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3583c924da |
feat(faces): consolidate look-alike clusters after a scan, and suggest the rest (#1107)
consolidate() has existed since #1074 and described this exact symptom in its own comment, but its only caller was recluster() — i.e. when an admin pressed Re-group people. After a normal background scan the centroids converged and nobody looked, so a gallery settled with 14 people that should have been 8. It now runs when a scan drains. There is no scan-finished event to hook, so an idle worker asks whether the events it touched have actually drained — 'a worker went idle' is deliberately not treated as sufficient, because with concurrency above one the others may still be working. The uncertain band asks instead of acting: pairs between the assignment threshold and the stricter auto-merge one surface as accept/dismiss suggestions, with sticky dismissals. Nothing merges silently — a pass that merged anything reports it and points at Split. Review rounds hardened it against overruling explicit decisions: it no longer absorbs ignored clusters (mergePeople ORs is_ignored onto the survivor, which would have hidden a real person), no longer merges dismissed pairs, no longer undoes a manual Split (which now records a separation), and no longer runs after detection is switched off. The dismissal read fails closed, a failed pass is retried with backoff rather than lost or hot-looped, and the new table follows event_people out of exports and backups. Name autocomplete needs no endpoint — the people list already open is the source, and it is event-scoped on purpose. Known limitation, tracked in #1132: separations are keyed on person ids, so a full re-scan loses them. Reported by @BraynArts. |
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87115b28e8 |
fix(gallery): give masonry tiles their real shape back (#1130, #1131)
Two independent causes of the same symptom — an aspect-ratio layout that does not lay anything out. gallery-premium discarded the tile height MasonryPhotoAlbum computed from photos.width/height and set height:auto on both card and image, so the rendered shape came from the intrinsic ratio of whatever rendition was served. With thumbnail_fit seeded 'cover' by migration 040 every rendition is square, so the layout drew identical squares and was indistinguishable from grid. The card now uses the height it is given and the stylesheet's existing height:100% applies. The bundled CSS templates pinned images to a fixed pixel height, which has specificity (0,1,1) and beats the .h-full utility (0,1,0) six of the seven layouts use. Elegant Dark is seeded is_default, so that was the out-of-the-box result for any layout other than grid/timeline. Migrations 052/053 corrected for fresh installs; 181 repairs the rows already seeded. Whitespace-tolerant because sanitizeCSS strips newlines from any template ever saved through the editor — an exact-text migration would have silently no-opped on most real installs. The height property is matched with a lookbehind so line-height/max-height/min-height are untouched, grouped selectors are handled, and nested rules are skipped rather than mis-rewritten. Both reported, measured in the live DOM, by @BraynArts. |
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bbce3cd2a2 |
feat(faces): let the photographer choose which photo represents a person (#1119)
Phase 1 of #1096. Clustering picks the cover, and its idea of a good one and a human's do not always agree. A cluster whose avatar is turned away or softer than the rest stays that way in the guest-facing people strip too, and nothing in the UI could change it. A picker reachable from each person row, reusing the face list the split dialog already loads — same query, same grid, different action on a click. Making the choice actually stick took four changes --------------------------------------------------------------------------- event_people.cover_face_id has existed since migration 177 and the PATCH already accepted it, so the first version of this was frontend-only. It was also a no-op: - facePeopleService.listPeople SELECTED cover_face_id and then discarded it, recomputing the cover as the best-scoring VISIBLE face on every read. The picker saved, said so, and the avatar reverted immediately. It now prefers the stored pick whenever this audience can see it, and falls back to the score-ordered choice otherwise — so visibility scoping still wins, and a guest is never handed a crop of a photo they cannot open. - recomputeCentroid overwrote cover_face_id unconditionally. It runs on rescan and on photo replacement, so any reprocessing silently undid a deliberate choice. It now keeps the chosen face while it is still a member of the cluster. - The face list is cached per person, and split/merge move faces between people. Until now the only reader closed itself after acting, so nobody saw the stale copy; the picker is a second reader of the same key. - cover_face_id meant two things. assignFaces seeded it with whichever face opened the cluster and recomputeCentroid overwrote it with the highest scoring one, so an automatic guess was indistinguishable from a deliberate choice — and honouring it would have pinned every UNCURATED person to that guess, which is worse than the fallback it replaced (the fallback is computed per audience and skips photos a guest cannot open). Both writers are gone, migration 179 clears the stored guesses, and the column now means one thing. That also removes the need to defend the choice against rescans: nothing overwrites it, and a dangling id self-heals to the derived cover. Clearing existing values is safe rather than destructive: no install has ever been able to SET a cover, so every stored value is an automatic guess by construction. Also fixes a PostgreSQL-only 500 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- GET /admin/events/:id/people/:personId/faces joined `photos` but did not table-qualify its WHERE, and photo_faces and photos BOTH have an event_id: column reference "event_id" is ambiguous Postgres refuses it, so the endpoint 500s and the Split dialog — its only consumer until now — has been broken on every PostgreSQL install since the join was added. SQLite resolves the ambiguity silently, which is why the suite stayed green. Reproduced against a real Postgres before and after. The query is now a named builder the route calls and the test imports, rather than a copy: an earlier version of that test re-declared the query, so the route could regress to the bare form while the assertions kept passing. Merge and recluster preserve the choice as well. Both already carried labels and privacy flags across; the chosen cover is human state of the same kind, so it now rides along — through a merge when the target has none, and through a recluster by following its FACE into whichever cluster ends up holding it, rather than the majority-descendant rule the label uses. The picker and the endpoint disagree past 500 faces, so the picker now says when it is showing a capped list rather than presenting it as exhaustive. Frontend suite 178 passing, backend 23 across the touched suites, build clean, no new type errors. Mutation-checked twice: dropping the cover preference fails the new listPeople test while the visibility-scoping test still passes, and restoring the auto-seed in assignFaces fails it too. |
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9431b9f094 |
feat(setup): configure the public address and SMTP in the wizard, not .env (#1104)
* feat(setup): configure the public address and SMTP in the wizard, not .env
A fresh install could not configure its own public address. `general_site_url`
and the `email_configs` row already existed as admin settings, but nothing
could reach them:
- docker-compose.yml injected FRONTEND_URL=${FRONTEND_URL:-http://localhost:3000}
and Dockerfile.aio baked in ENV FRONTEND_URL=http://localhost:3000, so
getFrontendBaseUrl() returned on its first branch every time and the setting
was never read. .env.example shipped the same value as an uncommented
placeholder for FRONTEND_URL / ADMIN_URL / API_URL.
- the wizard never asked for the address at all, and skipped its whole config
step unless a CRM-ish feature was selected — so a gallery-only install was
also never offered SMTP, despite gallery links, guest invites and expiry
warnings all going out through email_configs.
- eleven call sites read process.env.FRONTEND_URL directly rather than the
resolver, three of them defaulting to placeholder hosts that reached real
recipients: https://app.example.com in payment-reminder emails, localhost:3005
in admin invitation emails, https://app.example.com in dev template previews.
Stop injecting a default anywhere, and resolve the origin instead:
FRONTEND_URL -> general_site_url -> the origin the request arrived on ->
whichever exists -> ''. A loopback candidate is treated as unconfigured so the
installs that already have http://localhost:3000 baked into their environment
self-heal; the same guard previously lived inline in routes/gallery.js for the
slideshow QR (#848) and is now shared. The empty return is preserved because
shareLinkService and the SSO redirects in routes/auth rely on it to emit
relative urls — callers needing an absolute url use getAbsoluteFrontendUrl(),
which still ends at http://localhost:3000.
The wizard now persists window.location.origin right after the admin account is
created, so an install that skips the rest still has a usable origin for
background jobs that have no request to derive one from, and offers it as an
editable "Public address" field. Settings -> General shows the field read-only
when FRONTEND_URL pins it, instead of silently ignoring edits.
Also drop the `|| 'mailhog'` fallback when seeding email_configs: that host only
exists in the dev compose profile (which does not even start by default), so a
fresh install came up with a live config pointing nowhere while the wizard
showed empty SMTP fields. With no row, blank fields are the truth and
emailProcessor logs "No email configuration found". Developers set
SMTP_HOST=mailhog explicitly.
backend/src/services/emailService.js is deleted: nothing in backend/ references
it, and it was the only consumer of the SMTP_* variables, which misrepresented
how mail is configured.
Refs #705
* fix(setup): keep FRONTEND_URL ahead of ADMIN_URL/APP_URL when resolving links
The previous commit routed two call sites through the resolver but put the
site-specific variable FIRST, silently reversing precedence:
userManagementService was: FRONTEND_URL || ADMIN_URL || localhost:3005
became: ADMIN_URL || resolver
adminEvents/crud was: FRONTEND_URL || APP_URL || ''
became: APP_URL || resolver
An install with both variables set would have flipped which one won. Call the
resolver first instead — it starts with FRONTEND_URL, so the original relative
order is preserved and only the final fallback changes: localhost:3005 (not
even the frontend's port) and '' (a relative link inside an email) both become
the resolved origin.
Refs #705
* fix(setup): unpin loopback FRONTEND_URL, keep ADMIN_URL/APP_URL reachable
Review feedback on #1104.
isEnvPinned() reported ANY FRONTEND_URL as authoritative, including the
loopback values getFrontendBaseUrl() deliberately demotes. An install
upgrading with the old compose default FRONTEND_URL=http://localhost:3000
therefore resolved its origin from general_site_url correctly, but got the
Site URL field rendered read-only in Settings and skipped by the wizard's
seeding - locking the exact operators this change exists to unblock out of
configuring a public address anywhere. The predicate now mirrors the
resolver, and the derived general_site_url_effective the General tab reads
comes from the same helper instead of re-normalising process.env inline.
APP_URL and ADMIN_URL had become dead code: getFrontendBaseUrl() only
returns falsy when NOTHING is configured, so `|| process.env.ADMIN_URL`
after it never ran once a site URL existed - which after this PR is the
normal case. A split-origin install pointing ADMIN_URL at a separate admin
host got invite links on the public gallery origin instead. They are now
passed as an explicit `override` that resolves directly below FRONTEND_URL,
preserving the historic FRONTEND_URL-before-ADMIN_URL order while beating
the database- and request-derived fallbacks.
general_site_url now feeds the CORS allowlist and the
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header, not just email links, so a schemeless
value is an allowlist entry no browser origin can match. Validate it
server-side in PUT /general (isURL with require_protocol, require_tld off
so LAN/NAS installs on http://nas:3000 still work) and client-side in both
surfaces that write it - type="url" never fires in either, since neither
input sits inside a form.
Two more wizard fixes: the General tab no longer reposts general_site_url
while it is env-pinned, because the field then holds the effective env
value rather than the stored one and the round-trip read as a change to a
protected key, 403ing a settings.edit-without-settings.domains admin on an
unrelated save. And SetupConfigStep validates the From address before
posting - /admin/email/config rejects a blank one, which used to surface as
a generic warning while the wizard advanced from its finally block anyway,
discarding every SMTP value the user had typed, password included. A failed
save now keeps them on the step.
* fix(setup): surface a rejected public address instead of swallowing it
Review round 2 follow-up on #1104, pushed onto the branch.
saveSiteUrl() caught and discarded every error. That was defensible before
round 2 added a server-side URL check, but PUT /general can now answer 400 —
and the two validators disagreed:
http://my_nas.local client: accepted server: rejected
http://foo_bar:3000 client: accepted server: rejected
validate() let those through, the 400 was swallowed, `failed` stayed false and
onDone() ran. The operator finished the wizard believing the public address was
stored when nothing had been. That is the silent misconfiguration this whole
change exists to remove, landing on the LAN and NAS installs it targets.
Three parts:
- saveSiteUrl() throws. finish() resolves it before anything else is posted and
puts the message on the address field rather than the generic "some settings
could not be saved" warning. Skip for now still always leaves, by contract,
but warns instead of dropping the value in silence.
- allow_underscores on the server check, for the same reason require_tld is
off: browsers resolve http://my_nas.local and the client accepts it, so
rejecting it server-side only produced the mismatch above. Both validators
now agree across the LAN/NAS, IDN, bare-IP and scheme-less cases.
- LOOPBACK_BASE_RE anchors its host token. Bare prefix matching also demoted
https://localhost-nas.example.com, and now that this predicate gates the
whole resolver rather than just the slideshow QR, being demoted means a
configured address is silently ignored. 127. stays a bare prefix on purpose:
all of 127.0.0.0/8 is loopback.
Resolver suite 31 passing, up from 26. Mutation-checked: restoring the
unanchored regex fails the three new host-boundary cases.
* fix(settings): don't lock the General tab on a site URL nobody typed
Review follow-up on #1104, pushed onto the branch.
general_site_url was free-text until this PR added a server-side check, so an
upgraded install can hold something schemeless that predates it. The tab
flagged that on load, and `disabled={!!siteUrlError}` then killed Save for
EVERY General setting.
An admin holding settings.edit but not settings.domains could not clear it
either: correcting the address is a change to a protected key and 403s. The
tab has no permission gating, so that role was simply locked out of the tab
with no self-service way back.
That is the same role adminSettings.js:85-95 documents the no-op round-trip
allowance for. The allowance only helps if the request is made, and this
blocked it in the browser first.
Validation now waits until the field is actually edited, and an unchanged
value is dropped from the payload rather than reposted — matching what the
env-pinned case already does one line above, and for the same reason.
stored value invalid, untouched Save works, key not sent
edited to something unusable Save blocked
edited to a usable absolute url saved
Four tests, first coverage for this feature. Mutation-checked: removing the
dirty gate fails the untouched-value case.
