Auth/access-control audit fixes (all pre-existing on main; none are
regressions). Verified end-to-end where noted.
HIGH
- Thumbnail enumeration: photoAuth granted any gallery token access to any
flat /thumbnails/thumb_* file, so a visitor to one gallery could
enumerate another (password-protected) gallery's entire thumbnail set.
Scope thumbnail access to the token's event via photos.thumbnail_path.
Live-verified: cross-event fetch now 404s, own-event still 200s.
- Bulk ownership bypass: bulk-archive/bulk-delete acted on body-supplied
event ids with no owner filter (single-event routes enforce
requireEventOwnership), letting admin/editor archive or cascade-delete
any event. Add filterOwnedEventIds; also guard rename + import-external;
tighten photo-retry to scope admin (not just editor). Fix misleading
bulk-delete comment.
MED
- verifyGalleryAccess never checked decoded.type — assert 'gallery'
instead of relying on other token types incidentally lacking eventId.
- secure-images generate-token/secure-download missing denySlideshowToken
(#646 bypass): a leaked slideshow token could download originals.
- Frontend: AuthenticatedImage + api.ts attached the gallery bearer token
to absolute/external URLs — only attach to relative same-app paths.
LOW hardening
- Pin algorithms:['HS256'] on all auth-boundary jwt.verify calls.
- crypto.timingSafeEqual for share-token + HMAC compares (utils/timingSafe).
- Remove dead photoAuth import in galleryFeedback.
Tests: new regression suites for thumbnail scoping + filterOwnedEventIds;
fixed verifyGalleryAccess.customerRevoke fixture (real customer tokens
carry type:'gallery'). Full backend suite at the pre-existing baseline
(5 suites/27 tests fail on main too), zero new failures.
The 5-minute session-sweep interval at sessionTimeout.js:17 fired at
module-load time without .unref(), so every jest worker that
transitively required this module (server.js → middleware → most
of the route layer) kept the event loop alive forever. The worker
then got force-killed on shutdown, surfacing as the longstanding
"worker failed to exit gracefully" warning at the end of every CI
run on upstream/beta.
Under enough I/O / memory pressure on a CI runner, the force-kill
could land MID-test rather than after the suite finished, taking
out whatever else was running on that worker — most visibly
integration/storageBackend.test.js on PR #555's runs.
.unref() makes the timer not keep the loop alive on its own.
Production behaviour is unchanged: the timer still fires every
5 min as long as anything else is holding the loop open (the HTTP
server, always).
Third loop fix in the same /admin/login → /admin/dashboard → /admin/login
pattern as #355 and #363. Reported on v3.39.1-beta.0 — the loop returns
after a server restart or after an idle gap longer than the configured
session timeout.
## Root cause (server)
`sessionTimeoutMiddleware` is mounted on `/api/admin` (server.js:411). It
rejects with `401 SESSION_TIMEOUT` when either:
- the in-memory `lastActivity` for the token is older than the timeout, or
- this is the first request with this token AND the token's `iat` is
older than the timeout (post-restart guard).
`/auth/session` lives under `/api/auth/session`, NOT under `/api/admin`,
so the middleware never runs for it. Result: an idle/old-iat admin token
returns `valid: true` from `/auth/session` while every protected
endpoint immediately rejects it with `401 SESSION_TIMEOUT`. Frontend's
401 interceptor hard-redirects to `/admin/login`, `/auth/session` says
valid again, loop closes — exact same shape as the previous two
asymmetries the symmetry pass missed.
Fix: add a non-mutating `isSessionExpired(token, decoded)` helper to
`middleware/sessionTimeout.js` that reads the same in-memory map and
applies the same lastActivity / iat-vs-timeout logic as the middleware,
without updating the map (the middleware is the only place that records
activity; `/auth/session` is read-only by design). `/auth/session`
calls the helper for `decoded.type === 'admin'` after the existing
admin-existence and password-change checks. Same try/catch fall-through
pattern as the prior fixes so a missing/broken helper doesn't fail-closed
during early bootstrap or in test stubs.
## Root cause (client race amplifying the loop)
Even with the server fix, the previous `useSessionTimeout` hook called
`AdminAuthContext.logout()` which dispatches `POST /auth/logout`
fire-and-forget AND has its own `finally { window.location.href }`,
then immediately set `window.location.href = '/admin/login?session=expired'`
on top. Two consequences:
- The cookie wasn't reliably cleared before the new page loaded —
if any /auth/session asymmetry slipped through, the loop replayed
inside the same tab. New-tab and "refresh several times" "fixes"
were just the logout request eventually completing.
- Two redirects raced; sometimes the `?session=expired` query was
dropped, breaking the login-page toast.
Fix: rewrite the hook to (a) await `POST /auth/logout` so the cookie
is guaranteed cleared, (b) clear `sessionStorage.admin_user` directly
instead of going through AdminAuthContext.logout (which has the
side-effect redirect we don't want), and (c) navigate exactly once
with the `?session=expired` query.
## Tests
- `__tests__/routes/authSession.symmetry.test.js` — 4 new cases under
a `session-timeout symmetry` describe block: helper says expired →
valid:false; helper says active → valid:true; helper not called for
gallery tokens; helper throws → fall through to valid:true (defensive).
Existing 9 tests still pass (mock now includes
`isSessionExpired: jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve(false))` as the
default).
- `__tests__/middleware/sessionTimeout.isSessionExpired.test.js` — 7
new unit tests for the helper itself: fresh token / old-iat /
recently-active / null-input / no-mutation / 60-min default
boundary cases.
20 cases total, all green. Lint clean on every touched file.
- Set password_changed_at when changing password via adminAuth route so
existing JWT tokens are rejected by the auth middleware check
- Enforce session timeout on first request with unseen tokens by checking
token iat against configured timeout (prevents bypass after server restart)
- Convert camelCase roleId/isActive to snake_case role_id/is_active in
frontend updateUser service (fixes silent role update failures)
Resolves GHSA-rqg3-47p5-vgwg
- Disabled duplicate email service (emailService.js) that was creating redundant connections
- Increased connection pool size from 10 to 25 for production environment
- Extended session timeout cache from 5 to 30 minutes to reduce DB queries
- Added connection retry logic with exponential backoff for transient failures
- Fixed password validation to use retry wrapper and correct setting key
- Updated public settings and gallery middleware to handle connection failures gracefully
These changes address the "Connection terminated unexpectedly" errors in production by:
1. Reducing unnecessary database connections
2. Increasing available connection pool capacity
3. Implementing automatic retry for transient connection failures
4. Caching frequently accessed data for longer periods
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Original: feat: enhance security logging and ensure rate limit blocks are properly tracked
- Add comprehensive logging for rate limit blocks with full request details
- IP address (with proper proxy detection), user agent, headers, timestamps
- Rate limit info (current count, limit, remaining, reset time)
- Separate tracking for auth vs general endpoints
- Enhance authentication failure logging
- JWT validation failures with detailed error info
- Admin auth attempts without token
- Failed token validation with user context
- All events include IP, path, method, user agent
- Improve Winston logger configuration for production
- Add automatic log rotation (10MB errors, 50MB combined)
- Create separate security.log for auth/rate limit events
- Ensure logs directory exists automatically
- Add structured JSON format for log aggregation
- Support container logging with LOG_TO_CONSOLE env var
- Create comprehensive documentation
- Security logging guide with examples
- Monitoring recommendations
- Configuration reference
- Add test script to verify logging functionality
All rate limit settings remain configurable via admin panel:
- Window duration, max requests, auth limits
- Skip authenticated requests option
- Public endpoints only option
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Paul Nothaft
paul