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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Luca	b118695474	feat(permissions): granular permission gating + role editor & presets (#747 , phase 1 of #743 ) (#1045 ) * feat(permissions): granular permission gating + role editor & presets Make every admin feature permission-gateable so multi-user studios can split capability across roles (#747, and phase 1 of #743). - Split the catch-all settings.edit into dedicated dangerous-config perms (banking / domains / security / integrations / features): a team member can no longer change IBAN, domains, SSO, webhooks, API tokens or feature flags. Reads keep an OR with settings.view so existing roles keep visibility. The site-URL write inside /general is change-gated on settings.domains. - Add dedicated perms for admin surfaces miscategorised under settings.* (whatsapp, event_types, image_security, notifications, system) plus roles.manage and vat_codes.view; gate the previously-ungated VAT read. - Boot self-heal (_permissionsBoot.js): super_admin always holds every permission (tracks-all) so new perms never need a compensation migration; all other roles stay frozen (no silent escalation on upgrade). - Seed two presets: Solo Photographer (full operator) and Team Photographer (contributor — view events + manage photos + read-only CRM; no settings/users/billing edits, no events.edit). - Role editor: adminRoles CRUD (create/edit/clone/delete + permission matrix; system roles protected, super_admin immutable) and a Roles tab with a category-grouped matrix and preset cloning. - Settings page tabs are permission-gated with snap-back; i18n en/de. Migration 174. Backward-compatible: admin/editor/viewer unchanged. * feat(permissions): hide in-page action buttons a role can't use Wrap mutating controls on the surfaces restricted roles actually reach (Events list, Archives, gallery photo grid, event detail) in PermissionGate so they are HIDDEN when the user lacks the permission, rather than shown-then-403: - Events list: create / bulk archive / bulk delete / row archive / row delete / download-archive. - Archives: restore / download / delete. - Photo grid: single + bulk delete (photos.delete), per-photo download (photos.download), bulk move/hide/show (photos.edit). - Event detail: edit / rename / publish (events.edit), duplicate (events.create), archive (events.archive), create-invoice (bills.manage); the Actions card is hidden entirely for view-only roles. - Photos tab: upload / external import (photos.upload), export menu (photos.download). Backend already enforces these with 403; this is the matching UX so a Team Photographer never sees delete/settings controls. * fix(permissions): close settings-split bypass via generic settings writers Security review found the settings.edit split was bypassable: the generic settings writers (/general, /analytics, /seo, /security) upsert arbitrary setting_keys, so a role holding only settings.edit (or settings.security) could write keys owned by a narrower permission — repointing the public site URL (settings.domains), security policy (settings.security) or VAT/accounting config (settings.banking) via the wrong endpoint. Add stripUnauthorizedProtectedKeys(): before every generic upsert, drop any protected key the caller isn't permitted to write (general_site_url → settings.domains, security_* → settings.security, accounting_* → settings.banking). Dedicated routes still work because their caller holds the matching perm. Replaces the narrower in-handler site-URL guard. Also fix two tests affected by the RBAC changes: - authzPermissionGaps: API-token management moved to settings.integrations, so grant that (not settings.edit) to exercise the ownership 404. - AdminPhotoGrid.viewToggle: stub PermissionGate (its buttons are now gated and the test renders without a PermissionsProvider). * fix(permissions): address upstream review (#1045) - Renumber migration 174 -> 175 (174 now taken by 174_sqlite_nullable_event_dates from #1035; the collision made picpeakImportService's forward-only restore guard treat both as order 174 and accept a newer .picpeak onto an older schema). - Contain the roles.manage blast radius (delegation, not root escalation): a non-super_admin can no longer edit their own role, nor grant any permission their own role doesn't already hold (createRole + updateRole). - Protected-key denial now 403s (naming the keys + required perms) instead of silently stripping and reporting "saved" (adminSettings generic writers). - Reserve team_photographer so a custom role can't squat the preset name. - Boot self-heal: per-step try/catch so a role_permissions insert race on one replica doesn't skip preset seeding. - Forward-project the feature .manage perms that also replaced settings.edit gates (whatsapp/event_types/image_security/notifications/system), matching the settings.* split projection so the pattern is symmetric for phase-2. - Guard exports.down's roles/admin_users queries with hasTable. * fix(permissions): change-detection on protected-key 403 + commit guard tests (#1045) Round-2 review: - The protected-key 403 fired on key PRESENCE. The General tab re-posts general_site_url on every save, so a settings.edit-only role (the office manager this PR enables) got 403'd on every General save even when the URL was unchanged. Restore change-detection: compare the incoming value against the stored one and 403 only on an actual change; unchanged protected keys are dropped so the rest of the save proceeds. Only /general is affected. - Commit the self-amplification guard test (was run locally, never staged): adminRolesGuards.test.js — non-super can't grant perms it lacks, can't edit its own role, can't escalate another role; super_admin bypasses; team_photographer name reserved. - Add adminSettingsProtectedKeys.test.js pinning the change-detection: an unchanged general_site_url saves, an actual change 403s, super_admin changes it.	2026-08-16 14:59:52 +02:00