---------
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>
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b69dd134d0 |
feat(faces): People in this gallery — face recognition via an optional ML sidecar (#1074) (#1075)
* feat(ml): optional face-detection sidecar, opt-in and inert by default (#1074) First of four PRs for "People in this gallery". This one ships only the sidecar, its wiring and its CI — no schema, no backend code, no UI. Nothing in PicPeak calls it yet. picpeak-ml is a single FastAPI + onnxruntime container: three endpoints (/health, /info, /faces), no database, no volumes, no egress, no model download at runtime. Clustering, person identity and every privacy decision stay in the backend where the data already lives. Models are YuNet (detection) + FaceNet-512 (embedding), both MIT, both pinned by URL and SHA-256 and verified at build time. The licence analysis is in ml/LICENSES.md: the more accurate InsightFace weights are non-commercial-only and PicPeak's users are working photographers, so they are never baked into an image we publish. Two things worth review attention: - Alignment uses a least-squares similarity transform (Umeyama), NOT cv2.estimateAffinePartial2D. RANSAC and LMEDS exist to reject outliers among many correspondences; given five landmarks and no outliers they fit a three-point subset exactly and let the rest drift. Measured on a real off-frontal portrait: eyes and nose pinned to 0.11px, mouth corners 11.8px out on a 160px crop. Umeyama distributes it (max 6.5px, rms 5.1 vs 7.4). The failure mode is silent — a bad warp still yields 512 confident floats — so tests/test_pipeline.py pins it numerically. - FACENET_ONNX_URL has no default and the build fails loudly without it. deepface distributes FaceNet-512 as Keras .h5 only, so the ONNX is produced once by tools/convert_facenet.py and published as a release asset. Converting inside the build would drag TensorFlow through both architecture legs of every build to produce a byte-identical file. The CI jobs are gated on the FACENET_ONNX_URL repository variable and skip cleanly until it is set. Off by default, twice over: the sidecar is behind the `faces` compose profile, and the backend will gate on a `faces` feature flag that defaults to false. FACE_ML_URL defaults to http://picpeak-ml:8000 so the standard deployment needs no configuration — nothing dials that host while the flag is off, which is why a non-resolving default is harmless. Verified: 27 pytest tests green; YuNet loads and detects against a real portrait with its landmark order matching the alignment template index-for-index; both compose files validate and the faces profile is correctly excluded from a default `up`; workflow YAML parses and the job graph resolves. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(ml): pin the converter toolchain, verify parity, drop a false reproducibility claim (#1074) Ran the FaceNet-512 conversion for real and corrected what the previous commit assumed about it. The conversion works: 23,497,424 parameters, 89.6 MB ONNX, and the converted graph matches the Keras original to 2.086e-06 absolute / cosine 1.0000000000. That check is now part of the script rather than something I did once by hand — a subtly wrong graph still returns 512 plausible floats, so it refuses to leave the file on disk if parity fails. Also ran the full pipeline against both real models end to end. The embedding is L2-normalized to 1.000000, and the same face survives being re-rendered: half scale 0.973, double scale 0.984, JPEG q40 0.987, rotated 8 degrees 0.984, brightness +40 0.988. Scale invariance in particular is evidence the alignment warp is doing its job. Corrected claim: the conversion is NOT byte-reproducible. Two runs with the same pinned versions on the same machine gave different SHA-256s. The graphs are functionally identical — same 336 nodes, same 271 initializers, every weight matching to 0.000e+00 — but a few initializer names differ because tf2onnx's traced-op naming is not deterministic (Keras layer naming is deterministic; I checked). The previous commit message and README both claimed byte-identical output. They were wrong, and it matters: anyone re-running the conversion gets a different hash, and without this note that reads like tampering. The build-time SHA-256 pins one published artifact so its URL cannot start serving different bytes; validating a fresh conversion is the parity check's job. requirements-convert.txt now pins the exact set that produced the artifact, including transitive keras/protobuf/numpy, and documents that the converter needs Python 3.11 while the image runs 3.12. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * feat(faces): schema, queue, clustering and API for People in this gallery (#1074) Backend half of the feature. Migration 177, a face-detection queue, the clustering engine, the gallery and admin APIs, and the privacy wiring. No UI yet; nothing is reachable until the `faces` feature flag is on, which defaults to false. The flag is the gate, not FACE_ML_URL. That variable now has a working default (the compose service name), so its presence proves nothing about intent — if it were the gate, every install would poll a hostname that does not resolve. faceQueue re-checks the flag every tick, so turning it off stops the workers without a restart. Visibility scoping is the part worth reviewing closely. Face rows have no concept of photo visibility, but guests are restricted to photos.visibility='visible'. A raw count leaks how many hidden photos someone appears in, and an unscoped cover face renders a crop of a photo the guest may not open — with the best-scoring face being the likeliest pick, so it would happen often rather than rarely. facePeopleService recomputes both per request against the caller's own scope, and event_people.face_count_total is named to be conspicuous in a guest path. Six tests cover it, including the case where a person's photos are ALL hidden and they must vanish entirely. Face data is excluded from backups and .picpeak exports, per the decision in the thread: it is derived, so a restore re-scans rather than carrying biometrics between operators. Three separate mechanisms, because the engines cannot be filtered alike — EXCLUDED_TABLES for export, --exclude-table-data (not --exclude-table; the CREATE TABLE must survive or restore breaks on the first query) for Postgres, and DELETE + VACUUM on the temp copy for SQLite, which has no way to exclude a table from a whole-file .backup. The VACUUM is not cosmetic: without it the pages stay in the file and the claim is false on disk. Archiving now purges face data explicitly. photo_faces cascades off photos, but archive deletes neither the photo rows nor the event, so without this an archived gallery kept its biometrics indefinitely. Other decisions: clustering keeps names across a re-cluster by majority inheritance (without it, one button click silently discards every name the photographer typed); consolidation refuses to merge two people who were named differently; assignment never compares across model_version, since embeddings from two pipelines are not comparable; low-quality faces are stored but left unassigned so they show in "this photo contains" without spawning junk people. Migration is 177, not 174 — 174/175/176 landed on main while this branch was open. 29 tests green: 7 migration (idempotency, down(), cascade, and that installing it enqueues NOTHING), 11 clustering, 11 privacy/visibility. Lint clean; the pre-existing error counts in databaseBackup.js and server.js are unchanged. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * feat(faces): People strip, face filter and admin controls (#1074) Frontend half. Renders nothing anywhere unless the `faces` feature flag is on AND the photographer enabled detection for the gallery — the whole guest surface hangs off one boolean, event.people_enabled, which the server computes from the flag, the per-event toggle and the show-to-guests toggle together. Guest side: a People strip between the filter bar and the grid, circular crops from each person's cover face, an active-filter chip row, and a "Show all" bottom sheet. The face filter composes with category, search, media type and the liked/saved/rated filters in the same useMemo rather than replacing them, so "photos of Anna that I liked" works. Two people selected means AND by default — that is what picking a second face almost always asks for — with a toggle to OR that appears only once a second person is picked. Unnamed people show a photo count and never "Person 7". A number is honest about what the system knows; an invented name is not. There is a test asserting we don't do it. The strip renders nothing below two people, collapses to one line when dismissed (persisted per slug, so dismissing one gallery says nothing about the next), and appears mid-backfill with a progress line rather than blocking the gallery behind a spinner. Avatar crops are computed in ratios of the source dimensions so they survive whatever rendition the browser gets; without width/height they fall back to an uncropped thumbnail, since a wrongly-offset crop is worse than no crop. No new download endpoint: "download these N" rides the existing photoIds path, which already enforces access level and per-category permissions server-side. Adding a person_id selector would have been a second thing to authorize for no gain. Guest-facing copy never says "biometric" or "recognition" — those words describe our implementation, not the guest's experience. The sheet's footnote answers the first question every guest has (where does this go?) inline. The admin card, by contrast, is explicit: it states the controller obligation next to the toggle, and warns that scanning materializes the preview tier on galleries that never generated one, which is real CPU and disk an admin should know about before a 2,000-photo backfill. EN + DE translations. 140 frontend tests green (8 new), tsc and eslint clean. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(faces): measured match threshold, working build defaults, 89MB smaller image (#1074) Ran the Phase 0 spike that had been outstanding, published the model, and fixed what both turned up. THRESHOLD IS NOW MEASURED, NOT GUESSED. LFW's standard 1000-pair protocol run through this exact pipeline (YuNet -> Umeyama alignment -> FaceNet-512 ONNX), 100% detection on 2000 images: same person cosine 0.6958 +/- 0.1415 diff person cosine 0.0849 +/- 0.1674 separation 0.6109 peak accuracy 96.60% @ 0.405 So the pipeline separates people well — the thing I could not previously claim, since every earlier number was the same face re-rendered. Default moves 0.62 -> 0.50. The old value was a placeholder and a bad one: it gave 0% false merges but 22.4% false splits, i.e. roughly one in four same-person pairs failing to join, which fragments a gallery badly. 0.50 gives 1.0% false merge / 8.2% false split. Peak accuracy (0.405) is deliberately NOT chosen: for clustering the two errors do not cost the same. A false split is a duplicate row the photographer can merge away; a false merge puts a stranger into someone's "download my photos" — and until the Phase 2 merge/split UI ships, there is no way to undo one. So this sits on the conservative side of the optimum. The spike is committed as ml/tools/benchmark_threshold.py rather than thrown away, so "why 0.50?" has an answer in six months and a re-tune is one command. BUILD DEFAULTS. FACENET_ONNX_URL/_SHA256 now default to the published ml-models-v1 release asset, so `docker build ml/` and `docker compose --profile faces up` work with no arguments. Blanking either still fails loudly — a URL without a checksum is never acceptable, since the checksum is what makes the URL safe to trust. Found by running compose for real: it failed exactly as designed, which was correct behaviour and a bad out-of-box experience now that a canonical artifact exists. IMAGE SIZE. 389MB -> 300MB single-arch. `chown -R` after COPY rewrote every copied file into a fresh layer, duplicating the 90MB model for nothing; the user is now created before the copies and ownership set via COPY --chown. Also drops pip/setuptools from the runtime image. Measured RSS is 186MiB idle, and the container answers /faces end-to-end in well under the 80-150ms/photo the issue budgeted. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(faces): threshold 0.50 -> 0.60 from real clustering, theme-aware People strip (#1074) Both fixes come from running the feature on an actual gallery — 61 photos, 5 real identities — rather than reasoning about it. THRESHOLD. The LFW pairwise sweep in the previous commit said 0.50, and it was wrong. On a real gallery at 0.50, three of six visible clusters were contaminated: two different people merged into one strip entry, which is the exact failure that puts a stranger into someone's "download my photos". Pairwise error rates do not predict cluster purity. Greedy assignment compounds — one wrong face drags the centroid toward the midpoint between two identities, making the next wrong face likelier. A 1% pairwise false-merge rate is not a 1% chance of a clean gallery, and no amount of staring at an ROC curve would have shown that. Sweep against ground truth (5 identities): 0.50 -> 6 clusters, 3 contaminated 0.56 -> 6 clusters, 0 contaminated 0.60 -> 5 clusters, 0 contaminated <- exactly right 0.64 -> 5 clusters, 0 contaminated, fewer faces assigned 0.60 recovers the right number of people with no contamination; higher only loses coverage. Migration 177 carries the full reasoning so the next person to touch this knows why the obvious pairwise answer is the wrong one. THEME. The People strip hardcoded `text-neutral-800` for named people. On a dark gallery — which the screenshot immediately showed — that renders a named person's label almost invisibly, while UNNAMED people stayed legible. Exactly backwards. Labels, headings, the collapsed summary, the scan line and the filter chip row now read the gallery's own theme tokens (--color-text / --color-muted-text / --color-accent / --color-surface-border) like the rest of the gallery surface. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(faces): keep the mobile filter row inside the viewport (#1074) At 390px the photo count and Clear link were pushed against the right edge by ml-auto and clipped. Only apply it from the sm breakpoint up, where there is room; below that they flow after the chips. Found by screenshotting the real thing on an iPhone-sized viewport. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * feat(faces): complete Phase 1, add People management and auto-categories (#1074) Closes the two Phase 1 gaps, then builds Phase 2 and Phase 3. PHASE 1 GAPS. "Download these N" was specified, described as done in an earlier summary, and never actually built — I had verified the backend needed no new endpoint and let that stand as if the button existed. It now hands the filtered photo ids to the same path as a manual selection, so the server re-applies access level and per-category permissions on the way through. Photos in a downloads-disabled category are excluded client-side too, so the number on the button is the number the guest receives. Hidden entirely when downloads are off for the gallery. Lightbox person chips ("In this photo: Anna") are the second way into the face filter — a guest looking at a photo of themselves can act on it without scrolling back to the strip. Tapping one closes the lightbox and filters the grid behind it. PHASE 2. A People management modal over the endpoints that already existed and were already tested: rename inline, merge (multi-select, first pick is the target so the name a photographer typed survives), split via a face picker, hide, ignore. This matters more than it sounds — clustering deliberately errs toward splitting because a wrong merge puts a stranger into someone's download, and that trade only works if merging is easy. PHASE 3. Rule engine over face_count plus face-area ratio: 0 -> Details, 1 large -> Portraits, 2-5 -> Small groups, >5 -> Groups. The area ratio is what separates "a portrait of someone" from "someone is in this landscape". Three guarantees, all tested: it only ever fills an EMPTY category (enforced in the query AND re-checked in the UPDATE, so a photographer setting one mid-run still wins), everything it touches is marked auto_categorized so undo is exact, and it is a no-op unless separately enabled. Migration 178 adds the column — separate from 177, which has already run wherever this branch is deployed. Verified on the real gallery: 61 photos -> 48 portraits + 13 small groups, undo cleared exactly 61 and left the manual ones alone. Merge moved faces and removed the source. Both confirmed against the database, not just the UI. TWO BUGS THE BROWSER CAUGHT, both invisible to tsc: - The lightbox destructure never landed — my patch targeted a line that has a default value, matched nothing, and failed silently. `people` resolved to something else entirely and the chips would never have rendered. eslint's "outer scope value" warning is what surfaced it. - Admin face thumbnails 403'd because <AuthenticatedImage> attaches whatever gallery token is in session storage; an admin who has also opened one of their own galleries sends a type:"gallery" bearer to an admin route. Admin routes authenticate from the httpOnly cookie, which a plain same-origin <img> sends by itself. Worth noting AdminPhotoGrid has the same latent shape; not touched here. Also: the admin card now reports "N people (M shown to guests)" when those differ, so the settings page and the gallery stop disagreeing without explanation. 45 backend tests (8 new) and 140 frontend tests green; tsc and eslint clean. EN + DE for every new string. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * perf(faces): batch migration DDL and drop the face stack from server.js import (#1074) CI's backend job timed out at 10 minutes on the first run of this branch. Nothing failed — 132 of 182 suites passed and the wall clock ran out. Main does the same 182 in 124s, and where main has 12 suites slow enough for jest to print a duration, this branch had 77. Two changes, both worth making regardless of how much of the gap they close: - Migration 177 added its columns one ALTER TABLE at a time (four on photos, three on events, plus a separate index statement) and seeded settings with a SELECT and an INSERT per key. It now uses one alterTable per table and one SELECT plus one bulk INSERT. 178 folds its index into the same statement as its column. That chain replays in ~90 suites, so statement count there is multiplied by 90. - server.js required faceQueue at module scope, which pulls in axios and — through imageProcessor — sharp. Every supertest suite that imports server.js was paying for a module graph it never uses. Now required inside the startup block, next to the call that needs it. Honest about the evidence: locally the migration delta measures at zero (1.15s vs 1.13s for the same suite, three runs each), so batching alone does not explain an eight-minute regression. A fast local disk and many cores mask per-statement and per-import costs that a two-core runner with a shared disk does not. These are the two real costs this branch added to a path that runs in almost every suite; whether they are sufficient is a question for CI, not for another round of local speculation. 37 face tests still green after the change. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * i18n(faces): complete EN and DE coverage for the face feature (#1074) The admin card and the Features toggle were rendering entirely from inline English `defaultValue` fallbacks — 22 keys existed in no locale file at all, so a German admin saw an English consent notice, English toggles and English buttons. The gallery side was already translated; the admin side was not, and nothing in the toolchain flags this because a `defaultValue` always renders something. Adds the missing `admin.faces.*` (19), `settings.features.faces.*` (2) and shared `common.clear/saved/saveFailed` in both languages. Existing keys are left alone (setdefault, not overwrite), so the shared `common` strings other features rely on are untouched. Committed the audit as frontend/scripts/i18n-faces-audit.py rather than throwing it away: it extracts every t() key the face components actually use and diffs it against each locale, and it also reports German values that are byte-identical to English, which is the usual shape of an untranslated copy-paste. Currently: 69 keys in use, EN complete, DE complete, no identical pairs. Verified in the browser, not just in the JSON — the German card reads "61 / 61 Fotos durchsucht · 16 Personen (5 für Gäste sichtbar)" end to end. Also checked the components for hardcoded user-facing text (JSX nodes, title/aria-label/placeholder attributes) outside t(); there is none. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(faces): 13 defects from external review — coordinates, counts, erasure, races (#1074) Codex reviewed the branch against main. Thirteen findings, nine P1. I checked every one against the code and could not dismiss a single one as a false positive, so all thirteen are fixed here. THE WORST ONE: bounding boxes were stored in the wrong coordinate system. The sidecar reports coordinates in the space of the image it was HANDED — which is the ≤1920px preview, not the original — while every consumer compares them against photos.width/height, the original dimensions. A 6000px photo therefore produced boxes ~3x too small and areas ~9x too small: avatar crops landed in the wrong place and the Portraits rule could never fire. It is invisible on any photo already under 1920px, which is exactly why the demo gallery and every screenshot looked correct. Now scaled once in faceProcessor so everything downstream can assume original-image coordinates. ERASURE. The FK cascade on photo_faces is decorative on SQLite: PicPeak never enables `PRAGMA foreign_keys`, so deleting a photo left its embeddings behind. I first enabled the pragma globally and reverted it — six unrelated suites immediately failed on pre-existing dangling references, and switching it on would start rejecting inserts on every existing install. That is a real change worth making, but it is its own PR, not a rider on this one. Instead deletion purges explicitly: purgePhotoFaces in the photo paths (single, bulk, service) and photo_faces/event_people in deleteEventCascade. Tests assert this with the pragma explicitly OFF, so they can only pass if the code does the work. COUNTS. A re-scan deleted the old face rows without undoing their contribution to event_people, so counts inflated on every re-scan and ghost people survived. Now the affected people are recomputed before the replacements are assigned. My own "must not double its faces" test only checked photo_faces rows, which is why it passed throughout. RACES. A worker that finished after an admin purged the event committed its rows anyway — erasure reported success and the data reappeared. The commit is now conditional on the row still being 'processing'. And assignFaces is read-modify-write over an event's people, so two workers lost each other's updates; it is now serialised per event with an in-process mutex plus a Postgres advisory lock for the multi-pod case the queue advertises. METADATA LOSS. Merging discarded the source's name and suppression flags, so a merge could erase a typed name or un-hide someone. Reclustering remembered only people with a label, so an unnamed-but-hidden bystander came back guest-visible after one "Re-group people" — and suppression now propagates to every descendant cluster, not just the majority one. Also: export reset face_status so a restored gallery re-scans instead of claiming to be scanned forever; manual category edits clear auto_categorized so "undo automatic" cannot delete a photographer's own choice; external photos are skipped rather than failed (resolvePhotoStorageKey returns null for them by design); the gallery refetches photo memberships as a scan progresses so filtering is not stale; a failed VACUUM now fails the backup rather than publishing one that may retain biometric pages; and the ML Dockerfile's `|| true` is scoped to the uninstall — as written it was `(install && uninstall) || true`, so a failed dependency install produced a green layer and an image with no onnxruntime. Four new regression tests. Full backend suite failure set verified identical to origin/main; frontend 140 green; tsc and eslint clean. