Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Paul Nothaft f0e6d2dfb1 fix: enforce gallery access and consolidate gallery workflows (#1357)
Harden gallery authentication and authorization, consolidate gallery workflows, and prevent token-bearing URLs from leaking through nginx request error logs.
2026-09-08 15:34:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft 9143997f8e style(backend): clear the eslint backlog to zero
929 problems (928 errors, 1 warning) -> 0, exit 0.

Rule breakdown, which corrects the report's premise -- `indent` dominated, not
`quotes`: indent 719, quotes 68, no-unused-vars 54, no-empty 36,
no-useless-escape 22, no-case-declarations 17, no-inner-declarations 6,
no-control-regex 5, no-useless-catch 1, no-console 1 (warn).

--fix handled only indent + quotes (719+68 = exactly the "fixable" count).
no-useless-escape was NOT auto-fixable in this eslint version, so the one
genuinely risky class never went through the autofixer -- all 22 were done by
hand. Two mechanical proofs on the autofix diff: a token-level AST diff
(espree, before vs after) shows exactly 68 differing tokens, all quotes, with
the 719 indent fixes producing zero token changes; and a cooked-value diff of
every string/template/regex literal shows 0 differences.

Regex escapes: eslint was correctly conservative and did not flag the
load-bearing ones -- \- in [^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.] (unescaping makes an invalid
reversed _ -> . range) or in [!@#$%^&*()_+\-=...] (would become a + -> = range
silently matching ",-."). Every removal was a \/ \[ or \. inside a character
class; all 11 old/new pairs were brute-forced over 794 inputs with 0
mismatches.

Manual fixes: no-empty were all deliberate best-effort catches around activity
logging, annotated rather than restructured; no-case-declarations braced in
two adminBackup switches; no-inner-declarations converted to const arrows
after checking no call precedes the declaration and no this/arguments use;
no-control-regex and no-console got targeted disables with stated reasons;
one `catch (e) { throw e; }` wrapper removed.

Two unused bindings were near-misses worth noting: secureStatic.js's
`fullPath` is a path-traversal guard (safePathJoin throws on escape) and
restoreService.js's `backupManifest` is the throw-on-corrupt-manifest gate
before a rollback -- deleting either would have silently removed a check. Only
the bindings were dropped; the calls stay.

Two real bugs found and deliberately preserved with a comment plus a narrow
disable rather than deleted, since deleting would erase the evidence:
_workflowSeedBoot.js's `booted` is written but never read, so the intended
once-per-process guard is missing its early return and workflows re-seed on
every call; and quoteService.js's VALID_QUOTE_TRANSITIONS is a full state
machine nothing consults, so quote status changes are unvalidated.

Backend test suite: 253 suites / 2552 tests passing, 0 failures, before and
after.

Refs testplan REPORT.md #22 (Part 1.2.02).
2026-09-01 16:46:34 +02:00
Paul NothaftandPaul Nothaft 23cd9cb680 fix: address Shannon security assessment findings (37 vulnerabilities) (#254)
Remediate 4 Critical, 18 High, 10 Medium, and 5 Low vulnerabilities
identified in the Shannon security assessment (2026-03-20).

Critical fixes:
- Command injection via rsync SSH key path (INJ-VULN-01)
- Self-escalation to super_admin role (AUTHZ-VULN-11)
- Invite super_admin backdoor (AUTHZ-VULN-12)
- Handlebars SSTI in email templates (INJ-VULN-05)

Authentication hardening:
- Rate limit on share-link login (AUTH-VULN-01)
- X-Forwarded-For spoofing bypass (AUTH-VULN-02)
- reCAPTCHA fails closed when misconfigured (AUTH-VULN-03)
- Token revocation on admin/gallery logout (AUTH-VULN-04/05)
- Cookie Secure flag defaults true in production (AUTH-VULN-06)
- Remove JWT from admin login response body (AUTH-VULN-07)
- Timing-safe gallery slug validation (AUTH-VULN-09)
- Account lockout fails closed on DB error (AUTH-VULN-12)
- Session endpoint checks token revocation

Path traversal & file access:
- checksums endpoint path containment (INJ-VULN-03)
- manifest validate path containment (INJ-VULN-04)

XSS prevention:
- Block SVG data URIs in CSS sanitizer (XSS-VULN-01)
- Email preview iframe sandbox (XSS-VULN-02)
- SSR branding HTML escaping (XSS-VULN-03)
- User-Agent sanitization in feedback (XSS-VULN-04)

Authorization (IDOR):
- Event ownership middleware for all admin routes
- Cross-admin user profile read restriction (AUTHZ-VULN-10)

SSRF & infrastructure:
- Private IP validation for SMTP, S3, rsync hosts
- Replace inline JWT with standard adminAuth middleware
- CSRF Content-Type enforcement on mutating API endpoints
- CSP headers in nginx location blocks

Token revocation fix:
- Remove overly broad orWhere clause that invalidated all future tokens
- Allow empty-body POST requests (logout) in CSRF middleware

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>
2026-03-22 12:40:01 +01:00
Paul Nothaft 5b5e431b08 Implement per-IP gallery lockouts and UI controls (#42)
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2025-10-20 14:35:23 +02:00
paulandClaude f8fb1c3f4b fix: resolve backend startup errors in development
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- Added STORAGE_PATH environment variable and volume mount for storage directory
- Fixed authSecurity functions to check if login_attempts table exists before using it
- Prevents errors when running with only core migrations (new deployments)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>
2025-07-25 14:54:32 +02:00
paulandClaude 1773ed5f95 Initial commit - Project start (July 17, 2025)
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Original: feat: enhance security logging and ensure rate limit blocks are properly tracked

- Add comprehensive logging for rate limit blocks with full request details
  - IP address (with proper proxy detection), user agent, headers, timestamps
  - Rate limit info (current count, limit, remaining, reset time)
  - Separate tracking for auth vs general endpoints

- Enhance authentication failure logging
  - JWT validation failures with detailed error info
  - Admin auth attempts without token
  - Failed token validation with user context
  - All events include IP, path, method, user agent

- Improve Winston logger configuration for production
  - Add automatic log rotation (10MB errors, 50MB combined)
  - Create separate security.log for auth/rate limit events
  - Ensure logs directory exists automatically
  - Add structured JSON format for log aggregation
  - Support container logging with LOG_TO_CONSOLE env var

- Create comprehensive documentation
  - Security logging guide with examples
  - Monitoring recommendations
  - Configuration reference

- Add test script to verify logging functionality

All rate limit settings remain configurable via admin panel:
- Window duration, max requests, auth limits
- Skip authenticated requests option
- Public endpoints only option

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>
2025-07-24 16:57:07 +02:00