Paul NothaftandPaul Nothaft	b7005692b3	fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) (#941 ) * fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) * fix(security): harden SSRF fix per review (rsync backup path, S3 config-save, webhook transient-DNS retry) * fix(security): S3 endpoint validation on any endpoint update + no-connect on unresolved webhook host (codex r2) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>	2026-08-01 17:36:21 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	c488f481ca	feat: outbound webhooks for event/photo lifecycle (#327 ) PicPeak POSTs lifecycle notifications to admin-configured URLs. Each delivery is signed HMAC-SHA256 in the X-PicPeak-Signature header. Verified end-to-end: 1/1 Playwright spec, 8/8 backend integration tests, full UI click-through via Chrome DevTools. Schema (migration 082) - webhooks: id, name, url, secret (plaintext — required to compute HMAC for every outbound POST), secret_preview, events[], active, filter, template, created_by, timestamps, last_success_at/last_failure_at. - webhook_deliveries: webhook_id (FK CASCADE), event_type, payload, attempt_count, status (pending\|success\|failed), response_status, response_body (truncated to 1KB), latency_ms, next_retry_at, last_error, created_at, completed_at. Composite index (status, next_retry_at) serves the worker's hot-path query. Service + worker - webhookService.fire(eventType, data) — non-throwing entry point used by lifecycle hooks. Looks up active webhooks subscribed to the event and applies their per-webhook filter (dot-path equality predicate) before enqueueing one webhook_deliveries row per match. Filter and template logic ship in this commit; admin surfaces in the follow-up. - webhookDeliveryWorker — setInterval(5s) poller; fetches up to 5 pending rows; per delivery: re-validates URL via networkValidation (DNS-rebinding mitigation, opt-out via WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS), signs body with HMAC-SHA256, POSTs with 10s timeout, records outcome. Backoff schedule: 1m → 5m → 30m → 2h → 12h, max 5 attempts. Response body truncated to 1KB before storage. If a webhook has a template, the rendered string replaces the JSON envelope as the request body (signature is computed over the bytes actually sent). Lifecycle wiring - adminEvents.js POST /events → event.created (+ event.published when not draft); POST /:id/publish → event.published. - routes/events.js (legacy public POST) → event.created + event.published. - routes/v1/events.js (#322 API) → event.created + event.published on create, photo.uploaded on photo POST. - archiveService.archiveEvent() → event.archived. Per-photo photo.deleted intentionally NOT fired during cascade — receivers infer from event.archived to avoid flooding (issue spec). - expirationChecker.handleExpiredEvent() → event.expired BEFORE the cascading archive (so receivers see expired→archived in order). - adminPhotos.js — photo.uploaded on each batch row, photo.deleted on single + bulk delete. - photoProcessor.js — photo.uploaded for guest uploads + auto-import (covers all entry paths). - fileWatcher.js — photo.uploaded on add, photo.deleted on unlink (local mode only). Admin endpoints (mirrors adminApiTokens.js pattern) - /api/admin/webhooks: GET list, POST create (returns plaintext secret exactly once), GET :id, PUT :id, DELETE :id, POST :id/test (synthetic fire), GET :id/deliveries (paginated, filter by status), GET :id/deliveries/:deliveryId, POST :id/deliveries/:deliveryId/replay. Frontend - Settings → Webhooks tab (mirrors API Tokens layout): name + URL + event checkboxes + "Advanced" expander for filter (JSON) and template. Plaintext secret shown once on creation with a Copy button. Active/ Disabled toggle button per row. - /admin/webhooks/:id/deliveries — operational debug surface. Table with timestamp/event/status/attempts/HTTP/latency. Status filter chips (all/pending/success/failed). Row click → slide-over with payload + signature + response body. Replay button on failed rows. Send-test-event dialog. Auto-refresh every 10s. Dev infrastructure - dev/webhook-receiver/ — tiny node:alpine HTTP server (~100 LOC) that records every POST to an in-memory ring buffer. Exposes GET /requests for the E2E spec to assert deliveries landed with the right HMAC. Sibling pattern to MinIO. Reachable from the backend at http://webhook-receiver:8888 inside the picpeak network. Tests - backend/__tests__/integration/webhookDelivery.test.js (8/8) — signature verification, headers, retry/backoff, max-attempts → failed, response truncation, disabled-mid-flight, SSRF block, start/stop idempotency. - tests/e2e/webhooks-roundtrip.spec.ts (1/1) — create webhook → trigger event.published → assert receiver got POST with valid HMAC → visit deliveries page → row visible with status=success → API test event → API replay → disable webhook → assert no new delivery. Docs - README §"Webhooks" — event catalog, payload shape, HMAC verification in Node + Python + bash, retry semantics, SSRF protection. - .env.example — WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS, WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_INTERVAL_MS, WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_CONCURRENCY, WEBHOOK_HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS, WEBHOOK_MAX_ATTEMPTS. Out of scope for v1 (per issue): webhook templates' code-eval (the ${dot.path} substitution that ships is pure string replacement, no expression engine — see follow-up commit), per-webhook rate limiting beyond the global concurrency cap, synchronous "ask before delete" webhooks. Spanning files - App.tsx pulls in this commit with both the AnalyticsBootstrap (#325 dedup) and the WebhookDeliveriesPage route registration. Splitting via git add -p was forfeit for sanity; the single 92-line diff is honest about both contributions. - adminEvents.js diff bundles the webhook fires AND the allow_presigned_download field plumbing (#328 follow-up). Same reasoning. - The new webhookService/Worker/adminWebhooks files include the filter and template logic from the follow-up — they were authored in one pass; splitting them post-hoc would have produced fragile partial files. The follow-up commit covers the migration and the UI for these.	2026-04-28 10:07:39 +02:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Luca