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(faces): 12 more defects from review round 2 — cross-event purge, leaks, lifecycle (#1074) Second Codex round on the same diff, now including round 1's fixes. Twelve findings, seven P1. Again none were false positives. SECURITY, AND MINE FROM ROUND 1: the bulk-delete face purge iterated the raw `photoIds` from the request instead of the event-scoped `photos` rows the handler had already validated. purgePhotoFaces has no event scope of its own, so an editor could pass another gallery's photo id and delete its face data — even though the photo deletion right below it was correctly scoped. Fixing one thing and introducing another is exactly why the second round was worth running. ANOTHER VISIBILITY LEAK, same class as the one round 1 fixed: /people returns scan progress, and getScanStatus counted every photo with a face_status — including hidden ones. Guests could read the hidden-photo count off the progress bar while the people list and covers beside it were properly scoped. Now scoped by the same predicate, with the caller passing its audience. RECLUSTER, ROUND 1'S FIX WAS INCOMPLETE. I made suppression follow every descendant but still copied the flags from the majority ANCESTOR. When reclustering merges a visible named person with a hidden one, the majority ancestor is often the visible one — republishing the hidden person's photos. Suppression is now OR-ed across every ancestor contributing faces. The name also now goes to the genuine largest descendant; the previous code took whichever cluster came first in map order, which the comment already claimed it did not. LIFECYCLE. Face data is excluded from backups and exports, but photos. face_status came across intact, so a restored install claimed every photo was scanned while holding no faces — and the worker only claims 'pending', so it stayed that way forever. Now: the SQLite backup requeues in the dump, restore requeues after the pool reinit (the Postgres path cannot rewrite rows inside pg_dump), the portable importer purges LOCAL face tables (they were excluded from the replace list, so another instance's embeddings survived an import with FK checks suspended) and requeues, and archiving disables detection so a restored archive is honestly off rather than enabled-and-empty. WRITE PATHS. Only processPhoto enqueued. The synchronous upload path (chunked-upload completion, watch-folder) left photos unscanned, and replacePhoto kept the OLD image's faces on a row now pointing at a different picture — stale identities shown on the new photo. FRONTEND. PeopleSheet and the admin manager rendered centred thumbnails and ignored the bbox, so on group photos the avatar showed whoever stood in the middle and two people from one photo were indistinguishable — in the manager whose entire job is telling faces apart. The crop maths is now one shared helper (faceCrop.ts) so the three surfaces cannot drift again. Full-page layouts (gallery-premium, gallery-story) render their own lightbox and never received the people props. Backend failure set verified identical to origin/main; frontend 140 green; tsc and eslint clean. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * fix(faces): round 3 — five of round 2's fixes were wrong or no-ops (#1074) Third and final Codex round. Eight findings, four P1 — and the important part is that FIVE of them are defects in round 2's fixes, not in the original code. - The sync-upload enqueue I added was a silent no-op. It queried through `trx` after the transaction had already been committed, which throws "Transaction query already complete" straight into the catch I had wrapped it in. Chunked uploads and watch-folder imports were still never scanned, and the code read as though they were. Uses `db` now. - The post-restore requeue ran BEFORE the files were restored, in both the portable importer and the native restore. The face worker is live during a restore, so it could claim those rows and scan the previous instance's files, or fail them for originals not yet on disk — with nothing to requeue them afterwards. Both now run after file restoration; the native one is extracted into requeueFaceScans() and called from the full and database-only paths. - The admin face crop mixed coordinate spaces: an original-pixel bbox scaled against the THUMBNAIL's natural size. The API now returns the source dimensions alongside the box, so there is one space to reason about. - Forwarding people props through layoutProps did not make them work — the full-page layouts never destructured them. GalleryStoryLayout now threads them to its own lightbox. Genuinely new findings, all in the same class as ones already fixed: - releaseToPending updated unconditionally, so a photo purged while its sidecar request was in flight came back as 'pending' and was rescanned — biometric rows reappearing after the purge reported success. Round 2 fixed exactly this on the COMMIT path and I did not carry it to the retry path. Now guarded on 'processing'. - purgePhotoFaces left face_status alone, so a worker mid-scan still satisfied its commit guard and could write fresh faces into a photo being deleted — orphans, since the FK cascade is inert on SQLite. It now clears the claim as part of the purge. - Phase 3 was unreachable: the migration seeds face_auto_categorize_enabled false and nothing could ever write it, so the rule engine and its undo endpoint returned "disabled" in every real flow. Added GET/PUT and a toggle on the admin card, EN + DE. NOT fixed, deliberately: GalleryPremiumLayout uses yet-another-react-lightbox rather than the shared PhotoLightbox, so person chips there are a real port rather than a prop forward. Recorded as open rather than bodged. Backend failure set identical to origin/main; 41 face tests and 140 frontend tests green; i18n audit reports EN and DE complete at 71 keys. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * feat(faces): block face recognition on the all-in-one image (#1074, #1042) The single-container image cannot run this feature, so it is refused there rather than left to degrade. WHY, since the reason is not obvious from the code: the AIO image runs the backend, the frontend, SQLite and every background worker inside one container aimed at "one photographer plus guests browsing". It has no Redis, SQLite gives it a single writer, and it contains no ML sidecar to talk to. Face detection would add a second image-processing pipeline competing with Sharp for the same CPU and memory. That failure is not loud — the install just becomes slow and looks broken, which is the worst possible shape for a deployment whose whole promise is one container and no decisions. Gated on an explicit PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER marker, NOT inferred from SERVE_FRONTEND or a SQLite path: plenty of legitimate multi-container setups serve the frontend from the backend or run SQLite, and none of them should lose the feature by accident. Three layers, because the first is the only one that enforces: - faceSettings.isFeatureEnabled() returns false before consulting the flag, so a database restored from a full deployment with `faces` enabled still cannot switch it on here. - The feature-flag API forces `faces: false` in both directions, so the admin UI reflects reality instead of offering a switch that refuses to stay on. - The Features tab renders the card disabled with a plain-language reason, read from a new `single_container` field on /admin/system/version (an endpoint the admin UI already calls). Documented in ml/README.md and .env.example. Three tests pin the behaviour, including that the marker only accepts explicit truthy values. NOTE FOR PR #1068: this expects `Dockerfile.aio` to set `ENV PICPEAK_SINGLE_CONTAINER=true`. That one line lives on that branch and is not in this commit — until it lands, an AIO build would still offer the feature. Worth adding alongside the `Limits` section of docs/single-container.md. 44 face tests green; EN + DE complete at 72 keys. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc * test(faces): pin the bbox coordinate space with a real scale factor (#1074) The coordinate-space bug — boxes stored in preview space while every consumer reads them as original-image pixels — had no test, and could not have been caught by the ones that existed: every photo in the demo gallery is 750px, so the scale factor was always exactly 1.0 and the correction never executed. Verified by hand first, on a real 4000x3000 upload with the face placed off-centre so a wrong crop would be unmistakable. Before the fix the stored box was 1493,204 (preview space, face actually at x≈2850-3618); after, 3110,426 — a factor of 2.083, exactly 4000/1920, landing inside the face. The admin crop then resolved to left=-395px/top=-46px on a 64px window, which is the face centred. That verification is now a test rather than a memory. Three cases: a 4000px photo must scale by 4000/1920, a 1920px photo must NOT change (the case that hid the bug), and a row with no width must fall back to unscaled rather than storing NaN. Note for anyone extending these: jest hoists mock factories above the file, so anything they close over has to be `mock`-prefixed. Getting that wrong fails at transform time with a message that does not name the variable. 47 face tests green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ra4hcsYiKuQLbbRsg6EjAc --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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b48fa62eea |
feat(gallery): info banner above the photo grid (#932) (#1063)
* feat(gallery): info banner above the photo grid (#932) A short informational note rendered at the TOP of a gallery, above the photos. Distinct from the promotional banner (#440), which stays by the footer for marketing copy — the reporter's case is an onboarding hint ("use the menu button to filter"), which is useless below a gallery the guest has to scroll past first. Mirrors the promo feature's shape rather than inventing a second one: a global default in Settings → Branding (branding_info_markdown) plus a per-event inherit/custom/off override. Markdown via the existing MarkdownContent sanitiser — no raw HTML, no CSS injection. Empty global default means nothing renders, so upgrading changes nothing visible. Deliberately NOT included: an alignment knob (this is short helper copy, not marketing layout) and guest dismissal — the issue lists dismissal as a nice-to-have, and it needs per-guest persistence that is its own decision. Migration 176 is idempotent (hasColumn / existing-key guarded). Note on the payload plumbing: the per-event fields travel in the /photos response, not just /info. GalleryAuthContext seeds its cached event from the gallery LOGIN response — a small identity subset — so anything absent there is undefined right after a guest signs in. /photos is the payload that refreshes on every gallery load, which is why the fields were added there and why GalleryView reads them from `data.event`. Verified in a browser across all three modes; reading them from the context event instead silently collapsed every override back to 'inherit'. * fix(branding): map branding_info_markdown on read so saving can't wipe it (#932) External review caught this. BrandingSettings declared no info_markdown and formatBrandingSettings never mapped branding_info_markdown, so BrandingPage's hydration — setBrandingSettings(prev => ({ ...prev, ...formatted })) — kept the empty-string initializer instead of the persisted value. The form loaded blank and the next Save posted '' back, wiping a configured banner. Silently: the gallery keeps rendering the old copy until that save lands. This is the same bug the footer/promo fields hit in #441 + #440 / #460, which the read mapper still carries a comment about. Add the field to the interface and the mapper, and pin the round-trip for the whole editable branding set so the next field added is caught by a test rather than by a user losing copy. Verified: the new test fails 3/4 with the mapper line removed. * fix(gallery): honour the info-banner override in the reveal-hidden view (#932) External review, round 2. The hidden-until-reveal branch renders GalleryLayout with the context `event`, which is seeded from the gallery login response and carries no banner fields — so while a gallery was hidden, a per-event 'off' silently resolved to 'inherit' and the global banner appeared on a gallery the admin had muted. Resolve the fields there the same way the main render path does. The two full-page layouts (gallery-premium, gallery-story) are deliberately left alone: they return before GalleryLayout and render no header, footer or promo banner either — injecting a wrapper into layouts documented as having 'their own integrated UI' would be a design change, not a fix. --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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b118695474 |
feat(permissions): granular permission gating + role editor & presets (#747, phase 1 of #743) (#1045)
* feat(permissions): granular permission gating + role editor & presets Make every admin feature permission-gateable so multi-user studios can split capability across roles (#747, and phase 1 of #743). - Split the catch-all settings.edit into dedicated dangerous-config perms (banking / domains / security / integrations / features): a team member can no longer change IBAN, domains, SSO, webhooks, API tokens or feature flags. Reads keep an OR with settings.view so existing roles keep visibility. The site-URL write inside /general is change-gated on settings.domains. - Add dedicated perms for admin surfaces miscategorised under settings.* (whatsapp, event_types, image_security, notifications, system) plus roles.manage and vat_codes.view; gate the previously-ungated VAT read. - Boot self-heal (_permissionsBoot.js): super_admin always holds every permission (tracks-all) so new perms never need a compensation migration; all other roles stay frozen (no silent escalation on upgrade). - Seed two presets: Solo Photographer (full operator) and Team Photographer (contributor — view events + manage photos + read-only CRM; no settings/users/billing edits, no events.edit). - Role editor: adminRoles CRUD (create/edit/clone/delete + permission matrix; system roles protected, super_admin immutable) and a Roles tab with a category-grouped matrix and preset cloning. - Settings page tabs are permission-gated with snap-back; i18n en/de. Migration 174. Backward-compatible: admin/editor/viewer unchanged. * feat(permissions): hide in-page action buttons a role can't use Wrap mutating controls on the surfaces restricted roles actually reach (Events list, Archives, gallery photo grid, event detail) in PermissionGate so they are HIDDEN when the user lacks the permission, rather than shown-then-403: - Events list: create / bulk archive / bulk delete / row archive / row delete / download-archive. - Archives: restore / download / delete. - Photo grid: single + bulk delete (photos.delete), per-photo download (photos.download), bulk move/hide/show (photos.edit). - Event detail: edit / rename / publish (events.edit), duplicate (events.create), archive (events.archive), create-invoice (bills.manage); the Actions card is hidden entirely for view-only roles. - Photos tab: upload / external import (photos.upload), export menu (photos.download). Backend already enforces these with 403; this is the matching UX so a Team Photographer never sees delete/settings controls. * fix(permissions): close settings-split bypass via generic settings writers Security review found the settings.edit split was bypassable: the generic settings writers (/general, /analytics, /seo, /security) upsert arbitrary setting_keys, so a role holding only settings.edit (or settings.security) could write keys owned by a narrower permission — repointing the public site URL (settings.domains), security policy (settings.security) or VAT/accounting config (settings.banking) via the wrong endpoint. Add stripUnauthorizedProtectedKeys(): before every generic upsert, drop any protected key the caller isn't permitted to write (general_site_url → settings.domains, security_* → settings.security, accounting_* → settings.banking). Dedicated routes still work because their caller holds the matching perm. Replaces the narrower in-handler site-URL guard. Also fix two tests affected by the RBAC changes: - authzPermissionGaps: API-token management moved to settings.integrations, so grant that (not settings.edit) to exercise the ownership 404. - AdminPhotoGrid.viewToggle: stub PermissionGate (its buttons are now gated and the test renders without a PermissionsProvider). * fix(permissions): address upstream review (#1045) - Renumber migration 174 -> 175 (174 now taken by 174_sqlite_nullable_event_dates from #1035; the collision made picpeakImportService's forward-only restore guard treat both as order 174 and accept a newer .picpeak onto an older schema). - Contain the roles.manage blast radius (delegation, not root escalation): a non-super_admin can no longer edit their own role, nor grant any permission their own role doesn't already hold (createRole + updateRole). - Protected-key denial now 403s (naming the keys + required perms) instead of silently stripping and reporting "saved" (adminSettings generic writers). - Reserve team_photographer so a custom role can't squat the preset name. - Boot self-heal: per-step try/catch so a role_permissions insert race on one replica doesn't skip preset seeding. - Forward-project the feature .manage perms that also replaced settings.edit gates (whatsapp/event_types/image_security/notifications/system), matching the settings.* split projection so the pattern is symmetric for phase-2. - Guard exports.down's roles/admin_users queries with hasTable. * fix(permissions): change-detection on protected-key 403 + commit guard tests (#1045) Round-2 review: - The protected-key 403 fired on key PRESENCE. The General tab re-posts general_site_url on every save, so a settings.edit-only role (the office manager this PR enables) got 403'd on every General save even when the URL was unchanged. Restore change-detection: compare the incoming value against the stored one and 403 only on an actual change; unchanged protected keys are dropped so the rest of the save proceeds. Only /general is affected. - Commit the self-amplification guard test (was run locally, never staged): adminRolesGuards.test.js — non-super can't grant perms it lacks, can't edit its own role, can't escalate another role; super_admin bypasses; team_photographer name reserved. - Add adminSettingsProtectedKeys.test.js pinning the change-detection: an unchanged general_site_url saves, an actual change 403s, super_admin changes it. |
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6de30e5bf1 |
fix(docker): default NODE_ENV=production so non-compose deploys don't fall back to SQLite (#1038) (#1039)
