picpeak

2,397 Commits 86 Branches 516 Tags

3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Paul NothaftandPaul Nothaft	219d07b04a	feat(auth): OIDC logout-to-IdP — phase 3 (#798 ) (#865 ) * feat(auth): OIDC logout-to-IdP — phase 3 (#798) RP-initiated logout behind a new oidc_logout_from_idp setting: logging out of PicPeak also ends the IdP session. The SSO callback stores the raw ID token in an HttpOnly cookie (also the marker that the session came in via SSO — local-password sessions never bounce to the IdP); /logout builds the end_session URL from discovery metadata with id_token_hint + post_logout_redirect_uri + client_id and returns it as ssoLogoutUrl for the frontend to navigate to. Any failure (no end_session_endpoint, IdP unreachable, feature off) degrades to the plain local logout. Settings surface exposes the toggle plus the computed post-logout redirect URI to register at the IdP. Session timeouts deliberately stay local-only. 6 integration tests over the mock IdP; live-verified against Keycloak 26 (logout ends the Keycloak session, no confirmation prompt). * fix(auth): harden the SSO logout marker cookie (#798 phase 3) Codex review round 1: - Derive the oidc_id_token cookie options from the shared cookie policy (COOKIE_SAMESITE / COOKIE_DOMAIN / secure resolution) — hardcoded Lax meant split-origin deployments running on SameSite=None never sent the marker to the cross-site /logout XHR, silently disabling logout-to-IdP. - Oversized ID tokens (>3.9KB) now store a bare 'sso' marker instead of no cookie, so the claimed client_id-only end-session fallback actually happens; /logout only passes the value as id_token_hint when it is a real JWT. - establishAdminSession clears any stale marker on every fresh login — sessions can die without /logout (deactivation, expiry, restore), and a surviving marker would bounce a later local-password session to the IdP. The SSO callback re-sets the marker for its own session. Tests: oversized-token marker + hint-less end-session URL, stale-marker cleared on local login; helper updated for the clear+set cookie pair. * fix(auth): validate the logout hint against the current OIDC config (#798 phase 3) Codex review round 2: an ID token stored at login can outlive an issuer/client config change; sending it to the newly configured IdP as id_token_hint strands the user on the IdP's error page (providers validate iss/aud on the hint). buildEndSessionUrl now decodes the hint (no verification — routing only): different issuer → skip the round-trip entirely (the session belongs to another IdP); same issuer but changed client → keep the round-trip, drop the unusable hint. Two tests pin both paths. --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>	2026-07-24 11:42:09 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	7f7d38a57f	fix(oidc): security + robustness hardening from codex review rounds 1-2 Round 1: - bind SSO identities to (external_issuer, external_subject): OIDC only guarantees sub uniqueness within an issuer, so a sub-only lookup let a newly configured IdP's user inherit an old IdP's admin account on subject collision; migration 162 gains external_issuer + composite unique index (unmerged migration, edited in place) - fetch UserInfo (with sub cross-check) when the ID token carries no email — spec-compliant providers may serve email/profile claims only there; ID-token claims win on merge - allowlist /admin/sso/login + /callback in maintenance mode, or SSO-only (JIT) admins are locked out exactly when they need in - strip reserved keys (oidc_client_secret, setup_token) from BOTH generic settings reads (GET / and GET /:type) Round 2: - redirect_uri prefers API_URL (the API's public origin — where the state cookie lives); final redirects absolute to the frontend base; login button builds its URL via buildResourceUrl — split-origin deployments (absolute VITE_API_URL) work end to end - PUT /sso validates the MERGED resulting state (partial update cannot blank issuer/client while enabled=true survives; enabling requires a derivable redirect URI) - openid scope forced into oidc_scopes on save - discovery-cache key includes a secret fingerprint (multi-worker secret rotation) - email→admin linking claims the row atomically (conditional update on external_subject IS NULL) — concurrent first-time callbacks with the same verified email but different subjects can't both authenticate Tests: mock IdP gains userinfo endpoint + email-via-userinfo-only mode; new cases pin the userinfo merge and issuer-collision non-inheritance; redirect assertions updated for absolute URLs. 13/13.	2026-07-16 09:41:48 +02:00
Paul Nothaft	ed5fc5ad5c	feat(auth): OIDC SSO for admin users — phase 1 (#798 ) Authorization-code + PKCE against a single configurable IdP via openid-client v5, with JIT provisioning. Verified end-to-end against a real Keycloak 26 (realm + confidential client + verified-email user): settings → discovery test → login button → Keycloak → dashboard. Backend: - migration 162: admin_users.auth_provider ('local' default) + external_subject, composite unique index - oidcService: settings-driven config (client secret AES-256-GCM at rest, mfaService pattern, OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY fallback JWT_SECRET), cached discovery, sub-based identity binding — email linking of existing admins only with email_verified=true; JIT behind oidc_autoprovision with configurable default role and an unusable random password hash - GET /api/auth/admin/sso/login + /callback: state/nonce/PKCE verifier cross the redirect in a 10-min signed httpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie; the callback reuses the local login's session establishment (completeAdminLogin split into establishAdminSession + JSON wrapper) so SSO sessions are identical downstream; every failure lands on /admin/login?sso_error=<key> as a translated toast - dedicated /admin/settings/sso GET/PUT/test endpoints (secret write-only, redacted to a set-flag; registered ABOVE the generic /:type matcher which would shadow them); oidc_client_secret added to the reserved keys stripped from generic settings upserts - public settings expose only oidc_enabled + oidc_button_label for the login page Frontend: - Settings → Single Sign-On (OIDC) tab: issuer/client/secret, scopes, autoprovision + default role, button label, enable toggle, redirect URI copy box, server-side discovery test - login page: SSO button (custom label) when enabled; sso_error query param surfaced as translated toasts; EN+DE i18n Tests: 11 integration cases against an in-process mock IdP (real discovery/JWKS/PKCE/ID-token validation) — JIT on/off, sub-vs-email binding, unverified-email rejection, deactivated admin, missing/forged state cookie, nonce tamper, secret encryption round-trip, disabled 404. MFA is delegated to the IdP on the SSO path; local login stays available as break-glass. Role-claim mapping and logout-to-IdP follow in phase 2/3.	2026-07-16 08:54:26 +02:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Paul NothaftandPaul Nothaft