b118695474

feat(permissions): granular permission gating + role editor & presets (#747 , phase 1 of #743 ) (#1045 )

* feat(permissions): granular permission gating + role editor & presets

Make every admin feature permission-gateable so multi-user studios can
split capability across roles (#747, and phase 1 of #743).

- Split the catch-all settings.edit into dedicated dangerous-config perms
  (banking / domains / security / integrations / features): a team member
  can no longer change IBAN, domains, SSO, webhooks, API tokens or feature
  flags. Reads keep an OR with settings.view so existing roles keep
  visibility. The site-URL write inside /general is change-gated on
  settings.domains.
- Add dedicated perms for admin surfaces miscategorised under settings.*
  (whatsapp, event_types, image_security, notifications, system) plus
  roles.manage and vat_codes.view; gate the previously-ungated VAT read.
- Boot self-heal (_permissionsBoot.js): super_admin always holds every
  permission (tracks-all) so new perms never need a compensation
  migration; all other roles stay frozen (no silent escalation on upgrade).
- Seed two presets: Solo Photographer (full operator) and Team
  Photographer (contributor — view events + manage photos + read-only CRM;
  no settings/users/billing edits, no events.edit).
- Role editor: adminRoles CRUD (create/edit/clone/delete + permission
  matrix; system roles protected, super_admin immutable) and a Roles tab
  with a category-grouped matrix and preset cloning.
- Settings page tabs are permission-gated with snap-back; i18n en/de.

Migration 174. Backward-compatible: admin/editor/viewer unchanged.

* feat(permissions): hide in-page action buttons a role can't use

Wrap mutating controls on the surfaces restricted roles actually reach
(Events list, Archives, gallery photo grid, event detail) in
PermissionGate so they are HIDDEN when the user lacks the permission,
rather than shown-then-403:

- Events list: create / bulk archive / bulk delete / row archive /
  row delete / download-archive.
- Archives: restore / download / delete.
- Photo grid: single + bulk delete (photos.delete), per-photo download
  (photos.download), bulk move/hide/show (photos.edit).
- Event detail: edit / rename / publish (events.edit), duplicate
  (events.create), archive (events.archive), create-invoice
  (bills.manage); the Actions card is hidden entirely for view-only roles.
- Photos tab: upload / external import (photos.upload), export menu
  (photos.download).

Backend already enforces these with 403; this is the matching UX so a
Team Photographer never sees delete/settings controls.