* fix(docker): default NODE_ENV=production so non-compose deploys don't fall back to SQLite (#1038) knexfile.js selects its config block by NODE_ENV and the `development` block defaults to sqlite3. The image never set NODE_ENV, so every deployment that doesn't go through our compose files — Kubernetes, Helm, plain `docker run` — silently ran on SQLite and ignored DB_HOST/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD. It stayed invisible because wait-for-db.sh is shell: it reads DB_HOST directly, connects to Postgres, creates the database and logs "PostgreSQL is up" in the same container where the Node process then writes to a SQLite file. Migrations go through src/database/db.js → the same knexfile, so they also ran against SQLite, leaving the provisioned Postgres database empty. Setting the default alone would be unsafe: an affected install would flip to Postgres on its next image pull and come up against an EMPTY database, which reads as total data loss. So this adds a guard that runs before migrations touch anything: - logs the resolved engine + target at boot (nothing did before, which is why this went unnoticed for so long) - refuses to start when pointed at a virgin Postgres while a populated SQLite file exists, naming the file and the .picpeak export path for moving the data, with PICPEAK_ALLOW_EMPTY_PG=true as the escape hatch - warns but boots when Postgres settings are present yet SQLite is in use Compose files already set NODE_ENV explicitly, so compose users are unaffected. The engine-selection tests resolve knexfile in a child process with a clean cwd — dotenv.config() would otherwise let a developer's backend/.env decide the answer instead of the knexfile defaults under test. Fake credentials in the describeEngine tests are built at runtime rather than written inline, so secret scanners don't flag a literal after `password:`. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): stay on SQLite instead of blocking, and add a migration path (#1038) Reworks the guard from the previous commit after walking through what an existing install actually experiences on its next image pull. Blocking was the wrong trade. An operator who had unknowingly been running on SQLite (because the image left NODE_ENV unset) would have pulled the fix and got a CrashLoopBackOff: data safe, galleries offline, for something they did not do. Now the boot RESOLVES the engine before migrations run and stays on whichever one holds the data: - Postgres configured but holding no galleries, while a populated SQLite file exists → keep serving from SQLite, print what happened and how to migrate. Nothing moves until the operator decides. - once Postgres holds the data, the next restart switches over on its own. - an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT is always honoured. The check is keyed on Postgres holding DATA, not on it having tables: a stray `run-migrations` against the empty database creates every table, which would otherwise blind the check and strand the operator on an empty install. wait-for-db.sh resolves the engine and exports DATABASE_CLIENT before the migration step, so the runner and the server always agree. Manual migration runs (no entrypoint, no exported client) now refuse rather than build a schema in the wrong database. Adds scripts/migrate-sqlite-to-postgres.js for moving the data across. It reuses the .picpeak export/import services rather than hand-rolling a cross-engine copy — they already handle FK suspension, JSON columns and Postgres sequence resync. Two things had to be added for the SQLite → Postgres direction, both opt-in and CLI-only so the upload/restore UI is untouched: - `allowEngineSwitch` relaxes the importer's same-engine guard - cross-engine row coercion: SQLite has no real date or boolean types, so its rows carry epoch numbers where Postgres wants a timestamp and 0/1 where it wants a boolean. Postgres rejects both outright ("date/time field value out of range: 1786548038763"). Coercion is driven by the TARGET schema, never guessed from the value. Verified end to end against a real PostgreSQL 15: a seeded SQLite install migrated across with booleans, timestamps and foreign keys intact, and the serial sequences correctly advanced (the next INSERT got id 2, not a primary-key collision). Photo files on disk are never touched and the SQLite file is left in place as a rollback. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close four review findings on the SQLite fallback + migration (#1038) External review (codex) found four issues, all confirmed against the code and fixed here. Two of them could have cost data. 1. The engine resolver was reachable only through wait-for-db.sh. A Kubernetes manifest that sets `command`/`args`, or a plain `docker run … node server.js`, bypasses the entrypoint — exactly the deployment styles this fix targets. With NODE_ENV now baked into the image, such an install would have resolved to Postgres and come up against an empty database while its SQLite data sat there unseen. server.js now resolves the engine itself, before anything requires knexfile, via the same script the entrypoint uses. Verified by running `node server.js` directly against an install with stranded SQLite data: it logs the banner and serves SQLite. 2. Cross-engine loads double-encoded JSON. SQLite has no json type, so its json columns are TEXT holding JSON; the export dumps that as a string and serialiseJsonColumns stringified it again, storing `true` as the scalar string "true". app_settings.setting_value is json on every install, so this reshaped every migrated setting. The text is decoded before serialisation now — verified against a real Postgres: json_typeof(setting_value) is `boolean`, matching a native install exactly. 3. The migration could silently miss concurrent writes. If the backend keeps serving, rows written after the export never reach Postgres and vanish from view once the engine switches. The script now fingerprints the SQLite tables whose loss would be noticed, checks for drift BEFORE loading Postgres (so a detected race leaves the target untouched) and again after, and refuses with the exact rows that moved. It also says plainly to stop the backend first. 4. The child phases shared stdout with winston. Outside production, and whenever LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true, createPicpeak's own log line was concatenated with the archive path and the migration failed on a bogus filename. Payloads travel through a result file now; verified with LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 2 — six more data-safety findings (#1038) 1. The engine choice is now PINNED once the data is in Postgres. Previously the boot decided from "does Postgres hold galleries", so an operator who later deleted every gallery would be sent back to the stale pre-migration SQLite file while their settings, admins and CRM data stayed in Postgres. The migration writes a marker next to the database file (and retires the file itself by renaming it); the marker wins over any probe. 2. The migration refused to overwrite Postgres only when it held GALLERIES. A target with admins, customers, invoices or projects but no galleries was wiped without --force. Both the source and target checks now look for user data across the tables that are empty on a fresh install. 3. Same bug in the other direction: an install with no galleries but real admins/settings/customers was refused a migration it was entitled to. 4. Drift detection covered four tables and only count/max(id), so an in-place UPDATE (event edit, password change) or a write to any other table passed unnoticed. It now fingerprints every table the export carries, including max(updated_at). It still is not a substitute for stopping the backend, and the script says so rather than implying a guarantee. 5. probeSqliteData() treated an unreadable or corrupt file as "no data", which would have switched the install to an empty Postgres — the very failure this module exists to prevent. It fails closed now and stays on SQLite so the real error surfaces. 6. The "you are leaving SQLite data behind" warning was unreachable: setting DATABASE_CLIENT skipped the probes, so the branch that produces it never had the inputs. Postgres and SQLite are both probed whenever Postgres is the engine in play. Also: the final verification compares row counts for EVERY table rather than just galleries, and flags only a shortfall — the import legitimately adds an app_settings row (setSessionsValidAfter) that made the strict equality fail on a first real run. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15 end to end, including: the marker keeps an install on Postgres after every gallery is deleted; removing the marker and restoring the file rolls back to SQLite as documented. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 3 — occupancy, bootstrap admin, secrets in /tmp (#1038) 1. Both engine probes judged occupancy by GALLERIES alone. An install whose galleries were all deleted, but which still has admins, customers or accounting records, was treated as empty: on the SQLite side that meant booting the empty Postgres and appearing to lose everything; on the Postgres side it meant diverting a live install to a stale SQLite file. Both now look across the tables that are empty on a fresh install, matching the migration script. 2. The migration ran migrate-schema BEFORE checking the target, and migration 001 seeds a bootstrap admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set (common on legacy installs). The occupancy check then saw that admin and refused, pushing the operator towards --force against a genuinely empty database. The target is read first now. 3. probeSqliteData()'s warning went through the app logger, which writes to STDOUT when LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true — and the resolver's stdout is the protocol channel wait-for-db.sh captures, so DATABASE_CLIENT could have been set to a JSON log line. Diagnostics take an injected sink (stderr in the resolver), and the shell now validates the value it captured instead of trusting it. 4. The .picpeak archive holds password hashes, SMTP credentials and API keys in plaintext, and was only removed on the fully-successful path — any drift or import failure left it in /tmp. Every exit path removes it now. 5. A database-only migration still hauled every business-doc and upload through /tmp and back into the same volume. createPicpeak takes includeFiles:false for this path; rows move, files stay where they already are. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a gallery-less install with only an admin account now stays on SQLite and migrates successfully with ADMIN_PASSWORD set; the resolver emits exactly one token on stdout with LOG_TO_CONSOLE=true and a corrupt database; a drift failure leaves Postgres untouched and no archive behind. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): pin the boot to SQLite while a migration is unfinished (#1038) Review round 4. A migration that dies after touching Postgres leaves rows behind — schema creation alone seeds a bootstrap admin when ADMIN_PASSWORD is set, and a drift or row-count failure can leave a partial load. Since the occupancy probes were widened in round 3, those rows read as "Postgres is occupied", so the next restart would switch engines and hide the SQLite data that is still the database of record. The script now writes a pin file next to the database BEFORE its first Postgres write and clears it only on success (after the success marker exists, so no restart in between can pick the wrong engine). While the pin is present the resolver stays on SQLite and explains why. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15 by reproducing the exact scenario: a migration failed mid-run with ADMIN_PASSWORD set, leaving one bootstrap admin in Postgres. With the pin the next boot resolves to sqlite3; with the pin removed it resolves to pg — the failure this closes. The subsequent successful re-run clears the pin and the boot moves to Postgres. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 5 — occupancy, path drift, retry, host default (#1038) 1. A seeded bootstrap admin counted as "Postgres is occupied". core/001_init.js inserts one whenever ADMIN_PASSWORD is set, so a Postgres that was initialised once and never used would have beaten a SQLite file full of real galleries — the exact failure the guard exists to prevent, reintroduced by widening the probe in round 3. The two sides are deliberately asymmetric now: the SQLite probe counts any user data (err towards keeping data visible), the Postgres probe ignores rows that schema creation seeds (err towards requiring proof of real use). 2. The guard resolved DATABASE_PATH with its own logic while knexfile trimmed whitespace and collapsed the legacy duplicated-backend form. A path either engine normalised differently meant probing a file nobody uses, concluding there was no SQLite data, and booting an empty Postgres. The resolution now lives in one module both require. 3. Re-running after a partial migration — the documented recovery — was refused unless the operator passed the destructive-sounding --force, because the half-written rows read as target data. An unfinished run of this same script is now recognised as a safe retry. 4. wait-for-db.sh verified readiness against its own default host (`postgres`) while knexfile's production block defaults to `db`. With NODE_ENV now baked in, a bare `docker run` without DB_HOST would have passed the readiness check against one host and then dialled another. The entrypoint exports the exact connection it verified. Compose sets DB_HOST explicitly and is unaffected. Verified: a Postgres holding only a seeded admin now loses to real SQLite data; a DATABASE_PATH with surrounding whitespace resolves to the identical file in both knexfile and the guard. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 6 — explicit-client bypasses, retry scope, cleanup (#1038) 1. An explicit DATABASE_CLIENT bypassed the unfinished-migration pin, because decideBootEngine honoured it first. docker-compose sets DATABASE_CLIENT=pg, so a failed migration would have restarted on a half-written Postgres on exactly the deployments that pin it. Worse in the other direction: with DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3, a SUCCESSFUL migration renames the source file, so the next start created a NEW, empty SQLite database and served that. The pin now outranks explicit pg (clearing the marker is the override), explicit sqlite3 is left alone since it already points at the data, and the migration refuses up front when the deployment pins anything other than pg. 2. The retry allowance was bound to the SQLite file, not to the target. An operator who repointed DB_HOST/DB_NAME between attempts could have replaced an unrelated populated database without --force. The pin records the target and the allowance only applies when it matches. 3. The printed rollback did not roll back: with data on both sides and no marker, the resolver still selects Postgres. It now spells out all three steps, including DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3. 4. A failure inside createPicpeak left a partial archive — plaintext hashes and credentials — in the caller-supplied temp dir, which that service deliberately does not clean. The export phase removes it on error. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 7 — pin bypass on direct start, real admins (#1038) 1. server.js only ran the engine resolver when DATABASE_CLIENT was unset, so a deployment that both bypasses the entrypoint (Kubernetes `command:`) AND pins DATABASE_CLIENT=pg never consulted the migration pin — the round-6 fix was unreachable on exactly that path, and a failed migration would have served a half-populated Postgres. The resolver now also runs whenever a pin file exists. 2. Round 5 excluded admin_users from Postgres occupancy to stop a seeded bootstrap admin counting as real data. That over-corrected: an install that has completed first-run setup but has no galleries yet has exactly one user-created row — an admin — so Postgres looked empty and, with a stale SQLite file present, the boot would switch away and the admin's credentials and configuration would disappear. core/001_init.js seeds must_change_password=true; setupService writes false once a human completes setup. The FLAG, not the table, distinguishes them, and a legacy NULL counts as a real admin. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a Postgres holding only the seeded row loses to real SQLite data, the same Postgres wins once setup is completed, and a server started directly with DATABASE_CLIENT=pg and a pin present comes up on SQLite with the warning. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 8 — reset admins, CLI config, JSON nulls (#1038) 1. must_change_password is mutable: resetAdminPassword() re-raises it on REAL accounts (userManagementService.js:474). Round 7's discriminator therefore read a gallery-less Postgres whose only admin had been reset as an untouched bootstrap seed — and with a stale SQLite file present, the boot would have switched away and hidden those live credentials. The rule is layered now: more than one admin, any admin that has logged in, or must_change_password false all count as use. Only core/001_init.js's exact leftovers — one admin, never logged in, still flagged — read as a seed. 2. The CLI read process.env directly but never loaded the configuration the child phases get through knexfile, so running it directly (or via `docker exec`, which does not inherit wait-for-db.sh's exports) failed the pre-flight checks even with valid settings in backend/.env or /run/secrets/db_password. Both sources are loaded up front now. 3. The migration's target check counted a seeded bootstrap admin as user data while probePgData classified the identical row as empty, so migrating into a previously-initialised-but-unused Postgres demanded --force. Same rule on both sides. 4. Cross-engine JSON handling is simpler and no longer lossy. SQLite keeps json columns as TEXT holding valid JSON and Postgres accepts JSON text directly, so the correct action is to pass them through untouched. Round 1 parsed then re-serialised them to undo a double-stringify; that round-tripped the JSON literal `null` into SQL NULL, changing data and breaking NOT NULL json columns. Not serialising at all fixes both. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a migrated install now carries json_typeof = null for a JSON null, object for a nested object, and boolean for a boolean — matching a native install exactly. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): close review round 9 — probe error classes, marker ordering (#1038) 1. probePgData() answered every failure with "Postgres has data". That is right for an unreachable server — the app cannot run on it either way, and diverting a healthy pg install to a stale SQLite file over a transient blip would be worse — but wrong for a server that answers and then fails the query, which is what a half-built or damaged schema looks like. That is not evidence of data, and reporting it as such booted the empty Postgres and hid a populated SQLite file: the exact failure this guard exists to prevent. Reachability is now established with SELECT 1 first, so the two cases get opposite answers: unreachable → leave the configured engine alone; reachable-but-uninspectable → unproven, and the SQLite side wins if it actually holds data. 2. The success marker was written after the SQLite file was renamed away. A failure in between — a full disk — left the source retired with no marker: the next attempt reported "No SQLite database", the in-progress pin stayed, and the operator never saw the rollback path. The marker is written first and updated with the retired filename once the rename succeeds, so a failure at any point leaves everything recoverable. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a reachable database whose admin_users table lacks the probed column now resolves to sqlite3 rather than hiding the data, while an unreachable host still resolves to pg. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): don't fail the migration on empty SQLite-only tables (#1038) Review round 10. The final verification flagged every source table missing from Postgres, regardless of whether it held rows — and SQLite-only tables do exist: initializeDatabase() creates an `events_new` scratch table and, when its legacy column copy throws, the catch swallows the error and leaves the empty table behind (db.js:236). The importer correctly skips tables Postgres does not have, so verification then reported a mismatch AFTER the data had already landed, exited 1, and left the install pinned to SQLite with no way to finish. An absent target table only matters if the source actually had rows. Empty ones are now listed and skipped. Reproduced both ways against a real PostgreSQL 15 with an events_new table present: without the fix the run ends in "ROW COUNTS DO NOT MATCH" and leaves the in-progress pin; with it, the table is reported as skipped, the migration completes and the pin is released. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): a completed migration overrides an implicit SQLite config (#1038) Review round 11. The migration allowed the one configuration it should have worried about most: DATABASE_CLIENT unset AND NODE_ENV not "production", which resolves to the development block — i.e. sqlite3. That is precisely the state the affected installs are in, since it is why they ended up on SQLite at all, so an operator can easily run the migration before fixing it. The script then renames the source database away, and the next start resolved to the implicit sqlite3, created a NEW empty database and served it — after reporting success. The success marker now overrides an IMPLICITLY resolved sqlite3 when Postgres settings are present, because the marker is durable proof of where the data actually went. An explicit DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3 still wins: that is the documented rollback. The script says something rather than refusing — refusing would block exactly the population this exists for. Reproduced with NODE_ENV and DATABASE_CLIENT both empty, against a real PostgreSQL 15: the migration completes, the source is renamed away, and the next boot resolves to pg with the data intact. Before this it resolved to sqlite3 and would have served an empty database. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * refactor(db): drop the dead reachability flag in probePgData (#1038) github-code-quality flagged `if (reachable)` as always true, and it is right: the unreachable branch returns, so everything below it runs only when the probe connected. The variable and the conditional were leftovers from a first draft that used a single catch for both failure classes. No behaviour change — the two error paths still return opposite answers. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): refuse to choose when both databases hold data (#1038) Review round 12. 1. An install that ran on PostgreSQL, lost NODE_ENV/DATABASE_CLIENT, and kept working on SQLite has REAL data on both sides: old rows in Postgres, newer ones in SQLite. The stranded-data rule only protected SQLite when Postgres was empty, so pulling this fix would have booted Postgres and hidden every gallery created since the switch — the exact failure this PR exists to prevent, in a variant I had not considered. A completed migration leaves a marker saying which side is current. Without one, two populated databases are a conflict: the boot stops and prints both targets, the two DATABASE_CLIENT values that resolve it, and the migration command that merges them. This is the only deliberate refusal in the change — guessing here would hide data AND split subsequent writes across two databases. 2. probePgData was handed knexConfig.connection even when knexfile had resolved to SQLite (a completed migration whose environment still says sqlite3), so node-postgres dialled its own localhost defaults instead of DB_HOST/DB_NAME — false "unreachable" diagnostics and a needless delay on every boot. The probe target is now built from the environment when the config is not pg. The conflict is honoured by all three entry points: the resolver exits 3 with an empty stdout, wait-for-db.sh stops the container, and server.js refuses to start. Two existing tests asserted that Postgres wins when both sides hold data. They encoded the pre-conflict assumption and described a state that cannot occur after a real migration (which always leaves a marker); both now pass the marker. Found while testing: the resolver's logger shim had no .error, so the conflict path threw, was swallowed by the fallback, and silently chose Postgres — the precise outcome this refuses to make. The shim is complete now. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): symmetric bootstrap rule, one resolved Postgres target (#1038) Review round 13. Both findings are consequences of earlier rounds. 1. The conflict rule added in round 12 counted an untouched SQLite bootstrap admin as data. core/001_init.js seeds one whenever ADMIN_PASSWORD is set — including into the accidental SQLite database — so a healthy Postgres install that had ever started once without NODE_ENV would have had a seeded-only SQLite file beside it, been declared a both-populated conflict, and REFUSED TO BOOT. The bootstrap discrimination is applied on both sides now; a setup-completed or logged-in admin still counts as real use on either. 2. The CLI's child phases inherited whichever knexfile block NODE_ENV selected. The development block defaults Postgres to localhost/postgres/photo_sharing, production to db/picpeak/picpeak — and this script is explicitly meant to run with NODE_ENV unset. With DB_USER/DB_NAME left to defaults it would therefore have migrated into `photo_sharing`, after which following the script's own advice to set NODE_ENV=production pointed the app at an empty `picpeak`. The target is resolved once, with production defaults, and passed explicitly to every phase — so the block knexfile happens to pick can no longer decide which database the data lands in. The pin and success marker record that same resolved identity. