewritten to mock the shared resolver instead. That is both safe (every path stays in the tmpdir) and a sharper assertion: if the guard consumes getStoragePath() the mock moves its root, and if it went back to rolling its own expression the mock would have no effect and the test fails — which is exactly the regression being pinned. backupCoverageService and backupIntegrityService kept their own `STORAGE_PATH || cwd` roots. The backup walker itself already falls back module-relative, so with the variable unset the two diagnostics inspected a directory neither the walker nor the writers use and would report the business-docs tree as missing while it was in fact being backed up. Both now use the shared resolver. No regression: the same jest invocation over contract/quote/invoice/pdf/ backup suites gives an identical 11 failed, 24 passed before and after — those failures are a locally missing cron-parser dependency and reproduce on an unmodified tree. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <paul@MacStudio-von-Paul.local> |
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Paul Nothaft
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9cd6b08441 |
fix(security): reject ZIP-slip entries in archive/backup restore (GHSA-jfhw-fj23-fx6x)
node-stream-zip's extract(null, root) writes each entry to path.join(root, entry.name) without neutralising '../', so a crafted archive entry named '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the target dir and overwrote arbitrary files (logos, .env, route files → RCE on source deploys). Requires admin with archives.restore. Adds assertZipEntriesWithin() to utils/safePath.js — a lexical containment check run on the entry list BEFORE extract() — and guards both extract sinks: adminArchives.js (the reported route) and picpeakImportService.js (the sibling .picpeak import, same sink). Adds unit tests for traversal, absolute-path, and sibling-prefix entries. |
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Luca
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d543949188 |
feat(crm): backend code — services + routes + utilities + tests
Brings in the full backend CRM stack on top of the consolidated
migration (
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