* fix(permissions): close settings-split bypass via generic settings writers

Security review found the settings.edit split was bypassable: the generic
settings writers (/general, /analytics, /seo, /security) upsert arbitrary
setting_keys, so a role holding only settings.edit (or settings.security)
could write keys owned by a narrower permission — repointing the public
site URL (settings.domains), security policy (settings.security) or
VAT/accounting config (settings.banking) via the wrong endpoint.

Add stripUnauthorizedProtectedKeys(): before every generic upsert, drop
any protected key the caller isn't permitted to write (general_site_url →
settings.domains, security_* → settings.security, accounting_* →
settings.banking). Dedicated routes still work because their caller holds
the matching perm. Replaces the narrower in-handler site-URL guard.

Also fix two tests affected by the RBAC changes:
- authzPermissionGaps: API-token management moved to settings.integrations,
  so grant that (not settings.edit) to exercise the ownership 404.
- AdminPhotoGrid.viewToggle: stub PermissionGate (its buttons are now gated
  and the test renders without a PermissionsProvider).

* fix(permissions): address upstream review (#1045)

- Renumber migration 174 -> 175 (174 now taken by 174_sqlite_nullable_event_dates
  from #1035; the collision made picpeakImportService's forward-only restore
  guard treat both as order 174 and accept a newer .picpeak onto an older schema).
- Contain the roles.manage blast radius (delegation, not root escalation): a
  non-super_admin can no longer edit their own role, nor grant any permission
  their own role doesn't already hold (createRole + updateRole).
- Protected-key denial now 403s (naming the keys + required perms) instead of
  silently stripping and reporting "saved" (adminSettings generic writers).
- Reserve team_photographer so a custom role can't squat the preset name.
- Boot self-heal: per-step try/catch so a role_permissions insert race on one
  replica doesn't skip preset seeding.
- Forward-project the feature .manage perms that also replaced settings.edit
  gates (whatsapp/event_types/image_security/notifications/system), matching the
  settings.* split projection so the pattern is symmetric for phase-2.
- Guard exports.down's roles/admin_users queries with hasTable.

* fix(permissions): change-detection on protected-key 403 + commit guard tests (#1045)

Round-2 review:
- The protected-key 403 fired on key PRESENCE. The General tab re-posts
  general_site_url on every save, so a settings.edit-only role (the office
  manager this PR enables) got 403'd on every General save even when the URL
  was unchanged. Restore change-detection: compare the incoming value against
  the stored one and 403 only on an actual change; unchanged protected keys are
  dropped so the rest of the save proceeds. Only /general is affected.
- Commit the self-amplification guard test (was run locally, never staged):
  adminRolesGuards.test.js — non-super can't grant perms it lacks, can't edit
  its own role, can't escalate another role; super_admin bypasses;
  team_photographer name reserved.
- Add adminSettingsProtectedKeys.test.js pinning the change-detection: an
  unchanged general_site_url saves, an actual change 403s, super_admin changes it.

2026-08-16 14:59:52 +02:00

Paul NothaftandPaul Nothaft

b7005692b3

fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) (#941 )

* fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster)

* fix(security): harden SSRF fix per review (rsync backup path, S3 config-save, webhook transient-DNS retry)

* fix(security): S3 endpoint validation on any endpoint update + no-connect on unresolved webhook host (codex r2)

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>

2026-08-01 17:36:21 +02:00

Paul Nothaft

c488f481ca

feat: outbound webhooks for event/photo lifecycle (#327 )

PicPeak POSTs lifecycle notifications to admin-configured URLs. Each
delivery is signed HMAC-SHA256 in the X-PicPeak-Signature header.
Verified end-to-end: 1/1 Playwright spec, 8/8 backend integration
tests, full UI click-through via Chrome DevTools.

Schema (migration 082)
- webhooks: id, name, url, secret (plaintext — required to compute HMAC
  for every outbound POST), secret_preview, events[], active, filter,
  template, created_by, timestamps, last_success_at/last_failure_at.
- webhook_deliveries: webhook_id (FK CASCADE), event_type, payload,
  attempt_count, status (pending|success|failed), response_status,
  response_body (truncated to 1KB), latency_ms, next_retry_at,
  last_error, created_at, completed_at. Composite index
  (status, next_retry_at) serves the worker's hot-path query.