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a live Postgres beside a seeded-only SQLite file now boots pg rather than refusing, flipping that admin to setup-completed restores the conflict, and a migration records localhost:7102/picpeak_r13b as its target rather than a defaulted guess. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): one Postgres identity everywhere; protect the credentials file (#1038) Review round 14. Three of the six findings were the same defect as round 13's, surfacing through paths that fix did not cover: the connection used to PROBE or MIGRATE could differ from the one the application then OPENS, because knexfile's development block points Postgres at localhost/postgres/photo_sharing while production uses db/picpeak/picpeak. 1. server.js exported only DATABASE_CLIENT=pg after the resolver decided, so knexfile filled in host/user/database from whichever block NODE_ENV selected. With SQLite already retired by a migration, that meant opening an empty database. The whole connection is pinned now. 2. Two defaults existed for DB_HOST: wait-for-db.sh resolves and exports `postgres`, knexfile's production block says `db`. Since the entrypoint exports its value, `postgres` is what a running container actually uses — so a `docker exec` migration, which inherits neither, has to agree with that, not with the default that is only reached when the entrypoint did not run. 3. The migration's Postgres phases inherited an unset NODE_ENV and therefore the development block, which ignores DB_SSL entirely — a managed Postgres requiring TLS could never be migrated into. The phases run with production semantics now. 4. core/001_init.js writes data/ADMIN_CREDENTIALS.txt, and that data directory belongs to the SOURCE install. Bootstrapping the Postgres schema replaced the operator's real credentials file with ones for a temporary admin the import immediately discards. The file is preserved across the phase, including when it fails. 5. The boot line described knexConfig, so an install redirected to Postgres by a migration marker still logged "Database engine: sqlite (...)", contradicting the warning printed one line earlier. 6. On a both-populated conflict resolveBootEngine returns client:null, and both migration runners told the operator their data was in "null" and to set DATABASE_CLIENT=null. They now present the two real choices. Verified against a real PostgreSQL 15: a migrated install started directly with NODE_ENV unset now logs `postgres (localhost:7102/picpeak_r14)` and opens it, where before it would have gone to the development block's photo_sharing. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * refactor(db): resolve the PostgreSQL target in exactly one place (#1038) Rounds 13 and 14 both traced back to the same thing, each time through a caller the previous fix had not covered: three different defaults existed for the same connection. knexfile development : localhost / postgres / photo_sharing knexfile production : db / picpeak / picpeak wait-for-db.sh : postgres / picpeak / picpeak (and it EXPORTS them) So a process that probed or migrated against one could hand over to a process that opened another. Patching each caller was not converging — the guard, then the CLI's child phases, then server.js — so this deletes the divergence instead. `src/utils/pgConnection.js` now owns the resolution and knexfile's development and production blocks both derive from it, as does the engine guard. Same shape as the earlier sqlitePath.js extraction, for the same reason. The database NAME is what made this dangerous: a wrong host or user fails loudly at connect time, while a wrong name connects fine and presents an empty installation. BEHAVIOUR CHANGE: with DATABASE_CLIENT=pg and no DB_* variables, a non-production environment now resolves to postgres/picpeak/picpeak instead of localhost/postgres/photo_sharing. Deployments are unaffected — compose sets these explicitly and wait-for-db.sh exports them — but a local machine running Postgres bare now needs DB_HOST=localhost DB_USER=postgres DB_NAME=photo_sharing (or DATABASE_CLIENT=sqlite3, which is what backend/.env already uses). The failure mode of getting this wrong is a refused connection, not a silently empty database. Side effect worth having: DB_SSL is now honoured whatever NODE_ENV says, so the managed-Postgres case is fixed at the root rather than by forcing production semantics onto the migration's child phases. The test block keeps its own photo_sharing_test default — isolation is the point there. Verified: every block plus the guard resolve identically from the same environment; explicit DB_* still wins; production's pool tuning is preserved; and a full SQLite → PostgreSQL migration with NODE_ENV unset lands in the right database with JSON shapes intact. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): two more components that guessed the database instead of asking (#1038) Both found while sweeping for copies of the connection defaults. Checked in detail first — one of my suspicions about them was wrong. scripts/set-admin-password.js hand-rolled its own knex config while all four sibling scripts (reset-admin-password, create-admin, show-admin-credentials, reset-admin-mfa) use the application's connection. Two consequences: - it read DB_CLIENT, a variable nothing else in this codebase sets, so it defaulted to Postgres and could not work on a SQLite install at all; - it defaulted to database `picpeak_dev`, a name no other component uses. It now uses `require('../src/database/db')` like its siblings, so it follows whatever engine the install actually runs on. Timestamps are written as ISO strings because it reaches SQLite now, where raw Date objects are the documented landmine. NOT changed: the script's "all existing sessions have been invalidated" notice is accurate — auth.js compares token iat against password_changed_at — and it deliberately leaves must_change_password alone, which is right for an operator choosing a password rather than being issued one. routes/adminSystem.js re-derived three things the live connection already knows, and each could disagree with it: - the engine, from DATABASE_CLIENT || 'sqlite3' — so a Postgres install without an explicit DATABASE_CLIENT took the SQLite branch; - the Postgres database, from DB_NAME || 'picpeak'; - the SQLite file, from a hardcoded ../../data/photo_sharing.db that ignored DATABASE_PATH entirely. All three now come from db.client.config, with pg_database_size(current_database()). Verified: set-admin-password works on SQLite (new hash verifies, old rejected) and still on PostgreSQL; and on a SQLite install with a custom DATABASE_PATH the size logic reports the real database (1,748,992 bytes) where the old code reported a different file entirely (1,851,392) — or 0 where that path does not exist. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM * fix(db): bind the migration marker to its target; fix a phantom table (#1038) Review round 15. 1. The marker records `host:port/database`, but only its EXISTENCE was checked. Repoint DB_NAME or DB_HOST at a different, empty PostgreSQL after migrating and the marker would vouch for that one too — booting it, presenting an empty installation, and suppressing the SQLite fallback while the real data sits in the recorded target and the renamed rollback copy. The marker is compared against the current connection now, and a mismatch stops the boot with both targets named and the two ways out. 2. `incoming_invoices` is not a table — supplier documents live in `inbound_documents` (core migration 124). Both occupancy lists skip tables that do not exist, so those records were silently not protecting anything: an install whose only remaining data was inbound documents could be switched away from, or overwritten without --force. Verified every other name in the lists against the live schema at the same time. Verified: a marker naming picpeak_original with picpeak_mk configured refuses with exit 3 and prints both; making them agree boots pg. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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671c4dbd56 |
fix(events): make event_date/expires_at nullable on SQLite (#1029) (#1035)
Clearing a gallery's expiration failed on every SQLite install with
SQLITE_CONSTRAINT: NOT NULL constraint failed: events.expires_at
surfacing in the admin UI as "Failed to update event".
Migration 061 added the event_require_event_date / event_require_expiration
settings and dropped the NOT NULL on both columns — but only for Postgres. It
skipped SQLite on the premise that "SQLite doesn't enforce NOT NULL as
strictly", which is untrue, so "never expires" was never reachable there. The
#426 work that allows clearing the expiration on edit therefore never worked
on SQLite either.
Migration 174 finishes 061 for SQLite. Knex implements .alter() on SQLite by
recreating the table; migration 073 already does that on `events`, so the path
is well-trodden. Postgres is skipped — it was handled in 061 and .alter() there
would needlessly rewrite a column that is already correct.
The test asserts against the real engine (the Jest harness runs SQLite) and
reproduces the reporter's exact error without the migration.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168gubtwYYacJv8weAjy8DM
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>
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8e3573788b |
feat(downloads): per-gallery download resolutions (#858) (#1022)
Clients who need smaller files no longer make the photographer re-export. Two capabilities, both off by default. STANDARD RESOLUTION — the size a gallery hands out for every ordinary download (single, selected, download-all). Global default in Settings, overridable per gallery with the NULL=inherit tri-state. The pre-built download-all zip is built AT the standard resolution, so changing it invalidates those archives, including a fan-out to inheriting galleries. RESOLUTION PICKER — opt-in modal letting guests choose a different size. Custom archives are built as a DB-backed job the client polls, never cached. The picker never offers a size above the standard, and Original reappears only when the admin explicitly allows it. Resize is fit:'inside' + withoutEnlargement — aspect preserved, never upscaled — applied before the watermark, since the mark is sized relative to its input. Three rounds of external review hardened this: job archives are bound to the requester's visibility scope and re-validated at delivery, the streamed download-all path applies the cap, queue admission is bounded, and rejected resolutions no longer inflate download stats. Closes #858. |
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2e495d7c48 |
feat(transfers): add PicTransfer — cross-event file transfers (#998)
Closes #997. Send original files from any event as a token-protected download link, with an optional client-upload channel. Strictly opt-in behind a new `transfers` feature flag, default OFF. Migrations 170-172 (transfers, transfer_files, transfer_extra_files, transfer_uploads, transfer_recipients, transfer_downloads, default settings and two email templates) — all hasTable/hasColumn-guarded and idempotent, with destructive statements confined to down(). Backend: transferService (CRUD, 256-bit download token, 6-char upload token, cross-event ZIP streaming of originals), admin CRUD routes, and two public token routes. transferCleanupService runs an hourly retention sweep; source-event photos are never touched. All three routers fail closed via requireFeatureFlag('transfers'). Review closed two ownership blockers, both the same root cause — permissions used where ownership was needed: - photoIds arrived from the request body and were validated only for existence, so a scoped admin could bundle any event's originals and hand them out through the public download token. filterOwnedPhotoIds now resolves ids to their events and gates them through filterOwnedEventIds, on both the create and add-files paths. - The transfer list was unscoped and carried each row's download token, so any admin with events.view could read another's token and fetch their originals. The list is now scoped by created_by, the token/url fields are stripped from the list payload, and a single router.use('/:id', requireTransferOwnership) covers all twelve /:id routes, 404ing foreign and missing alike. The admin photo picker filters its event list to the same rule, so the UI stops offering picks the API would discard. Fork-PR workflows had not been approved since the fix commits, so the PR's green checks were stale against the pre-fix head. Verified by dispatching tests.yml against the actual head: backend and frontend both green. Follow-up: neither ownership guard has a regression test yet. Co-authored-by: Luca-Timo <[email protected]> |
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165cebdb5c |
feat(accounting): re-bill proof attachment, CRM panel & hours↔re-bills cross-add (#979)
Closes #866. Three features, all behind the `incomingInvoices` feature flag: 1. Attach the stored supplier proof PDF to the client-invoice email when a captured invoice is re-billed/passed through, as a SEPARATE attachment so invoice immutability holds. Global default (off), per-customer tri-state override, and per-file selection in a new Send dialog. A missing proof at issue time stamps inbound_documents.proof_attach_error rather than silently dropping, and never blocks the send. Proof filename is a configurable template with {INVOICE} {SUPPLIER} {YEAR} {MONTH} {SEQ}/{SEQ:0Nd} tokens. 2. Re-bills & passthrough panel under CRM → Customer, grouped Open/Sent/Paid with status derived from the linked invoice lifecycle rather than a duplicated column. 3. Cross-add dialog rolling open hours and open re-bills into one invoice, symmetric from both entry points. The two stay distinct, contiguous line groups — never merged into shared line items. Migration 169 is additive, hasColumn-guarded and idempotent. Review (two rounds) closed two concerns: - Storno stranding: nothing cleared inbound_documents.billed_invoice_id when a covering invoice was cancelled, so a Storno'd re-bill showed as Open in the new panel while every billing path filters on that column being NULL — the supplier cost could never be re-billed. releaseRebillsForCancelledInvoice now detaches the linkage on both invoice-cancel paths, with a regression test on the issued-cancel path. - Permission gating: the new controls rendered on data presence alone while their endpoints require accounting.view / accounting.manage / customers.edit. Now gated at both the query and render layers. Known follow-up: two cross-add counter queries are gated on a permission their endpoint does not check (HoursSection.tsx:174, CustomerCrmPanels.tsx:270) — degrades safely, one line each. |
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7c0c0a5b7f |
fix(security): enforce project ownership on project + project-email routes (GHSA-wrg5, GHSA-93x4) (#960)
* fix(security): enforce project ownership (GHSA-wrg5, GHSA-93x4) Project routes authorized on generic events.view / events.edit with NO ownership check, so an editor-like admin could enumerate, read, update and aggregate projects belonging to other admins' events. The project email endpoints keyed on an email_queue id alone — any admin with events.view / email.send could preview, resend, cancel or retry ANY queued mail by walking ids. The earlier 'needs a migration, deferred' assessment was wrong in one direction and right in another: ownership IS derivable transitively via events.project_id -> events.created_by, but only for projects that already have a linked event. A brand-new EMPTY project has no derivable owner, which is exactly where the create -> attach flow starts. So migration 167 adds projects.created_by (backfilled from the single linked event owner, skipping ambiguous multi-owner projects) and createProject finally persists the adminId it was already being passed. - ownedProjectIds(): union of the stored owner and the transitive path, so pre-167 rows and new empty projects both resolve. Reads created_by defensively so an instance that hasn't run 167 falls back to the transitive rule instead of throwing. - requireProjectOwnership on detail/update/attach-event/attach-quote/ attach-contract/overview; list filtered by an id allowlist (empty array means 'owns nothing' and must return no rows, hence null-vs-[] care). - POST /:id/events also validates the INCOMING eventId — owning the project is not enough, or an editor could pull a foreign event in and read its rolled-up documents via /:id/overview. - Queued-email routes scoped via email_queue.event_id. CRM document mail has event_id NULL and no ownable parent here, so a scoped caller is denied rather than guessed into access. 404 (not 403) so it isn't an id oracle. Note: adminEmail.js:315/332 let any email.view/edit admin archive or delete any email_queue row — the same class, pre-existing and outside these two advisories. Left untouched and reported rather than silently widened. * fix(security): codex round 2 — make the stored project owner authoritative (GHSA-wrg5) The first predicate union'd 'any linked event I can see' with the stored owner, which opened two holes: - A project owned by admin B containing ONE legacy ownerless event became readable by every admin — and /:id/overview aggregates B's other events, invoices and emails, so a single legacy event exposed the whole project. - Migration 167 deliberately leaves multi-owner (ambiguous) projects NULL rather than guessing an owner. A NULL owner was then treated as 'everyone's', so exactly those mixed projects became globally accessible. Now: the stored created_by wins outright, and a project without a usable stored owner only derives access when EVERY linked event is accessible (and at least one exists). A created_by pointing at a hard-deleted admin degrades to 'no usable owner' so the project falls back to its events instead of being locked away — no ON DELETE SET NULL migration needed. A project with neither a usable owner nor linked events stays super_admin-only: failing closed beats failing open, and a super_admin can reassign it. Also returns a knex SUBQUERY rather than a materialised id list, so a large project count can't hit the driver's bind-parameter limit. * fix(security): codex round 3 — enforce deal-lineage ownership on project attach (GHSA-wrg5) requireProjectOwnership vets only the DESTINATION project, while attaching a quote or contract cascades through linkDealToProject — which re-points every event the deal produced into that project. An editor could therefore create an empty project of their own, attach another admin's quote, and pull that admin's events (plus the invoices, emails and gallery that roll up with them) into a project they own and can read via /:id/overview. The single-customer guard did not stand in the way: an unassigned project ADOPTS the deal's customer rather than rejecting it. linkDealToProject now refuses to move lineage events the actor cannot own, and assignDocument cascades BEFORE stamping the document so a refused attach leaves nothing half-applied (the old order committed the foreign document into the caller's project and only then declined the cascade). The quote/contract create+update paths, which reach the same cascade with an arbitrary project_id, thread their adminId through as well; isSuperAdmin() resolves the role for them and fails closed when it cannot. Events are the only ownership signal a deal carries — quotes and contracts have no created_by in this schema — so a lineage that produced no event still cannot be attributed. That is a property of the CRM model, noted in the code. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me * docs(security): drop the stale ownership JSDoc left by the rebase (GHSA-wrg5) Rebasing onto main (which had gained scopeEventsQuery from #957) replayed the round-1 doc block above round-2's replacement, leaving a comment that describes the ORIGINAL union rule — "a project is the caller's when … it has at least one linked event they own" — directly above the code that deliberately no longer does that. That union is the hole round 2 closed; a comment asserting it is worse than none. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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da855cfef9 |
fix(security): scope dashboard stats/analytics/activity to the caller's events (GHSA-c2jj, gqx7, jhcf) (#958)
* fix(security): scope dashboard endpoints to the caller's events (GHSA-c2jj, gqx7, jhcf)
/dashboard/stats, /analytics and /activity are gated only by analytics.view,
which the editor role holds — but the events LIST restricts editors to their
own rows (adminEvents/crud.js: roleName === 'editor' -> created_by =
admin.id). So an editor saw instance-wide totals, and via /analytics
topGalleries other admins' gallery NAMES and SLUGS (the public gallery URL
component), for events invisible to them everywhere else.
- stats: all 10 aggregates scoped (events by id, photos/access_logs by
event_id).
- analytics: all 8 series/aggregates scoped, including topGalleries. The
external tracker device breakdown reports instance-wide data with no event
filter, so a scoped caller falls through to the access_logs heuristic
instead, which IS scoped.
- activity: feed scoped. activity_logs.event_id is nullable and the join is a
leftJoin, so system-level rows (logins, settings changes) are deliberately
excluded for a scoped caller — those are precisely the cross-admin actions
the advisory is about.
Scoping keys on 'editor' to mirror the events list exactly, so the admin
role's dashboard is unchanged. filterOwnedEventIds uses the broader
'!== super_admin' rule; the two conventions disagree in this codebase and
matching the list is the no-regression choice.
* fix(security): codex round 2 — fix activity misattribution, scope via subquery (GHSA-jhcf, c2jj, gqx7)
- expenseService passed adminId as logActivity's THIRD positional parameter,
which is eventId — so admin ids were being written into
activity_logs.event_id. The /activity scoping filter trusts that column, and
admin/event id sequences overlap, so a foreign admin's expense metadata could
surface under an editor's event. All 11 calls now pass null for eventId and
the admin as the actor, which is what they meant.
- Dashboard scoping now uses a SUBQUERY instead of pluck()+whereIn. An editor
owning more events than the driver's bind-parameter limit (~999 SQLite,
65535 Postgres) would have turned all three endpoints into 500s once each id
became a placeholder; below the limit it still re-sent the full list for each
of the ~10 aggregates per request.
Note: two billInboundNow() calls also end in ', adminId)' but have an unrelated
signature — verified untouched.
* fix(security): codex round 3 — correct legacy accounting activity rows (GHSA-jhcf)
expenseService called logActivity(type, metadata, adminId), but logActivity's
third positional parameter is eventId. Every expense / incoming-invoice entry
therefore stored the ACTING ADMIN'S ID in activity_logs.event_id.