219d07b04a

feat(auth): OIDC logout-to-IdP — phase 3 (#798 ) (#865 )

* feat(auth): OIDC logout-to-IdP — phase 3 (#798)

RP-initiated logout behind a new oidc_logout_from_idp setting: logging
out of PicPeak also ends the IdP session. The SSO callback stores the
raw ID token in an HttpOnly cookie (also the marker that the session
came in via SSO — local-password sessions never bounce to the IdP);
/logout builds the end_session URL from discovery metadata with
id_token_hint + post_logout_redirect_uri + client_id and returns it as
ssoLogoutUrl for the frontend to navigate to. Any failure (no
end_session_endpoint, IdP unreachable, feature off) degrades to the
plain local logout.

Settings surface exposes the toggle plus the computed post-logout
redirect URI to register at the IdP. Session timeouts deliberately stay
local-only.

6 integration tests over the mock IdP; live-verified against
Keycloak 26 (logout ends the Keycloak session, no confirmation prompt).

* fix(auth): harden the SSO logout marker cookie (#798 phase 3)

Codex review round 1:
- Derive the oidc_id_token cookie options from the shared cookie policy
  (COOKIE_SAMESITE / COOKIE_DOMAIN / secure resolution) — hardcoded Lax
  meant split-origin deployments running on SameSite=None never sent the
  marker to the cross-site /logout XHR, silently disabling logout-to-IdP.
- Oversized ID tokens (>3.9KB) now store a bare 'sso' marker instead of
  no cookie, so the claimed client_id-only end-session fallback actually
  happens; /logout only passes the value as id_token_hint when it is a
  real JWT.
- establishAdminSession clears any stale marker on every fresh login —
  sessions can die without /logout (deactivation, expiry, restore), and
  a surviving marker would bounce a later local-password session to the
  IdP. The SSO callback re-sets the marker for its own session.

Tests: oversized-token marker + hint-less end-session URL, stale-marker
cleared on local login; helper updated for the clear+set cookie pair.