Service + worker
- webhookService.fire(eventType, data) — non-throwing entry point used
  by lifecycle hooks. Looks up active webhooks subscribed to the event
  and applies their per-webhook filter (dot-path equality predicate)
  before enqueueing one webhook_deliveries row per match. Filter and
  template logic ship in this commit; admin surfaces in the follow-up.
- webhookDeliveryWorker — setInterval(5s) poller; fetches up to 5
  pending rows; per delivery: re-validates URL via networkValidation
  (DNS-rebinding mitigation, opt-out via WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS),
  signs body with HMAC-SHA256, POSTs with 10s timeout, records outcome.
  Backoff schedule: 1m → 5m → 30m → 2h → 12h, max 5 attempts. Response
  body truncated to 1KB before storage. If a webhook has a template,
  the rendered string replaces the JSON envelope as the request body
  (signature is computed over the bytes actually sent).

Lifecycle wiring
- adminEvents.js POST /events → event.created (+ event.published when
  not draft); POST /:id/publish → event.published.
- routes/events.js (legacy public POST) → event.created + event.published.
- routes/v1/events.js (#322 API) → event.created + event.published on
  create, photo.uploaded on photo POST.
- archiveService.archiveEvent() → event.archived. Per-photo
  photo.deleted intentionally NOT fired during cascade — receivers
  infer from event.archived to avoid flooding (issue spec).
- expirationChecker.handleExpiredEvent() → event.expired BEFORE the
  cascading archive (so receivers see expired→archived in order).
- adminPhotos.js — photo.uploaded on each batch row, photo.deleted on
  single + bulk delete.
- photoProcessor.js — photo.uploaded for guest uploads + auto-import
  (covers all entry paths).
- fileWatcher.js — photo.uploaded on add, photo.deleted on unlink
  (local mode only).

Admin endpoints (mirrors adminApiTokens.js pattern)
- /api/admin/webhooks: GET list, POST create (returns plaintext secret
  exactly once), GET :id, PUT :id, DELETE :id, POST :id/test (synthetic
  fire), GET :id/deliveries (paginated, filter by status), GET
  :id/deliveries/:deliveryId, POST :id/deliveries/:deliveryId/replay.

Frontend
- Settings → Webhooks tab (mirrors API Tokens layout): name + URL +
  event checkboxes + "Advanced" expander for filter (JSON) and template.
  Plaintext secret shown once on creation with a Copy button. Active/
  Disabled toggle button per row.
- /admin/webhooks/:id/deliveries — operational debug surface. Table
  with timestamp/event/status/attempts/HTTP/latency. Status filter chips
  (all/pending/success/failed). Row click → slide-over with payload +
  signature + response body. Replay button on failed rows. Send-test-event
  dialog. Auto-refresh every 10s.

Dev infrastructure
- dev/webhook-receiver/ — tiny node:alpine HTTP server (~100 LOC) that
  records every POST to an in-memory ring buffer. Exposes GET /requests
  for the E2E spec to assert deliveries landed with the right HMAC.
  Sibling pattern to MinIO. Reachable from the backend at
  http://webhook-receiver:8888 inside the picpeak network.

Tests
- backend/__tests__/integration/webhookDelivery.test.js (8/8) —
  signature verification, headers, retry/backoff, max-attempts → failed,
  response truncation, disabled-mid-flight, SSRF block, start/stop
  idempotency.
- tests/e2e/webhooks-roundtrip.spec.ts (1/1) — create webhook → trigger
  event.published → assert receiver got POST with valid HMAC → visit
  deliveries page → row visible with status=success → API test event →
  API replay → disable webhook → assert no new delivery.

Docs
- README §"Webhooks" — event catalog, payload shape, HMAC verification
  in Node + Python + bash, retry semantics, SSRF protection.
- .env.example — WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS, WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_INTERVAL_MS,
  WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_CONCURRENCY, WEBHOOK_HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS,
  WEBHOOK_MAX_ATTEMPTS.

Out of scope for v1 (per issue): webhook templates' code-eval (the
${dot.path} substitution that ships is pure string replacement, no
expression engine — see follow-up commit), per-webhook rate limiting
beyond the global concurrency cap, synchronous "ask before delete"
webhooks.

Spanning files
- App.tsx pulls in this commit with both the AnalyticsBootstrap
  (#325 dedup) and the WebhookDeliveriesPage route registration.
  Splitting via git add -p was forfeit for sanity; the single 92-line
  diff is honest about both contributions.
- adminEvents.js diff bundles the webhook fires AND the
  allow_presigned_download field plumbing (#328 follow-up). Same
  reasoning.
- The new webhookService/Worker/adminWebhooks files include the filter
  and template logic from the follow-up — they were authored in one
  pass; splitting them post-hoc would have produced fragile partial
  files. The follow-up commit covers the migration and the UI for these.

2026-04-28 10:07:39 +02:00