Round 2 scoped the activity feed with
`WHERE activity_logs.event_id IN (SELECT id FROM events WHERE created_by = me)`,
which does nothing about the rows already on disk. Admin ids and event ids are
small integers from the same range, so on any upgraded instance an editor who
owns the event whose id happens to equal another admin's id is served that
admin's accounting activity, verbatim metadata included — GHSA-jhcf, still
live. Migration 168 re-attributes those rows (event_id holds exactly the actor
id that was lost) and then clears event_id so the scope predicate can no longer
match them. All ten activity types are emitted by expenseService and nothing
else, so no row with a genuine event_id is touched.
Also: the round-2 rewrite passed `{ type: 'admin', id: adminId }`
unconditionally, which stored actor_type='admin' with a null id for the
automated mailbox intake (emailIntakeService calls recordInboundDocument with
no adminId). adminActor() restores 'system' attribution for those.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me
---------
Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>
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08ff9f20e7 |
feat(gallery): per-event toggle to hide the logo on the password page (#894) (#928)
* feat(gallery): per-event toggle to hide the logo on the password page (#894) * fix(admin): harden login_logo_visible coercion for SQLite + string booleans (#894) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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2f05fcc39d |
feat(gallery): reveal mode — hide gallery from guests until reveal (#838) (#856)
* feat(gallery): reveal mode — hide gallery from guests until reveal (#838) Guests can upload during the event but see no photos until the host reveals the gallery, manually ("Reveal now") or at a scheduled time. - migration 165: events.reveal_mode / reveal_at / revealed_at. Effective visibility is computed at REQUEST time (reveal_at <= now opens the gate exactly on schedule); the minutely scheduler only stamps revealed_at durably and emits a gallery.revealed workflow trigger - server-side enforcement in gallery.js: /photos returns the event shell with photos: [] + hidden_until_reveal for plain guests; image/download/stats endpoints 403 with GALLERY_HIDDEN (photo IDs are sequential — listing-only gating would be probeable); feedback-summary gated too. Slideshow tokens (surprise beamer), client access and the admin preview bypass; the guest upload route stays open - admin: reveal toggle + optional scheduled datetime next to the guest upload settings, status line and "Reveal now" button on the overview; re-enabling the toggle clears revealed_at so a gallery can re-hide - guest UI: upload-only view (hero, friendly message, scheduled time, upload button) for every layout; i18n for all 8 locales - timestamps written as ISO strings — the SQLite driver stringifies raw Date objects into garbage; ISO round-trips on both engines - 14 integration tests over minted gallery/slideshow/client/admin tokens * fix(gallery): reveal/re-arm semantics + upload button i18n key (#838) - "Reveal now" also clears a pending reveal_at: the schedule is consumed, so the full-form admin save can't accidentally re-hide a revealed gallery with a stale future date - setting a FUTURE reveal_at on a revealed gallery re-arms hiding — the one intentional way to re-hide without double-toggling the mode - guest upload button uses the existing upload.uploadPhotos key (gallery.uploadPhotos never existed; the button showed EN everywhere) * fix(gallery): close reveal bypasses from review round 1 (#838) - the hero-derivative route and the secure-images token-mint + secure-download routes are now reveal-gated: hero serves a 1920px derivative of ANY sequential photo id and secure tokens fetch originals — both were open bypasses while hidden. blockHiddenGallery moved to utils/revealMode.js and shared - customer-portal tokens (via:'customer', no accessLevel) now bypass reveal mode — they are the host/customer, not a guest, and were getting the upload-only view - an open hidden guest view refetches exactly at reveal_at plus a 60s fallback poll, so the gallery appears without a manual reload - gallery.revealed added to the workflow editor's trigger picker so the advertised notification hook is reachable in the UI - migration 165 guards each column independently (partial-state safe) * fix(gallery): reveal round 2 — remaining bypass surfaces + lifecycle edges (#838) - legacy /api/images router reveal-gated (view, secure-token + signed-url minting), and the signed-URL SERVE path re-checks hidden state via a backward-compatible bypass flag in the token payload - secure-image tokens record revealBypass at mint and are re-validated at serve time — a re-hide kills in-flight guest tokens within the request, while slideshow/client tokens keep working - OG metadata and the unauthenticated /og cover fall back to the brand logo / 404 while hidden — no hero-photo spoiler for social crawlers - photo-feedback GET/POST reveal-gated (sequential ids were enumerable); /my-feedback returns the empty back-compat shape (rows leak filename + storage path) - the reveal scheduler skips drafts — no premature stamp/notification for unpublished galleries - emitWorkflowEvent gains an additive dedupSuffix; both reveal emitters pass the reveal timestamp so a re-hidden gallery's second reveal fires workflows again instead of deduping into silence * fix(gallery): reveal round 3 — schedule consumption + two-way client sync (#838) - the scheduler now consumes reveal_at when stamping (matching "Reveal now"), and re-arming via a partial API update clears a stale PAST schedule — previously {reveal_mode:true} without reveal_at could instantly re-open the gate through the leftover date - /photos exposes reveal_armed so an open VISIBLE gallery keeps a 60s poll while the mode is on — a re-hide now propagates to open clients in both directions, not just hidden→visible Codex round-3 claim about timestamp-without-timezone drift on non-UTC Postgres was verified FALSE: knex's table.timestamp() creates timestamptz on PG (confirmed via information_schema on a live install), which stores absolute instants regardless of server TZ. --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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3d6c9848dc |
feat(feedback): emoji reactions on photos (#839) (#855)
* feat(feedback): emoji reactions on photos (#839) Per-photo emoji reactions from a fixed curated set (❤️ 😂 😍 👏 🎉), one reaction per guest per photo — same emoji toggles off, another switches in place. Stored as feedback_type='reaction' rows with per-guest scoping identical to likes (guest_id when present, device hash otherwise). - migration 164: allow_reactions toggle (default on, still gated by the opt-in feedback_enabled master switch), photo_feedback.reaction value column, denormalized photos.reaction_count - emoji whitelist enforced in the route validator AND the service (shared constants/reactions.js, mirrored in the frontend) - per-emoji tallies + my_feedback.reaction in the photo feedback endpoint; hidden-by-moderator reactions leave all counts - reactions ride the existing rate limiting (like-tier), guest identity modes, and moderation actions; long + pivot exports carry the emoji - gallery: reaction bar in the photo feedback panel (grid lightbox); admin: allow_reactions toggle next to likes, analytics tile, create/duplicate event paths - i18n for all 8 locales; 9 service-level tests * fix(feedback): reach reactions without comments; numeric analytics totals (#839) - the lightbox feedback-panel toggle was gated on allow_comments only — with comments off the new reaction bar was unreachable; the gate now opens for comments OR reactions - the analytics summary now coerces Postgres string counts to numbers: total_feedback concatenated instead of adding ("00006") * fix(feedback): harden reactions from review round 1 (#839) - per-emoji tallies are gated on show_feedback_to_guests — with sharing off a guest sees only their own selection, no aggregate counts - reaction toggle/switch operate on the guest-scoped row SET, so rows duplicated by the (like-parity) check-then-insert race collapse on the next interaction instead of counting twice - rate-limit defaults merge UNDER the persisted settings object — stored rows predating the reaction key otherwise dropped it to the generic 100/h fallback - optimistic revert uses the pre-mutation value via mutation context; the onError closure sees the post-optimistic render, so the old revert froze the wrong state on failed toggles * fix(feedback): review round 2 — hide reaction_count with sharing off, admin list shows emoji (#839) - summary.reaction_count is gated on show_feedback_to_guests like the per-emoji map, keeping the "no aggregates while sharing is off" promise consistent - the admin feedback list renders the reaction emoji on reaction rows and the type filter gains a Reactions option (7 locales; es has no types block and falls back to EN defaults) * fix(feedback): register reaction activity types with translated labels (#839) photo_reaction / guest_feedback_reaction are logged by the submission paths but were absent from the frontend activity-type union and the admin.activities label maps — the recent-activity feed would have shown the raw identifiers. All 8 locales. * feat(feedback): reactions in guest CRM and the premium gallery layout (#839) - guest CRM: per-guest reaction counts in the list aggregation and a Reacted tab (photo grid with emoji badges) + stats card in the guest detail modal; picks/aggregate/exports stay selection-only by design - premium layout: its own yet-another-react-lightbox now gets a fixed reaction-bar overlay (per-photo fetch, optimistic switch) — reactions were otherwise unreachable in this layout since it bypasses the shared PhotoLightbox - allowReactions threaded through the layout feedbackOptions; guest i18n keys for the 7 locales that carry the guests block * fix(feedback): portal the premium reaction bar to document.body (#839) Inside the layout tree an ancestor stacking context (framer-motion transforms) painted the bar under yarl's body-level portal — visible but unclickable, every tap landed on the slide image. As a direct body child the z-index 10000 genuinely wins over yarl's 9999. Verified by clicking through in the running app. --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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e8dad4b40d |
feat(slideshow): guest-scannable share-link QR overlay (#848)
* feat(slideshow): guest-scannable share-link QR overlay (#837) - Global settings (Settings → Slideshow): slideshow_qr_enabled/position/ opacity/size — same option shape and cascade as the watermark. - Per-event tri-state show_qr (migration 163): NULL inherits the global, true/false force on/off; editable in the per-event slideshow card. - State endpoint ships the QR as a PNG data URI (cached per share URL — the 3s projector poll never re-encodes), so the kiosk needs no QR lib and no extra authenticated request. - Kiosk renders the QR in a white padded corner box so it stays scannable on any photo. - i18n: en + de (the slideshow namespace has no other locales yet). * fix(slideshow): persist per-event QR override, show QR on empty shows, bound the QR cache (codex review of #848) - OverviewTab never passed event.show_qr into the settings card (and the Event type lacked the field), so a stored true/false override always displayed as 'inherit' and the next save silently reset it to NULL. - The QR overlay was nested inside the photos.length > 0 branch — an empty or category-filtered live gallery showed only 'Waiting for photos', exactly when 'scan to add the first photos' matters most. Now rendered for any running show. - slideshowQrCache: insertion-order eviction at 50 entries — rotated tokens and past events no longer accumulate base64 PNGs forever. * fix(slideshow): derive the QR origin from the kiosk request when the base is loopback (codex review of #848, round 2) With the compose-default FRONTEND_URL=http://localhost:3000 (or no base configured) the overlay QR sent scanning phones to their own localhost. The state poll comes from the kiosk browser itself, so its Host header + protocol (trust proxy is configured) are exactly the public origin guests can reach — used whenever the configured base is missing or loopback. Mirrors the ?origin= fallback #847 uses for the admin-side QR downloads. * fix(slideshow): kiosk passes its origin for the QR fallback (codex review of #848, round 3) req.get('host') is not the browser origin behind the standard proxies — frontend/nginx.conf forwards $host with the port stripped, so a compose LAN deployment on :3000 encoded port 80. The kiosk now sends window.location.origin with the session/state calls (validated server-side, same pattern as #847's admin downloads); the Host-derived origin remains as second fallback. * fix(slideshow): reject loopback kiosk origins, throttle QR regeneration per event (codex review of #848, confirmation round) - A loopback window.location.origin from the kiosk is no more guest-reachable than the loopback base it would replace — rejected; when no reachable URL remains the overlay is suppressed entirely (no QR beats a QR that sends phones to their own localhost). New test pins the suppression. - The QR cache is keyed by event id with a 60s regeneration throttle: the origin is caller-influenced when the base is loopback, so URL-keyed caching let a slideshow-link holder force a fresh QRCode.toDataURL per request via unique origins — a cheap CPU exhaustion path. Encode rate is now bounded per event regardless of input. QR margin also raised to the 4-module spec quiet zone, matching #847. * fix(slideshow): never serve a mismatched cached QR + single-flight encoding (codex review of #848, final round) - A slideshow-token holder could poison the projector's QR: an attacker-origin entry cached per event was served to the legitimate kiosk for the rest of the throttle window. A cached artifact is now only served when its URL matches the request; mismatches inside the window suppress the overlay briefly instead of showing foreign content. - Cold-cache stampede closed: concurrent polls share one in-flight encode promise instead of each scheduling a 512px render. Rejected from the same round (false positive, verified empirically): the loopback regex claim — /^https?:\/\/(localhost|127\.)/ matches 'http://localhost:3000' and '127.0.0.1:port' just fine (no trailing slash required), and the suppression test runs green. |
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7f7d38a57f |
fix(oidc): security + robustness hardening from codex review rounds 1-2
Round 1: - bind SSO identities to (external_issuer, external_subject): OIDC only guarantees sub uniqueness within an issuer, so a sub-only lookup let a newly configured IdP's user inherit an old IdP's admin account on subject collision; migration 162 gains external_issuer + composite unique index (unmerged migration, edited in place) - fetch UserInfo (with sub cross-check) when the ID token carries no email — spec-compliant providers may serve email/profile claims only there; ID-token claims win on merge - allowlist /admin/sso/login + /callback in maintenance mode, or SSO-only (JIT) admins are locked out exactly when they need in - strip reserved keys (oidc_client_secret, setup_token) from BOTH generic settings reads (GET / and GET /:type) Round 2: - redirect_uri prefers API_URL (the API's public origin — where the state cookie lives); final redirects absolute to the frontend base; login button builds its URL via buildResourceUrl — split-origin deployments (absolute VITE_API_URL) work end to end - PUT /sso validates the MERGED resulting state (partial update cannot blank issuer/client while enabled=true survives; enabling requires a derivable redirect URI) - openid scope forced into oidc_scopes on save - discovery-cache key includes a secret fingerprint (multi-worker secret rotation) - email→admin linking claims the row atomically (conditional update on external_subject IS NULL) — concurrent first-time callbacks with the same verified email but different subjects can't both authenticate Tests: mock IdP gains userinfo endpoint + email-via-userinfo-only mode; new cases pin the userinfo merge and issuer-collision non-inheritance; redirect assertions updated for absolute URLs. 13/13. |
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ed5fc5ad5c |
feat(auth): OIDC SSO for admin users — phase 1 (#798)
Authorization-code + PKCE against a single configurable IdP via
openid-client v5, with JIT provisioning. Verified end-to-end against a
real Keycloak 26 (realm + confidential client + verified-email user):
settings → discovery test → login button → Keycloak → dashboard.
Backend:
- migration 162: admin_users.auth_provider ('local' default) +
external_subject, composite unique index
- oidcService: settings-driven config (client secret AES-256-GCM at
rest, mfaService pattern, OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY fallback JWT_SECRET),
cached discovery, sub-based identity binding — email linking of
existing admins only with email_verified=true; JIT behind
oidc_autoprovision with configurable default role and an unusable
random password hash
- GET /api/auth/admin/sso/login + /callback: state/nonce/PKCE verifier
cross the redirect in a 10-min signed httpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie;
the callback reuses the local login's session establishment
(completeAdminLogin split into establishAdminSession + JSON wrapper)
so SSO sessions are identical downstream; every failure lands on
/admin/login?sso_error=<key> as a translated toast
- dedicated /admin/settings/sso GET/PUT/test endpoints (secret
write-only, redacted to a set-flag; registered ABOVE the generic
/:type matcher which would shadow them); oidc_client_secret added to
the reserved keys stripped from generic settings upserts
- public settings expose only oidc_enabled + oidc_button_label for the
login page
Frontend:
- Settings → Single Sign-On (OIDC) tab: issuer/client/secret, scopes,
autoprovision + default role, button label, enable toggle, redirect
URI copy box, server-side discovery test
- login page: SSO button (custom label) when enabled; sso_error query
param surfaced as translated toasts; EN+DE i18n
Tests: 11 integration cases against an in-process mock IdP (real
discovery/JWKS/PKCE/ID-token validation) — JIT on/off, sub-vs-email
binding, unverified-email rejection, deactivated admin, missing/forged
state cookie, nonce tamper, secret encryption round-trip, disabled 404.
MFA is delegated to the IdP on the SSO path; local login stays
available as break-glass. Role-claim mapping and logout-to-IdP follow
in phase 2/3.