* fix(auth): validate the logout hint against the current OIDC config (#798 phase 3)

Codex review round 2: an ID token stored at login can outlive an
issuer/client config change; sending it to the newly configured IdP as
id_token_hint strands the user on the IdP's error page (providers
validate iss/aud on the hint). buildEndSessionUrl now decodes the hint
(no verification — routing only): different issuer → skip the round-trip
entirely (the session belongs to another IdP); same issuer but changed
client → keep the round-trip, drop the unusable hint. Two tests pin both
paths.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>

2026-07-24 11:42:09 +02:00

Paul Nothaft

7f7d38a57f

fix(oidc): security + robustness hardening from codex review rounds 1-2

Round 1:
- bind SSO identities to (external_issuer, external_subject): OIDC only
  guarantees sub uniqueness within an issuer, so a sub-only lookup let a
  newly configured IdP's user inherit an old IdP's admin account on
  subject collision; migration 162 gains external_issuer + composite
  unique index (unmerged migration, edited in place)
- fetch UserInfo (with sub cross-check) when the ID token carries no
  email — spec-compliant providers may serve email/profile claims only
  there; ID-token claims win on merge
- allowlist /admin/sso/login + /callback in maintenance mode, or
  SSO-only (JIT) admins are locked out exactly when they need in
- strip reserved keys (oidc_client_secret, setup_token) from BOTH
  generic settings reads (GET / and GET /:type)

Round 2:
- redirect_uri prefers API_URL (the API's public origin — where the
  state cookie lives); final redirects absolute to the frontend base;
  login button builds its URL via buildResourceUrl — split-origin
  deployments (absolute VITE_API_URL) work end to end
- PUT /sso validates the MERGED resulting state (partial update cannot
  blank issuer/client while enabled=true survives; enabling requires a
  derivable redirect URI)
- openid scope forced into oidc_scopes on save
- discovery-cache key includes a secret fingerprint (multi-worker
  secret rotation)
- email→admin linking claims the row atomically (conditional update on
  external_subject IS NULL) — concurrent first-time callbacks with the
  same verified email but different subjects can't both authenticate

Tests: mock IdP gains userinfo endpoint + email-via-userinfo-only mode;
new cases pin the userinfo merge and issuer-collision non-inheritance;
redirect assertions updated for absolute URLs. 13/13.

2026-07-16 09:41:48 +02:00

Paul Nothaft

ed5fc5ad5c

feat(auth): OIDC SSO for admin users — phase 1 (#798 )

Authorization-code + PKCE against a single configurable IdP via
openid-client v5, with JIT provisioning. Verified end-to-end against a
real Keycloak 26 (realm + confidential client + verified-email user):
settings → discovery test → login button → Keycloak → dashboard.

Backend:
- migration 162: admin_users.auth_provider ('local' default) +
  external_subject, composite unique index
- oidcService: settings-driven config (client secret AES-256-GCM at
  rest, mfaService pattern, OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY fallback JWT_SECRET),
  cached discovery, sub-based identity binding — email linking of
  existing admins only with email_verified=true; JIT behind
  oidc_autoprovision with configurable default role and an unusable
  random password hash
- GET /api/auth/admin/sso/login + /callback: state/nonce/PKCE verifier
  cross the redirect in a 10-min signed httpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie;
  the callback reuses the local login's session establishment
  (completeAdminLogin split into establishAdminSession + JSON wrapper)
  so SSO sessions are identical downstream; every failure lands on
  /admin/login?sso_error=<key> as a translated toast
- dedicated /admin/settings/sso GET/PUT/test endpoints (secret
  write-only, redacted to a set-flag; registered ABOVE the generic
  /:type matcher which would shadow them); oidc_client_secret added to
  the reserved keys stripped from generic settings upserts
- public settings expose only oidc_enabled + oidc_button_label for the
  login page

Frontend:
- Settings → Single Sign-On (OIDC) tab: issuer/client/secret, scopes,
  autoprovision + default role, button label, enable toggle, redirect
  URI copy box, server-side discovery test
- login page: SSO button (custom label) when enabled; sso_error query
  param surfaced as translated toasts; EN+DE i18n

Tests: 11 integration cases against an in-process mock IdP (real
discovery/JWKS/PKCE/ID-token validation) — JIT on/off, sub-vs-email
binding, unverified-email rejection, deactivated admin, missing/forged
state cookie, nonce tamper, secret encryption round-trip, disabled 404.

MFA is delegated to the IdP on the SSO path; local login stays
available as break-glass. Role-claim mapping and logout-to-IdP follow
in phase 2/3.

2026-07-16 08:54:26 +02:00