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7eb6357b4a |
feat(setup): event-types step in first-run wizard + un-hardcode event type deps (#800)
Fresh installs can now shape the event-type catalog during the setup wizard — rename, delete or replace the seeded defaults while nothing references them. On existing installs system types stay protected. - New wizard step between features and config: edit name/URL prefix, remove, or add types; defaults shown as recommendations - setup_wizard_completed app setting (migration 161): seeded true when an admin already exists, false on fresh installs; POST /api/setup/ complete (adminAuth) flips it when the wizard finishes - deleteEventType: system types deletable only while the flag is unset; in-use check extended to quotes; per-type reminder template (event_reminder_<slug>) is deleted with the type - reminder-template self-heal no longer resurrects templates for slugs removed from the catalog - v1 API event creation validates event_type against the live catalog instead of a hardcoded whitelist (custom types were rejected; the never-seeded 'family' slug is no longer silently accepted) - contract→event conversion resolves the event type via crm_default_event_type / resolveDefaultEventType instead of hardcoding 'wedding' (resolveDefaultEventType moved from quoteService to eventTypeService for reuse) |
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a4b4485d32 |
fix(categories): address PR #790 review — event ownership, migration renumber, nits
- 🔴 Event ownership: GET /event/:eventId and DELETE /reorder/:eventId now use requireEventOwnership; POST /reorder (event_id in body) gets the equivalent inline check (super_admin bypasses; others limited to owned/ownerless events). New test covers a settings.edit-holding non-super_admin blocked (403) on all three per-event routes. - 🔴 Migration renumber: 158→159, 159→160 (upstream #788 already took 158); headers + the test's require path updated. - 🟢 Nits: stale inline "Drag the arrows" fallback → "Use the arrows" (matches en.json; control is click-only); invalid bg-accent-dark/150 → bg-accent-dark. |
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4698402b54 |
feat(categories): per-event category ordering — global default + override (#782)
Order a gallery's categories in the flow of the day instead of A–Z. Two layers, resolved per event: per-event override > global default > name. - migration 158: photo_categories.display_order (global default), backfilled from the current alphabetical order so existing galleries don't reshuffle. - migration 159: event_category_order (event_id, category_id, position) — the per-event override; no backfill, every event starts on the default. - utils/categoryOrder: shared resolution used by the admin event view and the public gallery; fails safe to the global default if the table is absent. - adminCategories: POST /reorder sets a per-event override (globals + event-specific, interleaved); DELETE /reorder/:eventId resets; POST /reorder-global sets the global default. Ordering endpoints + create append. - gallery renders the resolved order. - Settings → Photo Categories reorders the global default; an event's Categories tab reorders that gallery (one combined list + Reset to default). Up/down buttons — no drag-and-drop dependency. - en/de strings. |
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b768a53c5b |
feat(slideshow): per-event play order + category filter (#202)
The Live Slideshow already covers the core of #202 (fullscreen kiosk, live-appending new uploads, timing/transitions/watermark, per-event opt-in via the share link). This adds the two customization dimensions the reporter also asked for: - **Play order** (show_order): 'chronological' (upload order, default) or 'random' — the client shuffles the initial set (Fisher-Yates) so live-appended uploads keep working. - **Category filter** (show_category_id): restrict the slideshow to a single photo category (NULL = all photos, default). Enforced server-side on the slideshow /photos access and mirrored in the /session + /state photo_count, so the kiosk viewer can't widen the set. Per-event enable/disable (default off) is unchanged — it's the existing 'Generate/Disable slideshow link' flow (no token = no slideshow). - Migration 158: show_order (default 'chronological') + show_category_id. - Admin: Play-order dropdown + category picker in the Live Slideshow card (picker hidden for events without categories); EN + DE i18n. - Verified: migration (SQLite + PG); live API (category filter → 3/2/5 photos + matching count; order propagates) and the running kiosk requests exactly the filtered set; tsc clean, 136 backend tests pass. |
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99d5996561 |
feat(messages): search bar + Archive/Delete with Archived & Deleted folders
- Search box in the header filters the current folder's list (sender/subject),
client-side; works across the merged Archived/Deleted views too.
- Archive and Delete are now implemented as soft moves: migration 157 adds
mailbox_state ('active'|'archived'|'deleted') to email_queue + received_emails.
Archive → 'archived', Delete → 'deleted' (trash). Restore → 'active'. Deleting
FROM the Deleted folder is permanent (hard row delete).
- New cross-account system folders Archived + Deleted (merge sent + received of
that state, sorted by date). Normal folders now exclude archived/deleted.
- Backend: /queue + /received gain a `state` filter (default active + legacy
NULL); new POST /item/:kind/:id/state (archive/delete/restore) and DELETE
/item/:kind/:id (purge, email.edit).
- Toolbar Archive/Delete wired; Restore + "Delete permanently" shown in the
system folders.
Frontend build + migration boot (157) verified.
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f9c2b4ed75 |
fix(messages): dynamic addresses, branding accent, compose/sync, per-identity SMTP
Addresses dev-test feedback: - Sidebar + reading-pane addresses (rechnungen@ / hello@ / no-reply@) are now read from the mail config via GET /admin/email/identities, not hardcoded. - Highlight/selection now uses the branding accent (bg-accent-soft / text-on-accent-soft / accent-dark) instead of hardcoded blue, so it follows the admin's CI colour like the sidebar. - Header gains "New message" (compose) and "Sync" (poll mailboxes now) buttons. - Composer modal enlarged (920px, taller editable body). - Customer mailbox (hello@) now has BOTH incoming (IMAP) and outgoing (SMTP) settings — migration 156 adds smtp_* + from_* to mail_accounts; emailProcessor.sendRawEmail takes an accountKey and sends via that mailbox's SMTP identity (falls back to the global from). Manual/reply sends from the Messages UI use the 'customers' identity, so replies come from hello@. Frontend build + migration boot (156) verified. |
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768e84711f |
feat(messages): Phase 3 — editable-template composer, reply + create actions
The CRM action buttons and Reply now open a send-composer, not a silent
templated send.
- New send-composer (MessageComposer): loads the rendered template (via
previewTemplate) or a reply stub into a fully-editable body — the admin can
rewrite it or drop a note anywhere before sending. On send it goes out as-is
(server-sanitized), no template re-render.
- Backend: emailProcessor.sendRawEmail() sends admin-edited HTML via the
configured SMTP identity; POST /admin/email/send sanitizes + sends + records
the message in email_queue as a 'manual' send.
- Migration 155: email_queue.origin ('system' default | 'manual'). The Sent
stream now splits by origin — Automated ▸ Sent = system, Customers ▸ Sent =
the human/edited messages (which finally populates that folder). /queue gains
an origin filter + returns origin.
- Toolbar wired: Reply enabled on inbound customer mail (prefilled + quoted);
Create Quote/Contract/Invoice open the composer with that template loaded;
Gallery opens a blank compose. Accounting/Forward/Archive/Delete stay disabled
(later phases). After send, jumps to Customers ▸ Sent.
Deferred to a later phase: two-way IMAP write-back; per-identity SMTP (manual
sends currently use the global from address). Frontend build + migration boot
verified.
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ee46cf2125 |
feat(messages): Phase 2 — customer (hello@) mailbox + inbound body capture
Second inbound mailbox and real message bodies for the Messages viewer.
Backend:
- Migration 154: mail_accounts table (additional inbound mailboxes beyond the
primary accounting IMAP) + received_emails.{account_key,to_address,body_html,
body_text}. Additive/guarded.
- emailIntakeService now polls the accounting mailbox AND every enabled
mail_accounts row. Extracted pollAccountOnce(cfg, {accountKey, routeToExpenses});
accounting keeps its exact attachment->expenses behavior, customer mail is
logged with its body and NOT routed to accounting. Inbound HTML is sanitized
server-side (sanitize-html) on ingest.
- adminEmail: /received gains an account filter + returns account_key/to_address
(bodies excluded from the list); new GET /received/:id returns the body;
GET/POST /accounts + /accounts/test manage the extra mailboxes.
Frontend:
- Customers inbox now pulls the hello@ mailbox; reading pane renders the
sanitized body in a strict (script-less, no same-origin) sandboxed iframe.
Accounting inbox shows bodies too. Toolbar context keys off the mailbox.
- CustomerMailboxCard in Settings -> Email (behind the messaging flag) to
configure + test the hello@ IMAP box.
No behavior change to the existing accounting inbound flow. Frontend build +
migration boot verified.
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60b03b1728 |
fix(branding): unify hero logo SIZE the same way as visibility (#756)
Follow-on to the visibility fix in this PR — hero_logo_size had the same split-brain: GalleryLayout read the global branding_logo_size live while the hero-header path used the per-event snapshot, so a hero logo could render at different sizes on different layouts and the global size didn't reach hero-header galleries. Now mirrored on the visibility model: NULL per-event hero_logo_size = inherit branding_logo_size; explicit = override. - Migration 153: hero_logo_size nullable + backfill NULL so existing galleries inherit the global size (restores GalleryLayout's prior live-global behaviour and fixes the hero-header staleness). - Creation stores NULL unless explicit; gallery.js resolves per-event ?? global and sends the effective size. - GalleryLayout now consumes that resolved size for the hero logo (new heroLogoSize prop) instead of the global — both render paths match. - Admin size control gains a 'Use branding default' (inherit) option. Verified: migration on SQLite + PG; live resolution (inherit follows global both ways, override wins); creation stores NULL on PG; tsc clean, 106 adminEvents+gallery tests pass, build green. |
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96fe478bf8 |
fix(branding): make 'Show logo in hero' a true global toggle with per-event override (#756)
Before: the global branding_logo_display_hero toggle was only a creation-time default — snapshotted into each event's hero_logo_visible column at creation and never consulted again. Disabling it did nothing to existing galleries (the reporter's bug), and the two gallery render paths disagreed (GalleryLayout read the global, HeroHeader read the per-event snapshot). Now: NULL per-event hero_logo_visible = 'inherit the global toggle'; an explicit true/false is a per-gallery override. - Migration 152: make events.hero_logo_visible nullable and NULL out the defaulted rows so existing galleries follow the global going forward. Deliberate per-gallery hides () are preserved. - Creation stores NULL unless the admin explicitly sets it; the update path preserves NULL. - gallery.js resolves per-event ?? global (branding_logo_display_hero, default true) and sends the EFFECTIVE value on both gallery responses. - Both frontend render paths now consume that resolved value (GalleryLayout gets it via a new heroLogoVisible prop). - Admin per-event control is now tri-state: Use branding default / Always show / Always hide (en + de). Verified: SQLite migration + live resolution (inherit follows global both ways; override wins both ways); PG migration SQL dry-run; the admin tri-state renders 'Use branding default' for an inherited event; tsc clean, 106 adminEvents+gallery tests pass, build green. |
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72e2ef6721 |
feat(auth): admin TOTP MFA — enrollment, login challenge, recovery, CLI reset
Backend for #738. Real TOTP 2FA for admin accounts, all roles incl. super_admin (closes #735). - mfaService: otplib TOTP; AES-256-GCM encryption of the secret at rest (key derived from MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY or JWT_SECRET); bcrypt-hashed, single-use recovery codes; otpauth URI + QR. - Migration 151: adds two_factor_recovery_codes + two_factor_enrolled_at (secret/enabled columns already existed from legacy 016). - Enrollment endpoints (behind adminAuth, per-user): GET /mfa/status, POST /mfa/{setup,enable,disable,recovery-codes}. Disable/regenerate require a current code so a hijacked session can't strip 2FA. - Login challenge: /admin/login returns {mfaRequired, mfaToken} (no session) when 2FA is on; /admin/login/mfa exchanges a TOTP or recovery code for the session. Lockout counter is NOT reset until the second factor passes, so MFA brute-force is rate-limited too. - CLI break-glass: scripts/reset-admin-mfa.js --email <e> | --all --yes, audit-logged, matches reset-admin-password.js convention. - Docs + optional MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY env. Verified end-to-end on a live backend: enroll (super_admin), challenge, TOTP + single-use recovery login, disable, and CLI reset. |
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415bffa04c |
feat: zero-config first run — in-browser admin bootstrap + auto-generated secrets
Fresh installs need nothing in .env. See PR description for the full feature. |
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56c2386c90 |
feat(gallery): branded URL shortener — /s/<slug> with OG injection (#699)
Issue 3 from #699 (@alexvaltchev's report): expose a custom-named short URL per event that bots scrape for OG previews and browsers redirect to the underlying gallery. WhatsApp / iMessage / Facebook cache the OG metadata by the URL they crawl, so the SHORT URL becomes the cache key — admins can rotate or split-test underlying gallery URLs without re-pushing a fresh link to clients. Additive feature; no existing route, table, or column is modified. ## Backend - `gallery_short_urls` table (migration 150): id, short_slug UNIQUE, event_id FK CASCADE, target_path TEXT, created_by/at, hit_count, last_hit_at, deleted_at/by. hasTable-guarded so the migration is idempotent on re-run. - `src/services/galleryShortUrlService.js` — validator + CRUD + resolver. Slug rules: `/^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,62}[a-z0-9])?$/`, reserved blocklist (admin, api, auth, gallery, og, s, login, ...). target_path snapshots at create-time from the event + global short-URL toggle, so a later flip of the toggle does NOT silently change where existing short URLs resolve. - `src/routes/adminShortUrls.js` — `GET/POST /api/admin/events/:eventId/short-urls`, `DELETE /api/admin/short-urls/:id`. Structured errors: 400 INVALID_SLUG, 409 SLUG_TAKEN (with `suggested`), 404 EVENT_NOT_FOUND. Gated by events.view / events.edit + requireEventOwnership. - `server.js` /s/:shortSlug public route. Bot UA → server-render the same OG metadata the existing /og/gallery/<slug> handler produces, then override og:url to point at /s/<shortSlug> itself (cache-key invariant — social platforms key by the URL they scrape). Browser UA → 302 to target_path. Soft-deleted slug → 410 Gone (intentional-delete signal, distinct from 404 unknown slug). Hit accounting is fire-and-forget. ## Frontend - `services/shortUrls.service.ts` — list/create/remove. - `components/admin/ShortUrlsCard.tsx` — per-event card on the EventDetailsPage. Form for custom or auto-generated slug, list with copy-to-clipboard + soft-delete. SLUG_TAKEN error surfaces the service's `suggested` slug with a "use suggested" button. - i18n: events.shortUrls.* added to EN + DE. ## Tests 78 new tests, all passing: - `__tests__/utils/galleryShortUrlValidation.test.js` (48) — pure- function tests for validateSlug: accepts/rejects, reserved-slug blocklist, path-traversal + URL-injection vectors. - `__tests__/integration/galleryShortUrls.test.js` (19) — service layer against a real SQLite DB. Covers custom + auto-generated slugs, collision + SLUG_TAKEN + suggested, target_path snapshotting (backward-compat invariant), soft-delete + slug rotation, hit counting. - `__tests__/integration/galleryShortUrlRoute.test.js` (11) — HTTP-level: 302 redirect for browser UA, 200 + OG HTML for bot UA, og:url canonical points at /s/<slug>, 410 for soft-deleted + orphaned events, 404 unknown + malformed. Regression sweep: 47 existing migration-chain integration tests still pass; migration 150 is additive only. ## Backward compatibility - Existing `/gallery/<slug>`, `/gallery/<32-hex-share-token>`, `/gallery/<slug>/show/<token>`, `/og/gallery/<slug>`, `/og/gallery/<slug>/cover` routes are untouched. - The `/s/` namespace is new; no existing route lives there. - Migration 150 only ADDs the new table — no ALTERs on existing schema, no destructive changes. - target_path is snapshotted at create-time so flipping the global "Use short gallery URLs" setting after a short URL exists does NOT change where that short URL resolves. |
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0205c7dcce |
chore: migrate Docker registry + GitHub URLs to PicPeak org
Repo transferred from the-luap/picpeak → PicPeak/picpeak. Docker images
publish to ghcr.io/picpeak/picpeak/{backend,frontend} (lowercase, per the
GHCR canonical form computed by docker-build.yml's `${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}`).
Sweep covers:
- docker-compose.production.yml + Dockerfiles → new image registry path
- README, CONTRIBUTING, SECURITY, SIMPLE_SETUP, scripts/picpeak-setup.sh
→ new GitHub URLs
- Update-check / release-notes services (updateCheckService,
environmentService, updateNotificationService, adminSystem,
UpdateNotification, githubReleaseUrl) → GitHub API + tag URLs use the
canonical PicPeak/picpeak path
- Issue templates + README-DOCKER + workflow README → updated package URLs
- One commit-context comment in migrations/090 + customerAccountsService
CHANGELOG.md is intentionally untouched (historical release entries are
immutable; GitHub auto-redirects the old URLs indefinitely).
CLAUDE.md keeps the bare `(the-luap)` reference — that's the maintainer's
personal handle, not a repo URL.
22 files, 48/48 line swaps (every change is a 1:1 URL replacement).
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539a83711d |
fix(workflows): defer quote.accepted/declined emit until the 15-min response window locks
The customer's accept/decline can be toggled for crm_quotes_accept_window_minutes
(default 15) before it locks, and the public page promises exactly that. But the
booking workflow fired on the FIRST accept click and immediately converted the
quote (status -> 'converted'), so a decline within the window was rejected
('Quote cannot be responded to in status converted') — the grace period was dead
on arrival.
recordResponse / adminAcceptQuote now DEFER the workflow emit while the toggle
window is open; the new scheduler sweep finalizeQuoteResponses fires the FINAL
status once response_locked_at passes (idempotent via the new
quotes.workflow_response_emitted_at column, migration 149). A response recorded
with the window already closed (0-min window, or admin decline which locks
immediately) still emits inline. So toggling accept->decline->accept inside the
window converts at most once, for the final state, after the customer's grace
period — and a plain decline never converts.
Trade-off: with the hourly CRM scheduler, the booking flow now starts up to ~1h
after the window locks instead of instantly. Acceptable — the flow gates on admin
review anyway, and the alternative (graph-level wait) wouldn't reach already-
enabled built-ins (admin_toggled_at blocks re-seed).
Adds a finalize sweep test (deferred while open, fires + stamps once locked,
idempotent).
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5893ecb27a |
fix(workflows): ship built-ins disabled for first beta + enabled-based mutex + admin sentinel
Per review: the four cutover built-ins (dunning, gallery_expiring, gallery_expired, pre_event_email) now ship enabled:false. The mutual-exclusion guards revert to ENABLED-based (isBuiltinFlowActive, not existence) so the legacy paths keep running until the admin enables a built-in — enabling cuts over, disabling reverts to legacy (fixes concern #4's "disable = silent dark" foot-gun; no automation goes dark on upgrade). admin_toggled_at sentinel (migration 148) marks admin ownership; the boot re-seeder applies a shipped default-flip (enabled→disabled) only to never-touched built-ins and never overwrites an admin's enable/disable/edit (nit #1). SEED_VERSIONs bumped so the disabled default propagates. Nit: applyReminder unlinks the just-rendered Mahnung PDF if queueEmail throws (no orphan file). |
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d14f1d850c |
feat(workflows): per-quote booking-workflow picker + quote→invoice (no gallery) built-in
A quote can now choose which flow runs on acceptance instead of every enabled quote.accepted flow firing. Migration 147 adds quotes.booking_workflow_id; the editor shows a "Booking workflow (on acceptance)" dropdown listing the quote.accepted flows (workflow-engine flag only); emitQuoteEvent passes it as the new emitWorkflowEvent targetWorkflowId so ONLY the picked flow runs (still gated on enabled + trigger match → a disabled/None selection runs nothing). Adds the booking_invoice_only built-in (quote.accepted → prepare invoice → review gate → send; no event/gallery, no wait), the variant requested for shoots billed without an online gallery. Disabled stub like the other booking flows until the prepare_*/send_document cutover. Tests: targetWorkflowId runs only the selected flow; invoice-only built-in has no wait/prepare_event. |
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f78671fc6c |
feat(crm): event-type dropdown on quotes; quote→event uses it (no more hardcoded 'wedding')
Quotes now carry an event type (migration 146: quotes.event_type, the
event_types.slug_prefix), chosen from the active event-types catalog in the
quote editor's Event section. convertToEvent reads it instead of the
unconditional hardcoded 'wedding': quote.event_type → crm_default_event_type
setting → 'wedding' as last-resort seeded fallback. When the booking flow's
prepare_event is wired, it reads the same field.
Backend: createQuote/updateQuote persist event_type (hasColumn-guarded);
adminQuotes route accepts + returns eventType. Frontend: FormState + payload +
load + a catalog-sourced dropdown ("— Use default —"); EN/DE strings.
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192d2cbc06 |
feat(workflows): crash recovery — resume runs orphaned mid-flow
Closes the crash-safety gap: a run left in running/pending by a crash had nothing to resume it (the scheduler only wakes 'waiting'). Adds a heartbeat (workflow_runs.updated_at, stamped on every node advance + start/resume) and a recoverStaleRuns() sweep that re-enters runs whose heartbeat has gone stale (>10 min) from their persisted node. Runs on the scheduler tick AND the boot tick, so a restart catches anything stranded during downtime. Re-entry is at-least-once (the current node may re-execute) — loop counters + the late-fee math are idempotent, so the only residual risk is a duplicate reminder email. An attempts counter (migration 145, cap 5) marks a run failed instead of recovering a node that reliably crashes the process (crash-loop backstop). Flag-gated. Tests: orphan-resume + crash-loop cap. |
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5ed2fec2fe |
feat(crm): Mahngebühr on a separate Mahnung document; invoice stays immutable
Corrected dunning model (Mara): a Mahnung is a reminder LETTER showing the new total (original + Mahngebühr), NOT a separate invoice and NOT a mutation of the issued invoice. - The invoice PDF no longer shows the fee (buildInvoiceRenderContext reports lateFeeAmountMinor 0) and is NEVER re-rendered by a reminder — it stays immutable (§14/§11). - applyReminder now: tracks the fee as dunning state on the row (gross late_fee_amount_minor + new late_fee_vat_minor for the VAT portion, migration 144), renders a separate MAHNUNG PDF (pdfService 'mahnung' kind — reuses the invoice layout: same lines + Mahngebühr row + new total, 'Mahnung' title, no QR), stored under storage/business-docs/mahnung/, and attaches BOTH the unchanged original invoice + the Mahnung to the reminder email. - Fee resolvers split into net + VAT-rate (toggle + org-rate gated); a gross wrapper feeds the payment-check preview. en + de PDF title. Outstanding/collections still read late_fee_amount_minor (now dunning state). P3 (tax-report/Banana booking of the Mahngebühr VAT) stays Treuhänder-gated. Syntax + 17/17 workflow/invoice tests green. NOTE: the Mahnung PDF render path isn't unit-tested (PDF rendering is flaky in the test env) — eyeball on the dev box: fire a level-2 reminder, confirm the Mahnung PDF shows the new total and the original invoice PDF is unchanged. |
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eaceb7e71c |
feat(crm): toggle for VAT on late fees (jurisdiction-dependent)
Mahngebühr VAT differs by country (CH: liable; DE/AT: not), so it's now a toggle (crm_invoices_late_fee_vat_enabled, seeded into migration 143 in place since it isn't deployed yet — no compensation migration). When on, VAT is added on top of the net fee at the org's default rate (business_profile.vat_rate_default). Gated so it's a NO-OP when the org doesn't charge VAT (default rate 0/unset) — i.e. enabling the toggle on a non-VAT org adds nothing, as required. Settings UI: a self-documenting checkbox. The fee is treated as net + VAT-on-top; the tax-report VAT breakdown for the fee is part of the deferred dunning-document rework. tsc 0, build green, 9/9 workflow tests. |
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dcdbeb9cc5 |
feat(crm): 3-reminder dunning + flat/percent Mahngebühr on 2nd & 3rd + AGB notice
- Late fee can now be a FLAT amount OR a PERCENTAGE of the invoice gross (crm_invoices_late_fee_type/_percent, migration 143; defaults preserve the current flat behaviour). - Fee is charged from the 2nd reminder onward and accumulates per fee-bearing reminder (2nd = 1×, 3rd = 2×), computed from the level so re-applying a level never stacks. New resolvePerReminderFeeMinor() shared by applyReminder + the payment-check fee preview. - Reminder ladder extended to 3 levels (caps raised in sendReminder + recordPaymentCheckAction); the built-in dunning flow now loops 3× (seed v3, re-seeds the disabled built-in on boot). - Settings UI: flat/percent toggle + percent field, and a prominent AGB callout — a late fee is only enforceable if the concrete amount is stated in the terms (Mara's wording), 'verify with your Treuhänder'. en + native de. The fee math is examples-only / Treuhänder-verify; issued invoices stay immutable (the fee is tracked in late_fee_amount_minor, not folded into the original total). Tests 17/17, tsc 0, build green. |
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c818c25cf2 |
feat(workflows): schema + permissions (migration 142)
Adds the workflow engine's graph data model — workflows, workflow_nodes, workflow_edges (versioned so in-flight runs keep their version), workflow_runs (status/current_node/context, wake_at for the scheduler, unique dedup_key for idempotency), workflow_run_steps (per-node audit), and workflow_approvals (hashed email confirm/deny token + webview inbox). Seeds workflows.view / workflows.manage and grants them to super_admin + admin. Loose-FK integers per the whatsapp_queue/expenses convention; idempotent hasTable guards + reversible down(). |
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f2814e4a4c |
feat(feedback): per-guest favorite + like caps with mobile-friendly limit modal (#655)
Reporter @Duecki1 wants to stop telling guests "pick only 5 photos" by
hand. Per-event cap, enforced server-side, with a clear popup when the
11th click would exceed the limit. Per-guest scope matches the "every
couple picks their top 10" mental model; per-gallery aggregate is
explicitly NOT in scope (creates weird "first 10 visitors use up all
slots" race conditions).
## Schema (migration 141)
Two nullable columns on `event_feedback_settings`:
- `max_favorites_per_guest`
- `max_likes_per_guest`
null / 0 = unlimited (preserves current behaviour for every existing
install — operator must opt in). Both shipped together because the
code path is identical; photographers can cap either, both, or neither.
## Backend
- `feedbackService.submitFeedback` cap check on the INSERT branch only.
Toggle-off (un-favoriting) is always allowed, so a guest at 10/10
can free a slot by un-clicking an existing favorite.
- New `countGuestFeedback(eventId, type, guestId, guestIdentifier)` —
matches the exact same guest-key shape the existing duplicate-check
uses (guest_id when present, fallback to guest_identifier in simple
identity mode).
- Limit reduction grandfathers: admin lowering 20→10 keeps existing
rows in place; new adds blocked until the guest removes some.
- Route layer (`galleryFeedback.js` POST) translates a `limit_reached`
service-return into a structured 403 with `code:
'FAVORITE_LIMIT_REACHED'` / `'LIKE_LIMIT_REACHED'`, `limit`, and
`current_count`. Stable UI contract.
- `feedback-settings` GET exposes the caps so the gallery UI can
optionally render a counter near the heart icon (UI extension TBD;
the modal alone is the contract this PR commits to).
- `feedbackValidation`: range guard `0..10000`, null allowed,
per-field error messages.
## Frontend — the popup
New `FeedbackLimitReachedModal` component renders via a `createPortal`
to `document.body` so it escapes any lightbox / sticky parent stacking
context and reliably sits above everything else.
Mobile-first responsive:
- `items-end sm:items-center` — slides up from the bottom on phones
(native action-sheet feel), centers on desktop (familiar modal).
- `w-full sm:max-w-md` — full-width on phones, clamps to 420px on
desktop.
- `rounded-2xl sm:rounded-xl` — more rounded on phones for the
sheet feel.
- `pb-[env(safe-area-inset-bottom)]` — respects the iOS home indicator
and Android gesture bar.
- `z-[60]` — above the lightbox's z-50.
Title + body + "8 of 10 used" pill + "Got it" button. Backdrop click +
Escape both dismiss. Focus management lands on the OK button so
keyboard / screen-reader users can dismiss immediately.
New `useFeedbackLimitModal()` hook is the shared API: components
on every submit-feedback site wire `onError: (err) => handleError(err)`
and render `{limitModal}` in their JSX. Returns `true` from
`handleError` when the error is a structured cap-reached 403 (so the
caller can skip its generic error toast). PhotoFavorites + PhotoLikes
+ PhotoLightbox all wire through the hook — every favorite/like submit
path is covered, including the lightbox's three different submit
sites (guest mode, simple mode, post-identity-modal-confirm).
## Admin UI
`FeedbackSettings` card gets a new "Per-guest limits" section that
only renders when at least one of `allow_favorites` / `allow_likes` is
on. Two numeric inputs (0 / empty = unlimited) side-by-side on
desktop, stacked on mobile. Hint text covers the limit-reduction
grandfathering semantics so admins aren't surprised.
## i18n
EN + DE for:
- Modal title + body (parameterized with `{{limit}}`)
- Counter pill (parameterized with `{{current}}` / `{{limit}}`)
- OK button label
- Admin field labels + hints + section header + grandfathering note
## Tests
**Backend** (`__tests__/utils/feedbackPerGuestLimit.test.js`, 8 cases):
- null cap → unlimited (back-compat)
- 0 cap → unlimited (UI convenience)
- cap=10: rows 1-10 succeed, 11 returns limit_reached
- toggle-off frees a slot at the cap
- limit reduction grandfathers existing rows
- per-guest scope: guest A's cap doesn't affect guest B
- favorite cap doesn't block likes (per-type)
- like cap returns LIKE_LIMIT_REACHED-shaped payload
**Frontend** (`__tests__/useFeedbackLimitModal.test.ts`, 7 cases):
- Non-axios errors → null
- Non-403 axios errors → null
- 403 with wrong code → null
- FAVORITE_LIMIT_REACHED parsed
- LIKE_LIMIT_REACHED parsed
- Falls back to code-implied type when feedback_type missing
- Missing numeric fields → 0 (not NaN)
All 15 pass. tsc --noEmit clean. eslint clean on changed files.
Closes #655.
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80e8ec5bc7 |
Merge pull request #650 from the-luap/fix/whatsapp-template-params-647-followup
feat(whatsapp): admin-selectable template parameters + reorder (#647 follow-up) |
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cde028e919 |
Merge pull request #649 from the-luap/fix/branding-customcss-preset-drop-645
fix(branding+whatsapp): preserve customCss through preset switches (#645) + admin-pinned WhatsApp template language (#647) |
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1f46a241d2 |
chore(whatsapp): renumber migration 138 → 140 (after PR #646's 138+139)
PR #646's review-round renumbered its slideshow migrations to 138 + 139 to slot in after PR #649's 137 (whatsapp_template_language). That now collides with this PR's 138. Slide ours to 140 so all three land in strict order: #649 (137) → #646 (138, 139) → this PR (140). Content unchanged; pure rename + a one-line docstring tweak noting the slot. |
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16055cdc41 |
feat(whatsapp): admin-selectable template parameters + reorder (#647 follow-up)
Reporter @Rekoo-PS confirmed the language fix unblocked sending, then
hit a second gap: their template uses only `{{1}} = event_name` +
`{{2}} = gallery_link`, but the legacy `buildComponents` hardcoded all
5 positional values from the `gallery_ready` shape (customer_name,
event_name, gallery_link, password_line, expiry_date). Meta rejected
with a parameter-count mismatch even after the language matched.
This adds a per-config slot list — which built-in values to send, and
in what positional order — so admins can match templates of any shape
without code changes.
## Schema (migration 138)
Additive `template_params` TEXT column on `whatsapp_configs` (default
empty string = legacy 5-slot behaviour for existing installs). Stored
as a JSON-serialized array of slot keys: `customer_name`, `event_name`,
`gallery_link`, `password_line`, `expiry_date`. Unknown / duplicate /
non-string entries are sanitized out at read time.
## Processor
- `parseTemplateParams(raw)` — defensive parser; falls back to the
5-slot default on empty / malformed / all-invalid input.
- `buildComponents(data, metaLang, params)` — emits ONLY the listed
slots in the listed order, computed via a small switch on slot key.
The password line still receives the locale-specific 🔒 label and
the empty-when-no-real-password sentinel handling.
- Processor reads `config.template_params` once per cycle and passes
the parsed array to `buildComponents` per message.
## Admin route
- GET surfaces `template_params` as the parsed array (default 5-slot
when null/empty).
- PUT round-trips the incoming array through `parseTemplateParams`
before persisting, so the stored value is always the canonical
sanitized JSON.
- Test send rebuilt to use the same `buildComponents` path so the
admin's test message matches their configured slot shape — a
reporter who configures 2 slots gets a 2-parameter test send, not
the legacy 5-parameter payload.
## UI
- `WhatsAppTab` gets a checkbox + up/down list under the Template
language field. Each slot shows its current `{{N}}` position when
checked, an em-dash when unchecked. Live preview below the list:
"Your template will receive: {{1}} = event_name, {{2}} = gallery_link".
- EN + DE i18n for the field labels, hint, preview, and per-slot
human-readable names.
## Tests
- 17 unit tests in `__tests__/utils/whatsappBuildComponents.test.js`
covering: parseTemplateParams sanitization (unknown keys, duplicates,
non-strings, malformed JSON, all-invalid fallback, pre-parsed array
acceptance) and buildComponents shape (reporter's 2-slot case,
reorder, empty list, locale-specific password label, password
sentinel handling, expiry omission).
- All 17 + the 34 existing networkValidation tests pass.
## Migration numbering
Sits at 138 on top of PR #649's migration 137. If #646 (Live Slideshow)
merges before this, #646's own 137 + 138 take precedence and this
needs renumbering to 139. Coordinated via PR #646's review thread.
## Honest caveat
Still no Meta Business API account on my side. Spec-built, sanitizer +
shape unit-tested, lint + tsc clean. End-to-end against Meta needs the
reporter (or a maintainer with an account) to verify. If a real
round-trip surfaces a mismatch, drop it in #647 and I'll iterate.
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e6655f613b |
chore(slideshow): renumber migrations to 138/139 (after whatsapp #649's 137)
PR #649 takes migration 137 (add_whatsapp_template_language). Renumber the slideshow migrations to slot in after it: - 137_add_slideshow_share.js -> 138_add_slideshow_share.js - 138_add_slideshow_styling.js -> 139_add_slideshow_styling.js and update the slideshow migration-number references in comments/types. No content change — both are additive + addColumnIfNotExists-guarded, so re-running under the new filename on an already-migrated DB is a safe no-op. |
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4fd7709596 |
fix(whatsapp): admin-pinned template language + Arabic locale support (#647)
Reporter @Rekoo-PS hit three independent gaps trying to deliver an Arabic Meta template. Bundled here because they fan out from the same root cause (no first-class language config on the WhatsApp tab) and the review surfaces are tightly coupled. **1. Test send hardcoded `en_US` (`adminWhatsapp.js:141`).** Smoking gun for "I can't make it work" — Meta returned template_not_found_in_language (132001) on every test send for non-English templates, no matter what else the admin configured. Replaced with `config.template_language || 'en_US'`. **2. No `template_language` field on `whatsapp_configs`.** The only priors were per-message `data.language` (always null from our callers in `adminEvents.js:854,1188`) and `app_settings.general_default_language` (the *system UI* language, not the *template's* language registered with Meta). Migration 137 adds the column; GET + PUT surface it; the processor uses it as the highest-priority default when message_data doesn't override. Resolution order in `whatsappProcessor.processWhatsAppQueue` is now: 1. message_data.language (per-event override — caller path TBD) 2. config.template_language (admin-pinned template language) 3. app_settings.general_default_language (system fallback) 4. en_US (hardcoded last resort) **3. `LANGUAGE_MAP` + `PASSWORD_LABELS` didn't cover Arabic.** Added `ar` (Meta's single-code form per RFC; no region variant). For any language we don't enumerate (e.g. Turkish `tr_TR`, Chinese `zh_CN`, Hebrew `he_IL`), `resolveLanguageCode` now pass-throughs valid-shape codes (lowercase-language + optional underscore + uppercase-region) and forwards them to Meta as-is. If they don't match a registered template Meta returns 132001, which the test route already surfaces back to the admin via `error.message` — fail-loud, no silent fallback. Validation: - Unit smoke on `resolveLanguageCode` across 18 representative inputs (in-map, pass-through, canonicalization, rejection) — all behaviours correct. - Lint clean on all 7 changed files. - Frontend `tsc --noEmit` clean. - Migration `node -c` syntax-checked; additive + `hasColumn`-guarded so re-running is safe. Frontend: free-text input on the WhatsApp tab with EN + DE i18n. Pointing at Meta's supported-languages docs via the hint text — Meta's list grows; a hardcoded dropdown would rot. Closes #647. |